

**SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**  
PRESS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

**PRESS CLIPPINGS**

**Enclosed are clippings of the latest local and international press on the Special Court and related issues obtained by the Press and Public Affairs Office as of:**

Tuesday, August 03, 2004

The press clips are produced Monday to Friday.  
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**SUNHERALD.com**

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**THE SUN HERALD**

## Al-Qaida's growing sanctuary

By **DOUGLAS FARAH** and **RICHARD SHULTZ**  
THE WASHINGTON POST

**W**ith the end of the brutal conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, West Africa is seldom in the news or on the policy agenda these days. Yet the region is quietly gaining recognition as what it has long been: a haven for al-Qaida and other terrorist groups.

Weak and corrupt governments, vast, virtually stateless stretches awash in weapons, and impoverished, largely Muslim populations make the region an ideal sanctuary.

U.S. Gen. Charles Wald, deputy commander of the European Central Command, has been warning Congress and the Pentagon for months that al-Qaida-affiliated groups are active in Mauritania, Mali, Chad and Niger. The trade in diamonds used by terrorist groups, begun under the protection of former Liberian strongman Charles Taylor, continues despite international efforts to curb it.

"The terrorist activity in this area is not going to go away," Wald warns. "This could affect your kids and your grandchildren in a huge way. If we don't do something about it, we are going to have a real problem on our hands."

Wald has had success in bolstering regional efforts to face the terrorist challenge, but the problem is real. Despite Wald's warnings and other reporting on al-Qaida's regional activities and ties to the diamond trade, the intelligence community (particularly the CIA) has dismissed the reporting as inaccurate or irrelevant.

This attitude reflects the Cold War, state-centric culture that prevails in the intelligence community. As the national debate over intelligence reform expands, one key focus must be changing that culture. This entails recognizing and confronting the national security threat posed by armed groups, operating beyond state control, that are now the de facto rulers of growing swaths of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The ties of former Liberian president Charles Taylor to al-Qaida have been corroborated by the FBI and the U.N.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, which is charged with investigating crimes against humanity in that nation's brutal civil war.

Several lessons that have a direct bearing on intelligence reform can be drawn from the activities of al-Qaida and Hezbollah in West Africa. One is that terrorist and other armed groups are sophisticated in their exploitation of "gray areas" where governments are weak, corruption is rampant and the rule of law is nonexistent. They use areas such as West Africa to finance their activities, correctly betting that Western intelligence services do not have the capacity, resources or interest to track their activities there.

Another lesson is that terrorists are adaptable and learn from each other and their own mistakes. Hezbollah has been using diamonds from West Africa to finance its activities since its inception, successfully embedding its financial structure in the diamond trade. Al-Qaida operatives plugged into the same network, bridging the divide between Shiite and Sunni Muslims.

Al-Qaida demonstrated its adaptability in the aftermath of the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa. The United States froze some \$220 million in Taliban and al-Qaida gold deposited in the Federal Reserve system. To ensure that future finances could not be attacked in a similar way, the group began to systematically move its money out of banking systems and into commodities.

A third lesson is that terrorist networks and criminal networks can take over failed states such as Liberia and Afghanistan, turning them into multifaceted international threats.

A final lesson is that the intelligence community reacts poorly to information that was not on its radar screen. For example, the assumption was that the initial diamond story made the CIA look bad, and it therefore had to be attacked and discredited.

Collecting, analyzing and acting on intelligence in lawless areas and rogue regimes are difficult, complex tasks that will take time and resources. A first step is recognizing the threats posed by armed groups in parts of the world we often ignore. To meet the challenge, the culture of the intelligence community must change beyond the shifting of organization

boxes in the name of reform that occurs when outside criticism mounts.

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*Douglas Farah, on leave from The Washington Post, is a senior fellow at the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, a Washington-based research center. Richard Shultz is director of security studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts University.*

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The New Citizen

Monday August 02, 2004

## **REGRETS**

The New Citizen wish to apologise to the Special Court and its indictee, Issa Sesay for the article published on Friday 30th July 2004 captioned, "Issa Sesay Collapses in Court".

The New Citizen has been reliably informed by the Special Court and lawyer for Issa Sesay that the indictee did not collapse in court, inspite of the fact that he is suffering from a heart problem. We regret any inconvenience the article may have caused to the Special Court and the indictee.

Standard Times

Tuesday August 03, 2004

# War wounded and amputees calls for help

**BY BOBSON  
KAMARA (SBK)**

The war-wounded and amputees of Masorie in Mile 91 have called on the government and other concerned authorities to consider providing solutions to some of the many problems facing them.

Speaking to this reporter, the chairman of the camp where they are camped, Pa.

Foday Turay said that since they were brought to that settlement about three months ago, none of the agencies concerned have ever visited them to know their condition or what has become of them.

"NaCSA and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), who brought us here have never come back to see us, not to talk of providing us with food and medical

assistance," lamented the chairman.

"This place is full of mosquitos, and we have no tents to protect us from their attacks," added another.

We want to engage in small-scale farming or business to be able to send our children to school. But we have no seeds, no tools, and no money," cried Fatmata Kamara, a wife of an amputee. Other amputees

and war wounded say they have been deserted by their partners because of their condition.


The chairman therefore called on the concerned agencies and the government to intervene immediately to save them from a certain calamity.

He however commended the people of Masorie and Mile 91 for their hospitality.

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## Bush: Spy chief needed

Proposal accepts part of 9/11 panel's advice



Tom Ridge and Colin Powell stand by the president in the Rose Garden.

AP Photo by Ron Edmonds

By LAWRENCE M. O'ROURKE, News & Observer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON -- President Bush announced Monday that he would accept the establishment of a national intelligence director and a new counterterrorism center.

Both ideas are recommendations of the independent commission that investigated the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

"All these reforms have a single goal," Bush said in a Rose Garden appearance where he was flanked by his senior national security advisers. "We will ensure that the people in government responsible for defending America and countering terrorism have the best possible information to make the best decisions."

But Bush rejected the Sept. 11 commission's advice that the national intelligence director work in the White House and "report directly" to the president and that the counterterrorism center be a unit of the White House.

The president partially embraced one of the Sept. 11 commission's key proposals -- a new intelligence chief who would eclipse the current director of central intelligence, who runs the CIA.

The key difference between the president and the commission is that the commission wants to station the director at the president's side in the White House; Bush does not, preferring that the director be like a Cabinet officer, in a separate department.

Members of the Sept. 11 commission and members of Congress endorsing the commission's recommendations have asserted that the director should have the right to constant and immediate access to the president.

### Constraints on director

Bush said the intelligence chief would be responsible for "leading the intelligence community across our government."

The new director, the president said, would have the authority to coordinate budgets and help set priorities for intelligence agencies including the CIA and FBI and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, State and Energy.

Bush stopped short of giving the new intelligence director full control over the budgets and personnel

of the agencies, including those of the military, as recommended by the Sept. 11 commission on July 22.

Agency officials including Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Pentagon military chiefs objected to the idea that the new director have budget and personnel authority over their departments. Under Bush's proposal, Congress would continue to appropriate funds to the various intelligence agencies. About 80 percent of the nation's estimated \$40 billion annual intelligence budget is funneled through the Pentagon's budget, according to members of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The Sept. 11 commission said after completing its investigation into the causes and failures of the Sept. 11 al-Qaeda attacks that the national intelligence director should "report directly to the president" and should have the power "to hire and fire" the head of the CIA, the top Pentagon and FBI intelligence chiefs and the intelligence director at the Department of Homeland Security.

Asked why he did not accept the commission's recommendation that the director work in the White House, Bush said, "I don't think the person ought to be a member of my Cabinet. I will hire the person, and I can fire the person, which any president would like.

"That's how you have accountability in government," the president said. "I don't think that the office ought to be in the White House, however. I think that it ought to be a stand-alone group to better coordinate between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence matters."

The president acted as New York City, northern New Jersey and Washington, operated under a heightened Code Orange terrorist threat after Ridge said he had substantial credible evidence that terrorists planned to hit financial institutions.

At a separate briefing, White House chief of staff Andrew Card expanded on Bush's reasons for keeping the intelligence director off the White House staff.

Card said that the intelligence director's operation "would be similar to a Cabinet agency or an agency that would best do its work and not have the undue pressure of a White House staff or a White House activity."

Card said the president would have the authority to appoint the director, subject to Senate approval, and fire the director "because the president has to be comfortable with whomever would serve in that position."

### **A job for Congress**

Bush's announcement amounted to a request that Congress create the intelligence chief's position, as well as set up the staff and the counterterrorism center.

Congressional committees last week began public hearings on the Sept. 11 commission's package of recommendations.

"The Congress has been thinking about some of these ideas. They can think about them over August and come back and act on them in September," Bush said, according to Cox New Service.

But it is unclear whether the Republican-led Congress will be able to hammer out legislation setting up the new office before it adjourns in early October for the fall political campaign.

Some members have talked about returning after the election for a lame-duck session.

### **Sept. 11 panel reaction**

Several commissioners said they would lobby lawmakers to make sure the new director has the full powers their report advocates, The Washington Post reported.

"You don't want this person as a figurehead," said Thomas H. Kean, the commission's chairman. "Budget authority is very important."

Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste called budget authority "an absolutely essential part of our recommendation." Commissioner Timothy J. Roemer said, "The detail will be the difference between

success and failure."

Philip D. Zelikow, executive director of the Sept. 11 commission, said last week that if the new intelligence director was not given hiring and firing and budgetary control over the intelligence community agencies, he would oppose any change in the current system.

"If Congress takes the shell of this idea and then dilutes the powers so that it looks like they've done it but they haven't really done it, then you will have another bureaucratic layer," he said on PBS' "NewsHour." "They might as well not do anything at all, because they'll make us more worse off."

At his news conference, the president said he has been changing the government's information-gathering structure and procedures since Sept. 11.

"We've transformed the FBI to focus on the prevention of terrorist attacks," Bush said. "We're continuing to expand and strengthen the capabilities of the Central Intelligence Agency. We've established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center to merge and analyze in a single place foreign and domestic intelligence on global terror."

### Implications for CIA

Bush's plan would give the new intelligence director many of the responsibilities now held by the director of central intelligence, or DCI, The Washington Post reported. For example, the DCI is by law the principal intelligence adviser to the president, and as CIA director, also has the authority to direct, at the president's request, the clandestine collection of intelligence and initiation of covert actions.

Under the Bush plan, however, the new intelligence chief would lose any direct control over CIA activities. Today, the DCI sits in on the president's morning briefing and manages preparation of the threat matrix. The new director would do that also.

The DCI now has a 300-person intelligence community staff through which he attempts to manage the budget and intelligence activities of the entire community. The Bush plan would replace that group with a staff for the new intelligence director that would be expanded to include analysts.

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