

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR

Freetown – Sierra Leone

Before: Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge
Judge Benjamin Mutanga Itoe
Judge Pierre Boutet

Registrar: Mr. Robin Vincent

Date filed: 26 April 2004

THE PROSECUTOR**Against****SAM HINGA NORMAN****MOININA FOFANA****ALLIEU KONDEWA**

CASE NO. SCSL-2004-14-PT

**MATERIALS FILED PURSUANT TO ORDER TO THE PROSECUTION TO
FILE DISCLOSURE MATERIALS AND OTHER MATERIALS IN
PREPARATION FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL OF 1 APRIL 2004**

Office of the Prosecutor:

Luc Cote
James C. Johnson
Charles A. Caruso
Mohamed Bangura
Adwoa Wiafe
Joseph Kamara
Gloria Greywood
Paola Konge
Max Marcus
Kathryn Howarth

Defence Counsel:

James Blyden Jenkins-Johnston
Michiel Pestman
Charles Margai

1. The Prosecution submits these materials in compliance with the ORDER TO THE PROSECUTION TO FILE DISCLOSURE MATERIALS AND OTHER MATERIALS IN PREPARATION FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL dated 1 April 2004.
2. In compliance with Order 1, a list of the pseudonyms of each witness the Prosecution intends to call at trial appears under Cover Sheet 1.
3. In compliance with Order 2, a report indicating:
 - a. the number of witnesses for whom witness statements or summaries have been disclosed;
 - b. the date upon which statement or summary was disclosed; and
 - c. the total number of pages of each statement or summary appears under Cover Sheet 2.
4. In compliance with Order 3, a table appears under Cover Sheet 3 indicating:
 - a. a summary for each witness appearing on the list under Cover Sheet 1;
 - b. the count or counts in the indictment to which the witness will testify; and
 - c. an estimated length of time for the evidence in chief of each witness.
5. In compliance with Order 4, a table appears under Cover Sheet 4 detailing the exhibits the Prosecution intends to tender in evidence at trial.
6. In compliance with Order 5, a copy of each documentary exhibit appearing in the table under Cover Sheet 4 appears under Cover Sheet 5. As a result of technical difficulties the exhibits numbered 60, 80, 82, 83, 111, 112 and 119 as noticed under Cover Sheet 4 have not been reproduced here. These items will be provided as soon as possible.

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COVER SHEET 1

WITNESS LIST

PSEUDONYM
TF2 – 001
TF2 – 003
TF2 – 004
TF2 – 005
TF2 – 006
TF2 – 007
TF2 – 008
TF2 – 009
TF-010
TF2 – 011
TF2-012
TF2 – 013
TF2-014
TF2 – 015
TF2 – 016
TF2 – 017
TF2 – 020
TF2 – 021
TF2 – 022
TF2 – 025
TF2-026
TF2 – 027

TF2-028
TF2 – 029
TF2 – 030
TF2 – 032
TF2 – 033
TF2 – 034
TF2 – 035
TF2- 036
TF2 – 037
TF2 – 038
TF2 – 039
TF2 – 040
TF2 – 041
TF2 – 042
TF2 – 043
TF2 – 044
TF2-046
TF2 – 047
TF2 – 048
TF2 – 051
TF2 – 052
TF2 – 053
TF2 – 056

TF2 - 057
TF2 - 058
TF2 - 059
TF2 - 060
TF2 - 062
TF2-063
TF2 -064
TF2 -065
TF2 - 067
TF2 -068
TF2 -069
TF2-070
TF2 -071
TF2 -072
TF2 -073
TF2 -078
TF2 -079
TF2 -080
TF2 -081
TF2 -082
TF2 -086
TF2 -087
TF2 -088

TF2 -091
TF2 -092
TF2 -096
TF2 -103
TF2 -105
TF2 -108
TF2 -109
TF2 -111
TF2-115
TF2 -116
TF2 -118
TF2 -119
TF2-121
TF2-122
TF2-123
TF2 -124
TF2 -125
TF2 -126
TF2 -128
TF2 -129
TF2 -131
TF2 -133
TF2 -134

TF2 -135
TF2 -136
TF2-140
TF2-142
TF2 - 144
TF2 -145
TF2-147
TF2-148
TF2-149
TF2-150
TF2-151
TF2-152
TF2-153
TF2-154
TF2-156
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TF2-159
TF2-160
TF2-162
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TF2-164
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TF2-167
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TF2-175
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TF2 -179
TF2-180
TF2-181
TF2-182
TF2-183
TF2-184
TF2-186
TF2 -187
TF2 -188
TF2 -189
TF2-190
TF2-191

TF2-193
TF2-195
TF2-198
TF2-200
TF2-201
TF2-202
TF2-204
TF2-205
TF2-206
TF2-207
TF2-208
TF2-209
TF2-210
TF2-214
TF2-216
TF2 - 217
TF2 - 218
TF2 - 219

COVER SHEET 2

COMPLIANCE REPORT

COMPLIANCE REPORT

Witnesses disclosed to date number 207. This chart shows:

- The date of statement or summary
- The date disclosure was made
- To whom disclosure was made
- The number of pages of each statement or summary

Pseudonym	Statement/Summary Date	Disclosed to	Pages	No. of Pages
TF2 – 001	25/11/02	17/04/03	HN	8
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	28/11/03	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 002	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	11/01/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	6
	19/11/02	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 003	30/01/03	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 004	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	13/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	7
TF2 – 005	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	08/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	14/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
	23/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	10

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	24/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 006	27/11/02	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 007	29/11/02	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 008	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	27/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	28/11/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	11
TF2 – 009	03/02/03	17/04/03	HN	2
		30/07/03	AK MF	
TF2 - 010	08/04/03	17/04/03	HN	2
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN,MF,AK	1
TF2 – 011	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF,AK	
	22/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF,AK	3
	21/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	26/11/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	7
	23/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	4
	5/04/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 012	19/01/03	17/04/03	HN	5

		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 013	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	16/11/02	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	13
	15/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 014	27/11/02	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	26/11/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	15
	27/11/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	10
	18/12/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	9
	18/12/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
	16/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	132
	17/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	110
	28/03/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	8
	25/04/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	19/05/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	03/06/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	4
	23/06/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	5
14/07/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2	

	12/08/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2	
	19/12/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2	
	9/01/04	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3	
TF2 – 015	15/11/02	17/04/03	HN	10	
		30/07/03	MF, AK		
	19/11/03	16/02/04	HN	1	
		16/02/04	MF, AK		
TF2 – 016	16/11/02	17/04/03	HN	8	
		30/07/03	MF, AK		
TF2 – 017	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1	
		30/07/03	MF, AK		
	18/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1	
	2/12/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	8	
	18/12/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3	
	18/12/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	6	
	17-18/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2	
	27/03 /03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	4	
	25/04/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2	
	17/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	33	
	18/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	27	
	18/01/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	21	
	TF2 – 018	24/11/02	17/04/03	HN	2

		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2-019	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MK,AK	
TF2 - 020	26/11/02	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	05/04/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 021	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	04/02/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	11
	13/01/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	9
	05/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 022	16/10/02	17/04/03	HN	8
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	27/01/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 - 023	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	16/10/02	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	7
TF2-024	19/01/03	17/04/03	HN	5
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 025	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	

	16/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	23/10/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	9
TF2 – 026	18/11/02	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 027	16/11/02	17/04/03	HN	10
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	15/01/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 028	18/11/02	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2-029	16/11/02	17/04/03	HN	10
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	5/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4
	15/01/04	16/02/04	HN MF, AK	
TF2-030	26/11/02	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	05/04/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-031	26/11/02	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2-032	19/01/03	17/04/03	HN	
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 033	11/01/03	17/04/03	HN	9
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	19/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1

TF2-034	19/01/03	17/04/03	HN	10
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 035	31/01/03	17/04/03	HN	8
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-036	19/01/03	17/04/03	HN	5
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	28/11/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-037	27/11/02	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	30/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 038	01/02/03	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 039	19/11/02	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	10/01/03	17/04/03	HN	10
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	21/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 040	11/01/03	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 041	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	13/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1

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	17/11/02	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	6
TF2 – 042	10/01/03	17/04/03	HN	9
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 043	29/11/02	17/04/03	HN	10
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	28/11/03	16/02/04	HN	1
		16/02/04	MF, AK	
TF2 – 044	30/09/03	17/04/03	HN	8
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	19/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 045	18/11/02	17/04/03	HN	8
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 046	18/11/02	17/04/03	HN	10
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	14/01/04	16/02/04	HN MF,AK	2
TF2 – 047	24/10/02	17/04/03	HN	9
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 048	17/11/02	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	15/01/04	16/02/04	HN MF,AK	1
TF2 – 049	16/10/02	17/04/03	HN	5
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 050	16/10/02	17/04/03	HN	2
		30/07/03	MF, AK	

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TF2-051	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 052	23/10/02	17/04/03	HN	5
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	18/10/02	17/04/03	HN	5
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
13/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2	
TF2 - 053	19/11/02	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 054	08/04/03	17/04/03	HN	2
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 055	10/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	13/11/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	9
TF2 - 056	05/04/03	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	01/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 057	05/04/03	17/04/03	HN	6
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	01/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 - 058	06/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 059	07/04/03	17/04/03	HN	2
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 060	07/04/03	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	07/05/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1

	28/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 061	07/04/03	17/04/03	HN	2
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 062	07-08/04/03	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	02/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 063	09/04/03	17/04/03	HN	4
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	30/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	11
	07/05/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 064	08/04/03	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	28/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 065	08/04/03	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 066	17/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 – 067	06/04/03	17/04/03	HN	8
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	30/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 068	17/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	01/12/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1

	06/04/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	5
TF2 - 069	06/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 070	07/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 071	05/04/03	17/04/03	HN	5
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 072	17/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2 - 073	17/04/03	17/04/03	HN	1
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
	7/04/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	6
TF2 - 074	06/04/03	17/04/03	HN	3
		30/07/03	MF, AK	
TF2-076	03/04/02	30/07/03	HN MF, AK	2
TF2-077	21/07/03	30/07/03	HNMF, AK	1
TF2-078	07/04/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	3
	23/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-079	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
	08/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	01/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	10-11/05/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	23

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	15/05/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	23
TF2-080	08/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	5
	08/03/04	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-081	07/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	4
	30/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	7
	21/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	7
	29 /01/04	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-082	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
	09/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	08/05/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	25
TF2-083	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/05/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	7
	27/05/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	6
	04/06/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	96
	13/06/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	39
TF2-084	19/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 - 085	19/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 - 086	29/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	5
TF2 - 087	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1

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	21/05/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2 – 088	21/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	5
	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 089	21/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 090	20/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 091	23/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 092	21/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2 – 093	20/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 094	20/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 095	23/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 096	29/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2 – 097	20/05/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 098	20/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 099	22/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2 – 100	23/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-101	06/04/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
	09/04/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	3

TF2 – 103	10/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	6
TF2 – 105	20/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 106	19/05/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 107	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 108	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
	27/07/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2 – 109	28/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2 - 110	27/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 – 111	21/07/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
	19/06/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	5
	29/06/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2 – 112	19/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2 – 113	17/06/03	30/07/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-114	18/11/02	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	5
TF2-115	10/04/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	2
	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-116	04/08/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	8
	28/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	29/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1

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TF2-117	20/05/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2-118	15/07/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2-119	20/08/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	5
TF2-120	24/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-121	23/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-122	20/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-123	23/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-124	09/05/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	10
	02/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-125	17/11/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	1
	07/08/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-126	24/09/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-128	01/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	13/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-129	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	1/10/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	5
	9/10/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-131	25/09/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1

TF2-133	01/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	09/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-134	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-135	24/09/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-136	11/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	25/09/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2 -139	17/11/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-140	29/06/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-141	10/05/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-142	06/09/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-143	01/10/03	18/11/03	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-144	07/04/02	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
	05/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
	15/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-145	30/06/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-146	14/09/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-147	15/07/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	7
	19/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2

TF2-148	10/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
	15/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-149	07/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2-150	09/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
Tf2-151	10/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	14/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-152	09/11/03	16/02/04	HN,MF, AK	1
	15/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-153	07/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2-154	07/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4
	16/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-155	05/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2-156	7/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-157	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-158	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	18/02/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
Tf2-159	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
Tf2-160	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
Tf2-161	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-162	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	20/02/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1

TF2-163	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
Tf2-164	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
Tf2-165	27/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	5
TF2-166	27/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	6
Tf2-167	27/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-168	27/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
Tf2-169	28/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-170	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-171	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-172	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	3/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-173	29/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	5
TF2-174	30/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	7
TF2-175	30/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-176	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-177	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-178	03/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
Tf2-179	23/01/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-180	20/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-181	28/11/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4

TF2-182	21/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-183	22/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-184	22/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	03/03/04	1/04/04	HN MF, AK	1
TF2-185	21/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-186	21/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-187	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-188	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	25/9/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2
	11/11/03	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-189	24/09/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-190	09/05/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	9
	28/02/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	9
	05/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	4
	13/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-191	10/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4
TF2-192	3/12/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-193	22/05/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	6
Tf2-194	09/10/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-195	16/01/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	4

TF2-196	9/02/04	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-197	19/06/03	16/02/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-198	18/02/04	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-199	20/02/04	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-200	19/02/04	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	4
	04/03/04	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-201	20/02/04	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	8
TF2-202	11/11/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-203	27/11/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2- 204	25/09/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/11/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-205	24/09/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/10/02	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-206	25/09/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/11/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	2
TF2-207	01/10/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	13/10/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2- 208	01/10/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/11/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
TF2-209	24/09/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1
	11/11/03	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	1

TF2-210	3/03/04	18/03/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-211	21/05/03	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-212	15/07/03	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	8
TF2-213	02/12/03	1/04/04	HN	1
		1/04/04	MF, AK	
TF2-214	22/07/03	1/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-216	16/04/04	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	3
TF2-219	22/01/04	26/04/04	HN, MF, AK	4

COVER SHEET 3

WITNESS SUMMARIES

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 001	1&2 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness saw two police officers being killed by Kamajors. Witness learned that 3 soldiers who were being held as prisoners were killed by Kamajors. Witness saw Kamajors looting.
TF2 – 003	6 8	1hr.	Witness brought by uncle and initiated in Kenena, 1997 by Kamo Brima (rebels captured father and killed grandfather), told was joining for “protective reasons”, received military training in Zimmi. Witness fought in Kenema, Zimmi; describes the big , men of CDF as Sheku Kalloh, BJK, C.O. Mamoh, Musa Idrissa, Tagawa – from whom witness took commands, states others on top of these. Witness states other initiators included Kunduwai Bangura, Kam Munihu, Kam Bimba and many others.
TF2 – 004	1&2 3&4 6 8	1hr.	Witness joined the Kamajors in 1996 at the age of 10. Witness states that, in Zimmi, they shot an Alpha man and burned his wife alive. Witness states that there were many civilians in Zimmi and the ones that worked with the Junta were punished. Witness was initiated and received weapons training. Witness will testify that he fought in Telu Bongor, Pujehun town and Zimmi. Witness states that most of the fighters were older than he but some were younger. Witness saw HINGA NORMAN in Telu Bongor and Zimmi. Witness states that all the big bosses reported to HINGA NORMAN.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 005	1&2 6 8	4hrs.	<p>States that NH was in charge of everything and was a one man show; also that he commanded the death squad along with ALLIEU KONDEWA and MOININA FOFANA. Witness personally heard HINGA NORMAN instructing Kamajors to target civilians who worked with the junta or mined for them and treat them as enemies. Witness has knowledge that child soldiers as young as 12 were used in fighting.</p> <p>HINGA NORMAN issued a press release stating that all those working with the RUF would be seen as collaborators and would be treated as the enemy. Witness personally heard HINGA NORMAN instructing Kamajors to target civilians found to have been working with the junta or mining for them and treat them as enemies. Witness' Commander told him that many civilians were killed in the battle for Tongo.</p> <p>Witness was told that HINGA NORMAN had instructed frontline commanders to kill anybody who ventured out in the highways during the Black December operations.</p>
TF2 – 006	3&4 6 8	1hr.	<p>Witness was fleeing Bo when Kamajors attacked. Kamajors accused Witness of being a rebel and amputated four of his fingers with a machete. Witness saw child soldiers amongst those who attacked him.</p>
TF2 – 007	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was in Fengehun village, Bo, in 1998 when Kamajors mutilated and killed his father. He saw his father tied up by a rope, with blood oozing from his head as a result of his ear having been cut off. Witness' father was subsequently taken to a hut in the village, tied up and burned along with the hut.</p>
TF2 – 008	6	4hrs	<p>Witness will testify that the War Council met daily to discuss complaints relative to the conduct of Kamajors during the war. Witness states that "a good number of atrocities committed by Kamajor Operational Field Commander had the blessing of HINGA NORMAN." Witness reports that ALLIEU KONDEWA threatened to kill members of the War Council because they were checking on Kamajors.</p> <p>Witness personally heard HINGA NORMAN give instructions to do whatever was needed to capture Koribundo, including burning the town. Witness heard HINGA NORMAN say, at Base Zero during a speech: "if you see police, cut off his hand."</p> <p>Witness will give evidence that HINGA NORMAN, at a town hall meeting in Bo, took responsibility for the killing of 2 civilians.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 009	6 8	1hr.	Witness joined the Kamajors in 1996 and was initiated by Kamoh Brima. He fought for three years in Tunkia, Gbima and Kenema. HINGA NORMAN knew he was a soldier because a list of names was sent to him along with a request for food supplies. Witness was one of the several child soldiers in his unit.
TF-10	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a home with her husband when the Kamajors came into her house and took her husband out and murdered him. She was also present when the Kamajors looted houses.
TF2 – 011	6	1hr.	Witness heard HINGA NORMAN openly said at Base Zero and in Bo town in 1998, that he should be held responsible for the excesses of the Kamajors.
TF2-012	6	1hr.	Witness was present at a meeting in Koribondo Barray where HINGA NORMAN commended Kamajors and admitted that he sent them to capture Koribondo. HINGA NORMAN went further to say that he was responsible for the destruction of Koribondo and not the Kamajors. HINGA NORMAN said he was annoyed at seeing a lot of houses standing since he was only expecting to see 4 houses. He further said the Kamajors were not to be blamed for the burning of houses or looting because they were only acting under his instructions. Also present was MOININA FOFANA. Witness saw Kamajors looting and burning houses.
TF2 – 013	1&2 6 8	2hr.	Witness fought at Tongo (Black December Operation) and saw Kamajors bring Chief Conteh not far from his guard post and then return with only his head and organs. Witness had orders to kill persons with weapons in their home. Witness fought with a lot of small boys.
TF2-014	6	4hrs.	Witness was instructed at Base Zero to kill all captured rebels and collaborators as a result of which there were many such killings. Witness saw looting at several locations and heard HINGA NORMAN give direct orders that certain targets were to be looted.
TF2 – 015	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was in Tongo area when it was attacked. Kamajors gathered civilians at the NDMC HQ, segregated and removed various individuals throughout the night (particularly those in uniform) and hacked others to death. The following day, Witness fled the HQ and was traveling amongst a group of people when they were stopped at a bridge in Kamboma by Kamajors. Kamajors ‘chopped’ or shot all of these people as well as the Witness and left him for dead.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 016	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness saw Chief Aruna Konowa, tied and paraded around town by the Kamajors and later saw the disemboweled, dead body of Chief Konowa.
TF2 – 017	1&2 5 6	4hrs.	Witness was told by HINGA NORMAN that if the Kamajors succeeded in eliminating the RUF, they would run Sierra Leone for three years. Witness will testify to looting and burning, the use of child soldiers, and that HINGA NORMAN said that “rape was a part of war and civilian women were rations.” Looted items and a captured soldier were handed over to HINGA NORMAN in presence of MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA. HINGA NORMAN told Witness to kill any civilian in Bo who was a collaborator. HINGA NORMAN made these statements in the presence of ALLIEU KONDEWA and MOININA FOFANA. Witness heard HINGA NORMAN (with MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA present) say that Bo Town, Koribundo and Freetown Highway (which included Taiama and Kebe Town) were to be attacked, any rebels or collaborators were to be killed and no Prisoners of War were to be taken. HINGA NORMAN, in the presence of ALLIEU KONDEWA and MOININA FOFANA, told Witness to loot houses in Bo and return the loot to HINGA NORMAN. Looted items and a captured soldier were handed over to HINGA NORMAN in presence of MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA.
TF2 – 020	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was fleeing Bo after the Kamajor takeover and saw the Kamajors use machetes to hack 5 people, 4 people died as a result. Witness was threatened as part of a group of civilians.
TF2 – 021	1&2 5 6 7 8	1hr.	Witness was captured and initiated in 1996 (along with 6 others, the oldest was 11 years old). ALLIEU KONDEWA initiated Witness who says he joined because he didn’t have a choice. Witness saw Kamajors kill a Fullah man and the murdering of police officers in Kenema. Witness was in Freetown for two weeks when he was brought to Freetown to fight. In Bonthe district, Witness heard HINGA NORMAN say “if you capture an enemy, kill him.” Witness fought in the Masiaka-Port Loko highway, Kenema, Daru and Freetown. Witness will testify that HINGA NORMAN came to Bo to talk to soldiers. HINGA NORMAN used to visit all the Kamajors camps in the area. HINGA NORMAN encouraged him to fight and supplied him with arms and food.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 022	1&2 3&4 6 8	1hr.	Witness was a Tongo resident when the Kamajors came. Witness saw Kamajors slaughter civilians with machetes. He saw many others shot when Kamajors opened fire on them, and he later saw the dead bodies of others. He heard Kamajors say that HINGA NORMAN told them that when he entered Tongo he didn't want to see any civilians, that they should all be killed. Witness saw Kamajors kill three civilians, based on tribal origin, at checkpoints on the road out of Tongo. Witness saw three civilians with camouflage fabric wallets murdered. Witness was amongst a crowd of people that Kamajors fired on at NDMC HQ. Witness saw child soldiers 10-12 years old fighting in Tongo.
TF2 – 025	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness fled Tongo in August, 1997 when the Kamajors pulled out and returned to Lalehun in early 1998. Witness saw Chief Conteh's severed head being carried away.
TF2-026	1&2 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a Tongo resident in January, 1998 when the Kamajors took Tongo. Witness saw a captured rebel called Cobra killed as well as others who were accused of being rebels. Witness was told to drag the bodies into the bush. He also saw another person killed. Witness was made to transport looted property from Tongo on the orders of the Kamajors; he also saw Kamajors loot houses.
TF2 – 027	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness lived in Tongo throughout the war. He was herded into NDMC HQ as Kamajors took over. Once inside, Kamajors sorted civilians by tribe and ordered civilians to point out who the rebels amongst them were. Those pointed out were led away and he never saw them again. The next day, civilians were ordered to dig graves and Witness could see bodies being carried to the grave.
TF2-028	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was kept with a group of civilians in Tongo when the Kamajors chose people, especially young men who they alleged were rebels and took them to the back of a fence after which the witness never saw them again. He also witnessed the killing by gun shots or machete of other civilians in the crowd with whom he was kept.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 029	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was resident of Tongo when the Kamajors came in late 1997. He was taken to NDMC HQ. Witness was amongst a group of civilians into which Kamajors opened fire killing several. Witness heard a Kamajor say that HINGA NORMAN had given orders to kill all Tongo residents. He witnessed a young boy taken away by the Kamajors and never saw the boy again. Witness saw many civilians dead around the HQ on the day after the attack.
TF2 – 030	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a Bo resident when Kamajors came in February, 1998. She watched as her husband was mutilated and killed by Kamajors. Kamajors had tried to chop off both of his hands and feet and they were hanging by flesh. When Witness went to see him the next morning he was dead.
TF2 – 032	1&2 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness will testify about Kamajors attack on Koribondo. One of their commanders gave the orders for the houses to be burnt. Another ground commander was also involved in the looting and burning of houses. Witness found out on his return that his house along with many others had been burnt. HINGA NORMAN came and had a meeting in Koribondo where he said that he sent the Kamajors to burn the town with the exception of the court barray and mosque but the Kamajors did not do well. Witness was informed that a man called Kafala was killed between Koribondo and Bendu for being a rebel collaborator. Abema, a Kamajor, was killed for not operating as a Kamajor.
TF2 – 033	1&2 6 7	1hr.	Witness was present when the Kamajors entered Kenema. Witness saw Kamajors kill four police officers.
TF2 – 034	6	1hr.	HINGA NORMAN gave instructions to destroy all houses in Koribondo with the exception of 4 houses because every house in Koribondo had rebels or SLA or their relations. These instructions were given at Base Zero. MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA were all present. Upon entering Koribondo, Witness saw a lot of houses burning, which he says was done by Kamajors. Witness will testify that ammunition was supplied at Base Zero, but if you didn't take diamonds to HINGA NORMAN you did not get ammunition.
TF2 – 035	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Tongo Field and saw a twelve year old boy killed by the Kamajors along with a large number of other civilians.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2- 036	1&2 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness will give evidence about Kamajors burning houses in Koribondo, including his own. Witness saw Kamajors kill one Limba man for allegedly tapping palm wine for the soldiers. Witness will testify that collaborators were usually tried and sentenced in one house and handed over to a killer in another. Witness was present when HINGA NORMAN came to Koribondo and said that he was not expecting to see so many houses standing. He said that he had instructed the Kamajors to destroy everything except the mosque and that it was the presence of the junta in Koribondo which led to the attack on Koribondo.
TF2 – 037	1&2 3&4 6 7	1hr.	Witness, and another individual, was beaten and threatened with death for suspected of being a police officer from Bo. Witness was told that 3 of his colleagues had been killed by Kamajors. Witness heard that Kamajors were looking for police because they were “junta” police.
TF2 – 038	1&2 6 8	1hr.	Witness was forcefully conscripted by the Kamajors and taken to Guinea where he saw ALLIEU KONDEWA and HINGA NORMAN during his training and initiation. HINGA NORMAN brought food and guns. HINGA NORMAN told the troops in Guinea to treat the rebels in the same manner as the rebels treated the Kamajors. Witness saw Kamajors kill two children in Tanihun. Also saw Kamajors kill rebels captured in Segbema.
TF2 – 039	1&2 6 7	1hr.	Witness was in Kenema and was there when the Kamajors took the town. He assisted with the burying of the murdered police officers.
TF2 – 040	1&2 6 7	1hr.	Witness was in Kenema and will testify that the Kamajors killed numerous police officers. Witness helped bury the dead bodies of six officers.
TF2 – 041	1&2 3&4 6 7	1hr.	In February 1998, Witness was in Kenema and survived a Kamajor attempt to behead him. Witness’ colleague died in the same attack.
TF2 – 042	1&2 3&4 6 7	1hr.	Witness was in Kenema in February/March 1998 and she personally witnessed the killing of three police officers.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 043	6	4hrs.	<p>Witness was a Kamajor in Koribondo and present during all 4 attacks until it was taken on the 13th and 14th February 1998.</p> <p>Witness is aware of killing of civilians on the bus which was attacked as a result of Black December operation.</p> <p>Witness will testify that they were commanded to take Koribondo at all costs even if it meant destroying the town completely. This order was given by HINGA NORMAN. Kamajors looted everything. Witness saw some Kamajors with looted items and reports were made to HINGA NORMAN, who replied that they should be thankful that at least there were a few houses left standing.</p>
TF2 – 044	1&2 3&4 5 6 7	1hr.	<p>Witness was in Kenema when the Kamajors took the town. Witness saw dead police officers and heard Kamajors say that they were going to kill all police officers. Kamajors arrested and detained Witness, then cut and tortured him. He saw Kamajors with property looted from his home.</p>
TF2-046	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness personally saw the execution of two women by firing squad who were suspected of being wives of junta soldiers. Witness was also called out by Michael Cole to see the bodies of 50 collaborators killed by Kamajors. Witness also saw 7 people killed by burning tires placed around their necks. He was segregated from 60 of his other non-Mende colleagues by the Kamajors while escaping from Tongo to be told later that they were killed. Also as he walked away from the non-Mendes, he heard gunfire. Witness gives the names of 20 non-Mende people that were left behind and never heard from again.</p>
TF2 – 047	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was in Tongo when Kamajors took over the town and told everyone to go to the NDMC HQ. Witness saw a Kamajor kill a captured soldier. The following day, Witness saw the bodies of other dead soldiers with military ID's on their chests. Witness was involved in the burial of several victims.</p>
TF2 – 048	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was in Tongo during Operation No Living Thing (“... Operation No Living Thing, whether dog or mortal man-nothing was to be spared”). Witness watched as her brother was killed by a Kamajor.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 051	1&2 6	4hrs.	Witness will testify as to the structure and command responsibility of HINGA NORMAN, ALLIEU KONDEWA and MOININA FOFANA. Witness received reports of Kamajor atrocities, but disciplinary efforts were thwarted by HINGA NORMAN. Witness was aware of a truck load of Coffee and Cocoa that was captured and brought to Base Zero, and also a Mercedes Benz car.
TF2 – 052	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was forced to go to the NDMC HQ by the Kamajors along with many other civilians after Kamajors took Tongo Field. Witness watched as many people were taken by Kamajors to a field and never returned. Witness was later detained for eight days by Kamajors as he was suspected of being a collaborator.
TF2 – 053	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Tongo Field who took refuge in the NDMC HQ during the two Kamajor attacks in November. While at NDMC HQ, Witness saw two men executed after being pointed out as being juntas. His son was taken away by Kamajors and he has not seen him since.
TF2 – 056	1&2 5 6	1hr.	Witness was the head of the Limbas in Bo in 1998 and had to go to the Kamajor commander, on several occasions, to ransom Limbas. Witness saw the killing of a Limba man by Kamajors. In the capacity as Limba Tribal Leader, he received many reports of killings of Limba civilians. In March/April 1998, Witness saw Limba tribesman taken and held for ransom by Kamajors while their houses were burnt because they were thought to be collaborators. Witness states that policemen were killed at checkpoints the Kamajors had set up and he saw the bodies of 8 policemen. Witness' house was looted and all of his property taken by Kamajors.
TF2 – 057	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a Bo resident during the Kamajor attacks. Witness, along with his brother, was ordered imprisoned by MOININA FOFANA and kept on water only rations for a period of 25 days. After being taken away by Kamajors, Witness' brother and 2 other detainees were never seen again. Witness will also testify to a murder he saw take place at a checkpoint he was at as well as other things he saw when passing through a series of checkpoints.
TF2 – 058	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Kamajors stopped the Witness and her husband and gouged out her husband's eyes. She was told that Kamajors had cut off her husband's head and danced with it on a stick. Witness also saw another individual being killed with machetes by the Kamajors and another chopped dead body.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 – 059	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was fleeing Bo when he witnessed Kamajors kill 6 men by hacking them with machetes. Witness was robbed, beaten and threatened with death by Kamajors during a screening for collaborators.
TF2 – 060	1&2 6 8	2hrs.	Witness was initiated when he was 9-10 years old and ALLIEU KONDEWA was present. Witness will testify to seeing the killing of many people believed to be rebels and to receiving instructions from ALLIEU KONDEWA to kill people who were not Mende. ALLIEU KONDEWA also gave order to do sacrifices and Witness saw them. Witness fought in Njanjahun Gboko, Bo and Freetown. Witness states that there were about 50 small boys in his group.
TF2 – 062	1&2 5 6 7	2hrs.	Witness was present in Bo when Kamajors entered in February 1998. Witness saw multiple killings, mutilations and lootings by Kamajors and he attended public meetings in Bo held by HINGA NORMAN and attended by MOININA FOFANA. Witness heard HINGA NORMAN say at a meeting held in Bo: “Kamajors joined the society to protect their mother land. The Temnes came to this land, this is not their land, they have to go back to their own land. Whatever you want to do to these Temnes, Limbas, do it.” Witness saw people being tied up and their throats cut and others who had tires put on them, petrol added and then burned. Witness saw many lootings and heard HINGA NORMAN give orders, at public meetings held in Bo and attended by MOININA FOFANA, to burn the houses of the Temnes and Limbas. Witnesses will testify that two brother-in-laws’ houses were burned and land sold by Kamajors.
TF2-063	6	4hrs.	Witness will give evidence that armed Kamajors from the 19th Battalion broke into his house, fired shots and beat up his uncle. The group included MOININA FOFANA who was the commander of the 17th Battalion which was on Mahi Boima Road near HRS school. Witness will give evidence on Kamajor initiation rituals including the killing of a pregnant woman. Witness will testify to the initiation of small boys of the age of 5-7 years of age. Witness was taught how to use guns, arm and disarm, cock and fire.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -064	1&2 3&4 6 8	1hr.	Witness fought in Bo. He will testify that they went around from place to place for a long time killing rebels. In a village behind Tikonko village, "we killed a lot of the rebels there, only men. We left all the women. We killed the men with a knife." Witness will say that Kamajors taught small boys how to hide, how to cut and kill human beings and also to go 'in a group of small boys and grab the rebel and one of us would cut his throat.'" Witness states that they did this one time. Witness will testify that small boys were organized in groups and there was a small boy's group leader who did the cutting of the man's throat.
TF2 -065	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness is a Temne who was living in Bo at the time of the Kamajor take over. Witness saw Kamajors chase a man down and kill him. Witness was beaten, suffering permanent hearing loss as a result, his possessions were looted, and he was robbed by Kamajors.
TF2 - 067	1&2 3&4 5 6 8	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Bo when Kamajors took it in February, 1998. He saw Kamajors kill men and women, Temnes in particular, as well as disembowelings and mutilations. Witness was arrested on more than once; on one occasion, he was kept in jail for 26 days. Witness saw his father and other family members arrested by Kamajors. Sometime after March 1999, Witness saw Kamajors looting his home and the home of his uncle.
TF2 -068	6	4hrs.	Witness states that HINGA NORMAN, MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA did not punish those who were committing atrocities. At Talia, Witness found HINGA NORMAN who, Witness states, was in charge. HINGA NORMAN appointed the director of war, Battalion commanders, Director of Operations and Platoon commanders. He appointed the High Priest, ALLIEU KONDEWA. Initiation of Kamajors and military training took place at Base Zero. HINGA NORMAN was in charge of training and sometimes came with military instructors to do training. They were training in the use of weapons. Witness will testify that he saw a looted car at Base Zero and ALLIEU KONDEWA using it. HINGA NORMAN saw the car as well. Witness also saw a truck loaded with coffee and Cacao that was seized by Kamajors and taken to Talia. The truck was turned over to the High Priest and the Director of War, MOININA FOFANA. HINGA NORMAN was informed of this seizure.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -069	3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness lived in Bo during the Kamajor occupation. Witness was beaten and threatened by Kamajors. His home was looted and property stolen by Kamajors.
TF2-070	6 7	4hrs.	Witness will confirm many ethnically motivated killings that took place in and around Bo. Many Temnes were murdered, property looted, and houses burned as they were alleged to be supporters of the Junta. Witness will testify to the setting up of checkpoints in and around Bo and that people fleeing attack were screened on ethnic bases and once identified as non Mendes, were instantly labeled collaborators and killed. Those killings took place at checkpoints manned by MOININA FOFANA's boys and Witness states that he knew about the atrocities. Witness says that Kamajors burned house in Bo. Kamajors looted properties and shared them amongst themselves. Witness will state that the CDF, particularly the Kamajors, moved away from the idea of protecting people to attacking and killing them.
TF2 -071	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bonthe when the Kamajors took over 1998. He will testify that after September 15th 1997 an attack was launched by Kamajors on villagers from Bonthe Town and three were immediately killed and eaten by the Kamajors. The remaining were to be eaten in installments. The three victims were Bockarie Kpaka, Samuel Kamara (a Blacksmith in Bonthe Town) and one Junisa. Witness will testify that in January 1998 in Bonthe Town, a Guinean businessman was killed between Gbongoma and Molaikaika, Sitia Chiefdom, Bonthe District. Witness found Mohammed's body shot with his back cut open. Witness buried the corpse. Witness will give evidence that HINGA NORMAN had gone to Bonthe via helicopter and made a speech to the people saying that it was useless to complain about the Kamajors saying 'that working with the Kamajors was like working with a cutlass and it cuts you, you drop it, but later you pick it up and work with it again'.
TF2 -072	6	4hrs.	Witness will give evidence that the Kamajors received arms and ammunition from the army through HINGA NORMAN. Witness along with other Kamajors attacked and captured Bo from Kenema in February, 1998. Witness will testify that Kamajors were looting and burning houses. There were reports of killings at checkpoints manned by Kamajors especially the killings at Bakapu and Gbaian done by Kamajors for money and diamonds. All these incidences were reported to MOININA FOFANA.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -073	1&2 6 7	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Moyamba who will testify to the murdering of two traders. Kamajors looted Witness' home and took his car.
TF2 -078	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Bo when the Kamajors entered in 1998. She and her husband were beaten and tortured; Witness' husband was taken away by Kamajors and she later saw his mutilated, dead body. Witness was told that her son was also arrested and killed by Kamajors. Witness' house was looted and burned to the ground.
TF2 -079	1&2 5 6 7	4hrs.	Witness will testify that the Death Squad did everything ranging from killing to looting to vandalizing and that they were created to carry out the worst jungle justice. HINGA NORMAN created the Death Squad and allowed it to continue despite the fact that he had heard complaints about it. Witness will also say that the instructions given by HINGA NORMAN, in the presence of ALLIEU KONDEWA and MOININA FOFANA, for most towns (i.e. Black December, Tongo, Koribondu) were to attack it, occupy it, kill the collaborators and take property for the Kamajors. HINGA NORMAN gave instructions to attack juntas and collaborators in Tongo, take their property and create roadblocks so the junta can't pass with vehicles. Witness heard HINGA NORMAN say to Kamajors, on more than one occasion, "wherever you go, fight and take whatever is yours"; MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA were also present.
TF2 -080	1&2 5 6 8	2 hrs.	Witness was initiated into the Kamajors at Bumpe Village along with many others, a mixture of initiates from ages 12 to 20 years. Witness heard some of the boys yelling: "Leave me alone, let me go!" He had to pay a registration fee for joining which he paid to ALLIEU KONDEWA's secretary. He saw and participated in killing civilians, looting and burning. In 1999, Witness fought at Mogbongo village and Mile 91. In March and April of 1999, Witness' group ambushed rebels, killed them and kept their weapons. Witness states that one time they captured three boys and a woman rebel. They tied them up, took them away and cut their throats. At Camp Charlie, ALLIEU KONDEWA's right hand man gave the order to kill everyone, so every civilian or rebel that was seen was killed. At night they started burning all houses.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -081	1&2 6 8	1hr.	Witness is a 16 year old who fought as a child soldier after being initiated by ALLIEU KONDEWA. He watched Kamajors kill his father and then felt he had to join the CDF or be killed by them. Witness had gone with his father to get food when they were intercepted by the CDF in dress garb. They accused his father of being a spy, beat him, had him dig his own grave and killed him. Witness ran away and felt he had to join the CDF or be killed by them.
TF2 -082	1&2 5 6	4hrs.	Witness was a member of the Kamajors. He states that children were made to cut throats of prisoners because ALLIEU KONDEWA did not want ammunition wasted on them. Witness says that HINGA NORMAN gave him instructions not to spare any living thing; "kill them all whether they are human beings, domestic animals, everything that had life should be killed." Witness was aware that looting was going on because he saw it happening and he made an effort to return looted goods to civilians. HINGA NORMAN gave him direct orders to destroy all of the houses in the town.
TF2 -086	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a Bonthe resident in 1997 after the Kamajors took the town. Witness was mutilated and left for dead in the same incident in which Witness' friend was killed.
TF2 -087	5 6	4hrs.	Witness has information as to the structure of the Kamajors and the beginnings at Base Zero. Appointments to committees were made by HINGA NORMAN & MOININA FOFANA. Orders went directly from HINGA NORMAN to the District Administrators who then passed them on to the Chiefdom Commanders. Complaints of Kamajor excesses were passed on to HINGA NORMAN but nothing came of those reports, a case in point was the looting of drugs from Matru Jong Hospital. He states that HINGA NORMAN, MOININA FOFANA and ALLIEU KONDEWA had information about misdeeds in general but that nothing was done about them.
TF2 -088	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness is a resident of Bo District whose son was killed and his body parts used in a sacrificial manner. Witness reported the incident to HINGA NORMAN who said: "whatever a Kamajor does should be left to God". Kamajors looted and robbed Witness' house.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -091	3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a Bonthe resident who was held by Kamajors. Witness saw Kamajors looting property from houses. Witness was abducted by Kamajors and forced to cook for them.
TF2 -092	3&4 5	1hr.	Witness will testify that he was taken from church by Kamajors who undressed him and left him naked. Witness will testify that Kamajors accused him of supporting the Juntas and he was levied a huge sum to save his life. The money was paid to ALLIEU KONDEWA. Kamajors burnt down his house and looted Le. 2,000,000 from him.
TF2 -096	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Talia when the Kamajors first arrived. Witness personally saw ALLIEU KONDEWA kill two civilians by shooting them.
TF2 -103	5 6	1hr.	Witness was resident in Bonthe when Kamajors were at Base Zero. Witness was told of the killing of a young boy named Kekuru which he reported to the Kamajor commander who did nothing about it. Witness saw Kamajors looting and burning houses in his village. ALLIEU KONDEWA came to his village and threatened them with death if they didn't contribute food.
TF2 -105	1&2 5 6	1hr.	Witness will testify that he was in Bonthe when Kamajors attacked. He saw Kamajors shoot a man just behind the Mission on Lime Street. Witness observed Kamajors looting and burning houses. Witness saw one Kamajor beating the Town Chief.
TF-107	6	1hr.	Witness was aware of HN involvement in the freeing of Kamajors who were taken into custody for murder. Also provides information relative to AK and the execution of a civilian.
TF2 -108	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was abducted from her parent's home in Bonthe District in 1998. Witness' parent's property was carried away by the Kamajors. Witness was taken to Talia where she was raped and forced to "marry" a kamajor. Witness saw the killing of 6 civilians. Killings in Talia often took place on the instruction of ALLIEU KONDEWA or Kamoh Lahai. Witness was the subject of sexual violence and she witnessed it.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -109	1&2 3&4 5 6	2 hrs.	<p>Sometime in 1998 in the Dry Season during the AFRC regime, Kamajors from Talia attacked Witness' village and she was abducted together with other people and taken to Talia. Witness saw HINGA NORMAN and ALLIEU KONDEWA in Talia.</p> <p>In Witness' presence one civilian was arrested and brought to Talia by the Kamajors. ALLIEU KONDEWA gave orders that he should be burnt to death because he was a rebel and he was killed. She also saw another man killed by Kamajors.</p> <p>In Talia village, one of the Kamajors forcefully took her to be his wife. Witness will testify that she was "virginated". Witness will testify of other young women brought to Talia who were forced to have sex with Kamajors. According to Witness, some of the young girls who refused to have sex with the Kamajors were killed. Kamajors took these women as their wives and carried them to the war front. Kamajors also brought girls and women for ALLIEU KONDEWA.</p>
TF2 -111	6	4hrs.	<p>According to Witness, HINGA NORMAN arrived in Talia within three months of the AFRC coup. HINGA NORMAN and ALLIEU KONDEWA established the Base Zero. When HINGA NORMAN came to Talia he came with a great number of Kamajors. ALLIEU KONDEWA, HINGA NORMAN, and MOININA FOFANA were all based at Talia. ALLIEU KONDEWA was in a separate house which the chiefdom people gave to him. MOININA FOFANA and HINGA NORMAN were staying another house. ALLIEU KONDEWA was the highest ranking Kamajor as he was responsible for initiations.</p>
TF2-115	6	2 hrs.	<p>Witness was arrested sometime in 1998 and detained at the police station in Bo on the orders of the Bo District CDF Administrator. It was alleged that Witness had knowledge of the killing by Kamajors of two civilians in his area. Witness recalled seeing the two men riding on a bike coming through the town from one check point but could not tell whether they left through the other check point. The two men subsequently went missing and were presumed killed by Kamajors in his village. Witness was released after a few days. He met HINGA NORMAN on his way out of the police station. HINGA NORMAN inquired from him and he explained what had happened. HINGA NORMAN was unhappy with the Bo District CDF Administrator.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -116	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Bonthe Island who was present when Kamajors entered in February, 1998. A Kamajor told Witness that he just killed a young boy shortly after Witness saw him leave with the boy. Witness heard shots fire and then heard Kamajors reporting to their commander that they had shot dead a tailor accused of making clothes for the Junta. Witness later saw the tailor's dead body. Witness was threatened and ordered to be killed. Witness attended a meeting where civilians complained to ALLIEU KONDEWA, but as far as Witness knows, ALLIEU KONDEWA did nothing about it.
TF2 -118	6 8	1hr.	Witness was initiated along with other small boys, who were maybe 5-6 years old. After initiation, Witness was trained in Gambia for three weeks. The trainees were not younger than 9; the 5-6 year olds were not trained. ALLIEU KONDEWA was present for the training. Witness saw MOININA FOFANA at Gambia who told him that boys his age were allowed to fight.
TF2 -119	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bo on February 15, 1998. Just before Kamajors attempted to kill Witness, they advised him that HINGA NORMAN had given instructions that all police officers were to be killed. Kamajors made three separate attempts to kill Witness who suffered serious injuries as a result.
TF2-121	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was a Bonthe resident when the Kamajors took the town in 1998. Witness was present when the Kamajors shot and tortured to death a man who they accused of being a rebel collaborator.
TF2-122	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bonthe when the Kamajors took the town in 1998. Witness saw Kamajors kill 2 men.
TF2-123	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bonthe when Kamajors took the town. Witness saw Kamajors beat and then kill his friend.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -124	1&2 6	2hrs.	<p>Witness will testify that he, along with many others under the age of 15, was initiated by ALLIEU KONDEWA. They were trained to cock and fire, dismantle and assemble weapons.</p> <p>Witness will testify that MOININA FOFANA introduced the element of tribalism into the war. MOININA FOFANA gave orders to Witness' Commander to separate captured rebels or civilians by race and if anyone is a Mende they would let that person through but if you were from the other tribes, you had to wait. Then they would sort the people not allowed to pass through by the different tribes. They would take the Temnes into the forest and kill them. Manning a checkpoint, Witness was among other Kamajors when about fifteen Temnes, both men and women were killed.</p> <p>Witness will testify that he saw some Kamajors in the Bo area drink human blood, cut out the human heart, eat it and eat the human flesh.</p> <p>Witness will testify that once rebels were captured, they were killed in front of the other captives to terrorize them and the rest of the prisoners would be killed also.</p>
TF2 -125	3&4 5 6	1hr.	<p>Witness will testify that on Friday, 26th February, 1999, Kamajors armed with guns, sticks, and cutlasses entered her compound with one Peugeot car marked 'CDF' Koribondo's transport and put members of her household under gun point whilst the Kamajors broke into her husband's garage. Witness will testify that one of the attackers identified himself as Director for the Kamajors and that he has been instructed by HINGA NORMAN to remove two cars from her husband's garage.</p> <p>On that same morning, the same group of armed Kamajors with a new leader appeared at her compound and put them again under gunpoint and demanded the documents to the two vehicles already taken away by them. Witness submitted the documents and the entire house was ransacked. Pots, tea kettle, toaster, cooker, and perfumes were all carted away onto an awaiting vehicle.</p> <p>Various appeals were made to HINGA NORMAN to return the vehicles which he was later seen driving.</p>
TF2 -126	3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was abducted from Gambia around 1996/1997 and taken to Gbap (Bonthe). Witness was confined and raped multiple times by Kamajors. She was also forced to cut wood and cook for them. Anytime the captured women resisted, they were beaten and threatened. Witness heard that MOININA FOFANA used to visit the camp and brought the Kamajors logistics.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -128	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was captured by Kamajors when they invaded Bonthe town sometime in 1998 around the Ecomog invasion of Freetown. Witness' daughter was accused of being a rebel and killed. Witness was captured by Kamajors and repeatedly raped. She stayed with the Kamajors for about a month and escaped. At Mopete, the Kamajors were going from house to house selecting women to marry. She met MOININA FOFANA in Goba town.
TF2 -129	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was captured by Kamajors from Sandomie in the Pujehun District and taken to Bonthe. Witness was raped by Kamajors and kept as a wife. According to Witness, 3 pregnant women were used as a sacrifice for their Kamajor "husbands" to become members of a society headed by ALLIEU KONDEWA. The sacrifice was performed by ALLIEU KONDEWA.
TF2 -131	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness will give evidence that she had to hide in the bush with her parents and other villagers because Kamajors were doing things like looting and raping. Witness will testify that she was captured and taken to Talia by one Kamajor. She was held in a hut in Base Zero and was raped multiple times by Kamajors. Witness states that her parents were killed at Base Zero. She made a report about the rapes to some older women at the Base. They told her that they would inform the top commanders namely MOININA FOFANA & ALLIEU KONDEWA. MOININA FOFANA later remarked that it was part of the war. Witness will confirm that she saw MOININA FOFANA & ALLIEU KONDEWA at the camp having meetings with Kamajors.
TF2 -133	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness will give evidence that sometime in 1997, she and her parents were captured by Kamajors and taken to Sogbini chiefdom. Witness will testify that she was asked to be the Kamajors wife but she and her parents refused. Witness will give evidence that one of ALLIEU KONDEWA's Kamajors raped her. Witness' mother was raped when she protested against her daughter being raped. Witness cried and her parents protested, at which point he shot and killed both of them while she watched. Witness will testify that she could not run away because when the Kamajors went to fight, they left an armed Kamajor on guard. Witness was forced to stay with a Kamajor for about two months and now has a child from that relationship.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -134	3&4 5 6	1hr.	<p>Witness will testify that in the dry season of 1997, a group of Kamajors attacked Blama and Witness was captured and abducted. She was taken to Base Zero at Talia. Witness will testify that every morning Kamajors used to rape her. Witness would scream for help but no one would respond. Witness states that at one time ALLIEU KONDEWA observed one Kamajor having sex with her. Witness screamed loudly for ALLIEU KONDEWA to rescue her but he left the scene without saying a word. Even the leaders such as ALLIEU KONDEWA use to rape captured women and girls.</p> <p>Witness will testify that every morning ALLIEU KONDEWA took out his Kamajors for morning parade and it was during this parade Witness got to know HINGA NORMAN. ALLIEU KONDEWA introduced HINGA NORMAN as his boss. Witness will give evidence that she saw HINGA NORMAN providing food and ammunition and talking to the Kamajors.</p> <p>Witness will testify that she spent six months with the Kamajors and attempted to escape but was captured by one of the Kamajors who took her to their boss in Talia. She will also testify that Kamajors went to the nearby villages to loot properties belonging to innocent civilians.</p>
TF2 -135	3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness will testify that some time in 1997, Kamajors accused her of being a soldier and that she was blind folded and forced into a house. Then for 1 month she was raped continuously by many men a day.</p> <p>Witness escaped and was captured again by another group. The boss man himself raped the Witness for 3 nights. When Witness was freed, she and a group of other women went to MOININA FOFANA to report this as he was the director of war. MOININA FOFANA told them to gloss over it because it was happening to many women.</p>
TF2 -136	3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness will testify that she was captured during the dry season of 1997 by Kamajors at Gambia and accused of being a rebel. She was made to fetch wood and subjected to beatings and other forms of mistreatment. While there, Witness states that she was raped many times by the son of one of the commanders, who took her to be his wife. When he went to the battle front, other Kamajors would rape the Witness; sometimes 2 or 3 on the same day.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-140	6 8	1hr.	Witness will testify that when he was under the age of 15 he took part in 3 attacks on Koribundu.
TF2-142	5 6	1hr.	Witness was a member of the CDF during the Freetown invasion. He will testify that he saw looted property being carted away from a compound by Kamajors.
TF2 – 144	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was in Tongo when Kamajors ordered everyone into NDMC HQ where he saw Kamajors hack people to death. He also saw the killing of civilians at a checkpoint in Kenema. Witness' children were attacked and beaten by Kamajors, his houses burned to the foundation and a third house looted.
TF2 -145	1&2 6 7	2hrs.	Witness will confirm that he was told by some people that they had received an instruction from HINGA NORMAN that they should kill all police officers because the police were not in support of them (Kamajors). Witness said he had to advise them not to kill any policeman because that was not the reason why Kamajor society was formed. Witness confirmed that Kamajors committed many atrocities in Bo town. He confirmed the burning of houses of the Northerners by Kamajors. Witness will testify that HINGA NORMAN was aware of atrocities committed.
TF2-147	1&2 5 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bonthe during the Kamajor taking of the town in mid February, 1998. He will testify to the ransoming of hostages and killings that went on there.
TF2-148	1&2 5 6 8	1hr.	Witness was a Kamajor who fought in Kenema and Tongo. Witness' Commander said that MOININA FOFANA ordered that they proceed to attack Kenema and the instructions were to kill all captured combatants and their collaborators, burn their houses, and seize their property. In the battle for Tongo, Witness states that many individuals were executed for being collaborators, rebels or soldiers and for tribal reasons. Witness fought with child soldiers.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-149	3&4 7	2hrs.	<p>Witness will testify that HINGA NORMAN was aware that there was a lockup in the CDF office. HINGA NORMAN used to visit the CDF office, and he used to talk to all heads of office. HINGA NORMAN came to Kenema about once every two months.</p> <p>Witness will give evidence that there was a general policy of understanding within the ranks of the CDF that collaborators should be punished. Witness heard of people being burned on tires, of people being beaten at the task force command office, and of arbitrary arrests, in the context as punishment for collaboration.</p>
TF2-150	1&2 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was a Kamajor who went to the SS Camp when the Kamajors captured it from the rebels. Witness has information relative to the killing of collaborators and POW's.</p>
TF2-151	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	<p>Witness returned to Kenema after the Kamajor intervention in February 1998. Witness observed three separate incidents of Kamajors killing civilians. On more than one occasion, Witness was arrested, beaten and threatened to be killed while detained.</p>
TF2-152	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	<p>Witness watched as Kamajors launched a RPG bomb into the front of their house, looted and vandalized it. Kamajors found two tenants in the home who they hacked and killed.</p> <p>In a separate incident, Witness was arrested, detained and watched as Kamajors killed another detainee. Witness was threatened to be killed and cut in the neck by a Kamajor.</p>
TF2-153	1&2 5 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was a victim in Kenema Town of Kamajor looting and burning. Witness also saw Kamajors kill an individual.</p>
TF2-154	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	<p>Kamajors came looking for the Witness' father at their home in Kenema in February/March 1998. Witness watched as Kamajors launched a RPG bomb into the front of their home, looted and vandalized it. Kamajors found two tenants in the Witness' home who they hacked and killed. In a separate incident, Witness was arrested, subjected to screening based on tribe, and then watched as Kamajors killed two more civilians.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-156	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bo when the Kamajors took over. Witness was the only survivor of the group of 4 men who were killed at time Witness #11 lost her husband. Witness suffered serious physical injuries. Witness also saw a Temne man be killed by Kamajors. Witness' property was looted and he saw other civilians property being looted and burned.
TF2-157	1&2 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness was in Koribundo when Kamajors attacked in February, 1998 and when HINGA NORMAN made a speech at the town barrie. Witness heard HINGA NORMAN say the Kamajors did not do well as there were still houses left standing and everyone in Koribundo should have been killed (even the ants) because they were here with the soldiers. Witness saw Kamajors kill several residents of Koribundo.
TF2-158	1&2 3&4 6 7	1hr.	Witness' father was tortured and killed by the Kamajors when they took Koribundo in February, 1998. Witness attended a meeting at the town barri presided over by HINGA NORMAN. At this meeting HINGA NORMAN told the townspeople: that he was the party responsible for ordering the Kamajors to conduct themselves as they had; inasmuch as the people of Koribundo had supported the SLA they were being subjected to the treatment being meted out by the Kamajors; he was in fact disappointed in the Kamajors due to the fact that while he had instructed them to kill every living thing in the village and to destroy all but three of the buildings located in Koribundo and they had not followed his orders completely.
TF2-159	1&2 3&4 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness will testify that on a Friday in February 1998, Kamajors attacked Koribondo. Witness heard Kamajors say that they were acting on instructions from HINGA NORMAN. Witness will testify that the following Saturday, he saw Kamajors kill 5 Limba people along Blama Road; two were shot and three were beaten to death. Witness says that at 7:00 that same night, he saw Kamajors burn 10 houses on Blama Road. Witness states that women were killed because they were accused of being Junta wives. Their heads were displayed at checkpoints and bodies dumped into a well.
TF2-160	3&4 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Koribundo when the Kamajors entered in February, 1998. He heard the Kamajors were looking for him as a collaborator so he fled to Bo. Upon his return, he was beaten on two occasions by Kamajors. Witness attended a meeting where HINGA NORMAN stated that he was responsible for what the Kamajors did.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-162	1&2 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Koribundo during the Kamajor takeover in February of 1998. Witness saw the Kamajors kill two civilians by beating them to death with sticks. Witness was also present when the Kamajors began burning and looting the homes of townspeople.
TF2-163	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness will give evidence that he was informed about three graves containing the bodies of three people from Koribundo that the Kamajors had killed. The Witness was also informed that the chief of Goambu named Kafalla was killed by the Kamajors during this attack.
TF2-164	1&2 3&4 5 6 7	1hr.	Witness will give evidence that after the Kamajors captured Koribondo, he was arrested and whisked off to their HQ. While enroute Witness saw another group of Kamajors beating a Limba man who was killed and decapitated. Witness will testify that the commander ordered his Kamajors to burn his house. They looted his properties before burning the house.
TF2-165	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Moyamba in July of 1997 when Kamajors took over. Witness was present when Kamajors killed and decapitated one man for being a collaborator. Witness also saw Kamajors burn to death another person.
TF2-166	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Moyamba in 1998 when her father was mutilated by Kamajors and later died. Witness' home was looted and Witness was beaten with a cable by Kamajors.
TF2-167	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Moyamba on February 5, 1998 when Kamajors took over the town. Witness saw Kamajors kill numerous civilians; including his 3½ year old grandson. His daughters were captured and his son was shot.
TF2-168	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Moyamba on February 5, 1998 when Kamajors took the town. Witness watched as Kamajors killed his wife and looted from his home.
TF2-169	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Moyamba Town when Kamajors took over in 1998. Witness saw the head of a victim paraded around town.
TF2-170	1&2 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a resident of Bradford in March of 1998. He saw Kamajors kill a civilian by first chopping him and then shooting him in the face. Witness also saw Kamajors looting.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-171	3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was in Moyamba in February/March of 1998 when a letter was received by the townspeople telling them that HINGA NORMAN had not paid the Kamajors and that therefore the Kamajors were to engage in Operation Pay Yourself. Witness fled the town but was captured by Kamajors who recruited him to carry looted property. Witness fled to avoid the task and was shot by the Kamajors sustaining permanent injury.
TF2-172	1&2 5 6	1hr.	Witness was in Bradford, Moyamba in April, May, 1998. Kamajors caught Witness' brother and proceeded to torture him. Witness heard gunshots and his brother moaning and crying in pain; he later discovered his brother. Witness tried to save his brother by taking him to a hospital, but he died en route. His farm was looted.
TF2-173	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness will give evidence that he saw Kamajors shoot and kill his aunt and loot his aunt's property. Witness was shot in the arm. Witness saw HINGA NORMAN get stuck behind a broken down vehicle on the Mabang bridge in Moyamba. HINGA NORMAN got out of his vehicle and started yelling and then his bodyguards starting shooting indiscriminately. Witness saw two people get shot.
TF2-174	1&2 6 8	1hr.	Witness was appointed a member of the Kamajors in Moyamba after the ECOMOG intervention. He's aware of the command structure in Moyamba District. He attended many meetings at which HINGA NORMAN was present. Witness confirms that he also saw ALLIEU KONDEWA and MOININA FOFANA in Moyamba. Witness states that there were many Kamajor child soldiers.
TF2-175	6 8	1hr.	Witness was a Kamajor who served in Moyamba after the coup in 1997. Witness' son was initiated into the Kamajors and used as a soldier; Witness is aware that many children under the age of 15 were used as soldiers.
TF2-176	1&2 3&4 6 7	1hr.	Witness heard HINGA NORMAN'S speech wherein he said that he had given orders that no living thing should survive in Koribondo and that the civilians were not to blame the Kamajors for the burnings and atrocities but should blame him. He also heard HINGA NORMAN say that the people of Koribondo were being punished because they were collaborators. Kamajors tied Witness' hands and beat him.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -179	6	1 hr.	Witness' statement relates to an incident in late 1998 in Mabonda Village, Shenge in Moyamba District. Witness recalls fighting between Kamajors in Kagboro Chiefdom and those in Bumpe Chiefdom which led to some Kamajors being arrested and taken to the District Officer's office in Moyamba. While there, Witness and others saw the corpse of a woman brought in who was said to have been killed in the fighting. Witness and others were also informed that her son had been thrown into a fire by Kamajors. Witness gives the chain of command of the Kamajors in his area which runs up to MOININA FOFANA and HINGA NORMAN.
TF2-180	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was a Moyamba resident. Witness' husband was beaten by the Kamajors as Witness watched and her husband later died. Their property was looted and Witness and her children were forced to carry it for the Kamajors.
TF2-181	3&4 6	1hr.	Witness will testify that she was arrested and detained by Kamajors around Christmas 1997 on allegation that she was a junta collaborator. During the arrest she was mercilessly beaten all over her body and face. She heard Kamajors mentioning the names of HINGA NORMAN and MOININA FOFANA as their bosses. Witness was informed that there were instructions from the Kamajor high command to have her killed. Witness heard from her brother how her husband was killed and his head hung on a stick by the Kamajors.
TF2-182	8	1hr.	Witness served as a child soldier for the Kamajors.
TF2-183	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a Bradford Town resident in Moyamba District in 1998. Witness was with her brother and son when the Kamajors arrested them and shot her 5 year-old son, killing him. Her brother was also shot. Witness also saw the killing of two other civilians by Kamajors.
TF2-184	3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was present at a bridge that was blocked when HINGA NORMAN arrived and Kamajors started shooting randomly. Two people were injured by gunshot wounds. HINGA NORMAN was shown the injured but he merely walked away without saying a word.
TF2-186	1&2 6	1hr.	Witness will give evidence as to the killing of Mr. Thomas by the Kamajors in Moyamba. Witness will testify that MOININA FOFANA came to Moyamba and made a speech at the Court Barrie, whilst Witness and others were forced to listen.

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2 -187	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness will give evidence that in November 1998, she and three pregnant women were captured by Kamajors. One of the Kamajors took Witness and made her one of his three wives.</p> <p>Human sacrifices were done by ALLIEU KONDEWA and his Kamajors. ALLIEU KONDEWA would rub the blood of the victim on their faces. Witness will testify that she saw five pregnant women in all being sacrificed.</p> <p>Witness will testify that ALLIEU KONDEWA met her at a junction and forced her into the bush by the water side and threatened to kill her if she resisted, and then raped her, at that time she was pregnant with child.</p>
TF2 -188	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness will give evidence that she was abducted by Kamajors. Witness was ordered to carry loads or threatened with death. She carried the loads to Tihun. At Tihun, Witness was told that she was going to be taken as a wife by one of them, she refused and he threatened to kill her, so she agreed. She did not try to escape because she was threatened to be killed if she tried to escape.</p> <p>Witness will give evidence that while at Talia she met ALLIEU KONDEWA, the Chief initiator who said he was going to kill her mother for attempting to escape. Witness begged for her mother's life. ALLIEU KONDEWA took her into his room and raped her all night.</p>
TF2 -189	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was captured by Kamajors. Witness' husband was killed by a Kamajor. Witness was taken to Talia where she was forced to "marry" a Kamajor. Women from neighbouring villages were also taken to Talia as "wives" for the Kamajors. In Talia, Witness saw ALLIEU KONDEWA and HINGA NORMAN.</p>
TF2-190	6		<p>MOININA FOFANA and HINGA NORMAN came to Talia in a helicopter together with an unknown number of persons and soon thereafter a lot of Kamajors started coming to Talia. A Death Squad was formed for the security of Base Zero and posted at the border; they had one gray helux vehicle.</p> <p>The Death Squad reported to the War Council through a member of the War Council who was very close to HINGA NORMAN. He provided the Death Squad with food supplies. Witness was responsible for taking instructions from the base to the various commanders at the war front.</p> <p>Witness heard about complaints made against the Death Squad to HINGA NORMAN.</p> <p>HINGA NORMAN brought arms and ammunitions to Base Zero for the Kamajors.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-191	6	4 hrs.	<p>Witness will give evidence that he was taken prisoner, along with many women and children, and physically beaten repeatedly for one month by Kamajors because they accused him of being a collaborator who had mined diamonds for the RUF. Was told by captors that HN had to be consulted before they could release him.</p> <p>Witness will testify that he saw three accused collaborators executed and tortured in 1998 by the Kamajors.</p> <p>Witness was present when the Kamajors looted his house.</p>
TF2-193	6	1 hr.	<p>Witness will provide evidence as to the command structure of the CDF in terms of national office as well as local commanders in the Southern and Eastern provinces.</p>
TF2-195	3&4 6	1hr.	<p>Witness was a Moyamba resident during the Kamajor takeover in the dry season of 1998. Witness was beaten and suffered physical injuries as a result of Kamajors believing he was a rebel collaborator.</p>
TF2-198	1&2 3&4 5 6 7	1hr.	<p>Witness was a resident of Koribondo on February 13, 1998 when the Kamajors attacked the town. Following the first attack, Witness fled to Bo where the Kamajors arrested him as a collaborator and beat him severely. Witness' brother came to his defense and was tortured and killed by Kamajors who forced him to witness the killing. Witness returned to Koribondo and attended a speech at the town barray delivered by HINGA NORMAN where he took responsibility for the actions in the town as well as the killings as a collective punishment. Witness saw the houses which had been burnt by the Kamajors.</p>
TF2-200	6	4hrs.	<p>Witness says Kamajors would come to the court barray and say they were above the law and had orders from HINGA NORMAN & ALLIEU KONDEWA. Complaints about the Kamajors were made to Witness 2-3 days a week. Some were channeled through the court clerk, or to the court chairman. This happened in 1997, 1998, 1999, until 2000 when they finally disarmed. A letter of complaint that Kamajors were harassing civilians, looting property, etc. was directed to HINGA NORMAN.</p> <p>Kamajors were killing innocent civilians, looting people's properties, raping women and young girls, and beating people all over the chiefdom. If reports by Witness, Kamajors they would say that their actions were instructions directly from ALLIEU KONDEWA and HINGA NORMAN.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-201	6	4hrs.	<p>Witness will testify that HINGA NORMAN held a meeting in Talia in October 1997 to decide what the command structure should be. In that meeting, HINGA NORMAN named the posts that were available, and he asked Kamajors to choose. HINGA NORMAN announced that the war council would be appointed and explained what their role would be. It was MOININA FOFANA who was directing and commanding the Death Squad. HINGA NORMAN later gave commands to the Death Squad, as did MOININA FOFANA.</p> <p>HINGA NORMAN gave instructions to the commanders not to come back until they capture Koribondo. In the case of both Koribondu and Tongo, ALLIEU KONDEWA had been instructed to prepare charms for those attacks. HINGA NORMAN gave instructions that they should capture Bo and Kenema. Witness will give evidence that he heard HINGA NORMAN say that they should take police as their enemy.</p> <p>Witness says that in a war situation someone declared your enemy is like any other enemy in war. Witness will give evidence that HINGA NORMAN visited Kenema from 1998 through 2001 at least once every two weeks, sometimes staying for days.</p>
TF2-202	1&2 5 6	1hr.	<p>Witness saw his brother being tortured and mutilated to death. After the murder of his brother, the Kamajors went to the brother's house and looted a large sum of money from within.</p>
TF2-204	3&4 6	1 hr.	<p>Witness was captured from Malima Shebureh by kamajors and taken to Malima a few miles from Pujehun. Witness' parents were killed. She was raped and forced to "marry" one Mohamed Dabo. Witness had two still births while with Mohamed and suffered serious complications from the second birth.</p>
TF2-205	3&4 6	1 hr.	<p>Witness was abducted in early 1998, around March and taken to Bauya Junction. She was forced to "marry" one Captain Blood. ALLIEU KONDEWA was in charge of the camp at Bauya Junction. MOININA FOFANA used to visit the camp from time to time. Witness reported her abduction to MONINA FOFANA's guards but they said that this was part of the war and so they should bear it.</p>
TF2-206	3&4 6	1 hr.	<p>Witness was captured by the Kamajors in Mokosie village. She was raped and forced to "marry" a Kamajor called Vange. Witness heard that other women were captured and raped. Witness saw ALLIEU KONDEWA but did not make a report to him as she was afraid.</p>

PSEUDONYM	COUNT(S)	TIME	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
TF2-207	3&4 6	1 hr.	Witness was abducted from Pujehun during Johnny Paul Koroma's time for being a rebel woman. Witness was raped by two kamajors. She was subsequently forced to "marry" a kamajor. She had two children with him. She ran away after her kamajor "husband" died.
TF2-208	3&4 6	1 hr.	Witness was captured by the Kamajors during Johnny Paul Koroma's time. He mother was killed by the Kamajors. She was raped and forced to "marry" one Kasila. Other women were captured and taken to Gbap. She heard the Kamajors saying "this is my woman. I got her from mission."
TF2-209	3&4 6	1 hr.	Witness was abducted by Kamajors at the time when the AFRC was fighting the CDF from Matru Jong and taken to Moyawa. She was raped Kuku Sila. Kuku told her that he was going to take her to his boss ALLIEU KONDEWA in Talia because she was a rebel. Witness managed to escape when they got to Talia because HINGA NORMAN arrived in a helicopter.
TF2-210	1&2 3&4 5 6	1hr.	Witness was at Bradford Town in Moyamba in late 1998. He watched as his aunt was shot and killed by Kamajors and as his property was looted by them.
TF2-214	1&2 3&4 6	1hr.	Witness was a passenger on a bus in Bo District when the bus was stopped by Kamajors at a checkpoint. The passengers were taken from the bus and several of them were shot by Kamajors.
TF2-216	1&2 5 6 ICR	2 hrs.	Witness has information on the killings of suspected rebels in Moyamba. Witness will testify that HINGA NORMAN removed him from his position within the CDF because he refused to kill a woman.
TF2 - 217	3&4	1 hr	Witness will testify to the commission of sexual violence by Kamajors in Bonthe District.
TF2 - 218	1&2 6 8	1 hr	Witness will testify to killing of civilians by Kamajor child soldiers. Witness also has information about HINGA NORMAN's knowledge of the use of children as fighters by the Kamajors.
TF2-219	6	1 hr	Witness has information relative to HN and AK intervening in criminal proceedings on behalf of Kamajors either arrested or under investigation.

COVER SHEET 4

EXHIBIT LIST

Number	Item	Content
1	Letter	Letter from Regional Secretary (East) and Regional Co-ordinator (East), dated 22 March 1998.
2	Letter	Letter to Hinga Norman from Allieu Kondewa dated 29 June 2000.
3	Note	Note book seized from one of the locations used by Hinga Norman.
4	Map	Hand-drawn map with the title "Air Line Direction to Sierra Leone, Lower Bambara and Dodo Chiefdom, Kenema District Root "A" (SIC).
5	Map	Hand-drawn map with the title "Air Line Direction to Sierra Leone, Lower BAMBRA and Dodo Chiefdom, Kenema District. Root "B" Direction (SIC).
6	Memo	CDF Internal Memo from "National Director of War and Operations, Moinina Fofana to National Coordinator CDF, dated 19 March 2001.
7	Letter	Letter from Wellington, J.O., Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, to the "Head of CDF", dated 30 October 2000.
8	Statement	Statement by Raffieu Bendu concerning alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.
9	Statement	Statement dated 23 July 1998 by Salaymatu Bendu concerning alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.
10	Statement	Statement dated 23 July 1998 by Turay Mohamed concerning alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.
11	Statement	Statement dated 16 April 1999 by Turay Idrissa concerning an incident involving alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.
12	Statement	Two pages of a statement by Will Junisa regarding allegations of crimes committed by Kamajors
13	Statement	Statement by Konnie Donald Tom, CDF Chiefdom Ground Commander, about the alleged attacks by Kamajors.

Number	Item	Content
14	Statements	Collection of four statements (8 pages in total) made by Turay Issa; Conteh Boizy; Turay Imurana (Murana); Kelfala Woodie respectively.
15	Statement	Statement of Bendu Brima alleging attacks by Kamajors on him and his family in July 1998.
16	List	Distribution list for initiators for July 1998.
17	Letter	Letter written by Charles S.E. Moiwo, National P.R.O. CDF/SL, to authorities including Kondewa, dated 13 July 2000.
18	Message	Paraphrase of coded message from District Administrator CDF Moyamba, dated 12 May 2000, regarding the capture of Songo area and request for supplies. Contains handwritten notation from Hinga Norman that arrangements for supplies should be made.
19	Letter	Eugene Cowan's "Petition for Assistance to Retrieve Land Cruiser Vehicle Registration No. EL 15168" sent to CDS 2 March 1999
20	Letter	Petition sent by TF2-125 to Chief of Defence staff, dated 28 February 1999. The petition was forwarded to Deputy Defense Minister Hinga Norman with a 2 page cover letter by OC Medani, Commander for Chief of Defense Staff, 3 March 1999.
21	Document	Document signed by Mohamed Jalloh titled "Kamajors Loot Private Dwelling House and shop at Portee".
22	Documents	Documents (5 pages in total) related to the beating of Emmanuel Fillie, British High Commissioner's Driver, on 5 March 1999 by CDF Combatants.
23	Document	Curriculum Vitae of Samuel Hinga Norman. Contains biodata and other information about career of Hinga Norman.
24	Newsletter	Sierra Leonean Newsletter published by the Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Sierra Leone (MORDSIL), dated 11 August 1997.

Number	Item	Content
25	Letter	A letter written by J.S. Keifala, Secretary Eastern Union, signed both by Keifala and Hinga Norman, dated 17 March 1999.
26	Radio Message	Text of 3 radio messages sent from District Admin, CDF, Bo June 1999.
27	Situation Report	Copy of the text of a radio message (Situation Report) sent Dist Admin CDF (SL) Headquarters Pujehun in Zimmi to National Coordinator (Hinga Norman) in October 1999.
28	Radio Message	Copy of the text of a radio message sent out by National Director of Transport CDF (SL), 23 June 1999.
29	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent from CDF Headquarters Kenema to the national CDF Headquarters, Freetown - attention National Director of War, 2 April 1999.
30	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent from CDF Headquarters Bo - to the National Co-ordinator and info to Moinina Fofana; dated 19 April 1999.
31	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent by Hinga Norman to Dist Admin CDF (SL) Bo; dated 15 April 1999 regarding the raising of manpower.
32	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent by Dist Admin Pujehun CDF (SL) at Kenema sent to Dist. Admin Bo; dated 15 April 1999 asking for urgent provision of 500 men for operational purposes.
33	Letter	Letter written by Allieu Kondewa, sent from Civil Defence HQ, Tihun Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District, dated 31 July 1997.
34	Investigation Report	An investigation report by 15 ECOMOG Brigade Kenema authored by Captain A. Abukakar and dated 20 December 1998. The report was forwarded to Vice President, Republic of Sierra Leone, Kenema under a cover letter signed by Major A. N. Nwadiaro on 26 December 1998.

Number	Item	Content
35	Letter	Letter addressed to Allieu Kondewa from Sumaila Turay-Jabbie of CDF, Bumpe Ngao Chiefdom, dated 13 December 1997.
36	Letter	Letter titled "From High Priest Dr. Allieu Kondewa to Deputy Minister of Defences."
37	Letter	Letter sent from "Death Squad Unit, Tisana", signed by Bob Tucker and addressed to Dear Chief.
38	Passport	Sierra Leone Passport Number S005865, issued in the name of Samuel Hinga Norman.
39	Memo	Memo from the Commander in Chief (SLCDF) to the Honourable Chief Sam Hinga Norman dated 23 November 1997 titled "enlistment of executive members of zone II front line, assault rifles and shot-guns in possession."
40	Memo	Memo from the Secretary General SLCDF, Abu Konuwa, to Hinga Norman dated 16 November 1997, titled "Situation Reports as at 16 November 1997, and the violation of the Conakry Peace Accord by Both the AFRC and the RUF".
41	Letter	Letter from the Administrative Officer, South/Western region, Bonthe Moyamba District, dated 18 November 1997, titled "Administrative and War Report on the A trip to Mano Dasse."
42	Letter	Letter from Mustapha S. Sankoh, Deputy Director and Admin Officer War Council, from the SLCDF South/Western Region, Bonthe Moyamba District dated 22 November 1997 to the Head Office, Talia Town Bonthe District, titled "Administrative and War Report within Bonthe and Moyamba District."
43	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a dead body of a male of African extract found inside a Sierra Leone Service Passport Number S005865, issued in the name of Samuel Hinga Norman.
44	Photograph	Photograph of King Dr. Allieu Kondewa together with another person.

Number	Item	Content
45	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Saidu Duaivian.
46	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Joseph Abdulai.
47	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Robert Sevalie.
48	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Musa Share.
49	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Foday Lasana.
50	Letter	Letter from Allieu Kondewa to Chairman of Bo District CDF dated 4 September 1998.
51	Personal note book	Reports a number of killings committed by kamajors. Refers to a meeting in Base Zero where Hinga Norman said that he was to blame for everything that kamajors are doing. Refers to a meeting of some executive members of the CDF where it was discussed that in order to win the war a human being should be sacrificed.
52	Report	Report of War Council meeting held in Kenema on the 20 and 21 April 1998 submitted by TF2-068.
53	Letter	Letter from TF2-005 to Hinga Norman dated 20 March 1998.
54	Letter	Letter from the Commander of the Fifth Battalion Koribondu to the 38 Battallion HQ dated 11 October 1995.
55	Report	Undated report from TF2-073.
56	Letter	Letter from the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry in Freetown, signed by P.A. Gaima to the Commissioner of Police in BO, dated 16 March 1998.

Number	Item	Content
57	Letter	Letter dated 16 March 1998 to the National Director of Operations Civil Defense Force (CDF) Southern Province, BO. Copied to the Ecomog Commander Southern Province Bo, the Chairman of the Civil Defense Force, Southern Province, Bo, and Mr. M. B. Kamara Deputy Chief Conservator of Forest, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in Freetown.
58	Letter	Letter from the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture signed to the Deputy Minister of Defense, Freetown, dated 14 August 1998.
59	Letter	Letter dated 11 August 1998 addressed to the Acting Chairman NCC/CDF Defence Headquarter's in Freetown from the Chief Conservator of Forests in Freetown.
60	Report	Witness' report on atrocities committed by Kamajors implicating Hinga Norman.
61	Report	Report from Hassan Sherrif, commander of the 4th Batallion CDF, to Deputy Defence Minister, dated 31 October 1998.
62	Letter	Letter from Witness to Officer in charge, Moyamba Police station, dated 8 March 1999, reporting general incidents of armed robbery and murders by unspecified perpetrators.
63	Report	Report submitted by CDF National HQ to Chairman of national Co-ordinating Committee-CDF for the attention of President Kabbah.
64	Report	Report addressed to SCSL about atrocities and human rights violations committed by Co Julius Squire and other commanders.
65	Letter	Letter of appointment from Hinga Norman to Witness dated 11 February 1998.
66	Receipt	Receipt dated 3 March 1998 for Le 500,000 presented to the CDF Kamajors from the Bonthe Community.

Number	Item	Content
67	Letter	Letter of appointment for CDF regional representatives on the ceasefire monitoring committee approved by Hinga Norman.
68	Letter	Letter setting out actions of Kamajors in Bonthe District.
69	Letter	Letter referring to the suspension of some personnel of the Special Forces High Command on charges of gross insubordination to the Chairman and mutiny.
70	Letter	Letter from Mohamed Tarawally to Hinga Norman dated 10 July 1998.
71	Letter	The last page of an apparently 5 page letter written by Moinina Fofana (sic), Director of War/ Ops, Base Zero, Sierra Leone request to the addressee for supplies and ammunition.
72	Letter.	Letter addressed to "Chief Norman" written by Dixon S. Kosia, Deputy Coordinator, Lugbu CDF, Upper Saama, Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District re: request for arms and ammunitions for laying an ambush on Bo, Pujehun, and Sumbuya Highways", dated 29 September 1997.
73	Document	"Travelling Pass" dated 16 December 1996 (sic, should be 1998) issued by Civil Defence Southern Region - Bo, 14th Battalion – Koribondo.
74	Letter	Letter written circa June 1998, by "Representatives of the Bo District Kamajors Southern Province, Bo". The letter is addressed to "CDF/SL National Office, Freetown" through "National Coordinator, Hon, Sam Hinga Norman, Freetown".
75	Document	Document titled "Civil Defence Force, Bo, Sierra Leone, List of Security Personnel Attached to the National Co-ordinator CDF Sierra Leone, Bo Headquarters, 12 New Gerihun Road, Bo".

Number	Item	Content
76	Document	Document titled "CDF / SL Northern Region Structure" showing how many District Commanders, Battalion Commanders and Company Commanders exist in each of the Districts of Bombali, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Koinadagu.
77	Document	Document titled "Bo District Battalion Commanders". List of CDF Battalion Commanders in Bo District.
78	Document	Document titled "Bo District Company Commanders". This document contains a list of Company Commanders in Bo District.
79	Document	Document titled "Moyamba District BNS, BN/Commanders, Cdoms". This document contains a list of 7 CDF Battalions, Battalion Commanders and respective Chiefdoms in Moyamba District.
80	Document	Document titled "Official Postings" addressed to The Chairman, Committee for Identification, Documentation, Recovery and Release of Looted Properties".
81	Document	Document titled "Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone, Monthly Logistics Supply Returns". This document relates to April 2001 and is dated 7 May 2001. It was "Signed and Collected for Distribution By: Moinina Fofanah, Director or (sic) War CDF (SL)".
82	Document	Document dated 23 September 1997 addressed to Sam H. Norman, Dept. Defence Minister.
83	Letter	A letter consisting of a single sheet dated 15 October 1997 written by Andrew Harding and addressed to Sam H. Norman, Deputy Defence Minister.
84	Not Used	
85	Report	Daily Front Line Report dated 2 October 1997 from Alpha K. Siaka, Secretary General. The report is addressed to "S.H. Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence".

Number	Item	Content
86	Letter	Handwritten letter dated 18 November 2000 from High Priest Dr. Allieu Kondewa (sic).
87	Documents	A set of two documents comprising complaints against CDF by Madam Miata Fofanah for looting of her family property.
88	Document	An incomplete fax which appears to be the last page of a complaint lodged against CDF by Joseph Sinnah for looting his property at 9 Willoughby Lane, Brookfields, Freetown on 17 July 2000.
89	Documents	A set of two documents. The first document is a 3-page typed document titled "Summary of Decisions taken at the Workshop on CDF / Community Relationships – 17 June 1999 and 18 June 1999". The second document is titled "seven point undertaking by Chief Norman – National Co-Ordinator CDF/SL and Deputy Minister of Defence."
90	Letter	Letter dated 16 August 1999 written by the National High Priest Dr. Allieu Kunduwa (sic, Kondewa) and his Deputy Dr. Jibao Amara to Dr. Mosses M. Hakawa.
91	Not Used	
92	Letter	Letter dated 20 June 2000 written by the National High Priest Dr. Allieu Kundowa (sic, Kondewa) to National Coordinator, Civil Defence Forces (Hinga Norman).
93	Document	Document dated 8 January 2001 and titled "Ruthless Behaviour of Kamajors in and around Rokel village" written by Amadu Mannah, Chief Police Officer, Western "D" Division, and addressed to The Regional Commissioner (West) with a copy to the CDF representative Joint Coordination Centre (JCC).
94	Letter	Letter dated 10 January 2000 from National High Priest, Dr. Allieu Kundewa (sic, Kondewa) addressed to The Director of Personal (sic, Personnel) CDF /SL arguing against the possible disbanding of the National Task Force Office.

Number	Item	Content
95	Letter	Letter dated 10 January 2000 from National High Priest, Dr. Allieu Kundawa (sic, Kondewa) addressed to The National Public Relations Officer CDF / SL recommending the Mohamed Mansaray and Samuel Lahai as persons responsible for collecting all supplies and condiments meant for all CDF / SL Initiators.
96	Letter	Letter dated 6 July 2001 from the CDF Director of Personnel, Andrew N.K. Harding addressed to The Director of Logistics CDF, titled: "Reminding you for Unsettled Outstanding Bills".
96(A)	Document	Bill for ID Cards
96(B)	List	Names of registered CDF children on the C.A.W. program.
96(C)	List	List of wounded Kamajors at Brookfields Hotel, Freetown.
97	Letter	Letter dated 24 April 2001 written by the Moinina Fofanah, National War Office, Bo, addressed to National Coordinator, Civil Defence Forces (Hinga Norman).
98	Certificate	A "Certificate of Training" issued by The Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone to "Francis Kpanabom 0798". The certificate is dated 10 February 1998 but bears no signature.
99	Certificate	A "Certificate of Training" issued by The Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone to "Soloman Maoah, 0799". The certificate is dated 10 February 1998 but bears no signature.
100	Document	Document titled: "Battle Front Report Pujehun District, Date: 18 June 1997, Time: 1045 PM". The document is signed by Sam Hinga Norman.
101	Document	Document titled "Front Line Report, Pujehun District, dated 19 June 1997."
102	Document	Document titled: "Front Line Reports, Pujehun District; dated 20 June 1997."

Number	Item	Content
103	Document	Document titled: "Front Line Report, Pujehun District, 21 June 1997."
104	Communique	Communique issued by the CDF relating to child soldiers and Communique from meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, 15 May 2001.
105	Document	Document titled: "Report From Front Line, Points to Ponder".
106	Document	Document titled: "Reports From Front Line, Covering Period 13 July 1997 – 19 July 1997, Date: 18 July 1997, Attention: COS"
107	Document	Document titled: "Minutes of Meeting held between Chief Norman and the Delegation of Kamajors From Bo District on the 26 July 1997 at Gendema – Bo Water Side Mano River Bridge.
108	Letter	Letter dated 12 August 1997 written by Hinga Norman and addressed to The Chief of Staff, ECOMOG, Monrovia.
109	Document	Document dated 27 August 1997 titled "Very Urgent Front Line Request". It is written by Hinga Norman and addressed to The Chief of Staff, ECOMOG, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The document is not signed.
110	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed by Sam Hinga Norman dated 8 September 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document was written and signed for by Hon. M.L. Kallon, Chairman, Adm (Administration Wing). It bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema, Mano River Bridge".
111	Document	Letter written by Sam Hinga Norman, and addressed to Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG, Monrovia, Liberia; dated 26 September 1997.

Number	Item	Content
112	Documents	A set of documents the first of which is dated 26 September 1997, written and signed by Sam Hinga Norman, and is addressed to The Chief of Staff, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document is list titled: "Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone: Requisition for Arms and Ammunitions (sic, Ammunitions)".
113	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed by Sam Hinga Norman dated 17 September 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge".
114	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 29 September 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (dated 29 September 1997).
115	Document	Document titled "Very Urgent Request for Special Operations". It is written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman, dated 6 October 1997, and is addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters.
116	Document	Document titled "Progress Report / Request". It's written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 6 October 1997 and is addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia.

Number	Item	Content
117	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 3 November 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (dated 3 November 1997).
118	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 14 November 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (dated 21 November 1997).
119	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 3 November 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia.
120	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 17 December 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (not dated).
121	Letter	A letter of appointment dated 20 February 1998. The Letter is signed by Sam Hinga Norman and copied to the War Council.
122	Letter	Letter dated 24 February 1998 from The Director of War, 17 th Battalion Commander- Koribondo at Base Zero. The letter is signed by Moinina Fofanah and copied to the Coordinator, The Director of Intelligence and The Chairman – War Council.

Number	Item	Content
123	Letter	A handwritten letter from the Civil Defence Force, dated 12 November 1997. The letter is signed by King Dr Allieu Kondewa and approved by Moinina Fofanah.
124	Letter	A handwritten letter from the Civil Defence Unit Madina H/Q dated 16 October 1997. The letter is passing on information about the arrival of Hinga Norman at Talia Yawbeko with ammunitions for operations.
125	Pass	Bonthe District Civil Defence Kamajors HQ, Tihun, Sogbeni Chieftom pass, dated 14 November 1997. The pass certifies that the holder is an initiate of King Dr Allieu Kondewa, the High Priest and requests that all privileges be accorded the holder.
126	Document	Handwritten document bearing the caption "Guidelines to operate on after the capture of B" dated 20 February 1998.
127	Letter	A handwritten letter from Mohamed Sesay, Madina Town, Bum Chiefdom, dated 13 July 1997.
128	Letter	Letter from Moinina Fofana, Director of War, Civil Defence Force, Sierra Leone to All Battalion Commanders CDF SL dated 15 May 1998, signed by Fofana titled "request for troops" from all CDF commanders.
129	Letter	Letter from the representatives of the War Council now resident in Dassamu Village, Bumpeh-Ngao Chiefdom to Commander for the Special Operation - Koribondo, dated 18 February 1998.
130	Document	Handwritten pages containing a list of looted items from Addala - Tikonko.
131	Letter	A handwritten letter from Witness TF2-087, dated 4 May 1999.

Number	Item	Content
132	Letter	Letter from Civil Defence Force Sierra Leone – Koribondo addressed to the Director of War, Camp Zero, Gola Forest, Sierra Leone, dated 18 February 1998.
133	Letter	A letter to the Regional Coordinator, CDF Forces Southern Region, Bo, dated 17 April 1998.
134	Document	A handwritten note dated 15 August 1997.
135	Letter	Letter from the Regional Coordinator CDF/SL Bo, dated 17 April 1998.
136	Letter	Letter from C.O. Commander Gondama Base to Zone Commander, dated 12 March 1998.
137	Document	A short handwritten note from C.O. Gbassay Ansumana, dated 3 November 1998.
138	Letter	Letter to the War Commander dated, 15 January 1998, requesting arms and ammunition.
139	Letter	Letter from the Director of Operations – South to The Battalion Commanders, dated 4 March 1998, and copied to The Chairman War Council and The National Director of Operations.
140	Letter	Letter from Kamajors in Hoya, Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, dated 18 August 1997.
141	Letter	Letter from CDF Bagbo Branch-Ngolapon, Southern Province to an unknown addressee dated 7 August 1997, signed by the General Secretary and Adviser.
142	Letter	A letter from W.S. Kalil of Fulawahun to Yeiwa Turay of Koribondo, dated 4 March 1998
143	Letter	Letter from The Director of Operations – J. A.S. Koroma to The Acting Battalion Commander, all in Bo. Letter is dated 31 August 2000 and is copied to The National Coordinator CDF/SL The Director of War CDF/SL and The High Priest Dr Kondewa.
144	Letter	Letter from TF2-011 in Kenema to Commander TF2-082 dated 19 April 1998.

Number	Item	Content
145	Pass	A Pass from The Battalion Commander CDF/SL 5 th Battalion Headquarters Koribondo to "Those it may concern at Highway Gates", dated 23 March 1998.
146	Letter	Letter from The Deputy Director of War, to The Battalion Commander CDF/SL Koribondo, dated 28 February 1998.
147	Letter	Letter from the General Spokesman for the CDF/SL Sumbuya Base, dated 11 March 1998.
148	Letter	Handwritten note inviting Commander to a meeting with Sam Hinga Norman during an impending visit to Bo.
149	Letter	Letter from the Chairman War Council, Bo to the Commander 17th Battalion, dated 4 March 1998.
150	Letter	Letter from the Deputy Coordinator CDF/SL Sumbuya (Bum Branch) Base, dated 30 May 1998.
151	Letter	Letter from the Base Commander Sierra Leone CDF Bun Chiefdom Bonthe District Torma Base.
152	Letter	Letter of appointment from The National Coordinator Civil Defence Forces HQ in Base Zero, dated 11 February 1998.
153	Distribution List	A list showing distribution of logistics to CDF personnel.
154	Distribution List	A list showing distribution of logistics to CDF commanders for the month of September 1998.
155	Letter	Letter from the Madam Munda Fortune Kasilla II Battalion Bo to The Deputy Minister of Defence (National Coordinator-CDF) dated 27 September 1998.
156	Letter	Letter of Appointment from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to Mr Mualim Allie Sesay, dated 4 November 1998.

Number	Item	Content
157	Letter	Letter of Recommendation from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to The National Coordinator in respect of Mualim Allie Sesay, dated 26 July 2000.
158	Letter	Letter of "Recommendation" from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to The National Public Relations Officer (PRO) in respect of Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr Samuel Lahai (Secretary), dated 10 January 2000.
159	Letter	Letter of "Recommendation" from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to The National Public Relations Officer (PRO) in respect of Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr Samuel Lahai (Secretary), dated 13 January 2000.
160	Declaration	Declaration of commitment signed by Samuel Hinga Norman, to the Release of Child Combatants and Child Abductees by various Factions, March 2000.
161	Calendar	CDF Calendar for the year 2001 depicting photos of senior figures of the CDF.
162	Report by the Regional Reconciliation Committee (RRC) Southern Region	Report on unacceptable behaviour of CDF in the Southern Region, August 2000.
163	Letter	Letter to the Commissioner of Police, Sierra Leone Police Force East, Kenema referring to a "list of suspects in Kenema Prison accused of Junta collaboration", dated 13 July 1998.
164	Letter	Letter of Petition against termination from office, dated 1 July 2000.
165	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 June 1997
166	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 14 July 1997
167	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 31 March 1998

Number	Item	Content
168	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 15 June 1998
169	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 30 April 1999
170	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 9 October 1999
171	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 20 November 1999
172	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 7 August 2000
173	United Nations Document	Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 21 November 1995 (S/1995/975)
174	United Nations Document	Second Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 5 December 1997 (S/1997/958)
175	United Nations Document	Third Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 5 February 1998 (S/1998/103)
176	United Nations Document	Fifth Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486)
177	United Nations Document	First Progress Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 (S/1998/750)
178	United Nations Document	Second Progress Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 16 October 1998 (S/1998/960)
179	United Nations Document	Third Progress Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 16 December 1998 (S/1998/1176)
180	United Nations Document	Fifth Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 4 March 1999 (S/1999/237)

Number	Item	Content
181	United Nations Document	Sixth Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 4 June 1999 (S/1999/645)
182	United Nations Document	Seventh Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 30 July 1999 (S/1999/836)
183	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1346 (30 March 2001)
184	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1220 (12 January 1999)
185	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999)
186	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1181 (13 July 1998)
187	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1132 (8 October 1997)
188	United Nations Document	UNICEF Press Release, "Stop Using Child Soldiers, Sierra Leone Told," 19 June 1997
189	United Nations Document	UNICEF Monthly Report, "Events Pertaining to Children," 31 July 1999
190	United Nations Document	UNOMSIL – Human Rights Assessment Mission to Freetown 25 January and 1 to 4 February 1999, Findings and Recommendations.
191	Accord	The Abidjan Peace Accord, 30 November 1996, The Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)
192	Accord	The Conakry Accord: 23 October 1997 - ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan For Sierra Leone 23 October 1997 - 22 April 1998
193	Ceasefire Agreement	Ceasefire Agreement Between Government and the Revolutionary United Front, 18 May 1999

Number	Item	Content
194	Accord	The Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) "The Lome Peace Accord" 7 July 1999
195	Map	Sierra Leone, Scale 1:350,000
196	Record of States Party to Geneva Conventions	ICRC, States party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977
197	Treaty	Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977.
198	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape" Vol. 11, No. 3 (A) June 1999.
199	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror, Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone," Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) July 1998.
200	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "We'll kill you if you Cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict" Vol. 15 No. 1 (A), January 2003.
201	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone 1998 – a year of atrocities against civilians".
202	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone – Childhood – a casualty of conflict," AFR 51/69/00, 31 August 2000.
203	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International Annual Report 1999, "AI Report 1999: Sierra Leone".
204	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Practices for 1998, "Sierra Leone Country Report", released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor US Dept of State Bureau of Democracy, February 1999.

Number	Item	Content
205	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International "Annual Report 2000, Sierra Leone".
206	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International Press Release, "Sierra Leone: Action Needed to End use of Child Combatants", 31 August 2000.
207	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "World Report 1999: Sierra Leone, Human Rights Developments".
208	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch Report 2001: Sierra Leone, "Sierra Leone: Most Serious Attacks in Months. Human Rights Watch Interviews: Victims and Witnesses," 24 July 2001.
209	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Recent Abuses Documented by Human Rights Watch," 30 November 2000.
210	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Sierra Leone Government Bombing Causes Civilian Deaths," 12 July 2000.
211	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 28 "Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military & Political Strategy," 11 April 2001.
212	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	International Crisis Group Sierra Leone Project, "Sierra Leone Situation Analysis," 9 February 1998.
213	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Physicians for Human Rights "War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone," published 2002 ISBN: 1-879707-37-3.
214	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Mazurana, Dyan and Khristopher Carlson, "From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone" January, 2004.
215	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	No Peace Without Justice, "Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Program" Draft Copy, 9 March 2004 (reference to excerpt preface, chapters 1-3, 5).

Number	Item	Content
216	Speech	Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Freetown, 28 May 1997.
217	Speech	Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Freetown, 1 June 1997
218	Press Release - Radio Broadcast Statement	CDF Statement of FM 98.1, 22 December 1997 from the movement for the restoration of democracy, MRD, civil defence secretariat, Freetown.
219	Press Release	Kamajor Press Release issued by Samuel Hinga Norman, 23 December 1997
220	Interview	Summary of Conversations Held with Civil Defence Force Leader Sam Hinga Norman, 10 January 1998 by Alfred Sam Foray
221	Statement	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, "Government Statement", 24 May 2000.
222	News Report	Inter Press Service, "Children – Sierra Leone: Militia Admits Recruiting Child Soldiers," Lansana Fofana, 29 June 1998.
223	News Report	BBC News, "Sierra Leone diamond town besieged", 20 November 1997.
224	News Report	BBC News, "Sierra Leone clashes with Kamajor militia", 17 December 1997.
225	News Report	BBC News, "Despatches" by Mark Doyle, 18 January 1998.
226	News Report	BBC News, "Sierra Leone militias capture two cities", 15 February 1998.
227	News Report	BBC News, "Unicef calls for the demobilisation of child soldiers", 2 October 1998.
228	News Report	BBC News, "Traditional fighters clash with rebels in Sierra Leone", 6 October 1998.

Number	Item	Content
229	News Report	BBC News, "Sierra Leone defence forces given arms", 19 December 1998.
230	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 June 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
231	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 2 September 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
232	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 7 September 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
233	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 2 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
234	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 4 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
235	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 14 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
236	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 17 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
237	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
238	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 4 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
239	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 12 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
240	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 23 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
241	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 24 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
242	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 30 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web
243	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 1 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Number	Item	Content
244	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 2 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
245	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 8 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
246	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
247	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 16 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
248	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 17 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
249	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 18 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
250	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 19 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
251	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
252	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 21 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
253	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 26 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
254	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 29 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
255	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 8 February 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
256	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 February 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
257	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 15 February 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
258	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 6 March 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

Number	Item	Content
259	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 April 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
260	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 29 June 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
261	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 15 September 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web
262	News Report	Newswave, "To Die or To Live? The Verdict on Sierra Leone's plotters", October 1998.

COVER SHEET 5

**COPIES OF DOCUMENTARY
EXHIBITS**

359a

Number	Item	Content
1	Letter	Letter from Regional Secretary (East) and Regional Co-ordinator (East), dated 22 March 1998.

3593

00000647

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES S/L REGIONAL OFFICE, (EAST)

27 Kaisamba Terrace,
Kenema.
22nd. March, 1998.

Dear Sir,

We are pleased to update you on develops here since your departure. On the whole things are not bad, in fact things have been progressing slowly. Firstly, the front line reports indicate that with the exception of the threat that is faced by Tongo from the Wiama end (details to be furnished by Orinco), there is actually no other major problem area. Our men have made no retreats from their positions and the enemies have not made any advances into our previous positions since your departure. We still maintain all the grounds that you left with us. However, because of the threat on Tongo it was decided that Orinco should come and inform you in person, as all efforts to reach you or Chief Norman by Sat-phone have been unsuccessful.

We have been helping the war office to establish the base battalion and considerable progress has been made in this regard also. Farma Town was finally agreed by the Chiefdom authorities and us and the clearing is now in progress. The battalion Commander plans to move in by Monday 24/3/98.

Our welfare battle for the needs of the casualties still continues and we have made quite a few remarkable strides since your departure. With our determination to get the generator working at the hospital we succeeded in getting the Chiefdom authorities to give a million leones from which we are presently making the necessary disbursements to get the generator working. The original contractor for the generator could not perform and so it was agreed that the power authority should handle the job by themselves. The generator should be working by Monday 24/3/98 according to their plans as the Doctor cannot do their work without power.

We continue to keep the activities of the initiators in check but they still continue to indulge in excesses. One of these days one of Karamoh Muniru's apprentices initiated some Kamajors at Wiama and while testing the effect of their immunity he killed three initiators and wounded about 14 and this has scared up the number of admitted cases in the hospital. Two more have died from their number between 20th - 23 as the doctors cannot extract the bullets from their bodies.

Our dealings with ECOMOG becomes cordial day by day although it is becoming quite difficult for them to release arms to our fighters for the war front. This is all the more reason why we thought Orinco must come and join you to get our own arms from Freetown.

The Chiefdom authorities have been quite co-operative with us on the issue of the produce. They sent a memorandum to ECOMOG impounding all the produce that have been abandoned by the Junta Collaborators. They told ECOMOG that as the chiefdom authorities they take the view that the whole lot should be sold and the proceeds spent on the Kamajors as there is no money in the entire chiefdom. The matter is now being highly considered by ECOMOG. In a follow-up meeting with the ECOMOG Commander last night with Karamoh, Orinco and me, the Commander said he is discussing the matter with his Commander Col. Maxwell Kobo. We are therefore asking that you also discuss the matter with Chief Norman in order to influence a favourable outcome for us since it is the only way left for the Chiefdom authorities to get ready money to support the new battalion headquarters to be established as well as the war as a whole.

Wishing you all the best in all the endeavours.

Signed: *Amu Uu* 23/3/98
REGIONAL SECRETARY (EAST)

Signed: *[Signature]* 22/3/98
Ag. REGIONAL CO-ORDINATOR (EAST)

Number	Item	Content
2	Letter	Letter to Hinga Norman from Allieu Kondewa dated 29 June 2000.

35915


CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE
 THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH PRIEST
 KING DR. ALIEU KUNDEWA
 88 MAHAI BOIMA ROAD, BO
MOTTO: WE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY




Your Ref:.....

00000648

Our Ref:.....



To: Chief Hinga Norman,
 Deputy minister of Defence, Freetown,
 Sierra Leone.

Sir,

I was instructed to stay at Moyamba junction as my own Zone. Food and all other logistics needed for my children to advance to front are not available.

I am discouraged over this situation, as the letter I received from the C.D.F./SL Headquarters in Bo confirmed to me that my area needs total security.

I am now in a critical position as I have many people with me here without food and other logistics.

Bearer of letter Joseph Kamanda and Mualim Bonnie are two important people to prove my position.

Your immediate response to

This letter with reference to my present position is highly solicited.

Please make sure that Rebels are disturbing around Mile 91 area. It is not a safe town. I want to advance my men, but no chance.


Your effort to assist me, would give the CDF/SL a good name. Please send single Barrel Catridges, S.G, AA, etc. Also include R.P.G. Tubes and bombs with all necessary logistics I urgently need to deploy my men in very strategic areas.

I urgently need your response, as I am here awaiting. If no response, as this area is not safe, then I would not be happy. Just send few food, all I need here much is Arms and Ammo. Treat most urgent.

00000649

Yours faithfully,

Dr. Allieu Kondewa,
Naf High Priest.




3597.

Number	Item	Content
3	Note	Note book seized from one of the locations used by Hinga Norman.

3599

00000651

1960/01/20




UN

1. Peace Keepers cannot defend themselves and the properties they have and or carry.
- Senegalese
2. Peace Keepers seems to be operating under their individual Country's Mandate instead of under the UN Sec Council Mandate.
- Kenyans
3. Securing discredits by allow disarmament ordered by small number of men and weapons of the ~~UN~~ disarming combatants.
- Guineans
- Kenyans
4. Call the bluff

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3601



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Discussion


Discarding the

- SH - Gout
- CDF - Gout?
- RUF - not right
- RUF - Criminal

Camp Charlie as
the only most appropriate
site.

- a) The offer \$300^x
- b) What the DPD is doing
- c) The idea of the CDF
on the ground.

00000654




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All current offers to submit CV before individual interviews by an independent DFED Team for retention in the Army.


- Pensionable Service
- ✓ age
- Service no longer required
 - 4) - Bad Conduct
 - 5) - Promotion outside the mil procedure not been recorded by the Army.

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3605



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
Be observant
if we are to look after
these men.
Vehs - how long to land
—

00000658


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
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~~00000662 B~~ *07/15/75*
11/11/75
00000662A *7*




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00000662C
[Handwritten flourish]

00000662B
[Handwritten flourish]



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August 1972


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
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ENCLOSURE




361b



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
Gardner

3617



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


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
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- Those Wpas will be recovered by the UNAMSIL
- Some Wpas being handed over are not workable.

RUF

- Sincerity is absent that being the case, the UN deserves the right to evocate.

AFRC

Cannot deploy its JMC/CMC in Kabon and other areas where the RUF is.

12900000

- Friday should avoid to go to the Camps.

GOST

Peace keepers should have a mandate or mandates and should apply that Mandate.

SPECIAL ENVOY

Thanks to those who have attended.

00000672

- UN's Mandate is clear and will be distributed. Showed that it is impartial.

- UN is here upon the request of the signatories to the Peace Agreement.

- The AFRC and the RUF are one in the Agreement but practically on the ground, they are different and are operating differently.

- I don't know where the UNAMSIL is presently deployed in the country.

21

00000673

- The UNAMSIL is defd
- AFRC + RUF are one to the Unamsil.

- The - Oca Hill, P. Loko + Lungi; this loop is occupied by people who are looking for their daily subsistence.

- Other type of Violation

15-2-00

J.P. — AFRC

- Requested the list of CFV to verify

- The Okra Hill Sector still denying knowledge of the Kenyan Okra Hill Wpus.

- I dont want to be called a leader of an Armed group - at least I was kept from, do not want that type of reference any more!


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00000675

Mines-fields

The AFRC is not responsible for laying anti personnel. Because they are Cluster Bombs

362b



~~00000675~~ Z

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15-2-00

Mtg at The UN - Freetown
Response to points

FC UNAMSIL

- Welcome


- a) - JMC/CMC most are now on the ground.
- b) - parties (Combatants) should avoid CFV
- c) - Refusal to submit plan of various Combatant deployments, Minesfields and other hidden wpus.
- d) - Investigation of violation relative to seizure of wpus - non-negotiable.
 - no new negotiation

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 00000000

GOSK

Non-Compliance of
 ART 19 provision of head of
 Series of violation - Commensurate
 deterrent.

3628



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15 Oct

MTG of DPA & DHO / MOD

OUR ISSUES:

The best location preferable

a) Camp Charlie
Min of Agric

C. Ki. but no
preparing packing

b) Screening at Ccharlie

All will proceed with
towards Bush Camp
with their arms for civil
disarmament.


c) Disarmament before
proceeding to Ccharlie

Implementation of the plan
of action - Recruitment Apr 6

- a) Bush Camp
- b) Screening

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4th Friday Night - Talks with Conrad
Fisher - Emma Meyer

12th/13th Sat Morning - Moved to Makang

14th Mon - Moved back to Jt

14th Battle Caves - 96.2 12 - 2⁴⁵ PM

15th Mtg with CDF units - Re HE visit

" " Mof ✓


" " Moss ✓

" " Mow ✓

o) Khrushov - Fishermen.
Fuel Supplies

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363a



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
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
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
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
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
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
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501 447 Fasil

27/03/00


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
Selection of the fallen

non. selection by percentage

16900000

364-2

00000692



225736 H.E. 27.1.60

Do.

Kenia forest area to the

... with cases leading to the ...

at the ... which ...

... ..

... ..

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
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
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
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BRUNNEN



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



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
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
3694

00000704

1. Leaves — put into Boil water
and drink
2. Bottle Rub for
disappear
3. Plastic Container
to make bulb
ineffective
4. Moyei — for strength
5. Cow — Kill, ground part
 - a) to home and up
for outside
 - b) Pour feet + head
for myself.

00000705

3656




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
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CONFIDENTIAL






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1. 23rd Dec Rut attacked a Gosh controlled area - Woreh; the CDF honed to the site upon hearing gun shots.

Rut attack CDF upon CDF's arrival at the trouble spot. CDF responded with shot, one Rut was injured.

2. 5th Jan Rut invited CDF for peace talks at 8³⁰am. CDF went in the company of the SLA + Eco (Guinean Eco)

00000710

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00000711

7/2/00

1. Gbatalla Base for the RUF
aim is to train RUF
to disrupt the pending
elections.
2. As a result, all RUF has been
instructed not to give up
their Arms any more.
3. Two Holes owned by RUF
is moving to a Pro Kabalum
4. Maskita is now a
functioning part of the
presidential Security - a
cover posn 00000712
5. Charles, Maskita, Onay + Santoh
are in constant touch - esp
over mining proceeds.

00000713

00000713

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

6. Meeting between Mrs J. P. Koroma
- and Omery over the formation
of a new political party - this
is a camouflage - they will
merge thereafter the election.

7. They intend to copy the
- SLP Uniform.

8. A birthday party of a large
Gem (Sierra Leone Diamond) was
presented to Charles Taylor
by the RUF.

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
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100




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1.
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
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
4.
... ..

5.

1. Untrained Leadership
 ↳ Agency - Trained
2. Joint Int Comm - Policy
 ↳ Policy
3. Legislation - Structures



3669



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00000719

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

30 of Jan 2000

②

2

The UN Heli carrying
UN Supplies was
forced to park on the
ground at Mayboraka

00000720

2/2/00

③

Information reaching the
us states that MSF has
pulled out of Kambia reason
is that the RUF intends
to abduct them.

4

There are 5 Checkpoints
between Mauge & Kambia
especially a notorious
one manned by
a Col Emmanuel
alias - No living thing.

3671

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
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To
Copy: Controller of customs
" Officer Commanding Special
Anti Smuggling - Customs

This is to inform you that
the Customs Collector in Bo
Southern Region was suspected
of collaborating with ~~an~~
unknown smugglers to avoid
Customs duty on a huge
quantity of BOND CIGARETTES
on Friday 4th of February
2000.

Could you please investigate
and let me know for certain
that everything was done in
Govt's interest.


Highest regards.




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00000723



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00000724

00000552

- CDF - no objection
- Militarily Wrong
- CDF will disarm but
 - They will go home
 - They will occupy their homes.
- Bug down
 - DDR Not cost ready
 - thereby causing suspicion

Consent is given
- The Agreement?

00000225

3676

00000726

RECEIVED

A.E.

9.3.00

① Food shortages at the WFP¹⁸_{a.m.}
 - Auditors coming for enquiries

② Logistics
 for - RUF } SLA
 - CDF }

③ Alleged bias in favour
 of CDF

④ Outcome of the Bamako
 Summit.

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
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Am. Soc.





00000732

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~~00000732~~

J

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3624

~~00000733~~ Z

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
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
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
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


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
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3691

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3692



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Programmes

- 1. Cash
- 2. Wives + children of the deceased

Programmes

Living

- 1. Cash for gun
- x 2. Project for all crop + other farms
- xx 3. Widow + Orphan
- 4. General

Salutation - living } Remember the
 sympathy - dead } past

Dead

- xx Sacrifice
 Monument

00000743

~~3692~~

3694

00000744

00000742

~~3695~~
3695

00000745

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3696

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
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Handwritten notes, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is difficult to decipher but appears to include:

-
- Handwritten text (possibly "Handwritten")
- Handwritten text (possibly "Handwritten")
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① Age, Personal Service

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
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
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
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APRC/SLA's } design plan
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
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


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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Rotational Service


- be incorporated
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- Replacements of Rooms
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- operate
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- Over centralized system
- Heavy + light loads
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- requirements being
- Premium/Amount
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- Major Club Council/Center
- National Int'l Meeting
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Col. Williams

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1. - The Apparatus - RAW FURNI
had existed before
1959 - up

2. Findy & Retrieval of
the existing apparatus

Internal National

(3) Clarity of apparatus

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3736

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00000786

Mtg With Int & Jnt offs
of The AFSL 9/2/00

Opening of the talks - DMOD

Remarks _____ CJS

00000787

Does not have the right to possess arms in this country - right of self defense
 Fight alongside the Army - CBS should be in charge of this matter

He has passed your property and he should give account to the court - doctor to get hands

Declaration - 57A

6870000

Solves the attitude more
 from what is not calling
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 Mr. Proccares

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
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
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
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VICTORY

Should be done with our people !!!

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1000. Mtg - The Lodge 12³⁰ pm (23/11/99)

1. Con H.E. Congratulates RUF for the launching of the RUF party.

2. a) Election in 11 months

b) Appointment of

1. Elections Commission

2. Regional ...

c) Review? of the Cons


3. Election of Local Govt.

4. Management Committees.

5. Dist Councils

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MR VANDI SAMAL


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
in respect of food for the
3 families

Amir

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3751.



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Number	Item	Content
4	Map	Hand-drawn map with the title "Air Line Direction to Sierra Leone, Lower Bambara and Dodo Chiefdom, Kenema District Root "A" (SIC).

AIR LINE PROVISION IN SECTION
L-10000
BANKING AND AIR LINE PROVISION
REVISION
1007 AIR PROVISION

00000802

Approved by
20/1/77

Approved by
Mr. Mahomed O. Mawad
Member of Staff Committee

[Signature]

10000 PROVISION
CHIEF OF STAFF
HEAD OFFICE

Number	Item	Content
5	Map	Hand-drawn map with the title "Air Line Direction to Sierra Leone, Lower Bambia and Dodo Chiefdom, Kenema District. Root "B" Direction (SIC).

Number	Item	Content
6	Memo	CDF Internal Memo from "National Director of War and Operations, Moinina Fofana to National Coordinator CDF, dated 19 March 2001.

3757

FROM: The National Director of War and Operations,
Civil Defence Forces (SL)
42 Mahei Boima Road - Bo.

TO: The National Coordinator C.D.F. (SL)
C/o Ministry of Defence,
State Avenue - Freetown.

00000804

SUB: APPOINTMENT

19th March, 2001.

I wish to write on the above topic and to inform you that I have appointed Mr. Hassan H. Feika as General Battalion Commander, for Pujehun District.

By copy of this letter, all Paramount Chiefs in Pujehun District and C.D.F. (SL) Administrator for Pujehun District are informed accordingly.



c.c.:

- All Paramount Chiefs - Pujehun District.
- District Admin. - Pujehun District
- Director Personnel - Freetown
- " Logistics - "
- N.P.R.O. - Freetown
- Director of Intelligence ✓
- Director of Welfare

Number	Item	Content
7	Letter	Letter from Wellington, J.O., Permanent Secretary, Office of the President, to the "Head of CDF", dated 30 October 2000.

3759

Ministry of Presidential Affairs
State House
Freetown
Sierra Leone

Tel: 228710/229799


Ref: MPA/SM/3



30th October 2000

GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE

Office of the President



The Head of the CDF
C/o Ministry of Defence
Slater Terrace
Freetown

Attn: NPRO

00000807

Dear Sir

RE: STATE SECURITY CONCERNS

I write under the instructions of the Minister of State, Presidential Affairs to refer to the above subject and to subpend extracts of a letter from the Chief of Civil Affairs, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as follows:

"In both the Secretary General of the United Nations' latest report on Sierra Leone and the Security Council's resolution 1321 (2000), it was decided, amongst others:

- to assist in coordination with the Government of Sierra Leone, through the presence of UNAMSIL and within the framework of its mandate, the efforts of the Government to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilise the situation throughout the country;
- within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of physical violence.


In the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL has been made aware of reports of misconduct, some severe from CDF and SLA. These misconducts include incidents of rape, looting, arbitrary detentions, summary execution, extortion of money and personal belongings, theft of vehicles and the continued recruitment of children for the purpose of fighting.

To further assist the Government of Sierra Leone to restore law and order and promote respect of human rights by all, a misconduct committee has been established within UNAMSIL. The committee would very much appreciate meeting with your representation or, if you deem it necessary, with your honourable self to discuss the above mentioned allegations and examine ways to improve internal disciplinary measures of the SLA and CDF."

In the circumstance, His Excellency the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone has advised that an urgent meeting be held on Thursday 2nd November, 2000 at 10 a.m. at the Lodge, Hill Station to discuss the issues raised.

Please endeavour to attend and on time.

Yours faithfully


J. O. WELLINGTON
PERMANENT SECRETARY

- Cc: The Minister of State, Presidential Affairs
- The Secretary to the President
- The Secretary to the Vice President

NPRO/DOP/DOW + ADMS

please make necessary arrangements for this meeting on (2/11/00) at 10 a.m.

I advise that we urgently meet tomorrow in-house before Thursday.


31/10/00

Number	Item	Content
8	Statement	Statement by Raffieu Bendu concerning alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.

Statement Obtained from: Ruffien Banda

37621

00000809

② My name is Ruffien Banda. I live at Mlogbanka in the Rumbee Section. I am a farmer.

On Friday, 14/7/98, I took my cutlass and proceeded to my farm to build my farm-stead. On top of the farm-stead, I saw my step-mother Sallay Banda come from Rumbee. She called me and reported that Kamajors went to my father in Rumbee yesterday and attempted to arrest him. I left the situation whereby Imurana Banda (Kamajor) was preparing ropes to tie him. This is why I have come to inform you all.

I then left the farm with her and went and reported to my brothers who immediately joined me to go to Rumbee. On the way, we met the 6 Kamajors who demanded to know our mission. We then said we were going to Rumbee.

Imurana Banda then said that during their presence (Kamajors) at Rumbee, we never went there, now that they are returning is the time we are going there.

Since I had been saying that should we grow up with power we will return all debts incurred, he (Imurana) was not going to wait for me to grow to adulthood, he will start from me by killing me.

On Monday, 20/7/98 at about 1.00 Am, I heard my door being knocked and was able to identify the voice of Combat, a Kamajor. I, therefore, refused to open. Not too long, Satam gave orders to his men to start firing and sporadic firing then started, while I was inside.

Following an inmate of mine, then escaped through the window but was chased though not caught. Imwama then used obscene words to describe the get-away man. He further promised killing the same run-away man if he saw him.

00000810

Both Muram and Tommy Kpaka then opened the door to my room but stopped in the parlour. However, the door to my room was forcefully opened and they entered in the then dark room. Light was brought and while searching, they found me under the bed. Imwama took my cutlass and started dragging and beating me with the cutlass. In talking me outside Imwama pushed me so that I fell face-downwards receiving a cut in my mouth. He also kicked me vigorously in the face.

They took me near to my mother while still dragging and kicking and beating me. Seeing that my mother was following me, Imwama threatened to shoot if she continued to follow. She then retreated.

Imwama then declared that since I had been caught, they will not arrest or molest any other person.

My 2 (two) cutlasses, 1 (one) tin of palm oil and 1 (one) pair slippers all got missing during this fracas. Money to the tune of £15,000/00 (fifteen thousand pounds) was confiscated. The Down A.C. was then consulted for the 13 of us who were caught. Each person was to pay £5,000/00 to bail for himself/herself. After payment, all was asked to frog march 100 times. A.C. bailed for us for morning when I was again asked to pay £10,000/00 which I paid. For Pa Issa's transport fare I was to pay another £10,000/00, which I did. Imwama again gave another pumping ordeal.

12/11/63
 R. P.
 Senior

3764

Number	Item	Content
9	Statement	Statement dated 23 July 1998 by Salaymatu Bendu concerning alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.

(6)

1800000

My name is Salayman Bendi. I am a housewife. I live at Ramee.

One day, in the afternoon hours, while at Ramee, I saw 6 (Six) Kamajors of whom I knew 4 and the other 2 were strange.

On meeting me in the Kitchen, Imurana the Kamajor, identified Boima Bendi as the man to whom they had come. It was then that Woodie called Satan asked Boima Bendi to go to the verandah. Boima Bendi asked to know the reason, Boima Bendi then told them to go and wait for him as he had someone with whom he was discussing an important matter. Satan then said that if Boima Bendi wanted his respect he should immediately follow him to the verandah. Imurana also threatened to use force to take Mr. Bendi to the verandah. Mr. Bendi then asked to know the reason behind the threats. Mr. Bendi at this stage decided to sit down since he was standing at the time Boizy Centeh, at this stage demanded his gun from Abu Kamajor while taking out 3 (three) cartridges from his pocket. Mr. Boizy asked whether he (Boizy) wanted to shoot him.

Murana left, went & called Salim Bendi. On arrival again at Boima's place Murana asked why they had not killed the man (Boima).

At this stage, I went and called the court chairman & courtiers to come to the rescue of Boima Bendi. They asked the cause of the problem and they (Kamajors) explained the purpose of their mission. Boima said that had it not been for the chairman's intervention, he would not have gone to the verandah. Chairman then asked to know the purpose of the visit but Woodie (Satan) said he would not explain anything again except to say that Boima Bendi was taken forth under arrest.

Salayman R Bendi
23/7/77

00000812
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He was then handed over to the A.G.s,
Sore Fama. Murana emphasized that
their suspect must be kept in a lock-
up (Damba) but the A.G. refused to do this.

I left Bance on Monday 20/7/78 for
Mogbanka. While sleeping, we heard
voices outside and the sound of sporadic
gun shots in the air.

Murana gave orders to Woodie (Satana) to
fire on the window of one Md Hillan,
which he (Woodie) did and in the
process broke it. Fearing that the
house would be broken down, all of
us in the house came outside. Issa
Turay seeing me, identified me as the
wife of Brims Bendu. There and then,
Combat, a Kanajo, held me and gave
me a heavy slap. I also saw Abdulai
of Mogben hold Auntie Mamei, take her
outside and kick her. Marie another
of Brims's wives also came out and
Murana on seeing her, seized her and
slung his cutlass to beat her with it.
Kadi another wife on coming outside was
seized by Abdulai and pushed which
made her to fall down. Combat went
inside the house and seized upon
Hillan (Brims's wife) dragged her outside
and beat her with the soldier belt he
had. Murana entered one other room
and brought out Kabinatu, dragged
and beat her also.

At this stage, a curfew order was placed
on us from entering the house. All the
Kanajos including Issa Turay, ^{Abdulai} entered
and searched throughout the house.
Madam Kadiatu then asked me for the
money which was sent by Brims Bendu
for safe-keeping but I told her that I
left it under the pillow. When I asked
for permission to enter the house, I was
given Combat as escort. On entry, no
money was found. The money given to
me totalled ₦ 700,000/00 inclusive of
monies deposited by the Court to me.

(See white sheet)

K
A
Subjunct
23/7/78

We were then asked to toe - the - line and the A.G. sent for. While Satana was firing sporadically, I couldn't bear the sound of the gun - shots, so I aimed upon myself.

Murama was informed about this, but he wanted a bigger disgrace than this. I then told Issa Turay not to see me being killed but he, too, said he wanted my death.

00000813

I then observed that they were doing all this because we were in a bush environment where authority is not adequate but Murama Turay then replied that they knew no govt, except the

Tejan Kabba's govt, was not their own govt.

Standing in the rain, they demanded ₦5,000/00 each from us before leaving us. They then said that if there was no money, they would tie all of us and lock us inside the house until the next morning. The Town A.G. then pleaded with them to release us to him.

At this stage, they demanded food from us. Telling them there was no food, they promised to tie us but before that we were lined up to dance. A.G. then asked us to hang heads. On going outside, one woman, Mamei, said she had $2\frac{1}{2}$ bushels of husk rice. We beat $1\frac{1}{2}$ bushels that night. Meanwhile, Woodie alias Satana, had gone and taken 1 goat from behind our house, killed it and asked us to cook for them that night. They later refused us cooking

P. T. O.

and decided doing it themselves.

In the morning, the 13 of us were arraigned before them where we paid the \$5,000/00 each. This same morning, they wanted to eat again so the remaining husk rice was thrashed and beaten. The H.G. had killed a deer at night so they took everything from him. Again they did the cooking.

Woodie in his anxiety that morning slip and fell down. On getting up and wanting to slash Abdulai Bendu's wife, the woman ran away, and he cut the stick acting as pillar in the verandah. He (Woodie) then ran after 2 women to wound them but he was restrained by some men.

I then left for my family house where I stayed until departure for Abenja.

This is all I know.

R
T.
P.  Salaymoh
Bendu
23/7/98

00000814

Number	Item	Content
10	Statement	Statement dated 23 July 1998 by Turay Mohamed concerning alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.

My name is Mohamed Turay. I live at
Mogbanka. I am a farmer.

00000815

While sleeping at Mogbanka on the night
of Monday 20/7/98, I heard gun-shots
outside. I couldn't therefore go outside,
while inside, I heard doors and windows
being kicked and people shouting. Still
inside, I heard someone say, 'catch him'.
I then decided to come outside since
I was sent for by one Tommy Kpakpa.
It was then Tommy told me that Satana
wanted to see me.

I met women outside in very awful
conditions. The Kamajors at this time
were beating everyone in sight.

Satan (Woodie) then informed me that
Battalion Commander II had sent them
to arrest Raffien Bendu and some
others. I then told them that they
should have reported to me before
this time but now that so much
damage has been done it's late
calling my attention. Woodie then said
that they did not want their suspects
to escape therefore, they did not send
for me earlier.

There was a locked house which they
(Kamajors) wanted to break open but I
told them that was Brima Bendu's old
mother's house. They however, forced
the door open. They saw one Momoh
inside hiding under the bed, took him
outside and beat him mercilessly.
I admonished them to first interrogate
people who are caught before molesting

23/7/98



Mohamed
Turay

P. I. D.

them, but I was quietly asked to shut up.
 Joe - lining all those people who had been caught, they directed them to my premises. Encircling them (13 of them) Satana then demanded Le 5,000/00 from each of them before being released. The suspects were shared among the Kamajors for the easy collection of the said Le 5,000/00. Seeing that the people had no money that night, I asked that they be handed over to me for the morning. I signed Le 100/00 and they were given to me as A.G of the town. However, Raffien Bendu, was classified as a rebel. He was later handed over to me after much questioning. Before handing over however, Raffien was to pump 100 times and the women to dance. They requested for food but there was nothing. They then decided to search all rooms for anything they could lay hands on. One woman had husk rice in the house, so they (women) took the rice and beat some that night. Seeing that the one beaten was small, they asked for more clean rice, so the women beat more. They went and caught a goat behind my house but released it only for Satana to go and collect one behind Brime Bendu's house. This was slaughtered. They cooked everything themselves behind my house.

00000816

In the morning, I was requested for the bail money of last night. The suspects managed to pay Le 30,000/00 - 6 of them were released until all the 13 people paid in full. After this, they became blood-thirsty and started to hit and slash at the zinc of houses belonging to Brime Bendu. I also saw one Kamajor attempt to wound Abdulai Bendu's wife, but upon missing.

R
I
A
23/7/98
Iⁿ claimed
T. way



he hit the pillar of the nearby house. With all advice given to them to desist from causing havoc, they still continued to cut open the roof of the building.

Later, I was made to understand the matter between Raffien and Issa Turey. During the interrogation of Raffien, they demanded to know whether he had not behaved like a rebel. Feeling a little dazed and confused to answer, he was threatened to be shot by Issie Peku; so Raffien surrendered in the positive. This was documented by one Jimusa alias Sr. Blood.

Woodie alias Satana, attempted firing Raffien but luckily was stopped by Issie Peku.

They then demanded to eat but since there was no food, the remaining husk rice was beaten and a deer killed by me was taken as source meat.

Because one suspect had disappeared, I was to be tied up and taken to Moyamba in his stead. I begged them with Le 6,000/00 and I was released.

Raffien, was however, taken to Yondu where he remained with them for 2 days.

This is all I know.

00000817

Mohamed R.
Turey T.P.

23/7/98

3773

00000818



Number	Item	Content
11	Statement	Statement dated 16 April 1999 by Turay Idrissa concerning an incident involving alleged crimes committed by Kamajors.

Name - Idrissa Turay
Address - 70 Bai bureh Road
Age - Adult
Nationality - Sierra Leonean
Occupation - Business
Religion - Muslim

3775

00000819

Taken down on Friday 16th of April 1999 at the C.D.F. intelligence head quarters, Ministry of Defence, State Avenue
Free town at 10:10 am. I have been asked if I wish to say anything and cautioned that I am not obliged to say anything unless I wish to do so. I have asked some one to do it for me and what ever I may say here will be recorded and given as evidence.

I.T.W/017

16-4-99

On the 14th day of April 1999, at about 6 pm, a group of Kamajors ~~landed~~ a Convoy stopped at my petrol station at no 70 new bai bureh Road. On their arrival, they told me that they want Diesel but I told them that there is no Diesel. But they insisted that there is Diesel. They remarked that if they see Diesel, they will kill me. I told them that I am a Sierra Leonean and despite that they are my usual customers so I appeal not to kill me. One of the Kamajors by the name of Blood Corked his Gun saying that he will kill me because I'm a rebel. They damaged my tank and pump 35 gallons of Diesel with a spanner which cost at Le 8,000 per gallon. After they have pump this amount, I later found out

I.T.W/017

3776
that the whole machine was damaged because of force
they used to open it. One Elom & soldier with
one S.S.D came to the scene and advice the
Karnajors that they should not behaved to me -
like that since I am a licence dealer in fuel.
one PA Langba came to the scene, I explained
to him exactly what happened but he told me that
he will responsible for it. He insisted that I
should arrest him. And since he talked to me nicely,
I agreed. I have just come to make this report
officially. That is all.

00000820

I. T. W. O. N.

16-4-98

Number	Item	Content
12	Statement	Two pages of a statement by Will Junisa regarding allegations of crimes committed by Kamajors

Name - JUNISA WILL

Address - SHENG / KALORORO

Age - Adult

Occupation - FARMER / KAMAYO

Religion - MUSLIM

00000821

Nationality - SIERRA LEONEAN

Taken down on Friday 27th of November 1998 at the Ministry of Defense Intelligence office of C.D.F. Freetown at 2:25pm

I am making this statement in connection of the case that Mr. Brima Banda brought me and others here in Freetown for, on the 14th day of October 1998 at 8pm night. I received a message from one A.G. machine with my daughter in law Hama in Matamora. The message was that Brima Banda took 6 Kamayors from Lumpch together with other C.D.F member and went with them to Kambi. As soon as they reached in Kambi, they arrested 4 women including a baby girl on the. They were beaten and tied and all their properties confiscated. They also captured one Mama Nail and Brima's woman ordered his Kamayors to tie the woman as it was alleged that the woman was cooking for the Kamayors. She was tied and beaten. They took her to Zassu where she and others were detained. From there they went back to Yowon. On their arrival they surrounded 'Yankuba' house and starting knocking heavily on front door. Yankuba was not in the house. His wife was in the house and he opened the door. She was severely beaten and all their properties taken away. She was kicked on her -

private part and it was away of. They trip for weeks.

The Kamajors that were in the village were only few in number. In their main power was not strong enough to confront them so they all escaped. At 3:20pm night, they moved to my son Aminade's house. They knocked at his door and he opened, then Brown ordered his army soldiers fighting erupted. He was beaten with guns and sticks and cleared out his properties. They tied him. Mr. Brown asked that who tied Mr. Aminade? Mr. Brown said that he ordered the arrest.

The other Kamajors were so aggressive taking all kind of his some languages asking for me. I immediately went to the chief Kamajor in Mithankpil in order to get some Kamajors to go and cross check whether it is true that the other Kamajors are burning houses, beating people and looting properties. They went and they saw 3 people tied up while my son was released but I was injured. As soon as they saw my Kamajors they started shooting up the air. My Kamajor hold grip of them and disarmed them. They were arrested and taken them to me to be brought forward to the chief Kamajor Mithankpil. When I saw them, coming, I became afraid but they call my attention that I should be afraid as it was my Kamajors. They showed me all the Kamajors concerned. I asked Brown why he did such thing. He replied that he was sent by the police and I come with a letter for me concerning a report that Brown Banda made against three people. I did not believe any letter instead I only saw them coming together with the people.

Number	Item	Content
13	Statement	Statement by Konnie Donald Tom, CDF Chiefdom Ground Commander, about the alleged attacks by Kamajors.

NAME: DONALD TOM KONNIE
 ADDRESS: MANO JUNCTION, SHENGE
 AGE: 42 years 00000823
 RELIGION: CHRISTIAN
 OCCUPATION: C.D.F. CHIEFDOM GROUND COMMANDER

STATEMENT

The incidence in Kagboro chiefdom (Kagboro and Bundu Sections) of October 14, 1998 happened in my absence as I was in Freetown.

I arrived at my village (Mano Junction) on October 15, 1998 at about 11:30 P.M. from Freetown.

Also, the Retributional Actions of Bundu, Bumpel and Kagboro chiefdoms happened in my absence as I was in Moyamba Town on the invitation of Messrs A.S.O. Kallon and Tejan Saikoh.

Most of what I am saying is based on Reports received and what I saw.

FRIDAY OCTOBER 15, 1998 :

I received a report at about 8:30 P.M. at my village that a group of Kamajors came from Bumpel chiefdom together with vigilantes led by chief Brima Bendu of Kagboro and caused acts of looting, arson, abduction etc. etc.

I left at 10 P.M. to check with the chief Kamajor of Motombar village arriving 5:30 A.M.

-2-

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1998

At Motombar village, 6 Kamajors and the Gumpel Chiefdom Ground Commander - Mr. Osman Koroma, together with a WALKIE TALKIE were handed over to me. I saw the son of Mr. Junisa Will badly beaten up with swollen head and wounds. People (Kamajors) handed over to me were:-

1. Osman Koroma (2) Williams Sesay
3. Sonba Fofanah (4) Amara Fofanah
5. Abdul Sheriff (6) Takiya Kelfala
7. Danda Kargbo.

00000824

However, I sent the 6 Kamajors and those beaten to Shenge Town.

Osman Koroma, chief Kamajors and myself left to visit the two sections where the incident took place.

We saw 3 houses burnt and 5 completely vandalized at Motombar village; 2 houses burnt and 4 completely vandalized in Rembi Town; 1 house burnt in Mai and 2 houses burnt in Younda Town. The two sections were deserted.

One section commander called Mohamed met us at Martiya village and told us that he came to enquire about Osman Koroma and others. He also told us that 2 boats loaded with Kamajors and volunteers have headed for Sierra to enter Kargbo.

Osman Koroma told him to go and stop them from entering Kargbo.

-3-

SUNDAY OCTOBER 18, 1998

Osman Koroma and myself left Mantyan village at 7: a.m. for Shenge Town and arrived at 1:30 p.m.

I later received a report that Blangbeh Kamajors and vigilantes entered Yowadu Town late in the afternoon under the command of one SAMSON CAULKER but there was no fight. However, on their return journey, looting took place.

MONDAY OCTOBER 19, 1998

I sent the Kagboro C.S.O. Mr. Eric Leonie to report the matter to the C.D.F. officials in Moyamba

00000825

TUESDAY OCTOBER 20, 1998

Osman Koroma and others arrested were sent to Moyamba Town with a letter to the District Administrator and Battalion Commanders by me calling them to intervene immediately.

THURSDAY OCTOBER 22, 1998

A.D.O. Kallon, Mr. Tejan Sankoh and ECOMOG Commander Abbas came to Shenge Town and demanded that all Kamajor Heads and Hq. Paramount Chief report at Moyamba Town on or before Saturday October 24, 1998 without fail so that we can go to Camp Challe to iron-out things.

The Moyamba Contingent held a meeting at Katora Wharf, Shenge.

00000826

At the meeting, we saw fleeing civilians from 'foundu Town' and when questioned, they told all of us that Blumpch Kamajors and vigilantes have again entered Kaybon taking people and looting.

A.D.O. Kallion and Mr. Tejan were asked by the Ag. Paramount Chief and request to go to the area but they refused and still demanded that every body living in the two sections should move from there.

A.D.O. Kallion and Team lifted me to my village after sending letters to Kamajor Heads to come from the area to Shenge and meet me.

I left Shenge Town on a motorbike on Saturday October 24, 1998 for Moyamba Town followed by the Ag. Paramount Chief and others on Sunday October 25, 1998.

It was in Moyamba Town that I saw the abducted civilians and Kamajors from Kaybon in poor condition. In fact Mr. Tejan Sambo told me that he brought clothing for our Kamajors as they came from Koforun half naked.

While in Moyamba, I started seeing wounded people brought from the area and finally a dead Kaybon woman on Tuesday October 27, 1998.

We were taken to Camp Challa, arrested and thrown into the Guard Room for 4 days. Taken to 80 Brigade for 12 days and Defence Headquarters in Free Town. Released on Friday November 20, 1998.

Number	Item	Content
14	Statements	Collection of four statements (8 pages in total) made by Turay Issa; Conteh Boizy; Turay Imurana (Murana); Kelfala Woodie respectively.

(5)

My name is Issa Turay. I live at
Mogbanka in the Rembe section of
Kagboro chiefdom. I am a farmer.
I don't know anything for which I
came to Senegal.

00000827

Issa
Turay
23/7/58

(6)

I am called Boizy Conteh. I live at Mofuso in the Mofuso section of Kagboro chiefdom. I am a fighter (Kamajor).

One day, Pa Mustapha Inway of Motombor, asked me to escort Woodie Kelfala (Jatana) at Rember. Arriving at Rember, we met Brims Bendu standing in his kitchen. I then introduced Pa Brims to Woodie Kelfala.

By then, the day was nearly ended, so I asked him to give me my gun as I was going to Moyemur in the Bumpuh section chiefdom. At that stage Pa Brims said that if he fired his gun (Brims) and missed him, then he Brims will kill him (Boizy).

At this stage, Jatana said that if he civilian challenged a Kamajor to fire him and it is done, then the case will be foolish and void.

The elders around, then convinced him (Mr. Brims) to go to the verandah.

Brims Bendu, later invited Woodie and another Kamajor to food and further said he would not give food to his enemies. Woodie invited us but could not accept, because we are enemies. Why he was calling us enemies was because he (Brims) had gone to Jombo and declared us as enemies to the junta. This is as I understand it the reason for his hating the Kamajors since he had left us behind and gone to Jombo to save his skin. The Rember group had brought a junta member to Rember who came and beat up our Kamajor brother and left our shoes post-free.

On our way to Motombor, we met Pa Issa at Moybanka who gave us a report concerning Raffien. This is what I know.

00000828

R Boizy
p Conteh
23/7/98

My name is Innana Turay. I live at Mogbanka in the Rembebe Section of Kagboro chiefdom. I am a fighter (Kamajor).

Nature of Complaint:

One morning both Mustafa Kassangey and I left for Mogbagra on a mission by Timisa Will for one Mada. The person to whom we were sent, upon seeing us from far off, ran away. While at Mogbanka, my father informed me that Pa Brims Bendu had reported me to him. Strongmen in the village were gathered to ~~the~~ search for Mustafa Kassangey because he had been firing all over. Report was brought by one Jahya. These guns were given for rebels and not to be fired in towns where people are found said by Brims Bendu.

My point in bringing this report is because Pa Brims has declared that the Kamajors are enemies to him; because of Mustafa Kassangey. One night while sleeping one Mada knocked on my door to say that I was being invited by the Town Chief of Mogbanka, but I refused to go because that was Brims Bendu's house and he had openly declared Kamajors as enemies. I did not go. Pa Brims also declared that since we only respond to Mustafa Kassangey's calls and not his own call, he does not respect us.

Points of Contention:

1. Pa Brims does not care about Kamajors
 2. - - - also knows them as enemies.
- I stop so far.

R. Innana
T. Turay

23/7/98

00000829

(alias Satana)

(4)

My name is Woodie Kelfala. I am resident at Moyamba but born of ~~Motombor~~ in the Baguwa chiefdom. I am a fighter (Kamajor).

At one time while in Moyamba, we saw Mustapha Jurey go to No II Bat. Comm with a report that a certain Kamajor had reported Binta Benda to him. No II Comm then said he will not be available as he was going to F/Town but was sending Woodie Kelfala together with M. Jurey to go and investigate or if not able to bring all those involved to Moyamba.

On arrival, we slept at Motombor when in the morning I was given Boizy Cortek Abu Kamajor and Dr. Bland to go with me to Rumbee. However the Kamajor who reported this matter must also go with us. We collected Murama & proceeded to Rumbee.

I introduced myself to him (Binta Benda) in his kitchen and told him the purpose of my mission. He sat down & refused to budge an inch. He will not go anywhere even if Woodie has to go to Motombor again.

Boizy at this stage demanded his gun from Abu since he wanted to return because Binta Benda had decided not to go. He thought Boizy wanted to fire him and said if he failed to shoot him then he (Binta) will kill Benda. I then asked him to follow me to the verandah where I would tell him my mission properly. People prevailed upon him to go, while I told him about a report against one Nicol and Munda and that the Lt chief should

00000831

000000832

go with them. Since I have not seen Nicol nor Munda, I want you to go with us so that investigations could be initiated before the results are taken to Moyamba.

Mr. Boring then decided that we should travel by sea to Shenge and the next day to Moyamba but I refused because Matombor was our meeting place. He said he would have followed me to Matombor but with the presence of the Rember Kamajors - Imirana etc. he will not go because they were his enemies. I also told him that I will send the Rember Kamajors ahead to Juring Will while we take the same route I came with. Again, he denied fearing an attack on the way. I told him that I only knew him today. There was no knowledge of each other before only that day. Should he (Bendi) say that the Rember Kamajors were his enemies, I, too, am an enemy to him because I came with them.

Thinking that nothing will go wrong with you, now in the presence of the chairman and speaker, I ask that you give 2 or 3 strongmen to follow me to Matombor. That again he denied. I also refused to go by boat to Shenge. Because of Boring Bendi having wasted such a long time in deciding now that the place was dark (after 8 pm), I then ordered his arrest and detention until a senior citizen bailed him for tomorrow. I then handed him over to the Town A.G. Meanwhile, I wrote to J. Will informing

00000833

him of developments in Rendu. He replied to say that if he accepts going to Motombor then they should go through Marthyn. If not let him know again.

In the morning I then decided that since Brimo Rendu had refused to travel with us then all Kamajors who went with me, returned with me to Motombor. However, while returning, we met a group of men and women who were identified as the sons and wives of the S/Chief, Brimo Rendu.

On arrival at Moghanka, we met Murana's father crying bitterly. He, the father reported to us that Raffien, son of B/Rendu had come with a cutlass in hand threatening to kill him in reprisal of what is happening to his father. He, Raffien, however had gone to see if his father was safe and sound, if not, then Murana's father was going to suffer.

I then advised Murana to refrain from doing any bads to the B/Rendu family while I was away. However, on my return to collect those who had been reported I will make sure of collecting him (Raffien) too. We then left for Motombor where I made my report to Mustapha Turay.

A letter was sent to Kenen Toma as a report of the happenings; he promised coming on Saturday but not available. Kenen Toma then wrote to say that all those involved in the matter should report at Shenge together with all documents concerned.

On Mon. 20/7/98, due to heavy rain I left Motombor in the evening together with

00000834

2 (two) Kamajors given by Patrol Commander
 Mwothamkel. On arriving at the border,
 the Dep. Patrol Commander, and a group
 of Kamajors, (10) in all went to escort
 me since this was enemy territory.
 In Mwothamkel at dead of night, we
 knocked the door of Boma Benda but a
 certain voice came out saying the
 people outside were enemies. One
 young man then fled through the window
 thinking that it was Raffien Benda.
 I asked to see Raffien but the inmates
 said they did not know him. Since
 these were Boma Benda dependants
 and they have declared not knowing
 Raffien I therefore, gathered all of them
 to go to the A.G. If they do not produce
 Raffien, then each must pay Le5,000.00
 to free him/herself. Payment started, I
 asked for food, which was prepared.
 That night (thawing, cooking, etc) A
 young goat was slaughtered.
 Later, Pa Issa explained the complaint
 against Raffien. He (Raffien) later signed
 a document declaring himself to be a
 rebel.

This is all I know.

Woodie R
 Kelfala S

23/7/98

Number	Item	Content
15	Statement	Statement of Bendu Brima alleging attacks by Kamajors on him and his family in July 1998.

23/7

Statements from People Affected by the
Kamajor Onslaught - Moybanka -

① Brima Bendu - Section Chief, Rember

My name is Brima Bendu; I am a farmer and also the Section Chief, of Rember.

On the 13/7/98 at about 2.30 pm, while sitting down in my kitchen at Rember, I saw 6 Kamajors fully armed with guns & cutlasses come. On meeting me, Imurana declared me as the want man. "We have come to you so go to the verandah. If you want to maintain your respect let us go quickly." Their K.P. emphasised that I should go to avoid molestation but I stood my ground and refused to go. 00000835

Boizy Conteh took out 3 shot-gun cartridges and attempted loading his gun but was restrained by Abu Madina Koroma.

On attempting to forcefully seize me, neighbours heard the noise and ran and came to my aid. Woodie ^{Ketala} Patrol Commander, then set his A.K 47 in readiness to fire. At that stage, they declared that I was under Arrest.

We then went to the verandah where we met Mohamed Bendu, Section Speaker, Rember. He asked to know whether these Kamajors reported to anybody on their arrival. They replied in the negative and asked for mercy.

Mohamed Bendu then asked the purpose of their intent to arrest Brima Bendu and Woodie then spoke for the group. He said they had been sent by Battalion Comm. II, Kener Toma, to execute the arrest because of derogatory and damaging remarks uttered by Brima Bendu while he was in Moyamba sometime back.

Their directive was to first take me to Mustapha Furay at Matamboor. I requested them to use a boat instead to transport me to Shenge from where we will then proceed to Moyamba if need be but they refused. I was handed over to their A.G at Rember, Sorie Lorna, who for 2 days never gave me food to eat. During this period, I managed to escape to Shenge where I have made my report to the N.A. Office.

Later Keneri Toma, came himself from Moyamba and was confronted by the Ag. P. C. on this issue, but he denied any knowledge of sending Kamajors to arrest Borne Benda, Section Chief. While waiting for the 27/7/98 to confer with the other party - the Kamajors, I saw half of my family from Mozbanka come to Shenge with a report that they had been attacked and beaten by Kamajors at night.

This is my own side of the incident as it happened to me.

00000836

R.T.P
23/7/98

Borne Benda
(S/C, Rember)

3797

Number	Item	Content
16	List	Distribution list for initiators for July 1998.

3798

DG's Copy

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR INITIATORS (CDF/SL FOR
THE MONTH OF July 1998.

00000868

17

NO.	DISTRICT	NAME OF INITIATOR	QTY. OF RICE (BAGS)	CASH FOR CONDIMENTS	DATE RECEIVED	SIGNED
1	Bo	Dr. Alieu Kondewa High Priest	10	Le100,000		
2	Bo	Dr. Jibao Deputy High Priest	9	80000		
3	Kenema	Kamoh Brima Bangura	8	80000		
4	Bo	Madam Munda Fortune	7	60000		
5	Bo	Janig Lahai Bangura	7	60000		
6	Kenema	Yankuba Vandi (Sacramento)	7	60,000		
7.	Kenema	Lahai Massaquoi	5	50,000		
8.	Kenema	Kamoh Muniru Sandy	6	60,000		
9.	"	Kamoh M. Kelfala	5	50,000		
10.	"	Kamoh Alieu Sesay	5	50,000		
11.	"	Kamoh Alieu Kowah	4	40,000		
12.	Bo	Dauda koroma	5	50,000		
13.	Kenema	Fodei Karamoh Koroma	5	50,000		
14.	Bo	Kamoh B. Lukullay	5	50,000		
15.	Bo	Sheku Kailie Bombowai	5	50,000		
16.	Bo	Kamoh Mustapha Idriss	5	50,000		

2799

NO.	DISTRICT	NAME OF INITIATOR	QTY. OF RICE (BAGS)	CASH FOR CONDIEMNT'S	DATE RECEIVED	SIGNED
17.	Bo	Mohamed S. Sheriff For Family	2	50,000		
		TOTAL	100	Le1,000,000		

REMARKS: This is to certify that we the above signed Initiators have received in full our allocated supply for the month of July 1998 from our respective District Administrators and therefore append our signatures or Right Thumb Prints.

Delivered by: 
Francis M. Lumeh
National Logistics Officer - CDF

Witnessed by: 
Charles S.E. Moiwo
National P.R.O. - CDF/SL

Approved by:  for July 1998
National Coordinator/CDF
Director General of Defence

00000869

3800.

Number	Item	Content
17	Letter	Letter written by Charles S.E. Moiwo, National P.R.O. CDF/SL, to authorities including Kondewa, dated 13 July 2000.

3801

From: The N.P.R.O, CDF/SL

To: The District Admin. - Koseh Hindowa
High Priest CDF/SL - Dr. Alieu Kondowa
Director of Transport - Joseph Fefegula

00000870

13th July, 2000


Dear Sir,

This is to inform you that we saw a letter from Rtd. CPO M.S. Dumbuya reportedly written by Mamah Munda Fortune to him informing him about the seizure of ECO 106 at Mandu by Kamajors denied her involvement in it (Mama Munda)

The high command of the CDF/SL and the Chief of Defence Staff Sierra Leone Army met with the Vice President and a decision was reached that the CDF should send a team of investigators to Bo to effect the following:-

- (1) To arrest the vehicle and its driver back to the Defence Headquarters (DHQ)
- (2) To invite Madam Munda Fortune to Freetown for further investigation.
- (3) You were also asked to investigate the ^{activities} ~~active~~ of the driver of the said vehicle and report to us.
- (4) In this regard you are asked to travel to Freetown with the team of investigators to submit your report to the CDF/ SL High Command for onward submission to High ^{authorities}.
- (5) In the light of the above you are kindly asked to co-operate with the team from DHQ accordingly.

Your usual co-operation is highly solicited to reach the truth of this matter.




c.c. Vice President
" Deputy Minister of Defence
" Chief of Defence Staff ✓
" Rtd C.P.O. M.S. Dumbuya

Number	Item	Content
18	Message	Paraphrase of coded message from District Administrator CDF Moyamba, dated 12 May 2000, regarding the capture of Songo area and request for supplies. Contains handwritten notation from Hinga Norman that arrangements for supplies should be made.

00000871

141

PARAPHRASE OF CODED MESSAGE



FROM: DISTRICT ADMIN. C.D.F. MOYAMBA
TO: NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR CDF/SL
MIN. OF DEFENCE
DATE DESPATCHED: 11/5/2000
TIME DESPATCHED: 1855 HRS.

INFO:
DATE RECEIVED: 12/5/2000
TIME RECEIVED: 0855 HRS

CDS/Col. DIGGINS

CDF. OF 11/5/2000 (.) A COMBINED TEAM OF FIVE HUNDRED BO/MOYAMBA
KAMAJORS HAVE CAPTURED SONGO AREA THIS A.M. (.) SAME WILL
ADVANCE ON MAKOLOH/FREETOWN HIGHWAY NEXT A.M. ON THE RIGHT
FLANK FROM FREETOWN (.) LOGISTICS ARE URGENTLY NEEDED (.)
PLEASE AIRLIFT THE FOLLOWING URGENTLY (.) FIFTY PACKETS TEN
BOXES SHOT-GUN CATRIDGES AND SEVEN THOUSAND ROUNDS NATO
AND TWO HUNDRED GALLONS OF DIESEL, FIFTY GALLONS PETROL, TWO
HUNDRED AND FIFTY BAGS OF RICE, AND ASSORTED DRUGS (.) ABOVE
LOGISTICS ALREADY WILL SEE US THROUGH TO FREETOWN (.) REGARDS

(.)

DOP/DOE/FRENT LINE

④ DG

Dumbor/A →

②

please make sure the above
team stops at MAKOLOH and
wait there to link-up with
CDF from Freetown. All request to be
assigned and despatched under LOG Control.
Thanks.

I have already
add this to the
CDS as a matter
of urgency.
Thanks.

③ ACDS-DHO

please take note
of the underlined
above and make
arrangement for
supplies where possible.
Thanks.

[Signature]
12/5/00

[Signature]
12/5/00

[Signature]
12/5/00

1 a m l s t s

3804

00000872

Ministry of Defence

Number	Item	Content
19	Letter	Eugene Cowan's "Petition for Assistance to Retrieve Land Cruiser Vehicle Registration No. EL 15168" sent to CDS 2 March 1999

3806

MR Yakub

C.D.F Brookfields Hotel

00000874

Champion Fund company Ltd
49 Siaka Stevens street
Freetown
Sierra Leone
2nd March, 1999

TO: The C.D.S
Defence Head quarter
Cockrill
Freetown
Sierra Leone

Dear sir

PETITION FOR ASSISTANCE TO RETRIEVE LAND CRUISER VEHICLE
REGISTRATION NO. EL 15168 - COLOUR BLUE

with all due respect, I humbly submit to you a letter of petition as referred to above.

On the 11th January, 1999, the above said vehicle was taken at Youyi building ground by a Kamajor whose name is Allieu Parawally who I made to understand is the Kamajor Task force commander. He first took this vehicle to Brookfields Hotel grounds where he is still staying, but had since then changed the location of the vehicle.

We have met him personally with all relevant documents to substantiate our claim but to no avail and had even gone to the extent to compensate him for securing the vehicle we still cannot get his cooperation.


In this regards sir, we are left with no other alternative than to forward his complain to higher authority.

Finally sir, we kindly seek your utmost and timely assistance in other for us to retrieve our vehicle.

Thanks for your cooperation in advance.


Yours sincerely

CC: F.C
Force Provo Marshall
C.D.F


EUGENE COWAN

Number	Item	Content
20	Letter	Petition sent by TF2-125 to Chief of Defence staff, dated 28 February 1999. The petition was forwarded to Deputy Defense Minister Hinga Norman with a 2 page cover letter by OC Medani, Commander for Chief of Defense Staff, 3 March 1999.

3808



Mrs. Annie Campbell
12A Upper Tengbeh Town
Freetown
28th February, 1999

The Chief of Defence Staff
Sierra Leone Armed Forces
Cockerill
Freetown

00000878

Dear Sir,

REPORT OF LOTTING, MOLESTATION, AND GUNPOINT

On Friday, 26th February, 99 at 2 P.M., seven men came with a white van marked CDU 14 IBM Koribondu. At my compound gate they forced to open and came in saying our boss sends us Hinga Norman to demand Mr. Claude Campbell's Vehicles and should be handed to ECOMOG officials. When asked why? One of them shouted saying, "break her feet then she will understand." I was put under gunpoint with my ward Musa kargbo and my sister Lucian Johnson. They demanded the vehicle key from us and took the metallic blue Benz 300D V boot with registration number WU 33619. They took two motor car batteries, one tapolin, some money, 10 gallons diesel, 5 spare tires, and tools from all the five cars including the jerks, speakers from the white trackers 4 in number - 2 big and 2 small one new car battery and went away. One Tamba drove the car from Brookfields Hotel. The matter was then reported to the nearest ECOMOG Officers checkpoint.

On Saturday, 10.30 a.m., another group came they were 10 in number with a CDF white van and told me they have got the report so I should explain, I did explain and they asked me to meet them at Brookfields hotel in half an hours time so I went again to the ECOMOG Officers at the check point and re-reported the matter. The ECOMOG Officer accompanied us to the Brookfields hotel and investigated but the boss at the Kamajors camp at Brookfields hotel told us that they did not sent any one on such operation.

On our way we saw one of the men who came to our house in the morning and the ECOMOG Officers interrogated him and he confessed that he only came with the boss one Commander Ali who is now at a meeting but told us to go at 4 p.m. where commander Ali will be available. He will be able to explain well. So we returned with the ECOMOG Officers.

Before the 4 p.m. appointment they came back to the house in my absence and forced their way through and met Lucian Johnson and took one white tracker jeep away and they told Lucian to tell me about the keys for the other vehicles if not they will kill all of us.

Again at about 6.30 p.m., they came with one Sierra Leone Police jeep (blue) they were ten in number with a middle age man. This man asked for the owner of the house and about the vehicles. I narrated everything to him that transpired between the previous CDU groups and me. He told me they were investigating and he will relay all to the higher authorities and he will bring back the answer to me. One of them told me that, their boss has no vehicle if I could give one to them and he also asked me about the documents of the vehicles. I told them that I have sent them to be photo copied. He advised me not to allow any body to demand anything here again. He promised to bring security to me. They inspected the other 3 vehicles and asked for the tyres and batteries. I told them that the previous CDU have taken everything. They came with two ECOMOG Officers. The ECOMOG Officers asked whether I have documents because the white tracker is at Brookfields hotel and the metallic blue Benz is at Cockeril so that they will claim the vehicles. They went away promising to come back on Sunday afternoon with a word from their boss.

00000879

At 6.45 a.m., on Sunday 28th February 1999. I was asleep when a heavy noise woke me up. I was kamajors at my two gates shouting for me to open or else they will kill us so I sent for the gate key and my ward opened the gate and they rushed into my compound surrounded the entire house. Some of them went upstairs, and they deployed themselves all over the house inside the room, kitchen etc threatening that I was keeping meetings here as they were informed. I then responded that it is a black lie, as I am not even interested about those things for we are religious people and my husband is in problem and sick and it is only three of us staying here so he said they will come for me to go and explain and they want to stay here and they must see that they remove us here and kill me. So they took my money for cement Le43,000, my sisters Le5,000, computers, fax machines, type writer in its case, perfumes, electric tea kettle, jewlleries, watches, spectacles, satellite parts from the satellite dish, shoes, vono mattress, and so many other items which I cannot name until such time and threatened to come back for the vehicles. One of them declared that it is wrong for the others to loot because they are sent to search for ammunition and they threatened to put the house into flames if we don't leave the house and they went at about 8.05 a.m. - I again reported at the ECOMOG checkpoint and they said they saw them but lied that they are coming here.

At the present time I feel threatened and unsafe and I humble request security in view of the incessant threat of being shot by the kamajors and also to use your good offices to retrieve my properties which have been looted from my house.

Yours faithfully,
A. Campbell
Mrs. Annie Campbell

Cc:
ECOMOG Commander
ECOMOG Freetown Garrison Commander

RESTRICTED

DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS



00000876

Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone
Cockerill North
Wilkinson Road
Freetown

DHQ/SL/107/2/A

Tel: 230124

See Distribution

03 March 1999

**ALLEGATION OF LOOTING AND MOLESTATION
AT GUN POINT BY KAMAJORS**

1. I am directed to forward to you for necessary action the attached petition from Mrs Annie Campbell alleging repeated raid on her house, illegal confiscation of her property and constant threat to her life and that of her family by individuals claiming to be Kamajors. The CDS requests that necessary investigation be carried out to identify and punish the individuals concerned and measures put in place to forestall further occurrence.
2. Above for information and further action please.

OC MEDANI
Commander
for Chief of Defense Staff

Encl:

1. Copy of Mrs Annie Campbell petition

Distribution:

External

Action:

Hon Deputy Minister of Defense

Information:

His Excellency, President, Commander-in-Chief

3811

RESTRICTED

Vice President
National Security Adviser
Deputy Inspector -General of Police

00000877

Internal:
Information:
File

Number	Item	Content
21	Document	Document signed by Mohamed Jalloh titled "Kamajors Loot Private Dwelling House and shop at Portee".

00000880

**KAMAJORS LOOT PRIVATE DWELLING HOUSE AND SHOP AT
PORTEE, FREETOWN**

On Friday 15/10/99, three cars loaded with Kamajors arrived at our shop at No.170 Bai Bureh Road, Portee, Wellington. They were led by their Commander one THOMAS DAVID LANGBA. They went out with the pretext that they were cleaning the city. After that, they told the Shop boy that they were going to occupy the said premises, but that they should leave within 24 hours.

On Sunday 17/10/99, they came with a reinforced team to occupy the place. They arrived in three vehicles: (1) Toyota Hilux (White) No.AAC336, (2) Landrover Discovery and the said vehicle of their Leader THOMAS LANGBA a Peugeot Familiar Car marked CDF but they were resisted. Before leaving, they told us that would come back on Monday.


The matter was then reported to the Kissy Police Station and the boys were given Medical Forms to report on the following day, which was on Monday.

On Monday the 18th October, 1999, at about 1.30p.m., one Long DAF Truck Reg. No.ECO106, and one Land Cruiser CDF belonging to THOMAS DAVID LANGBA arrived at the scene. Without asking anybody, they started the looting spree. They looted everything in the house and the shop, including a store rented to one Nigerian businessman. Also, they robbed from the Daily Cash Drawer the sum of Le28,900,000/00, (Thirty-eight Million Leones), U.S.\$16, 200 (Sixteen Thousand, Two Hundred U.S. Dollars) and Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Guinea Franc (GF250,000).

Another Shop Attendant MOHAMED JALLOH who recently arrived from Guinea to seek a Visa to the U.S.A. was seriously beaten. He was struck with a stick on his nose and side. He also had his wallet snatched from his pocket which contained U.S.\$1,500 (One Thousand, Five Hundred U.S. Dollars), Thirty Thousand Guinean Francs, GF.30,000, Ten Thousand Leones (Le10,000). He lost his Wrist Watch, his Belt even his Slippers was taken by the Kamajors.

When he attempted to get back his wallet, they dragged him to the toilet and beat him mercilessly. One of the Kamajor Commanders said "Let us kill him; this boy is resisting us".

The matter is still being looked into by the Police while moves are underway to locate, identify and prosecute the culprits. Already some of the Kamajors have been arrested with some of the looted items in their custody.

Signed:.....

MOHAMED JALLOH
House Owner

Number	Item	Content
22	Documents	Documents (5 pages in total) related to the beating of Emmanuel Fillie, British High Commissioner's Driver, on 5 March 1999 by CDF Combatants.

SECRET

3815

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

00000881

c/o Ministry of Defence
State Avenue,
Freetown.
9th March, 1999.

FROM: DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE CDF(SL)

TO: THE NATIONAL PRO CDF (SL)

REF: BEATING OF MR. EMMANUEL (DRIVER AT BRITISH
HIGH COMMISSION) BY C.D.F. COMBATANTS

On Friday, 5th March, 1999, at about 7.30 p.m., three Kamajors lead by Alpha H. Coker (alias Blood) arrested Mr. Emmanuel and his children for breaking curfew at New England. In the process, Mr. Emmanuel was assaulted while he was trying to protect his children from harassment. Mr. Emmanuel was however brought to Brookfields Hotel where he was handed over to Mr. Steven Sowa the Operational Commander.

Mr. Sowa on the other hand warned Mr. Emmanuel to obey the curfew as it is through such chances the enemies would want to infiltrate. Also he strictly warned the three Kamajors that C.D.F. should not be used as a threat to the people of Sierra Leone.

FINDINGS: In the process of this investigation it was noted that the three (3) kamajors, namely: Alpha H. Coker, Sylvanus and Mohamed are all attached to the Special Task Force headed by Allie Tarawally.

2. That this special task force boys do not go to war front at Waterloo. They are just in Freetown, going about commandeering vehicles and other valuable properties from people. ~~the~~


3. That they are more linked to ~~ECOMOG~~ ^{Patrols in Area} than to our own Authorities ~~the~~ C.D.F. They have no regard for people like Kenzie Torma, Kemohai, except Allie and Junior Tarawally.

4. That in this matter, those named above actually molested Emmanuel even though the matter was later amicably settled by Steven Sowa.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That arrangement be made for the repatriation of these special task force boys immediately to their original base at Zimmi.

2. That a letter of apology is sent to the High Commission for the action of ~~the~~ boys and also an undertaking be made that such will not occur in future.

3. And severe punishment be taken against the three culprits for their misbehaviour.



SECRET

3816

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

00000882

c/o Ministry of Defence
State Avenue,
Freetown.
9th March, 1999.

FROM: DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE CDF(SL)
TO: THE NATIONAL PRO CDF (SL)

REF: BEATING OF MR. EMMANUEL (DRIVER AT BRITISH
HIGH COMMISSION) BY C.D.F. COMBATANTS

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
Mr. Sowa on the other hand warned Mr. Emmanuel to obey the curfew as it is through such chances the enemies would want to infiltrate. Also he strictly warned the three Kamajors that C.D.F. should not be used as a threat to the people of Sierra Leone.

FINDINGS: In the process of this investigation it was noted that the three (3) Kamajors, namely: Alpha H. Coker, Sylvanus and Mohamed are all attached to the Special Task Force headed by Allie Tarawally.

2. That this special task force boys do not go to war front at Waterloo. They are just in Freetown, going about commandeering vehicles and other valuable properties from people.
3. That they are more linked to ECOMOG than to our own Authorities i.e. C.D.F. They have no regard for people like Kennie Torma, Kemokai, except Allie or Junior Tarawally.
4. That in this matter, those named above actually molested Emmanuel even though the matter was later amicably settled by Steven Sowa.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That arrangement be made for the repatriation of these special task force boys immediately to their original base at Zimmi.

2. That a letter of apology is sent to the High Commissioner for the action of ~~the~~ boys and also an undertaking be made that such will not occur in future.
3. And severe punishment be taken against the three culprits for their misbehaviour.



3817



British
High Commission
Freetown

6 March 1999

The Hon
Captain Hinga Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence

00000883

Dear Hon. Deputy Minister,

~~I write to express my serious concern about an incident which occurred at~~
New England yesterday evening which involved my driver at the High Commission
Mr Emmanuel Fillie and his family and members of the C.D.F.

I attach for your information a report on the incident prepared by the Head of
my Close Protection Team Staff Sgt. Lamont.

It is particularly disturbing that this incident should take place just 2 days
after I had met the members of the C.D.F. with you at Brookfields. You will recall
that in the remarks which I addressed to the assembly, I reminded the C.D.F. that
in carrying out their important duties they should not adopt the method of "the
enemy" by harassing the people and violating their human rights. I appreciate the
difficult task which the members of the C.D.F. are performing and I have been in the
forefront of trying to obtain more support for them. However incidents such as
occurred last Friday make this more difficult.

The name C.D.F. is well chosen and I suggest that there should be as much
emphasis on the first word Civil as the other two, Defence Force.

Yours sincerely,
Peter Penfold

Peter Penfold
BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER

Attachment

Paul Lamont
 Close Protection Team leader
 British High Commission
 Spur Road
 Freetown
 Sierra Leone

00000884

6 Mar 99

British High Commissioner

Sir,

Incident involving Mr Emmanuel Fillie, British High Commissioner's driver - 5 March 1999.

1. This report covers the details of an incident involving Mr Emmanuel Fillie, the British High Commissioner's driver and members of the Civil Defence Forces from the Brookfields hotel, Freetown on 5 March 1999.
2. About 1915 hrs I received a telephone call at home from the British High Commission night receptionist, informing me that Mr Emmanuel Fillie's father had telephoned the High Commission in a distressed state to inform us that his son (Emmanuel) had been arrested by the Kamajors for violation of the curfew. I informed the residence security that I was going to go to the Brookfields hotel to establish the details of the incident and to help facilitate Mr Fillie's release from arrest if needed.
3. About 1930 hrs as I approached the hotel a vehicle came out of the hotel car park. This vehicle appeared to be full of Kamajors, they were sitting in the boot of the vehicle and the back seat and front seats were also full. As I came level with this car one of my team members signalled for the vehicle to stop as we were going to ask where Mr Fillie was. On getting out to speak to the Kamajors we were met with shouts of 'we are Kamajors'. The occupants of the car continued to shout this over and over again. As I was about to speak to the Kamajors we noticed that Mr Fillie and his nephew Junior were in the back seat of the vehicle. I instructed Mr Fillie and his nephew to get out of the vehicle and to get inside our vehicle. This they did. I also at the same time told the Kamajors that we were going to take Mr Fillie home. The Kamajors agreed to this and then drove off.
4. We then drove Mr Fillie home, and once there I asked him the circumstances involving his arrest. He informed me that various children including members of his own family, had been late back from collecting water from the nearby stream. Apparently there had been no water in the New England area that day. At around 1810 hours a group of Kamajors had made the children sit down and were beating them. Mr Fillie went down to collect his children and attempted to talk to the Kamajors to explain what had happened. They would not listen to him and started to beat him with a rifle. One of the Kamajors fired his rifle three times into the air.
5. Mr Fillie stated that a scuffle then broke out between him and a member of the Kamajors whilst he was trying to protect the children. The Kamajors continued to beat him on the back of the legs and torso with rifle butts as well as kicking him. He was then thrown into


00000885

the back of a vehicle with his nephew Junior and taken to the Brookfields hotel. Whilst this was going on not only was Mr Fillie's wife and child there but also his parents witnessed this attack. One of the Kamajors who identified himself only as 'Blood' continuously asked him for his 'calendar' which Mr Fillie stated that he had one in the house but that he did not carry one with him.

6. On reaching the hotel Mr Fillie was again kicked and rifle butted by the Kamajors. He was also subjected to having the back of his ankles whipped with a blunt object. At the hotel he was questioned a senior member of the CDF who identified himself as Stephen Sowa as to where his ID card was. Mr Fillie then produced his ID card to verify he was who he said. It was at this point that the Kamajor who had earlier asked him for his 'calendar' stated that Emmanuel was a liar, as when asked earlier he had not produced his 'calendar' (this Kamajor obviously does not know the difference between an ID card and a calendar). Mr Fillie then explained again what had happened, and also that he worked for the British High Commission. It was at this point that the Kamajors started to apologise for the 'misunderstanding' and they offered to take Mr Fillie home and asked that he not tell anyone of the incident.

7. I have inspected the injuries to Mr Fillie and although I am not a Doctor, I can tell that he has very bad bruising to both his ankles and to the rear of his legs. Emmanuel was in a very distressed state when we took him from the vehicle. When we dropped him at his home Mrs Fillie was there and she too was very distressed. It would appear that Mrs Fillie had also been assaulted by the Kamajors as she had bruising to her arm where she had been struck by one of the Kamajors.

8. This is an account of the events as related to me by Mr Fillie. I would like to also add that the Kamajors who carried out this attack, again visited Mr Fillie's home after we had left again asking him not to mention to anyone what had happened.



P R Lamont
CPTL

Number	Item	Content
23	Document	Curriculum Vitae of Samuel Hinga Norman. Contains biodata and other information about career of Hinga Norman.

CURRICULUM VITAE

00000886

NAME: SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN

DATE OF BIRTH: 1ST JANUARY, 1940

PLACE OF BIRTH: NGOLALA VILLAGE, MONGHERE, VALUNIA CHIEFDOM, SOUTHERN PROVINCE

NATIONALITY: Sierra Leonean

MARITAL STATUS: Married with 6 children

EDUCATION: - Monghera Native Administration School - Talato
1947 - 1949

- Military Elementary School - Murray Town Barracks, Freetown 1949 - 1954

- Military Secondary School (Boys Platoon) 1954-1958

- Wireless Operator's Training Instructors Course - Western Germany 1959-1960

- Mons Officer Cadet School Aldershot - U.K. 1966

- UNICEF Farmers SUMMIT - Bo 1990

- United Nations UNFPA Population Programme - Freetown - 1995

- Proliferation of small arms workshop - Republic of South Africa - 1996

WORK

EXPERIENCE: - Joined the Sierra Leone Army as a boy soldier - 1954-1972

Horton Investment Trust - 1975-1982

World Courier INC - 1982-1984

Director, Samco Int. - 1984-1988

00000887

<u>APPOINTMENTS:</u>	Staff Officer, Military Headquarters	-	1966
-	ADC to H.E. The Governor General State House	-	1967
-	Company Commander (Bravo Coy) 1 RSLR	-	1967
-	Adjutant 1 RSLR	-	1968
-	Manager, Horton Investment	-	1978-1982
-	Manager, World Courier Inc	-	1982-1984
-	Managing Director Samco Int.	-	1984-1988
-	Liaison Representative Government of Sierra Leone and Valunia Chiefdom	-	1989
-	Proprietor/Co-ordinator, Ngolala Integral Development Project-Mongheri	-	1989
-	Regent Chief of Jaiama-Bongo	-	1993
-	Deputy Minister of Defence and Minister responsible for Internal Affairs	-	1996


INTEREST:

- Agricultural Activities
- Politics
- Reading

3823

Number	Item	Content
24	Newsletter	Sierra Leonean Newsletter published by the Movement for Restoration of Democracy in Sierra Leone (MORDSIL), dated 11 August 1997.

3824



TRUE SIERRA LEONEAN NEWSLETTER 00000889

The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Sierra Leone (MORDSIL)

Volume 1 No. 1

August 11, 1997

Page 1

FREE

The Movement for the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone (MORDSIL) is a Non-aligned Movement formed in the aftermath

of the May 25 coup that overthrew the democratic government of Sierra Leone. MORDSIL seeks to unite all civil defence forces in Sierra Leone

and also to bring all diplomatic and other pressure to bear on the AFRC to stand down.

KAMAJORS EXHIBIT CAPTURED WEAPONS AND PRISONERS

The Kamajors on August 6, 1997 displayed prisoners of war, uniforms, arms and ammunition to foreign journalists at Fairo which they captured from the combined forces of the AFRC during the recent raid on Zimmi

Among the captured items were large quantities of single barrel Shot guns, RPG bombs, Apple grenades, AK 47 and 58 rifles, Stick grenades, AK ammo, Cartridges, Military uniforms and two prisoners. None of the Kamajors was killed



White - bearded Chief Norman, the man behind the Kamajor successes addressing Kamajors in the presence of BBC correspondent.

Aware of the fact that a lot of lies have been propagated by the AFRC about the current control of Bo Waterside and Zimmi, MORDSIL wishes Sierra Leoneans to know the truth, the whole truth and nothing else. In deed there was battle at Bo Waterside but the AFRC was crushed decisively and one of the councilmen, Sam Bockarie (Mosquito/RUF) was shot and faces the risk of amputation - a taste of his own medicine. The Kamajors captured one Toyota Hilux van with the CCSL seal.

After six years of senseless rebel war that has ripped our country apart and led to the needless deaths of thousands of poor Sierra Leoneans, the "National Army" has shamelessly closed ranks with the same rebels against whom they allegedly fought in Kailahun District up to the hour of the coup and turned their guns at the Kamajors, Kapras and innocent tax payers who pay for their up-keep. This strange relationship between the partners of the AFRC have aptly proved the ordinary Sierra Leonean right that, indeed, the "National Army" are "Sobels", a name ascribed to them from the early days of the rebel war.

BIG DEMO AGAINST AFRC

Thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, August 7, 1997, staged a big solidarity march on Monrovia in support of the unconditional and immediate reinstatement of President Tejan Kabbah. The demonstrators presented their petition to the ECOMOG Field Commander for General Sani Abacha, ECOWAS Chairman, and copied the wider international community, appealing to them to use the military option if it is the only way to force the unacceptable, unpopular and the notorious regime out of power.

According to the refugees spokesperson, the angry but calm demonstrators had already packed their bags and baggage in readiness for repatriation when the coup took place. "This situation has greatly embarrassed us and is causing us untold sufferings", one refugee remarked.

All the demonstrators carried placards some of which read thus: AFRC MUST GO NOW... MR. AMBASSADOR WHO DO YOU SERVE, DEMOCRACY OR JUNTA? MR. AMBASSADOR WHY YOUR FREQUENT VISIT TO BOPOLU R.U.F. CAMP? DOWN DOWN AFRC UP UP Tejan Kabbah.

MORDSIL CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION

Following the collapsed negotiations in Abidjan, MORDSIL joins the Security Council, ECOWAS, OAU and the Commonwealth to condemn the junta's continued intransigence to unconditionally restore power to President Tejan Kabba.

However, Sierra Leoneans view the International Community stance of sanction as a double punishment for the common man whose property including food stuff, money, vehicle have been looted by the AFRC "Sobels". The AFRC "Sobel" are by no means bothered about the sanction. Sanctions to them is viewed as a way of slowly killing the people who have vowed not to be loyal to the junta. MORDSIL is, however, worried about the AFRC continuing violence, threats and genocide against the civilians, foreign nationals and NGOs. We are therefore calling on the OAU and ECOWAS to mandate an immediate and decisive military intervention to bring the junta down. This is the only way out of this quagmire. Sierra Leoneans are impatiently awaiting ECOMOG to intervene.

Sierra Leoneans would not want a repetition of the Burundi Scenario in Sierra Leone. When Pierra Buyoya overthrew the Hutu-led-government a little over a year ago, all the states of the Great Lake region denounced the coup and resolved to isolate that regime. But when the coupists maintained their grounds, sanctions were relaxed and normal trade and other international relations are now booming while Buyoya entrenches himself in power. In fact Buyoya was invited and attended the Harare OAU Summit in July 1997. What do Johnny Koroma and his cronies care if the entire nation is plunged in darkness or if people die of diseases and starvation. As far as the rebel regime is concerned the answer is NOTHING! They would not mind to wade through slaughter to the throne.

LETTER TO SIERRA LEONEANS

Dear True Sierra Leoneans,

Let's congratulate ourselves for the sustained resistance to the Junta and all their empty justifications. Thanks also for ignoring Karefa - Smart, Abass Bundu, Pallo Bangura and their likes.

MORDSIL is appealing to all Sierra Leoneans to trust their hopes and not their fears... for ours is a noble and legitimate course. Please don't allow any trivialities to detract us because above all else... Sierra Leone first. Let no amount of threats and intimidation make you

Succumb to the AFRC... for the struggle shall not be long.

00000890

To you the RUF now the so called Peoples Army (P.A) you still have a package in Abidjan Accord. Quit the junta now and spare yourselves and the people of Sierra Leone another blood letting. If you persist, however, and cause any further force to be used... then you stand the chance of losing the demobilization and reintegration benefits.

To you the men and women of the National Army you still have an opportunity to surrender to ECOMOG or join the Militia wing of MORDSIL. The junta is illegal and the offices are only causing untold hardship and death for their own selfish gains. In the interest of your families, friends and your country please stop destroying your father land for posterity. You are only making a bleak history for your own generation.

Yours faithfully,
Mother Sierra Leone

STOP PRESS:

Lt. S. Bah and an unidentified Captain of 18th Battalion, Kenema and 48 NCOs killed in Zimmi Battle.


Details - next week

NEXT ISSUES

- MORDSIL meets President Tejan Kabbah.
- Sierra Leone Ambassador to Liberia in dirty deals with EX-RUF Combatants.
- MORDSIL visits Refugees in Guinea.
- Special tribute to the Late P.C. Demby.
- War front this week.

Number	Item	Content
25	Letter	A letter written by J.S. Keifala, Secretary Eastern Union, signed both by Keifala and Hinga Norman, dated 17 March 1999.

3827



C/o J.S. Keifala, Road Transport Authority, Kissy Road, Freetown

Tel:-250093/251056

The Resident Minister
Eastern Province
Kenema.

00000891

17th March 1999.

Dear Sir,

AUTHORITY TO PERFORM C.D.F INITIATION

The Eastern Union in consultation with the Deputy Minister of Defence have authorised the undermentioned people viz:-

- 1. Mohamed Abdul-Rahman Kabba
- 2. Abu Bakarr Sherif

to perform the initiation of C.D.F.

All Paramount Chiefs and Local Authorities in the Eastern Province are therefore urged to give them their fullest co-operation until further notice.

Yours faithfully,

J. S. Keifala

 J. S. Keifala
SECRETARY

Signed:
Chief Hinga Norman
 Chief Hinga Norman
 (Deputy Minister of Defence)

.....
 Mr. Maigore C. Kallon
 (Chairman Eastern Union)

cc
 Hon. Momoh for JEM
 & Hon. Dr. Abba Kondeh
 - for info only

Number	Item	Content
26	Radio Message	Text of 3 radio messages sent from District Admin, CDF, Bo June 1999.

DTG: 011419 Z JUNE 99

00000892

3829

FM: DIST ADMIN CDF(SL) BO DISTRICT-130.

TO: DEPUTY TASK FORCE COMMANDER CDF(SL) F/TWIN

TEXT: CDF(SL) H/O - BC/54/1/06/99 @ YOUR VEHICLE AS ORDERED BY DIST-ADMIN AT PUSEHUN WAS TO LOAD SOME OF MY QUOTA INCLUDING YOURS @ BUT YOUR DRIVER KAPOI LEFT WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE @ PSE ASSIST IN INSTRUCTING HIM TO HELP BRING MY DIST. RATS @ BEST REGARDS @

224413

MR GRAYWOOD

~~0705 HRS~~

11/1/99

DTG: 011411 Z JUNE 99

FM: DIST ADMIN CDF(SL) BO DISTRICT-130

TO: NATIONAL P. R.O. CDF(SL) MINISTAY OF DEF SPATIAL AVENUE - F/TWIN.

TEXT: CDF(SL) H/O - BC/55/1/6/99 @ PSE INFO THAT SCAMIA TRUCK 051 UNDER CONTROL OF ALPHA JALLOH WAS INSTRUCTED BY ADMIN PUSEHUN (EDIE MASSALLY) TO COLLECT OUR RATS. FOR BO DIST @ HE WAS TO COLLECT SOME OF MY PERSONELS CHINA BUT HE LEFT WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE @ PSE SEE THAT OUR FOOD DISPATCHED WITHIN @ BEST REGARDS @

~~0715 HRS~~

01/06/99

3830

DTG: 017400 Z JUNE 99

00000893

FM: DIST ADMIN CDF(SI) BO DIST-BO.

TO: NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORT CDF(SI) MINISTRY
OF DEF STATE AVENUE - F/TWIN.

INFO: NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL CDF(SI) MINI-
STRY OF DEF STATE AVENUE - F/TWIN.

TEXT: C.D, F(SI) H/O - BC/53/1/06/99 PSE INFO THAT
THE TRUCK C D F(SI) 025/S, L, R, A, THAT WAS
SEIZED IN BO WAS ORDERED BY THE DIRECTOR
OF WAR AND THE SAID VEHICLE IS BEEN USED
FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES UNDER HIS SUPERVISION.
PSE INFO ADMIN IN BO TO CONTACT THE DIRECTOR
OF WAR TO RELEASED THE SAID VEHICLE.
COMMANDER SOWA IS ON HIS WAY GOING BACK
TO F/TWIN. PSE ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR IMMED.
ACTION. BEST REGARDS.

~~Signature~~

0730 HRS

01/06/99

Number	Item	Content
27	Situation Report	Copy of the text of a radio message (Situation Report) sent Dist Admin CDF (SL) Headquarters Pujehun in Zimmi to National Coordinator (Hinga Norman) in October 1999.

3832

P= DIST 18 1723 Z OCT. 99


Fm: Dist. Admin. CDF/SL H/Q Pus. in Zim

To: Nat. Co-Ordinator - CDF/SL Nat. H/Q
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE - MINISTER
OF DEFENCE - State Avenue - Ft. Harare

00000894

Text:

SITREP as at dated fm introps received stated that three (3) un-identified Kamas died as a result of gun-shot wounds at Senehun Massazuri - Gallinasperi e/dom on Friday 13-10-99 at 0845 AM. A man by the name of Edward Piries commonly called Boboruthie claimed to be an initiator performed a ceremony on the three (3) Kamas. In the process of firing at them to prove his initiation power am tzo-2 of the Kamas died at the spot and one taking to BO Government Hospital where he died on Sunday 17-10-99. It was understood that the alleged initiator is a citizen of Taitama am kori e/dom am Moyamba Dist. He and all who were involved are now in Police custody in Pwefun under investigation. Psc accute for your info and understanding. Firm regards.



1654 HRS

19-10-99

Number	Item	Content
28	Radio Message	Copy of the text of a radio message sent out by National Director of Transport CDF (SL), 23 June 1999.

00000895

REF: NIG: 230822 = June 99

FM: NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORT, C.D.F. (L) NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

TO: NATIONAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORT C.D.F. (L) - EC


UPD

INFO: NATIONAL TASK FORCE COMMANDER, C.D.F. (L) - EC CMM
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF WAR, C.D.F. (L) BO CMM ALL
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS, C.D.F. (L) - EC CMM, KENYA
CMM, MCHAMBA CMM, FUCHUM CMM, BONING CMM, KES
AND KALAHUN.

TEXT EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON REC. THIS MSG. THE
BELOW LISTED VEHICLES ARE TO BE RETRIEVED AND PARKED
AT THE NEAREST C.D.F. (L) DIST. H/CS @ SCANIA TRUCKS USED
BY: COMMAND. B.S. KALLOI CMM, COMMANDER HASSAN W. JALEF
CMM, C.D.F. (L) DRIVER TAMBA MUMOI CMM, TOYOTA LAND
CRUISER USED BY COMMAND. ISHAMEL KOROMA CMM, VOLVO
TRUCK USED BY MOAYIOMA KAMAS CMM, TOYOTA HILUX PICK
UP MARKED GUMU VALLEY WATER COMPANY USED BY
BRAMA KONGICH (FUCHUM DISTRICT C.D.F. (L) P.R.O.) CMM,
MOTOR BIKE XL 125 USED BY ONE KAMAUOR AT FUCHUM
AND TOYOTA TRUCK MARKED MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE USED
BY FUCHUM DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR @ PSE RENEZI RE-
ACTS. SO AS TO FACILITATE THE CONVEYANCE OF THESE
VEHICLES TO THE C.D.F. (L) NATIONAL H/CS IN A/T/VAL
TO BE HANDLED OVER TO THE APPROPRIATE OWNERS @ PSE
ACCEPT INFO FOR YOUR STRICT COMPLIANCE @ RESM. (SS)

TRANSMITTED TO EN. KEN.
FUCHUM MCHAMBA. SMITH
KALAHUN AND KES
RECEIVED BY:
J.M. MUMOI
23/06/99

0850 HRS
23/06/99



Number	Item	Content
29	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent from CDF Headquarters Kenema to the national CDF Headquarters, Freetown - attention National Director of War, 2 April 1999.

IMMED.

DIG: 201450 Z APRIL 99

00000896

FM: C.D.F. (S/L) H/Q KEN. DIST. KENEMA.

TO: C.D.F. (S/L) H/Q - ~~STATE~~ STATE AVENUE
F/TWIN.

INFO: NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF WAR, C.D.F. (S/L) - BO.

TEXT REF. MY SIG. MSG. OF ~~19-4-99~~ 191048
 Z X 9910 FOR THE FINAL ON SLAUGHTER ON SEGB
 KENEMA TOWN AND ITS ENVIRONS WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL
 AS THERE WERE A LOT OF AMBS. AND TRENCHES
 ON THE WAY. BUT SAID AMBS. WERE ALL
 CLEARED AND TRENCHES FILLED BY OWN TPS.
 AND ALLIED FORCES. AFTER APPROACHING A
 VILLAGE CLOSED TO SEGBKENEMA, THEN MET A
 STRONG RESISTANCE FM. ENS. WHICH CAUSED THEM
 TO RETREAT TO BASE AT MAND JUNCTION.
~~THE~~ THESE BTL. LASTED FOR 4 HRS. OWN TPS.
 CAS. KIA - 1 (ONE), CUM KIA - 1 (ONE) ^{AND} MANY MIA - NIL
 ENS. CAS. - KIA - BELIEVED TO BE MANY, CUM, SOME
 WERE EVEN DISCOVERED. CUM, KIA - MANY, AND
 MIA - NOT KNOWN. SIR, CUM REF. MY SIG. MSG. OF
 10480 APRIL 99. THIS H/Q IS IN DIRE NEED
 OF THE BASIC LOGISTICAL SUPPORT THAT
 WERE MENTIONED IN THE SITREP Y/DAY.
 UPON THE RECEIVAL OF THIS SIG. MSG. CUM
 THIS H/Q IS EXPECTING AN IMMED. AND
 PROMPT ACTION. REGARDS.

Number	Item	Content
30	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent from CDF Headquarters Bo - to the National Co-ordinator and info to Moinina Fofana; dated 19 April 1999.

FM: DIST. ADMINISTRATOR CDF (SL) BO DIST. - BO

TO: THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR, CDFSL AND DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEF. STATE AVENUE - FREETOWN

INFO: DIRECTOR OF WAR, ~~CDF (SL)~~ - - - - - MAININA
FOFANKO RESUME - SOUTH - BO. CHAIRMAN
N-C.C., F/TWN. LOGISTICS OFFICE CDF (SL)
F/TWN. DIRECTOR OF WELFARE, CDF (SL) F/TWN.
N.P.R.D. CDF (SL) F/TWN.

00000897

~~TEXT~~ CDF (SL) BO, 04 of 19-4-99 @ TEXT @
OPERATIONS TO CLEAR THE BO F/TWN HIGHWAY
STARTED ON THE 14-04-99 @ 200 @ BLACK
DECEMBER KAMAS WERE ALLIES TO THE 26th
INFANTRY BDE, AND THE NABATI. 24 FORMERLY AT
CAMP CHARLIE AND PREVIOUSLY RETREATED FM
WAMA GRAMA SONGA AND TAYAMA @ IT WAS
A FIERCE BATTLE AS THE REBELS PLANTED MINES
ON THE HIGHWAY AND ALSO TRENCHES DUG
AT THE MIDDLE OF THE HIGHWAY @ THEIR MEETING
GROUND ~~HERE~~ WAS YONIBANIA TOWN WHERE THEY
BATTLED WITH THE KAMAS FOR NEARLY TWO
HOURS BEFORE THEY WERE PURSUED OUT OF
THE AXIS @ ON THE SIDE OF THE CDF SL
WAS ONE CASUALTY CALLED GABRIEL VANJAI
OF THE 19th BN. - BO WHO HAS A GUN STROT ON
HIS LEG, NOW HOSPITALISED IN THE BO GOV.
HOSPITAL @ ONE OTHER KAMAJOR FROM 15th BN
BO ON APPROACHING TO BONGABABAY HAD TO
GET ON ^{AN} MINES PLANTED BY THE BRIDGE
AND SHATTERED LEFT LEG @ HE WAS
AMPUTATED ON THE 16-04-99 @ TAKO
OTHER KAMAJORS,

3839

ECOMOG AND ALLIED FORCES (KAMAJORS) HAVE
SO FAR CAPTURED MILE 91, CAMP CHARLIE,
YONIBANIA, MILE 88, AND THEY ARE PRESENTLY
APPROACHING MAGBOSIE ~~AFB~~ (JUNITA ATTEMPTED
TO CAPTURE MILE 91 ON THE 14-4-99 AROUND
1:00 AM ~~●~~ BUT WERE REPELLED FM. THE AXIS ~~●~~ BELOW
IS THE ANALYSIS ^{OF THE} CASUALTY ON THE SIDE OF CDFSC
①

00000898

3840

Number	Item	Content
31	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent by Hinga Norman to Dist Admin CDF (SL) Bo; dated 15 April 1999 regarding the raising of manpower.

OP IMMED:

DIG: 151740 APRIL, 99.



00000899

FM: THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR, CDFSL, AND DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE - FREETOWN.

TO: DISTRICT ADMIN. CDFSL ~~BO~~ - BO DISTRICT.

U/C @

INFO: DISTRICT ADMIN. CDFSL - BUSHMAN DISTRICT AI KENEMA.

AI KENEMA

TEXT @ REF SIGN. MSG OF 151620 HRS APRIL 99, YOU ARE TO CONTACT THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF WAR AI BO, AND THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE COMMANDER TO SOURCE THE REQUESTED MANPOWER @ THEY ARE TO MONITOR THE MANPOWER AI BO AND INFO DIST. ADMIN IMMED. OF BUSHMAN IMMED. FOR THEM TO BE CONVEYED TO HIS LOC. FOR SAID OPS @ USE ACCEPT INFO FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE @

TRANSMITTED TO BO

16-04-99

1640 HRS

J. Marshall

Number	Item	Content
32	Radio Message	Text of a radio message sent by Dist Admin Pujehun CDF (SL) at Kenema sent to Dist. Admin Bo; dated 15 April 1999 asking for urgent provision of 500 men for operational purposes.

IMM- 15458 APRIL, 99

FM: ADMIN. PUJEHUN DIST. CDFSL

~~TO~~: AT KENEMA. 00000000

TO: ADMIN. BO DIST. CDFSL

INFO: ~~ADMIN.~~ NATIONAL CO-ORD.
CDFSL, NATIONAL DIRECTOR
OF WAR,

TEXT: AS PER OUR LAST DISC.
ABOUT THE 500 MAN-POWER
FM. YR. DIST., SAME OPS IS
NOW IN PROGRESS. I AM IN
DIRE NEED OF THOSE 500
MEN FOR THE ONGOING
OPS PURPOSES. WITH AN
IMMED. EFFECT OF THIS MESSAGE,
YOU ARE REQUIRED TO GET
THE MEN READY FOR ONWARD
CONVEYANCE TO MY LOC. I
WILL BE GRATEFUL IF
QUICK AND NECESSARY STEPS

ARE TAKEN @ REGARDS @
00000901

From

Doc + Info

Please info
Admin Bo to
Contact DOW
& and the NAT
TASK FORCE to
source the
manpower,

Thanks.

[Signature]
15/1/99


~~[Signature]~~
1620 HRS
~~J. Marshall~~
15/04/99

TEL: 224698

DC
Kam Khan
C-1-D. Hommel
Sector

Number	Item	Content
33	Letter	Letter written by Allieu Kondewa, sent from Civil Defence HQ, Tihun Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District, dated 31 July 1997.

I



00000904

Civil Defence HQ
Tihun Sogini Chiefton
Bantah District
31/7/1997.



Dear Sir,

I rather appreciate the effort you are making in order to track down civil disobedience in our beloved country. I will first of all introduce myself to you as Dr Allen Kondowa whom you left in the Hotel immediately after the take-over. Even the bullets you gave me, for self security and the pistols saves me a lot.

Though there were obstacles, but God of all creations protects my life. I am presently residing in Tihun where my Headquarter is based.

Moreover I am sending four men who will serve as guarantee to what ever I'm going to tell you in this letter: Muallem Bonnie, Muallem Collier, Thomas Mbogba and Jaiah Kamara. Infact Muallem Bonnie is the second Man in my cabinet at the Headquarter.

Furthermore I want to assure you that anything that is in possession should be airlifted to Tihun, as security of it is of no problem in this whole area. My men will explain how really security

II



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00000905

~~is~~ is operating.

Kamajors are all over Sierra Leone and the method to regroup them is very easy now.

Conclusively, anything that is meant for the Kamajors should be lifted to Tihun in Sogbiri, all the people concern are here. More fighters are ready to dislodge the soldiers from places of occupation. Don't refuse these people as they are with my actual words. I hope our enterprise shall thrive and our fraternity still exists.

Creetings to you all, but my best wishes goes to the President and Pq, Hinga Norman. May God Protect us all



Sincerely Yours
King Dr. Allieu Kondewa

P/s. I will like to have your phone number + address as I would like to communicate with you anytime the need, and possibility arises. This is my picture for you to be sure that this letter is from me and that the bearers will bring more facts from me.
your good



Number	Item	Content
34	Investigation Report	An investigation report by 15 ECOMOG Brigade Kenema authored by Captain A. Abukakar and dated 20 December 1998. The report was forwarded to Vice President, Republic of Sierra Leone, Kenema under a cover letter signed by Major A. N. Nwadiaro on 26 December 1998.

RESTRICTED

00000906

3849

Headquarters
15 ECOMOG Brigade
NIGCON - ECOMOG
PMB 3
Reservation Road
Kenema
Sierra Leone

Tel: 215

15EEDE/126/A

The Honourable Vice President
Republic of Sierra Leone
KENEMA

26 Dec 98

Sir

HANDING OVER OF MR KBK MAGONA -
NATIONAL TASK FORCE COMMANDER
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE AND THE REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION CARRIED OUT ON HIS
ACTIVITIES IN KENEMA

1. I am directed to handover Mr. KBK Magona, the National Task Force Commander, Civil Defence Force along with the report of investigation carried out on his activities within and around KENEMA for your perusal and further disposal. I am further to inform you that this Headquarters highly appreciates your willingness to dispose of this matter in the best interest of law abiding and loyal citizens of the Eastern Province whose security is our paramount concern.
2. Thanks for your fatherly concern and co-operation.

Yours faithfully


AN NWADIARO
Major
for Commander

Enclosure:

1. Report of Investigation on the activities of Mr KBK Magona - 1 copy.

Copy to:

DHQ SL
HQ ETFSL
CDF Kenema

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3850
0000090715 EDDS NAIC DETACHMENT
HQ 15 ECOMOG Brigade
NEBOON - ECOMOG
KINEMA

15 EDDS NAIC/DET/15/G

See Distribution:

20 Dec 98

INVESTIGATION CARRIED OUT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
MR KKK MAGOMA OF CDF/SL BASED IN KINEMAINTRODUCTION:

1. This is an investigation report carried out on the activities of Mr KKK Magoma, National Task Force Commander of CDF, he became a thorn in the flesh of virtually every peace loving inhabitant of Kinema and environ. Apart from the terror he unleashed on innocent citizens, Mr Magoma held series of meetings with some Kamajors (CDF) and few locals aimed at undermining ECOMOG troops activities/ops in the Eastern province of Sierra Leone. He was arrested and detained on 14 Dec 98 in HQ 15 ECOMOG Bde MP guardroom for leading a group of irate Kamajors to fire several rifle shots in Kinema town that disrupted the peace enjoyed for long by all inhabitants of Kinema and environ at the period when the security situation became fragile.

AIM:

2. The aim of this report is to highlight on the activities of Mr KKK Magoma of CDF S/L that led to his arrest and detained at HQ 15 ECOMOG Bde guardroom on 14 Dec 98.

CASE HISTORY:

3. On 14 Dec 98, Mr KKK Magoma, National Task Force Commander CDF/SL was arrested along with two of his close aides in Kinema for firing several rifle shots which caused pandemonium (chaos). The problem started by 14:00Z Dec 98 when Mr Magoma led truck loaded with his Kamajors, loyalies and store Milton Maghai Guest place (a palm wine drinking joint) located on Koromah street, Kinema under the pretext of arresting Gambi - Sative (Marijuana) dealers. The rifles shots were preceded by illegal search, confusion, looting and forceful seizure at gun point of people personal effects. Similarly, on return to CDF HQ, located off Hanganh road Kinema, one of Mr Magoma's body guards Morris Senny of No 17 Hanganh road Kinema fired some shots aimed at dispersing the crowds. This increased the confusion around the centre of the town. Some people were said to have started packing their personal effects and ready to leave the town for nearby bushes for safety. He was quoted as saying "Leave them within 3 days I will turn the whole town upside down". Though Mr Magoma denied making such statement, alot of people present while he was making such a statement attested to it. Chief Kamoh Brainah (Senior Kamajor initiator) invited Mr Magoma to his house when he learnt that it was Mr Magoma that led the firing in the town but Mr Magoma turned down the invitation.

4. The Commander, 15 ECOMOG Bde sent some soldiers to Kamoh Brainah house to find out who was firing, Kamoh Brainah sent back the soldiers to tell the Commander that Mr Magoma led some kamajors to raid an area and they were responsible for the firing. The Commander sent more troops led by the BN and arrested Mr Magoma. When Mr Magoma was arrested alot of things he illegally collected, looted from his victims were either recovered from him directly or

from his cohorts. The items were immediately returned to the owners who personally lodged a complain to HQ 15 ECOMOG Bde on him.

5. Prior to the incident of firing on 14 Dec 98 which led to the arrested, detention and subsequent investigation, series of complains were made to HQ 15 ECOMOG Bde on Mr Magana by individuals and groups including ECOMOG troops, officials of CDF Kenema district and law abiding citizens in and around Kenema. Among other things, Mr Magana was accused of carrying out an unlawful arrest detention, extortion and most cases killing of innocent people who he tagged RUF/JUNTA collaborators at his SS Camp (near Moa river bridge) detention centre. The Commander 15 ECOMOG Bde called a meeting with the CDF officials which Mr Magana attended. During the meeting complains and allegations were made by ECOMOG duty officers/soldiers on regular patrols in Kenema of using the Deputy Defence Minister's name or vehicle to effect arrests and terrorised innocent people during curfew hours using his Kamajor loyalties in the Task Force (CDF). The EDF Kenema District officials accused him of using his Task Force group to cause confusion among them and put the name of CDF to disrepute. Mr Magana brought the issue of mishandling of cartridges issued to CDF Kenema District which he was handling to silence the complainants on the issue of unlawful arrests, harassment and all other forms of security breaches brought against Mr Magana. It was decided that a Board of Inquiry (BOI) involving CDF representatives be instituted to investigate the matter. The BOI report which indicted Mr Magana was sent to the CDF HQ and no action was taken against him in order to forestall future occurrence.

6. Closely monitored activities of Mr Magana showed that he organized series of meetings with the Kamajor (CDF) loyal to him in Kenema and environ with the soul aim of subverting ECOMOG activities in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. He embarked on the seizure of weapons from Kamajors other than the ones operating under his Task Force for reasons best known to him. The information regarding the meeting and seizure of weapons from kamajors were confirmed by Chief Kamoh Braimah (the most senior kamajor initiator) in his statement as attached. Kamoh Braimah said he warned Mr Magana to desist from holding meetings aimed at confronting ECOMOG otherwise he was going to have it rough with him. Kamoh Braimah also presented quantity 1 RPG tube and 1 GPMG (all serviceable) seized from his kamajors and recovered from Magana's resident while he is in ECOMOG custody. Though he denied seizing weapons from kamajors under Kamoh Braimah, however on presentation of the said weapons to by Kamoh Braimah, he went flat on ground pleading for forgiveness.

FINDINGS:

7. The following findings were made out of the investigation:
 - a. Mr KBK Magana is the CDF/L National Task Force Commander based in Kenema.
 - b. Mr Magana took up appointment as the National Task Force Commander CDF/SL in september 98 and since then law abiding citizens in Kenema have seen no peace.
 - c. Its discovered that on 14 Dec 98, Mr Magana led a truck load of kamajors to and raided a palmwine Joint along Koromah street in Kenema where some shots were released

- d. He admitted that he and his kamajor group fired shots on the air in order to stop the fleeing people at the paluwine Joint.
- e. He admitted forceful collection of personal effects and Marijuannah (Cannabi-Sativa) from the paluwine Joint.
- f. He however alleged that the firing at CDF office was made by Moris Sessay (kamajor)
- g. Most of the items looted/forceful collected by Magona were recovered from him and his group and immediately handed over to the owners.
- h. The two people he arrested and detained on the allegation of dealing in the drug were handed over to the police for further action.
- i. Mr Magona is Mende by tribe and hails from Pujehun in Gaura chiefdom of Kenema District.
- j. Kamoh Braimah confirmed that Mr Magona held series of meeting with kamajors loyal to him and also seized weapons from kamajors not operating under him with soul aim of sabotaging ECOMOG operations and security set ups in and around Eastern Province of Sierra Leone.
- k. According to Kamoh Braimah (Mr Magona's initiator) if Mr Magona continue to remain around Kenema area, it will be difficult for ECOMOG to operate successfully.
- l. Even though Mr Magona denied killing anybody at the SS Camp there are strong evidences even within the kamajor groups that he committed the act.
- m. He also admitted seizing weapons from kamajors and claimed re-issuing same to troops in the bush. However, a few weapons like RPG, GPMG and AK 58 rifle belonging to Kamoh Braimah kamajor, were recovered in his house.
- n. Its discovered that kamajors operating under the National CDF Task Force are better armed and always protected from going to fight enemy at the front for reason best known to Mr Magona.

CONCLUSION:

8. There is no doubt that since the assumption of duty as National CDF Task Force Commander Mr Magona has made life virtually miserable not only to law abiding citizens within Kenema and environ but also made operations/security arrangements and coordinations difficult to both ECOMOG and CDF in Eastern Province. His recent utterances notably the illegal arrests, detention, terrorism, seizure of weapons from kamajors, misused of kamajors and holding of meetings aimed at sabotaging ECOMOG security and operations are just a few to mention .

RECOMMENDATION:

9. Its recommended that:
 - a. Mr Magona be kept out of the scene until the war is over.
 - b. Master Moris Sessay and Mohammed Sallon who participated in the incident of 15 Dec 98 and detained together with Mr Magona be released to the CDF immediately.
 - c. The rifles belonging to Mr Magona and the two kamajors detained with him be collected back.

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3853

- d. CDF authority should be advised to educate its members on the danger of firing their weapons in the town especially at this period of the year.
- e. Its also opined that Mr Magona's private vehicle now in custody of the ECOMOG PRO PL be handed over to CDF officially.


M. A. TUBAKAR
Capt
BIC

Distributions:


Internal

Actions:

HQ 15 ECOMOG Bde

Information:

15 ECOMOG Bde Pro Pl

CDF Kenema District. 

CDF HQ. Kenema

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Number	Item	Content
35	Letter	Letter addressed to Allieu Kondewa from Sumaila Turay-Jabbie of CDF, Bumpe Ngao Chiefdom, dated 13 December 1997.

3855

Civil Defence Force
Bumpe Ngao Chiefdom

13-12-97

00000911

Dear King, Dr Allieu Kondawa,

I am hereby sending to a message because Bumpe is your home, We are now calling your attention to the Bumpe chiefdom at large. This one as a report from us all in Bumpe chiefdom.

You told us the last, we should find ways and means of searching for diamonds in order to purchase arms and Ammunitions for our chiefdom. This was adheres to by the whole chiefdom. 800 people participated in this mining activities. Holes were dugged, we have already excavated the gravel.

Jegbeyama took some reasonable number of Kamajors to the site and took the gravel to the Waterside for final process; they shouted for the rest of today and the whole chiefdom is annoyed over ~~action~~ this action, this shouting means, they have collected all the Gems by themselves

When fine was levied on one defaulter, he come back to area grabbing the chief Kamajor beating him mercilessly with wands all over his body and still struggling in pain. He further stated that he has powder more than you all here; And you are our brother and head of Civil Defence, we came purposely come to report this particular mess report to you.

More explanations will be heard from Jahyah Barrie and Pa Sumaila Turay-Jabbie.

Greetings to you all

13/12/97

Yours Sincerely
Sumaila Turay-Jabbie

3856

King Dr. [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

00000912

Number	Item	Content
36	Letter	Letter titled "From High Priest Dr. Allieu Kondewa to Deputy Minister of Defences."

3858

FROM HIGH PRIEST DR. ALLIEU KONDEWA TO DEPUTY
MINISTER OF DEFENCES

00000913

I am very sorry to explain myself to you as you were even not going to find me in Bo today.

I HIGH PRIEST DR ALLIEY KONDEWA, I am a warrior, all what has met me in Bo is to my surprise. To start with I had a vehicle at BASE ZERO which was transporting my KAMAJORS for long, it was in my possession, in Bo. Mr Daramy Rogers told ECOMOG to take that Vehicle from me and infact ordered the Arrest of my boys and they were locked up at Brigade Head- Quarters in a guaid room.

I went to lodge my complain to the Resident Minister Hon. Foday Sesay and later ECOMOG brought a war Tanker to fight me for the said Vehicle. I had to hold my peace and went back home.

Since I never feared them, later Mr. Daramy told me, he was going to get a Vehicle for me but uptill now I have not got the Vehicle. Later he wrote me a letter inviting me and when I turned up he again ordered that the Mercedes Benz car be taken from me forth with.

Further more, Mr Daramy gave me a Junta house at Bo No2 where I was Residing, he has again driven me out of the house in my absence without even given me lieu of notice. Again Sir, within these days, he has ordered ECOMOG to make a check point nearer to my resident only to proveke me. Infact at night presently stones are being thrown at my resident every mid night which I am sure Mr Daramy Rogers is creating all these problems for me.

Even yesterday I saw ^{one} ~~one~~ lady who went to check me that she has her properties in the house I was residing which was a gross chick to my position.

I know from start I am not a bad man but I have now suspected that there is nobody to talk for me in the S.L.P.P. Government.

Even now, I have dispatched my families who are travelling on foot to my home Talia Yorbece. So, I have known that you brought me to Bo only to disgrace me but God will decide. I know t what I have done for the Kamajors,. So the ^{Good} ~~god~~ that gave me the miracle will also be the ^{Good} ~~god~~ that will help me in the whole situation.

May God bless us in the services of the nation.

HIGH PRIEST DR. ALLIEU
KONDEWA

3859

Number	Item	Content
37	Letter	Letter sent from "Death Squad Unit, Tisana", signed by Bob Tucker and addressed to Dear Chief.

Dear Chief,

00000914

Death Squad Unit
118219

I am informing you that we have never ~~but~~ reported to you about our feeding since our lengthy stay. But now things have gone bad and we have not afforded food for some times now.

Please inform your elders and all those concern that we should have food tomorrow. ~~We~~ will not fail.

Please Chief to maintain the good relationship between us


we ask that you provide three (3) bags
of rice and ~~Le 100,000.00~~ (hundred
thousand leones) **00000915**

We know that you people don't
like us pestalking on digging we
will refrain from it, but as
from now onwards our feeding
is your responsible. And you
know what it means for a warrior
to be hungry.

Bob Tucker

38621

Number	Item	Content
38	Passport	Sierra Leone Passport Number S005865, issued in the name of Samuel Hinga Norman.



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00000916

3864

00000917

PASSPORT

These are to request and require in the name of the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without any hindrance and to afford him every assistance and protection of which he or she may stand in need.



S. J. Chris Charles
PASSPORT CONTROL OFFICER
FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE

Given at _____
this _____ 12TH day of _____
MAY 1995



00000918

This passport contains 32 pages.
Ce passeport contient 32 pages.

SERVICE PASSPORT
PASSEPORT DE SERVICE
REPUBLIC OF
SIERRA LEONE

No. of PASSPORT { S 005865
No. du PASSEPORT {

NAME OF BEARER { MR. SAMUEL HINGA
NOM DU TITULAIRE { NORMAN

ACCOMPANIED BY HIS WIFE {
(Maiden name) {
ACCOMPAGNÉ DE SA FEMME {
(Née) {

{ and by children {
{ et de enfants {

NATIONAL STATUS NATIONALITÉ

CITIZEN OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SIERRA LEONE AND THE
COMMONWEALTH

3865

00000919

2

DESCRIPTION — SIGNALEMENT

Bearer—Titulaire		Wife—Femme	
Profession Profession	FARMER / REGENT CHIEF		
Place and date of birth Lieu et date de naissance	MONGHERE 1. 1. 40		
Residence Résidence	SA. LEONE		
Height Taille	5 ft. 9 in.	ft.	in.
Colour of eyes Couleur des yeux	D/BROWN		
Colour of hair Couleur des cheveux	BLACK		
Special peculiarities Signes particuliers	—		

CHILDREN — ENFANTS

Name-Nom	Date of birth-Date de naissance	Sex-Sexe

Samuel Joseph

Usual Signature
of Bearer
Signature
du Titulaire



[Signature]

Usual Signature
of Wife
Signature
de sa Femme

00000919

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3



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00000921

4

COUNTRIES FOR WHICH THIS PASSPORT IS VALID
PAYS POUR LESQUELS CE PASSEPORT
EST VALABLE

00000921

Valid for travel to all Countries of
the world unless otherwise endorsed
and Subject to any visa or other
entry regulations of countries to be
Visited

The validity of this passport expires:
Ce passeport expire le:

11TH MAY 2000

unless renewed.
à moins de renouvellement.

Issued at / délivré à } FREETOWN

date / date } 12TH MAY 1995

00000922

5

RENEWALS
RENOUVELLEMENTS

00000922



OBSERVATIONS

NOT VALID FOR TRAVEL TO, OR THROUGH,
COUNTRIES FOR WHICH A MILITARY, OR
CONTROL COMMISSION, OR OTHER SPECIAL
PERMIT IS REQUIRED, UNLESS SUCH PERMIT
HAS FIRST BEEN OBTAINED.



NO FURTHER ENDORSEMENT AS TO THE
VALIDITY OF THIS PASSPORT SHOULD BE
MADE WITHOUT PRIOR REFERENCE TO
THE PRINCIPAL IMMIGRATION OFFICER
FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE

J. P. Chris Charles
Passport Control Officer

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
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
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

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
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

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00000945

VISAS

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0B8E

32

CURRENCY AUTHORISATIONS

00000948

00000948

[Handwritten signature]

00000949

NOTES

1. Sierra Leone passports are issued and renewed by the competent authorities in Sierra Leone and by the Diplomatic Missions and Consulates of Sierra Leone abroad to which application should be made. Passports should not be sent from one country to another by post.

2. They are available for five years in the first instance unless otherwise stated, and may be renewed for a further consecutive period of five years from the date of expiry provided the total period of validity of ten years from the original date is not exceeded. The fee for renewal is Le. 4.00. Passports are not valid beyond ten years from the original date of issue. If at any time the passport contains no further space for visas, a new Passport must be obtained.

3. They are only available for travel to the countries named on page 4, but may be endorsed for additional countries. The possession of a passport so endorsed does not exempt the holder from compliance with any immigration regulations in force in the territories named or from the necessity of obtaining a visa or permit where required. Passports endorsed as valid for the British Commonwealth are also available for travelling to territory under British protection or trusteeship.

REGISTRATION AT CONSULATES ABROAD

Sierra Leone citizens who are resident abroad should at the earliest opportunity register their names and addresses at the nearest Diplomatic Mission or Consulate of Sierra Leone. Failure to do so may in a period of emergency result in difficulty or delay in according them the assistance and protection to which they are entitled. Changes of address or departure from the country should also be notified to the Mission or Consulate.

CAUTION

This passport remains the property of the Government of Sierra Leone and may be withdrawn at any time.

It is a valuable document and should not be altered in any way or allowed to pass into the possession of an unauthorised person. If lost or destroyed, the fact and circumstances should be immediately reported to the Passport Office, Freetown, or the Sierra Leone Mission or Consulate and to the local police. New passports can only be issued in such cases, after exhaustive enquiries.

Number	Item	Content
39	Memo	Memo from the Commander in Chief (SLCDF) to the Honourable Chief Sam Hinga Norman dated 23 November 1997 titled "enlistment of executive members of zone II front line, assault rifles and shot-guns in possession."

FROM: The Commander-in-Chief
Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces (S.L.C.D.F)
Zone II Front Line
Kenema District

00003715

TO: The Honourable Chief Sam Hinga Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence and Co-ordinator
Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces (S.L.C.D.F)
Republic of Sierra Leone - West Africa

23rd November, 1997

Dear Sir,

ENLISTMENT OF EXECUTIVE MEMBERS OF ZONE II FRONT LINE,

ASSULT RIFLES AND SHOT-GUNS IN POSSESSION.

I herewith present to you an enlistment of Executive Members of the Zone II Front-Line comprising of eight chiefdoms - Dodo, Lower Bambala, Simbaru, Kando Keffriama, Wlandor, Gorama Mende, Kangama Gorama and Nongowa Chiefdom, Co-ordinating the proper functions of the S.L.C.D.F. Kamajors.

This enlistment also includes the number of Assault Rifles and Shot-Guns in our possessions for your recognition and necessary approval.

Looking forward towards your co-operation. With kind regards.

Faithfully Yours,

Musa O M Aminisa

~~SIG: [Signature]~~

(Commander-in-Chief)

EXECUTIVE MEMBERS OF ZONE II FRONTLINE

KENEMA DISTRICT

00003716

1. Muso O.M. Tuniso	Commander-in-Chief
2. Mohamed O. Moosa	Deputy Commander-in-Chief
3. Abu Bakkar Kenuwa	Secretary General
4. Peter C. Sandy	Asst. Secretary General
5. Amama Siaka LAHAI	General Field Commander
6. Milkailu S. Samuka	Asst. General Field Commander
7. Baggie J. Klatters	Commander - - Tongo-Kenema Road.
8. Kekura Amara	✓ - - Panguma-Kumpah Road
9. Jusu Amara	✓ Kando Leppama-Dodo Road
10. Muso Foray	✓ Tonge Kono Rd By Tonge.
11. Sahr Ndapi	✓ Tonge Kono Rd By Kono
Lahai Kekura	✓ Wiima Bendu Junction Rd.
13. Ibrahim Samma	Asst. CO.
14. Osman Tengbeh	✓
15. Bockarie Lamin	✓
16. Bebor Juannah	✓
17. Moses B. Mendeglea	✓
18. Ezima Musa	✓
19. Amara Manch	✓
20. Joe Banda	Patrol Commander
21. Mohamed Kaineh	✓
22. Malikie Porme	✓
23. Mohamed A. Samking	✓
24. Sahr Samsama	Nursing Official (Health)
Joseph Musa	✓
27. Sia James	✓
28. Tailu Musa	✓
29. Mustapha Alpha	Ameral
30. Amadu Beckarie I	✓
31. Morie Hallel	✓
32. Abdul Bah	Driver
33. Amara Yambasu	✓
34. Kinie Kallay	✓
35. Kinie Amara Allieu	Senior Kamajor Police (K.P)
36. Sao Nostah	K.P.
37. Lansana Gandi	Plateau Commander

NOTE: To be continued. - Sier ~~Mohamed~~ ~~Siaka~~ / 23-11-97
Commander-in-Chief

00003717

FROM: The Commanders in Chief - S.L.C.D.F.
Zone II Front Line - Dodo and Lower Bambara Chiefdoms
Kenema District.

TO: The Honourable Chief Hinga Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence and Coordinator
Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces
Republic of Sierra Leone - West Africa

25th November 1997.

Dear Sir,

As we have put Tongo Field in the Kenema District under
siege, and for the effective Mobilisation and Operation of our
Kamajors, we humbly submit the following Suggestions for your
reasonable Considerations and prompt action.

1. Additional Rifles:

- (a) Shot-gun / Single Barrel and Cartridges.
- (b) FN Guns and Bullets.
- (c) A.K. Assault Rifles and Bullets.
- (d) More R.P.G Bombs and Tubes.

2. Medicines / Drugs.

3. Condiments

4. Power-saw - Petrol, Engine oil, and Gasoline.

5. Considerations for the Front Line Executive Commanders.


6. Books and Stationaries.

7. Recognition for Karamoh Mustapha K. Kelfala; Recognition and
certification.

8. Advice on the next Operational intention and programmes.
(a) Tongo (b) Kenema and (c) Njijama Mimi Koro c/dam - Kenema Dist.
(d) When and How.

Looking forward towards your advice in regard thereof.
With kind regards.

Faithfully Yours
Musa O.M. Punisa (i.c.)
25-11-97

(2) Mohamed D. Moosa (D.C.I.)
Sig. 
(3) Abubakar Kamawa (Sec. Gen.)
Sig.  25/11/97

ASSULT RIFLES AND SHOT GUNS IN POSSESSION AND MANPOWER
OF S.L.C.D.F - ZONE II KENIEMA DISTRICT

00003718

- 1. NO. of Shot - Guns 275
- 2. NO. of AK. Guns 78
- 3. NO. of G3 Guns 28
- 4. NO. of S.A.R 45

TOTAL 426 RIFLES.

- 5. Kamajors with Machetes 774
- 6. Others Deployed in Strategic Locations in the C/Doms. 377 + 3393 = 3770
- 7. Task Force in Action with the C.I.C. - Musa O.M, Nimisa 30 (Headed by Lansana Gaudis)

TOTAL S.L.C.D.F - 5000 KAMAJORS.

SIG. ~~MOXX~~ ~~SH/9~~ 23-11-97
(COMMANDER - IN - CHIEF)

SIG. ~~SH/9~~ 23/11/97
(DEPUTY COMMANDER - IN - CHIEF)

SIG. ~~SH/9~~ 23/11/97
(SECRETARY GENERAL)

3886

00003719

~~SECRET~~
23-11-97

HONOURABLE CHIEF SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND CO-ORDINATOR
SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES (S.L.C.D.F.)
REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
WEST AFRICA

Number	Item	Content
40	Memo	Memo from the Secretary General SLCDF, Abu Konuwa, to Hinga Norman dated 16 November 1997, titled "Situation Reports as at 16 November 1997, and the violation of the Conakry Peace Accord by Both the AFRC and the RUF".

FROM: The Secretary General
Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces (S.L.C.D.F.)
Zone II Operational Front Line
DODO/Lower Bambara Chiefdoms.
Kenema District.

00003720

TO: The Honourable Chief Sam Hingaah Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence and Co-ordinator
Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces (S.L.C.D.F.)
Republic of Sierra Leone - West Africa.

16th November 1997.

Dear Sir,

SITUATION REPORTS AS AT 16th NOVEMBER 1997, AND THE
VIOLATION OF THE CONAKRY PEACE ACCORD BY BOTH THE
ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (AFRC) AND THE
REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF)

With honour and Maximum respect sir, I do herewith forward you this letter, in relation to the above subject matter. To start with, let me first and foremost thank you for and on the behalf of all the civil defence forces from the chiefdoms of Dodo, Lower Bambara, Simbari, Wandor, Kando Heppiana, Kangama, Gorama, Gorama Mende and part of Nongowa (i.e. Bassara, Massao, Bambawo and Largo Townships) who are bravely fighting against both the AFRC and RUF to liberate Sierra Leone - Our beloved Country in the Zone II Front Line under the supervision and brave Command of both the Commander-in-Chief - Musa O.M. Turisa and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief - Mohamed O. Moosa.

I thank you very much indeed for throwing your huge weight behind our front line security strength, and for procuring the most needful logistics for us to an extent and hasn't being for that all the chiefdoms mentioned should have been ruined by now and completely devastated by the AFRC and the RUF.

Once again, let me also thank you for receiving our brother here whom we sent to you in Zimmi Months ago especially for the Military training they undergone and returning home again in good spirits. May the Almighty Allah bless, help, guide and protect you.

For your information and documentation, please receive our Situation reports in good spirit and without any fear, in outlining all activities of about five thousand (5000) Civil Defence forces (S.L.C.D.F.) of Dodo and Lower Bambara Frontline, commencing from the time of the ammunition consignment dispatched and arrived in Rama

town in Dodo chiefdom, for all operations now in progress, unto the present date of writing.

May the Almighty Allah moved us towards speedy victory in our endeavours to liberate Sierra Leone - our beloved Country on to returning this Country the Constitutionally elected Government of S.L.P.P. headed by president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.

With kind regards.

Faithfully Yours
Abu Bakarr Kromuwa

SIG [Signature] 16/11/97.
(SECRETARY GENERAL)

ENDORSED BY:

1. Musa O.M. Junisa

SIG [Signature] 16-11-97
(COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF)

00003721

2. MOHAMED O. MOUSA

SIG [Signature] 16/11/97
(DEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF)

FROM: Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces (S.L.C.D.F.)
 Zone II Operational Front line
 Dodo and Lower Bombala C/Doms.
 Kenema District

00003722

TO: Honourable Sam Hingah Norman
 Deputy Minister of Defence and Co-ordinator
 Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces (S.L.C.D.F.)
 Republic of Sierra Leone - West Africa.

16th November, 1997

Dear Sir,

SITUATION REPORTS AS AT 16th NOVEMBER, 1997.

Please receive these reports of the activities of the S.L.C.D.F. Kamajors loyal to the ousted Government of the Constitutionally elected Sierra Leone Peoples Party (S.L.P.P) headed by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, in their unbrink efforts to liberating this Country from both the A.F.R.C. and R.U.F being ignored and Rejected by the Regional Power - ECOWAS and the international Communities. These reports are as follows: -

1. THE OCCUPATION OF PANGUMA TOWN:

Ever since the fighting between the Civil Defence forces of Zone II and the A.F.R.C./R.U.F Rebels in Panguma on the 19th September 1997, in which case we captured the town ~~and~~ and deployed there for a week, we after all withdrawn tactically to Dodo Town because of Logistical and welfare problems. Hence Panguma remained a ghost town; to some extent a place of 'No-go'.

On receiving the cache of arms and ammunitions from our brothers who returned from Talia, Yobeko in the ~~Kenema~~ ^{Bonthe} District with much happiness and jubilation, our dear Commanders-in-chief made a fair and reasonable distributions to the respective and brave Commanding officers of various operational areas we have located in ~~the~~ parts of the Kenema District.

However indeed on Sunday 2nd November, 1997, over five thousand Kamajor Militia men finally entered and occupied Panguma town for permanent deployment, and thus deployed at all Ops areas of strategic importance and then diverged their strenght unto Bumpah a village closed to Tongo Field. Prompt deployment teams were also sent to Njagbema and Soaraylah to Consolidate Panguma Defences.

00003723

2. GUYEIHUN ATTACK:

On the 6th November, 1997, about thirty-two (32) S.L.C.D.F. Kamajors led by Patrol Commander - Mualimu Mohamed Kanneh, who were armed with one (1) R.P.G. Muzzle and Bombs, Assault Rifles and Matchetes, attacked the AFRC Rebels in Gyeihun at about 4:00 P.m. in their efforts to breach the Kenema Main Motor Road that leads to Tongo.

After a brief engagement in hours of battles, the Rebels were defeated and driven out.

Two Trucks loaded with four bags of onions, Rice etc were captured and burnt later on.

Some A.K. 47 Ammos, Two G3 Rifles and Two R.P.G. Bombs were and conveyed to our Main Base.

3. THE TALAMA AMBUSH:

Information received on the 6th November, 1997 that a ~~list~~ of Junta forces who had already attacked and burnt houses in Guala Village, were advancing towards our main base at Talama Town.

The Base Commanding Officer - Keltana Amara and Ten (10) strong Kamajor Militia Men, armed with assault rifles, R.P.G. launcher and Matchetes, advanced and ambushed Junta forces before they could advance to Talama a small town close to Panguma. After about several hours of battles, the Junta forces were depressed, thus they were defeated.

4. KANGAMA GORAMA - S.L.C.D.F. ON THE KONO HIGHWAY:

The Main Motor Road of Tongo - Kono has been blocked and man by Kamajors of about 150 men headed by - Sahr Ndapi of Kangama Gorama since early this month.

On the 9th November, 1997, three (3) truck loads of heavily armed AFRC soldiers and Peoples Army Rebels ~~left Tongo~~ left Tongo and attacked our main base at Meimandu. After about 45 minutes of serious exchanging of artilleries, about twenty-eight (28) bodies of AFRC and PAF were discovered and five of them were captured alive.

One (1) R.P.G. Muzzle, two (2) Bombs, two (2) AK guns, one X.L. Honda but was eventually burnt down.

In the evening at about 4:46 p.m. our Kamajors encountered another attack by AFRC Rebels in two (2) truck loads of another heavily armed Rebels from Kono. Heavy fighting again resumed which lasted for about an hour and thirty minutes. In the battle that ensued 17 AFRC Rebels were killed and one of them captured alive.

We suffered any casualty.

Two (2) of their R.P.G. Bombs, one (1) Hand Grenade was captured and also one of their vehicles that was burnt later on.

5. THE ACCIDENTAL DEATH OF OUR KAMAJOR - FODAY SAFFA:

On the night of the 9th Nov. 1997, three (3) Kamajor Police (KPS) were ordered by their Commanding officer of Swarayllah Base - Mr. Baggie A. Walters - a very brave Kamajor Militia Man.

These KPS were ordered to arrest some unduly Kamajors at Swarayllah Base, which led to a stampede in which case Foday Saffa got collided in darkness with another sword bearing Kamajor.

Foday, a Kamajor from Kamboma sustained a fatal wound to his stomach and died some 15 minutes later.

The other Kamajor also sustained a severe head injury.

6. THE CAPTURE OF ONE AFRC AGENT:

00003724

On the 9th Nov. 1997, the Patrol Commander of Panguma Ops - CO. Siaka Lahai and eight of his Kamajor militia men, patrol a vast area into Gbeegiana Village, these Kamajors were armed with assault rifles and one R.P.G. Launcher. They entered that village without incident. There upon one Junta agent was captured. This agent was in possession of a large number of AFRC Market due tickets. After the captured Agent Robert Ndanema accepted complicity with the AFRC/RUF Rebels, he was eventually given summary execution.

7. AFRC AND RUF'S PEOPLES ARMY (REBELS) ATTACK OUR MAIN POSITIONS IN PANGUMIA TOWN AND WE DEFENDED OURSELVES:

On the 10th November, 1997, the Junta Forces (Rebels) from Pango Fields inflicted a simultaneous attack upon us, in both Panguma and Talama towns about 2:15 Pm.

These rebels were approximately about 300 in number backed by a host of unarmed civilians, to give them other assistance Kamajor Militia Men were Mobilised by their brave CO - Siaka Lahai. These rebels were properly armed with assault rifles - both light and heavy machine guns R.P.G. Launchers and hand mortars.

The Kamajors armed themselves with assault rifles Single Barrels and R.P.G.s to man the situation.

After an hour of serious battle and heavy artillery exchange, the attack of the rebels was eventually halted. The rebels then took to their heels.

One of our Kamajors was killed in action and three (3) wounded in that same action.

The enemies suffered heavy casualties including over twenty (20) of them killed in action.

One (1) G3 Rifle (No. 63 FMP 354254 - 1078) and one (1) AK-47 Rifle (84224) were all captured from the rebels.

00003725

8. BREACHING OF THE TONGO-KENEMA HIGHWAY AT PUJELHUN VILLAGE.

A large Patrol team of Eighty-six (86) Kamajors armed with machetes, Assault Rifles, and equipments such as shovels, pickaxes and one Power-saw, were all led by another Patrol Commander - Ibrahim D. Sama, to Pujelhun village on the 11th Nov. 1997 and encountered the rebels, a brief engagement neutralized.

Two huge Cotton trees were felled on this main Kenema Road.

The bridge was removed as to make the situation worsened for the rebels.

The operation lasted for the whole night of 11/11/97.

One AK. Rifle was captured.

One Rebel killed in action.

Three houses in that village where the rebels used to dwell were razed to the ground.

KANGAMA GORAMA S.L.C.D.F ON THE KONO HIGHWAY AGAIN.

9. On the 12th Nov. 1997 another heavily armed soldiers attacked Kangama Kamajors in to truck loads of AFRC Rebels attack, this time, they came from Kono to re-enforce Tongo.

Another serious confrontation occurred between our Kamajors and those rebels.

The battle lasted for about one hour. Five (5) Rebels were killed.

There was no casualty on the side of the Kamajors.

The survived rebels took to their heels in the bushes and Kamajors chased them. These rebels burnt houses in the villages of the chief Kamajor of Kwangama - Meinmandu, Bandama, Lungu Dawabu Torbu and Senehun villages were burnt by the rebels. They looted and vandalised other villages as well. Most women were raped by the rebels. However, our Kamajors chased them and capture one rebel alive, who was later on executed.

10. CIVILIANS EXPRESSED THEIR LOYALTY AND SUPPORT FOR OUR VICTORIOUS OPERATIONS IN PANGUMA TOWN.

The People of Panguma Town who had until recently been living in hideouts (SORKNEHUN) emerged on Friday 14th November, 1997, to express and consolidate their loyalty and support for our successful operation on the ground. The women have harvested and presented to the Co. on the ground - Siaka Lahai, Sacks filled of Rice for the welfare of the Kamajors. Most civilians have returned to their homes in Panguma, especially when at a time Kamajors repelled a massive attack by the Junta Rebels.

11. BLOCKING OF THE TONGO - KENEMA HIGHWAY VIA KAMBOMA:

On Thursday 13th November, 1997 about one hundred and twenty-two (122) Kamajors led by Patrol Commander - Mualinu Mohamed Kanneh, led a surprising attack on the rebels that have been in control of both Kamboma old and new townships. Kamajor Militia men attacked these rebels and seized the townships; inflicting heavy casualties on them. Our Kamajors captured a cache of arms and ammunition, a Radio Communication Set and its Solar Battery. The following Morning 14th Nov. 1997 the Rebels inflicted counter-attack on us, that ran into a Kamajor ambush but such was beaten back. In the road blocking operation, the Power Saw felled only one big Cotton tree and the main road became faulty.

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Meanwhile, information was revealed that Junta Rebels were mobilising at neighbouring Mangjuction to regain control over Kamboma Towns again. However, Patrol team of Kamajors led by CO - Ibrahim D. Samma and Twenty-Eight Kamajors has been ordered to re-enforce Kamboma. The Kamajors arrived in Kamboma at dusk during which period the New Town of that village along the Kerema main Road was attacked on two directions by Rebels. Kamajors made a tactical withdrawal to Panguma Base. Four (4) Kamajors were wounded in action.

The followings were captured from the Rebels:-

One (1) Radio Communication Set and Solar Battery.
Five (5) Rifles (1 G3 and 4 AK-47).

One (1) R.P.G Launcher (5381 - 1997) and five (5) Bombs.
Several documents belonging to the AFRC and KUF
Rebels.

Twenty (20) of them were killed in action, including one Officer - a lieutenant, whose buttons are on the ready for presentation to you.

Honourable Minister of Defence, these are the development and success made ever since you rendered to us that kind of meaningful assistance, for your information Sir.

Once again, let me thank you very much indeed for and on the behalf of all brave Kamajors on the ground here. May God bless you and your Boss. With regards.

I remain

Abu Bakar Kamawa

SIG. 16/11/97
(SECRETARY GENERAL)

ENDORSED BY

1. Musa O.M. Junisa

SIG. 16-11-97
(COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF)

2. Mohamed O. Meesa

SIG. 16/11/97
(DEPT. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF)

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3896

~~SECRET~~ 16-11-77

HONOURABLE CHIEF SAM HINGAH NORMAN
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND CO-ORDINATOR
SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES (S.L.C.D.F.)
REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE
WEST AFRICA.

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3897

Number	Item	Content
41	Letter	Letter from the Administrative Officer, South/Western region, Bonthe Moyamba District, dated 18 November 1997, titled "Administrative and War Report on the A trip to Mano Dasse."

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Administrative officer

South West Region

Boile Moyamba District

18th Nov. 1997

Administrative and War Report on the
A Trip to Mano Dasse.

On the 17th of Nov 1997 we made a trip to Mano Dasse with Mr. Mustapha Ngobeh, Steve Sowa and Mr. Michael Josiah, on our arrival we meet Mr. Bobor Tucker and group in Mano Dasse, with a vehicle which was seized with some food items like Palm oil, and some bags of Garri.

He Mr. Bobor Tucker hand over 8 bags of Garri and 6 Robbers of Palm oil to Mr. Mustapha Ngobeh.

Mr. Mustapha Ngobeh then hand over the food items to Mr. Steve Sowa⁵ share them among the three main check-point within the Moyamba District (eg) ① Mokorewo Check Point - 2 Robber Palm oil
- 2 bags of Garri

② Nyabahun Check-points 2 Robber Palm oil
2 bags of Garri

③ Mano Town Checkpoint - 3 bags of Garri

④ Moniba Base - - 2 Robber of p/oil.

We then left Mano Dasse to visit some check point that day, we left Mr. Bobor Tucker's group at Mano Dasse at about 2:30 p.m.

faithfully Submitted
Mustapha S. Sanku
22-11-97.

Number	Item	Content
42	Letter	Letter from Mustapha S. Sankoh, Deputy Director and Admin Officer War Council, from the SLCDF South/Western Region, Bonthe Moyamba District dated 22 November 1997 to the Head Office, Talia Town Bonthe District, titled "Administrative and War Report within Bonthe and Moyamba District."

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00003731

Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force
South Western Region

Bottle Moyamba District
29~~th~~ Nov. 1997.

To The Head Office
Talia Town
Bottle District.

Dear Sir,

Report within Bottle and Moyamba District
Administration and Klar

In my position as Administration officer and Deputy Director of Klar, I was in the residence of Mr David Kamara the A.G. Mamba Town, when the Voice of America (V.O.A) said that the Kamajors have turned down all the houses in Moyamba Town and vandalized the Government Hospital,

On the 18th Nov. 1997 I left Mamba Town through Kamama Town for Moyamba Town. At Kamama town I had a meeting with the town Borta Steamboat Co Christian elders and the Kamajors for me to brief them about the present position of the klar and what has been done out of the Council e.g. The blockade and the road blocks leading to the main roads to Mambasa and Bo.

This meeting was chaired by Mr Michael Joriel. During the meeting the Acting Christian speaker brief the high table about a vehicle that going to Mambasa with some food items. This vehicle was up held by some of the Kamajors from Mamba Town. Later I came to know that all the food items were seized. As the people of this Christian will like

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to know that or were about the food items. In my reply, I admonished the chiefton people that all the food items that was seized, will go down towards the ^{war} effort. Some of this food items like Palm oil, Garri etc, were send down to Tolia for the Trainees and at the check-points.

Ending my address by saying that it was the embargo that the Kamajors are enforcing and the Council have agreed - that no food items leave for freetown, but your people and the business people are against the law of the Council.

I later explain to them about the training programme of the Kamajors, and the number we need per chiefton (64). The acting chiefton speaker who is also a Kamajor agreed to send the Kamajors for the training programme. The meeting end with a laud of prayer.

At about 2:30 p.m. the same day I left for Sembuh Bagruwa chiefton through Moyamba town ~~etc~~ to present the Ground Commander for the three chiefton - e.g. Sembuh, Shenge and Tendele, and to see if the allegation made by the U.O.A. is true, but later we see that the allegation is not true, we then left for Sembuh towards the night.

On the 30th Nov 1997 about 11:30 am. I held a meeting with the chiefton people and the Kamajors of Sembuh Bagruwa chiefton. The meeting was chaired by P.C. Victor Barlentu, who is also a Kamajor. In the chair-man's address, he advise the chiefton people and the Kamajors within his chiefton.

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to support the work of the Council, and what ever message was received from them. The following people address the meeting (eg), The Clifton speaker, the Clifton Grand Commander, the Base Commander and Mr. A. J. Bangs.

After addressing them about the Training programme in Calicut for the Leamings, the enforcement of the Embargo and Role-acts of the main roads leading to factories and within the Morganza District. I explain to them that the Leamings are in control of the Cliftons in the Morganza District.

At the end of my address to the Clifton people and the Leamings, the people left the hall to hang round, if they were ~~accepted~~ ^{accepted} the Area Grand Commanders on note. They later return with a word by the leader and a Clifton Committee member that our the people of this Clifton has rejected or refused New Mustafa's leadership as their Area Grand Commander. They said they want Mr. Bookarie Kamme to be ~~their~~ Area Grand Commander.

I then thank the people, but rebuke them and explain to them that the Council has send this man. I will take back the message to the Council, but you will ^{not} tell the Council what to do?

The Paramount Clifton is the Chairman and a Leamings Grand, Please tell the Council that we will accept this man as "Principale".

The Clifton speaker gave the vote of thanks. After the vote of thanks, The Paramount-Clifton

present to me a letter which was send to him from the District Officer Morganza District, dated 14 Nov

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1997, with a head line "Kamajors' Activities in Bagasso Chiefdom". The letter was retyped for you to see and the Council to react.

The meeting ends with a word of prayer.

On the 21st Nov 1997, I held a meeting in Shenge Kagboro Chiefdom at about 11:15 a.m. The meeting was chaired by the Chief Kamajor in the Chiefdom. The Chair-man admonished the Chiefdom people and the Kamajors to welcome the Council members in Kagboro Chiefdom. He asked the people to work hand in hand with the Kamajors, so that the war will come to an end, we need to support the Kamajors because they are our fighters.

Mr. Today Kamara the town Chief of Plantee Island told the Chiefdom people that a lot of Business people are rumour mongers, they use to carry all kind of news which is not true or good towards the Kamajors.

On the 17th Nov. 1997 one boat owner and a business woman took a bad news to the Island that the Kamajors are cutting the hands of civilians in Shenge, that made the boats from Tomba refused to enter Shenge.

Mr. Director the road leading Shenge to Moyamba route, has been closed. Please inform the Council that this is the only route leading to Plantee Island, we have no food, People are going out of the Island, we the people of Plantee Island will be grateful if the road will be open.

(5)

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So that we will get food for our people, and Planter people will bring fish for Shenge. We need to work with our brothers the Kamajors hand in hand, he ends his address.

As a Director, I address the Chiefdom people and the Kamajors point by point.

① Blockade, I admonished them that the Blockade is enforced by the Council, and the Kamajors are in place to block all leading roads. These roads are block due to the embargo. The Kamajors will enforce the embargo, because your children, brothers, sisters and uncles are bad people.

② Rumour Mongers :- I will be grateful to all the business people who used to carry bad news about the Kamajors to stop now. I will order my men to be looking around for any body who is carrying bad news.

③ The Training Program: I then explain to the people and the Kamajors about the training program of the Kamajors, and the number we need for Chiefdom (64). In replying the Chief Kamajor said, the Kamajors from this Chiefdom have gone for the training to Talia through Gbangbatoka by sea, with all they needed.

Ending my address I present Mr. Mustapha Monduwa as the Area Ground Commander for the three Chiefdom, e.g. Sembahu, Tan deta and Shenge. The Chiefdom people then asked the Council members to leave the hall, they want to hang heads. After hanging heads, the Spolice man Mr. Foday Kamara said, He have 19 Sections in this Chiefdom, We need

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to call all the ~~Sub~~ Sections, we will not take any discussion now, but for now we have to accept the Area Ground Commander in Principle.

The Vote of Thank was given by Mr Brima the Acting Principal of Shenga Sec School; He made few point about; Rumour-mongers, Respect among Kamajors and Civilians and Cooperation between the Chiefdom people and the Kamajors. The meeting ends with a word of prayer.

SUGGESTIONS

- ① With your approval and the War Council, Sir, You please allowed me to open the road for Moyamba Town to Shenga, because our hard working or fighting (men) Kamajors are all over the Moyamba District.
- ② Allow me to supply Ammunition to Bontle Island and the various area like, Shenga Sambokun and Tembele, because these areas ^{are} ~~are~~ by the sea.
- ③ The Commanders of these areas said that they will not seize fine because the A. F. R. C. ~~is~~ people have failed ^{to} ~~to~~ seize fine ~~themselves~~.
- ④ That we strengthen more Kamajors to the Bontle Island.

Yours faithfully
~~Mustapha~~ 22-11-97.

Mustapha. S. Sankoh
 Deputy Director and Admin. Officer
 War Council.

3906

Number	Item	Content
43	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a dead body of a male of African extract found inside a Sierra Leone Service Passport Number S005865, issued in the name of Samuel Hinga Norman.

3907



P0000001

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Number	Item	Content
44	Photograph	Photograph of King Dr. Allieu Kondewa together with another person.



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P0000002

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Number	Item	Content
45	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Saidu Duaiavian.

3911



SANDU DAMIR

P0000070

Number	Item	Content
46	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Joseph Abdulai.

3913



JOSEPH ABDU
POO0071
F

3914.

Number	Item	Content
47	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Robert Sevalie.

3915



ROBERT SEWELL


P0000072

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3916

Number	Item	Content
48	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Musa Share.

3917



MUSA SHARR

P0000073

10

Number	Item	Content
49	Photograph	Photograph of what appears to be a child soldier by the name of Foday Lasana.

3919



FUDAY LASTANA

POOOO74


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Number	Item	Content
50	Letter	Letter from Allieu Kondewa to Chairman of Bo District CDF dated 4 September 1998.

to be filed

3921

The B. District Kamajor Initiators
B. District Civil Defence Forces (SL)
88, Mahei Boima Road
B.



4th September, 1998.

The Chairman
B. District Civil Defence Force
88, Mahei Boima Road
B.

Dear Sir,

A RECOMMENDATION IN FAVOUR OF
MR. FODAY TOMMY TO UNDERTAKE
MEDICAL STUDIES OVERSEAS TO
AS A DOCTOR.

We the under signed members of Kamajor Initiators wish to write on the above subject and to inform you that Mr. Foday Tommy has been observed by us, to have a wonderful medical talent. During the rebel and junta war, he was of an immense help to all Kamajors when they fell sick or sustained bullet wounds. He carefully treated them and they recovered to continue the fight. In the hottest part of the battle, he utilised his time without fear to go about treating Kamajors only to make sure that the Man-power capacity of the Kamajors is sustained.

Because of his national service and devotion, respect and love for humanity, we the initiators are recommending Mr. Foday Tommy without any reservations to you for an immediate help, so that he could be ~~sent~~ sent for training ~~and~~ and qualify as a doctor.

We would be therefore grateful if your office could consider this, as a matter of urgency. We now regard Mr. Foday Tommy as a real son of our beloved country, Sierra Leone. We strongly vouch for him to be given the privilege to train as a medical doctor; we shall not be disappointed. Your favourable response is solicited.

Yours Faithfully,

Aliou Kondewai

Mr. Aliou Kondewai
High Priest and Head of Kamajor
Initiators



P.T.O.

Number	Item	Content
51	Personal note book	<p>Reports a number of killings committed by kamajors.</p> <p>Refers to a meeting in Base Zero where Hinga Norman said that he was to blame for everything that kamajors are doing.</p> <p>Refers to a meeting of some executive members of the CDF where it was discussed that in order to win the war a human being should be sacrificed.</p>

* Chief Kamapu - I/Bogor ~~is~~
 killed by Hassan Teika
 on the directive of
 Garbar - Reason ^{Name} of victim
 = where
 = witness
 = see

* Ribi Chiefdom Speaker
 killed by A/Bu Bonote
 Reason
 where
 witness
 see

* One woman & a child
 killed & thrown into
 fire by Jesse Betty,
 Kany Boy, Fassa Kpalca,
 nurse will + Donald.

h

- 5. On issue order - Gambia
- 4. For perpetrator: \angle D Lamin
Njandahun
Village, Mada
C/dm Pujon
Dm, Pujon
- 3. Date of event: December
Kpema and
E. H. West Wande
C/dm So District
- 2. Place/Location - Behon
Sandi
- 1. Name of Victim - Lamin Sandi

6. Reason - ~~Refused~~
~~to leave the camp~~
~~to go back to~~
~~house.~~
 Failure to provide
 food, ~~for~~

7. Witnesses - Temei Sandi
 Mamara Kalisa
 Musa Aue
 Adama Sandi

~~11~~ // Mrs. Anon
Kens 87
Duffer Green

Miss Lamm

Land Phone

263977

Phone Number
Vandl & Arsenq

958 727

- Musa
Mrs. Peyikie *
- Mr. John Musa *
- Mrs. Jombo *

Bonthe Dist

- 1. A Fullah was killed by Amode Peika
- 2. Someone murdered in Gambia

Bgo District

- 1. A Student killed in nokosa
- 2. A man killed in maka yonni
Kamayas chief Killed
by Hasem Feika

1. Coy

Seimbehum Tokofele
Joe Munnie killed
a man for vehicle.

Wit, Nelson Cawker

Matta - dnusa Will

Malikie Gektor
- Helma Benda

Motabaga

Pelita - Sada Benda

Mama Tabu - Moga
kato waga

Name of Victims - Mama

Abdul Kamal

Abdul Kamal

Village Negeri
Matake

Motaka Monopson

General Quack
Mobile Junction
Real Name -
Purpose -
Associates -

General Bank
 Albany, Masson
 Street
 60 Kanals
 In the approval
 of Chief Admin
 Meet of Com
~~And includes~~
 Great than-112
 Shop each P.C. Quicks

to fall by to Kanaps
in the Bonthe
Dist not to prosecute
him in the special
Court.
Morrina Fofana

Assignment

TERRA
NORMAN BOYS
Solo B. Boys.
General Quack
50 Names
Lis

Responsibilities

1. ~~to~~ Donor
Funds misapp
ropriation

~~to~~ All NGO

primary
Co-observation
with foreigners
to dupre our country

- Snuggly

- Drugs

pornography

Sexual ^{inter}
course with girls

at the ^{supra}

from the pictures

Tisando

Boring

Libao

Number	Item	Content
60	Report	Witness' report on atrocities committed by Kamajors implicating Hinga Norman.

ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY KAMAJORS THAT IMPLICATES CHIEF SAM HINGA NORMAN.

The Kamajors like all other factions in the Sierra Leonean war committed terrible crimes against humanity. And at the height of the then war, nobody would dare to complain in the open. Even if there was someone to do so, the question would have been, who would listen? Or to say: Where to complain? And as they (the Kamajors) was paraded like angels of light, ~~the~~ people saw them as a necessary evil. And so we all waited for this great opportunity.

My focus will be on the Bontne Sherbro Island, the second base of the S L P P and otherwise considered the neglected Island. When you look at the geography of Bontne Island, it will appear clear that it is isolated from the country as a whole. Terrorism was at its highest degree which resulted to the loss of so many lives. We thought at first that these were carried on under the instructions of Konduwa who was crowned High Priest.

But as the Kamajors ~~revealed~~ ^{revealed}, they, including the high priest were all working directly under the commands of Sam Hinga Norman. I will at this ~~point~~ ^{junction} begin to outline some of these crimes that could be remembered.

The Kamajors at one time captured 34 civilians who went to fetch cassava and other food items in the neighboring villages. Three of them were murdered on the spot and their bodies eaten by them at a village called Mosandi, in the Sittia chiefdom, Bontne District. The remaining 31 civilians were kept in custody and to be killed by instalment. But thank God that the soldiers based in Bontne town who intervened and liberated innocent people.

When these attacks on civilians became intensive, the entire township mobilized religious leaders and other elders of the town to take a message of plea to Sam Hinga Norman and

and all the Kamajors at Base Zero, (for that was the place where Kinga Norman and others planned and executed all of ~~the~~ activities. It would also interest ~~one~~ to know that even ~~we~~ collected a huge amount of money to give them token. Our message was: "Please don't send Kamajors to attack Bonthe people again. We would support you if you travel by sea to Freetown and overthrow the Junta here, Bonthe is not the seat of the AFRC. We are tired of seeing people (civilians) being killed and amputated." That was the content of our message. But while the ambassadors left they were ~~beaten~~ beaten and seriously maltreated by the Kamajors at 'Mamaya' and 'Mattru Jong'. But they reached the base and delivered our message from Bonthe. Sam Kinga Norman and Kondurain agreed that the Kamajors would come to Bonthe again. It actually amazed us when they attacked us back on the 15th September, 1997, some of the Kamajors were killed and some of civilians lost their lives on that day.

They went further to make a seige around Bonthe town that anybody coming out of Bonthe was to be killed. Some other people were declared wanted dead or alive by the hierarchy of the Kamajors. The prominent people among the list were Pa Lahai Ndokoi Koroma, Chief Brandon, Mrs Violette Tucker and others. And by chance if anyone goes outside of Bonthe would die if caught. And indeed people died by these cruel hands.

When the ECOMOG troops invaded and removed the Junta from power, the soldiers ran away from Bonthe to Guinea. On a Sunday in the month of February, 1998, the Kamajors entered the town with indiscriminate killing and looting of property. They now had the advantage because ~~and~~ nobody resisted them. And this time they were in their hundreds. On Sunday alone, 5 people were killed including Alfred Bendehe (Kondorboi), Kpana Manso and Abu

Saunka. They led everybody into hiding for safety. Some of us were hiding in the compound of a Catholic priest called [redacted] (He can be reached at Pujehun). The Kamajors and [redacted] in particular said that Hinga Norman has given them orders to ~~kill~~ kill and destroy everybody in Bontne. Well, ^{it} ~~was~~ ^{was} sound so strange.

But what ~~was~~ shocked everybody was when he (Hinga Norman) after one week fled into the town with two Econog officers and it was jubilation all over in the town. People thought their days of depression was ~~over~~ over. That no Kamajor would terrorize them because Hinga Norman had the power to deploy Econog troops to oversee the Island. It was a big situational irony. ~~Hinga told~~ (Hinga Norman) responded to the complaints of the civilians in these strong and heart-rendering words: "When the Kamajors were fighting, nobody grumbled. And now that they are paying themselves, people are proving to be ungrateful." After he left for Freetown ~~and there was no deployment~~ of a superior force over the Kamajors. Until when the battalion commander Morray Jusu Kamara advised that some people form a delegation and go to Freetown to report the matter to the President. It was coincidental ~~that~~ with the return of Tejan Kabba from Guinea to Freetown.

Bontne used to be the place where Tejan Kabba ^{got} married to Lucia Kabba as his wife. But that connection did not open his ears to the complaints brought by the delegates. His only response was, ~~that~~ he sent 100 bags of rice to the Kamajors and some money. So it appeared funny that the government wanted to compensate them for looting and killing innocent civilians.

Three of us, myself, [redacted] and [redacted] went to the Econog high Command in Freetown who was based at ministry of Foreign Affairs building, ~~to~~ and asked him to send his troops to Bontne. He simply said that Hinga Norman and his troops ^(Kamajors) were in control ~~of~~ Bontne and that he had not visited the area. That nothing was going on wrong.

in Bontie. And since then we haven't heard of any opportunity of expressing what we saw with our eyes.

We only ~~could~~ concluded that they were the Government's avants. Apart from the moneys they collected from us by ~~us~~ setting us free from being killed, there are other stories we would get if ~~the~~ genuine interviews are conducted on the Bontie Island.

4005

Number	Item	Content
61	Report	Report from Hassan Sherrif, commander of the 4th Batallion CDF, to Deputy Defence Minister, dated 31 October 1998.

FROM: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

#2

[Signature] 1/10/98

To: THE DEPUTY DEFENCE MINISTER
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STATE AVENUE
FREETOWN.

31st OCTOBER, 1998.

DEAR SIR,

REPORT AGAINST [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

I wish to report that on Friday, 30th Oct 1998 whilst on my way to visit Cangari hills as I had received ammunition from the C.D.F and Ecomog Commander, two of my Kamajors came to inform me that a team of ECOMOG soldiers led by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] visited my house at [REDACTED] that day and forcefully entered into all the rooms, therein, pried my boxes and those of my wife and mother and looted our personal belongings worth thousands of leones. Returning to [REDACTED] on Saturday, 31st Oct. 1998, I found out that the reports from my Kamajors was true; and that even the ammunition and food stores were broken, and the reserved ammunition and food were taken away. I was further informed that before their departure back to Bo, they promised to attack my house at any other time mainly to get my personal effects for reasons best known to them.

P.T.O

As I don't want any further speculation and
[redacted] team which will result in
result in [redacted] discussion, I hereby request
the above matter to you for your honorable
indulgence for an immediate investigation
in order to avoid any future unpleasantness.

Thanks for your Cooperation
Yours faithfully

~~[Signature]~~ 31/10/98
[redacted]
[redacted]

- Copy: 1. Vice President - Federation of ECO1906 Commander BO
- 3. Mr. Korsch Hindong
- 4. Mr. Minna Fofanah (Ward Director) BO ✓
- 5. National P.R.O. F/Town

NPRO

Please urgently peruse this matter together with the Chairman - Disciplinary Committee, and the Director of W&A and Commander National Task Force and report your findings to the attention of the National Co-ordinator.
Thanks.

[Signature]
2/11/98

Number	Item	Content
62	Letter	Letter from Witness to Officer in charge, Moyamba Police station, dated 8 March 1999, reporting general incidents of armed robbery and murders by unspecified perpetrators.

4009

#3

Sembehun Town
Bagruwa Chiefdom
Moyamba District

8th March 1999

[REDACTED]

Dear Sir

INCIDENTS OF ARMED ROBBERY AND MURDERS

As your office appears not to be aware I wish to inform you of rampant cases of calculated armed robbery and brutal murders currently happening in this chiefdom for personal gains. Already local interrogations and eyewitness accounts have revealed public confessions and written statements of open admission by some of the suspects and there is abundant evidence including murdered human bodies. Your immediate appearance on the scene is now being gratefully awaited to confirm and complement our local initiatives and in particular to apprehend the suspects before they get lost to constitutional justice. Some of the culprits are being held under local custody pending your arrival. They have named partners who are yet at large apparently under cover by some highly placed personalities in the community for share of the plunders.

I make this report because I am aware that the country is back under constitutional government and your official responsibility to this effect is not only mandatory but undiminished. It should be promptly available to contain and prosecute criminals in a legitimate and timely manner. It would also assure residents of our area of regular police protection at all times. To do otherwise is to abandon us to interminable re-currence of the above dreadful acts.

Yours faithfully

[REDACTED]

Copy:

1. The Town Chief, Sembehun Town
2. The Paramount Chief, Bagruwa Chiefdom
3. The District Officer, Moyamba District
4. The Provincial Secretary, Southern Province
5. The Minister, Internal Affairs and Local Government
6. The Resident Minister, Southern Province
7. The Moyamba District Chairman, S.L.P.P
8. Concerned Citizens Bagruwa Chiefdom

Number	Item	Content
63	Report	Report submitted by CDF National HQ to Chairman of national Co-ordinating Committee-CDF for the attention of President Kabbah.

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE

FROM : THE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES
OF SIERRA LEONE, NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
BROOKFIELDS HOTEL BASE,
FREETOWN

TO : THE CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL CO-ORDINATING
COMMITTEE - CDF(S/L),
FREETOWN.

FOR : THE ACTIVE ATTENTION OF HIS EXCELLENCY,
THE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE.

SUBJECT : VOTE OF NON-CONFIDENCE
IN CHIEF SAM HINGA NORMAN-NATIONAL
COORDINATOR CDF(S/L) AND THREE(3) OTHERS

We the undersigned representatives of Initiators, Administrators and the Commanders of the Fighting Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces Organization, having critically and objectively detected that *Chief Sam Hinga Norman* National Co-ordinator, Mr. Charles Moiwo (The National Public Relations officer) Mr. Francis M. Lumeah (National Logistics Officer) and Mr. Brima Babo (Monitoring and Evaluation Officer/Logistician/Finance Clerk etc.) have failed the organisation in their respective capacities, unanimously resolved in a meeting of the Technical Restructuring Committee held on Monday, 13th November, 2000 at 10:00 a.m. to pass a vote of non Confidence in the said authorities, which is accordingly enacted in this communication.

The following are some of their failings among many others:-

- (1) Riot provoking missuse/misappropriation of CDF funds and other resources such as the F.M. 96.2 Atila's donations, monies and other gifts from both our internal and external benefactors; the regular government offer of 3440 bags of rice and Le51.6 million costs of condiments monthly ration to CDF and the War Front location rations that are supplied from the DHQ has become a chronic phenomenon in the current administration under Chief Sam Hinga Norman as National Co-ordinator
- (2) Chief Sam Hinga Norman as a Deputy Defence Minister has been popularly criticized by other politicians for his political ambition in Sierra Leone. The criticism has negatively affected the Civil Defence Forces of Sierra Leone who have been wisely described as Norman's Thugs that they may be possibly used to protect, not democracy, but his personal political interest. In order to maintain *CDF neutrality* and freedom from political influence we have resolved to terminate Chief Norman's Co-ordinating role played in the Civil Defence Forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2) Chief Norman has strongly supported and protected Mr. Charles Moiwo (N.P.R.O.), Mr. Francis M. Lumen (*Logistic Officer*) and few Initiators to dominate the CDF National Administration with Mr. Charles Moiwo emerging as the most powerful decision maker, and a fearless unfair distributor of CDF resources. These have successfully frustrated many other CDF functionaries including some initiators, administrators and their commanders, the Directorates of Personnel and Welfare, using some dangerous techniques to set our ranks and files against each other so that we may not have the stamina to stand together as a body to stamp out the dubious games that they are playing with the Government investments on CDF.

Chief Norman is himself a very powerful and technically minded natural authority, and a Deputy Minister of Defence of Government, who uses his power and influence to suppress/crush down any bold step taken by the suffering masses to expose their authorities failings. These treatments have in this way succeeded in setting not only the forces against each other but also let the greater percentage of our number believe that Government has done/is doing nothing for CDF hence the popular cries all over the country despite the efforts exerted.

(4) Chief Norman and Mr. Charles Moiwo (*His N.P.R.O.*) have failed to sympathize with, and to serve the interest of the suffering masses - (*ie; the Commanders and their fighters, the disabled, orphans of our K.I.A's etc*) He is in the habit of dressing our minds with unfulfilled promises, giving preferential treatment to some individuals whom they set against the suffering masses in the event of any complaint to Government. A serious investigation into the conduct of things leaves the investigator in no doubt to understand that such detractors are just betrayals of their people; being neither at peace with most of their commander nor with the fighters or the Civil Society.

(5) This very non-consultatively appointed National CDF Administration whose unpatriotic activities have created the current ugly picture of CDF in the minds of the public was single handedly appointed by Chief Sam Hinga Norman from amongst his close associates, some of whom have been incapacitated to function well by the stated super imposed four-man CDF National High Command.

(6) Norman and team have been specifically very negative to the Eastern Province in the matter of distribution of war logistics including arms and ammunitions and the supply of ration for our Blocking Forces. The Kenema, Kono and Kailahun Districts CDF Units were only deceived by the National Co-ordinator's Radio announcement in December, 1999 that he was supplying arms and ammunition to administrators in Kenema only for the administrators and Commanders to rush for nothing. Not even a single arm has ever been supplied by these authorities to Kailahun District, and until the Kono's played their own cards with the Late General Khobe, they would never have been able to address their own CDF Logistics problems. Even Kenema remained in doubt about the position of their own share of these arms unto the time of disarmament. The East is therefore aggrieved and concerned about the neglect while we have discovered of late, that Chief Norman and his *N.P.R.O.* do requisite for arms

and ammunitions for supply to our forces which we have never received (see example attached)

(7) Only a group of Initiators who entered into some special deals with Chief Norman and his High Command team are better cared for and well protected in the denounced administration. All others are neglected and not even recognized, except by the fighters in their operational areas.

(8) In order to control the expressed feelings, efforts were put together during the struggle against the AFRC to prepare constitutional regulator to the life of CDF as an organization, which Chief only handled and kept in the darkest ditch. And after struggling very hard to host the last September 12th-14th 2000 first of its kind National Consultative Restructuring Conference, Chief Norman has skillfully clustered threatening weights using our resources to eventually blockade presentation of this report to our Dear President of this Republic of ours.

We have therefore resolved to cut off link with Chief Norman and his party. We most respectfully ask His Excellency the President to appoint some one in his stead. The attached details of the report on the investigation held by the Military at Camp Hill and CDF into the 17th July, 2000 CDF riot at the Brookfields Hotel will further ascertain the rationale behind this action which is in the best interest of all Civil Defence Forces of Sierra Leone.

Signatories:

- 1. Eastern Province
- 2. Eastern Province
- 3. Western Area
- 4. Western Area
- 5. Southern Province
- 6. Southern Province
- 7. Northern Province
- 8. Northern Province

40111

~~Handwritten scribble~~

CDF Headquarters
Ministry of Defence
State Avenue
Freetown.

August, 2000

CDS


REQUISITION FOR ARMS AND AMMUNITION
DARU OPERATION

The UNAMSIL Commander, Daru have just informed us by telephone. that they have started getting pressure from Segbewema end and he is requesting the Defence Headquarters to supply the following Arms and Ammunition for CDF/SL in Daru

- Shot gun cartridges - 10 cartons
- 60MM Motor Bombs - 3 boxes
- 7.62 - 39mm special - 5 boxes
- 7.62 - 51mm Nato - 3 boxes


Faithfully submitted

Approved by:



Deputy Minister of Defence

22/8/00



Number	Item	Content
64	Report	Report addressed to SCSL about atrocities and human rights violations committed by Co Julius Squire and other commanders.

4/016

(101)

SI. ED-C-7-3
JUL 24 2005

My Contact Address:

[REDACTED]

7-24-05
Graham
Caitlyn
8-10-05

18th July 2005

The Prosecutor
Sierra Leone Special Court
FREETOWN/BONTHE

Dear Sir

REPORT AGAINST MR JULIUS SQUIRE, A FORMER KAMAJOR COMMANDER OF BENDU-CHA CHIEFDOM, BONTHE DISTRICT, PRESENTLY RESIDING IN BONTHE

[REDACTED]

I wish to refer to the above and to present a report against Mr Julius Squire and others, former Kamajor Commanders, for gross human Right Violation and crime against humanity,

After the May 25th 1997 coup and before 14th February 1998, Kamajors made several attempts to attack the Naval Wing of the Sierra Leone Military Force based in Bonthe at that time but never succeeded.

On Saturday 14th February 1998, the Sierra Leone Navy departed Bonthe to an unknown destination. On Sunday 15th February 1998, a set of Kamajors entered Bonthe through Gbongboma and in three different directions in the following order:- 1st group took the Northern part of Bonthe i.e. Otto Street and Medina Street; 2nd group took the middle town street of King Street and the third group took the Southern part of Bonthe through the Muslim Praying ground; all converged to the old P.E. compound which previously hosted the Sierra Leone Navy soldiers known as the billet.

The people of Bonthe especially women were rejoicing having in mind that they were been freed from the suppression of the soldiers but it turned out to be the opposite as Kamajors straight away started killing innocent people on the first day of their arrival in Bonthe. The victim of the 1st killing was one Koana Masso, a fisherman who was killed on the same Sunday, 15th February 1998, by one Kamajor Commander by the name of Saigeh from Gbanpor Wullibun, a fishing ground in Bendu-Cha chieftdom. The deceased, Koana Masso's bones after dogs have feasted on his flesh were buried by the sea face at P.E. jetty area.

On Monday, 16th February 1998, another group of Kamajors entered Bonthe from various chieftdoms including Bendu-Cha, Imperri, Jons, Dema, Siwia, Gbap Nongoba Bullom, etc., etc. On their arrival, the Bendu-Cha group, headed by Julius Squire, all armed and dressed in kamajor uniform entered [REDACTED]

He was brought out of the house into the veranda where Julius Squire asked him about me but his reply was "I do not know his whereabouts."

[redacted] was again asked about the location of my room which he showed Julius Squire. Commander Squire then commanded his men to damage my steel windows, door and wardrobes, removed and transported all that was found in my room including money which they did according to his instructions. The items looted from [redacted] and I were then transported to Commander Squire's house which is located very close to our compound by [redacted]. Julius Squire later remarked that I was lucky not to have been at home otherwise I would have been a dead man. Fortunately for me, I was ill with malaria and I went to receive treatment to the Dispenser by the name of [redacted]. It was during the period of taking the treatment that my children ran to inform me about the entry of armed men into our compound led by Julius Squire and the subsequent looting of property.

After the looting and beating of [redacted] they took him away. On hearing this sad news, I went into hiding for fear of my life. Later, on the same day 16/2/98, kamajors seized the Government Hospital Ambulance to transport looted items from various private homes, government and religious institutions including the Government hospital, District Office, Government Fisheries, Roman Catholic and U.N.C. Mission, the Police Station in Bonthe, etc., etc. During these operations on the same 16/2/98, one Abu Kamara Manteh, son of the then Regent Chief of Sittie Chiefdom was shot dead. His body was displayed at the junction of Medina Street and Lime Street. His left arm was also cut off and taken away by kamajors. (He was the second victim)



[REDACTED]

Immediately after that remark he ordered his men to drag one young boy by the name of Kondor Battiana who was sitting under the feet of one Mr Alfred Bagpie. This boy was brought into the meeting by a group of kamajors alleging that he was one of those working with the junta forces in the Sierra Chiefdom.

All the elders of Bonthe who attended that meeting on that day 16/2/98 pleaded to save Kondor Battiana but RAMBO said no to a point that he attempted to shoot the boy under the barri in the church compound but Rev. Father John Garrick intervened and said "no, you will not kill him here, this is a church compound." The boy was immediately dragged to the sea face on Heddie Road at Marine workshop where he was killed by RAMBO with two shots. RAMBO came back with his men and said openly in the meeting that he was now satisfied and that the peace talks could now go on.

After the killing of Kondor Battiana who was the third (3) person to be killed between the 14th and 16th February 1998 by kamajors in Bonthe, we were asked to pay Le100,000.00 (One hundred thousand leones) each for organising a group to undertake cleaning exercises in the township during the civil disobedience period. This group, the Bonthe working Committee, was formed with the consensus opinion of all stakeholders of Bonthe including the Late Pa Isaac E Williams as our adviser for the sole purpose of cleaning the township after months while observing the civil disobedience period.

Whilst we were finding ways of raising the Le100,000.00 (One hundred thousand leones) each or whatever we could be able to raise, I got an information that Commander Julius Squire [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

While getting ready to leave the house, we heard a gun shot along Otto Street. We waited for some kamajors to go and investigate; they came back and told their bosses that some of their colleagues shot dead one Conteh a tailor by trade who was alleged to be a collaborator of the junta forces.

Mr Conteh was now the 4th person killed by the kamajors in Bonthe. Before we left Pa Isaac's place, we were instructed to report at Mr J.P.A. Koroma's place along the same Marine Street, the next day.

Before we got to the said house the next morning, there was already an [redacted] who went and gave a testimony on our behalf regarding the operations of the Home Working Committee vis-a-vis other related issues in Bonthe.

It was on the strength of [redacted] testimony that the District Commander and his team apologised to us. He further asked that we forgive them because they were ~~mislead~~ misled by some group of people in Bonthe who had hatred minds for us. We accepted because we were under duress as they were the powers of the day.

witnesses to testify to this are as follows:-

- 1. [redacted]
- 2. [redacted]
- 3. [redacted]
- 4. [redacted]
- 5. [redacted]
- 6. [redacted]

Yours faithfully

[redacted signature]

Number	Item	Content
65	Letter	Letter of appointment from Hinga Norman to Witness dated 11 February 1998.

4021
103

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE

HEADQUARTERS - BASE ZERO

M. F. F.1998

FROM: *The National Coordinator*

TO: [REDACTED]

LETTER OF APPOINTMENT


It is my pleasure to inform you that upon the recommendation of the WAR COUNCIL, I have accepted and approved your appointment as [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] with effect from [REDACTED] 1998.

You have earned this as a result of your hard work and dedication to the cause of our people and the restoration of DEMOCRACY in Sierra Leone.

I wish to urge you to take this appointment as a challenge to strive further and continue to protect not only the lives and properties of our people, but to redouble your efforts for the restoration of constitutional order and the reinstatement of Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as President of Sierra Leone.

I wish you good luck and more successes in your services.

Yours,



NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR

cc: CHAIRMAN - WAR COUNCIL
DIRECTOR OF WAR
FILE

Number	Item	Content
66	Receipt	Receipt dated 3 March 1998 for Le 500,000 presented to the CDF Kamajors from the Bonthe Community.


RECEIVED

3.3.98

I do acknowledge receipt of the 500,000. presented to the Civil Defence Forces Kamajohs on behalf of the Bontle Community. We also appreciate the one drum of diesel fuel and ten gallons which has made mobility a possibility for us at the moment.

We look forward to a closer working relationship between the Civil Defence Forces and the Bontle Community
Thanks.

More Juan Kamajoh
Batalion Commander
Bontle Naval wing
CDF SC



4024

Number	Item	Content
67	Letter	Letter of appointment for CDF regional representatives on the ceasefire monitoring committee approved by Hinga Norman.

4025

CIVIL DEFECTE FORCES - SIERRA LEONE

(Motto: We fight for Democracy)

C/O Min. of Defence
State Avenue,
Freetown.


2nd August, 1999

CDP(SL) REPRESENTATIVES ON THE JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION (JMC) AT NATIONAL LEVEL

Mr. Ambrose F.M. Nabi -
Mr. Andrew N.K. Harding



Andrew N.K. Harding
Director of Personnel CDF/SL



Approved by: National Coordinator - CDF/SL

4026

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES - SIERRA LEONE


(Motto: We fight for Democracy)

CDF/SL REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES ON THE CEASEFIRE MONITORING COMMITTEE (CMC)

REGION/PROVINCE	NAME	
North	Mr. Laima Tarawalli	Mr. Sheik A.T. Sesay
South	Mr. Ibrahim Kanneh	Mr. David Kobby
East	Mr. Ahmed Koroma	Mr. Mohamed O. Moosa
West	Mr. Charles Harding	Mr. Cyril Thomas


Prepared by:-

Director of Personnel - CDF/SL



Approved by:-

National Coordinator - CDF/SL



4027


CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES - SIERRA LEONE

Motto: We fight for Democracy)

CDF-SL REPRESENTATIVES ON THE CEASE FIRE MONITORING COMMITTEE (CMC) AT DISTRICT LEVEL


DISTRICT	NAME	
Port Loko	Mr. A.G. Kamara	Mr. Alhaji Abas Bangura
Tonkolili	Mr. Foday Turay	Mr. John Fullah
Koinadugu	Mr. Yamakoro Sesay	Mr. Mohamed S. Marrah
Kambia	Mr. N.Y. Kamara	Mr. Nabie Dumbuya
Bombali	Mohamed Mansaray	Balla Kamara
Moyamba	Tejan Sheku Sankoh	Matthew L. Punga
Bonthe	Mr. Olom Baker	M.T. Collier
Pujehun	Eddie Massalay	Thomas Roger
Bo	Hindowa Kosseli	Joseph Demby
Kono	Sahr Buffa	Miah S. Lebbie
Kailahun	Kandeh Samai	Malcom S. Kamara
Kenema	Arthur Koroma	Abu Bakarr Konowah
Koya Rural	Brima Gibril	Okikie Hunter
York Rural	Johnny Greene	Sorie I. Bangura
Mountain Rural	Godwin Thomas	Sonny Smith
Waterloo Rural	Akie Browne	Sam Cole

Prepared by:-



Director of Personnel CDF/SL

Approved by:-



Nat. Coordinator CDF/SL

Number	Item	Content
68	Letter	Letter setting out actions of Kamajors in Bonthe District.

201 [REDACTED]
 I pray to our Almighty God to give you patience
 have courage to read through this matter that is reported to you.

I decided to submit the report through you because you do not
 sell yourself to the control of the spirit that is not God's Holy
 spirit and you believe only the Bible and your Lord Jesus Christ.
 The actions of the "Kamaron" in Bonthe, is the purpose of this letter.

Putting up the case of the Poor and innocent peaceful civilians.
 As per John 10: 10 "The thief does not come except to steal,
 to kill and to destroy". The present "Kamaron" came to Bonthe
 supposedly for the matter as mentioned supra.

You are aware by the time they came, they stole from poor civilians,
 documents of the District Officers office, the Police station and
 scattered them on the streets; Drug from the Hospital, and materials
 from BONTECH.

now, they attack peaceful civilians in their private houses, civilians
 walking on the streets not saying a word to them, they attack them, kicking
 them, knocking them with Guns and heavy sticks.

when doing their actions, they comment thus "We will set
 fire on this house, kill every body nothing will come out of it".

They call civilians when he or she does not go to them, they
 log him with guns.

Now our President and ECOMOC authorities have appealed to every
 fighting people to lay down their guns. But these Kamaron use guns
 on people. Example: those residing at Samabul took their guns
 on Friday evening about to fire on a poor man who they unlawfully
 attacked, other people intervened. Instead of fixing the gun, they
 flopped him with the gun base.

on Saturday morning they attacked people at Coulson Street
 with their guns. even though they were taken to their base, nothing
 came out of it. They went to their resident and started dancing.

At a recent meeting at the Town Hall, every body was informed that
 all matters are now in the care of the Police. Why are they forcing
 themselves on unlawfully on peaceful civilians. Why are they disturbing
 peaceful civilians?

we are taking this report to you with the hope that you will do
 God's work to protect the poor and peaceful civilians. through
 Revelation 2: 26 our Lord says "And he that overcometh and keepeth my works
 unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations".

If they know the person that sent this letter to you, they will
kill me. That is why I am Unanimous.

May the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing
so that by the power of the Holy Spirit, you may abound in
hope.

May the God of peace be with you.

Yours The Bonthonian.

Number	Item	Content
69	Letter	Letter referring to the suspension of some personnel of the Special Forces High Command on charges of gross insubordination to the Chairman and mutiny.

Number	Item	Content
70	Letter	Letter from Mohamed Tarawally to Hinga Norman dated 10 July 1998.

4033

10th July, 1998.

Atten: Hon. Sam H. Norman
National Cordinator C.D.F. (SL)&
Depury Defence Minister (SL)
Subj: Attestion & Security Clearance.

Sir,


I write to appeal to your honorable office to write out attestation to the ECOMOG high command, briefing them about the existence of the SPECIAL FORCES and that we are the Vanguard Force of the C.D.F. (SL). Attestation is all we need now in order to avoid the re-occurrence of the recent detention of sixteen (16) fighters of the SPECIAL FORCES - all because of lack of identification.

May I appeal that you instruct the office of personel to issue all SPECIAL FORCES fighters identification cards at your expence.

I hope you will treat this matter with due consideration

My thanks and appreciation in advance.

Much Regards



M.S.V. Tarawalley Jr.
Adjutant GENERAL &
Chairman SPECIAL FORCES
C.D.F. (SL)

cc: file

H.E. Albert J. Demby
Vice President
Republic of Sierra Leone

Gen. Maxwel M. Khobe
FORCE COMMANDER
Wilberforce
Freetown

Number	Item	Content
71	Letter	The last page of an apparently 5 page letter written by Moinina Fofana (sic), Director of War/ Ops, Base Zero, Sierra Leone request to the addressee for supplies and ammunition.

CONCLUSION

00003874

125
31
5/1

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4035

It could be seen that the field of operation has now become wide involving a lot of manpower and equipment deployment. Therefore the demand for ~~more~~ ^{more} WAR PERS should not be treated lightly.

Cash for Condiments to upkeep the fronting men ~~and~~ ^{and} the festive period while they are away in the field, should also be considered. The above are urgent requests especially where the operations have now spread nation wide.

Thanks and appreciations are extended to all for actual and continuous assistance

Seasons greetings - May God bless.

Faithfully Submitted

Moinina Pofana
Director of War/PERS
Base Zeno
Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
72	Letter.	Letter addressed to "Chief Norman" written by Dixon S. Kosia, Deputy Coordinator, Lugbu CDF, Upper Saama, Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District re: Request for arms and ammunitions for laying an ambush on Bo, Pujehun, and Sumbuya Highways", dated 29 September 1997.

4037
From the Desk of Deputy Co-ordinator,
Lugbu Civil Defence Committee
Private Mail Bag.
Upper Saama, Lugbu Chiefdom.
Bo District, Sierra Leone.



Dear Chief Norman, 00003875

Sub: Request for an Arms and Ammunitions
for laying an ambush on Bo, Pujehun and
Lunsarya High ways:

I refer you to the above subject matter
and bring to your honourable attention that a few
days ago we the leaders of all Kamajors in the
Lugbu chiefdom visited the Nigeria Contingent
at Bondama requesting them for the above issues.

Please note however that after having a complete
two hours discussions, we were told that they
will only issues those items to ^{us}, provided we
get in touch with you while you in turn
obtain an approval from the field Commander in
Monrovia Major general Victor Malu.

It can be recalled that June 23rd and 25th, 1997
attack respectively was done by Lugbu, Mahlan,
and Bagbo chiefdoms; but our failures at that
time was due to lack of enough weapons. It
therefore, stress that you should endeavor in this
regard. Let me tell you frankly that it seems
to us very much dismay and devastated of some
of our ministers staying in that bush without
infact enjoying a better light of our country →

that is why we the above mentioned chief domo 4038
Kamajors are fighting with all our mights so as to
get rid of those bandits at Koribondo through and
by your total support so that you and your
entourage may come and forge ahead to clear
Bo Brigade military Headquarters in a short possible time.

Chief Norman, we are all aware of the fact that
you are making a great sacrifice for the emancipation
of our people in this Country but there are some individuals
out there with you as we understand are nothing but
Crooks so I advise that you should be aware of those
kind of people or else, we may not get the lasting
solution to peace soon if you fail to correct their mistakes.

Chief, is it true that you had been sending a
little purse for every Kamajor in their respective
chief dom every month? if the story is true, well,
nothing like that or ours has never reach us and I will
be delighted to hear from you when replying to this
letter and also wishes to know the person that purse
would always be sent to for distribution because ^{as} you
know, an empty bag cannot stand.

The reply to this letter would be given to the brave
Mr. Kaidu Hindolo, my Patrol Commander and it is
expected soon. Thanks very much for ^{our} usual kind
Cooperation trusting that this letter will claim your
urgent attention in this regard.

Yours faithfully,

00003876

Dixon S. Kasia.

(Deputy Co-ordinator) Lugbu

Number	Item	Content
73	Document	A one-page "Travelling Pass" dated 16 December 1996 (sic, should be 1998) issued by Civil Defence Southern Region - Bo, 14th Battalion - Koribondo.

4040

00003877

FROM: CIVIL DEFENCE SOUTHERN REGION - BO
14TH BATTALION - KORIBONDO



TO: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUB: TRAVELLING PASS

BEARER Mohammed Saime FROM Abolama Pula VILLAGE/TOWN
IN THE Kpanda bunka CHIEFDOM. Papua DISTRICT.

IS GIVEN THIS PASS TO ENABLE HIM/HER TO TRAVEL TO BO Town
VILLAGE/TOWN IN THE CHIEFDOM DISTRICT

KINDLY ACCORD HIM/HER WITH EVERY POSSIBLE SECURITY AND TRAVELLING
COURTESIES AND ALLOW HIM/HER TO PASS WITHOUT MOLESTATION OR
HINDRANCE.

THIS DOES NOT PREVENT YOU FROM CHECKING THE BEARER

EXPIRED DATE: 16/12/98 + 23/12/98 1998

THANKS FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION

H. H. H.
GOD BLESS YOU

Number	Item	Content
74	Letter	Letter written circa June 1998, by "Representatives of the Bo District Kamajors Southern Province, Bo". The letter is addressed to "CDF/SL National Office, Freetown" through "National Coordinator, Hon, Sam Hinga Norman, Freetown".

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE OF SIERRA LEONE BO
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

- 1. DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR: MR. J.B. KOSSEH HINDOWA.
- 2. ASSISTANT DISTRICT SECRETARY I: MR. G.A. TOMMY.
- 3. ASSISTANT DISTRICT SECRETARY II: MR. J.S.M. MANLEY.
- 4. ASSISTANT FIELD SUPERVISOR: MR. JOSEPH DEMBY.
- 5. ASSISTANT DISTRICT FIELD SUPERVISOR I (OFFICE) MR. JOHN JIGBA.
- 6. " " " II (FIELD) JOSEPH BUNDU.
- 7. DISTRICT TASK FORCE COMMANDER: MR. AUGUSTINE S. NGAOJIA.
- 8. COMPANY COMMANDER ZONE I: MR. ALFRED PESSIMA.
- 9. " " " II: MR. MOHAMED BARRIE.
- 10. " " " III: MR. SHEKU MOHAMED.
- 11. " " " IV: MR. MOHAMED LAMBOI
- 12. LOGISTIC OFFICER I: MR. JOSEPH L.G. LAPTIA.
- 13. ASSISTANT LOGISTIC OFFICER II: MR. SAFFA KALLON.
- 14. HEALTH OFFICER I: MR. MICHAEL D.E. KULANDA.
- 15. " " " II: MR. BOACKARIE KAMARA.
- 16. PUBLIC RELATION OFFICER: MR. MUSA A. MORRAY.
- 17. DISTRICT CHIEF KAMAJOR I: MR. MOHAMED SHERIFF.
- 18. " " " II: MR. MOHAMED ANSUMANA.
- 19. KAMAJOR INTELLIGENCE BRANCH: MR. P.J. POKAWA.
- 20. " " " (VICE): MR. JOHN BASH KAMARA.
- 21. " " " SEC. GENERAL: MR. JOSEPH B.M. KAINESIE.
- 22. " " " ASST. SEC. GENERAL: MR. ANTHONY L. SESAY.
- 23. " " " DESK OFFICER I: MR. THOMAS M.D. BULL.
- 24. " " " DESK OFFICER II: MR. ELLIS HARDING.
- 25. " " " DESK OFFICER III: MR. SOLOMON GBENGA.
- 26. " " " " MR. ALBERT WILLIAMS
- 27. " " " " MR. JAMES KEN SESAY.
- 28. " " " " MR. AUGUSTINE BLALLIE.
- 29. " " " " MR. JOSEPH GBESSAY.
- 30. " " " " MR. STEVEN F. SONNAH.
- 31. " " " " MR. MOHAMED KAMARA
- 32. " " " " MR. DURAMANY LA SANA.
- 33. TRANSPORT OFFICER I: " MR. HUGGARD BOACKARIE.
- 34. " " " II: " MR. MOHAMED JALLOH
- 35. TRANSPORT OFFICER III: " MR. FRANK P. HARDING.
- 36. DISTRICT DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE: " MR. GEORGE NGEGBA.
- 37. DISTRICT " " " ALHAJI IBRAHIM SHERIFF.
- 38. " " " " FODAY T. VEILA.
- 39. KAMAJOR POLICE " MR. SAHR LEBBIE.

4044

Number	Item	Content
75	Document	Document titled "Civil Defence Force, Bo, Sierra Leone, List of Security Personnel Attached to the National Co-ordinator CDF Sierra Leone, Bo Headquarters, 12 New Gerihun Road, Bo".

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE BO SIERRA LEONE
LIST OF SECURITY PERSONNELS ATTACHED TO THE
NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR C.D.F SIERRA LEONE BO
HEADQUARTERS

13 NEW ECKHART ROAD BO

00003881

NAME	DESIGNATION	
1. MUSTAPHA MBAHUN	CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER	
2. ABDUL S. KABE	INTELLIGENCE	4 bags Le 60,000
3. THOMAS SMARII	PRIVATE	4 bags Le 60,000
4. ABDUL SANDI	"	2 bags Le 20,000
5. SULAIMAN LANSANIA	"	2 bags Le 20,000
6. MOHAY BOLKARIE	"	2 bags Le 20,000
7. MOHAMED GIMAH	"	2 bags Le 20,000
8. ABDUL KALLONI	"	2 bags Le 20,000
9. MOHAMED CAMA	"	2 bags Le 20,000
10. MOHAMED KAMARA	"	2 bags Le 20,000
11. MOHAMED KANNEH	"	2 bags Le 20,000
12. TIRAHIM SANNIOH	"	2 bags Le 20,000
13. CHARLES FODAY	"	2 bags Le 20,000

SECURITY
PREPARED / SIGNED BY

SECURITY
SIGNATURE
DATE 2016 4-29-16
C.D.F. S/L H. QUARTERS

MUSTAPHA MBAHUN
(C.S.O)

Number	Item	Content
76	Document	Document titled "CDF / SL Northern Region Structure" showing how many District Commanders, Battalion Commanders and Company Commanders exist in each of the Districts of Bombali, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Koinadagu.

CDF/SL Northern Region - Structure and Conviction. 4/04/77

1. Bombali Dist.

00003882

- a. District-Commander = 1
- b. Battalion Commanders = 5
- c. Company " = 14

2. Port Loko Dist.

- a. District-Commander = 1
- b. Batt. Commanders = 5
- c. Company " = 11

3. Tonkolili Dist.

- a. District-Commander = 1
- b. Batt. Commanders = 5
- c. Company " = 11

4. Koinadugu Dist.

- a. District-Commander = 1
- b. Batt. Commanders = 4
- c. Company " = 11

Number	Item	Content
77	Document	Document titled "Bo District Battalion Commanders". List of CDF Battalion Commanders in Bo District.

PRO District Battalion Commanders.

Name of Batt. Commanders	00003883	chiefdoms-
1. Kenneth Coker		Kakua.
2. Hassan Hecker		BAOMA.
3. JOE Temende		1. Tikonko 2. Wonde 3. Lugbu. 4. Bagbu 5. J/Bongos.
4 FRANCIS YAJAH		1. GBO 2. SELINGA 3 H/LENGA
5. HASSAN SHERIFF		VAHUNA
6 J-S. LAWONDEH		1. KOMBOYA 2. BAGWE 3. BADGIA
7 JOSEPH LADDIA JR.		BUMPÉ

Number	Item	Content
78	Document	Document titled "Bo District Company Commanders". This document contains a list of Company Commanders in Bo District.

Home of Company Comm.

Chieftain

- | | |
|--------------------------|-----------|
| 1. Mr Villa J. | Kakua. |
| 2. Mr Joseph Bandu | Begwe. |
| 3. " Victor Kabha | Baoma. |
| 4. Henry Kosoma | Tikonko. |
| 5. Mr. J.C. Mansaray | H/Lenge. |
| 6. P.D. Agapica | Eelenge. |
| 7. M. M. B. Jallah | Wonde. |
| 8. Michael Kebbie | Luybu. |
| 9. Kasim B. Timmy | Bafor. |
| 10. Brinei Taxawally | J/Bonyor. |
| 11. Eric Hinderna | Komboya. |
| 12. Fudie Messaque | Bumpe. |
| 13. | |
| 14. Mr Kondapa. 00003884 | Chro. |
| 15. | Valuna. |
| 1. | Badjia. |

4052

Number	Item	Content
79	Document	Document titled "Moyamba District BNS, BN/Commanders, Cdoms". This document contains a list of 7 CDF Battalions, Battalion Commanders and respective Chiefdoms in Moyamba District.

MOYAMBA DISTRICT BNS, BN COM, Chief
12/6/2001

BNS	NAMES OF BN COM	CHIEFDOMS
A	GENERAL BN - KINNI TORMA	GENERAL
B	1ST BN - SYLVESTER KEMOKA	LOWER BANTA UPPER BANTA DASSE
C	2ND BN Co. - BORBOR (HAILES	KAIYAMBA FATUNYA BAGRUWA
D	3RD BN - DAVID FATORMA	KORI KOWIA KAMAJEI
E	4TH BN Co. - MOSES SAM	KONGBORA TIMDALE KAGBORD
F	5TH BN Co. FODAY BWM FOFANA	BUMPEH RIBIZI

00003885

6 COMMANDERS

14 CHIEFDOMS

4

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Number	Item	Content
80	Document	Document titled "Official Postings" addressed to The Chairman, Committee for Identification, Documentation, Recovery and Release of Looted Properties".

Number	Item	Content
81	Document	Document titled "Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone, Monthly Logistics Supply Returns". This document relates to April 2001 and is dated 7 May 2001. It was "Signed and Collected for Distribution By: Moinina Fofanah, Director or (sic) War CDF (SL)".

4056

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES SIERRA LEONE
MONTHLY LOGISTICS SUPPLY
RETURNS

00003887

Month. April, 2001

Dated: 07/05/01

No.	OFFICERS	DESIGNATION	RICE	CASH	SIGNATURE
1.	Joseph A. S. Koroma	Director of OPS.	5	50,000	
2.	Jusu A. Nallo	Deputy Director of OPS.	3	30,000	
3.	Joseph Fefegula	D/Director, T/rasp.	5	50,000	
4.	Musa Orinco	Deputy- War	3	30,000	
5.	Prince Brima	Information	3	30,000	
6.	David Khobie	Secretary - DOW	2	20,000	
7.	Senesie Lahai	Security - DOW	1	20,000	
8.	Keifala Fofanah	Security - DOW	1	20,000	
9.	James Fofanah	Security - DOW	1	20,000	
10.	Michael D. Kamara	Security - DOW	1	20,000	
11.	Mohamed S. Koroma	Driver - DOW	1	20,000	
12.	Moininah Fofanah	Director - War	5	50,000	
TOTAL			31	360,000	

NOTE: Total Amount of Le 360,000 (Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand Leones)
And 31 (Thirty One) bags of rice for the above Provincial Officials of the CDF.

.....
Signed and Collected for Distribution By:
Moininah Fofanah
(Director or War CDF(SL))

Prepared By: *[Signature]*
Brima Baba Jr.
(Monitoring Officer Log.)

Number	Item	Content
82	Document	Document dated 23 September 1997 addressed to Sam H. Norman, Dept. Defence Minister.

Number	Item	Content
83	Letter	A letter consisting of a single sheet dated 15 October 1997 written by Andrew Harding and addressed to Sam H. Norman, Deputy Defence Minister.

4059

Number	Item	Content
84	Not Used	

4060

Number	Item	Content
85	Report	Daily Front Line Report dated 2 October 1997 from Alpha K. Siaka, Secretary General. The report is addressed to "S.H. Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence".

00003897

Daily Front Line Report 02/10/97

From: Alpha R. Seana Sec. GEN

To: Hon S. H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence

At the Front (Gofor) 01/10/97

Patrol Team

A patrol team consisting of four Kamajors left Gofor for Tusa Village on 01/10/97. The team was headed by Manna Rogers. When they arrived at Tusa, they found a man and a woman mining diamonds. When they were interrogated, the woman confessed that the man was her husband and that they were gold from Zimra. The two of them were instantly sentenced to death. The following items were found with them:

- (a) Fox Combat Trousers
- (b) Military hat
- (c) Cooking utensils

At the Jendema Base 02/10/97

The day was bright and sunny. The Chairman Mr. Andrew Harding started his days duties by appointing

II

Mr. Tefan Samkrah as the vice distributor in the store and Mr. Bangura as the Communication Man. He admonished the two of them to be committed and dedicated as final appointments will be made at Zimmi. He then dispatched the driver to Monrovia and they moved with Mr. Moinina Fofana to the Economy base where they were engaged for the whole day.

At about 9.30 AM, all the Kamajors at the Tendina Base were assembled at our usual assembly ground. They were followed by all the initiators except Karmah Alieu Sesay. The Kamajors were then given their final blessing and war cry by the leader of the initiators Kariol. Binna Bangura. He told the Kamajors that all the initiators were now united and that they should have maximum regard for all of them. He advised them not to any longer fear the gun as they are well fortified by God. He strongly promised that Zimmi will be captured this time but advised them not to attack on a Saturday.

00003899

Screening of people ^{who} now use the
Sudema base as a route to Monrovia
has taken a turn for the better. It
is so rigorous that one would fear
for the life of any relative who would
want to use this route. Two women
were today screened but were refused
entry into Liberia.

A Kamajo known as Moya from
Kandi Dekpeya in the Kedeua District
left yesterday for Kedeua in the
company of two women who were of
dubious character. Kamajors were
sent after them to bring them back
dead or alive. Unfortunately only Mr
Moya was brought back. After
interrogation, he was given fifty lashes.
Thirty three Kamajors reported again
today from Galesse. They came
with a zeal to clear Zim.

Faithfully Submitted
~~Alpha K. Seaba~~
Alpha K. Seaba

After debarking the whole day
about the activities of Tackee and
others Kwawwema Gorahun Tansia chiefdom Arms and
Ammunitions were given to him which details will be given
to you later.
J. Hopkins
2/10/97

410 b4f

Number	Item	Content
86	Letter	Handwritten letter dated 18 November 2000 from High Priest Dr. Allieu Kondewa (sic).

4065

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE

THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH PRIEST

KING DR. ALIEU KUNDEWA

88 MAHAI BOIMA ROAD, BO

MOTTO: WE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref:.....

Our Ref:.....

00003900

DATE 18th NOV. 2000

Brookfields Hotel,
Free town

To: National Logistics officer,
through National Director
of transport.
CDF/SL.

Allondewal
18/11/2000

Sub. Maintenance of High Priest's vehicle of CDF/SL

The above mentioned vehicle has the following parts already ruined: They are as follows:

- | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|------------|
| 1. Gear box oil seal - 50,000.00 | } | 165,000.00 |
| 2. Clutch kit - 40,000.00 | | |
| 3. Bushing - 20,000.00 | | |
| 4. Brake oil - 5,000.00 | | |
| 5. Brake liners - 50,000.00 | | |

Your co-operation would highly be appreciated, due to your kind response.

Faithfully yours,
High Priest, Dr Alieu
Kondewal.

Allondewal

Number	Item	Content
87	Documents	A set of two documents comprising complaints against CDF by Madam Miata Fofanah for looting of her family property.

From: Madam Miata Fofanah,
No. 9B Willoughby Lane,
Brookfields,
Freetown.

00003911

Fax No. C/o Mr. Joseph A. Kargbo - Sierra Tel - 232-22-224439

To: His Excellency Dr. A.T. Kabbah,
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone,
Presidential Lodge, Hill Station,
Freetown.

Fax No: 231404 Presidential Lodge.

Date: 28th February, 2001.

A REMINDER FOR NOVEMBER 7, 2000
LETTER OF COMPLAINT.

Your Excellency, I am in tears to remind you about my letter of complaint on November 7, 2000. On July 17th, 2000 last year, CDF Personnel's unleashed terror and sufferings on me and my children by looting all our properties (see worth attached)

Being my last hope on this earth as a vulnerable and defenceless civilian woman to save me from this suffering to bring justice to life.

With special reference to the last letter of complaint attached, the CDF authorities have made no sincere move to address this situation on any humanitarian grounds we are baffle whether the letter in question reached you and they fail to honour any option you made to address it.

To be frank on humanitarian grounds, the Head of the CDF (Chief Norman) told me that he has summon a meeting with his authorities on this issue and they have concluded to be law abiding and helpful to humanity. They all agreed to refund the cost of all our stolen properties.

Looking into this, He instructed his logistics officer to start payment of Le600,000 (Six Hundred Thousand Leones) out of Le8,000,000 (Eight Million Leones Leones).

Your Excellency, without the fear of God, and to know even that we are human beings, this instruction after the six hundred thousand Leones in December as a start of paying the claims was dishonoured by the Logistics Officer reasons best known to him. I am sure if I was his sister or any other relation, he would not so do.

Kindly help me as I am falling prey to this manace. Please do not allow this unfortunate situation to overcome me and move me into prostitution by way of my survival and children.

Yours faithfully,

Miata Fofanah 9/3/2001
Madam Miata Fofanah.

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00003911-A(c.w)

FROM: Md. Miata Fofanah
No. 9B Willoughby Lane,
Brookfields,
Freetown.

Date: November, 7th 2000.

Fax No: C/o Mr. Joseph A. Kargbo - Sierratel Fax No: 232-22-224439.

TO: His Excellency Dr. A.T. Kabbah,
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone,
President Lodge, Hill Station,
Freetown.

Fax No: 231404 Presidential Lodge.

Dear Sir,

Re: LETTER OF COMPLAINT

I am a vulnerable woman with five children that was seeking refuge at Brookfields Hotel when our former place of residence at Kissy was burnt down. I am in tears to report the authorities of CDF in Freetown who for reasons best known to them, without the fear of the law of this land and God have unleashed such a terror of suffering to me and my children by looting all my properties (see attached) on July 17, 2000.

Your Excellency, you are now my last hope on this earth for the peaceful settlement of this complaint after the Almighty God as a vulnerable and defenceless civilian woman, because all the CDF authorities have received this complaint since that time but deliberately refused to bring out justice BUT threaten us and allow us to suffer for life. It is really a concern that have turned to hatred and propaganda tarnishing my image within the rank and file of the CDF of which I know nothing about their society as an organization being a poor woman.

On July 17, 2000, about five month ago some kamajors at Brookfields Hotel went into looting riot and went into my room and took away all my properties as they were in arms threatening to kill whosoever stand their way in their mission. On that day Brookfields area was put into panic as they enter into people houses (Civilian) beat them up and take away their properties by force. During this riot, we were forced to leave our house/rooms and run for our lifes.

This matter was reported to the police at New England Ville and later send to the Sierra Leone Military Headquarters, Cockeril. The Military Police intervined as the matter grew very serious and beyond control because of arm threats by these kamajors unleashing terror on we the poor civilians who are not part and parcel of their society. Statements were obtained by the Military Police Personnels and after thorough investigation, the culprits were

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00003911-B(CW)

then arrested and detained for further trial through the legal law of this country that was violated by these kamajors (see attached names).

Furthermore, records of these investigations and the culprits in detention that were to be handed over to the Police for further prosecution was later requested by the authorities of CDF in the persons of NPRO (Mr. Charles Moiwo) and the Director of Personnel (Mr. Andrew N.K. Harding), even the National Co-ordinator and the Deputy Defence Minister is aware for re-investigation and peaceful settlement by their organization which up till this time has not been done.

Sir, it is disheartening to know that since and after they were able to convince the Military Police to release these culprits and the documents with the idea to settle of this matter, the authorities have totally abandoned us and do not even care. They have resulted in provoking the situation so that we shall take the Government to heart as not protecting the life's, property and right of its citizens more especially we who have fallen victims of this notorious disaster.

Your Excellency, we have made several attempts to contact them but to no avail. They have shown no interest and paid no respect to our humanity because they are armed men, have power and seems to be above the law of this country. The authorities indeed have less concern and it seems that they are backing these mysterious deeds and happy about this treacherous punishment they have given us. They close their doors at us each time we attempt to see them, ignore our telephone calls and infact prejudice our character quiet contrary to the matter they are suppose to deal with. The National Co-ordinator and the Deputy Defence Minister have been in the known of such incident and our suffering but had made no move to sympathise with us but with series of promises of refunding our properties in cash while we still remain suffering. Our children are driven from school while the culprits pass freely unpunished.

As a vulnerable mother of five children whose care and responsibility is on me is now falling prey to this menace. Is it because I do not have freedom and justice as a woman?

I once more appeal to you as my last hope to intervene. Please don't allow this problem forced me to prostitute my womanhood. I was taking care of myself and my children through the help of God Almighty. Several people I have met to talk to their bosses but they listen not, even-though there are clear evidences of guiltiness in them.

I and my children remain suffering and weep in agony for such disgrace. God bless you being our good leader. Please help!

Yours faithfully,

M. Miata Fofanah 9/3/2001
Md. Miata Fofanah.

Number	Item	Content
88	Document	An incomplete fax which appears to be the last page of a complaint lodged against CDF by Joseph Sinnah for looting his property at 9 Willoughby Lane, Brookfields, Freetown on 17 July 2000.

4071

00003912

starvation and whatever the like for the entire family to fall victims of this unlawful Kamajor menace. Even the National Co-ordinator, we have made several appeals to him for the cost refunds of our properties, but had made no respond as if he does not care for us being our Defence Minister in your Administration thus believing that ~~the~~ supports what the Kamajors did. The Police have tried to arrest the culprits for the law to intervene but all attempts fell on deaf ears and always threatened the officers as they go to invite them. From that day, our children do not go to school.

Your Excellency Sir, we are in tears and sorrow craving for your official intervention into this matter so that justice can be done towards the inclination of poor and defenceless Civilians like us you Govern. These people have really punished us and our suffering is now beyond endurance. Please help us as peaceful Sierra Leoneans because authorities of CDF remain bias to bring out justice.

We thank you for your Godly intervention relieving us from such menace.

Yours faithfully,



Joseph Sinnah
(HEAD OF FAMILY)

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PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF MR JOSEPH SINNAH
LOOTED BY CDF PERSONNELS AT NO 9 WILLOUGBY
LANE BROOKFIELDS ON 17/07/2000.

00003913

1.	5 JEAN TROUSERS	35,000	175,000
2.	6 T- SHIRTS	10,000	60,000
3.	2 CREPE SHOE	55,000	110,000
4.	JEWELRIES	50,000	50,000
5.	WEIST WATCH	40,000	40,000
6.	SCIENTIFIC CALCULATOR	110,000	110,000
7.	2 BED SHEET	35,000	70,000
8.	X -BASS SHARP TAPE RECORDER	350,000	350,000
9.	PASS PORT	60,000	60,000
10.	BED DAMAGED	150,000	150,000
11.	CUP BOARD DAMAGED	100,000	100,000
12.	3 EMPTY CONTAINERS (DRUMS)	65,000	195,000
13.	35 5 GALLONS EMPTY	6,500	227,000
14.	PHYSICAL CASH	500,000	500,000
15.	20 TAPE CASSETTES	50,000	500,000
16.	1 SONNY WORKMAN	135,000	135,000
17.	1 PAIR SHOE	60,000	60,000
18.	2 (TWO) PLASTIC DRUMS-PAIM OIL		
	EACH 13 (5 GALLONS)	45,000	1,170,000.
19.	64 FIVE GALLONS CONTAINERS		
	PAIM OIL	45,000	2,880,000
	TOTAL		6,942,000

Number	Item	Content
89	Documents	A set of two documents. The first document is a 3-page typed document titled "Summary of Decisions taken at the Workshop on CDF / Community Relationships – 17 June 1999 and 18 June 1999". The second document is titled "seven point undertaking by Chief Norman – National Co-Ordinator CDF/SL and Deputy Minister of Defence."

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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS TAKEN AT THE WORKSHOP ON
CDF/COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP - 17TH - 18TH
JUNE 1999

00003914

INTRODUCTION:

There is growing concern that CDF/SL has become disrespectful to civilians, to Chiefdom elders and authorities; that they are taking the law into their hands, harrassing civilians, resisting communal works and refusing Chiefs to perform their duties.

The community strongly condemns indiscipline among CDF, their flagrant- wrong-doings by molesting and intimidating travellers, innocent and peaceful citizens; extortion of money from drivers & civilians at checkpoints and preventing NGOs from having safe corridors to target areas.

Consequently, the civil society is losing confidence and trust in CDF as an effective body for security.

This growing resentment, lack of trust and confidence against the CDF could undermine effective security for the State thereby potentially exposing it to security threats.

The International Community, through local and International NGOs operating in the country, has raised this concern over this growing sour relationship as it tends to impede the smooth delivery of humanitarian supplies to areas of need in the community. Hence the reason for this workshop.

NOTE: WORKSHOP SPONSORED AND FACILITATED BY EC/SLRRP - BO

2. WORKSHOP OBJECTIVE: TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY TO IMPROVE CDF/COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP.

00003915

3. In order to rebuild the lost confidence and trust in the CDF, representatives of CDF and the community agreed on the following points:

- that the community must recognise and appreciate CDF and its role in the present conflict.
- that all Kamajors must give full respect to Chiefdom authorities.
- that all Kamajors are subject to Chiefdom Bye-Laws and must therefore fully and actively participate in all communal works in respect of Chiefdom development.
- that all Kamajors should desist from taking decisions on ^{civil} matters and must allow the Courts and the Police to perform their duties.
- that all combatant-Kamajors should be encouraged to return to their Chiefdoms of origin and non-combatants to return to their normal rural or business activity.
- that behaviour codes of conduct for CDF be made available to ensure disciplinary measures against defaulters of such rules and regulations.
- that Initiators should desist from initiating children and must henceforth allow formal screening procedure by Chiefs before initiation
- that all Commanders should refrain from involving children in combat and all combat related activities. All children carrying weapons to be arrested and disciplined.
- that all society taboos to be explained to the community at village or town levels and also in Chiefdom meetings to avoid breaches of the laws by civilians.
- that a general registration and identification of all Kamajors to be conducted as soon as possible - (i) combatants (ii) non-combatants & (iii) child kamajors.
- that all Kamajors to accord full respect to Battalion Commanders and all other CDF Officials any where at all times.
- teacher-Kamajors or Government employees in general who neglect their

duties without valid excuses be penalised by employing authorities.

- that commandeering of all vehicles and looting of any sort are strictly forbidden. The need for vehicles for urgent operations should be made by Commanders to Motor Drivers Union.
- that all Kamajors at the various checkpoints should provide safe corridors to all NGO vehicles without undue delay. However, all NGO vehicles are subject to thorough checking at all gates.
- NGOs to provide support for child Kamajors in formal and non-formal skills training institutions.
- CDF to accomodate demobilised RUF/AFRC members in their communities.
- NGOs to provide skills training and educational opportunities to demobilised CDF in future.
- that all CDF reports against NGOs to be made to NCRRR and the NGO concerned.
- that workshops on CDF/community relationship to be sponsored and conducted by NGOs at Chiefdom levels.
- CDF/PETTY TRADERS ASSOCIATION/DRIVERS UNION to agree on dues collections.
- that CDF to appreciate current financial and economic situation of the country - but Government to have and express confidence in CDF; Government to address logistical needs of CDF; and Government to provide financial assistance to CDF to help with their family problems, CDF war victims (both dead or the wounded)
- that CDF respects the Rule of Law and CDF is subject to the Laws of Sierra Leone

4077

00003917

4078

00003918

THE SEVEN-POINT UNDERTAKING BY

CHIEF HINGA NORMAN - NATIONAL

DC-ORDINATOR CDF/SL & DEPUTY

MINISTER OF DEFENCE.

1. All CDF personnel are strongly advised to give maximum respect to all Chiefs, elders and authorities at all times.
2. All CDF personnel are subject to the LAWS OF SIERRA LEONE and should face prosecution in all Courts of Law.
3. All initiation of children in the Kamajor society to stop now. Children already immunized for protection against gunshots should be handed back to their parents with immediate effect. And all children who are Kamajors attending schools and other institutions are subject to the rules and regulations of that institution which they are forced to obey. Such child-Kamajors must show respect for their authorities and colleagues alike.
4. Children should no longer be involved in combat or combat related activities. All children found with weapons or carrying weapons should be arrested and disciplined.
5. All CDF personnel at checkpoints and in towns/villages should provide safe corridors to NGOs to access target groups; CDF must not interfere or be seen to impede the smooth operations of NGOs.
6. CDF must stop commandeering vehicles now and must not be seen to engage on looting activities.

7. "The Sacred Rites of Initiation are given freely by God, and freely the Initiators are expected to give in return".
- Chief Norman appealed to all Initiators to be moderate in charging fees for initiation except for those adults who desire immunization for self-protection.

Compiled by:

21/6/99

CDF/SL NATIONAL WAR OFFICE - BO

DISTRIBUTIONS:

THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR CDF/SL & MINISTER OF DEFENCE
 DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE

THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE CDF/SL

THE RESIDENT MINISTER - SOUTHERN PROVINCE

THE BRIGADE COMMANDER - 26TH. INFANTRY BRIGADE - BO

HON. P.C S.B.HINDOWA V - BO DISTRICT

THE CDF/SL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR - BO DISTRICT

THE NATIONAL P . R . O CDF/SL

THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL CDF/SL

THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS CDF/SL

THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORT CDF/SL

ALL BATTALION COMMANDERS & DEPUTIES CDF/SL - BO DISTRICT

ALL CHIEFDOM GROUND COMMANDERS CDF/SL - BO DISTRICT

ALL CHIEFDOM SUPERVISORS CDF/SL - BO DISTRICT

THE REGIONAL CO-ORDINATOR - EC/SLRRP

Number	Item	Content
90	Letter	Letter dated 16 August 1999 written by the National High Priest Dr. Allieu Kuntuwa (sic, Kondewa) and his Deputy Dr. Jibao Amara to Dr. Mosses M. Hakawa.

00003925



CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE

From: The Nation 1 High Priest Dr. Alieu Kondewa and his Deputy Dr. Jibao Amara

To: Dr. Moses I. Makawa

Date: 16th August, 1999



Subject: LETTER OF APPOINTMENT

I am hereby hereby directed by the above council to inform you that, you have been officially appointed as National Spokesman for all initiatives CDF/SL,

It is hoped that you will work in the interest of the nation for the restoration and sustenance of democracy in Sierra Leone.

Respectful Sign

King Dr. Alieu Kondewa
High Priest
District 1



Dr. Jibao Amara
Deputy High Priest

- cc: Chairman N.C.C - Vice President
- " Nation 1 Commander, CDF/SL, Freetown
- " Nation 1 Public Relation Officer, Freetown
- " National Director of War, So
- " District Administrator, CDF/SL, So
- " District Supervisor, So
- " District Public Relation Officer, So
- " District Administrator, Bonthe
- " District Administrator, Pujehun
- " District Administrator, Bonthe
- " District Administrator, Moyamba
- " Logistic Officer, CDF/SL, Freetown

4082

Number	Item	Content
91	Not Used	

Number	Item	Content
92	Letter	Letter dated 20 June 2000 written by the National High Priest Dr. Allieu Kundowa (sic, Kondewa) to National Coordinator, Civil Defence Forces (Hinga Norman).

FORCE SIERRA LEONE
OF THE HIGH PRIEST
ALIEU KUNDEWA
BOIMA ROAD, BO
FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref.....


00003927

Our Ref.....

King Dr. Allieu Kondowa,
National High Priest.

The National Coordinator,
Civil Defence Forces,
FREETOWN.

DOP
Please assemble
all CDF Srw
at B/F Hotel to discuss
and acquaint me
with result and advise



Dear Sir,

APPROVAL OF MUALIM ALLIEU SESAY, FOR FREETOWN CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OPERATIONS.

J. J.
24/5/00

I, King Dr. Allieu Kondowa, National High Priest have done all that is necessary to secure all Kamajors in the city, in order to liberate our beloved Sierra Leone.

I strongly advise all Kamajors to obey him and receive from him all that I have prepared for the entire security of all Kamajors to face an front, to liberate this country.


I would have travelled to Freetown myself, but my responsibility now, is to prepare all initiators for the different zones of war affected areas for the security of this country from Revolutionary United Front.

I can advise all initiators to work with Maulim Sesay and also realise that I have done very much for the security of all Kamajors on the Freetown Highway and the entire city.

Your cooperation is highly solicited.

SIGNED:.....
KING DR. ALLIEU KONDOVA
NATIONAL HIGH PRIEST CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES,
SIERRA LEONE.

- Copy to:- National Personnel Officer, CDF/SL Ftn.
- National Public Relations Officer, CDF/SL Ftn.
- National Logistics Officer, UDF/SL Ftn.
- National Director of War, CDF/SL
- District Administrator, CDF/SL, Bo.
- Resident Minister, South.
- Director of Operations, CDF/SL Bo.
- National Director of Transport, CDF/SL, Bo.



Maulim should stay active
as the porting of Kamoh
Alieu Sesay is not for
but Sesay and Port L...
...

Number	Item	Content
93	Document	Document dated 8 January 2001 and titled "Ruthless Behaviour of Kamajors in and around Rokel village" written by Amadu Mannah, Chief Police Officer, Western "D" Division, and addressed to The Regional Commissioner (West) with a copy to the CDF representative Joint Coordination Centre (JCC).

WDE.15/15

00003928

4086.
6/10/14
60114
61014

The Regional Commissioner (West)

8th January, 2001.

COPY: Chairman J.C.C.

" C.D.F. Representative J.C.C. ✓

RUTHLESS BEHAVIOUR OF KAMAJERS IN AND AROUND
ROKEL VILLAGE

Reports reaching me indicate that a group of Kamajers attached to Rokel Check Point have been having confrontations with the residents of Rokel village and John Therpe villages respectively. Such confrontations have led to assaults and wounding cases now under investigation at Kissy Police Station.

2. Being part of the security Forces on the ground at Rokel Check Point, there is bound to be confrontations between the Kamajers and the police or the military in such behaviour is not ribbed in the bud.

3. I shall treat the Assault matter according to it's merit but the Joint Coordination Centre being the over riding factor should also intervene immediately to avoid such conflicts in future.

4. Thanks for your cooperation.


(Amadu Bahmah) Supt.,
Chief Police Officer, 'D' Div.

Divisional Police Headquarters,

Western 'D' Division,

Kissy Police Station,

KISSY

AM/kj.

DOK
To kindly provide fuel
to Kenie Tomoh to move to Rokel
for immediately investigation.


N-P.R.C.

Number	Item	Content
94	Letter	Letter dated 10 January 2000 from National High Priest, Dr. Allieu Kundewa (sic, Kondewa) addressed to The Director of Personal (sic, Personnel) CDF /SL arguing against the possible disbanding of the National Task Force Office.

4088

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE

THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH PRIEST

KING DR. ALIEU KUNDEWA

68 MAHAI BOIMA ROAD, BO

MOTTO: WE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref:.....

Our Ref:.....

Handwritten notes and stamps:
DATE: 15/1/2000
15/1/2000

DATE 10th. Jan., 2000.

FROM: The National High Priest Dr. Alieu kundewa CDF/SL.

To: The Director of Personal CDF/SL.

00003930

Dear Sir,

It has come to my notice that there are now plans for the disbanding of the National Task Force Office, due to the problem which has arisen between the National Task Force Officer and the Deputy National Task Force Officer which is still unresolved.

If that is the case, I'm advising that thorough investigation into the matter be made and who soever is found guilty most be warned or eliminated from office to ensure the smooth running of the National Task Force Office.

I am completely against the closure of this office, because lets say there is a problem somewhere, it is the National Task force Office that will take up the responsibility in trying to resolve that problem.

I'm kindly asking that immediate attention be place on this issue to avoid future embarrassment between these two officers.

I count on your usual co-operation.

Faithfully yours

Handwritten notes and stamps:
DATE: 10/1/2000

.....
Dr. Alieu Kundewa
National High Priest - CDF/SL.

cc.

M.P.R.O. CDF/SL.

National co-ordinator CDF/SL.

National Director of logistic CDF/SL. ✓

Resident minister south. ✓

Brigade commander 26th. Infantry

Director of intelgent CDF/SL.

National Deciplinary chairman CDF/SL.

Director of war.

District administrator.

File

Number	Item	Content
95	Letter	Letter dated 10 January 2000 from National High Priest, Dr. Allieu Kundawa (sic, Kondewa) addressed to The National Public Relations Officer CDF / SL recommending the Mohamed Mansaray and Samuel Lahai as persons responsible for collecting all supplies and condiments meant for all CDF / SL Initiators.

41090

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE
 THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH PRIEST
 KING DR. ALIEU KUNDEWA
 88 MAHAI BOIMA ROAD, BO
MOTTO: WE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref:.....

Our Ref:.....

DATE..... 10th January, 2000

From: The National High Priest, Dr. Alieu Kondewa C.D.F./S.L.

To: The National Public Relations Officer, C.D.F./S.L.

RECOMMENDATION


00003932

I wish to recommend Dr. Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr. Samuel Lahai (Secretary) to be signing for and collecting all supplies and condiments meant for all C.D.F./S.L. initiators with effect from the above date.

I am confident that they will maintain the good working relationship that has been existing between us.

I count on your usual co-operation.

Signed.....
 Dr. Alieu Kondewa
 National High Priest



- The National Co-ordinator C.D.F./S.L.
- The Director of Personnel C.D.F./S.L.
- The Director of Logistics C.D.F./S.L. ✓
- The Director of War C.D.F./S.L.
- The District Administrator C.D.F./S.L.

File

Number	Item	Content
96	Letter	Letter dated 6 July 2001 from the CDF Director of Personnel, Andrew N.K. Harding addressed to The Director of Logistics CDF, titled: "Reminding you for Unsettled Outstanding Bills".

4092

00003934

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE
THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
C/O MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
STATE AVENUE
FREETOWN

Date: 6th July, 2001

The Director of Logistics CDF
C/o Ministry of Defence
State Avenue
Freetown

Dear Sir,

REMINDING YOU FOR UNSETTLED OUTSTANDING BILLS

I would like to draw your attention to the above mentioned subject matter for bills that have never been paid since September 1999.

Be informed that the following personals of wounded (disabled CDF) and child combatants were issued I.D. Cards for two reasons

- (a) Disabled CDF) for all of them to return to their homes which many really returned to their towns.
- (b) Child Combatants were issued I.D. cards so that their handing over programme Children Associated with the War (CAW) could be successful and it was successfully done.


Self explanatory documents are attached for your support in case investigators want to go through.

Your usual co-operation is highly needed.

NOTE.

Please Mr Lunnch, the bills were two and you have them in your file, only one I have send. The total of the two were in between Le 500,000 to Six Le 600,000/000

Thank you
- K. Harip



4093

Number	Item	Content
96(A)	Document	Bill for ID Cards

4094.

MAGIC PHOTOS & GENERAL SERVICES

00003935

29th September, 1999.

00003936

From: Issa Dumbuya - Managing Director

To: Mr. Andrew N. K. Harding - National Director of Personnel CDF/SL

Dear Sir,

BILL FOR PAYMENT


Below I submit a bill for payment for ID cards issued out to wounded CDF/SL fighter.

65 ID cards for wounded Kamajors @ 3,500 = 227,500

We hope that you will give this bill the most priority concern so as to enable us to procure more materials.

I thank you in advance.

Yours Sincerely



Issa Dumbuya
Managing Director



MAGIC PHOTOS & GENERAL SERVICES

C-18, Bayconfields • Off Fergusson Street • Freetown • Sierra Leone
Office Tel: 242042 / 241832 / Res. Tel: 229536 / 229509
Bankers: Union Trust Bank Lightfoot Boston Street / Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, Siaka Stevens Street.

L10095

Number	Item	Content
96(B)	List	Names of registered CDF children on the C.A.W. program.

NAMES OF REGISTERED C.D.F CHILDREN V IN DER C.M.W. P.R. GRAMA

00003938

NAME	POSITION	AGE	TOWN/VILLAGE	CLUB/ASSOCIATION
1. Muthyha Korrna	Commanding Officer	23	Abundanga	Abundanga Abundanga - Kailash
2. John Muro	Komajor	15	Nyendekum	Abundanga - Kailash
3. Basai Muro	Komajor	15	Bororo	Agre - Kailash
4. Aple Muro	Komajor	21	Abogye	Agre - Kailash
5. Aple Muthyha	Komajor	22	Bororo	Agre - Kailash
6. David J. B. Kelly	Administrators Sec.	22	Bororo	Agre - Kailash
7. Abdul Jeer	Komajor	14	Agre	Agre - Kailash
8. Francis Jage	Komajor	21	Agre	Agre - Kailash
9. Aljo Korrna	Komajor	15	Tora	Agre - Kailash
10. Edward K. Akwasi	Komajor	17	Sybauwa	Agre - Kailash
11. Edward Jimmy	Komajor	13	Agre	Agre - Kailash
12. Joseph Twisha	Komajor	17	Korrna	Agre - Kailash
13. Joseph Twisha	Komajor	17	Korrna	Agre - Kailash
14. Mohamed Sany	Deputy Commander	18	Korrna	Agre - Kailash
15. Mohamed Sany	Deputy Commander	22	Agre	Agre - Kailash
16. Joseph Twisha	Deputy Commander	22	Agre	Agre - Kailash
17. Joseph Twisha	Deputy Commander	22	Agre	Agre - Kailash
18. Joseph Twisha	Deputy Commander	22	Agre	Agre - Kailash
19. Joseph Twisha	Deputy Commander	22	Agre	Agre - Kailash
20. Joseph Twisha	Deputy Commander	22	Agre	Agre - Kailash
21. Muthyha Korrna	Komajor	14	Agre	Agre - Kailash
22. Muthyha Korrna	Komajor	14	Agre	Agre - Kailash
23. Muthyha Korrna	Komajor	14	Agre	Agre - Kailash
24. Muthyha Korrna	Komajor	14	Agre	Agre - Kailash
25. Muthyha Korrna	Komajor	14	Agre	Agre - Kailash

NAME

- 24 Sando Amanan
- 25 Ibrahim Bando
- 26 Amara Ernest
- 27 Patrick Friday
- 28 Mohamed Awan
- 29 Sulaiman Komsok
- 30 Jimmah Abomoh
- 31 Sylvester Harding
- 32 Fajiba Logleh
- 33 Alpha Komsok
- 34 Lamin Kamsok
- 35 Edwaint Sparja
- 36 Ibrahim Komsok
- 37 Bruma Gwama
- 38 Minkala J. Awan
- 39 Eric J. Komsok
- 40 Mohamed H. Ali Awan

POSITION

- Komjor
- Komjor
- Komjor
- Komjor
- Komjor
- Komjor
- Patrol Officer
- Komjor Police
- Komjor
- C. O.
- Patrol Commander
- Komjor
- Asst. Amicator
- Patrol Commander
- Body Guard to E.D.M.

AGE

- 23
- 17
- 16
- 16
- 17
- 14
- 17
- 24
- 20
- 30
- 12
- 29
- 15
- 32
- 55
- 18
- 23

TOWN/VILLAGE

- Tacama
- Serabe
- Bo
- Blama
- Nyama
- Bo
- ~~Atte~~ Njyabun Nalajidin - Ken
- Aburahun
- Borahun
- Borahun
- Dace
- Abardaw
- Nyanama
- Banda Island
- Maso - Junction
- Pyshan
- Tongbeu

CLOUSE/DISTRICT

- Hot - Njyabun
- Komjor - Bo
- Katun - Bo
- Small Bo - Komsok
- Hot - Njyabun
- Katun - Bo
- Hot - Njyabun
- Katun - Bo

00003939

4098.

Number	Item	Content
96(C)	List	List of wounded Kamajors at Brookfields Hotel, Freetown.

.. List of wounded Kampjors at Brookfield Hall 4099

Freetown.

00003940

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1, Musa - Samai ✓ ^{Needs I.D. CARD} | 24, Robert + Mboke ✓ |
| 2, Mustapha - A.S. Koroma ✓ | 25, John - Bullie ✓ ^{OK} |
| 3, Brima - Momah ✓ | 26, Sahr - Sheku ^{Needs I.D. CARD} |
| 4, Umaru - Saibu ✓ | 27, Ash - Mbayo ✓ |
| 5, Sheke - Lamin ✓ | 28, Amadu - v. Cheriff ✓ |
| 6, Musa - Kallon ✓ | 29, Tamba - Sorie ✓ |
| 7, Tajia - Kamara ✓ | 30, Latia - Musa ✓ ^{R.P. G.} |
| 8, Morie - Amara ✓ | 31, Morie - Juma ✓ |
| 9, Kennie - Amara ✓ | 32, Rashid - Sebay ✓ |
| 10, Bockarie - Musa ✓ | 33, Sheku - Sawaneh ✓ |
| 11, John - Musa ^{OK} | 34, Simbo - Nor man ^{OK} |
| 12, Joseph - Colimba ^{Needs I.D. CARD} | 35, Vandi - Soka ^{Needs I.D. CARD} ^{care taker} |
| 13, Amara - Jahai ✓ | 36, Momah - Blackie ✓ |
| 14, Brima - Koroma ✓ | 37, Moses - O.G. Charles ✓ |
| 15, Mustapha - Bawoh ✓ | 38, Sheku - Momah ^{OK} |
| 16, Lamin - Kawah ^{OK} | 39, Antony - Fafana ^{Needs I.D. CARD} |
| 17, Hassan - Corteh ^{Needs I.D. CARD} | 40, Olu - Moiwai ✓ |
| 18, Thomas - Sindi ✓ | 41, Vandi - MalSaghi ✓ |
| 19, Latia - Sarrak ✓ | 42, Geneset - Saidu ✓ |
| 20, Alpha - Kamrek ^{OK} | |
| 21, Latia - Bom ^{Needs I.D. CARD} | |
| 22, Abassay - J. Kallon ^{OK} | |
| 23, Brima - Koroma ^{Needs I.D. CARD} | |

4100 .

Number	Item	Content
97	Letter	Letter dated 24 April 2001 written by the Moinina Fofanah, National War Office, Bo, addressed to National Coordinator, Civil Defence Forces (Hinga Norman).

4101.

24th April, 2001

FROM: THE NATIONAL WAR OFFICE,
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (SL)
42 MAHEI BOIMA ROAD,
Bo.

00003946


TO : THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR C.D.F. (SL) AND DEPUTY
MINISTER OF DEFENCE, C/O MINISTRY OF DEFENCE H/Q
STATE AVENUE - FREETOWN.

Sir,

I am glad to remind you about the Appointment of Mr. Hassan H. Feika as General Battalion Commander for Pujehun District. I am hereby requesting that you order the director of Logistic to hand over all Battalion supplies for Pujehun District to him, as we have been agreed upon Sir.

I would also want you to approve the requisition which he, Hassan H. Feika had presented to you for the proposed Official Presentation of the General Battalion Commander. The bearer will explain more.

I thank you Sir.



CC: DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICE
C.D.F.


NPRO / D of / DoL / ADM FTJ
 Please take care of this document as this Command was demoted and removed from Command. The action however was not resulting from any complaint from the Pujehun Dist Adm.
 Thanks.
 Moinina Fofanah
 25/4/01

4102 .

Number	Item	Content
98	Certificate	A "Certificate of Training" issued by The Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone to "Francis Kpanabom 0798". The certificate is dated 10 February 1998 but bears no signature.

00003947

EXPERIENCE FORCE OF SIERRA LEONE



Motto: We fight for Democracy

Certificate of Training

This is to certify that the bearer

Francis O. Kpanabon 0798

has successfully completed the CDF training programme as

Kamajor Kapra Tamaborro Donso

on this 10th Day of February A. D. 19 98

Signed _____
Director of Training/ Ops


Signed _____
Co-ordinator

Signed _____
Chief Initiator

Number	Item	Content
99	Certificate	A "Certificate of Training" issued by The Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone to "Soloman Maoah, 0799". The certificate is dated 10 February 1998 but bears no signature.

00003948

EXPERIENCE FORCE OF SIERRA LEONE



Motto: We fight for Democracy

Certificate of Training

This is to certify that the bearer

Suleman Alford 0799

has successfully completed the CDF training programme as

Kamajor Kpra Tamaborro Donso

on this 10th Day of February A. D. 1998

Signed _____ Signed _____

Director of Training/ Ops

Chief Initiator

Signed _____

Co-ordinator

4106

Number	Item	Content
100	Document	Document titled: "Battle Front Report Pujehun District, Date: 18 June 1997, Time: 1045 PM". The document is signed by Sam Hinga Norman.

4107

00003952

BATTLE FRONT REPORT

Date: 18/6/97

PUJEHUN DISTRICT

Time: 10.45 PM

Commanders (Civil Defence Forces) from BO Waterside (Sierra Leone) came to Monrovia with the following reports:

1. That on their way to BO Water Side the previous day, 16/6/97 they were apprehended and detained together with all the fighting logistics and even in inspite of the copy of legetimate document that was presented to ascertain their identity, and further even inspite of the fact that they were accompanied by combatant Nigerian soldiers dressed in uniform, providing escort for the Civil Defence members, the Ghanian members of the ECOMOG forces at Clay Check Point refused to recognise and accept facts presented and the entire Civil Defence force including the Nigerian soldiers were taken to Tubmanburg Bomi Hill and detained. They were only released around 11 a.m 17/6/97.

2. The team after having been released from Ghanian detention proceeded to BO Water Side and were told that operations intended for the capturing of Zimmi ~~started~~ hours ahead of their arrival at Waterside. They managed to rush some Commanders to take part in the ensuing battle. At round 4p.m, the civil defence forces had managed to captured the following towns from very strong military guards:

- Gbaa
- Gisswlo
- Gofor

These are towns surrounding the main military base at Zimmi. The Civil Defence immediately launched ~~from~~ attack on Zimmi. By night fall, Zimmi had almost been captured by the Civil Defence Forces. By this time, some members of the civil defence had sustained some serious injuries that needed immediate medical/surgical attention.

4108

00003953

3. While the battle to completely take Zimmi was going on, a team departed immediately with the injured for medical attention at the ECOMOG Base in Monrovia. Report on the out come of the battle to capture Zimmi is still being awaited, but Ground Commanders of the Civil Defence Forces are optimistic of the out come. They have however requested additional ammo for:

- a. FM
- b. G3
- c. AK 47
- d. RPG Bombs

The wounded are currently being treated at the ECOMOG Base hospital, *in* Monrovia.

END OF REPORT.

BA Z...

[Signature]

Number	Item	Content
101	Document	Document titled "Front Line Report, Pujehun District, dated 19 June 1997."

COMMANDERS, CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES FROM BO WATERSIDE
CAME TO MONROVIA WITH THE FOLLOWING REPORTS

Time: 10.30pm

That the Civil Defence Company that was tasked to overrun Zimmi is on the brink of executing the task but a remnant of the soldiers who were in Zimmi have taken refuge on the compound of the ICRC together with their wives and children and ~~the~~ soldiers are armed. For the past 48 hours, all efforts to dislodge them without firing a shot in an area with an International Organisation has failed. Since the civil defence has other object to capture apart from Zimmi within a specified time limit, The team that is tasked to take Zimmi is set to do so finally, between noon and 6pm today, 19/6/97. The use of force to accomplish this task can only be avoided if:

- a. The soldiers surrender before that time. **00003954**
- b. The ICRC disarm and disrobe the soldiers and deliver such arms and robes to the Civil Defence before that time indicated above.
- c. ECOMOG High Command be present at Zimmi and intervene to take control of the surrender procedure before the specified time above.

Otherwise, the task must, repeat must be carried out as stated above.

The civil defence forces advancing to other objectives are now requesting for the following, very urgently.

- a. Arms & Ammo
 - (1) AK ammo - 10 boxes
 - (2) AK magazines - 50 pieces
 - (3) FN magazines - 30 "
- b. Field Hospital
 - (1) First Aid Kits - 10
 - (2) Tents - 6 pieces
 - (3) Camp beds - 15

These requests are in addition to the request contained in the battle front report dated 18/6/97. Since the Commanders intend to return to their areas of operation not later than 11 am today 19/6/97, it is requested that these supplies be kindly delivered as early as conveniently possible.

00003955

If these supplies are not available as requested, then whatever quantity that is presently available will be highly appreciated.

Hopping these request will meet the urgency it deserve.



Submitted by:
Hon Sam Hinga Norman
DMOD/Co-ordinator
CDF Sierra Leone



Compiled by:
Baimba Adam Zorokong
Secretary to DMOD/Co-ordinator CDF

Number	Item	Content
102	Document	Document titled: "Front Line Reports, Pujehun District; dated 20 June 1997."

00003956

FRONT LINE REPORTS
PUJEHUN DISTRICT

Date: 20 - 6 - 97

Time: 7 a.m


At about 7a.m on the 20/6/97, reports reaching us from the front line covering the areas of Zimmi, Gbaa, Peewai, Palama and Gofor indicates Kamajors in full control. Moping up exercises will start very early on 20/6/97. Meanwhile, some wounded (7) Kamajors requiring surgical treatment have been brought and for fear of Sierra Leone ECOMOG team intervention, they have been left somewhere along the road but very close to the OAU Gate. They need immediate evacuation to hospital.

Reports further states the Kamajors numbers are increasing by the day in those areas and therefore, more fighting and other logistics are needed urgently.


Shortages of food and other food items are now beginning to give problems. Urgent attention is needed today (20/6/97). Further follow up reports are being expected.

END OF REPORT.

Compiled by:


.....
Baimba Adam Zorokong
Secretary

Submitted by:


.....
Hon. Sam Hinga Norman
DMOD/Co-ordinator
CDF Sierra Leone

4114

Number	Item	Content
103	Document	Document titled: "Front Line Report, Pujehun District, 21 June 1997."

4115

FRONT LINE REPORT
PUJEHUN DISTRICT

00003957

Date: 21/6/97

Time: 11.45 a.m

Information received from the front line indicates that Zimmi and surrounding areas have been captured by the Civil Defence forces. That 15 soliders escaped to Liberia. Thorough clearing to make save the whole area is continuing and that a request for Hon Norman and ECOMOG Press Team together with other Press Teams (if they are allowed) has been made to visit Zimmi on Tusday 24/6/97.

Seven (7) CDF wounded in action were brought and admitted at ECOMOG Hospital. Urgent requests were made for the folloiwng:


- a. Tarpaulin - quantity - 15 pieces
- b. Short guns catridges - " - 150 cartons
- c. Camp beds - " - 15
- d. Cleaning kits
- e. More ammo

Reports indicate that soldier in Pujehun have surrendered and handed their weapons to the civil defence Commanders in that area but instructions in respect of the soldiers that have surrendered are being awaited from ECOMOG.

Plans are now afoot for further operations but replenishment is being awaited.

END OF REPORTS

Submitted by:



Baimba Adam Zorokony
for and on behalf of DMOD/
Co-ordinator CDF
Rep of Sierra Leone



Number	Item	Content
104	Communique	Communique issued by the CDF relating to child soldiers and Communique from meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, 15 May 2001.

Communiqué

MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT,
DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION
Government of Sierra Leone - RUF - UNAMSIL

15 May 2001

1. In furtherance of the agreement reached in Abuja on 2 May 2001, a meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) comprising UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF was held at UNAMSIL Headquarters in Freetown on 15 May 2001.
2. The meeting was chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji. The delegation of the Government of Sierra Leone was headed by the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Mr. Solomon Berewa. The Chairman of the Political and Peace Council, Mr Omrie Golley, led the RUF delegation. Representatives of the CDF attended as part of the Government delegation. A full list of the delegations is attached as Annex 1.
3. In view of the urgency of addressing the continuing fighting between the CDF and the RUF in the Eastern Province, the leaders of the CDF and the RUF issued a joint communiqué undertaking to ensure the immediate cessation of all hostilities and instructing their combatants forthwith to desist from any hostile activity. UNAMSIL was requested to ensure the observance of this undertaking as well as the unimpeded movement of persons, goods and services throughout the country.
4. The meeting examined the key issues relating to the DDR programme, including timetable and modalities for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, responsibilities of the parties, monitoring mechanisms, sensitisation of combatants and communities.

Disarmament:

5. The two parties agreed on the following:
 - a) the immediate recommencement of the DDR programme with a fixed timetable;
 - b) implement the simultaneous disarmament of CDF and RUF combatants;
 - c) ~~to release to UNAMSIL all CDF combatants and abductees, particularly young women and children, starting on 25 May 2001~~
 - d) that the CDF and the RUF shall disclose the number of combatants and weapons by location to UNAMSIL. Global figures and types of weapons in the possession of RUF and CDF were communicated to the meeting by them;
 - e) criteria established by the NCDDR for the eligibility of ex-combatants into the DDR programme;
 - f) to consider, as a matter of urgency, the establishment of DDR camps in Lunsar, Makeni, Kamakwie, Masingbi, Koidu, Kailahun, Alikalia, Pujehun

and Bonthe, in addition to the existing facilities in Port Loko, Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru;

- g) an encampment period of maximum four weeks for combatants during which they will undergo orientation and counselling programmes;
- ~~h~~ h) the principle of a cordon and search after the established period for disarmament;
- i) include the RUF and the CDF in the planning and implementation of the entire DDR programme.

6. In connection with disarmament in Kambia and Port Loko districts, the two parties agreed on the following:

- a) ~~disarmament process for both RUF and CDF in Kambia district to begin on 18 May 2001 and to be completed not later than 28 May 2001;~~
- b) disarmament in Port Loko will also start during this period;
- c) Port Loko DDR camp will be used as a common facility for demobilisation of RUF and CDF ex-combatants disarmed in Kambia district;
- d) NCDDR will immediately begin the preparation of a DDR camp in Lunsar;
- e) ~~the RUF provisionally estimates 1000 combatants in Kambia; the precise figure will be confirmed by Friday 18 May 2001. The CDF estimates 350 combatants in the Kambia district plus 735 in Port Loko district.~~

7. By the end of May 2001, recommendations will be made by the joint Technical Committee on the next locations by district for the country-wide implementation of the DDR.

Reintegration

- 8. In addition to the existing integration programme of NCDDR, the two parties:
 - a) proposed the establishment of a Trust Fund, with the assistance of the international community, to support the reintegration of ex-combatants. The modalities for the Fund will be worked out by the two parties and interested partners through a working group;
 - b) agreed to open access to all identifiable Government positions, including SLA and SLP, on the basis of existing criteria for recruitment shared during the meeting;
 - c) agreed that special attention be accorded to dependants of ex-combatants.

Monitoring mechanisms

- 9. The two parties agreed to:
 - a) use the Ad-hoc DDR Committee, comprising the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF, UNAMSIL and the CCP to monitor the overall implementation of the DDR programme;
 - b) use the existing NCDDR structure, with the participation of the RUF and the CDF, to review technical issues relating to the DDR programme;
 - c) include RUF and CDF representatives in NCDDR regional structures to monitor implementation of the programme in the various regions.

Sensitization

10. The two parties agreed:

- a) to form joint sensitization teams to visit various parts of the country to educate the combatants about the present decisions;
- b) to arrange visits of joint teams to witness disarmament processes, starting in Kambia and Port Loko districts on 18 May 2001;
- c) to promote country-wide community reconciliation processes.

Other matters

11. The RUF requested the release of its members currently detained by the Government as a confidence-building measure. It also enquired about the alleged deaths of some of them under custody. The Government assured the meeting that no RUF detainee ~~had died in custody and reaffirmed its commitment to consider the release of detainees especially in the light of progress being made in the peace process~~

12. In connection with the RUF's request for Government assistance in the provision of public buildings in Freetown and in the provinces for party offices, the Government invited the RUF to identify such premises and to bring the information to Government's attention.

Freetown, 15 May 2001.

4/20

00003890



UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE
(UNAMSIL)

UNAMSIL NEWS 10


Communiqué


Issued by
the Civil Defense Force (CDF)
and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

We, the leadership of the CDF and the RUF, meeting in Freetown today 15 May 2001, in furtherance of the agreement reached in Abuja on 7 May 2001, solemnly undertake to ensure the cessation of all hostilities and, to that effect, hereby instruct all our combatants to desist from any hostile activity. UNAMSIL will immediately ensure the observance of this undertaking as well as the unimpeded movement of persons, goods and services throughout the country.


For the CDF

For the RUF


Chief Kings Norman
National Coordinator
Deputy Minister of Defense


Omre Colley
Chairman of the Political
and Peace Council

Witnessed by UNAMSIL


Oluyemi Adeniji
Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Done in Freetown, 15 May 2001

4121

Communiqué

issued by
the Civil Defense Force (CDF)
and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)


We, the leadership of the CDF and the RUF, meeting in Freetown today 15 May 2001, in furtherance of the agreement reached in Abuja on 2 May 2001, solemnly undertake to ensure the cessation of all hostilities and, to that effect, hereby instruct all our combatants to desist from any hostile activity. UNAMSIL will immediately ensure the observance of this undertaking as well as the unimpeded movement of persons, goods and services throughout the country.

For the CDF

For the RUF




~~Chief Musa Norman
National Coordinator
Deputy Minister of Defense~~



~~Omiz Golley
Chairman of the Political
and Peace Council~~

Witnessed by UNAMSIL



~~Oluyemi Adeniji
Special Representative of the Secretary-General~~

Done in Freetown, 15 May 2001

Number	Item	Content
105	Document	Document titled: "Report From Front Line, Points to Ponder".

00003961

REPORT FROM FRONT LINE
POINTS TO PONDER

- 1. Strength/personnel.
 - a. Friendly forces - Kamajors/Civil Defence forces.
 - b. Enemy forces - Military, SSD?, RUF AS AT 16/6/97.
- A. Above was approximately 75 fighting men.
- B. Above composed of only men in uniform were as follows:
 - Military - 60 personnel.
 - SSD - 40 personnel.
 - RUF - Unknown.

During the fighting that ensued beginning 16/6/97, the strength of both friendly and enemy forces kept increasing. It has now been discovered that the enemy's strength tremendously increased (from approximately three (3) platoons to approximately half a battalion - 275 fighting men). These were armed with various types of assault weapons and small arms, firmly entrenched in well prepared dugouts surrounded by buildings occupied by unarmored civilians. Some of these enemy forces are occupying most of the buildings including a building occupied by the ICRC.

Information gained alleges that the ICRC is occupying a building shared by both the ICRC and the SSD. Also, information states that there are many injured casualties of both enemy and friendly forces in the ICRC Compound who are awaiting evacuation to hospital, or treatment centres as ICRC is alleged to have run out of drugs.

The strength of the friendly forces has also increased beyond 1,500 fighting men in Zimmi and its surrounding areas. This manpower requires - Command, Control and Communication arrangements. Requisite supply in fighting and other administrative logistics to sustain effective operation is required as a matter of urgency to facilitate the capturing of Zimmi by the Civil Defence forces without delay.

As at now (30/6/97), the following are the situations on the ground.

- A. Friendly Forces. Strength approximately 2,500 fighting men armed with:
 - assault weapons.
 - small arms.
 - traditional weapons.
- B. Enemy Forces. Strength approximately not above 150 fighting men armed with assault weapons and small arms occupying well prepared defensive areas.

The enemy prior to and during our encounter was supported by two mounted AA guns and heavy mortars. The two mounted AA guns have been knocked out of action with the vens damaged beyond repair. The mortar has also been silenced either due to lack of bombs or by some direct hit. The enemy however still has a number of other assault weapons and small arms and is suspected of having a good amount of ammo still stored in some bunkers.

00003962

C. Concluding. It is the determination of civil defence to capture Zimmi at all cost between the first of July 1997 and the 10th of July 1997 because it is only by so doing that the drive to capture the brigade areas of Kenema and Bo can be meaningfully undertaken. Supplies to Kenema, Bo and other areas in the interior reaching other areas occupied by the civil defence forces will be made easier if Zimmi becomes the coordinating centre. The importance of Zimmi cannot therefore be under-estimated, hence the determination of the enemy not to give up easily.

The civil defence intends to drive towards Freetown but not until other strategic military positions in the provinces have been put under control. The need to support the civil defence with necessary logistics is very urgent. Transport, to convey personnel, weapons, food etc and communication system to facilitate information are needed.

The civil defence forces commenced operations on the 16th of June 1997 after the AFRC forces attacked some of the positions of the civil defence forces on the 15 of June 1997 killing one civil defence Commander in a village called Gbaa whose men thought that soldiers who had been in friendly terms would not attack them. The offensive started can only now be halted if:

- The AFRC surrenders and accept the immediate restoration of the democratic system in Sierra Leone.
- The AFRC accept the immediate re-instatement of President Ahmed Tejan Kabb and his government unconditionally or
- The AFRC surrenders without conditions to the ECOMOG forces deployed in Sierra Leone.

List of urgently needed logistical supplies is here attached for action at the earliest convenience.

4125

URGENT LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENT
CDF - SL

00003963

A. ARMS & AMMO

- 1. a) AK 47/58 - Ammo only
 - 1) Ammo (Ord) 15 Cases
 - 2) Tracer 5 "
- b) (1) Shot Guns (SSB) 500 pcs
- (2) Cartridges AA 150 Cartons
- 2. FN Ammo - 10 Cases
- FN Mag - 30 pcs
- 3. RPG
 - a) Tubes 6
 - b) Bombs 150
 - c) Fuses 159
- 4. GPMG
 - a) Guns 4
 - b) Ammo 20 Cases
- 5. Grenades
 - a) Launchers 6 pcs
 - b) Grenades 10 Cases
- 5. Cleaning Kits & Materials for all Weapons issued.

B. OTHER LOGISTICS

- 1. a) Vehicles
- b) Hondas
- c) Bicycles
- 2. WIRELESS & OTHER COMM SETS
 - a) VHF (hand sets)
 - b) HF
- 3. MEDICALS
 - a) First Aid Kits
 - b) Tents
 - c) Camp Beds
 - d) Tarpaulines
- 4. FOOD & FOOD ITEMS
 - a) Rice
 - b) Garri
 - c) Sugar
 - d) Salt

412b.

00003964

5. GENERAL

- a) Fuel & Lubricants
- b) Generating Machines
- c) Wheel Barrows
- d) Axes
- e) Pick Axes
- f) Shovels
- g) Matchets (more)

6. CASH

Condiments & Other Expenses - \$45,000 (Forty-five thousand US Dollars)

Coordinator
CDF Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
106	Document	Document titled: "Reports From Front Line, Covering Period 13 July 1997 – 19 July 1997, Date: 18 July 1997, Attention: COS"

4128

00003965

REPORTS FROM FRONT LINE
CONVERGING PERIOD 13TH - 19TH JULY 1997
DATE: 18/7/97

ATTENTION: COS

ATTACK

At about 9.00a.m on Wednesday 16th July 1997, the Kamajors at Jendema, Mano River Bridge were suddenly attacked by Forces composed of AFRG, RUF and SSD personnel which disrupted normal life and economic activities of everybody at both Jendema and Bo water Side.

Rocket propelled grenades (RPG) Anti Air-Craft Guns (AA) Assault Rifles and small arms were used by the enemy. The Kamajors succeeded in repelling the attack and finally chased the enemy 10 miles away from their base locations. Over 15 (fifteen) of the enemy troops were killed, it is believed that many others were wounded, but searches are still being conducted in the surrounding bushes.

CAPTURED ARMS, AMMUNITION & OTHER ITEMS

- (a) Arms - AA (Gun) Frame.
- (b) Ammo - 2 (Two) Bazooka Bombs.
- (c) Other items - 1 Vehicle, Toyota Hilux - 4WD.
- Administrative Documents.
- 1 Military Cap bearing a crest.

PRESENT SITUATION REPORT - SITREP

Presently, the civil defence forces are deployed at 18 miles distance from the bridge at the Towns of Fairo, Wonde and Werikenda respectively, and troops are on standby to attack Zimmi as soon as necessary preparations are made and orders received.

RECCE REPORT

The strength of enemy forces have been increasing on daily basis according to reliable informations, grouping up at Zimmi to launch another attack on the Kamajors at Jendema. Enemy forces number is approx 1000 men. This manpower requires, Command, Control and Communication arrangements, all arrangements should be treated as a matter of urgency to grant effective operations in order to facilitate the capturing of Zimmi by the Civil Defence Forces. Active Recce is being conducted every day.

4129

00003966

~~00003965~~ C.W.

TRAINING

Meanwhile, an intensive Military Training is going on presently at Kamajor Camp. Common Assault, Drilling, Tactical Maneovers, and 81mm operations are part of the Training Programme in progress.

ARRIVALS

- Mr A.M. Amara - Chairman, Civil Defence Force Kenema District - 15/7/97.
- 102 Kamjors of the Civil Defence force, Kenema District - 18/7/97.
- 17 Kamjors of the Civil Defence Force, Kenema District - 21/7/97.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, resulting from the below Intrep, we require urgent action on the requirements.

Attached, please find list of requirements.

INTREP

Intelligence information received states the followings:

- (a) That the 18th Bn previously stationed around Kenema Town has now moved to a location called SELETI that is not too far from Zimmi, a distance of approximately 5 miles.
- (b) That this Bn has flame throwers and other heavy support weapons.
- (c) That this Bn intends to strength the present manpower in Zimmi with a view to:
 - (1) Join forces with Zimmi and launch an attack on the Kamajors at Jendema - Mano River Bridge.
 - (2) Join forces with Zimmi to prevent the Kamajors or ECOMOG forces from capturing Zimmi.

The Bn is building up strength daily since the 17/7/97.

Submitted:

JOSEPH MASSALLY
ADJUTANT
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE ✓

.....
JOHN M. SWARAY
INTREP OFFICER
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE ✓

[Handwritten notes and stamps]

REQUIREMENTS

00003967

- 50 (fifty) Bags for a week. *Recd 30 Bags*
- 25 (twenty-five) Bags for a week. ✓ 10 "
- 60 (sixty) Cartons. ✓ 50 Ctus

ARMS, AMMUNITION

REPLENISHMENT

- Rifles - 50 Pcs } *Recd 10 Pcs*
- Rifles - 50 " } *Replenishment for additional*
- } *Nil 119 Kamajors.*
- Grenades - 15 Boxes. *Recd 2 Boxes*
- EMG Ammo - 10 " *Nil*
- Ammo - 10 " *Nil*
- Ammo - 10 " *Recd 10 Boxes MAG- 10 Pcs*
- MG Bombs - 15 " *" 10 "*

STATEMENT OF ARMS

- Rifles - 11 malfunction - in the arms store - BO Water Side.
 - 8 rifles have been repaired
 - balance replacement-23/7/97.
- 81mm Mortar Tube malfunction - in the arms store - BO Water Side.

OTHER ITEMS

- (9) Shovels - 15) ✓
- Picks Axes - 15) ✓ For disposal of enemy KIA and also for manual
- Axes - 15) ✓ Road and other works.
- Wheel Barrows 5) ✓

All recd.
[Signature]
 25/7/97

Compos } to return to
Garr 2 } co-ord.

Submitted By:
 JOSEPH MASSALY
 ADJUTANT OFFICER

.....
 EDDIE MASSALLY
 DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR
 CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES

How SH. 7/10/97
Cor 21. 25/7/97

Number	Item	Content
107	Document	Document titled: "Minutes of Meeting held between Chief Norman and the Delegation of Kamajors From Bo District on the 26 July 1997 at Gendema - Bo Water Side Mano River Bridge.


413a

00003968

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD BETWEEN CHIEF NORMAN
AND THE DELEGATION OF KEMAJORS FROM BO DISTRICT
ON THE 26 JULY 1997 AT GENDEMA - BO WATER SIDE
MANO RIVER BRIDGE

1. On Friday July 25 1997, a Contingent of 25 Kamajors arrived at Jendema, Bo-Waterside with a message from the various Commanders in and around Bo District for the Co-ordinator, Deputy Minister of Defence, Capt (rtd) Hon S.H. Norman.
2. On ~~Saturday~~ ^{at} July 26, 1997, Capt. Norman held a meeting with the Bo District Kamajors.
3. After Salutations and expressions of joy and delight at seeing and talking with the Deputy Minister, messages from Commanders of the various Districts Kamajors groups were relayed. The strongest points in the messages were:
 - a. The Kamajors determination to re-install Democracy.
 - b. Reinststate His Excellency President Tejan Kabba and his Government ^{at} the earliest.
 - c. That they now want to go on the offensive sicne it seems the Coup makers have not been sincere in their various talks for peace.
4. As a result, the following requests were made for the following:
 - Arms & Ammo.
 - Comm Sets.
 - Other logistical supports.
5. Assurances were given for the protection of whatever they may receive to carry to their other Bases as the other Kamajors were anxiously waiting to receive them with whatever they may have to carry.
6. The Deputy Minister also was informed of a meeting held between the Kamajor Commander Mr Hassan and the Nigerian Contingent Command at Gondama near Bo, at which meeting the Commander said the he would like to assist the Kamajors with Ammo but that he would need authority from his higher Bosses. Mr Hassan therefore requested the Deputy Minister to make the arrangement so that the Nigerian Commander at Gondama can render such assistance. The Kamajors want to have this opportunity so that they can also be of assistance if the need arises.
7. The Kamajors expressed their desire to return as early as possible.

End.


Co-ordinator 28/7/97

4133

00003969

REQUIREMENTS

1.	FN/G3 Rifles	Quantity	50
2.	" " Ammo	"	10 Boxes
3.	AK 47/58 Ammo	"	10 Boxes
4.	GMP Guns	"	2 Guns
5.	" " Ammo	"	2 Boxes
6.	H-Grenades	"	5 Boxes
7.	RPG	"	5 Tubes
8.	" Bombs	"	5 Boxes

Number	Item	Content
108	Letter	Letter dated 12 August 1997 written by Hinga Norman and addressed to The Chief of Staff, ECOMOG, Monrovia.

00003970

Hon S.H. Norman
Deputy Def Min and Co-ordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone
12 Aug 97


The Chief of Staff
ECOMOG
Monrovia

Dear Chief,

dated 11.8.97,

Attached, please find EMERGENCY requests sent from
Hon. M. L. Kallon, the Chairman Administrative Wing at the
Front Line (THE KAMAJOR FORCE) which is forwarded for action
at your earliest convenience.

Highest regards.



HON. S. H. NORMAN
Dep Def Min & Co-ordinator
Civil Defence Force

12.8.97

AA
pls arrange 3 copies
of each of this docu
for distribution to
- Logistics
- Stores
- Adm
Frank
13/8/97

4136

From: M.L Kallon

00003971

11 : 8 : 97

To: Chief Norma

Dear Chief

EMERGENCY FRONT LINE REPORT (THE KAMAJORS ARE ADVANCING)

Enemies attacked own position at Fairo this morning (11/8/97) but were repelled and our men are now on full offensive to Zimmi and beyond. I was in Fairo yesterday when a helicopter landed at no man's land between Fairo and Gorfor. Please ensure that the required logistics are sent to us in time today.

Best regards.

for BA Z...
Hon. M L KALLON

Submitted for urgent consideration

[Signature]

*co-ord
dep def Min
12.8.97*

4137

00003972

SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (SLCDF) G1/OPS JENDEMA

11THE AUGUST, 1997

VERY URGENT REQUISITION

"THE KAMAJORS ARE ADVANCING"

NO	ARMS & AMMO	NO	RATION	NO	OTHER SUPPLIES
1.	AK Rifles - 300 pcs	1.	Rice - 100 bags per week	1.	Petrol - 6 drums per week for 6 vehicles
2.	G3/FN Rifle - 300 pcs	2.	Garri - 12 bags "	2.	Diesel - 1 drum for one vehicle.
3.	Shot Guns - 100 pcs	3.	Campo - 25 Cartons "	3.	Engine Oil - 7 Gals SAE 50 per every 2 weeks.
4.	FN Ammo - 10 Boxes	4.	Condiment - Cash 15,000 Monthly.	4.	Gear Oil - 3 Gals per every 2 wks
5.	AK Ammo - 10 "	5.	Petty Cash - \$25,000.00 Monthly.	5.	Transmission Oil - 3 gals per 2 "
6.	Shot Guns Cart - 100 Cartons		Monthly.	6.	Heavy grease - 3 tins per every 2 weeks.
7.	Grenades - 25 Boxes (AA/SG) only			7.	Grease guns - 2 only.
8.	* 81mm Mortar - Replacement of damaged one reported to Monrovia.			8.	Tyres - 5 (five) - 175 x 14
				9.	Battery - 1 x 12V x 60Amps
				10.	Jack - 2 x 4 Tons

Note

a) The arms & ammo are urgently required at the front line to enable the Kamajors to advance quickly.

b) Increase in manpower stands at 1000 today and is increasing at the rate of 100 arrivals per day. Training in small/support arms is now going on every day.

Note

The fuel (petrol) consumption for 6 petrol vehs presently forming the fleet, and covering longer distances into the hinterland is now very high.

Signed:

HON. M. L. KAILLON

Number	Item	Content
109	Document	Document dated 27 August 1997 titled "Very Urgent Front Line Request". It is written by Hinga Norman and addressed to The Chief of Staff, ECOMOG, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The document is not signed.

4139

00003973

Hon. S.H Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence forces
Sierra Leone
27 - 8 - 97

Chief of Staff ECOMOG
ECOMOG Headquarters
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Chief,

VERY URGENT FRONT LINE REQUEST

This is to inform you that fighting and auxillary manpower has increased to around 3,000 men at Jendama

Of the above number, around 1,200 have been deployed for offensive towards Zimmi today. The rest are deployed in the various areas from Jendema and around.

The following are now in urgent need:

Arms/Ammo	Rifles	Ammo/Bombs
AK 47/58	250	25,000
G3	150	15,000
FN	150	15,000
HMG	10	10 Boxes
GPMG	5	5 Boxes
RPG	50	400 Bombs
H/Grenades	-	25 Boxes
Shot Guns	250	AA/SG 200 Cartons

RATION

Rice Quantity - 150 Bags
Garri " - 50 "
Comp " - 150 Cartons

Case for condiments and Misc expenses - US\$15,000.00
=====

Thanks and regard forusual reaction.

.....
HON. S.H. NORMAN

Number	Item	Content
110	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed by Sam Hinga Norman dated 8 September 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document was written and signed for by Hon. M.L. Kallon, Chairman, Adm (Administration Wing). It bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema, Mano River Bridge".

00003981


4141

Hon. H.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence force
Sierra Leone
8/9/97

Commander
Contingent
- Liberia

EMERGENCY FRONT LINE REPORT

Attached, please find an emergency front line report from
Hon. H.L. Kallon, Chairman administrative Wing for your urgent
action.

For 
Hon. S.H. Norman
DMOD
Coordinator
Civil Defence force
Sierra Leone

4142

SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
EMERGENCY FRONT LINE REPORT
FROM JENDEMA
MANO RIVER BRIDGE
08 - 8 - 97

00003982

GENERAL

On the first of September to date there had been a lot of activities both at the administrative and fighting levels.

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Badly damaged former custom houses of about 22 buildings each of two to three apartments have now been completely cleared out and surrounding areas cleared.
2. Training/recreational grounds about four football size in area have also been cleared.
3. Both operations above have cost very close to L\$75,000.00 (Seventy-five thousand Liberian Dollars). More is yet to be spent on these areas before final completion.

BATTLE

Battles around Zimmi and areas further inland have been and are still being fought proceeding further inland. Because the areas of battle are expanding, requiring more manpower, arms, ammunitions and rations, the following needs are now extremely potent:

- Manpower

This is readily available and more is being added daily.

ARMS AND AMMUNITONS

There are very urgent needs for more arms and ammunitions to replenish and supply additional manpower.

There is now a total cutoff between the Brigade in Kenema and the Battalion in Zimmi at the road link between Joru and Gorahun Tonkia. There now remains another cutoff between Gorahun Tonkia and Zimmi which is presently underway.

Although, manpower is available to carry out these and other operations, the needful fighting logistics in the area of arms, ammunitions, ration and medicines corresponding to the manpower on the ground have to be made readily available to enable the civil defence force to obtain their battle objectives.

It is therefore hoped that every efforts should be made by our supporters to do everything possible to enable the availability of the fighting logistics even as we appreciate, extend our grateful thanks for every assistance so far.

4143

00003983

CONCLUSION

The men in the Front Line and those at the administrative base have and still are prepared to give off their best. Their morale are high and are expecting to be helped urgently.

REQUESTS

Arms and Ammunitions. We are still looking forward to response to our emergency Front Line Report and request submitted under a letter dated 26 August 1997, signed by Hon SAM H. Norman and addressed to the Chief of Staff ECOMOG Headquarters Monrovia - Liberia.

Our urgent request for arms, ammunitions, ration and medicines while we await response to our letter under Reference are as follows:

ARMS AND AMMO

			<u>AMMO</u>
-	AK 47/58 Rifles	quantity 150	10,000
-	FN	" 50)	5,000
-	G3	" 50)	
-	RPG Tubes	" 50	Bombs - 150
-	Grenades	"	15 Boxes
-	GPMG Guns	" 6	15,000

FUEL AND LUBRICANT

There are now 3 (three operational areas and the ferrying of Reinforcements, replacements and replenishments require more vehicular movements; therefore, more fuel and lubricants are now required: for 8 vehicles, 6 War front and 2 Adm.

- Petrol - 10 Drums for 6 vehicles
- Diesel - 3 " " 2 vehs
- Lubricant - Nil at present.
- 6 tyres: 750 x 16 = 4, 650 x 14 = 2

RATION

- Rice - quantity 50 bags
- Garri - " 20 "

CASH FOR CONDIMENTS - US\$10,000.00

Two special teams conducting special operation composing 250 (Two hundred and fifty) men are to be supplied with the above logistics.

Sign: *M.L. Kallon*
 HON. M.L. KALLON
 Chairman
 Adm Wing

4144

Number	Item	Content
111	Document	Letter written by Sam Hinga Norman, and addressed to Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG, Monrovia, Liberia; dated 26 September 1997.

41145

Number	Item	Content
112	Documents	A set of documents the first of which is dated 26 September 1997, written and signed by Sam Hinga Norman, and is addressed to The Chief of Staff, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document is list titled: "Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone: Requisition for Arms and Ammunitions (sic, Ammunitions)".

Number	Item	Content
113	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed by Sam Hinga Norman dated 17 September 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge".

00003984

4147

Hon. S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone.

17th September, 1997.

The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
ECOMOG
Headquarters
Monrovia - Liberia.

Dear Sir,

EMERGENCY FRONT LINE REPORT.

Attached, please find an emergency front line report from Hon. M.L. Kallen, Chairman administrative wing for your urgent action.



Hon. S.H. Norman
DMOD
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone.

00003985

448

17th September, 1997.

SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE EMERGENCY FRONT LINE REPORT FROM
JENDEMA - MANO RIVER BRIDGE.

GENERAL.

From the 15th of September to date there had been new developments both at administrative and fighting level.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

Many influx refugees have arrived from Zimmi and surrounding areas and are being screened before they are allowed to settle with our men at Jendema. According to intelligent reports gathered from them, the enemy forces are running away from Zimmi to hide in the surrounding bushes.

BATTLE.

The enemies were attacked at Zimmi at around 2:30p.m on the 16th September, 1997. The battle lasted for three hours and the enemies were forced to withdraw to an unknown RUF base around Kenema. Our men are in high spirit to pursue the enemies but have ran out of ammunitions.

ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS.

The need for more arms and ammunitions is urgent to finally dislodge the enemies from Zimmi and its surroundings. The cut-off planned between Gerahun and Zimmi stated in our front line report dated 8th September, 1997 had already been effected. The enemy forces are now completely besieged. We therefore hope that our request for more arms and ammunitions and other fighting logistics will be acceded to without delay.

Number	Item	Content
114	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 29 September 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (dated 29 September 1997).

4151

00003987

Hon S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone

29 - 9 - 97


The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
ECOMOG
Headquarters
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear sir,

FRONT LINE REPORT

Attached, please find the front line report from Mr Andrew N.K Harding, Administrator for your urgent action.

Highest regards.


Hon S.H Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone

#152

SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
FRONT LINE REPORT
FROM JENDEMA
MANO RIVER BRIDGE
29 - 9 - 97

00003988

From: Mr N.K Harding

To: Chief Norman

Dear Chief,

FRONT LINE REPORT

GENERAL

This is a report covering the period 17th September to 28 September 1997 indicating series of developments both at administrative and fighting level and would wish to invite attention to emergency front line report dated 17th September 1997 submitted during the absence of the COS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

The administration has had a very difficult period especially during the absence of the Civil Defence Coordinator, Hon Deputy Minister of Defence from the 8th of September to the 17th September 1997 and during the absence of the Chief of Staff (COS). Very many administrative problems were posed especially in the following areas:

- A. 1. Arms and ammo.
- 2. Ration.
- 3. Cash for condiments and miscellaneous expenses.
- 4. Other logistical needs.

There are serious shortages affecting the above mentioned items.

B. Influx of:

- 1. More Kamajors.
- 2. Civilian refugees arriving from other hostile areas.

Because of the shortages in ration and the mounting population of human beings the welfare problem at Jendema base is now advancing into serious problem.

BATTLE

There have been series of clashes between CDF (own forces) and the enemy forces at various areas beginning from Zimmi all the way to around Kenema. There is hardly a day between the 9th of September and the 28th of September 1997 that clashes lasting for hours have not taken place, resulting into very heavy uses of ammo of all types. Casualties on the side of own forces have been very light. On the enemy by its own report through its INFO had suffered heavily. Its INFO received indicated report the captured of some Prisoners of War (POW) but this is yet to be confirmed. The morale of our own fighting men is being affected by the insufficient fighting logistics to enable them maintain offensive momentum.

4153

00003989

PLAN

Plans have been worked out with various Commanders to despatch special teams to certain strategic operational areas for some very specific operations. The strenght of each team is about a hundred fighting men and the teams are to be effectivly armed with various weapons. It is hoped that needfuls being available the teams are expected to be despatched not later than Friday the 3rd of October 1997.

ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

Because of the pending expansion of operations, the need for more arms and ammunitions is extremely urgent and it is hoped that this will be treated with the understanding it deserves.

RATIONS AND CONDIMENTS - CASH

Rations in the areas of rice and garri will stand at Nil in the next 24 hours. Condiments - Cash has ran out. The speedy decrease in condiment cash resulted in the purchase of fuel for the vehicles for front line and administrative uses and cost for repairs and replacement parts of the vehicles.

FUEL AND LUBRICANTS

The supply of fuel and lubricants for the period covering 24th to 30th September 1997 was not issued. This created a lot of problems especially at the front line where because of the series of crashes, vehicles had to do more runs than on previous occassions.

REQUESTS

We are still looking forward to the response to the request made in the front line report submitted under a letter dated 26 August 1997 and addressed to the Chief of Staff ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia Liberia. Since there is no response to the request refered to which can adequately satisfy the fighting logistical needs required, we have no alternative but to submit an interim request as contained in this report to enable the fighting men to be effectively on the offensive.

A. ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

AK 47 Rifle	Qty 30	Magazine 2 each	Ammo Qty 9,000
FN/G3	15	2	" " 6,000
SMG	20	2	" " 6,000
Single Barrel	10	-	" " 300 pkts
RPG (7)	Tube 10	-	Bombs 100
Mortar	" 2	-	" 100
Grenades	-	-	5 Boxes 14
Grenade Launcher	2	-	5 Boxes 14

Note: There are six special operational teams. Therefore, the requests above are to be multiplied by six. However, 50% of the required items is enough to enable the teams to launch the pending operations.

B. RATIONS

Rice	Quantity	100 bags
Garri	"	50 "
Compo	"	60 Cartons

FUEL & LUBRICANTS

Petrol 10 drums per Week for 6 Vehicles.
Diesel 3 " " " for 2 Vehicles.

Lubricant at present - Nil.

Tyres 750 x 16 - 4
" 185--70 x 14 - 3

Cash for Condiments US \$15,000.00.

Condiments and miscellaneous expenses are increasing daily corresponding to the increase in manpower and expansion of operational areas.

CONCLUSION

The men at the front line and the special operation teams that have been operating in the various areas have had weeks of interesting experiences. They have ^{launched} ~~lost~~ series of attacks and have constructed permanent road blocks that have now disabled, denied the enemy the supply of reinforcement and replenishment to the enemy bases. The morale of the fighting forces (own troops) have been high but reports filtering in are indicating that the high morale is lowering because of lack of sustained replenishment of arms and ammunitions, rations and other fighting logistical needs. To reactivate their high spirit, we are requesting for a quick humane consideration and response. Highest consideration for usual co-operation.

Signed: *BAZONG*
Mr Andrew N.K. Harding
Administrator
CDF
Jendema Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
115	Document	Document titled "Very Urgent Request for Special Operations". It is written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman, dated 6 October 1997, and is addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters.

4156

00003991

Hon S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone

6 - 10 - 97

The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
ECOMOG Headquarters

Dear Commander,

VERY URGENT REQUEST FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1. After series of discussions and deliberations covering a period of about seven days involving top officials on the issue of urgent and special operations covering the entire country of Sierra Leone, the following decisions were reached:

- a. That special teams be despatched to various strategic areas within the country with specific operational instructions.
- b. That a certain number of fighting men of the Civil Defence Force plus some administrative officers of the same force be despatched to a specific part of the country for coordinated operations.
- c. That a large number of fighting men of the CDF be kept in readiness for strategic operations at certain centres and areas of importance within Sierra Leone as and when required in the shortest possible time.
- d. The total manpower involved in the entire operation could not be less than seven thousand, five hundred fighting men (7,500).
- e. Command, Control and Communication (CCC) may involve about one hundred and fifty men (150).
- f. Estimates in the areas of the under-mentioned is presented under request:
 - 1. Arms and ammunitions.
 - 2. Ration.
 - 3. Transportation and fuel.
 - 4. Wireless communication (etc).
 - 5. Medicines/medical supplies.
 - 6. Cash for condiments.

2. The request presented in this document is to enable the fighting men to capture, retain and defend areas of importance and to enable them to sustain the advances. If the disaster of withdrawal is to be avoided, then it is submitted that the fighting men must be adequately supplied with needful fighting logistics. It is in this light that the following request is submitted:

ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

- AK 47 Rifles)
 - FN/G3)
 - SMG)
 - Single Barrel)
 - RPG (7))
 - Mortar)
 - Grenades)
 - Grenade Launcher)
- These should be supplied equivalent to the manpower stated ie 10,000 fighting men.

RATION

- Rice
- Garri

TRANSPORTATION

- a) Jeep
- b) Pick ups
- c) Trucks

FUEL

- Petrol
- Diesel
- Lubricants
- Miscellaneous - Cash for replacement parts

WIRELESS COMMUNICATION

- a) SSB
- b) VHF

MEDICINES/MEDICAL SUPPLIES

- a) Treatment drugs
- b) Treatment equipments
- c) Field hospital equipments

MISCELLANEOUS CASH

- a) Condiments
- b) Other expenses

4158

00003993

3. The total manpower for the pending operations will not be less than seven thousand, five hundred (7,500) fighting men and for logistical support, request is submitted for not more than ten thousand (10,000) fighting men. Supplies should therefore be equivalent to the strength of ten thousand fighting men as submitted and the request should be worked out accordingly. Emphasis however are placed in the areas of (more of) ammunitions, ration and medicines. Ammunitions particularly in the ares of:

- 1. AK Ammo
- 2. RPG Bombs
- 3. Grenades
- 4. SMG rounds
- 5. Motar bombs (65mm)

COMBAT UNIFORM

4. There is need for combat uniforms for one hundred and fifty fighting men and fifteen administrative staff making up a total of one hundred and sixty-five men for extra special services.

MOVEMENT

5. Movement of extra special unit is by air from base to operational centres. It is hoped that this will be arranged accordingly.

TIMING

6. The timing of this operation and the supplies of necessary logistical request will have to be estimated by authorities accordingly; but it is hoped that time is considered to be of the essence.

Faithfully submitted.

B. Azurukony
 Hon S.H Norman
 Deputy Minister of Defence
 Coordinator
 Civil Defence Force
 Sierra Leone

4159

Number	Item	Content
116	Document	Document titled "Progress Report / Request". It's written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 6 October 1997 and is addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia.

4160

00003994

Hon S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence force
Sierra Leone
6 - 10 - 97

The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
ECOMOG Headquarters
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Commander,

PROGRESS REPORT/REQUEST

According to reliable Int Info from the following areas, following have been received:

1. Bonthe

Information from this area is that the Civil Defence is now in full control of Bonthe Island. We have also informed that the Bonthe Branch of the Civil Defence succeeded in capturing one of the gun boats presently being operated by the Navy of the AFRC. This incident is reported to have taken place ten days ago.

2. Bo

By a letter dated Second October 1997 received Six October 1997, it is reported that the following roads are now being blocked and currently under the control of the Bo Branch (Kamajors) of the Civil Defence.

- a) Bo-Mattru Jong Kamajors attacked, captured one military Mercedes truck and eliminated two officers ^{and} a good number of Junta fighting men.
- b) Bo-Tikonko Bumpe Road blocked by Civil Defence force. Movement on these roads are being denied to all AFRC Junta Forces.
- c) Bo-Matotoka Road at a place called Dambala, the Civil Defence Forces ambushed truck loads of AFRC Forces. The CDF forces succeeded in eliminating a good number of the enemy forces including ten officers. Two AA Single barrel guns were also captured including four vehicles.

4161

00003995

Request for more arms and ammunitions to urgently reached these areas have been made to Chief Norman so as to sustain a continue domination by the Civil Defence Forces in their present location and to proceed on further offensive as a result, these requests as an interim measure is submitted for your very urgent action to despatch the already prepared Combat Ready Teams to depart in the next four days with effect from date of this letter (6 - 10 - 97).

Four teams have now been slected for this-so to speak rescue operation. Each of the four teams is composed of one hundred and twenty fighting men.

REQUIRMENTS - EACH TEAM

ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

AK 47 rifles	50 x 4 = 200	ammo 20,000x4 = 80,000
SMG	20 x 4 = 80	10,000x4 = 40,000
Single Barrel	10 x 4 = 40	5 Cartons x 4 20 Ctns
RPG Tube	5 x 4 = 20	
" Bombs	20 x 4 = 80	
Grenades	2 boxes	

RATION

Garri	15 bags x 4	= 60 bags
Compo	20 Cartons x 4	= 80 Ctns

MISCELLANEOUS CASH

Conditments and other expenditure - US\$1,000 x 4 = US\$4,000.00

CONCLUSION

I am pleading that because of the dire situation already facing, the concerned areas, that these requirments or even 50% of it be made available to enable these men to depart not later than a.m Friday 10 October, 1997.

Highest regards.

S. H. Norman
 for Hon S.H. Norman
 Deputy Minister of Defence
 Coordinator
 Civil Defence force
 Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
117	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 3 November 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (dated 3 November 1997).

4163

00003996

Hon. S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone

3 - 11 - 97

The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
ECCMOG
Headquarters
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Sir,

FRONT LINE REPORT

Attached, please find the Front Line Report from Mr N.K Harding,
administrator CDF, Jendema base for your urgent action.

Highest regards.

for *RH Zorokong*
Hon. S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
CDS
Sierra Leone

4164

00003997

SIERA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
FRONT LINE REPORT
FROM JENDEMA
MANO RIVER BRIDGE
3 - 11 - 97

From: Mr N. K Handing

To: Chief Norman

Dear Chief,

FRONT LINE REPORT

GENERAL

This is a report covering the period 7th October 1997 to 31 October 1997 indicating series of developments both at administrative and fighting level which is here submitted.

ADMINISTRATIVE

There has been changes in the administration which has come as a blessing to the Civil Defence Forces in that situations around Jendema/Bo Waterside and far inland are now proven to be effective. Many administrative problems have now been put under control. The only remaining problem is the administration perpetual request for:

- Arms and ammunitions
- Rations
- Cash for condiments
- Medicines
- Fuel and lubricants and other logistical supplies such as chain saw (Power Saw), 5KV generator, cutlasses, pick axes and shovels etc.

The lack of communication sets is also a major area for concern and there is urgent need for these.

BATTLE

Series of clashes between the Civil Defence Forces (own forces) and the Junta Forces beginning from Zimmi and extending to various areas deeper inland led to the capture by own forces of the following areas:

- 1) Gorahun Tonkia and Joru in the eastern region.
- 2) Tikonko and Dambala near Bo in the southern region.
- 3) Tumbudu near Kono in the eastern region.

4165

00003998

Attempts to capture the important town of Koribondo which is the base for 38th battalion took place around the middle of October. This battle lasted for more than five hours (5hrs) but own forces could not overrun and capture the base because of lack of sustainable armour.

SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

Civil Defence Forces (Kamjor Wing) successfully assisted in locating and assisting to evacuate the Nigerian Contingent at Godama Camp and Kenema. The Recce team from Kenema is being arranged to further search for, locate and evacuate some more members of the Nigerian Contingent from areas in and around Kenema.

PLANS

Even though no mention was made of the Civil Defence Forces in the Communique that was signed announcing the programme for the return of consitutionalty to Sierra Leone and also announcing an immediate cessation of hostilities, the Civil Defence Forces have however decided to prepare various plans to collaborate with and assist ECOMOG in the process if so requested.

SPECIAL REQUESTS

Although, there was a BBC announcement by ECOMOG of an immediate cessation of hostilities upon the signing of the communique on the 23rd October 1997, the Junta Forces have however continued to attack the locations of the Civil Defence Forces and are currently preparing to launch ground and air attack on the locations of the Civil Defence Forces. In anticipation therefore, the civil defence forces are making defensive arrangements and as a result, have no alternative but to submit the following requests to enable the fighting men to be on a very effective defensive readiness:

ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

	Qty	Magazines	Ammo
AK 47 Rifle	300	2 each	30,000
FN/G3	100	2 "	10,000
Single Barrel	100		100 Cartons
Cartridge AA	75 Cartons		
SG	25 "		
RPG(7)	20 tubes		150 Bombs
Mortar 60mm	15		150 "
Grenades			10 Boxes

RATIONS

Rice	50 bags
Garri	30 "
Ccmpto	100 Cartons

FUEL AND LUBRICANTS

Petrol	4 drums
Diesel	4 " - 2 -

4166

00003999

00003998

C.W

CONDIMENTS CASH - US \$10,000.00

CONCLUSION

The above is an urgent request meant for various Front Line Areas on the mainland that are threatened daily by the Junta Forces. The logistics are meant for fighting forces (own troop) that are constantly under the Junta Forces attack even inspite of the announced immediate cessation of hostilities. A quick positive response is anticipated to keep the morale of the Civil Defence Forces at it present high peak.

Signed: *B. Azon King...*

for MR ANDREW N.K HARDING
Administrator
CDF
Jendema
Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
118	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 14 November 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (dated 21 November 1997).

4168

00004000

Hon S. H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone

November 14, 1997

The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
UNMOG Headquarters
Harprovia, Liberia

Dear Sir,

FRONT LINE REPORT

Attached, please find Front Line Report from Mr Monina Fofana,
administrator CDF, Mainland Base for your urgent action.

Highest regards.



Hon S. H. Norman
CDF Coordinator
sierra Leone

4169

00004001

SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
FRONT LINE REPORT
FROM MAINLAND BASE
SIERRA LEONE
21 - 11 - 97

From: Moiniana Fofana

To: Chief Norman

Dear Chief,

FRONT LINE REPORT

GENERAL

This is a report covering 1st ^{Nov} November to the 23rd November 1997, indicating developments at administrative and fighting levels of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) in most of the Country.

CEASEFIRE VIOLATION

This has been submitted under a separate cover dated November 1997.

ADMINISTRATIVE

The only administrative problem confronting the CDF is the perpetual shortage in the following areas for as the requested commodities are always in urgent need:

- Arms and Ammo.
- Ration.
- Medicines.
- Fuel and lubricants.
- Condiments - Cash.

BATTLE

There has been many battles resulting from AFRC/RUF attacks on the Civil Defence Force (CDF) bases and settlements through out the South and East since the day of the announcement of Ceasation of hostilities contained in the Signed Communique dated 23rd Oct 1997 which caused the Civil Defence force (CDF) to result to defensive fighting. Most of the areas attacked are mostly occupied by unarmed civilians, among them were men, women and children most of whom were killed. These battles are now being fought on daily basis. However, reports in this areas are being submitted.

OPERATIONS

Civil Defence Force (CDF) (Kamajor and intelligent wings) assisting the NIGCON have successfully located and evacuated three (3) more NIGCON soldiers from areas surrounding Kenema. some other are still being sought.

TRAINING

The training of more than eight hundred fighting men got underway in early October and will be completed in the last week of November, 1997. Thesa men who would have gone through the various disciplines, some of which are weapons and tactics will be used in supporting the ECOMOG and other forces in locating fighters and their

weapons in their various hide outs as and when the need for their services are required. They will however need arms and ammunitions for defence, food, medicines and uniforms will also be required.

REQUESTS

Because of the continued ceasefire violation by the Junta Forces, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) are finding it difficult to mount defences for the unarmed civilians. The following requests are therefore submitted for your urgent action:

ARMS AND AMMUNITIONS

	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Magazines</u>	<u>Ammo</u>
- AK 47 Rifle	300	2 each	10,000
- FN/G3 "	100	2 each	5,000
- Single barrel	150		
- RPG		- Cartridges(a. AA 75 Ctns ((b. SG 25 "	
- RPG (7) 20 tubes	-	-	150 bombs
- Mortar 60mm 15	-	-	150 "
- Grenades	-	-	10 boxes

RATIONS - (One Month)

- Rice - 60 bags
- Compo - 100 Ctns

FUEL AND LUBRICANTS - (One Month)

- Petrol - 6 Drums
- Diesel - 4 "
- Kerosine - 2

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENTS

MEDICINES

- Field First Aid Pack

CONDIMENTS

- Cash US\$10,000.00
=====

CONCLUSION

Because of the proximity of the Front Line which covers extensive territory, it is submitted that logistics requested be supplied on monthly basis and in huge quantity to save frequent transportation expenses.

The above are an urgent request for the on-going operations. The morale of the fighting men is very high and this will be maintained if the necessary logistics are made available.

Thanks and appreciation are extended for continuous assistance.

Faithfully submitted.

Monina Fotana
MONINA FOTANA
Director of OPS
Mainland Base
Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
119	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 3 November 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia.

Number	Item	Content
120	Documents	A set of two documents, the first of which is a letter written and signed for by Sam Hinga Norman dated 17 December 1997 and addressed to The Commander, Nigerian Contingent, ECOMOG, Monrovia, Liberia. The second document bears the heading "Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force, Emergency Front Line Report From Jendema - Mano River Bridge" (not dated).

00004006

4173

Hon. S.H. Norman
Deputy Minister of Defence
Coordinator
Civil Defence Force
Sierra Leone

17 Dec 97

The Commander
Nigerian Contingent
ECOMOG
Monrovia, Liberia

Dear Sir,

Attached, please find the front report from Mr Andrew Harding,
acting Administrator CDF, Jendema Base for your urgent action.

Kind regards,

for *BA Zoro Kon*
Hon. S.H. Norman
Coordinator
CDF
Sierra Leone

4174

SIERRA LEONE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE 00004007
FRONT LINE REPORT
FROM JENDEMA
MANO RIVER BRIDGE

From: Mr N.K. Harding

To: Chief Norman

Dear Chief

FRONT LINE REPORT

This is a report covering the period 9 December to 15 December 1997 indicating another cease fire violation apart from the two official violations reported to ECOMOG.

CEASE FIRE VIOLATION

Another cease fire violation took place on the 9th December 1997 at Fairo twelve miles from the Mano River Bridge by the JUNTA/RUF forces.

ADMINISTRATIVE

The administration is said to be on a sound footing. The problem of arms and ammunitions have now been taken care of by our coordinating partner (ECOMOG) for which we extend our heartfelt thanks and appreciation. The Civil Defence Force (CDF) at the various crossing points bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia are now in defensive mood to repel attacks by the JUNTA/RUF forces.

BATTLE

Apart from the JUNTA/RUF attacked on the 9th December 1997, at Fairo which was repelled by the Kamajor wing of the Civil Defence Force, (CDF) another battle was fought at Tolo in Tonkia chief dom, Kenema district. This battle left many civilians crossing into Liberia for safety. There was only one (1) civilian killed in the Fairo attack but there has not been any independent report on the Tolo fight to ascertain casualties on own forces or the enemy forces. But we are sure that with the supplied of arms to own forces before the Tolo attack, they may have overpowered the enemy forces.

REQUESTS

The replenishment of arms and ammunitions to own forces has given them more zeal to fight and repel attacks by the JUNTA/RUF forces. There has been more movement of fighters from inland to Jendema to prepare for a final assault on Zimmi. At present there are about six hundred (600) fighters at Jendema including the ones at the crossing points. More fighters are expected to arrive from mainland base to Mano River Bridge.

00004008

475

Our main concern now are the shortage of food, petrol and communication sets for our men at the front. The twenty (20) bags of rice sent by ECOMOG and the condiments of onion, salt, oil, and maggi were received and evenly distributed among the fighters at Jendema and the war front. With the influx of more fighters, we are kindly requesting that you provide additional food to enable us cope with these influx.

CONCLUSION

With the recent discouraging news from the JUNTAS regarding the Conakry accord, it is cryster clear that they are not ready to relinquish power to the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone headed by H.E Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.

The Civil Defence Force (CDF) appreciates every effort by ECOMOG to restore peace and tranquillity in Sierra Leone.

We have no doubt that the above requests of fuel, food and communication sets will be acceded to without delay.

faithfully submitted,



17/12/97

ANDREW N.K. HANDING
Acting Adm
CDF Jendema.

4176

Number	Item	Content
121	Letter	A letter of appointment dated 20 February 1998. The Letter is signed by Sam Hinga Norman and copied to the War Council.

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE

4177

HEADQUARTERS - BASE ZERO

20th Feb 1998.

FROM: The National Coordinator
TO: Mr. Joe Tomdale Ngassim

Dear Mr. Ngassim

LETTER OF APPOINTMENT

It is my pleasure to inform you that upon the recommendation of the WAR COUNCIL, I have accepted and approved your appointment as *Batchelor* *Commander* for the *17th Batchelor - Koribondo* with effect from *20th Feb 1998*.

You have earned this as a result of your hardwork and dedication to the course of our people and the restoration of DEMOCRACY in Sierra Leone.

~~you are urged to take this~~
I wish to urge you to take this appointment as a challenge to strive further and continue to protect not only the lives and properties of our people, but to redouble your efforts for the restoration of constitutional order and the reinstatement of Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabba as president of Sierra Leone.

I wish you good luck and more successes in your services



CC - CHAIRMAN - WAR COUNCIL
DIRECTOR OF WAR
FILE

NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR

Number	Item	Content
122	Letter	Letter dated 24 February 1998 from The Director of War, 17 th Battalion Commander- Koribondo at Base Zero. The letter is signed by Moinina Fofanah and copied to the Coordinator, The Director of Intelligence and The Chairman – War Council.

4179

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE

HEADQUARTERS - BASE ZERO

24th. February, 1998.

FROM: THE DIRECTOR OF WAR

TO: [REDACTED]


Dear Commander

Re: CAPTURED VEHICLES AND OTHER ITEMS

It has come to the notice of the Civil Defence Forces High Command including the Co-ordinator Hon. S.H. Norman and War Council that Vehicles and other Items were captured and now under your command.

I am now ordering you not to release any one of them (Vehicles and other Items) to any other person until they are registered with C.D.F. Headquarters. This is for your own protection in case the owners take action regarding them in future.

Comply please.



CC: COORDINATOR
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN - WAR COUNCIL

Yours
Mr. Moinina Fofana
DIRECTOR OF WAR

Number	Item	Content
123	Letter	A handwritten letter from the Civil Defence Force, dated 12 November 1997. The letter is signed by King Dr Allieu Kondewa and approved by Moinina Fofanah.

4182



Civil Defence Force
Talia Dausheho
12 - 11 - 97

To: [Redacted]

Subject: Appointment as Chief Kamajor
Dear Sir,


With reference to the above subject, I am hereby appointing [Redacted] as the chief kamajor for [Redacted]. Therefore all kamajor activities including control, maintenance etc should be in his hand or control by him.

He should work side by side with the chairman to also decide cases/matters. Honour and respect to authority is what is required of you all in the chieftdom.

With Thanks

Faithfully Yours

King Dr Allieu Kondewa
Approved by: Marina Fofana



Sec: [Signature]
12-11-97

[Signature]
12-11-97

Number	Item	Content
124	Letter	A handwritten letter from the Civil Defence Unit Madina H/Q dated 16 October 1997. The letter is passing on information about the arrival of Hinga Norman at Talia Yawbeko with ammunitions for operations.

Civil Defence Unit
Machina H/O

16/10/97.

Dear [REDACTED]

Be informed that pa Hanga Norma has come to Talia Yorbeke. He came with plenty ammunition to CLEAR [REDACTED] and give cut-off Bo-Freetown High way, Bo-Kenema High and Bo-Makeni High way.

With such condition, I am kindly asking you and some kamajors to come this morning for Koribondo operation as it was said.

I'm just from Talia yesterday. Bawa Kamajors [REDACTED] will give you full details.

Your co-operation is needed please.

Yours
[REDACTED]

Handwritten note on the right margin, partially obscured.

2


5
2
1



Number	Item	Content
125	Pass	Bonthe District Civil Defence Kamajors HQ, Tihun, Sogbeni Chiedom pass, dated 14 November 1997. The pass certifies that the holder is an initiate of King Dr Allieu Kondewa, the High Priest and requests that all privileges be accorded the holder.


4187

BOHINE DISTRICT
CIVIL DEFENCE KAMAJORS'
HEADQUARTER, TINUN
SOGBINI CHIEFDOM



This is to certify that the holder of this certificate is an initiate of King DR. Alieu Kondewah, the high Priest. Please grant him all privileges accorded to Kamajors.

Name of initiate: Museapha Sensi Age: 22
Place of initiation: TINUN SOGBINI CHIEFDOM BOHINE DIST
Date of initiation: 15th Nov, 1997
Home Address: NGEDUMA SPAA Bumpen Chiefdom Ro Dist.
Village/Town Section Chiefdom



SILVOSTER RAMONG KEMOKAI
CHIEF CLERK

Approved by: KING DR. ALIEU KONDEWAH, HIGH PRIEST.

Number	Item	Content
126	Document	Handwritten document bearing the caption "Guidelines to operate on after the capture of B" dated 20 February 1998.

4189

Guide lines to operate on after the Capture of Bo Township

20 February, 1958.

- 1 Looting of possessions of innocent civilians in the township of Bo is strictly prohibited.
- 2 Egatin Bonda - Leader of the SLPP Young Generation. The organisation is divided into zones wherein CDF Commanders are to be deployed along with their Kamajor personnel to work in collaboration with the heads of these zones. These zonal Leaders are to point out the enemies houses for thorough search and are also responsible for the feeding of the Kamajors assigned to their zones.
- 3 No youth is allowed to command any Kamajor except wherein special directives come from the Concerned Citizen Patriotic Citizens (CPC), signed by Mr Charles Juana Palma at No. 27 Palma Priza.
- 4 On no account should a youth, without the above defined document, command or give command to a Kamajor without that youth getting arrested and be punished.
- 5 All Kamajors are to be immediately deployed in various zones as soon as the township of Bo is captured from the Junta and RUF rebels.
- 6 Sporadic shooting unnecessarily around the township after the command of Seize Fire is strictly prohibited. Any violator should be severely punished.
- 7 No Kamajor should leave this zone he is been assigned without written permission from his Commander of that zone.
- 8 All the Commanders are to call at the highest Commanding headquarters to report on their day and night operations.
- 9 No Zonal Commander should walk about idly in the street without any tangible reason.
- 10 It is the ~~sete~~ responsibilities of the Zonal Commanders to see to it that their Kamajor personnel are well fed by the zonal youth leaders.
- 11 The appointments of Patrol, Company, platoon commanders etc, for the zones are the duties of the Zonal Commanders.

All houses in the zones should be thoroughly searched for enemies, arms and ammunition. ~~Any house~~ ^{Any house} which house must be destroyed immediately these items are found in it the house in which these items are to be found must be destroyed immediately. Personal properties of

Personal properties of inmates of the houses searched should not be looted if none of these items in No 12 is found in them.

Number	Item	Content
127	Letter	A handwritten letter from Mohamed Sesay, Madina Town, Bum Chiefdom, dated 13 July 1997.

Mohamed Sassy
Madua Town,
Bum chefon
13th July, 1952

Dear [redacted]

I am hereby informing you that a group of Pramajors led by one Gbckpa Terry stormed into my house last night in questons of the rice that was given to us a long time. I was severely threatened to give them the rice or they should see the series of Marketstions were enforced on me, so I gave them the rice as it was the major requisition.

In respect of the I am therefore making the complaint to you for Mr. Allen Kondense to know that these younger guys have misbehaved on me with the use of guns and rope for such a small matter.

Lastly, I want to surrender or desert

from all the Kanaga undertakings in
the Chieftain following this type of treatment
from ~~the~~ Gbakpa led group to me.

My lots of greetings to you and I
thank you very much.

Yours truly
Mohamed



Number	Item	Content
128	Letter	Letter from Moinina Fofana, Director of War, Civil Defence Force, Sierra Leone to All Battalion Commanders CDF SL dated 15 May 1998, signed by Fofana titled "request for troops" from all CDF commanders.

4195

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
SIERRA LEONE

From: Moinina Fofana, Director of War - CDF, Freetown

To: All Battallion Commanders
C.D.F. S.L.

15th May, 1998.

REQUEST FOR TROOPS

You are required to provide men as shown against your battallion against Sunday May, 17th 1998.

<u>Bo</u>			
Mongere	-	300	men
Baoma	-	300	"
Koribondo	-	300	"
Damballa	-	200	"
Wonde	-	100	"
Bompeh	-	700	"
Kakua	-	300	"
Bonthe	-	400	"
Moyamba	-	400	"
Pujehun		Nil	

Reason: Pujehun District is responsible for 27 crossing points.

Your cooperation will be highly appreciated and please treat this directive with the urgency it deserves.

- cc: The President
- The Vice President
- Deputy Minister of Defence
- Gen. Khobe - ETFC/SL
- Coordinator - North
- " - South
- " - East


- cc: National Operation Commander
- Operation Commander - North
- " " - South
- " " - East

Director of Logistic

National P.R.O.

High Priest & Deputy

Yours



Moinina Fofana
 Director of War

Number	Item	Content
129	Letter	Letter from the representatives of the War Council now resident in Dassamu Village , Bumpeh-Ngao Chiefdom to Commander for the Special Operation – Koribondo, dated 18 February 1998.

4198

From: The Representatives of the War Council
Now Resident at Dassam Village - Buph
Near Chiflon.

To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Dear Sir,
REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION
TO ATTACK BO ON FRIDAY 20th Feb 1998

This letter serves to request you to join other Commanders from the Bo District to finally attack the Junta Forces in Bo Town on Friday the 20th February 1998 at 7. A.M prompt.

At the receipt of this letter you are also kindly requested to inform [REDACTED] the Commander of the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to participate in this operation in order to save our neck from this shame.

Hoping for your cooperation for this operation.

Yours faithfully

[Signature]

18/2/98

For the War Council

[REDACTED]

4200

Number	Item	Content
130	Document	Handwritten pages containing a list of looted items from Addala – Tikonko.

LISTS OF LOTTED PROPERTY FROM
ADDALA - TIKONIKO

MORIE LAHAI -> 3 trousers, 4 shirts, 3 new
clocks, one pair silver, Le 65,000
/00 and other things were thrown
one bedsheet and four pillow
cases and my wife was seriously beat^{en}

MAMIE MORIE - One travelling bag, 4 new
lappas, 4 female polo, one pair of
silver, 4 new clocks, one tin grease, a
powder and one purse.

JOHN LAVALLIE - 2 shirts and Le 20,000/00

LUCY COMBEH - Le 500,000/00 in a purse and
travelling, 2 grosses of Bond Cigarette,
7 pkt. Colmes, one red colour sunny 6
battery tape recorder, one flash light,
one 34 cm new bucket, one high silver
a lot of documents and a kettle.

MOHAMED MUNDA - one new jean trousers
one shirt, a new dress and a
pair of spectacles.

GIBBSBY MUNDA - 3 shirts, my wife's clothes
3, 2 shovels, 2 lappas
and one shade lamp.

MUSUFU LAHAI - one four battery tape recorder
four lappas, clothes for my child.
3 grosses of bond 2 grosses bond, 1 gross
tobacco, 2 pkts battery, 1 pkt finger

2 pairs B&S, 2 stepache, 1 pair pannel and
100 inclusion.

MIAMBU MALIKIE - 2 trousers, 3 polo, 2 bed
sheets, all my childrens wear and

Le 10,000/00, drinking bucket, one sin-
gle barrel gun, a pair shoe, 4 lappas.

ALBERT ABDULAI - one travelling bag, 4 trou-
ser, 5 shirts, one shade lamp, flash
light, Le 9,000/00.

BRIMA AMARA - 2 new jean, 2 new polo,

4 lappas, 2 women's polo, one new

pickaxe, 2 new shakers, one new

bedspread, 4 clothes of my children

and Le 100,000/00.

MUSA KANESSIE - 5 new jeans, 7 polo,

2 bed sheets, one verseline, 2 tooth

brushes, 2 dress, 2 bottle spray, 2

flash lights, one cap, Le 30,000/00

MUSA AMARA - one walkman tape, 3 Cattle-

ties, 4 new lappas, 2 new lappas

2 handties, 2 polos, one set culture

and ² pairs of female footwear and

Le 20,000/00.

JOHN SEVALLIE - 2 jeans, one bag, 2 polos,

3 single barrel ammors, one new bedsheet

4003

~~LEOPOLDINA~~
JOSEPH LEBBATE — 3 polo, 4 trousers, my child's clothes, one new bedsheet, one blanket, 8 lappas for my wife, 4 female polos, 2 headties, 2 pairs of slippers, 3 female easy wear, 3 tins of milk groundnuts, 3 waist knives, one belt, one dotted female travelling bag, one big new travelling bag and Le 170,000/00

LAMINA FUNNA — one travelling bag, 2 jeans, 4 T-shirts, one bedspread, a wrist watch, one pair crepe-shoes and Le 25,000/00

MUSTA MENDEI — one big travelling bag, one short gong, one set 2 pac T-shirt for my child, one short cotton sewed one trousers and one shirt, one mirror, one silver spoon, 2 shakers, 4 shovels and Le 13,000/00

HASSAN BESHY — 4 lappas, 4 trousers, one shemie, one rubber bucket, 2 shirts and Le 30,000/00

ANDY SWARAY — 2 jeans, 2 women boys T-shirts, one sport crepe, one new bedsheet and one new travelling

BAMA SWARAY — 4 jeans, one lavatank bag, 4 T-shirts, 2 new bedsheets, Le 40,000/00, 2 pair of slippers

IBRAHIM BORBOR — 3 bedsheets, 3 trousers, Le 70,000/00, one leather shoe, 6 lappas and 4 lappas for my wife and daughter, 2 cutlasses and one big travelling bag.

TITY SWARAY — 4 lappas, 2 clothes, 1 headtie, one brazi-ier, 2 trousers, 2 male shirts one shoe lappas, 2 bedsheet, Le 3,000/00

MUNDA BLIKE — one trousers, 2 new lappa, one new bedspread and nursing bra.

IBRAHIM MUNDA — 2 trousers and one shirt.

JOSEPH KAPPAIR — Le 50,000/00

BORBOR ALBERT — 2 bushels of milk groundnuts, one pair female tortoise, one bag and two shirts.

HENRY SANIAH — 4 jeans, ~~3~~ + 2 pair T-shirts, one ⁴²⁰⁴
pair both footwear and Le 40,000/00

JENNIE MORRAY — Her whole house was totally looted.

JOE KAINESSIE — one new bed sheet.

MAMIE SANDY — Le 100,000/00, 6 matured chickens and
30 cups of rice.

ALPHA DENE —

Number	Item	Content
131	Letter	A handwritten letter from Witness TF2-087 to Joe, dated 4 May 1999.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Our Ref

Your Ref

[Redacted]

SIERRA LEONE
WEST AFRICA



(032)

[Redacted]

4/5 19 99

Dear [Redacted]

Bearer has reported to me that her
Sister [Redacted] was arrested by some
Kamajors at Sumburu (7) for being a wife of a Soldier.
This lady is my relation and I am appealing to
you to release her from their custody. Her marriage
with the Soldier was long ago and she herself
did not commit any act of law breaking.

Thanks for your cooperation.
Yours sincerely,

[Redacted signature]

[Redacted signature]

4207

Number	Item	Content
132	Letter	Letter from Civil Defence Force Sierra Leone – Koribondo addressed to the Director of War, Camp Zero, Gola Forest, Sierra Leone, dated 18 February 1998.

4208

Civi Defense Force of Sierra Leone
Koribondo

18th Feb. 1958

The Director of War
Camp Zero, Gola Forest
Sierra Leone

Dear Sir,

THE WOUNDED KAMAJORS

We have already captured Koribondo, one of the strongest Janta Buses with three casualties and three wounded. ^{on our side} The two persons hereby sent for medication are the most serious ones. ~~Barbara Collier~~ is said to have died in the ~~the~~ battle yesterday. We therefore present these wounded Kamajors for medication.

This serves as the second letter written to you of which the first has met with no response.

The attitudes of Borbor Tucker (alias Jesse Yama) of d deuls Squad, and Lahai George were not really conducive and in harmony with any good operation. I

I am still inviting you to visit this at Koribondo which is assured to be very safe with optimum protection.

We have capture some weapons but we do not have the ammunition for these weapons. The arm generally possessed are the AK47 rifles of which we are out of ammunition. We are the

48 - boys

2

Commander - 1

Mr. Ranges - 1

officer men - 1

7 cups for each around post

7 x 5 = 35 for 11 days 4 cups

x 11	30 30	thousand of specimens
<hr/>	15	Cups
35	12	Cups
35	20	Cups
<hr/>	18	
385	<hr/>	
	95	
	+ 12	
	<hr/>	
	107	

Number	Item	Content
133	Letter	A letter to the Regional Coordinator, CDF Forces Southern Region, Bo, dated 17 April 1998.

Civil Defence Forces of Sierra Leone

4211

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Date: 17th April, 1958

From: [REDACTED]

To The Regional Coordinator, Civil Defence Forces, St.
Southern Region, Bo

Subject: Reply to your letter dated 17th April, 1958

Sir,

We received your letter dated as ~~the~~
above ~~date~~, referring to series of vehicles
been confiscated and are in my area
of operation:

It has concerned us to act immediately
about ~~the~~ Magistrate, Hamilton's car that is
said to be in possession of C.O. Kinie Farma
at Gboyama, blonde chiefdom.

However, from [REDACTED] to Gboyama and
even to the town where the car was said to
be confiscated is over thirty miles. To
retrieve this vehicle from this C.O. Farma we
need to drive there ourselves rather than just
sending a kamajor with a letter, and this ^{will} ~~will~~
require transport or a vehicle for it will ^{probably take} ~~take~~
two to three days operation because we have
learnt that C.O. Farma has sold most of the
parts from his car and we have to press him
to show all where he did sell them. We shall
have to reach to Blama, small Bo chiefdom as well.
Therefore we shall be in need of enough petrol to
do this operation for, you which will cover over
ninety miles.

CC file

SE FORCE OF
James [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4212

Number	Item	Content
134	Document	A handwritten note dated 15 August 1997.

Moyia Base
15/8/97.

[Redacted]

Dear Sir,

Glad to inform you that Pa Hinga Nema has sent Ammunition to capture Koribondo.


According to the letter I received, R.P.G 27 Tubes with Berberjides and other guns.

The guns carriers left at Gambia Popena to continue to Senegal.

Do come tomorrow to go for the arrangement at Tulum please.

Your Good Friend
[Redacted]

4214



VERY URGENT

[REDACTED]

Number	Item	Content
135	Letter	Letter from the Regional Coordinator CDF/SL Bo, dated 17 April 1998.

4216

FROM:- The Regional Coordinator Civil Defence Forces C.D.F./S.L. Be

TO : [REDACTED]

17th April, 1998.

Dear [REDACTED],

I am writing in respect of the vehicle I wrote to the Commander at Momajo which I understand is now with you at [REDACTED] and you have refused to send to me because I failed to inform you. I want to say that you are right to point out that I would have raised it through your Command.

Please take it that it was a slip not meant to dishonour or discredit your Command. Please therefore deliver the same vehicle to its owner.

Secondly there is another vehicle that was taken from Kenema belonging to Magistrate Hamilton which we understand with C.O. Gboyama Kinie Farma.

I want you to also try to retrieve this vehicle from Kinie Farma and send it to me. I understand that he has removed the tyres and some parts.

Please impress on him that Our War Council Member Chief Vandy Soka is interested in this case and the matter has been reported also to Chief Norman.

I am finding next week to come for a day to spend some ^{time} with you and discuss with you some issues about your areas.

Hope you are fine, May God bless you.

Finally I want you to ask [REDACTED] your Secretary to send 2 drums of palm oil from my farm which I want to send for our men at the war front and Ecomeg.

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
Yours Sincerely,
Sign [REDACTED]
Regional Co-ordinator
[REDACTED]

cc: National Coordinator F#town,

" C/man War Council F/town.

4217

Number	Item	Content
136	Letter	Letter from C.O. Commander Gondama Base to Zone Commander, dated 12 March 1998.

GONDAMA BASE

12-3-98

TO THE

ZONE COMMANDER

17th BATTALION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AS Ground
 Commander for Gondama Base
 [REDACTED] "C.O." is now
 letting you know that the
 Ground has been swept totally
 throughout the course of Pa Bhina
 Kamara, and in fact all the
 majors at this Ground have
 decided to leave today because
 of the following cause: Any
 person who is collected is
 arrested by him claiming
 that he is doing for this
 Ground. Secondly, there
 was a property arrested such
 as, SHOVEL, HEAD-PAN,
 PICK-AXES AND BATTERY
 ARRESTED HAS BEEN TAKEN

D T O

AT HIS VILLAGES FOR HIS OWN USE.

THE WORST OF ALL DONE LAST NIGHT IS THIS. YESTERDAY, SOME TEMBE WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ADEWENT THEIR TOWN IN NUMBER WERE SEEN HOSE BY HIM YESTERDAY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE TOWN AUTHORITY AND THE KAMAJORS.

AS COMMANDER, I WAS ABLE TO FIND OUT ABOUT THEM AND REPORT THIS MATTER TO THE TOWN CHIEF AND ELDERS, THE A.C. AND HE DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF HIS ACT. I ARRESTED THESE PEOPLE AT MY HEAD QUARTER BASE. WHEN THESE PEOPLE WERE TAKEN FOR INTERROGATION PA. TSUKINA WAMANA CAME AND CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION UN KNOWN TO THE THE A.C. AND TOWN ELDER. I THERE -

P.T. O

WRITE TO LET YOU KNOW THAT
THIS IS THE PROBLEM WE ARE AND ARE
FACING RIGHT NOW AT THIS COMMAND
THE PA IS SO CORRUPT THAT ALL THE
KAMAJOS ARE AGAINST THIS KIND ACT.

FURTHER I WILL LIKE TO KNOW
WHO IS IN CHARGE OF THE COMMAND
BECAUSE I DON'T WANT ANY ENTANGLEM-
ENT, IF I AM TO GO BACK AT MY VILLAGE
NO PROBLEM I WILL GO, BUT LET THERE
BE CLEARANCE FOR THE COMMANDER OF
THIS DISTRICT. BE IT KNOWN THAT I DID
NOT KEEF ANY RANSOM, LOOT ANY PART FROM
THE AM LEFT BECAUSE I WAS SITTING BY
THE CLEARANCE WHEN ALL THIS MESS WAS
WRITTEN.

I STAY HERE TILL I MEET YOU
IN PERSON.

THANKS,

ITS ME,

CO. DAVID VON

4221

Number	Item	Content
137	Document	A short handwritten note from C.O. Gbassay Ansumana, dated 3 November 1998.

Number	Item	Content
138	Letter	Letter to the War Commander dated, 15 January 1998, requesting arms and ammunition.

FROM [REDACTED]

15/1/98

TO The WAR COMMANDER
[REDACTED]

URGENT LETTER. please ^{we} are in need
of ARMS and Ammunition
The Peoples Army are now in
Kandor Village.
we need more R.P.G. BUM From you
yours faithfully
C. O. AGBEKEH.

MS.

WHY The Mission Did Not take
PART last night, we get ^{the} information
that the Peoples Army will attack
us in Ngandeyama village
As for The Tonia Group you please
give order to move so to
come immediately and for him
to come and talk with his
men. Because we did not
want to take Commander's
tasks

4224

TO THE WAR
COMMANDER

[REDACTED]

PROTECTORA 1166

VERY URGENT

4225

Number	Item	Content
139	Letter	Letter from the Director of Operations – South to The Battalion Commanders, dated 4 March 1998, and copied to The Chairman War Council and The National Director of Operations.

From: The Director of Operations - South
To: The Battalion Commanders

4th March 1998

Subject: Establishment of Mini Base in
your Various Areas.

With reference to the above matter, I wish to draw your attention to the Establishment of Mini-Base in the area which you are covering/operating.

I want to believe that you are quite aware of the present strength of security situation in this country. As a result, I may therefore suggest that you create a mini Base Twelve miles off Bo which will help you to disabilise your enemy. In this regard, you are advised to furnish the office immediately when the selection of area is done.

Your co-operation is highly solicited.
A. S. D. ^{for Ops} - Secretary

cc The Chairman War Council
The National Director of Operations

5

The Commanding Officer

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

•
•

•
•

•
•

L222

Number	Item	Content
140	Letter	Letter from Kamajors in Hoya, Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, dated 18 August 1997.

Hoya
Kumebai Kin Chik
18th August 1992

Dear Sir

Invitation to Attend An Urgent
Meeting of The Kamajors
Kumebai Kin Chikdom

I write with reference to the above subject and a letter addressed to me and Paramount Chief Hengoba Buhun Chikdom by the District Officer Bante, which Dr. Alton Kunduwa regards an unprovoked attack by Kamajors on Bante town, and to invite you to a Chikdom meeting on Saturday 23rd August 1992 at 10 AM. Without fail at Bendumu.

All Kamajors in Kumebai Kin Chikdom have been invited to this meeting.

Please endeavour to attend and on time.

Yours faithfully

[Redacted signature and name]

Number	Item	Content
141	Letter	Letter from CDF Bagbo Branch-Ngolapon, Southern Province to an unknown addressee dated 7 August 1997, signed by the General Secretary and Adviser.

Civil Defence Force,
Bagbo Branch - Ngelapan,
Southern Province.

7th August 1997.

Dear Sir,

Following the recent call of all Kamajors in the Southern Province by Chief Hinga Norman, you have been eyemarked to lead the Kamajors from your Krim end to Bagbo immediately upon receipt of this letter, to travel to Chief Hinga Norman with a troupe of 3000, three thousand Kamajors from Krim, Bum and Bagbo chiefdoms.

You are travelling through P's Rogers and Sallo Atakaya of Yessa, and you will be told what you are to do before departure to Zimmi, Atakpele chiefdom where Chief Norman now resides.

Remember, you have been fighting to end the rebel war and all equipments have been brought now awaiting Kamajors. There has been serious fighting to clear Zimmi Atakpele and chief need strong re-enforcement from this end.

Please come, come up with your troupe without delay or doubt. Kindly bring them all without fail.

Regards.

Pat S. Rogers - General Secretary to
Sallo Atakaya - Advisor - Bagbo
Kamajors.

Number	Item	Content
142	Letter	A letter from W.S. Kalil of Fulawahun to Yeiwa Turay of Koribondo, dated 4 March 1998

To: [REDACTED]
Kombondo

From: [REDACTED]
No. 2 Sandenahm Street
Fulawaham
BO -
4. 3. 98

Dear [REDACTED]

Please note that I have just returned to BO and found out that my house was completely looted and also my Car Peugeot 505 GL, light Green, SM 1886 was taken away.

I have been informed that the Car was taken away by Joe N'Uma, Kamajer and handed over to [REDACTED] and is been kept at Gondama, old town.

I shall therefore be grateful if you would please contact [REDACTED] and kindly arrange for the Car to be brought back to my above address as there is no battery in the car now.

Kindly treat this matter as very urgent so that the Car can not be cannibalised.

Yours faithfully
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Number	Item	Content
143	Letter	Letter from The Director of Operations – J. A.S. Koroma to The Acting Battalion Commander, all in Bo. Letter is dated 31 August 2000 and is copied to The National Coordinator CDF/SL The Director of War CDF/SL and The High Priest Dr Kondewa.

FROM: The National Director of Operations
Mr. J.A.S. Koroma
C/o 88 Mahei Boima Road,
Bo.

31st July, 2000.

TO: Acting Battalion Commander
19th Battalion, Mr. Kenneth Koker
42 Mahei Boima Road,
Bo.

Dear Sir,

In consultation with the District Administrator and other top C.D.F. (S.L) personnel, we have envisaged that you are not or unable to cope with the present security situation in the township of Bo and its environs. Since Bo is the Provincial Headquarter and second capital city, we have now decided to appoint a full fledged Battalion Commander for the township.

So in view of the above, you will hear from me after consultation with the District Administrator Bo District and the Director of War Mr. Moinina Fofanah. Please pull your legs so that you may be considered for the appointment. Your positive consideration in this matter will be highly appreciated.

With many thanks in advance.

Yours sincerely,
National Director of Operations
1/8/2000
DATE

c.c.:

- National Co-ordinator CDF S/L
- National P.R.O. - Mr. Charles Moiwo
- Director of War C.D.F. S/L
- District Administrator C.D.F. S/L Bo District
- Deputy Director of Transport
- Resident Minister South
- Provincial Secretary South
- S.D.C. - Bo
- Regent Chief Makua Chiefdom
- Commissioner of Police South
- Commander UNAMSIL
- High Priest Dr. Kondewa
- Deputy High Priest Dr. Amara Jibao
- District P.R.O.
- District Supervisor
- SN Battalion Commander Joe Findale
- SN Battalion Commander Hassan Sheriff.

4238

Number	Item	Content
144	Letter	Letter from TF2-011 in Kenema to Commander TF2-082 dated 19 April 1998.

Kenema

19. 5. 98

Dear Commander [REDACTED]

This is to inform you that the War Council in its extraordinary meeting in Kenema has today rescinded [REDACTED] as ~~per~~ [REDACTED] (Southern Province with immediate effect).

[REDACTED] is therefore now being mandated to join you in planning your men for the Kono/Kailahun operations. Please in the Name of CDF Solidarity and discipline, lend your support to all arrangements for the operations to succeed. I have asked SCOMAF to give you all logistical support in that direction.

Will see you on my return to Bo.

Yours sincerely,

Alhaj Daromy Lopes
Regional Coordinator CDF

4240.

Number	Item	Content
145	Pass	A Pass from The Battalion Commander CDF/SL 5 th Battalion Headquarters Koribondo to "Those it may concern at Highway Gates", dated 23 March 1998.

Civil Defence Forces of Sierra Leone

(404)
84

[Redacted] Battalion Headquarters
[Redacted]

From: The [Redacted] Date: 23rd March, 1998
To: Those it may concern at Highway Gates
Subject: Clearance for Mr Laha Koroma, driver for
Vehicle No

The holder of this document, Mr [Redacted]
[Redacted] a driver of Vehicle No [Redacted] Gbaama,
Tajama, Bongor Chiefdom Bo District is an
appropriate Chasseur. He is therefore given this
paper as a protection against unnecessary delay,
intimidation, molestation and extortion of anything
from him or his passenger Kerof.

[Redacted]
Battalion Commander

[Redacted]
Joseph Koroma
Bo District

4242

Number	Item	Content
146	Letter	Letter from The Deputy Director of War, to The Battalion Commander CDF/SL Koribondo, dated 28 February 1998.

4043

TO Battalion Commander

Deputy Director of 2007

C. D. F/S. L.

[Redacted]



Dear Commander,

It have become a habit of most of our men the ~~to~~ ^{have} entirely sabotage our operation due by commandeering of vehicles from Head Quarter.

You are ordered to bring the [Redacted] talking from [Redacted] without permission by [Redacted] yesterday. Failure to comply, the rest will have no one to blame. And all commandeering vehicles must be reported to C. D. F/S. L. Head Quarter in the period of one week time. It is time to do ~~so~~ and on time.

Yours most regard
Yours truly,

C.C

C. D. F. Command members
Director of operations
Director of operations Southern Region.

[Redacted signature area]

C. D. F/S. L.

[Redacted]

File _____

[Redacted signature]
25/2/99

~~4054~~

10

Collection Commander

C. D. F/S-L

~~██████████~~

Number	Item	Content
147	Letter	Letter from the General Spokesman for the CDF/SL Sumbuya Base, dated 11 March 1998.

Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone
Jumbuya Base
11th March, 1958.

[Redacted]

Koribondo.

Dear Commander,

With reference to our discussions held yesterday at Koribondo, I have instructed Bobor Bamba (Ngbangbaja) to you for postings to Bondama Bridge.

I am asking that his postings take place with an immediate effect without any delay.


He is instructed to work with [Redacted] as Base Secretary and [Redacted] as his assistance Secretary.

I have left for Talia - Base Zero for final meeting with Honourable Sam Hinga Norma there after, I will meet ^{you} for more talks.

Your kind co-operation is highly needed, please.

Your Good Friend,

[Redacted Signature]



N/B:- kindly make sure that you withdraw all Kamajors from Bangoma as discussed to move with [Redacted]

Be informed that, [REDACTED] has finally returned home [REDACTED] and she has come with your [REDACTED] requested for.

You going to try very hard for your feeding (food) at Telia - Base Zero.

Number	Item	Content
148	Letter	Handwritten note inviting Commander to a meeting with Sam Hinga Norman during an impending visit to Bo.

~~_____~~ ~~_____~~
~~_____~~

[Faint, illegible handwriting]

4251.

Number	Item	Content
149	Letter	Letter from the Chairman War Council, Bo to the Commander 17th Battalion, dated 4 March 1998.

From Chairman, War Council, Bo

To: Battalion Commander [redacted]

4-3-98

Dear [redacted]

This letter serve to inform you that I am in Bo with some members of the War Council as an advance party of the National Council and the Director of War Visit to Bo on 7/3/98.

In view of the above, I am Commanding you to be present in Bo tomorrow before 10.00 AM.

I hope you will treat this letter with seriousness.

Yours truly,

[redacted signature]

NB

You are also requested to bring delivery belonging to M.S.F. which is in your custody.

Mr.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Battalion

[REDACTED]

4254

Number	Item	Content
150	Letter	Letter from the Deputy Coordinator CDF/SL Sumbuya (Bum Branch) Base, dated 30 May 1998.

Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone (C-D-F).

[Redacted]

30th, May, 1998.

[Redacted]

Batalion Commander,

[Redacted]

Dear Commander,

I write to inform you that the provincial secretary - South, Regional Co-ordinators - Bo and other members shall be visiting Lungu Island to hold up a meeting with the Island people and the Kamajors at Yambama on the 1st & 2nd June, 1998.

We have heard an information from a source that the entire meeting shall be propelling up on our affairs to remove us from Sumbuya back to Lungu Island of which it was not they that brought us to Sumbuya.

In regard of this matter, I've been therefore asked by some important people here at your house in Sumbuya to write and invite you to that meeting on those 2 days mentioned without fail, please.

We have long since been advised by the National Co-ordinator, Hon. Sam Hinga Norman and the National Director of War, Mr. Mainina Fajana that it is only they that have power to remove us from this station, and no one else since it was Base Zero Council to brought us to Sumbuya.


Your presence in that meeting, those two (2) days will sound grateful in the eyes of people behind you.

Your usual Co-operation is highly regarded, please.

Your Good Friend

[Redacted Signature]

(Deputy Co-ordinator)



Number	Item	Content
151	Letter	Letter from the Base Commander Sierra Leone CDF Bun Chiefdom Bonthe District Torma Base.

4257

Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces
Bom Chiefdom, Boma District
Torma Base

Date: 4th June, 1958

From: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

To: [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: An Urgent Summon

With reference to my letter last, this is to underline that you are urgently requested to visit here within a very short time.

Two men have been brought here as rebel collaborators of which I wrote you to handle the case. Meanwhile a letter has been got from [REDACTED] of Talia, Yankoko chiefdom, demanding the transfer of this case to him, and to which I made response that this matter had already been forwarded to you - the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for decision and that I could no longer re-transfer it to him as he demanded.

In this respect, please, make it possible for you to come over for the settlement of this matter. We expect you to come along with the special carrier of this letter or you give him a very short time of the day you are to be available so that we shall inform all parties concerned to be present on that day.

We look forward to seeing you at the shortest possible time of convenience.

Yours faithfully,
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Urgent !!

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces

[REDACTED]

Bo District

4259.

Number	Item	Content
152	Letter	Letter of appointment from The National Coordinator Civil Defence Forces HQ in Base Zero, dated 11 February 1998.

4260
103

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE

HEADQUARTERS - BASE ZERO

11th Feb 1998

FROM: *The National Coordinator*

TO: [REDACTED]

LETTER OF APPOINTMENT


It is my pleasure to inform you that upon the recommendation of the WAR COUNCIL, I have accepted and approved your appointment as [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] with effect from [REDACTED] 1998.

You have earned this as a result of your hard work and dedication to the cause of our people and the restoration of DEMOCRACY in Sierra Leone.

I wish to urge you to take this appointment as a challenge to strive further and continue to protect not only the lives and properties of our people, but to redouble your efforts for the restoration of constitutional order and the reinstatement of Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah as President of Sierra Leone.

I wish you good luck and more successes in your services.

Yours,



NATIONAL COORDINATOR

cc: CHAIRMAN - WAR COUNCIL
DIRECTOR OF WAR
FILE

Lj2b1

Number	Item	Content
153	Distribution List	A list showing distribution of logistics to CDF personnel.

WAR FRONT LOGISTICS DISTRIBUTION FOR
C.D.F./S.L. ([REDACTED])

DATE	DEPLOYMENT AREA	NO. OF PERSONNEL	ITEMS DELIVERED	QTY. DELIVERED	NAME OF RECEIVING COMMANDER	SIGNE & DATE	REMARK
29/9/98	Funeral of 1 Komajor C/O Dodo	1	Rice SALT RICE	1 BAG 1 ✓ 2 ✓	Chief [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
30/9/98	[REDACTED]		RICE SALT	2 (100) BAGS 1 BAG	B/C Boakarie Fombra	[REDACTED]	30/9/98
01/10/98	[REDACTED]		7.62 mm (SP) 7.62 mm (NATO) S/G Cartrgs. RPG Bombs RICE	4 Boxes 4 ✓ 4 ctus. 1/4 Bombs 6 BAGS	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
01/10/98	[REDACTED]	1	S/Gun Cartridge	1 pkt	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
01/10/98	[REDACTED]		RICE SALT	1 BAG 1 BAG	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Funeral of five (5) Komajor Killed in Rev. 1/1/98

WAR FRONT REGISTERS DISTRIBUTION FOR
C. D. F. / S.L. (KENEMA DISTRICT)

DATE	DEPLOYMENT AREA	NO. OF PERSONNEL	ITEMS DELIVERED	QTY. DELIVERED	NAME OF RECEIVING COMMANDER	SIGNE & DATE	REMARK
28/1/78	Forward of Korumbur [REDACTED]	1	RICE SALT	1 BAG 1 "	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
30.9.78	[REDACTED]		RICE SALT	2 (small) BAGS 1 BAG	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
10.11.78	[REDACTED]		7 62mm (SP) 7 62mm (M7) S/G Cartridges RPG Bombs	4 Boxes A V. A 14 Bombs	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
14.10.78	[REDACTED]	1	3/4 Gun Cartridge	1 prc	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	
2.11.78	[REDACTED]		RICE SALT	1 BAG 1 BAG	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Forward of Five (5) Km away Korumbur in Forward of village the F. Net

4263

WAR FRONT REGISTERS DISTRIBUTION FOR
 C.D.F./S.L (KENEMA DISTRICT)

DATE	DEPLOYMENT AREA	NO. OF PERSONNEL	ITEMS DELIVERED	QTY. DELIVERED	NAME OF RECEIVING COMMANDER	SIGNE & DATE	REMARK
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	
11/11/88	Front	1	1 CHC	1	[Signature]	[Signature]	

4264

4265

Number	Item	Content
154	Distribution List	A list showing distribution of logistics to CDF commanders for the month of September 1998.

7207

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEPLOYMENT GDP/SL FOR THE MONTH OF 1998

No.	NAME OF CHIEFDOM	NAME OF COMMANDER	QTY OF RICE BAG	CAS FOR CONDIMENT	DATE RECEIVED	S I G N E I
1.	Nongwa Chiefdom					
2.	SMALL-BO "		12	Le50,000.00		
3.	NIAMA "		12	50,000.00		
4.	LANGRAMA "		11	45,000.00		
5.	SIMBARU "		6	30,000.00		
6.	KANDI-LEPIAMA		12	50,000.00		
7.	PALLA WANDOR "		12	50,000.00		
8.	GORAMA MENME "		11	45,000.00		
9.	DODO "		12	50,000.00		
10.	LOWERT-BARBARA "		12	50,000.00		
11.	MALLEGOHUN "		12	50,000.00		
12.	TUNKIA "		12	50,000.00		
13.	GAUTHA "		12	50,000.00		
14.	KOVA "		12	50,000.00		

4268

DISBURSEMENT LIST FOR DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT QBR/SL

No.	NAME OF CHIEFDM	NAME OF COMMANDER	CITY OF RICE BAG	CASH FOR COMMODITY	DATE RECEIVED	S I G N E
15.	NOMO CHIEFDM	[REDACTED]	12	50,000.00		
16.	BAMA "		12	50,000.00		

FOR THE MONTH OF 1998

4269

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR CDF/SI
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF FOR MONTH OF [REDACTED] 1998

No.	SECTION	PERSONNEL	QTY OF RICE BAG	CASH FOR COM. DIVERSE	DATE RECEIVED	SIGN
1.	District Administrator	[REDACTED]	4	10,000.00	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
2.	Deputy Administrator	[REDACTED]	4	10,000.00	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
3.	National Deputy Director of War	[REDACTED]	4	10,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
4.	Administrative Secretary	[REDACTED]	4	10,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
5.	Asst Admini Secretary	[REDACTED]	3	10,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
6.	Director of Operations	[REDACTED]	1	5,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
7.	Communication Officer	[REDACTED]	4	10,000.00	18-9-98	[REDACTED]
8.	Welfare Officer	[REDACTED]	1	5,000.00	4/10/98	[REDACTED]
9.	Director of Logistics	[REDACTED]	2	10,000.00	12/9/98	[REDACTED]
10.	" Intelligence	[REDACTED]	3	10,000.00	13/9/98	[REDACTED]
11.	" Investigations	[REDACTED]	2	5,000.00	19/9/98	[REDACTED]
12.	Transport Officer	[REDACTED]	3	10,000.00	12/9/98	[REDACTED]
13.	Brima A. Jimmy	[REDACTED]	2	10,000.00	18/09/98	[REDACTED]
14.	Major Police Commander	[REDACTED]	2	10,000.00	17-9-98	[REDACTED]
15.	Deputy Dirco of Operations	[REDACTED]	2	10,000.00	17-9-98	[REDACTED]
16.	" " Intelligence	[REDACTED]	3	5,000.00	17-9-98	[REDACTED]

4270

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR ODE/SL - [REDACTED]
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF FOR THE MONTH OF [REDACTED] 1998

No.	SECTION	PERSONNEL	QTY OF RICE BAG	CAS FOR COMPLIMENT	DATE RECEIVED	SIG
17.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	5,000.00		[REDACTED]
18.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	5,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
19.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	5,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
20.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
21.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	5,000.00	18/09/98	[REDACTED]
22.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	5,000.00	18-9-98	[REDACTED]
23.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	22/9/98	[REDACTED]
24.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	12/9/98	[REDACTED]
25.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	2,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
26.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17-9-98	[REDACTED]
27.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	22-09-98	[REDACTED]
28.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17-09-98	[REDACTED]
29.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	19/9/98	[REDACTED]
30.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
31.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	4,000.00	17-9-98	[REDACTED]
32.	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2	4,000.00	17-9-98	[REDACTED]

11271

DESCRIPTION LIST FOR CNY/SL - MEMBERS

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF FOR THE MONTH OF.....1998

No.	SECTION	PERSONNEL	QTY OF PICE MAG	CASH FOR COMPTRENT	DATE RECEIVED	SIGNATURE
33.	Store Keeper	[REDACTED]	2	1,000.00	12-2-98	[REDACTED]
34.	War Council Representative	[REDACTED]	2	1,000.00	12-2-98	[REDACTED]
35.	Armorer I	[REDACTED]	2		18/9/98	[REDACTED]
36.	Armorer II	[REDACTED]	1		21/9/98	[REDACTED]
37.	Bane Herberlist	[REDACTED]	1		22/9/98	[REDACTED]
38.	Typist I	[REDACTED]	1	1,200,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
39.	Typist II	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	18-2-98	[REDACTED]
40.	Intelligent Officer I	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
41.	" " II	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17-2-98	[REDACTED]
42.	" " III	[REDACTED]			18.9.98	[REDACTED]
43.	" " IV	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	18.9.98	[REDACTED]
44.	" " V	[REDACTED]			17-9/98	[REDACTED]
45.	Office Attendant I	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17.9.98	[REDACTED]
46.	" " II	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
47.	Drivers I	[REDACTED]	1	2,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
48.	" " II	[REDACTED]	1		23/9/98	[REDACTED]

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR GDF/SL - KENYA DISTRICT
 ADHITSRAVIVE SPARE LIST FOR THE MONTH OF.....1998

No.	SECTION	PERSONNEL	QTY OF LICE BAG	QTY OF CUMMERBUND	DATE RECEIVED	SIGN
49.	Amputees (5)	[REDACTED]	5	50,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
50.	Security (55)	[REDACTED]	10	20,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
51.	Advisers (6)	[REDACTED]	7	240,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
52.	Hospitalised Kamajors	[REDACTED]	10	50,000.00	17/9/98	[REDACTED]
53.	Battalion Commanders (10)	[REDACTED]	1		18/9/98	[REDACTED]
54.	Printer	[REDACTED]	1	1,000.00	18/9/98	[REDACTED]
55.	Store Keeper	[REDACTED]				[REDACTED]

4274

NO.	NAME OF PARTY	RESIDENCE	DATE	SIGNATURE
1.	[REDACTED]	1 DAY	1010,000.00	18/9/98 [REDACTED]
2.	[REDACTED]	1 DAY	10,000.00	18/9/98 [REDACTED]
3.	[REDACTED]	1 DAY	10,000.00	19/9/98 [REDACTED]
4.	[REDACTED]	1 DAY	10,000.00	21/9/98 [REDACTED]
5.	[REDACTED]	1 DAY	10,000.00	19/9/98 [REDACTED]

RECEIVED BY FOR THE ACCOUNT OF [REDACTED]

DATE OF RECEIPT

TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVED

DATE RECEIVED

SIGNATURE

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4275.

Number	Item	Content
155	Letter	Letter from the Madam Munda Fortune Kasilla II Battalion Bo to The Deputy Minister of Defence (National Coordinator-CDF) dated 27 September 1998.

4276

Civil Defence Force - Sierra Leone, District
From Chief Initiator and Herbalist
(Madao Wanda Fortune)
Kassila II Battalion
No. 18, 9th Street - Kc II
Co.
27th September, 1998.

The Deputy Defence Minister
(National Co-ordinator - CDF)
Freetown.

Sir,

LETTER OF AN URGENT FOR TRANSPORT AND INCREASE IN FOOD

I want to crave your indulgence to critically go through this humble and legitimate note considering the war crisis still existing in our beloved country - Sierra Leone. As an initiator of Kassila II, Battalion, I have some serious problems which I would want to bring to your good office.

Moreover, I was asked to initiate some Kamajors in fifteen Chiefdoms, which was four thousand (4000). At that time, each initiate was expected to pay the sum of Le30,000.00 (Thirty thousand Leones). Considering the tense of the crisis at that time, we were duly trying to increase the number of fighting force to redeem our beloved country - Sierra Leone. As a matter of fact, the total sum involved went to Le12,000,000.00 (Twelve million Leones). To testify this, the fifteen Chiefdoms include - Sakua, Belanga, Nyawallanga, Valunya, Bargbeh, Barjah, Komboya, Nbaoma, Gbo, Basse, Kowa, Kamajei, Wandor, Simbaro and Tonge respectively.

~~As an initiator, my mobility is really zero in terms of transport considering~~
the numerous tasks looking at the war crisis still existing in the country. There is sometime negligence of duty on my part when I am asked to attend to important meetings. The distance from my residence is far away from my office and besides that, I need to be mobile in areas where my warriors will be operating especially at this time of time when we need to end the war in the shortest period of time.

You may or may not be surprised to hear that the quota in terms of food is really minimal considering the number of Kamajors with me presently. I would appreciate it very much if more attention is paid to this. As the proverb goes, an empty bag cannot stand.

Sir, it is with all these in mind, I have decided to write and bring them up to your good office. I would be very much grateful, if you can use your good office to assist in this matter.

Hope to hearing from you at your convenience.

Thank in advance.

Yours faithfully,

S.S.S. Madao Wanda Fortune 28/9/98

(MADAO WANDA FORTUNE)

Approved by:

MADAO WANDA FORTUNE
(CHIEF INITIATOR AND HERBALIST)

- cc: 1. The Vice President
2. The Chairman, CDF, Bo
3. The Chief Initiator, CDF, Bo

4277.

Number	Item	Content
156	Letter	Letter of Appointment from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to Mr Mualim Allie Sesay, dated 4 November 1998.

4278

OROE SIERRA LEONE

OF THE HIGH PRIEST

ALLIEU KONDEWA


DIMA ROAD, EO

NET FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref:

Our Ref:



Mr. Maalim Allie Sesay,
Civil Defence Forces,
SIERRA LEONE.

Dear Sir,

LETTER OF APPOINTMENT

With reference to the above matter, I wish to inform you that, you have been appointed the position of National Initiators' Spokesman, effective today's date.

You have proved well in the entire operations of Civil Defence Forces of Sierra Leone, on connection with the inceptions of the war in this country.

Because of your positive responses and continuous hard work, I appoint you as National Initiators' Spokesman.

I hope you continue your hard work to liberate our beloved country, Sierra Leone.

SIGN:
KING DR. ALLIEU KONDEWA,
NATIONAL HIGH PRIEST,
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES,
SIERRA LEONE.

- Copy to:- National Coordinator, CDF/SL.
- National Public Relations Officer, CDF/SL.
- National Director of War, CDF/SL
- District Administrator, CDF/SL
- Resident Minister, South
- National High Priest, CDF/SL
- National Logistics Officer, CDF/SL
- Logistics Officer for Initiators, CDF/SL.
- Deputy National High Priest, CDF/SL.
- Director of Personnel, CDF/SL.



4279.

Number	Item	Content
157	Letter	Letter of Recommendation from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to The National Coordinator in respect of Mualim Allie Sesay, dated 26 July 2000.

4280

FORCE SIERRA LEONE
OF THE HIGH PRIEST
ALIEU KUNDEWA
BOIMA ROAD, BO
FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY




Your Ref:.....

Our Ref:.....

King Dr. Allieu Kondowa,
National High Priest.

The National Coordinator,
Civil Defence Forces,
FREETOWN.

DATE 26th



DOP
please assemble
all CDF SAs
at B/F Hotel to discuss
and acquaint me
with results and all

Dear Sir,

APPROVAL OF MUALIM ALLIEU SESAY, FOR FREETOWN CIVIL
DEFENCE FORCES OPERATIONS.

29/10

I, King Dr. Allieu Kondowa, National High Priest have done all that is necessary to secure all Kamajors in the city, in order to liberate our beloved Sierra Leone.

I strongly advise all Kamajors to obey him and receive from him all that I have prepared for the entire security of all Kamajors to face any front, to liberate this country.


I would have travelled to Freetown myself, but my responsibility now, is to prepare all initiators for the different zones of war affected areas for the security of this country from Revolutionary United Front.

I again advise all initiators to work with Maulim Sesay and also realise that I have done very much for the security of all Kamajors on the Freetown Highway and the entire city.

Your cooperation is highly solicited.

SIGNED:.....
KING DR. ALLIEU KONDEWA
NATIONAL HIGH PRIEST CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES,
SIERRA LEONE.

- Copy to:- National Personnel Officer, CDF/SL Ftn.
- National Public Relations Officer, CDF/SL Ftn.
- National Logistics Officer, CDF/SL Ftn.
- National Director of War, CDF/SL
- District Administrator, CDF/SL, Bo.
- Resident Minister, South.
- Director of Operations, CDF/SL Bo.
- National Director of Transport, CDF/SL, Bo.



Maulim should stay action
as the porting of Kono
+ Maulim Sesay is not to be
but songs and port Le...

4281.

Number	Item	Content
158	Letter	Letter of "Recommendation" from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to The National Public Relations Officer (PRO) in respect of Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr Samuel Lahai (Secretary), dated 10 January 2000.

4282


CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE

THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH PRIEST

KING DR. ALIEU KUNDEWA

88 MAHAI BOIMA ROAD, BO

MOTTO: WE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref.....

Our Ref.....

DATE 10th January, 2000

From: The National High Priest, Kundawa C.D.F./S.L

To: The National Public Relations Officer, C.D.F./S.L.

RECOMMENDATION

I wish to recommend Dr. Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr. Samuel Lahai (Secretary) to be signing for and collecting all supplies and condiments meant for all C.D.F/S.L. initiators with effect from the above date.

I am confident that they will maintain the good working relationship that has been existing between us.

I count on your usual co-operation.

Signed.....
Dr. Alieu Kondewa
National High Priest

cc:-

- The National Co-ordinator C.D.F./S.L.
- The Director of Personnel C.D.F./S.L.
- The Director of Logistics C.D.F./S.L. ✓
- The Director of War C.D.F./S.L.
- The District Administrator C.D.F./S.L.


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4283.

Number	Item	Content
159	Letter	Letter of "Recommendation" from The High Priest of The Civil Defence Forces Sierra Leone to The National Public Relations Officer (PRO) in respect of Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr Samuel Lahai (Secretary), dated 13 January 2000.

4284

The Director of Logistics
CDF/SK
Freetown



L/285

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE SIERRA LEONE

THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH PRIEST

KING DR. ALIEU KUNDEWA

88 MAHAI BOIMA ROAD, BO

MOTTO: WE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY



Your Ref:

Our Ref:

13th January 2000

DATE

Alieu Kunderwa
13/1/2000

From: The National High Priest
Dr Alieu Kunderwa CDF/SL

To: The National Public Relations Officer - CDF/SL

Dear Sir

With reference to the letter of recommendation dated 10th January 2000 for Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) and Mr Samuel Lahai (Secretary) written to you and copied amongst others, I wish to inform you that it has now been resolved that Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) should be responsible for the signing of all documents relating to the supplies and condiments for CDF/SL initiators.

In case Dr Mohamed Mansaray (Initiator) is absent, Mr Samuel Lahai (Secretary) can deputise him.

It is hoped that this may not cause any inconvenience on your part.

Thanking you in advance.

Alieu Kunderwa
13/1/2000

Dr Alieu Kunderwa
National High Priest

- Copy: The National Co-ordinator - CDF/SL ✓
- The Director of Logistics " ✓
- The Director of Personnel " ✓
- The Director of War " ✓
- The District Administrator " ✓

Number	Item	Content
160	Declaration	Declaration of commitment signed by Samuel Hinga Norman, to the Release of Child Combatants and Child Abductees by various Factions, March 2000.

22 March, 2000

CARITAS MAKENI

STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS CAMPAIGN

DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT TO THE RELEASE OF CHILD COMBATANTS AND CHILD ABDUCTEES BY THE VARIOUS FACTIONS.

HAVING regard to the provision of the said Lome Peace Accord, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 to which Sierra Leone is a State Party.

MINDFUL of the need to create conditions of stability where the children of Sierra Leone in particular can enjoy a secure environment and develop to their fullest potential.

BEARING IN MIND that to achieve the objective enunciated in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, children need to grow up in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, RE-AFFIRMING our commitment to the Peace Process in Sierra Leone, respectively, to the intent that the country shall return to normalcy within the minimum of time to enable the implementation of development programs

HEREBY ADOPT THIS DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT this 22nd day of March 2000.

ARTICLE 1

The parties hereto shall forthwith facilitate the disarmament of all child combatants that is to say, children under the age of eighteen years and bearing arms and shall take immediate steps to prevent the use of child combatants in any manner whatsoever.

ARTICLE 2

The parties hereto shall in tandem with the actions contemplated in Article 1 above, release, free and cause to be released, all children and other persons abducted both during the conflict and after the signing of the Lome Peace Accord.


ARTICLE 3

The parties shall in utmost good faith facilitate the return and/or handing over of child combatants and abductees to UNAMSIL, DDR Camps and other Humanitarian Agencies by May 15th, 2000 (the International Day of the Family), to enable them receive care and attention and ultimately to be reunited with their families and relatives.


ARTICLE 4

The parties in this regard undertake to co-operate with UNAMSIL, all agencies concerned with the welfare of children and the war affected and shall assiduously work towards the attainment of the goals enumerated in the Declaration.

DONE AT FREETOWN THIS 22ND DAY OF MARCH 2000.


CHIEF SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN
DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE
AND LEADER OF CDF


CHAIRMAN FODAY SAYBANA SANKOH
CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC MINERAL RESOURCES
COMMISSION AND LEADER OF RUFF


CHAIRMAN JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR THE
CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE


BRIG-GEN. MITIKISHE MAXWELL KHOBE
CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF,
SIERRA LEONE MILITARY ARMED FORCES

WITNESSES:



MD. JO ANNA VAN GAPEN
UNICEF REPRESENTATIVE
SIERRA LEONE


MR. JOSEPH RAHALL
CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL FORUM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS


Number	Item	Content
161	Calendar	CDF Calendar for the year 2001 depicting photos of senior figures of the CDF.

00000887

CDF Calendar 2007




H.E. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President and Commander-in-Chief
Republic of Sierra Leone



H.E. Joe Demby
Vice-President
Republic of Sierra Leone



Hon. Samuel Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence and Regent Chief of Jajama-Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District, is the founder of the Kamajors and the National Coordinator of the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces. Chief Norman was born in Valunia Chiefdom, Bo District in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone and educated at various colonial military schools in Sierra Leone. He is a graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Mons in the United Kingdom and a retired captain from the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces.



1. Chief Norman, in his State Avenue Office, Ministry of Defence
 2. Norman at Passout for CDF trainees. Behind him is Alien Kondowa, Chief initiator and other initiators.

4892

00000839


January 2001


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**Sierra Leone
Civil Defence
Forces**

Sierra Leone Action
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P.O. Box 852125
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
USA

*We Fight For
Democracy*





The Late Prof. Alpha Lavalie

00000840



Moinina Fofanah
National Director of War

As far as the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces are concerned, they don't say war unless he says they say war. Moinina Fofanah (above left), popularly known within the CDF as Director, is the man who oversees the mobilization and deployment of the volunteer fighters of the CDF. When his men are not engaged in combat against the rebels, Fofanah refers to himself as Director of Peace.

One of the earliest victims of rebel atrocities includes Prof. Alpha Mohamed Lavalie (shown right), historian and founder of the Hindo-Hindo movement, a predecessor to the Kamajor movement of the CDF. He was assassinated February 8, 1994. To him this first edition of the CDF calendar is solemnly dedicated. "Greater love has no man ...than to lay down his life for his friends." (Jesus of Nazareth)

February 2001


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Stone Mountain, GA 30083
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We Fight For Democracy





1

Hon. Aliou Kondouwa

1. Aliou Kondouwa, the Chief Initiator of the Kamajors and allied militia forces, is the embodiment of the legend and mystery of the Kamajors. He is decked in his ceremonial attire above as High Priest.



2



3

2. Initiators and Priests of the Kamajors in their ceremonial uniforms.
 3. Kamoh Labai Bangura (center) is a high priest of the Kamajors. With him are initiators Kamoh Alie Sesay (L) and Mohamed Mansaray (R).

00000842

4296

March 2001


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


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FORCES

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


Col. M. S. Dumbuya (center), Commander of the Tamaboro wing of the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces. Dumbuya, an undisputable leader of the Northern resistance to the AFRC/RUF rebels, is believed to be one of the leading experts on bush warfare. He is show here with his Commanders, Initiators and Directors.



Hon. R.E.S. Lagawo, MP
Chairman of the NCC

He is believed to be the oldest member of the oldest political party in West Africa - the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). Undentably, he is the glue that has held the presidency and the nation together during these uncertain days of our national quagmire. "Hon. Richard Lagawo is a man whose support for the CDF is unlimited," says the CDF. He is the Chairman of the National Coordination Committee for the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Forces.



00000844

CDF personnel at the Monghere Training Center, Valunia Chiefdom, Bo District. Battalion Commander, Albaji Sherriff, third from right. "Maa ma luma sokee ii genda, ke mu lumai e teh feh." Mende Proverb

April 2001

00000845



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**Sierra Leone
 Civil Defence
 Forces**





00000846

When they are not in combat defending their towns and villages against the rebels, members of the CDF are engaged in various restoration and security duties around the country. Above left, Security Officer, Dohor Sandy on guard at a market place. Above right, Field Commanders of the Gbelthi, Jamahoro and Kapra Militia in battle uniform. Bottom right, the strategic Mabang Bridge between Moyamba and Freetown which was captured and destroyed by the rebels, has now been reconstructed by UNAMSIL and the CDF.

4300

May 2001


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00000848



1. Above left, CDF personnel await their allowance following disarmament at their base at Brookfields Hotel in Freetown.
 2. Above right, Director of Welfare, M.K. Harding, must have the most unenviable job in the country.
 3. Caring for the sick and wounded, is the responsibility of the Medical Director of the CDF, Mustapha Vonu, who operates mostly from make-shift clinics and unfurnished wards around the country. To his left, are wounded fighters of the CDF.

4302

June 2001


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
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Keeping a close eye on our boarders with Liberia, is the job of Pujehun District Director, Eddie Massalay. He is the man often in hot water when his judgements are questioned by government leaders in Freetown and Monrovia. Above right, is the Pujehun District CDF Headquarters. Below right, Field Commanders of Pujehun District. They include the ever vigilant, Boarder Battalion of the CDF.



4304

July 2001


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

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




LEFT: OBHS Field Commander, Charles L.H.S. Harding, oversees security personnel in Freetown and the Western Area.
RIGHT: OBHS leaders

00000852

Following the unparalleled success of the Kamajors and allied forces in the Provinces, Western Area Hunting Societies organized themselves into the Organized Body of Hunting Societies (OBHS). They are the vanguards of the city of Freetown and the surrounding Mountain Area. The OBHS includes the Ojeh, Ogugu and the Hunting Society, a federation of former traditional cultural organizations in the Western Area.



4306

August 2001


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
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Basic combat training is at the heart of the CDF success against the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front and AFRC allies. Above left, CDF recruits undergo weapons training. Below right, recruits undergo obstacle training. Above right, National Director of Training and retired Sierra Leone army officer, Mohamed B. Jawara, oversees training activities for the CDF.

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Knowing what the enemy is going to do before he does it, is the art of military intelligence. Top left, Chief Security Officer, Alie Katta, takes no chances. He and his staff are on duty twenty-four hours a day throughout the country. Top right, Director of Communications, Joseph Massalay, keeps track of rebel and CDF movements throughout the country. Bottom right, Director of Intelligence, Augustin Giombi, tries to stay ahead of enemy activities from his office at CDF High Command.

October 2001

00000857

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


TRANSPORTATION: Moving CDF personnel from one end of the country to the other is the responsibility of CDF Director of Transportation, Ahmed Koroma. Above right, CDF personnel are on ferry from Fagrin to Freetown during the January rebel incursion into Freetown. DDR: Under the United Nations sponsored Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration program known as the DDR, former combatants who turn in their weapons to the UN peace keeping forces, receive monetary compensation and are reintegrated into civil society. Above left, CDF liaison on the DDR program, and administrative assistant to the National Coordinator, Baimba Zorokon

November 2001

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Charles Moiwo, NCC Member and National Public Relations Officer, CDF.

Mustaph Lameh, NCC Member and Director of Logistics, CDF.

Mabel Rollings, NCC Member and Secretary to the Secretariat.

Sahr Matturi, Secretary General, NCC Secretariat.

Above Left to Right: Moiwo, Lameh, Rollings and Matturi

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Mohamed Daramy, NCC Member, Eastern Province

Humphrey Swaray, NCC Member, National Security Advisory

Hon. A.O. Bangura, NCC Member, Northern Province, Chairman of the Defence Council

The National Coordinating Committee of the Sierra Leone Civil Defence Force is the government's oversight committee for the CDF. Its membership includes representatives of government, the CDF and other civic leaders. The National Coordinator of the CDF, Chief Hinga Norman, reports to the NCC. The four members of the NCC Secretariat above are the only ones who are not members of the CDF.

December 2001


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Number	Item	Content
162	Report by the Regional Reconciliation Committee (RRC) Southern Region	Report on unacceptable behaviour of CDF in the Southern Region, August 2000.

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*REGIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE (RRC)
SOUTHERN REGION*

RRC Membership:
PC B. Hindawa, PC Parliamentary Representative, Bo District
Eric Jumu, Regional Programme Coordinator South, NCRRP
I.B. Kamara, Regional Coordinator South, NCDDR
Director of War and Operations CDF (SL)
Office of the Commissioner of Police Southern Region
Simon Arthy, Regional Programme Coordinator South, EC/SLRRP
Umaru Koneh, Regional Secretary, Associated Transport Workers Union
Chairman Petty Traders Union South
Chairman Peace Building and Reconciliation Committee South
Representative, Sierra Leone Teachers Union South
Chairman Child Protection Committee South

From: RRC Southern Region

To: Honourable Albert Joe Demby, Chairman National Coordinating Committee CDF
CC: Honourable Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence
Honourable Charles Margai, Minister of Safety and Security
Honourable Foday Sesay, Resident Minister South
Chairman, Joint Coordinating Committee
Commander, Guinean UNAMSIL Detachment, Bo

Dated: 8 August 2000

REPORT ON UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR OF CDF
IN THE SOUTHERN REGION, AUGUST 2000

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June 1999, it was noted that the relationship between the CDF and civil society had become excessively strained. CDF/Community Reconciliation Workshops were conducted in Bo and Kenema, and these helped stimulate a gradual improvement in this relationship. Through great efforts on the part of the CDF, as well as other parties, by April 2000 the situation had improved remarkably. General behaviour of the CDF was commendable, and public trust and confidence in the organisation was high. Check points were few and associated harassment was infrequent. CDF respect for chieftain authorities and judicial and law enforcement bodies was returning. Indeed, when disarmament began in the Southern Region in April 2000 it was embraced by the CDF, and the kamajors' rate of disarmament was constrained only by the capacity of DDR staff. By the end of April, 600 kamajors had disarmed in Bo and Moyamba, and the remainder were eagerly awaiting their chance to disarm and re-continue a normal civilian life style.

When in late April 2000 the RUF resumed hostilities and again threatened Freetown and other government held areas, the CDF understandably remobilised to face this threat. Check points inevitably sprung up again all over the Southern Region, and many of those who had disarmed

were armed again. For this swift response to the RUF threat and the protection provided to the region, the Southern Region community were nothing but grateful

However, in the short period since remobilisation, CDF behaviour has rapidly deteriorated. With alarming speed, kamajors have reverted to committing crimes against the general public and peaceful citizens. Most worryingly, crimes and unacceptable behaviour have been and continue to be committed by senior members of the CDF, as well as junior ranks, and all have gone unpunished. The actual and perceived involvement and condoning of unacceptable practices by senior CDF members, and the unwillingness or inability of the organisation to hold its members accountable for gross malpractice, has shaken public confidence in the CDF to the core.

On the roads of the region, drivers and traders are once again subjected to harassment and intimidation. Commandeering of vehicles has been rampant, and recovery of such vehicles has often been blocked by the apparent involvement of senior members of the CDF. Raids on towns and villages in the region and looting of properties by the CDF have occurred. More shooting incidents (CDF/CDF or CDF/Community) have occurred in the region in the last 2 months than in the previous 2 years. Armed robbery in Bo Township is at an all time high, with the public convinced of CDF involvement. Two recent incidents involving a grenade blast and indisciplined firing by a night patrol has resulted in 6 deaths, and has provoked public anger and heightened fear of the CDF. Arbitrary arrests, beatings and detention of civilians, including chiefdom authorities, by the CDF have also led to increased public bitterness, condemnation and fear.

Against this background, the CDF initiators have resumed their initiation activities, supposedly to 'top up' the power of kamajors ready for the war front. However, because of a lack of reference to chiefs and authorities to assist in screening procedures, many new members have been initiated, and children, criminals and law breakers have joined these numbers. In addition, while the charging of a fee for these 'topping up' ceremonies has brought millions of leones worth of revenue to the initiators, the repercussions in the communities has been an increase in taxation, and greater efforts at check points to extort money from the public to meet these 'initiation' payments.

The continued lack of transparency and accountability in the process of distribution of supplies from government to the CDF at chiefdom level has led to increasing frustration and anger within the CDF. Indeed, on several occasions in the last month, shooting incidents have occurred in the region over this issue.

With all this occurring, very little or no action appears to have been taken by the CDF High Command or CDF National Coordinating Committee to control the situation. This silent stance has merely served to actively encourage further crimes, and to widen the gap of community mistrust and lack of confidence in the CDF.

It saddens this committee to see the reputation of the CDF sinking to such a low ebb, and the region's population suffering so unnecessarily. There is no doubt that if it was not for the positive actions of the CDF in the Southern Region in the last few years, the region would not have enjoyed the peace and security which are now associated with the South. For this action in time of need, the CDF will always be held in the highest esteem. It is this Committee's fervent wish that today's CDF regain that position of trust and esteem. Sadly, this will not happen without firm leadership and the proper exercise of authority, responsibility and accountability within the organisation.

Incident vs. pattern

Regional Reconciliation Committee Southern Region - August 2000

This report is submitted to bring to the attention of the CDF hierarchy and National Coordinating Committee incidents and patterns of behaviour that have now become common place in the Southern Region. The Regional Reconciliation Committee Southern Region respectfully requests an audience with the NCC to learn its response to this report, and what action is being or will be taken to improve the situation, and bring peace and security back to the region. At this meeting, the RRC will be happy to discuss what it too can do to contribute to this process. While this could include sensitisation workshops and meetings at grassroots level, it is nonetheless felt that such initiatives ~~alone~~ will be ineffective, unless strong action is ~~first~~ taken by the CDF leadership.

1. UNCHECKED BEHAVIOUR OF INITIATORS

General:

Since the resumption of hostilities by the RUF in May 2000, CDF initiators have once again begun initiation activities. The rationale given has been that since kamajors have been in contact with normal civil society and have broken society rules since last being initiated, they need to have their powers 'topped up' before being ready for the war front. However, due to a lack of involvement of chiefdom authorities or even CDF commanders in the screening of those coming forward for 'topping up', new members have certainly been initiated. As happened in 1999, amongst these have been children and criminal elements. Having been initiated, they then 'attach' themselves to a battalion (a practice that even the Battalion Commanders are complaining about), join check points and start making money. This can clearly be seen today in all areas where initiation / 'topping up' activities are occurring, in the increasing number of check points and increasing numbers of kamajors at each check point. In addition, the charging of a fee for the 'topping up' or initiation ceremony has led to increased taxation of communities, and encouraged and even forced kamajors to harass civilians to extort the money necessary for their ceremonies. At the same time, this has of course netted the initiators millions of leones.

The continued policy of initiators to demand the sole and total loyalty of their initiates, over and above any loyalty to commanders, leaders, or the CDF as an organisation, continues to undermine CDF organisational control of its members. Just as initiators are seen to be unaccountable and above the law, so too their initiates believe themselves to be, as their behaviour too often reflects. In such a situation, senior commanders are often left impotent to enforce discipline and hold individual kamajors accountable for their behaviour.

Whilst this resumption of unchecked and uncontrolled initiation activity has caused general problems through the region, the behaviour and activities of one initiator in particular is causing widespread mayhem and fear. This individual is High Priest Kondowa, the head initiator of the CDF.

High Priest Kondowa:

In early 1999, High Priest Kondowa began initiating new kamajors in Bathurst, Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthie District. Initiation activities subsequently continued in Bumpe Town, Bumpe Chiefdom, Bo District. Initiates were charged up to Le50,000, and estimates of how many kamajors were initiated range from 5,000 to 10,000. In order to entice even those kamajors who had already been initiated, Kondowa claimed that this new initiation gave the individual even greater powers than

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normal initiated kamajors. These new kamajors were called 'Avondos', and they were identified by the wearing of an ear ring in one ear. Within the general public, this move was seen primarily as an economic, money-making exercise. There was no involvement of chiefdom or other authorities in the selection of new initiates, resulting in numerous children and criminal elements entering the society. The behaviour of the Avondos caused such disruption in the region that Kondowa was finally arrested in Bo by ECOMOG, and held until he made a public announcement that the Avondos' powers were actually no greater than those of other kamajors, and that they should be law abiding.

Since May of this year, Kondowa, like the other initiators, has again been conducting initiation activities. However, unlike the other initiators, Kondowa has again given his newly initiated or 'topped up' men a separate identity to other kamajors ('Banya Moli'), and claims that their powers are greater than that of other kamajors. The separate identity is reinforced by the wearing of red bandanas, or the tying of red material onto the barriers at check points. This active policy of creating a supposedly superior group of kamajors within the wider CDF has already led to tension and conflict. In addition, the behaviour of this new group towards the civilian population is causing fear and apprehension. Of interest, Banya Moli is Mende for 'Don't ask me'. This is in the context of 'Be silent', not, 'I don't know the answer'. In other words, 'I take your rice and palm oil and demand payment from you, but don't dare ask me why I'm doing it - stay silent'. This name in itself sends a strong message to the very civilian population these kamajors purport to protect.

Kondowa was conducting his initiation activities during May-July at Waterloo, Fakunya Chiefdom, Moyamba District. However, the behaviour of himself and his men led to a climate of 'fear and intimidation' (words used by the Chief at Waterloo in a letter of complaint to government) in the local population, and vehicle commandeering became rampant. The pattern of behaviour culminated in the 11 July ambush by Kondowa's men of the SLA purser travelling to Masiaka to pay the ex SLA. This incident almost led to armed hostilities between the ex SLA and CDF, and Kondowa was ordered to leave Waterloo. He returned to his home village of Balehun in Bumpe Chiefdom, Bo District. Of interest, the Banya Moli kamajor who initiated the ambush had reportedly been an SLA soldier up to a month before (quite clearly, therefore, newly initiated). He had previously worked with the SLA purser, and hence recognised him on the road, and guessed that he must be transferring pay up country.

In the last few days of July, Kondowa has again resumed initiation / topping up activities, this time at his home village of Balehun in Bumpe Chiefdom. Hundreds of kamajors each day are converging on the site, paying their money and becoming Banya Molis. Incidents of enforced lifts have increased, the increasing numbers of kamajors at the check points in the chiefdom are becoming increasingly aggressive and demanding, and the public is once again growing wary and afraid of travelling through Bumpe (which of course lies on the main route from Bo to Matru).

The civil populace of Bumpe Chiefdom of course have to live with Kondowa amongst them, and their situation is a particularly difficult one. During April and May 2000, a series of consultations were held in Bumpeh Chiefdom with a broad representation of stakeholders from the chiefdom. These were facilitated by a group which included senior CDF and civic society members and staff of the NGO Conciliation Resources. In public, the population was not prepared to openly complain about Kondowa, due to fear of the violent reaction they would receive from Kondowa and his group of heavily armed kamajor followers. The Regional Chief himself denied there is any problem

at all. However, during private discussions, it rapidly became clear that major problems are faced. Indeed, even some chiefdom authorities were prepared to talk about this, but only on the condition of anonymity. In essence, the presence of Kondowa is seriously undermining any leadership in the chiefdom and seriously disrupting the lives of numerous people. Serious human rights abuses are reported to be taking place regularly, especially in terms of punishment meted out by Kondowa on people who cross his path or he perceives as enemies. He fines people as if he were a chief, and they are intimidated into paying by the gang of heavily thugs who follow him. Some people are even reportedly leaving the area because they cannot live in peace around him. But although Kondowa continues to be a serious scourge on their society, people are simply too afraid to handle him - especially the very chiefdom authorities who should handle him

A concrete example of Kondowa's excesses is the incident of 21 July 2000 at Gbangbatok, Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District. On 20 July 2000, the Chiefdom Security Officer (CSO) at Gbangbatok saw a well known looted truck at the local trade fair. In response to strict orders sent down from the Deputy Minister of Defence and Director of War and Operations to all commanders to seize and return all looted vehicles, the CSO apprehended the truck. The truck was full of Kondowa's men, the Banya Molis, who demanded that as it was Kondowa's truck it should not be taken. As the truck was a looted one, the CSO confiscated it regardless

When Kondowa heard that evening that the truck had been taken, he travelled with several hundred of his men to 'teach a lesson' to the people of Gbangbatok. At 0530 on 21 July, he and his men entered Gbangbatok fully armed. Shots were fired, and seven commercial shops were fully looted (one shop alone is reported to have had Le9m cash taken). The CSO and everyone found in his compound (including the local societal head, Baba Musa) were beaten mercilessly. When all this mayhem had been completed, Kondowa is reported to have called the Regent Chief and community elders and instructed that they and the population should now pay him for his troubles ('Pour Libation', with Kondowa taking away the 'offerings'). A large quantity of palm oil, rice and even goats are reported to have been taken as 'payment'.

Such behaviour is outrageous. That it is conducted by the senior initiator of the pro government CDF, an individual who receives a monthly supply of around 200 bags of rice and pay directly from government, makes it all the more appalling. How the CDF hierarchy and Government can allow such behaviour to continue in the Southern Region without any course of action being taken against the guilty party is worrying to the extreme. Equally worrying to the general public is the rate at which Kondowa is initiating these new Banya Molis. They are now found throughout Moyamba and Bonthe districts, in large areas of Bo district, and even in Rujehun District. Because of the impunity with which their initiator, Kondowa, is seen to be able to conduct excesses, their behaviour reflects their belief that they too are immune from any disciplinary measures (see 'Vehicle Commandeering' below for further examples of Kondowa's behaviour). Their increasing numbers, their fanatical loyalty to Kondowa and the appalling track record of Kondowa himself have all combined to raise great concern and fear amongst the region's public.

Reference is made to the following commitments made by the Deputy Minister of Defence on behalf of the CDF last year:

CDF members who break the law of Sierra Leone and CDF Regulations will face appropriate disciplinary procedures.

In Bo, before the signing of the Lome Peace Accord, Chief Norman said the following:

Initiators get their powers free from God. They must therefore pass them on freely. Therefore no fees should be paid for initiation

Formal screening procedures (for new initiates) by chiefs should be reinstated.

Cease initiation of children into the CDF.

In Kenema, after the signing of the peace process, Chief Norman said the following:

All initiation must stop

The RRC requests confirmation that the CDF Hierarchy and NCC stand by these commitments. If they do, the RRC would like to know how they will be enforced with reference to the above cases.

3. VEHICLE COMMANDEERING

The incidence of vehicle commandeering in the Southern Region has increased markedly in the last 2 months. Both commercial and NGO vehicles have been affected. Most have been returned; for example, the CRS Land Cruiser commandeered in early July in Bumpe Chiefdom by kamajors who used it to travel to Waterloo to be re-initiated by Kondowa; the UAC Christian Brothers Land Cruiser commandeered in Moyamba town in June; the MCSL truck commandeered by Kondowa's Banya Moli kamajors at Waterloo in June. But of note, the 4 vehicles belonging to the NGO Lutheran World Services (LWS) commandeered by the Pujehun District Initiator Sualiho Sherif in Sorogbema Chiefdom in mid July are still to be returned.

For commercial drivers, the seizure and holding of commercial trucks in Bo North remains a serious problem, and the Drivers Union have several times had to consider halting all commercial traffic into the area.

- In early July, a commercial truck was seized in Mandu by the initiator Mame Munda when it was discovered it was on route to RUF areas to the north to sell fuel and food.
- A small time later, High Priest Kondowa sent men to take the truck, saying they had orders to do so from Chief Norman. The truck and its contents were taken. Soon after, the truck was repainted and seen undertaking commercial activities on behalf of High Priest Kondowe. Following complaints, the PRO, Charles Moiwo, reportedly sent a delegation to retrieve the truck, with a letter of instruction from both Chief Norman and the Vice President. The delegation and letter were reportedly ignored by Kondowa, who is still using the truck for his own purposes.
- In early July, a truck was seized at Mongeri for attempting to conduct illegal trading activity with the RUF (large consignment of stores being transported northwards). Despite attempts to retrieve the truck by 19 Battalion Commander, the CDF Transport Officer, and the Director of War's Office, the truck is still being held by Hassan Sherif, the local battalion commander. His excuse is that 'Chief Moiwo' (Charles Moiwo, CDF PRO) has given the truck to him, and that he will therefore not release it.

On about 24 July, another commercial truck was seized in Bo North (AAK 417). It was an ex Swiss military truck, painted blue with yellow stripes, and being an ex military truck appears to be the only reason it was commandeered. It was held in Gbangba village, 4 miles from Damballa, by one commander Francis Yaja. Again, for some time attempts to retrieve this truck were fruitless, with the commander stating that it had now been assigned to him by 'higher authorities'. It was eventually released at the end of July, but of interest, within 24 hours it was involved in trading of goods to RUF territory, with senior CDF involvement and approval (see section 5 below, Trade of Food and Fuel from Bo to RUF Areas).

In all the above cases, the trucks are either being held by senior members of the CDF hierarchy (High Priest Initiator), or the consent of senior members of the CDF hierarchy is being given as the reason for not returning them. Whilst it is agreed that vehicles and individuals involved in trade with RUF must be arrested, it is clear that the trucks should be handed over to the police, not held by individual commanders. The perceived or actual support and involvement of members of the CDF hierarchy and senior initiator merely sends the message to the CDF as a whole that commandeering is acceptable, and that those involved will not be punished.

Reference is made to the following commitments made by the Deputy Minister of Defence on behalf of the CDF last year:

Vehicle Commandeering of any kind is unacceptable (.....except in a life and death emergency situation.....)..... and guilty members would be punished.

CDF members who break the law of Sierra Leone and CDF Regulations will face appropriate disciplinary procedures.

The RRC requests confirmation that the CDF hierarchy and NCC stand by these commitments. If they do, the RRC would like to know how they will be enforced with reference to the above cases.

4. DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT RICE TO CDF

Lack of control and accountability of rice distribution from government to CDF continues to cause serious problems. Contrary to the commitment made by the CDF last year, chiefdom authorities are still not informed of what is supposedly being delivered to kamajors at chiefdom level, and when. As a result, kamajors at chiefdom level all over the region are disgruntled and angry, believing they are being cheated of their just allocation. Anger is directed at both the CDF hierarchy and government as a whole. In fact, the belief that their own commanders are misappropriating supplies with impunity leads many to ask what is wrong with them harassing and appropriating community supplies at a local level.

Of particular concern is the fact that this anger and disgruntlement has recently led to several incidents of shooting:

In mid July in Tihun, Sogbiri Chiefdom, Bonthe District, kamajors believed their commander was misappropriating rice meant for them, and tied and held him for some time. On his release, he left,

collected reinforcements and returned to the town. Shooting took place, during which a pregnant woman was reportedly shot in the leg.

In late July, kamajors demanding their food supply attacked the house of the Bonthe District Administrator in Bonthe Town. Shots were fired, but there are no reports of casualties.

Reference is made to the following commitments made by the Deputy Minister of Defence on behalf of the CDF last year:

CDF will ensure logistical distribution is monitored, transparent and accounted for to Chiefdom Authorities.

The RRC requests confirmation that the CDF hierarchy and NCC stand by this commitment. If they do, the RRC would like to know what has been or will be done to enforce it.

5. TRADE OF FUEL AND FOOD ITEMS FROM BO TO RUF HELD AREAS

In July, public concern was raised about the trade in fuel and food items passing from Bo, through Bo North and Gorama Mende, to RUF held areas around Makeni and Kono. Trading with the RUF is a lucrative business. In northern Gorama Mende, fuel can be sold at Le100,000 for a 5 gallon container, a bag of rice fetches Le70,000, and a bag of flour Le150,000. Trade is normally conducted at the village of Mondema, with trucks coming from Kono and Makeni to collect the goods and transport them back to RUF forces.

In particular, concern was raised by both the public and kamajors on the ground that this activity was only being allowed to happen because drivers were receiving written security clearance from senior CDF members (Bo District Administrator and Transport Officer were reported to be signing these clearances). At the RRC meeting of 7 July 2000, the CDF answered these concerns by saying that Chief Norman had recently decreed that this trade should cease. However, even after this order, security clearances are reported to have been issued by senior CDF members from Bo District Administration and some trucks were still plying the route. Two trucks guilty of this offence were arrested in mid July, and an investigation was reportedly launched into the involvement of senior CDF members in issuing security clearances. While it was reported that the situation was thereafter brought under control, it was clear that no action had been taken against those involved in the trade.

In the last few days of July, the initiators Kamoh Lahai Bangura, Lahai Massaquoi and Mohamed Mansaray began this trade again, through Gorama Mende. Not only did they sell several truck loads of fuel and food to the RUF, but in addition, because their own trucks broke down on the way, they commandeered several trucks locally and forced the drivers to carry the loads.

All such activity described above clearly constitutes collaboration with the enemy. Most armies would shoot anyone found guilty of this, or at the least lock them up until the end of the war. The fact that senior members of the CDF have been, and continue to be, involved in this activity, and that no action is taken against them, totally undermines the credibility of the CDF in the public's eye.

The FRC therefore requests confirmation of what action the CDF hierarchy and NCC is taking to stop this activity, and to hold those guilty of supporting it accountable

6. INSECURITY IN BO TOWNSHIP

In the last few months, the incidence of night robberies occurring in Bo town have rocketed. Few nights have gone by without reports of either actual robberies occurring, or of doors and windows being knocked at in the early hours and orders being given to open up for 'night patrol inspection'. CDF and Police are the only ones patrolling the town at night, as UNAMSIL has declined from conducting such activities. Inevitably, therefore, public suspicion of who is involved in this widespread practice of armed robberies has fallen on the CDF.

Public confidence in the CDF's ability to control the situation effectively has been further deteriorated by the tragic events of late July which led to the death of 6 individuals and 13 injured. The grenade explosion at the Bo Town Hall on 16 July caused when Bo kamajors were preventing the entry into the hall of another armed kamajor (apparently recently returned to Bo from Freetown) was a terrible tragedy, and highlighted the dangers of untrained young men being free to roam within the township with weapons. The second incident on 22 July which led to the death of the MSF Belgium Bo Administrator is less clear cut. A CDF night patrol supposedly came across him when he was urinating in the early hours outside his house, and opened fire. Exactly when they opened fire, and whether it was at him or into the air is unclear. What is clear is that in trying to get into a house to take refuge he smashed a window and cut himself, and that when he was found in the morning and eventually taken to hospital, he died soon after from blood loss. The rumours of foul play have been further stoked by the fact that doctors at the hospital refused to conduct an autopsy (reportedly because of ~~immundation~~); and that on the second night ~~after the body~~ was buried, a group of men were caught trying to dig up the body (they escaped capture).

Regardless of the exact circumstances of the case of the MSF(B) administrator, the combined effect of numerous robberies and the deaths of Bo citizens has produced great anger, frustration and fear amongst the town's population.

7. INEFFECTIVENESS OF UNAMSIL

One of the contributing factors to the insecurity in Bo Township is perceived by the public to be the ineffectiveness of the Guinean UNAMSIL contingent stationed at Bo. Last year's Bo ECOMOG contingent conducted visible day and night patrols, as do UNAMSEL contingents in other major towns and cities (eg. Kenema and Freetown). A strong and active presence from a recognised and capable external security organisation has been shown to deter criminal activity, and to subdue some of the problems which occur within the CDF or between the CDF and the civil community. Unfortunately, the current Guinean UNAMSEL contingent appears far from active. Indeed, the combination of their inactivity and the increased availability of UN food items and supplies now for sale in Bo markets has led them to be viewed by the public as at best ineffectual, and more commonly with disdain. Following concerted pressure from government administration and civil society, the contingent commander agreed at the end of July to start patrolling.

The RRC will carefully monitor the regularity and effectiveness of the UNAMSIL contingent's patrol activities, and hope that it will at last begin to make some contribution to the security of Bo Township and the environs. If it proves unable to do so, the committee will not hesitate to ask that it be reinforced or replaced by troops able to achieve these objectives

8. HARRASSMENT AT CHECK POINTS

As part of the CDF response to the renewed RUF threat in May, numerous armed check points have sprung up all over the region. While it is accepted that the security threat must be met accordingly, the following points are made:

- Harassment, intimidation and extortion of money is again common at check points. This is particularly so for traders and commercial drivers.
- Numbers and locations of check points do not appear to reflect the security threat. Rather, in many areas kamajors appear to have restarted check point activity purely for commercial reasons.
- Vehicles are rarely checked properly at check points. Rather, money is collected and the vehicle moves on. If money is not handed over, the vehicle and occupants are forced to park and are held until such time as the occupants change their mind.

Reference is made to the following commitments made by the Deputy-Minister of Defence on behalf of the CDF last year:

CDF will educate personnel at check points on duties and responsibilities.

CDF will sensitise members that money given by drivers and traders at check points etc is a voluntary contribution and must not be coerced.

The RRC requests that the CDF hierarchy increases its efforts to instil disciplined and reasonable behaviour at check points, and reviews the question of the number and location of check points. Check points which contribute to the security of the Southern Region are actively encouraged and supported; those which are there purely to extort money from drivers are not.

9. CDF / CHIEFDOM AUTHORITIES RELATIONSHIP

Sometime in June, CDF Battalion Commander Joe Timidale arrested the Paramount Chief and Chiefdom Speaker of Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District, and took them to Korbundo where they were locked up. The intervention of the SDO and CDF District Administrator secured their release within 24 hours, but no action was taken against the commander beyond asking him to apologise.

The public and the region's chiefs were horrified that such an act could go unpunished. Merely asking the guilty party to apologise sends entirely the wrong message to all kamajors, indicating that kamajors are above all laws and codes of customary behaviour.

4307

Regional Reconciliation Committee Southern Region - August 2000

Reference is made to the following commitments made by the Deputy Minister of Defence on behalf of the CDF last year:

*Every member of the CDF must respect Chieftdom and government authorities
CDF members who break the law of Sierra Leone and CDF Regulations will face appropriate disciplinary procedures*

The RRC requests confirmation that the CDF hierarchy and NCC stand by these commitments. If they do, the RRC would like to know how they will be enforced with reference to the above case

SUMMARY

In summary, the RRC once again respectfully asks the NCC and CDF hierarchy to examine the incidents and patterns of behaviour detailed above, and to determine what they will do to rectify this unacceptable situation. While it is recognised that the control of a non professional civil militia is no easy task, the fact remains that the responsibility for the behaviour and actions of the CDF lies squarely with the NCC and CDF hierarchy. We and the public therefore look to this leadership to use its authority decisively to enforce discipline and accountability within the CDF, so that the organisation's reputation may be restored and once again the region's civil community and the CDF can live together harmoniously.

The RRC respectfully requests an audience with the NCC, either in Freetown or Bo, to learn its response to this report. At this meeting, the RRC would like to discuss what it too can do to contribute to the improvement of the current situation. But as stated above, while this could include sensitisation workshops and meetings at grassroots level, it is nonetheless felt that such initiatives alone will be ineffective, unless strong action is first taken by the CDF leadership.

If the meeting is to be held in Freetown, it is asked that at least a week's notice may be given. Please contact the Committee through NCRRR South


Simon Arthy
For and on behalf of the Regional Reconciliation Committee Southern Region.

librarian

00000863



SIERRA LEONE GOVERNMENT



Ref: MRD/LG/D1/6

From: The Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government

To: The Director General, Ministry of Defence

28th August, 2000

REPORT ON UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR OF SOME CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (CDF) MEMBERS IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCE

With reference to the above subject, I am directed to respectfully forward herewith, for the attention of the Honourable Deputy Minister of Defence, photocopy of a letter addressed to my Minister by the Honourable Paramount Chief Samba B. Hindowa V of Bo District, in the Southern Province.

3

Thanks for info in item 2. Please refer to the document stating that the Dep Min of Def and National Co-ordinator of the Civil Defence has advised that you should forward this document to the attention of the Dep Secy to the Resident Min, South. And the Police Comdr of CDF South.

A. B. YILLAH

FOR: PERMANENT SECRETARY

6TH FLOOR
YOUYI BUILDING
FREETOWN

(2) For urgent reaction.

See Ref 27/8

Hon DMS 31/8/00

The attached report has been forwarded to you for urgent action.

Note: This matter has been handled by Hq. Minister.

4329

Received 23/8/2000
P. Davies 170

00000864

Parliament Building,
Tower Hill,
Freetown.

18th August 2000

The Minister of Rural Development
and Local Government,
6th Floor,
Youyi Building,
Brookfields,
Freetown.

Dear Sir,


**REPORT ON UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOUR OF SOME
CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (CDF) MEMBERS IN THE
SOUTHERN REGION**

When in April 2000 the RUF resumed hostilities and again threatened Freetown and other Government held areas, the CDF understandably remobilised to face the threat, checkpoints inevitably emerged all over the Region, and many of those who had disarmed were armed again. For this swift response to the RUF threat and the protection provided to the region, the Southern Region Community were nothing but grateful.

However, in the short period since remobilisation, CDF behaviour has rapidly deteriorated. With alarming speed, Kamajors have reverted to community crimes against the general public and peaceful citizens. Most worrying, crimes and unacceptable behaviour have been and continue to be committed by members of the CDF and all have gone unpunished. The actual and perceived involvement and condoning of unacceptable practices by Senior CDF members and the unwillingness or inability of the organization to hold its members accountable for gross malpractice, has shaken public confidence in the CDF to the core.

On the roads of the region, drivers and traders are once again subjected to harassment intimidation. Commandeering of vehicles has been rampant, and recovery of such vehicles have often been blocked by the apparent involvement of Senior members of the CDF. Raids on towns, and villages in the region and looting of properties by the CDF have occurred; more shooting incidents (CDF/CDF or CDF/Community) have occurred in

:



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the region in the last 2 months than in the previous 2 years. Armed robbery in Bo Township at all time high, with the public convinced of CDF involvement. Two recent incidents involving a grenade blast at the Bo Town Hall, indiscipline firing by a night patrol has resulted in 6 deaths and several injuries, and has provoked public anger and heightened fear of the CDF. Arbitrary arrests, beating and detention of civilians by the CDF have also led to increased public bitterness, condemnation and fear.

+

+

Sometime in June, the CDF Battalion Commander Joe Timidale of Koribondo, dragged Paramount Chief A . J. Nallo and the Chiefdom Speaker of J.A.K. Muana of Lugbu Chiefdom Bo District to Koribondo, where they were flogged and locked up for over 24 hours.

The intervention of the Senior District Officer and the Civil Defence Force Administrator secured their release, but no action was taken against the Commander beyond asking him to apologise.

The public and the Chiefs of Southern Region are horrified that such act could go unpunished. Merely asking the guilty party to apologise sends the entirely wrong message to all Kamajors indicating that Kamajors are above the laws and codes of customary behaviour.


The Chiefs are no longer in control of their chiefdoms. The CDF members impose heavy fines on poor civilians for minor offences with no reference to the chiefs. The inability of the organisation to punish its members for crimes committed against civilians have undermined the administration of the chiefs.

In July 2000, Cdf Battalion Commander Joe Timidale dragged the Section Chief of Niagorihun Bagbo Chiefdom and other Sub-chiefs to Koribondo where they were beaten and locked up till heavy fines were paid by their relations before being released. The Chairman of the Bo Town Council Committee of Management Mr. D.A. Kawa had to personally intervene on behalf of his relatives the section chief and other sub-chiefs. All these molestation, beatings and arbitrary arrests go unpunished.

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
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Since May this year, High Priest Kondowai like the other initiators has again been conducting initiation activities. However, unlike the other initiators, Kondowai has again given his newly initiated or "topped up" men a separate identity to other Kamajors ("Banya moli") and claims that their powers are greater than the other Kamajors. The separate identity is reinforced by the wearing of red bandanas or tying of red material on the barriers at check-points. This active policy of creating a supposedly superior group of Kamajors within the CDF, has already led to tension and conflict. In addition the behaviour of this new group towards civilians population is causing fear and apprehension. - Of interest, Banya moli is mende for Don't ask me! This is in context of "Be Silent", not I don't know the answer. In other words, I take your rice and palm oil and demand payment from you but don't dare ask me why I'm doing it, stay silent. This name (Banya moli) in itself sends a strong message to the very civilian these Kamajors purport to protect.



A concrete example of Kondowai's excesses is the incident of 21 July 2000 at Gbangbatoke Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District. On the 20th July, the Chief Security Officer (CSO) of Gbangbatoke saw a well known truck at the local trade fair. In response to strict orders sent down by the Deputy Defence Minister and Director of war and operations to all Commanders to seize and return all looted vehicles, the Chief Security Officer apprehended the truck. The truck was full of Kondowai's men the Banya molis, who demanded that as it was Kondowai's truck, it should not be taken. As the truck was a looted one, the CSO confiscated it regardless.

When Kondowai heard that evening that the truck had been taken, he travelled with several hundred of his men to "teach a lesson" to the people of Gbangbatoke. At 05:30 a.m. on 21st July he and his men entered Gbangbatoke fully armed. Shots were fired and several commercial shops looted. The CSO and everyone found in his compound (including old Teacher Barba Musa of Bo School) were beaten mercilessly. When all this mayhem had been completed Kondowai is reported to have called the Regent Chief and community elders and instructed that they and the population should now pay him for his troubles (Pour libation with Kondowai taking away the offerings). A large quantity of palm oil, rice and



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even goats were reported to have been taken as "payment". Such behaviour is outrageous. It is apparent that Kondowai is now building up his own army. Even instructions from Chief Norman to return commandeered vehicles are ignored.

Sir, we ask for your timely intervention, and to prevail on the National co-ordinating Committee and the CDF hierarchy to use its authority decisively to enforce discipline and accountability within the CDF, so that the organizations reputation may be restored and once again the region's civil community and the CDF can live together harmoniously.

Thanks for your usual co-operation.

Yours sincerely

[Handwritten Signature]
Hon. P.C. Samba B. Hindawa V
18/8/00

Copy: Permanent Secretary
Min. of Rural Dev. and Local Govt.
Freetown. ✓

Chairman,
Council of Paramount Chiefs
Freetown.

2:
DSM 24/8/00
DLG,
P. NOTE of B.1
FOR DISCUSSION WITH
THE HON. STM.
[Handwritten Signature]
23/8/00

Number	Item	Content
163	Letter	Letter to the Commissioner of Police, Sierra Leone Police Force East, Kenema referring to a "list of suspects in Kenema Prison accused of Junta collaboration", dated 13 July 1998.

4334
10

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES OF SIERRA LEONE

EASTERN REGION
MOTTO: We Fight For Democracy



27, Kai-Samba Terrace
Kenema

Your Ref.....

Our Ref.....

Date: 15th July, 1998

The Commissioner of Police,
Sierra Leone Police Force - East.
Kenema.

Dear Sir,

RE: LIST OF SUSPECTS IN KENEMA PRISON
ACCUSED OF JUNTA COLLABORATION

1. We have received a copy of the above-mentioned document compiled by your office.
2. In relation to those detainees against whom no concrete evidence of collaboration has been supplied, we, in view of the Government's policy on the Civil Defence Forces(CDF), believe it is left with the Police and the Magistrate to ensure that the rights of the citizens involved are stopped being violated.
3. That we view the detention of Mr. Vandi Kanneh and Mr. Abdulai Kallon with alarm, as both detainees, from our investigations appear only to have been aiding Kamajors to identify fighters of the AFRC/RUF Junta.
4. After the Kamajor occupation of Kenema in February 1998, the Junta forces attacked the township on two occasions. So as a security measure, fighters of the Junta forces were hunted down and executed. And our experineces with the personnel of the SSD in Tongó and Zimmi during the junta rule made them obvious targets. Under the circumstances of the IMMEDIATE RESTORATION PERIOD, the two Kamajors were executing orders, and Messers Vandi Kanneh and Abdulai Kallon were only assisting as many patriotic citizens' Sir.
5. Our office is not aware of any efforts being made to re-arrest Mohamed Bawoh and Foday Kemokai, with a view to returning them to prison. We were in a War situation, the SSD personnel were fighting on the side of the Junta, against ECOMOG and the Kamajors.
6. We believe Mr. Vandi Kanneh and Mr. Abdulai Kanneh have been unlawfully detained, and therefore request for their immediate and unconditional release.
7. Thanks in anticipation of your co-operation.

*C.P.O.
Above sec
minutes 1/4
12/3*

Yours faithfully,

 DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF PRISONS,
 KENEMA DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION
 CDF, SL

- CC:
1. The Magistrate, Kenema.
 2. The ECOMOG Commander, Eastern Region.
 3. The Provincial Secretary, for the Resident Minister.

Number	Item	Content
164	Letter	Letter of Petition against termination from office, dated 1 July 2000.

433b

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE OF SIERRA LEONE (CDF/SL)

KENEMA DISTRICT.

The Logistics Officer
C.D.F./SL,
Kenema District.
1st July, 2000.

The Hon. Deputy Minister of Defence
and National Co-ordinator,
Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone
C/o Ministry of Defence,
State Avenue,
Freetown.

Dear Sir:

A LETTER OF PETITION AGAINST MY TERMINATION FROM OFFICE
BY MR. ARTHUR KOROMA - CDF/SL ADMINISTRATOR - KENEMA DISTRICT.

With the most honour and respect, I herewith forward this letter to you, in relation to the above subject matter for your information and necessary action.

In the first place Sir, I was voluntarily enrolled in the Kamajor Organisation on the 1st of November, 1991

[REDACTED]

In December 1992,

[REDACTED]

When the AFRC toppled the SLPP Government on the 25th May 1997, I established the 1st Kamajor Base in Dodo Chiefdom in the East and played a key role in sending a contingent of fighters to your location in Simbi to fight against that AFRC Government. Since September 1997, I did travel from the east to Base Zero on three occasions leading groups of fighters in the east to meet you at your location in the pursuit of procuring arms/ammos for Kamajor in that part of the east (on foot). Eventually,

[REDACTED]

When in January 2000, I obeyed to the orders of the Sierra Leone Government by Disarming Mr. Arthur Koroma thus terminated my long term Services in the Kamajor organisation.

I therefore forward this Petition letter to you against Mr. Arthur Koroma for the following undermentioned reasons:

1. All members of the CDF/SL Administration; Battalion Commanders, other Commanders and other Kamajors in the Chiefdoms have been disarmed, but they are still performing their former duties and posts except me alone being Sacked by Mr. Arthur Koroma for being disarmed as the only reason he gave.
2. Mr. Koroma did not give me any letter for my termination from office [REDACTED]
3. His Secretary and personal friend he appointed has been collecting [REDACTED] in my name while I was doing the actual job [REDACTED]. I have never collected any Payment ever since. Not even a single cent.

- 1. It was not Mr. Korman that appointed me but the National Co-ordinator of the CDF/SL.
- 2. Having worked for this organization for nine years without payment, it is now that Mr. Korman is bringing in his friends and school mates who were in the Teaching Field in order to marginalizing the foundation members.
- 3. Mr. Arthur Korman should pay me for my long services as a Manager [REDACTED]

Mr. Arthur Korman was invited to a well attended meeting held at the CDF Headquarters in Kono, comprising a participation of the Administration, Battalion Commanders and other Commanders, CDF Administrators of Pujehun, Kono and Kailahun District, CDF Administrators headed by Chief Isaac Gamba Lonsana and that meeting was chaired by the National Deputy Director of War Mr. Mohamed O. Koman. [REDACTED]

I therefore kindly solicit your kind action on this matter. Best regards.

Yours faithfully,

Signed: [REDACTED]

- 1. National Director of Personnel - CDF/SL
- 2. National W.A.C. - CDF/SL
- 3. National Director of Logistics - " "
- 4. National Director of War - " "
- 5. Mr. A. A. [REDACTED] - " "
- 6. Administrator CDF/SL - Kono District
- 7. Director of Operations - CDF/SL - " "
- 8. National Base Force Commander - CDF/SL
- 9. Mr. [REDACTED] - W.A.C. Dist.
- 10. CDF/SL/W.A.C. - Dist.
- 11. Hon. [REDACTED] Mr.

File.

RECORDED:

SIGNED: [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 (NATIONAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF WAR - CDF/SL)

Number	Item	Content
165	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 23 June 1997

Source: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 23 Jun 1997

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 18 - 23 Jun 1997

Period covered: 18-23 June 1997

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY

1. The kamajors have gradually increased their areas of influence in the Eastern and Southern Provinces of Sierra Leone establishing frequent checkpoints on the Bo-Kenema highway and the Makeni - Kono highway. The kamajors have reportedly accumulated a large force in Tikonko, approximately 12 km from Bo town, and there is speculation that they will attack the military base at Bo before beginning to move towards Mile 91 and the Freetown peninsula. Aid agencies and eyewitnesses have reported that kamajors are well-equipped with AK 47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. AFRC spokesmen claim that the kamajors are being supplied by the Nigerians through Liberia with the assistance of ULIMO-K. It is known that Chief Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence under the SLPP and de facto head of the kamajors, visited Sierra Leone and had discussions with the Nigerians during the past week.

2. Clashes between Kamajors and military in Kenema have intensified during the past few days. Sierra Leone Red Cross has counted 12 bodies (8 kamajors, 2 soldiers and 2 civilians) although the true number of casualties is believed to be higher. In Koribundu, approximately 20 km south of Bo town 18 people were reported to have been killed in a confrontation between the kamajors and the RUF during the weekend. In Zimmi in Pujehun district 200 civilians took refuge in the ICRC compound following fighting between the military and the kamajors. It is believed that the kamajors now control the area. War wounded are being treated by ICRC.

3. The Nigerian military build-up continues in Sierra Leone. Several military aircraft landed at Lungi on 19 June and the Nigerians are believed to be in an advanced state of operational readiness.

4. There has been a significant increase in the number of violent crimes such as murder and robbery over the past few days despite the presence of the Anti-Looting squad which continues to execute and occasionally mutilate culprits. There is no civilian movement after dark and few non-military vehicles are in evidence on the streets at any time. Fear of crime has now replaced fear of ECOMOG bombardment as civilians main concern.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

5. A Ghanaian delegation, headed by deputy Foreign Minister, Victor Gbeho, held talks

with the AFRC during the weekend of 21-22 June. Major Koroma, leader of the AFRC, said in a radio interview that the task which Ghana has undertaken will finally lead to the restoration of peace, security and constitutional order in Sierra Leone. No formal statements have been issued by the Ghanaian delegation. An ECOWAS meeting is scheduled to take place in Conakry on 26 June.

6. The Nigerian Foreign Minister has been making a tour of West African states, including Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana, in order to explain Nigerias position vis-à-vis the new regime in Sierra Leone.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

7. The European Union has issued another statement noting its concern that constitutional order has not yet been restored to Sierra Leone. The statement continues. The European Union and its member states therefore consider that existing development assistance to Sierra Leone cannot be provided under present circumstances. The statement made no mention of the EUs position over the provision of humanitarian relief.

FOOD AID

8. Action Aid have reported that they have 120 MTs of maize meal 22 MTs pulses and 9 MTs vegetable oil in Kambia. Over the weekend 21-22 June Action Aid distributed 52 MTs of maize and pulses to approximately 4,000 beneficiaries.

9. WFP successfully transported 50 MTs of food to Makeni in two different trucks on 19 June. Commercial transport rates had increased by 30 percent which is lower than anticipated given the recent price rises in fuel. It has not been possible to transport more food upcountry because WFP has been unable to open its store in Kline town in Freetown due to large numbers of military in the area who are well aware that the store contains rice. CRS local staff have also indicated a reluctance to check stocks at warehouses in Freetown as soldiers have shot on site suspected looters and CRS staff are afraid of being mistakenly targeted.

NON-FOOD ITEMS

10. Attempts are being made to identify quantities of non-food items still available among the humanitarian community in Sierra Leone. At a meeting on 19 June, agencies revealed the following supplies of non-food items:

Concern Universal:	No in-kind items but USD 50,000 available for emergency interventions.
Care:	28 MTs upland seed rice in Moyamba, 48 MTs upland seed rice in Makeni, 1,500 tool kits in Bo.
FAO:	130 MTs upland seed rice, 80 MTs lowland seed rice, 14 MTs seed

	maize, 28 MTs groundnut seeds, 17,000 cutlasses, 17,000 hoes. These inputs are being stored by the Ministry of Agriculture in its warehouses in Kenema, Bo, Moyamba and Makeni.
SLRC:	Makeni: 31,500 MTs seed rice, 1,500 household kits (mats, blankets, kitchen sets). Freetown: 150 rolls plastic sheeting.
UNHCR:	12,000 kitchen sets, 15,000 4x5 plastic sheets, some plastic sleeping mats, 100x25 kg containers of chlorine, 4x60 KVA generator, 7,000 hurricane lamps in Abidjan. All these items were originally earmarked for the repatriation programme but are available for other purposes.

11. The above list does not include food stocks or medical supplies as inventories of available resources in these sectors have been included in earlier reports. UN-HACU is aware that the list of inputs is not comprehensive and welcomes further information from agencies not included above. Anyone wishing to make use of the aforementioned items should contact the relevant agency directly.

HEALTH

12. MSF/ICRC intend to establish 10 health clinics in Freetown during the week beginning 23 June. Another MSF trip to Pamelap border in Guinea on 19 June revealed that the situation was unchanged from their previous trip 3 days earlier. Existing ICRC, MSF and UNICEF programme continue without significant change.

REFUGEES

13. According to UNHCR approximately 1,000 Liberian refugees at Jui camp in Freetown have moved into Waterloo camp on the outskirts of town due to fighting between the Nigerians and the Peoples Army in the area. The location of the remaining Liberian refugee caseload is unknown.

14. UNHCR have sent a staff member from their Liberian office to the border to monitor refugee influxes from Sierra Leone.

COORDINATION IN LIBERIA

15. Information exchange / coordination meetings are now being held three times a week in Monrovia for evacuees of the Sierra Leonean relief programme and there is a regular flow of information between Monrovia and Conakry on issues relating to Sierra Leone. At the third Liberian coordination meeting held on 20 June it was decided that ICRC should be the focal point for the transport of staff or supplies into Sierra Leone from Monrovia.

This report is available on the internet through RELIEFWEB: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

Complex Emergency Division (CED) New York

Mr. Peter Due
Tel.: (1 212) 963.1731
Fax: (1 212) 963.3630
E-Mail: due@un.org

Inter-Agency Support Branch (IASB) Geneva
Mr. David Bassiouni - Chief
Mr. Chris Kaye
Tel.: (41 22) 788.6385
Fax: (41 22) 788.6389
Registry E-Mail: Rosemary.Addo-Yirenyki@dha.unicc.org

Press to contact (DHA-Geneva)
Ms. Madeleine Moulin-Acevedo
Tel.: (41 22) 917.2856
Fax: (41 22) 917.0023
Telex: 414242 DHA CH
E-Mail: Moulin-Acevedo@dha.unicc.org

Number	Item	Content
166	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 14 July 1997

Source: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 14 Jul 1997

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 08 - 14 Jul 1997

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY

1. On 9 July, the Peoples Army attacked Lungi Airport in a bid to break through ECOMOGs outer security perimeter and destroy the 98.1 FM radio station which has recently served as a mouthpiece for President Kabbah and which they believed to be in the area. (See point seven below). The attack was comprehensively repulsed by ECOMOG troops and reliable Freetown sources have reported that at least 350 Peoples Army soldiers were killed by a combination of Nigerian and Guinean forces. The RUF commander who led the attack, Sam Bockarie (known as Mosquito) was injured in the foot during the fighting and has been seen in hospital by reliable eyewitnesses.

2. During the weekend of 12-13 July, the Peoples Army suffered another significant setback during fighting with Nigerian forces involving heavy artillery in the Jui and Hastings area. Although precise numbers of casualties are unknown, two trucks laden with corpses were observed returning to Freetown on the afternoon of 13th July. While the Nigerians suffered some casualties, the Peoples Army clearly incurred far more severe losses. ICRC reported 26 newly-wounded civilians at Netland and Connaught hospitals on 14 July. AFRC claims that Nigerian troops that were using Guineans as human shields have been ridiculed by ECOMOG Force Commander, Victor Malu. An ECOMOG warplane was observed flying over Freetown at the start of the fighting, but it was not seen to have dropped any ordnance.

3. Nigerian troops are now in control of Hastings Airport and the area up to and including Allen town. Residents from these areas are relocating in large numbers to the hills and into central Freetown. The main road out of Freetown is effectively closed as few vehicles have been observed on this route since 13 July. In Freetown, the Peoples Army have been preparing heavy machine gun positions on the high ground in the Hill station area. Some of these guns are mounted on the back of pick-up trucks and are mobile.

4. There has been sporadic but intense fighting between the RUF and the kamajors during the past week in the Zimmi area and an estimated 1,500 civilians and 300 kamajors are believed to have been forced into Liberia. Control of the strategically-important Bo Waterside bridge on the Sierra Leone/Liberia border has fluctuated between the two sides. Although the RUF was believed to have taken the bridge earlier in the week, Chief Norman, Deputy Minister of Defense and de facto leader of the kamajors, reported that the kamajors were in control of the bridge on 14 July.

5. The Kenema-Kono highway, which was previously controlled by the kamajors, has now been secured by the Peoples Army following AFRC/RUF re-enforcement of the

area.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

6. The date of Major Koromas proposed meeting with the ECOWAS committee of four has been changed from 15 July to 17 July. The meeting is scheduled to take place in Abidjan and not in Conakry.
7. President Kabbah has made several broadcasts to Sierra Leone over the 98.1 FM radio station which have proved to be a considerable irritant to the AFRC. In his first broadcast on 8 July, Kabbah urged the AFRC to step down to spare the people of Sierra Leone further pain and suffering. He also ordered soldiers and RUF to report to the nearest ECOMOG base and declare their loyalty. This tactic has been partially successful as several AFRC soldiers have since surrendered to Nigerian forces at Lungi.
8. On 8 July, in an attempt to undermine the impact of Kabbah's broadcast which took place earlier in the day, the AFRC announced its 19 member Cabinet. The majority of the posts are filled by former representatives of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). For example, Captain SAJ Musa, Secretary of Mineral Resources and Chief Secretary; Victor Brandon, Secretary of Development and Economic Planning; Col. Dr. KIS Kamara, Secretary of Health and Sanitation; Major Kula Samba, Secretary of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs.
9. The Finance Secretary, Joe Amara Bangali, was a former minister in the APC and the Foreign Secretary; Dr. Paolo Bangura, was a former Ambassador to the UN. The RUF are represented through the appointment of Foday Sankoh as Deputy Chairman and SB Rogers as Acting Secretary of Lands and Environment. Two portfolios, namely Trade, Industry and State Enterprises and Energy and Power, have not been filled but the posts have been reserved for representatives of the Peoples Army. 37 posts in the Supreme Council have also been created, but only 22 have been filled to date. The extent to which nominees were consulted prior to their appointment is debatable. In a radio broadcast on BBCs *Focus*, Mr. Saaba Tumor, who was appointed Director of Information and Broadcasting, denied all knowledge of his appointment.
10. In a statement issued on 11 July following its meeting with the Committee of the four ECOWAS Foreign Ministers, the UN Security Council reiterated its view that the attempt to overthrow President Kabbah's government was unacceptable and called for the immediate and unconditional restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone. The Security Council expressed deep concern over the negative humanitarian consequences of the continuing crisis in Sierra Leone as well as its threat to regional stability. The Security Council welcomed the mediation efforts initiated by ECOWAS and expressed its full support for these efforts as set out in the communique issued at the meeting of the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers in Conakry on 26 June. Finally, the Security Council stated that it would continue to follow the progress of efforts aimed at the peaceful resolution of the crisis and that it was ready to consider appropriate measures if constitutional order in Sierra Leone is not restored without delay.

11. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, on which nine different Commonwealth countries are represented, convened on 10-11 July to review developments in Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. In its discussions on Sierra Leone, the Group urged the international community to continue to deny recognition to the AFRC and decided that participation of Sierra Leone in the councils of the Commonwealth would be suspended pending the restoration of legitimate government.

12. On 10 July, the EU issued a statement welcoming ECOWAS efforts to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone. The EU particularly, welcomed the inclusion of the OAU on the ECOWAS committee of Four. With regard to its aid programme, it was stated that Pending the return of the legitimate government to Freetown . . . the EU maintains its view that development aid to Sierra Leone cannot be continued in the present circumstances.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

13. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has endorsed the joint UN/NGO Strategy and protocols for Sierra Leone as well as the United Nations Strategy for Inter-Agency Emergency Humanitarian Response. See Sitrep dated 24-30 June for more details. The US-based NGO consortium, INTERACTION, has also expressed written support for these strategies.

14. There has been much speculation over the status of the embargo in Sierra Leone as envisaged in the ECOWAS communique. There is no doubt that there are four Nigerian warships off the coast of the Western Area as at 14 July. Although these vessels are not visible to Freetown residents, they have successfully prevented commercial ships from docking at Freetown's port. Rocketing insurance premiums have also been a significant deterrent to shipping companies. There have, however, been many reports of pirogues and other small vessels successfully circumventing the blockade.

15. Media reports of an influx of a million people into Bo town are hugely exaggerated. ACF and MSF, both of whom have a presence in Bo estimate that less than 10,000 people have moved into Bo since the coup.

FOOD AID

16. The increase of the price of rice in Freetown to 40,000 leones per bag from its previous cost of 25,000 leones per bag is a clear indication that rice shortages are becoming increasingly acute. Although retailers still have rice available in their stores, wholesalers have exhausted their stocks as no food vessels have arrived in Freetown since the coup. Attempts by the business community to import rice into Freetown at the request of the AFRC have been unsuccessful primarily due to the exorbitant cost of insurance. Food agencies have managed to transport limited quantities of commodities (approximately 500 MTs) to Makeni and Bo during the past week. There is still a capacity of approximately 1,400 MTs in warehouses in Port Loko and Kambia.

17. The food aid pipeline for humanitarian relief remains healthy. Providing there are no unforeseen complications, there will be 10,000 MTs of food aid in Conakry available for programmes in Sierra Leone by the end of July. Another 5,000 MTs of food commodities are due to arrive in Conakry during August 1997. Distribution modalities will be determined by the Committees on Food Aid.

18. Existing targeted feeding programmes as outlined in previous sitreps continue. A one-off emergency distribution is being planned for approximately 8,000 displaced in Kabala in Koinedugu district in the Northern province of Sierra Leone. As the normal population of Kabala is estimated to be 10,000 people, this new influx is putting considerable strain on the coping mechanisms of the local population.

HEALTH

19. **Freetown.** There is a concern over the maintenance of the drug pipeline for the eight clinics currently being operated by ICRC, SLRC and MSF in Freetown. Staff from these agencies are investigating how long existing stocks will last. The caseload for the ICRC/MSF surgical programme has continued to decrease notwithstanding recent admissions due to the fighting in the vicinity of Hastings. ActionAid has agreed to make incentive payments to Blue Flag volunteers working on cholera prevention in Freetown.

20. **Bo.** An assessment of the MSF-supported hospital in Bo on 5 July revealed that the hospital building has not been damaged by recent fighting although the emergency department is still under rehabilitation. There is deemed to be sufficient local surgical capacity to treat casualties from possible future clashes. There were only 40 in-patients in the hospital as at 5 July this is attributable to insecurity and inaccessibility due to poor public transport to local areas.

21. **Kenema.** Merlin continues to support the Kenema government hospital in the Under Five clinics (the Pediatric Ward and the Lassa Fever Ward). Support is provided through the provision of therapeutic and supplementary foodstuffs and essential drugs and equipment. Merlin also plays a supervisory role as well as enhancing cholera preparedness. The programme is supervised by Merlins Medical Coordinator who is based in Monrovia. Although Merlins drug supplies were left intact, the pharmacy in Kenema hospital was completely looted. ICRC is seeing an average of 800 patients per week at the Nongowa clinic in Kenema. Drugs are provided by ICRC, Merlin and UNICEF.

CHILD PROTECTION

22. Although the family tracing and reunification network in Sierra Leone was temporarily disrupted by the coup and the departure of several key staff, efforts are being made to restart the reunification programme as the regional focus organisations, ADRA and Christian Brothers are still operational.

23. At the first Child Protection meeting in Conakry on 7 July, it was acknowledged that there were several impediments to successful implementation of child protection/demobilisation programmes in addition to security constraints namely: lack of reliable numbers of child soldiers as the only source of information was the former Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Unit under MNRRR; uncertainty over potential AFRC counterparts (e.g., the former programme manager of the DDR Unit, Major Kula Samba, is now Secretary of Social Welfare, Children and General Affairs and the former Army Chief of Staff, Col. Max Kanga is now Director of the National Relief, Rehabilitation and Demobilisation Commissions); the degree to which any programme might apply to the kamajors; and the current capacity of NGOs to implement any programmes. UNICEF is exploring the possibility of a pilot demobilisation project for 50-100 children to test the publicly-stated commitment of the AFRC to demobilisation of child soldiers.

REFUGEES

24. Concern Worldwide, the Irish NGO which still has one expatriate in Freetown, has reported that a caseload of 7,700 Liberian refugees have been receiving WFP food on a regular basis since the coup. All Liberian refugees have moved out of Jui camp to Waterloo camp, Clay Factory Camp and Freetown. Concern Worldwide continues to run a medical and therapeutic feeding programmes in Segbwema.

25. 200 of the 489 Sierra Leonean refugees who have been living in Waterloo camp in Freetown since their repatriation prior to the coup have indicated that they would like to return to their areas of origin. The first group of 40 will return by bus to the Eastern province as soon as possible.

This report is available on the internet through RELIEFWEB: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

Complex Emergency Division (CED) New York

Mr. Peter Due

Tel.: (1 212) 963.1731

Fax: (1 212) 963.3630

E-Mail: due@un.org

Inter-Agency Support Branch (IASB) Geneva

Mr. David Bassiouni - Chief

Mr. Chris Kaye

Tel.: (41 22) 788.6385

Fax: (41 22) 788.6389

Registry E-Mail: Rosemary.Addo-Yirenkyi@dha.unicc.org

Press to contact (DHA-Geneva)

Ms. Madeleine Moulin-Acevedo

Tel.: (41 22) 917.2856

4349

Fax: (41 22) 917.0023

Telex: 414242 DHA CH

E-Mail: Moulin-Acevedo@dha.unicc.org

Number	Item	Content
167	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 31 March 1998

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 31 Mar 1998

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 10 - 30 March 1998

REG. NO. 98/0031

Period covered: 10-30 March 1998

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea

SECURITY

ECOMOG has now deployed large numbers of troops into the interior of Sierra Leone and has secured all major towns throughout the country with the exception of Kono and Kailahun. On 22 March another two battalions departed the Western peninsula for the Eastern province and large numbers of troops are currently consolidating their position at Daru (East of Kenema) to prepare for the assault on Kailahun. Many Junta soldiers have surrendered to ECOMOG in the past month. These surrenders are being registered by ECOMOG troops and in some areas, particularly in the south-east, they are incarcerated. In other parts of the country they are allowed to move freely within ECOMOG controlled areas.

With the exception of Kambia neither the United Nations nor NGOs have permitted international staff members to remain overnight in rural parts of Sierra Leone. Checkpoints established by ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) on the main highways in Sierra Leone have resulted in a regular flow of traffic between Freetown and Kambia, but there are still relatively few vehicles on the road from Freetown to Bo. There are still some dead bodies from reprisal killings in evidence on the verge of some of the roads.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The UN Secretary-General submitted his most recent report on Sierra Leone to the Security Council on 25 March. The report commends the diplomacy of ECOWAS and its Committee of Five and highlights the contribution made by ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces in their removal of the junta. The report proposes that the Office of the UN Special Envoy be strengthened through the deployment of 10 UN military liaison officers, two police advisers and one human rights officer subject to the Security Council's approval. The UN Secretary-General has also established a Trust Fund for Sierra Leone to finance the immediate requirements of the GoSL, ECOMOG and the UN peace-building efforts. The British Government has pledged 2 million pounds sterling to this Trust Fund.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

The formal lifting of the UN sanctions (except the import of weapons and the movement of junta associates) and the ECOWAS embargo has led to the importation of several consignments of fuel and foodstuffs by sea into Freetown. This has caused the price of basic commodities to plummet helping to alleviate the humanitarian plight of the civilian population. For example, the cost of diesel in Freetown has fallen from 20,000 leones per gallon at the beginning of February to its pre-coup level of 3,000 leones per gallon.

Although the main highways in Sierra Leone are deemed too insecure for the safe passage of International UN and NGO personnel, commercial transporters have taken advantage of reduced fuel prices to deliver rice and other foodstuffs to the urban centres of Bo, Kenema and Makeni. Markets in these areas are thriving and food prices have fallen to pre-coup levels. International staff have been monitoring humanitarian programmes by chartering commercial aircraft for one-day assessments.

On 26 March President Kabbah formally launched the United Nations Flash Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone in the presence of UN Agencies and the local media. The Appeal seeks USD 11.2 million to meet immediate humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone. Priority interventions identified in the Appeal include: provision of emergency agricultural inputs in time for the planting season in May; re-establishment of essential health services, disease control and immunisation; access to safe drinking water; child protection and food for malnourished children; emergency basic education inputs; logistics support to food distribution; assistance to and repatriation of Liberian refugees; initial support for the return of the displaced to their areas of origin; coordination support and logistical services.

The British Government has provided support to the Government of Sierra Leone to enable it to re-establish the machinery of Government. Valued at approximately 1 million pounds, the package includes generators, computers, public address equipment, vehicles and office furniture.

The Government of Sierra Leone has established a National Commission for Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reconstruction (NCRRR) to act as the Government focal point for the coordination and management of all humanitarian, rehabilitation, resettlement, reintegration and reconstruction work in Sierra Leone. The NCRRR, which is attached to the Office of the President, will not execute or implement programmes. The capacity of the NCRRR is limited at present as the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner are the only two members of the Commission to have been appointed. UNDP is providing direct support in the recruitment of the technical staff of the NCRRR. The first inter-agency meeting at the new Commission was held on 30 March.

A recent assessment by World Vision in Bonthe district revealed that the nutritional status of the civilian population was less severe than previously thought. This is attributable to the significant harvest in the district which escaped misappropriation by armed elements. Brushing for the next planting season is already underway. However, the assessment did reveal that there was an urgent need for health-related interventions in the area as the primary health care system was in disarray.

FOOD AID

WFP, CRS, Care International and World Vision have continued to transport relief food by sea and by land into Sierra Leone. Since the ECOMOG intervention, 3,600 MTs of food have been shipped to Freetown by sea and approximately 2,000 MTs by land through the Guinean border town of Pamelap. The cross-border food aid operation from Liberia through Bo Waterside has not yet commenced as ECOMOG are not yet able to provide escorts for relief convoys. The proposed food aid airlift operation to meet urgent humanitarian needs in Bo and Kenema has been temporarily suspended as WFP has successfully managed to transport relief food by road to these areas through Kambia. WFP and food supply NGOs have also moved modest quantities of food commodities to Makeni.

In Freetown ICRC has completed the first monthly food distribution to registered Liberian refugees, 6,000 beneficiaries in more than 50 institutions and 6,650 individuals in central Freetown whose houses have been burnt or destroyed. The ICRC is cooperating closely with the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS), whose volunteers are instrumental in carrying out relief distributions and monitoring.

ADRA and the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) have completed distribution of food to 9,600 beneficiaries in Waterloo and Grafton camps in Freetown. ACF will start wet feeding canteens (with a capacity of 1,000 per day) in the six most vulnerable areas of Freetown in April 1998. The target groups for these centres are children under the age of five, the elderly, the disabled and lactating mothers. The period of intervention for the wet feeding programme is two months. CRS is supporting youth centres and Care has supported Food-for-Work activities equivalent to at least 36,000 work days thus far.

In rural areas the food aid regional technical committees have identified estimated vulnerable populations of 8,000 in Bo and 12,000 in Kenema. Food distribution to these groups will commence in the near future. In Makeni distribution to 9,600 beneficiaries of the Vulnerable Group Feeding programme started on 30 March. 11 MTs of rice donated by the British Government will only be distributed to institutions in Bo, Kenema and Makeni under the auspices of the technical committees in these areas. ACF has reactivated its therapeutic feeding centres in Bo and Makeni and Merlin in Kenema. There is an urgent need for Food-for-Work projects to repair the road between Bo and Pujehun.

HEALTH

During the next three months UNICEF, in conjunction with the Ministry of Health, has decided to revitalise 10 Peripheral Health Units on the western peninsula outside the immediate environs of Freetown. This intervention will complement the activities of ICRC and MSF who are jointly supporting 10 clinics in central Freetown. UNICEF is also planning a mass immunisation campaign in Freetown targeting 100,000 children under the age of five and 50,000 women.

In Bo and Pujehun districts MSF continues to support a total of 12 clinics and 2 hospitals through the provision of drugs and food. In Kenema a mass immunisation campaign is being planned as the cold chain has been broken and eight measles cases have recently been identified.

Assessments of water conditions in Bo, Kenema and Makeni have revealed that the main reason for the intermittent urban water supply in these areas is a shortage of fuel to operate the National Power Authority's generators. It is hoped that the fuel which has recently arrived in Freetown will be dispersed to rural areas in the near future. There is also a real need for chlorine to disinfect contaminated wells in these areas as most aid agencies lost their chlorine stocks during the period of the ECOMOG intervention. For example, in Makeni 1500 kg of chlorine owned by ICRC was tipped onto the ground by looters wanting to abduct the containers for the storage and transport of fuel.

Sanitation in all these areas is poor and there is a need for shovels, wheelbarrows, pickaxes and containers to dispose of the waste. However, significant progress has been made by aid agencies with regard to the exhumation and reburial of hundred of civilians originally buried in mass graves in Bo and Kenema.

The assessment of the water and sanitation needs in Lunel conducted by UNICEF and Oxfam has been completed. UNICEF has agreed to construct 15 new wells, 500 new latrines and to rehabilitate so old wells. The facilities will benefit a basic catchment population of 35,000 persons.

CHILD PROTECTION

Child protection agencies have held several discussions with ECOMOG and the Government of Sierra Leone on the issue of the release of children held in detention and the need to protect these children from mob justice. In spite of these discussions ICRC has had difficulties securing the release of eight children detained in Pademba road prison in Freetown.

The family tracing programme has also suffered some severe setbacks following the recent ECOMOG intervention. Although ADRA and KDDO have had some success in reunifying small numbers of children in Kambia and Kenema with their families, all family tracing activities in Bo have come to a standstill. This is because the offices of Christian Brothers, the lead agency for family tracing activities in Bo, were burnt and all tracing and reunification data destroyed.

On 25 March 35 Civil Defence Unit (CDU) leaders in Freetown attended a one-day workshop, sponsored by UNICEF and CAW, on the need to protect children associated with fighting forces. Representatives from the Ministry of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs, the Police and FM 98.1, the pro-democracy radio station, were also present. At the end of the workshop the CDU leaders agreed to work with child protection agencies to form anti-child abuse committees within each unit. These units

will help to ensure that children's rights are respected irrespective of whether they are combatants or non-combatants.

REFUGEES

Sierra Leoneans from Kono and Kailahun have continued to cross into Liberia and Guinea due to the depredations of junta forces in these areas. It is estimated that 30,000 Sierra Leonean refugees have moved into Vahun in Upper Lofa in Liberia but the new arrivals in Gueckedou in Guinea have not yet been registered. UNHCR has also facilitated the return of 3,500 Sierra Leonean refugees from Conakry to Sierra Leone.

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Complex Emergency Division (CED) New York

Mr. Stephen Johnson

Tel.: (1 212) 963.3044

Fax: (1 212) 963.3630

E-Mail: johnsons@un.org

Inter-Agency Support Branch (IASB) Geneva

Mr. David Bassiouni - Chief

Mr. Thierry Delbreuve

Tel.: (41 22) 788.6384

Fax: (41 22) 788.6389

Registry E-Mail: Abu.Conteh@dha.unicc.org

Information Service

Ms. Thérèse Gastaut - Director

Tel.: (41 22) 917.2300

Fax: (41 22) 917.0030

E-Mail: tgastaut@unog.ch

Number	Item	Content
168	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 15 June 1998

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 15 Jun 1998

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 22 May - 8 Jun 1998

REG. NO. 98/0058

This report has been prepared by the office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea.

SECURITY

1. The security situation has continued to deteriorate as RUF/AFRC expands its presence throughout the North of Sierra Leone. Rebel attacks are now taking place as far west as Rogberi Junction, located between Port Loko and Lunsar towns and there has been rebel movement reported to the South of Kukuna in Kambia district. In other parts of the North, rebels continue to attack and burn villages and inflict atrocities on innocent civilians. On 23 May the RUF inflicted its most significant defeat on ECOMOG since the return of the democratically-elected Government when a group of about 150 rebels launched a well-coordinated attack on Fadugu, an ECOMOG-held village to the South of Kabala in Koinadugu district. ECOMOG were put to flight and sustained some casualties after which the rebels laid waste to the village. Ongoing insecurity is clearly having a negative impact on the ability of humanitarian agencies to access populations at risk.

2. One of ECOMOG's major constraints thus far has been a lack of logistical capacity. In an attempt to address this issue the USA has provided ECOMOG with the logistics and communication services of PAE, valued at USD 4 million.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

3. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs will visit Sierra Leone 10-13 June, 1998. The purpose of the mission is to assess the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone and to draw the attention of the local and international community to outstanding areas of concern.

4. On 3 June an inter-agency mission comprising the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and representatives from NCRRR, UNICEF, WFP, UN-HACU, the Field Security Officer and Christian Extension Services conducted a rapid assessment of Koidu town in Kono district. This was the first time that the humanitarian community has visited Koidu since the ECOMOG intervention. The mission observed that Koidu town was completely destroyed and that security was tenuous.

The mission was unanimous in its conclusion that Koidu town was facing a serious humanitarian emergency, the scale of which was far more severe than any other area of Sierra Leone assessed since the return of the democratically-elected Government to power. The civilian population was clearly in distress. A large proportion of the children in the town were displaying visible signs of malnutrition and numerous individuals were afflicted with skin diseases associated with prolonged hiding in the bush. Medical facilities were non-existent with the exception of occasional treatment by ECOMOG or local doctors. Water and sanitation facilities were observed to be poor.

5. Local residents reported an influx of 38,000 displaced into Koidu town. While the mission was in no position to verify this figure, physical crowding of the urban environment was evident. Most houses contained 8-12 adults with children although some interviewees reported figures as high as 20 adults with children per household. Most of the shelters required roofing materials which is a cause of concern in light of the impending rainy season.

6. There are clearly immediate life-threatening circumstances in Koidu which must be immediately addressed to improve the condition of the civilian population. However, as Koidu is clearly in the war zone care must be taken to ensure that the delivery of humanitarian assistance does not contribute to the dynamics of the conflict. Discussions are currently ongoing within the humanitarian community to prepare a joint strategy to address the current situation in Koidu in the most effective manner.

7. During the period under review MSF and ICRC have conducted several one-day assessments by helicopter in the North-East of Sierra Leone. Areas visited include Alikalia and Kabala in Koinadugu district, Njaiama-Sewafe in Kono district and Masingbi in the East of Tonkolili district. These locations were chosen due to prior reports of an influx of war-wounded into these areas and the assessments focused primarily on providing assistance to these target groups. As a result, small quantities of dressings and medical supplies were delivered and small numbers of war-wounded were evacuated to Freetown. The most significant finding to emerge from these assessments is that access to healthcare remains a serious issue for many civilians living in the North-East. It is estimated that 20 percent of war-wounded are able to find their way to safety and that the majority remain in the bush for security reasons.

8. United Nations Agencies are in the process of preparing a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone to cover the period from 1 March - 31 December, 1998. The document attempts to illustrate the following: the impact of humanitarian interventions during the period of the Flash Appeal (ie. March through May 1998), the impact of those activities planned and not implemented, the impact of those activities undertaken outside the framework of the Flash Appeal and planned activities for the June-December period covered by the new Appeal. The document also outlines changes in the humanitarian climate during the past three months. In this regard it highlights the precarious humanitarian plight of civilians in the North and the North-East in the wake of the ECOMOG offensive in these areas resulting in the exodus of over 150,000 refugees in Guinea and Liberia and extensive internal displacement.

FOOD AID

9. Relief trucks are now being commandeered by ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Force in Kambia and Makeni as well as in Bo and Kenema districts despite verbal assurances from the ECOMOG Force Commander and the Deputy Minister of Defence (and de facto head of the CDF) that such activities would cease. Commandeering of vehicles has hampered agencies' ability to deliver relief supplies as many transporters are reluctant to move around much of the country.

10. The Committee on Food Aid (CFA) has approved a joint Food for Agriculture strategy to guide agricultural interventions in 1998. The policy states that Food for Agriculture may be provided as a complement to inputs of seeds and tools to identified farm families and that farm families should normally not receive assistance for more than one planting season. Given the deterioration of security in the North during the past few months Food for Agriculture may be authorised on an exceptional basis to farmers who received inputs during 1997 but subsequently lost them through looting and destruction.

HEALTH

11. The influx of war-wounded into Connaught hospital in Freetown and the Government Hospital in Makeni continues to rise. In an effort to alleviate overcrowding at Connaught hospital ICRC has rented a private hospital to cope with a potential influx in the future. Several amputees have also been relocated to the clinic at Waterloo refugee camp on the outskirts of Freetown. Health facilities in Magburaka and Port Loko are being rehabilitated in a bid to alleviate the pressure on the overcrowded hospitals in Freetown.

12. The British Medical Research Council has reactivated five health centres to the North of Bo a process which has been supported by UNICEF through the consignment of drugs and surgical equipment. The second phase of the UNICEF-supported mass immunisation campaign in the Western Area is underway. The programme targets 100,000 children under the age of five and 50,000 women of child bearing age. Arrangements for similar campaigns in Bo and Kenema have been finalised.

CHILD PROTECTION

13. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict visited Sierra Leone from 26-29th May, 1998 to assess the needs of children affected by conflict. The Special Representative managed to extract several commitments from the Government, ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Force as follows:

- The Civil Defence Force would stop recruiting and initiating children under the age of 18 and would begin the process of demobilising child combatants within their ranks.
- ECOMOG and the kamajors agreed to provide special protection to AFRC/RUF child combatants who come into their custody through surrender, capture or escape.
- In creating a new national army the Government agreed that children under the age of 18 would not be recruited and that the UN would help with the provision of training material on respect for civilians, particularly women and children.
- Parliamentarians agreed to create a caucus advocating the rights of children.
- It was agreed that a Joint Task Force be constituted, comprising representatives from ECOMOG, Civil Defence Force, Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs and international humanitarian agencies to establish and oversee a procedure for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.

14. The Child Protection committee, which comprises representatives from Government, UN Agencies and NGOs, has coordinated the registration of 52 children associated with the fighting forces and 130 unaccompanied children in Daru and Segbwema in the East of Sierra Leone following recent assessment missions to this area. The children will continue to stay with foster parents until their families are traced. The registration team noted that though the number of unaccompanied children was not alarming, a large number of children were living with vulnerable families.

REFUGEES

15. UNHCR has launched a Flash Appeal for USD 7.3 million to meet the immediate protection and emergency needs of 255,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia from March to December 1998. Since the start of the ECOMOG offensive in the East of Sierra Leone in March

1998, 182,000 new Sierra Leonean arrivals have been registered in Guinea and 55,000 in Liberia bringing the total caseload to 530,000 in these two countries. Although the influx of refugees into Liberia has ceased, the influx into Eastern Guinea continues with the result that UNHCR has added an additional 18,000 to the current caseload for planning purposes.

16. UNHCR raises several issues related to protection in the Appeal. In Guinea, refugees presumed to be AFRC/RUF combatants are arrested and taken to Conakry without UNHCR being given the opportunity to access these refugees to determine whether they should be excluded from UNHCR's mandate. In Liberia there are reports of 2,000 former AFRC/RUF combatants among the Sierra Leonean refugees arriving in Vahun. This is a source of concern as it is important that military elements are separated from the refugees to maintain the civilian character of refugee sites. UNHCR is currently in discussions with ECOMOG and the Government of Liberia over the involvement of ECOMOG in the physical separation of former combatants from the civilian refugee population.

17. The proximity of Vahun to areas of Sierra Leone still under AFRC/RUF control is another security concern to UNHCR. It is important to relocate these Sierra Leoneans to other areas before the onset of the rainy season, which will make transportation virtually impossible. However, the proposed relocation exercise is subject to two major constraints: first, UNHCR's truck fleet in the region is overstretched on account of the ongoing repatriation of Liberian refugees; second, many refugees in Vahun are reluctant to move away from the border due to ethnic affinity with the local population.

This report is available on the internet through RELIEFWEB: <http://www.reliefweb.int>

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169	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 30 April 1999

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 30 Apr 1999

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, Apr 1999

HIGHLIGHTS

1. Political developments

- Foday Sankoh begins consultations with RUF delegation in Togo
- Civil Society reach consensus on peace process
- Donors meet on humanitarian aid in Sierra Leone
- International Contact Group on Sierra Leone meet in New York
- UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping briefs Security Council on situation in Sierra Leone

2. Security

- Little change over the last two weeks.
- Gradual gains by ECOMOG near Freetown.
- Fighting in Liberia and Guinea related to Sierra Leone.

3. Humanitarian Highlights

- Sectoral Updates
- A looming food crisis in Bo and Kenema threaten assistance programmes
- Health agencies tackle measles outbreak in different parts of the country
- New humanitarian challenges emerge
- Accessibility Profile of war-affected populations
- Resources

4. Refugees

- Voluntary Repatriation of Liberian refugees postponed

1. Political developments

Summary

Political developments during this period were dominated by preparations for the RUF internal consultations and possible subsequent peace negotiations between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. A number of key issues have become focused on this

meeting, although it is not clear that all issues can be addressed. Humanitarian agencies and organizations have held several meetings to consider and highlight the role of humanitarian aid in the ongoing peace process, particularly the issue of gaining access to war-affected populations across the entire country.

RUF Internal Consultations in Togo, Lome

RUF in-house consultations began in Lome, Togo on 26 April, after a weeklong delay. Some 19 RUF members are said to be present at the discussions, which are aimed at formulating proposals for full-fledged peace negotiations with the government of President Tejan Kabbah. Conspicuously missing at the start of the talks were RUF Field commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie and former Chairman of the AFRC Johnny Paul Koroma. During a BBC interview on 27 April, RUF Spokesman Omrie Golley denied reports of a possible split within the RUF, and stressed that the RUF was "strong and unified." Mr. Golley further stated that the RUF was ready to declare an immediate cease-fire under certain circumstances.

Meanwhile, as Sierra Leone marked its 38th anniversary on 27 April, President Tejan Kabbah told the nation that coups, counter-coups and the country's eight-year civil war had "taken a heavy toll on all aspects of life in this country." He called on the RUF to renounce violence and earn power through the ballot box. "Our message to the RUF rebels is that if indeed they are genuinely interested in peace, if indeed they want to rule, or if they want political power in any proportion, they must first secure the will of the people of Sierra Leone," he said. President Kabbah appeared to rule out any power-sharing arrangements ahead of elections. He said that if Sierra Leone found it necessary to make substantive changes to the constitution, "we will, as in other democracies, do so only with the consent of the people, and in accordance with the relevant provisions for amending that supreme document of the state."

Civil Society reach consensus on peace process

The President's views appeared consistent with his latest initiative to call a national consultative conference to elicit the views of civil society towards formulating a national consensus on the peace process. The conference, which was organized by the National Commission on Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) was held from 7 to 9 April and recommended the following:

- General amnesty to be granted to all combatants on the condition that those who are accused of committing serious offenses should face a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At the same time a fund should be created to assist victims of Human Rights violations;
- Foday Sankoh to be freed only after he and members of his organization show a genuine commitment to peace. While the legal process should be suspended to

enable him meet members of his organization, his return to the country should be guaranteed and the full process of law completed before a state pardon.

- Rebels should release all abductees and withdraw from all economically viable areas which should revert to government control. This was presented as a precondition for government acceptance of a cease-fire.
- There should be no power-sharing outside that provided for in the Abidjan peace accord, which stated that the RUF should have access to the political process.
- International community should serve as moral guarantors to monitor any future peace agreement and at the same time provide logistical support for ECOMOG.
- any peace agreement is to be ratified by parliament before it is implemented.
- The recommendations of the meeting are not binding, but are viewed as an important source of ideas and legitimacy for the peace process.

Donor Initiatives

Consultation on Humanitarian Aid in Sierra Leone

At the end of March, ECHO organized a special consultation in Brussels to address the issues of humanitarian aid in Sierra Leone. The meeting aimed to create awareness at a political level about the serious humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone and to maintain close coordination among the key humanitarian players through exchange of information and views on humanitarian policy, orientations and priorities. Participants included 30 representatives of humanitarian agencies, nine EU Member states, Canada, Norway, USA and the European Commission. The organizers deemed the deliberations useful and constructive, leading to "a better identification of humanitarian concerns and priorities" and increased understanding between donors and humanitarian organizations. Noting that the restoration of 'humanitarian space' in Sierra Leone cannot be left to the sole responsibility of humanitarian organizations, donors agreed to support humanitarian considerations as an agenda item for future political negotiations between the GOSL and the RUF.

International Contact Group Meeting on Sierra Leone

The second meeting of the Sierra Leone International Contact Group was held at the UN building in New York on 19 April 1999. Mr. Tony Lloyd, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, chaired the meeting. Participants included representatives of 22 countries, the UN, ECOWAS/ECOMOG, the EC, the Commonwealth, the World Bank, IMF, ICRC and the GOSL. The main objectives were to support the process of political dialogue and national reconciliation and to sustain, widen and help coordinate international assistance to the GOSL and to the ECOMOG forces working to restore peace and security.

Noting the serious developments since their last meeting in November 1998, participants confirmed their strong support for the twin-track approach to restoring peace and stability and pledged further support for the GOSL, ECOWAS/ECOMOG efforts towards this goal. The UK pledged a further £270,000 to support the security sector, while the US committed to double the extent of its financial and material support to the peace process, assuming security can be maintained. Other countries, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden and the European Commission reaffirmed existing pledges or provided new ones.

Addressing the meeting on the Humanitarian situation in the country, Mr. Kevin Kennedy, Chief, Emergency Liaison Branch, OCHA, noted that "the humanitarian community has grappled with, but never entirely achieved unhindered access to all areas of the country." He said the proposed peace process may present the opportunity to achieve this goal of humanitarian access and stressed the importance of promoting the humanitarian agenda during the deliberations in Togo.

The issue of humanitarian access in Sierra Leone was pursued further at the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) held in Rome from 22 to 23 April, which consists of high level United Nations and NGO representation. A Position Paper on negotiating humanitarian access prepared by UN-HACU with support from the international humanitarian community and UNOMSIL formed the primary basis of the discussions on Sierra Leone. The Paper, presented by the Humanitarian Coordinated and the Chief of UNHACU, details principles and possible mechanisms for obtaining unhindered humanitarian access to all areas of the country and provides a strategic framework for negotiating access with all parties. The comments provided by the meeting have been incorporated into the Paper, which will now be presented to members of the International Contact Group, the Government of Sierra Leone, and the rebel leaders.

UN Security Council Briefing on Sierra Leone

On 23 April, the Under-Secretary- General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Bernard Miyet, briefed the Security Council on the situation in Sierra Leone. During the discussion, Council Members expressed unanimous support for the dual track process and commended ECOMOG for its role in the country. They welcomed the preparations for negotiations for the intra-RUF talks and the subsequent dialogue between the Government and the RUF. Council members also expressed their concern about the

humanitarian situation, in particular about the allegations on the recent killings in Songo as well as the RUF attacks at Mola in Guinea. Several members stated that they believed that illicit diamond and arms smuggling should be addressed through a tightened sanctions regime.

2. SECURITY

Summary

Little has changed in the overall security situation in the country in the last month. ECOMOG / CDF have slightly expanded their control of key areas near Freetown, but there have been no major exchanges of territory. This means that the security situation in the country continues to be highly fluid and unstable, and caution should be maintained by humanitarian staff at all times.

Freetown and the Western Area

The gradual extension of ECOMOG / CDF control outwards from Freetown has slightly improved the security of Freetown itself. ECOMOG forward positions are now reaching as far as Masiaka, where fighting has been taking place over the last two days for the control of the strategic town.

In Freetown, additional checkpoints have been introduced over the last two weeks, many of which are now being maintained by Sierra Leone Army units instead of ECOMOG. The curfew continues to be enforced from 18:00 to 07:00, and should be strictly observed. ECOMOG has been maintaining a higher level of activity around Lumley beach, and frequently enforce a clear zone in the area.

Following reports of fighting in Songo in the week ending 17 April, a United Nations team has visited the area twice. Destruction of property is considerable, and consistent with that suffered by other villages in the area (such as Newton). Songo and its surrounding villages were completely evacuated at the beginning of the year, and the area had no civilian presence at the time of the mission. Once IDPs return to the area, in common with other areas, considerable assistance will be needed from humanitarian agencies, subject to inter-agency assessments. Both missions were unable to find any evidence to support the reports in the press of large numbers of civilian deaths in the area. While it is believed that there were casualties, there was no available evidence of a 'massacre'.

Northern Province

Port Loko continues to be controlled by the Malian and Guinean contingents of ECOMOG, while the Guinean forces continue to hold their positions outside Kambia. Rogberi Junction is held by Nigerian ECOMOG troops. While there has been little change in the control of these areas, occasional encounters between ECOMOG and rebel forces continue to occur. The majority of the province continues to be inaccessible to

humanitarian agencies, although there is some passage of civilians to many areas in the North. Areas around Lungi and Port Loko can currently be reached. A recent CARE mission indicated that normality is returning to Port Loko town, and the surrounding villages. However, all offices in the town have been looted, and military forces are staying in most public buildings. A curfew is enforced from 18:00 to 08:00. Vehicles are using the road to Lungi on a regular basis, and ECOMOG has encouraged NGOs to return to the area. However, the commander requested a letter informing of NGO plans before arrival.

HACU staff in the area report that the situation in Kambia district is highly unstable, although there have been few incidents in the last two weeks. IDPs continue to be concentrated in chiefdoms to the East and West of Kambia town. Some commercial traffic has been reported passing between Port Loko and Kambia.

Eastern Province

CDF forces have been building up in the area of Bunumbu, North-East of Kenema. This has been part of continuing efforts to control the areas around Kenema, particularly the strategic diamond fields, and alleged RUF supply lines from Liberia. Daru continues to be isolated from Kenema, and Segbwema is still in the control of rebel forces. Fighting continues in the area, particularly in the villages around Bunumbu.

Southern Province

ECOMOG / CDF forces control the road from Bo to Mile 91, but have not yet succeeded in opening the road to Masiaka and Songo Junction. Five commercial trucks carrying rice and onions arrived in Bo, having encountered sporadic fire around the Bradford area.

Liberia / Guinea

On Wednesday 21st April, a joint WFP/UNHCR/Donor mission was temporarily detained by armed men in the early hours of the morning, from four different locations. This coincided with fighting between different factions of Liberian armed forces, and the transit of RUF leaders to Lomé. The Sierra Leone Humanitarian Helicopter was sent to Monrovia to assist in the evacuation of the mission, which interrupted regular services for a short time. The Liberian President, Charles Taylor, accused Guinean authorities of supporting 'incursion forces', and stated that Liberia would defend itself. The Guinea government indignantly rejected the charges.

A number of incursions by forces thought to be affiliated to AFRC / RUF rebels have successfully infiltrated Guinea in the Forecariah prefecture over the last two weeks. An attack on Mola on Monday 19th April resulted in two dead and eleven wounded. Residents of the town then attacked a Sierra Leonean refugee camp on the following day, accusing them of sheltering rebels in the area. The Guinean Army has again raised the level of security in the area following the attack. Additionally, reports continue to point to

occasional rebel incursions in Guinea near the Liberian border. Specific information is not currently available.

3. HUMANITARIAN HIGHLIGHTS

The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is likely to worsen in the next few months, as the regular 'rainy season' begins. This time of year, (May to November) is normally characterized as the "hungry season", as food stocks traditionally run low prior to the harvest at the end of the year. It arrives against the backdrop of a lingering and brutal conflict that has left large numbers of people destitute and lacking even basic abilities to cope with hardship. The devastating fighting in Freetown and other parts of the country in January caused considerable hardship and destruction which will continue to have an impact on the humanitarian situation throughout the rest of the year. The formal economy has virtually collapsed and business confidence remains at a low level. This impacts on the Government's ability to raise revenue to provide basic services. As the living situation of most Sierra Leoneans remains desperate, humanitarian agencies are anxious to provide basic emergency support in as many areas as possible. As peace negotiations get underway in Togo, it is crucial that humanitarian considerations are given a high profile. Additionally, consultations between humanitarian agencies and government continue on how to provide a secure environment in currently accessible areas. This follows considerable problems with commandeered humanitarian assets, and other forms of harassment by armed groups.

Sixty-day humanitarian Plan of Action ends - progress made

Against the background of the urgent needs following the January fighting, the Humanitarian Community, in consultation with the GOSL, developed a 60-Day Emergency Plan of Action in February to allow for international support of the efforts of Government and National humanitarian staff. The Plan benefited from improved security conditions in Freetown and surroundings, allowing the return of expatriate staff who relocated to Guinea in January. In March, programmes were expanded from western Freetown to central and eastern parts of the peninsula area. Despite uncertainties about the security situation and constraints including loss of relief assets, the response has been considerable in most sectors, including health, non-food relief items, food aid, WATSAN, child protection and human rights. NCRRR, with support from UNHACU, succeeded in reactivating many parts of the National Coordination Structure to effectively coordinate and harmonize response. (see figures III).

SECTORAL UPDATES

Health

UNICEF, WHO, MOHS and health NGOs have combined efforts to bring the health situation under control after a health emergency was declared in January. There are now 25 functional health centres in Freetown, in addition to eight mobile clinics. Another 22 centres are being reopened. Furthermore, all private and public hospitals in accessible areas have now been rehabilitated and are staffed with the support of UNICEF, WHO and

health NGOs. Health interventions during this reporting period were marked by the intensification of EPI activities to tackle outbreaks of communicable diseases, particularly measles. UNICEF, MOHS, MERLIN and MSF-Belgium have now completed measles immunization campaigns covering 45,723 children below the age of 12 in Bo and Kenema, and 20,802 in Freetown and the Western Area. A significant reduction in the number of children admitted to Kenema Pediatric Ward and Blama Measles Isolation Unit run by MERLIN is an indication that the outbreak is now under control. A cumulative total of 626 children were admitted in both units between mid February and end of March. By end April, new admissions were down to 80 in Kenema and 20 in Blama. MERLIN reported six deaths in these Units, indicating an effective treatment approach. British Medical Research Council (MRC) is operating in Bo North and has reported an outbreak of measles in the area, up to 60 cases and six deaths at the first assessment. Four of their mobile teams have begun operations in the area while 10 PHUs in the northern part of Bo are expected to start operations in the near future.

The MOHS reported about 19 measles cases in eastern Freetown this month. UNICEF is confident that good coverage achieved during the campaign in March will prevent any major outbreaks in the area. The measles campaign has ended in Bonthe district, with almost 100 per cent coverage of the target population.

With regard to the recent outbreak of chicken pox in Freetown, 135 cases had been registered by mid April. No case fatality resulting from the outbreak was reported. Health agencies report that the outbreak is being well managed and does not constitute a serious health concern at present.

Normal health programmes in all accessible areas are ongoing with increased support from UNICEF and WHO which are providing medical supplies and equipment as well as technical expertise to the MOHS and health NGOs.

In addition to support provided to health centres and clinics in Freetown, UNICEF has recently signed an agreement to assist more NGOs supporting health centres and mobile clinics in various areas of operation. In Bonthe district, WVI continues to support health activities in 11 clinics with drug supply from UNICEF for the next nine months.

In Bo and Kenema, health programmes are continuing unhindered. Some 25 PHUs are functioning in Bo with the support of MSF-B, UNICEF, ACF, MOHS and MRC. MSF-B has been able to send adequate drug supplies to Bo to sustain its mobile clinics and other health activities.

Assistance to amputees and war-wounded is ongoing with the efforts of Handicap International and other partners who provide occupational and psycho-social therapy. MSF-France is willing to assist with treatment of amputees when needed.

Nutrition:

On 22 April, the MOHS released its *Rapid Assessment of the Nutritional Status of Under-5 Children in IDP Camps in Freetown*. The report describes the nutritional status of

children in IDP camps as "seriously compromised" due to extreme food scarcity and high commodity prices affecting the country. One important conclusion of the assessment is that the presence of acute malnutrition in children of breast-feeding age (0-5 months) strongly indicates maternal malnutrition. Among other recommendations, it urges that all lactating internally displaced mothers be included in Supplementary Feeding Programmes.

Meanwhile, ACF continues nutritional programmes in its Therapeutic Feeding Centres in eastern Freetown with a caseload of 124 children as of mid April, an increase of almost 40 per cent in the last three weeks. It maintains three dry-ration Supplementary Feeding Centres in Calaba, Wellington and Kissy with weekly distributions to 1,025 moderately malnourished children. In December, ACF was operating five such centres in Freetown, with a caseload of 2,200. However, this current caseload of just over 1,000 does not reflect the true picture of those needing assistance. ACF believes that current needs exceed those of December, considering the higher levels of displacement and homelessness in the area. As people begin to return to their homes and to concentrate in selected camp locations, a more extensive survey of the nutritional status will become possible. In the meantime, ACF plans to extend its feeding programmes to more locations in affected areas so as to capture more of the moderately malnourished populations. Assessment of the Waterloo area is currently ongoing, with plans to start feeding programmes there.

In Bo, the number of children in ACF's TFC increased from 65 to 90 children in the first half of April. The increase could be partly explained by the outbreak of measles in Bo North and the current food crisis. The price of rice in the region has more than doubled in the last few weeks, from Le 35,000 to Le 80,000 per bag (\$1=Le2,000). Supplementary feeding continues in four centres in Bo district, and one in Mattru town in Bonthe district. ACF plans to carry out a nutritional survey in Bo town in May.

NON-FOOD ITEMS

Status of Freetown IDP camps, April 1999

Table I:

Camp Site	Lead Agency	Status	Current Caseload
Parade Grounds	CORD-SL	Shelter construction completed. WATSAN facilities in place. MSF-B and OXFAM supplied NFI. Food distribution undertaken by WFP. EU is considering a project for the provision of mattresses.	767
National	CARE	Shelter construction completed;	

Workshop		work on roofing pending; scrap metal cleaning in progress. NFI distribution to family sizes completed by CARE; IRC considering the provision of educational materials for the displaced children;	
Trade Centre	EFSL	30 sheds completed, including kitchen; Multi-purpose shed under construction. Water is being provided by ACF	238 family heads
National Stadium	CCSL	Distribution of NFI completed: Distribution of two-week food ration completed on 22 April. Approval given to build 15 temporary booths.	1,904
Rokupa		No progress - problem of site layout unresolved.	Not available
Approved School	IIRO	20 out of 80 sheds completed; More than 10,000 IDPs from Koya and Waterloo have still not been registered.	Not available
Bailor Barrie	SLRCS	Food provided by WVI; Medical facility provided by SLRC	Not available
Pa Morlai Playing Field	CCSL (?)	On hold due to land dispute	Not available
Grafton	GOAL	15 of 94 sheds completed; ACF will be responsible for WATSAN activities	3,000
Waterloo Camp (old)/Town,	ADRA/SLRCS/CWW	ADRA Project for permanent shelter yet to be approved; clinics covering both sites; Food distribution ongoing;	20,000
Mandella Playing Field,	EFSL	Will be completed this week The problem of squatters persists	

Current Capacity

Action Aid: Received approval of their donors to transfer funds for traditional development areas of Wellington and Calaba Town towards the purchase and subsequent distribution of ten different non-food items in these areas;

CARE: Received additional non-food items including 200 rolls of plastic sheeting and

30,000 blankets;

MSF-B: Items available for immediate distribution to registered and verified IDPs include --10,000 aluminium pots; 10,000 each of plastic plates, spoons and cups; and 15,000 packets of laundry soap.

The NGO *OREINT* has announced the availability of NFIs which will support about 1000 IDPs.

UN-OCHA: Arrived in Freetown: 90 rolls plastic sheeting; 27 cartons of nylon ropes; 84 bales of blankets; 30 community kitchen sets; 5x5000 litre water tanks; and 3,050 jerry cans

FOOD AID

During April, WFP distributed a total of 641 Mts of assorted food rations to 82,386 beneficiaries in Freetown, Lungi, Kenema, and Blama. No food distribution has been possible in Kambia, which has been inaccessible since the attack on Pamelap in March. (see figure 4). Distributions in Freetown are being undertaken as populations at the various approved and unapproved sites are registered and verified. Registration has been completed in 22 unauthorized IDP locations in the city, with a caseload of 6,630 who have received monthly food rations. IDPs at the National Stadium received rations from CRS, who also fed 9,994 in Waterloo town. In Kenema, WFP provided two-week rations to 32,836 IDPs, as well as 14,256 IDPs in Blama. An additional 3,970 IDPs in Gofor about 5 km outside Kenema town also received two-week rations. WFP has run out of food in Kenema, but reserved sufficient stocks for institutional feeding programmes until end of May. In Bo, 6,706 IDPs in camps received monthly food rations on 25 April. The distribution did not target some 3,000 IDPs integrated into the host population. Food agencies are reserving remaining stocks for targeted feeding programmes.

Table II:

WFP FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS - APRIL 1999 (01 - 25 April 1999)									
Distribution Point	Partner	Programme	Ration Days	Case Load Pop	Cereal	Pulses	Veg. Oil	CSB	TOTAL Metric Tonnes
Freetown	WFP/SLRCS/IIRO/CMSL	IDPS-VGF	30	7,397	67	0	6	28	101
	WFP/WCSL	Institutional-VGF	30	1,500	14	0	2	6	22
	WFP/OHDRA	Disable-VGF	30	2,615	24	0	2	10	36
	WFP/UNHCR	Liberian Refugees	30	3,649	22	0	3	0	25
	WFP/SLRCS	Institutional	30	2,240	1	0		1	2
Lungi	WFP/CMSL	Institutional	30	663	5	0	1	3	9
Freetown Sub-Total				18,064	133	0	14	48	195
Bo	WFP/ADDO/CCSL	IDPS	30	6,706	60	0	4	25	89

	WFP/SLRCS	Liberian Refugees	30	1,658	10	0	1		11
Bo Institutional	WFP/Hospital/ADDO/CCSL	Institutional	15	572	1	0	0	2	3
Bo Sub-Total				8,936	71	0	5	27	103
Kenema Town	WFP/KDDF	Liberian Refugees	30	2,661	16	0	2	0	18
Kenema - Camps	WFP/KDDF/MCSL	IDPs	15	32,836	148	28	12	0	188
Kenema - Blama	WFP/KDDF	IDPs	15	14,256	64	13	5	0	82
Kenema - (Gofor & Town IDPs)	WFP/KDDF	IDPs	14	3,970	18	7	2	0	27
Kenema - Orphanage	Ben Hirsh	VGf	60	153	3	1	0	0	4
Kenema - TFP/SFP	MERLIN	VGf	30	3,510	30	0	2	0	32
Kenema Sub-Total				57,386	279	49	23	0	351
GRAND TOTAL				84,386	483	49	42	75	649

Current Capacities

WFP: approximately 6,000 mts in-country and in sub-region

CARE: 7,700 mt in Freetown and the sub-region

CRS: 7,300 mt in-country and sub-region

WVI 1,800 mt in-country, another 7,000 mt arriving in sub-region

WATSAN

Water trucking, well rehabilitation/chlorination and waste management activities in most IDPs sites have reduced the incidence of water-borne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea. As the peak of the cholera season approaches, UNICEF and its partners have drawn up a Cholera Preparedness Plan for Freetown and surrounding areas. Fortnightly chlorination of community wells in Wellington and Calaba town has commenced and a training programme on chlorination has been developed for over 1,500 well owners. UNICEF presently has 9.5 Mts of chlorine in stock and is distributing to NGOs for their chlorination programmes.

UNICEF has also provided 2,000 sachets of ORS to be distributed to about 200 Blue Flag Volunteers during their cholera sensitization campaign in depressed communities. A further 2,000 sachets of ORS and a drum of chlorine was supplied to MSF-H for use in the Kambia district IDP camps.

UNICEF has launched a weekly radio/TV social mobilization campaign on hygiene education and cholera preparedness and prevention, and is supporting the Animated Area

Development Committee, which covers 27 communities in eastern Freetown with fuel and chlorine for the de-watering/cleaning and chlorination of wells.

ACF, MSF-B, and OXFAM are assisting with WATSAN activities in Waterloo town and IDP camps in Bo, Kenema, and Blama. In Waterloo, ACF provided a 95,000-litre water tank for immediate installation. In Blama, two wells have been constructed to meet the needs of the health centre and the IDPs at the camp. At the Splendid camp/cholera camp in Bo, OXFAM and MSF-B completed rehabilitation and chlorination of five wells. OXFAM and CARE conducted a two-day hygiene promotion seminar for 49 IDPs representing all the camps in Bo. WATSAN activities in Bonthe district are being managed by World Vision, which has completed the construction and rehabilitation of wells in the area.

Education

In Freetown, UNICEF reactivated the Education Coordination Committee to address emergency needs in the sector. Action Aid will rebuild eight schools which were burned down, while the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) will extend health facilities to schools and support the non-formal education programme. UNICEF will rehabilitate 15 partly damaged schools and provide essential school materials. It has also donated school materials to the school for orphans at Kissy and IDP camp schools in Bo.

All educational institutions in Bo have now re-opened with the exception of the Government (boarding) Secondary School which is currently facing food shortages caused by the closure of the Freetown-Bo highway. UNICEF has provided school materials for most of the schools. Schools remain closed in Kenema district where most facilities continue to be occupied by IDPs. Parents are putting pressure on local authorities to relocate the IDPs. Up to 179 booths need to be constructed at the Kenema Lebanese camp for the relocation of IDPs occupying educational institutions. However, most agencies do not currently have the capacity to address the situation. Local authorities are continuing to seek ways to address the matter, and the relief community is considering moving some shelter materials from Freetown to Kenema.

Child Protection

As of mid April, UNICEF documented a cumulative total of 3,268 missing children in Freetown, out of which 356 have been found. Of the 204 separated children, 153 have been reunified, as well as the 92 released by ECOMOG and the RUF. UNICEF and partners are following up on their well being through regular visits and provision of counseling services. Some 150 counselors have been trained to offer counseling to both unaccompanied children and those released by armed groups. UNICEF also supported the Italian NGO COOPI in the establishment of the Holy Mary clinic in Wellington. The clinic is expected to provide medical and counseling services to the affected children. ECOMOG continues to release captured and surrendered child combatants to UNICEF.

A special coordinating committee has been established to provide assistance to sexually abused women and children, to provide medical and psychosocial counseling.

The Irish NGO, GOAL is operating mobile clinics to serve street children in Freetown. The Organization plans to collaborate with the three existing centres for street children.

Refugees

UNHCR has continued to provide assistance to some 480,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in neighboring countries. The repatriation exercise for Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone has been suspended in order to undertake a re-registration exercise to determine the exact numbers willing to be repatriated. From 8 March to 13 April, UNHCR succeeded in repatriating 694 of the refugees. They are currently providing relief assistance to a caseload of 3,690 refugees in the Freetown area.

Logistics

The Humanitarian Helicopter funded by the US, ECHO and the Government of Norway has continued to operate flights between Conakry, Freetown and Kenema. According to WFP which manages the helicopter, during the first 60 days of operation (February to April), the helicopter covered 98 flying hours, carried 1,069 passengers and lifted 37 Mts of cargo to operational areas of 11 agencies. The helicopter will be out of regular service for routine maintenance between the 1st and 3rd of May.

Agriculture

The food shortage in the East and South, combined with the tremendous pressure caused by the poor security situation and large numbers of displaced, has considerably increased the demand for agricultural inputs. Some 143 bushels of rice distributed by CRS, AFRICARE, SLRC and MAFE have all been consumed by IDPs who say they have run out of food and that farming land is not safe from rebels. The same situation applies in some areas of the Southern Province. Ongoing food security assessments are required to ensure swift response to needy areas.

On 12 April, the SLRCS donated Le 16 million worth of vegetable seeds to the Ministry of Agriculture to support farmers in the Western Area. This package was initially meant for the northern and eastern provinces, but was diverted due to the limited access to these areas.

NEW CHALLENGES

Yele/Mondema: A recent assessment of humanitarian agencies indicate emergency needs in Yele where 5,743 IDPs have been registered. An additional 3,000 displaced are estimated to be staying in villages just outside the town. Priority needs include food, household units, health services, water, health education, WATSAN, and agricultural

input. Insecurity in the area is preventing comprehensive assessments at this time. Also at the town of Mondema there are 9,489 IDPs reported.

Waterloo: About 20,000 IDPs are now living in Waterloo, spread between the old IDP camp, the Post Office Community Centre and surrounding villages. The IDPs at the old camp have been registered and food distribution is expected to begin soon. A caseload of 9,994 residing in make-shift camps at the community centre received two-week food rations from CRS at the end of April. Toilet facilities and water sources remain a big problem, and the camp area must be viewed as temporary. ECOMOG forces are still occupying the health centre. The Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) will support CRS in providing plastic sheeting and blankets. ACF will assist with WATSAN needs. ECOMOG has assured agencies that the area is now secure for operations, although regular access is not always possible.

Port Loko: The rebel attack on Port Loko town in late December led to the suspension of all relief activities by CARE, SLRCS, CARITAS, WVI, ADRA and Action AID. Although the town has been under the control of Guinean ECOMOG troops since January, the security situation along the Lungi - Port Loko route remained unclear for some time, preventing the return of aid workers and an assessment of the area until recently. A recent assessment of the town by a number of agencies indicate that the market is functioning and a few shops have re-opened. NGOs plan to restart activities in the town and nearby communities as soon as possible. CARE expects to resume normal project activities by June while the NGO *CAP ANAMUR*, has sent drug supplies to the children's hospital and Port Loko hospital where patients are beginning to return. Children's Aid Direct has stocked a substantial quantity of drugs which will be airlifted to Lungi for health services in the Port Loko District. As the damage to relief assets and public property is considerable, relief efforts at the initial stage cannot be full-scale.

Kambia: Aid workers who fled to remote villages in Kambia district during the March attack on Pamelap, have managed to reach Forecariah and report large concentrations of displaced populations in the villages of Funkdeh, Kabaya and Milaia north-east of Pamelap. Exact numbers of the displaced were not available at the time of reporting but estimates are in the tens of thousands. Most of the displaced are said to be living in congested shelter situations. Some of them appear to be moving to settlements along the Pamelap-Gbalamuya route in search of better shelter, as the rainy season approaches. Security in Kambia town continues to be fluid, preventing the return of the displaced and the re-establishment of relief programmes. MSF-H national staff continue to visit Samu Chiefdom where large numbers of IDPs have been reported.

'Displaced' NGOs from most of the northern districts are setting up offices in Forecariah with a view to assisting UNHCR in the refugee camps and assisting IDPs in nearby villages. CARITAS plans to undertake child protection activities in all the refugee camps in Forecariah as well as care for some 150 unaccompanied children, 51 of whom are an earlier caseload from Kambia. The rest are from Kalia, Dakhagbe and Faramoria refugee camps. They have secured permission from the Guinean authorities to operate a mobile clinic in areas around Gbalamuya to provide basic medical services for the displaced.

Action Aid is planning WATSAN, health education, reconciliation and trauma healing programmes in some of the refugee camps in Forecariah.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN SIERRA LEONE

Humanitarian response to the country's emergency continues to be defined by the issue of access to war-affected populations trapped in large sections of the country. The northern districts of Bombali, Koinadugu, Kambia, Tonkolili and Port Loko, home to approximately **1.6 million** people, have been **inaccessible** to humanitarian agencies for sustained periods of time. Similarly, more than 60 per cent of the population normally residing in the eastern province is beyond the reach of relief aid. All told, at least **55 per cent (2.6 million)** of the total Sierra Leone population residing in conflict-affected parts of the country are presently out of reach of humanitarian agencies (*See figures 1 and 2 -- Accessibility Profile*). Given the fact that the Sierra Leone civil war has been fought with absolute disregard for human rights and humanitarian principles, it could be safely assumed that majority of these populations have been chronically affected by the fighting, and thus require emergency health, food aid, shelter and non-food assistance.

As far as is known at this stage, the populations of major towns in these districts have fled to villages ranging up to 15 miles distance from the centre of town. Although their situation has not been assessed for sometime, it is evident from the few who manage to escape to safer havens that humanitarian conditions are desperate. One example is the fact that 95 per cent of the measles cases that hit Kenema and Blama in February, originated from Kailahun and Kono districts, parts of which have not been accessible for relief activities and other basic services for several years. Recent reports of outbreaks of measles and meningitis in Kabala (Koinadugu district), are a further indication of the crisis at hand as this area, though controlled by ECOMOG does not indicate a safe environment for restarting relief operations.

In the more accessible government-controlled areas where some 2 million people reside, and where humanitarian agencies are providing emergency services to just over 120,000 beneficiaries, insecurity on the roads, and sometimes in the main towns makes it difficult for agencies to operate. This is most evident in Bo and Kenema where a declining food security situation requires emergency support. Although food aid agencies are actively seeking ways to replenish stocks in the regions, initial attempts to assess an alternative route via the Nitti Port revealed logistical and security difficulties that may take weeks to resolve. In newly accessed areas, prevailing insecurity along those routes also prevent timely intervention. For several weeks, displaced populations, believed to be moving from the Masingbi/Magburaka axis have been trapped in Yele, Tonkolili district, and in Mondema and Barma Konta in Kenema district without adequate relief assistance.

It should be noted that at present, humanitarian agencies are unable to move substantial quantities of relief goods to any part of the country but Freetown.

Table iii: POPULATION ACCESSIBILITY PROFILE IN SIERRA LEONE - APRIL 1999


Region	1997 POP EST.	IDPs as at December 98	Total IDPs Accessed since January 99	Total Pop Accessed	Total Pop Inaccessible	% Pop Inaccessible	Operational Agencies at Present
North Total	1,629,791	175,041	17,743	166,879	1,462,912	89.76%	
Bombali	428934	44257	Unknown	0	428934	100.00%	None
Koinadugu	229133	48000	Unknown	0	229133	100.00%	None
Kambia	238376	11142	12,000 relocated to the border area of Guinea	12,000 (accessible from Guinea)	226376	94.97%	CARITAS - Makeni
Tonkolili	311788	62236	5743 (Yele Town)	43171	268617	86.15%	None
Port Loko	421560	9406	Unknown	111708	309852	73.50%	OXFAM, WFP, KAP ANAMUR, CARE, CAD
South Total	973,145	2,680	10,558	924,718	48,427	4.98%	
Bo	362706	Not Available (NA)	10,558 (Bo Town)	362706	0	0.00%	WFP, OXFAM, CARE, WVI, ACF, MSF-B, UNICEF, CRS, ADDO, MAFE, MOHS, MRC, AFRICARE,
Bonthe	131259	NA	NA	131259	0	0.00%	WVI, SLRCS, CARE, APEGS, MAFE, MOHS

Pujehun	153512	NA	NA	153512	0	0.00%	WVI, ACF, MSF-B, AFRICARE, Bo-Pujehun RDP, CRS, ICRC, SLRCS PUDDRA, WFP, MOHS
Moyamba	325668	2680	Unknown	277241	48427	14.87%	None
East Total	1,277,745	118,882	47,042	187,039	1,090,706	85.36%	
Kenema	471877	44587	47,042 (Kenema Town & Blama)	187039	284838	60.36%	WFP, OXFAM, CARE, WVI, ACF, UNICEF, CRS, KDDO, MAFE, MOHS, AFRICARE, MERLIN
Kailahun	299314	26442	Unknown	Nil	299314	100.00%	None
Kono	506554	47853	Unknown	Nil	506554	100.00%	None
West Area & Freetown Total	719,566	12,092	* 50,923	719,566	0	0.00%	WFP, OXFAM, CARE, WVI, ACF, UNICEF, CRS, MOHS, AFRICARE, MERLIN, SLRCS, ARD, CCSL, EFSL, MSF-B, MSF-F, IIRO, EFSL, CORD-SL, ADRA, COOPI, GOAL, ARD, A. Aid, CAUSE Canada, ORIENT, CAD
**Freetown	601313	Nil	*31,811	601313	Nil	0.00%	
Mountain	4298	Nil	Nil	4298	Nil	0.00%	
Waterloo	67659	12092	19112	67659	Nil	0.00%	
York	29310	Nil	Nil	29310	Nil	0.00%	
Koya	16986	Unknown	Unknown	16986	NA	0.00%	
Total	4,600,247	308,695	126,266	1,998,202	2,602,045	56.56%	

NOTE: *Numbers represent war-affected populations residing at IDP camp sites approved by the Government. It is believed that at least another 100,000 war-affected people are residing with families and friends in the city and surrounding towns.

Figures are based on 1997 population estimates and the UNHACU IDP database. The numbers will change as more information becomes available.

Figure 1: Population Accessibility Profile in Sierra Leone



Resources

Most of the activities undertaken under the Plan of Action were executed with existing funds of humanitarian agencies. As the peace negotiations open up new prospects for greater access to populations in need, agencies will require new funding to meet 1999 needs. The UN Consolidated Appeal for 1999 requested \$27.9 million, but so far, only about five million has been forthcoming from donors. (see Table IV below)


Table IV:

**Funding to the 1999 UN Consolidated Inter - Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone
Summary of Requirements and Contributions - by Appealing Agencies as of 16
April 1999**

Compiled by OCHA on the basis of the information provided by the respective Appealing Agencies

Appealing Agency	Appeal Requirements	Contributions	Shortfall	% of Request Covered
UNHCR	8,024,800	940,370	7,084,430	11.7%
UNICEF	7,750,000	2,712,190	5,037,810	35.0%
WFP	3,260,786	1,394,068	1,866,718	42.8%
FAO	2,883,000	-	2,883,000	0.0%
WHO	2,166,110	-	2,166,110	0.0%
UNDP	1,676,000	-	1,676,000	0.0%
UNFPA	950,000	-	950,000	0.0%
OCHA	713,600	694,805	18,795	97.4%

OHCHR	500,000	64,935	435,065	13.0%
GRAND TOTAL	27,924,296	5,806,368	22,117,928	20.8%



New Appointments

Ms. Joanna Van Gerpen has been appointed Special UNICEF Representative to Sierra Leone. She resumed work in Freetown on 7 April.

The UN Resident /Humanitarian Coordinator, Ms. Elizabeth Lwanga, has ended her in Sierra Leone after nearly five years service. Mr. Kingsley Amaning, current Representative of UNHCR has been appointed interim Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and Designated Official for security.

American Dr. William Aldis has replaced Dr. Nsu-Milang as WHO Representative for Sierra Leone.

Figure III: National Humanitarian Coordination Structure

Please send comments and/or contributions to:

Ahunna Eziakonwa, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (information), UN-HACU, Sierra Leone
aeziaki@hotmail.com

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit for Sierra Leone

4-382

United Nations House, 43 Siaka Stevens Street, P.O. Box 1011, Freetown, Sierra Leone
Tel: +232-22-227764, Fax: +232-22-228720, Email: rpainter@sierratel.sl

Number	Item	Content
170	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 9 October 1999

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 9 Oct 1999

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 03 - 09 Oct 1999

1. Political Developments

The return of Chairman Foday Sankoh and Major Johnny Paul Koroma continues to improve prospects for peace in the country. Since their arrival in Freetown on October 3rd the RUF/AFRC leaders have been visiting civil society groups, IDP camps, DDR campsites and others. They are expected to work closely with the GOSL in the formation of a Government of National Unity. They are also making plans to visit their various locations to further sensitize their men on the DDR programme. Addressing about 800 people including some ex-combatants at Lungi on October 8, Chairman Sankoh said he had moved from guerrilla warfare to political warfare. He urged the ex-combatants to ask the forgiveness of all Sierra Leoneans and to do something positive for the country.

The UN Security Council is currently meeting to discuss the peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone, and is likely to adopt a resolution before the end of the month.

In other developments, Britain has notified the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee that it will be exporting live ammunitions and military equipment to Sierra Leone for use by the new military. The shipment includes 4.5million pounds promised by Britain to help re-train the Sierra Leone army. Some 5.5 million pounds has already been paid directly to ECOMOG.

On October 5, the Government, with the support of Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) held an anti-corruption workshop as part of the on-going effort to eradicate corruption in the public services. Participants included cabinet ministers, senior government officials and RUF/ AFRC leaders Chairman Foday Sankoh and Major Johnny Paul Koroma. Presidential spokesman Septimus Kaikai reported that the workshop focused on three main areas: Prevention, Enforcement and Education. Mr. Kaikai also reported that an anti-corruption bill was before Parliament. When enacted, the Bill will provide the legal basis for establishing an anti-corruption commission.

2. SECURITY

The security situation has not significantly improved since in the last week. On October 4, it was reported that rebels on the Masiaka - Mile 91 highway, attacked a Sierra Leone Road Transport bus bound for Kenema. The bus was reportedly stopped at a checkpoint five miles to Masiaka on the Freetown highway. According to the report, all the commuters were ordered to disembark while the band of armed men stripped them of all they had, and abandoned the bus at a nearby bush-path. Human Rights Watch interviewed some of the passengers on the bus who confirmed that some of the girls had been raped. One pregnant woman reportedly aborted after suffering physical abuse by the captors. Such abuses are said to be on the increase in the northern region. The RUF/AFRC have blamed bandits for the incident.

These security incidents are hindering access to RUF/AFRC-controlled areas, particularly in the north. Concern Worldwide (CW) which has been attempting to re-start relief activities on the Magburuka - Matotoka axis, reports that it has been prevented from moving into the area by RUF/AFRC Commanders who are demanding that food be distributed in their district. According to CW, travel to Matotoka is not possible at the moment. Terrorism in villages around Magburuka and Matotoka is on the rise. Residents are forced to give food to the Paramount Chief who in turn gives to the armed combatants. Sometimes, the rebels go directly to the farmers for food, causing them to be doubly taxed. OSM officials in the area are reportedly afraid of the commanders, all of whom seem to be at the same level of command. UNOMSIL has been informed and is looking into the matter.

Makeni residents reportedly went into a panic when shooting broke out in parts of the town on 3rd October over a period of three hours. The Bishop of Makeni, Bishop Biguzzi (who was on a visit to the town) was prevented from leaving the town until the situation was brought under control. He reported that a meeting between the RUF and AFRC led to a resolution of the situation.

There are also persistent reports of armed groups attacking civilians (seizing properties, demanding money and beating civilians) in villages in the Kambia district. The harassment has reportedly led civilians (some of them just returning from refugee camps in Guinea) to flee these villages and head back to the refugee camps or to settle in villages very close to the border with Guinea. The security situation in Port Loko district is also of concern. An aid agency working in the district reported some difficulty in the implementation of its programme due to the fragile security situation in the district. Groups of the AFRC are reported to be harassing civilians along the Port Loko - Lungi road and also at Loko Masama. Rape cases were also reported in this area.

In the Western Area, there are continuing reports of armed robbery attempts and the harassment of civilians by unidentified groups of young men suspected to be ex-combatants. According to UNOMSIL, there are reports of weapons being smuggled into the city.

The security situation in the southern region remains calm. However, elements of the CDF in the Bumpeh area continue to pose threats to the security of the people in the town. According to aid workers, these individuals are harassing innocent civilians. They confirmed that CDF personnel shot a pregnant woman dead on suspicion that she was having an affair with another man. The matter is under Police investigation. The peace-building and reconciliation committee and NCRRR are also following up on the issue.

3. Humanitarian Highlights

Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Kailahun District

Following the inter-agency assessment mission to Kailahun District last week, WFP and other relevant agencies are beginning to take some practical steps to address some of the urgent needs. A detailed report of the mission is attached.

Health

The main health event during this period was the start of National Immunization Days (NIDs) on October 9, aimed at eradicating polio in Sierra Leone. Some 800,000 children under five are targeted for immunization countrywide. The whole of the southern region and parts of the northern and eastern regions were covered in this first phase. WHO, UNICEF and Rotary International, are the main supporters of the government in mounting the campaign. Their goal is to reach the entire country by the end of the third round. UNICEF and WHO reported that the first round got off to a good start as parents turned up in their numbers to immunize their children. In Freetown, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah immunized the first child to kick-off the occasion. Over 5,000 children were reported to have been immunized by noon on the first day.

The programme was also undertaken in the RUF/AFRC-held northern towns of Makeni, Kabala, Kambia, Kono and Port Loko. Despite the overall success thus far, there have been a number of hitches. On 7 October, a scheduled helicopter flight to deliver vaccines to Makeni for the programme had to be cancelled, as there was no clear approval from the RUF/AFRC commanders for the helicopter to land. An assessment was made of the situation based on information from a number of sources (NGOS, UNOMSIL, ECOMOG) which led to the decision that at that time, it was not advisable to proceed to Makeni. The organizers managed to provide alternative means of transporting the supplies to the town. A serious security incident occurred during the exercise in the eastern town of Segbwema. Six MOHS staff members and NID volunteers have been missing since 9 October, and their abandoned vehicle has been found. Contacts have been made and negotiations are ongoing to secure their release.

It is hoped that by the end of the programme, at least 70% of the target group would have been covered. Community Health Organizations (CHOs), nurses and other health staff/volunteers have been fully trained for the programme. Intensive sensitization and awareness building programmes are being carried out throughout the country. The 2nd and 3rd phases will be undertaken on November 6th and December 11th .

Reported cholera cases in the Western Area have now increased to 927 cases with 9 cholera related deaths. There were however no new cases reported at the IDP camps. Efforts continue on all sides to combat the outbreak (See SITREP 23-30 September 1999). In Port Loko District, the District Medical Officer confirmed 40 cholera-related deaths during the month of September. Some 400 cases are currently being treated at the health center.

During the past week, a seven-year old died of measles at the METCHEM section of the National Workshop Camp in Freetown. An outbreak of measles is also reported at the Approved school camp. Concern Worldwide is handling the situation at its camp clinic.

The MOHS has announced the start of the Cost Recovery Program as of October 1, 1999 in all areas, with the exception of Kono, Kailahun and the displaced camps. The outpatient Units in Magburaka, Kambia, Port Loko and Makeni are now operational. Malnutrition cases are the most prominent in these locations.

Food Aid

During the past week, WFP served 12,885 IDPs in all camps in Bo and 777 IDPs with host population at Mandu in the Bo North cluster. CRS also provided food for 4,273 beneficiaries in TFCs, SFCs and institutional programmes. At the Songo-Masiaka axis, WFP, ACF, ADRA carried out food distributions to 5,957 persons. These distributions will be followed by a distribution to 3,130 beneficiaries at villages between Masiaka - Makeni. Also, food pipeline agencies are soon to complete the third month of Food-For-Agriculture in their areas of operation.

As more areas of the country are accessed, the collective resources of food aid agencies will be insufficient to address increasing needs. There are reports of continuing food shortages in many areas in the north, including Fadugu and Kabala. The food situation in Makeni (in spite of the last distribution) is said to be getting bad. Some agencies have recommended a second distribution to avoid further deterioration.

CARE, WFP and CRS provided 3,946 mt of food aid to 276,190 IDPs and war-affected populations during the month of September. At the time of writing, WVI figures were not available.

Food Distribution - September 1999

Food Pipeline Agency	Population Served	Bulger	Oil	Lentils	CSB	Others	Total (mts)
CARE	60,531	558	48	221	-	-	827
CRS	87,873	619	63	255	57	-	994
WFP	106,013	637	48	325	83	745	1,838
WFP Partners	21,773						287
Grand Total	276,190	1,814	159	801	140	745	3,946

Nutrition

MERLIN reported an increase in the cases of malnutrition in Kenema town, IDP camps and in some chiefdoms within the district. They reported a total caseload of 411 and 176 severely malnourished cases in Kenema and Blama respectively. MERLIN is in the process of handing over its supplementary feeding caseload to GOAL. They are working

closely with GOAL and CRS to address the nutritional problem in the area, through a joint distribution/ screening exercise planned for all under 5s in Kenema. This will be undertaken in a few weeks.

Agriculture

In an effort to strengthen the existing coordination mechanism in the agriculture sector, FAO, in collaboration with MAFE and the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR), has embarked on the production of a monthly newsletter called AGRISIL. The first edition has just been distributed to partners. The monthly newsletter will attempt to highlight agricultural relief and rehabilitation activities carried out by the government, UN Agencies, International Organizations and NGOs in Sierra Leone. It is expected that AGRISIL will serve as a medium of information exchange among agencies in the agriculture sector.

Celebrations for the *World Food Day* are underway. FAO, in collaboration with MAFE, other agencies and farmers associations in the Western Area, has lined up activities to mark the day on October 16. "Youth against Hunger" has been selected as the theme for this year's celebrations, to highlight the potential contribution of young men and women in achieving food security for all.

FAO has in principle, agreed to provide US\$6,000 to fund the needs assessment survey referred to in SITREP 23-30 September. It is expected that the exercise will guide stakeholders in the agriculture sector to better plan for the year 2000.

Distribution for the last phase of the planting season is still in progress. FAO, MAFE and NGOs are currently distributing seed rice, vegetable seeds, tools, groundnut and sweet potatoes to 8000 Farm Families. MAFE recently concluded the distribution of 1.3 Mt of vegetable seeds to Farm Families in the entire country. It is expected that at the end of October 1999, agencies will make their input distribution reports available to the NGO Desk and HACU for collation and analysis.

Finally, a tools selection-clearing house has been established within the Ministry of Agriculture to help NGOs and other interested organizations to select the right tools for their beneficiaries.

IDP Update

There was no significant change in IDP figures during this period. Registration done at Lunsar town for VGF distribution revealed a total of 30,616 war-affected persons (not encamped).

Water and Sanitation

ACF has constructed 4 (4 x 4) latrine structures on Kendeyella site 1 camp in Bo. These are now in use by 750 IDPs. The following is being done on site 2 by ACF:- 12 x 4 squat

blocks of latrine pits dug; 6 x 4 squat blocks of latrine foundations cast. Latrines are expected to serve up to 6,000 IDPs. The first phase of sensitization on hygiene promotion at site 1 has commenced. At Splendid and Kendeyella camps, ACF also completed general spraying of latrines and drainage at Splendid, Lebanese and Kendeyella camps. At Splendid, 7 latrine blocks have collapsed and have been closed. ACF is also engaged in dismantling old latrines at the former Tikonko road camp, and has completed the construction of 1 x 4 squat block latrine at Yele. Another 2 x 2 block of VIP latrines has been completed at Yele for the community health center. ACF intends to provide additional ones once space is available. CARE has completed one latrine at the Lebanese camp to complement the existing ones that are expected to serve 1,131 IDPs.

OXFAM has rehabilitated nine wells on Kendeyella site 2 with one awaiting hand pump from UNICEF. Four more wells are on standby and will be completed according to demand. In Koya rural, WSD and OXFAM are rehabilitating 100 wells constructed by Plan International.

At Kaffu Bullom chiefdom in Port Loko district, OXFAM has completed and fitted three new lined wells fitted with hand-pumps. Two more wells are under construction. Family latrine projects are underway in eight more villages in the chiefdom and 500 latrines are planned. Support is also being given to the Lungi Hospital cholera ward in the form of buckets, plastic drums, plastic sheeting's, gloves and chlorine. Temporary latrines are being constructed at the site to complement the poor sanitation systems. CARE International is also planning to resume its water and sanitation programs in three chiefdoms in Port Loko District.

In Kenema, OXFAM has repaired 6 latrine blocks and construction is underway for 12x5 latrine blocks. Four full latrine blocks have been shut down. At Nyawama camp, - installation of a gravity water system will provide water to 3,500 camp residents.

In the Western Area, Guma Valley has solved the water situation at Parade grounds camp, and UNICEF is supplementing shortfalls with daily trucking of water to the camp. OXFAM is in the process of building three new latrine blocks and two wash areas for IDPs at Approved School camp.

Child Protection

Some 90 people were released in Lunsar on October 2nd, of which 72 were children. On October 3rd, another 29 children were released. On October 6, RUF/AFRC commanders turned over 78 children to UNOMSIL and CARITAS - Makeni.

Refugees

UNHCR reported that the recent crisis in Lofa County has seen the movement of about 2,000 Liberian refugees and Sierra Leoneans back to the Kailahun area. They are proposing increased monitoring in this area by humanitarian agencies. Although the people did not appear in poor condition, their shelter situation is of concern.

3. Socio-economic

UNDP organized a press briefing on the National Human Development Report on 8 October 1999, in preparation for the launching of the Report on 11 October. The launching will be followed by a two-day workshop in Freetown.

4. DDR

The DDR camp for 2000 ex-combatants in Port Loko is now ready, but will have to be increased so as to accommodate their families, which makes it only 80% ready to use. The newly constructed water wells have been found to be salty so alternate water supply has to be looked into. SRSG Ambassador Francis Okelo led a mission to the demobilization camp in Port Loko at the end of the week, including the DFID program manager, political and human rights officers. Ambassador Okelo confirmed significant progress in preparation of the site and commended DFID and ECOMOG for a job well done. He said the demobilization phase of the DDR process should start soon and should ensure the full participation of Chairman Foday Sankoh and Major Johnny Paul Koroma. The new campsite is attracting a lot of commerce in the area and it is expected that up to Le16 million will go into the local economy daily.

During the week, officials from the DDR secretariat, on their visit to Bo, announced that Bo (Gerihun) has been designated as one of the DDR centers in the country. Pre-planning will commence in the near future. It is expected that more than 10,000 CDF personnel in the region will be disarmed and demobilized. Child combatants will form the core of the total number of CDF to be disarmed. Meanwhile, in certain areas in Bo and Pujehun districts, the CDF is expressing their desire to disarm, return to their homes and engage in meaningful projects, which will help rebuild their shattered lives. The DDR site at Kenema is ready and the operation is expected to start by mid October. The programme is also expected to begin in Daru at the same time. RUF Brigadier Mike Lamin has been in the area sensitizing the combatants. A total of 50 ex-combatants are now at the site in Lungi. In Makeni rebels have not allowed the inspection of DDR campsites.

4391

Number	Item	Content
171	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 20 November 1999

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Date: 20 Nov 1999

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 7 - 20 Nov 1999

SUMMARY

Continued violations of the cease-fire agreement and the slow implementation of the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme have continued to hinder humanitarian interventions. Security continues to be poor in most parts of the Northern Province, and real questions remain about the ability or willingness of the parties to the conflict to support the DDR process.

1. Political

Multi-Donor Mission to Sierra Leone

A Multi-Donor Mission visited Sierra Leone (November 8-11) led by the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Ms. Carolyn McAskie. The mission consisted of representatives from a number of key donor countries (Japan, USA, UK, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Canada and Ireland), the EU and United Nations officials from the FAO and WFP as well as a representative from IOM.

The objective of the mission was to demonstrate the commitment of the international donor community to support Sierra Leone's recovery from the civil war, and to focus on critical needs across all sectors. The mission met people across a wide variety of sectors including government officials, leaders of the AFRC and RUF, international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) local members of civil society and UN officials.

They visited the amputee camp at Aberdeen, and the St Michael's Children's Centre in Lakka. They also visited the Therapeutic Feeding Centre, Government Hospital and the Lebanese camp in Kenema. Ms. McAskie stated that the uncertain security situation on the ground made it difficult for humanitarian agencies to access areas where people were suffering. She urged all parties to speed up the DDR process that plays an important role in humanitarian intervention, and to respect the commitment to provide access to all parts of the country for humanitarian aid.

New Special Representative to replace Ambassador Francis Okelo

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Anan has appointed veteran Diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji as Special Representative to replace Ambassador Francis Okelo who is ending his two years position in Sierra Leone. Mr. Adeniji is considered an expert in disarmament and conflict resolution and has produced several publications in this regard.

UNAMSIL Peace-Keeping Contingent

Kenya has agreed to send 45 Officers and 779 servicemen and 6 service women as part of the 6,000 strong peace keeping-force (UNAMSIL). The United Nations has stated that it will begin deployment of troops to Sierra Leone on the week of 22 November.

Canadian Government donates money to Sierra Leone

Cause Canada announced that the Government of Canada has donated 100,000 Canadian dollars for permanent shelter support in the country. Cause Canada intends to use funds to construct 60 houses equipped with Kitchens, Latrines and water wells in the villages of Bevehun, Bandama and Waima along the Bo-Kenema Highway.

United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Mission

A two-week mission to Sierra Leone by two representatives from UNIDIR- Dr. Robin Poulton and Dr. Anofloe Ayissi (Specialist in African Security in the UNIDIR) to promote new ideas for Peace and Disarmament ended on 14 November.

The team visited with members of the government, UN Agencies, civil society groups and the press. Dr. Poulton said that if disarmament should continue at a fast pace then, there must be a visible sign that the people can appreciate. He suggested that a 100 weapons should be burnt as a "Smoke of Peace" as a means of building up the confidence of all Sierra Leoneans in the DDR programme. UNDP and the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone (CCSL) are launching the campaign against small arms nation wide.

Government Policy on Displaced Camps

The National Committee for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCRRR) gave a press release on 12 November on behalf of the Government discouraging IDP camps. The Commissioner encouraged all IDPs whose homes are in safe areas to return home and resettle in their homes. Plans are being put in place for the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs after disarmament of ex-combatants.

The NCRRR commended Freetown Cold Storage Company for employing four amputees, stating that this type of positive action is one of the best ways of helping amputees prosper in society. Other private business enterprises and institutions were urged to follow this step.

US Mission to Aid Sierra Leone

The US State Department is funding a mission to rehabilitate victims of war; Charles Ellmaker who left for Guekedou, Guinea on 13 November will head the mission. The mission grant of US\$766,000 is for a year and will focus on psychological help for tortured victims. Ellmaker stated that "if torturers no longer get the political benefit that they expected, then that as a weapon becomes useless."

The OCHA/HACU, UN Agencies and International NGO's also had a visit from Beth Stanford from the OFDA office in Washington and Janet Beik, the Regional Refugee Coordinator from the State Department office in Abidjan. They were here to discuss programs that the US government is funding.

Formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

On 8 November AFRC called for the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as provided by the Lomé Peace Accord. This commission will form a forum where Sierra Leoneans can tell their stories, express their grievances and identify those who tortured them. The Commission will form an essential part of the peace and reconciliation process, but Chairman Foday Sankoh of the RUF opposes the idea and calls for a blanket amnesty for all crimes.

Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in South Africa

The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Durban, South Africa on 15 November called on all parties to the Lomé Peace Accord to fulfil their commitments to the DDR programme. The communiqué also commended ECOMOG force and expressed support for UNAMSIL.

2. SECURITY

The security situation has not improved since the last sitrep, when a number of incidents were reported that severely impacted on the ability of humanitarian agencies to carry out their activities. Insecurity has also affected the DDR programme in Lungi and Port Loko.

On 8 November riots broke out at the demobilisation camp in Lungi among rebel SLA soldiers. The soldiers were demanding information, an acceleration of the DDR process and payment of monies they claim are owed to them. The ex-SLA looted businesses and personal homes. While the United Nations Military Observers and Government staff were eventually able to restore calm at the camp, tensions remain. Also ex-combatants have threatened DDR staff at the Port Loko centres. This has helped to highlight the necessity of dramatically improving the consistency and quality of the sensitization effort and speeding up the process of providing the benefits to the ex-combatants.

As reported in the Human Rights section below, there continue to be almost daily attacks on civilians in Port Loko district. These primarily consist of raids for food, but abductions and rapes are also frequently reported. These attacks have been followed by an incident involving a vehicle belonging to Children's Aid Direct (CAD), an International NGO carrying out humanitarian operations in Port Loko district. The occupants of the vehicle, engaged normally in supplementary feeding activities, were stripped, beaten and forced to march into the bush. While they were released the following day, this unacceptable incident has severely jeopardized operations in the area, and will be addressed at the highest levels. This is the first attack on an international aid agency, outside of a combat situation, for over a year.

Insecurity continues to grow in the Kabala area, where RUF armed elements continue to push ex-SLA soldiers from their bases in the North. Many of these soldiers are now in Kabala town, and have informally surrendered their weapons to loyal SLA. Others remain in the outskirts of the town, with their weapons, and have been responsible for some looting. A United Nations mission is planning to go to Kabala this week to highlight the issues there, and recommend on a future course of action.

The Yele-Matotoka road is currently blocked, following disagreements between the CDF and RUF.

A UNAMSIL mission in Segbwema was diverted to Buedu, at the request of Sam Bockarie. Initial reports indicated that the team had been detained, but UNAMSIL officials have since denied this.

Other areas of the country remain quiet, notably in Makeni/Magburaka, where the new command appears to have consolidated its control.

All persons abducted in October near Mange Bridge along the Masiaka highway have been released.

Information that several members of UNAMSIL were detained at Kailahun is false and should be disregarded.

3. HUMANITARIAN HIGHLIGHTS

A. Access

Access to the North has significantly reduced over the last few weeks, primarily due to the lack of secure environment in which to work, threats against agency staff, and the mentioned attack on CAD. Despite a number of pledges and commitments by RUF commanders, looted aid resources have not been returned. Travel and security in most of the northern province still remains a problem, which has limited the amount of humanitarian intervention in the area. With considerable and persistent effort a minimal supply of medical, nutrition and food has been able to reach this area in the past. At this time, conditions do not exist for a significant increase in activity in the Northern Province.

WFP and World Vision International have completed an assessment mission to Kailahun district and hope to start small-scale operation once logistical constraints have been addressed.

B. Sectoral Analysis

Agriculture

FAO delivers fishing equipment to fishing communities

An FAO project is assisting war-affected artisanal fisherman and women groups who are fish processors and marketers in the Western Area, Pujehun, Bonthe, and Moyamba districts. Some 2000 families are benefiting from the ongoing distribution of project supplies which include fishing boats, outboard engines, fishing nets, kuralon hard cord, ropes, twines, hooks, life jackets, lead in plates, ice machine, insulated containers and fish smoking ovens.

The project also provides training in fish processing and marketing. On 12 November project inputs were delivered to beneficiaries in Tombo, in the Western area. Tombo is considered one of the most important fishing areas in Sierra Leone that suffered the devastation of the war. The distribution was completed on 17 November with distributions to Fogbo and Magmpoh few miles from Waterloo.

CAD agricultural team has provided an additional 1,000 vulnerable farm households in Masimera, Malal and Yoni chiefdoms in the Port Loko and Tonkolili districts with groundnut seeds, cassava, potato vines and farm tools.

International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) and the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS) have completed agricultural input distribution to 12,226 farm families in Lower Yoni, Kholifa Mabang and Gbonkelenken Chiefdoms in the North. They have also assisted 237 war victims in Mortaim and Morgegba Villages near Grafton with seeds and tools, while Evangelical Fellowship of Sierra Leone (EFSL) is planning to assist with food for agriculture.

Child Protection

Spontaneous releases continue to occur, supported by ECOMOG, Human Rights community, UNAMSIL, and Child Protection Network and rebel groups. On 14 November 52 Child combatants were released at Laia Junction, as well as 6 abductees, 2 babes and 4 children. However, there remain 2,486 children registered as missing in the Western Area since January 1999.

At the St. Michael's Children's Centre Lakka west of Freetown there are 152 children (abductees and children associated with the fighting forces) being taken care of by Family Home Improvement (FHM) in collaboration with Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) and UNICEF, prior to fostering or reunification.

National Family Tracing and Reunification October 1999

	Western Area	Northern Province	Southern Province	Eastern Province	TOTAL
Missing CHN Documented	70	-	35	30	135
Missing CHN Reunified	245	-	-	-	245

Found CHN Documented	11	345	99	06	461
Found CHN Reunified	74	05	69	16	164

CHN...Children

Source: UNICEF- Sierra Leone

Western Area Family Tracing And Reunification Update January - October 1999

	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER
Missing CHN. Documented (Reg./UAC)	70	4,411
Missing CHN Reunified	245	1,925
Children Still Missing		2,486
Found CHN. Documented (Reg.)	11	584
Found Children Reunified	74	400
CHN. In Interim Centres and Foster Homes		184

Reg.:- Registered

UAC:- Unaccompanied Children

Source: UNICEF -Sierra Leone

Released Children/Abductees- January to October 1999

MONTH	Western Area Children Officially released		Northern Area Children Officially released		Total Number of Children released
	ECOMOG	AFRC/SLA	ECOMOG	AFRC/SLA	
January	-	-	-	-	-
February	40	-	-	-	40
March	55	51	-	-	106
April	05	-	-	-	05
May	01	-	-	-	01
June	02	-	-	-	02
July	10	129	-	-	139

August	04	165	-	52	221
September	03	-	-	76	79
October	19	29	-	217	268
November	-	51	-	-	51
TOTAL	139	425	-	345	912

Official Number of Demobilised child soldiers to date =160

Source: UNICEF -Sierra Leone

Food Aid

On 8 November a caseload of 2,647 Liberian refugees in the Eastern region received their November ratio of food (159bags of bulgur, 159 bags of maize meal and 107 pails of vegetable oil) from WFP.

Discussions in the Committee on Food Aid (CFA) have been focused on expanding access to areas that desperately need assistance. In particular, Makeni and its surrounding towns clearly need support, but security remains uncertain and insufficient to allow for action. However, in the meantime, more information will be sought on the situation in Kabala and Port Loko, and the possible implications for food aid.

Some progress has been reported on the funding for the WFP EMOP set up to acquire food for DDR participants: the Norwegian government has committed US\$250,000 in cash, the Swedish are considering an equal sum, and the US agency Food for Peace has committed up to US\$1million worth of pulses and oil.

Health and Nutrition

Second Round of National Immunization Days (NID)

The second round of the NID took place between 6-7 November. Vitamin A was given during this round, which plays an important role in the resistance of under five children. This round was considered successful; the teams were able to access most parts of the country including Kono. Oral Polio Vaccine coverage was 85% and 80% coverage of the Vitamin A supplement nationwide.

The causative agent for bloody diarrhea in the Southern Province has been identified in Shigella N. in the Southern Province. The agent is resistant to antibiotics; the MOHS has recommended the use of noladixic acid for serious cases.

Medicins Sans Frontiers Belgium (MSF-B) started operating a mobile clinic on 9 November between Kendeyella site2 and Splendid camp in Bo. This clinic is expected to serve 11,000 IDPs. This clinic will also cover Kendeyella site1 camp.

Lebanese Camp in Kenema continues to receive medical attention from the UNICEF sponsored clinics at the New Police barracks.

Planned Parenthood Association Sierra Leone (PPASL) conducted refresher courses for 75 Community Based Distribution (CBD) agents, 45 Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and 15 Mother/Child Health (MCH) Aides in reproductive health, Family Planning and Income Generating skills.

Courses in Soap making and gari processing for 100 women of reproductive age were given. Bumpe, Boama and Jama Bongor chiefdoms in the Southern Province were the target areas.

CAD continues to support 7 health clinics in Port Loko District with medical supplies, equipment, basic repairs, furniture and incentives for MOH staff. In the first week of November support was extended to an eighth clinic. They continue to implement a Supplementary-feeding Programme for malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women from 8 locations in Port Loko District. The severely malnourished cases are transferred to the Action Contra la Faim (ACF) feeding centre in Freetown. Approximately, 600 children and 500 pregnant women are currently being supported in the programme.

Refugees

UNHCR reports that the current number of Sierra Leonean refugees is 460,000 with 380,000 in Guinea and 80,000 in Liberia. Of these numbers 173,000 are originally from Kailahun, 28,000 from Kenema and 20,000 from Freetown. Repatriation as planned is unlikely to begin in significant numbers as planned for the beginning of 2000 due to insecurity. However, 3,000 ex-SLA soldiers are expected to return from Liberia in the near future. Fighting along the Makeni-Kabala axis has resulted in the movement of 1,000 civilian's north into Kabala.

Water and Sanitation

Oxfam has completed 3 showers and 3 laundry facilities at the Kendeyella site 2, and well construction at Tikonko is on going. The maintenance of existing hand pumps has been completed. Repairs on hand pumps and hygiene promotion is ongoing at Gondama in Bo. ACF is installing one submersible pump at their TFC. They have completed 12 blocks of latrines at the Kendeyella site 2. Construction to underway for 6 new latrine blocks and 2 VIP latrines for MSF-B who started running a clinic at the Kendeyella site 2.

Distribution of medicated soap and hygiene promotion at site 1 is ongoing. Construction of hygiene training hall at the site is in progress.

World Vision Sierra Leone (WVSL) has rehabilitated 63 wells in 6 chiefdoms in the Bonthe District, and has installed 40 pumps.

CARE is doing concrete work at various stages on 25 wells in the Moyamba district. Rehabilitation work on 10 existing wells is in progress. 90 latrine slabs have been cast and placed over pits while 79 latrine pits have been excavated and health lessons being taught in the Moyamba District.

OXFAM and ACF will be constructing 6 Latrines each at the Splendid camp after the demobilisation of booths.

C. IDP Updates

Due to the recent attacks in the Port Loko-Lungi-Lunsar axis the number of displaced people has soared with numbers between 8,000-10,000 in Port Loko town. When the security situation allows, the National Technical Committee (NTC), HACU and NCRRR are planning an assessment mission to the area to evaluate needs in food, shelter and water sanitation.

Actionaid has acquired a variety of non-food emergency items for Kambia district and will distribute them as soon as accessibility improves.

African Muslim Agency (AMA) distributed clothing to different areas:

- Jui refugee camp 55 bales
- National Workshop 25 bales
- Jui/Kossoh Town 10 bales
- AMA centre Kenema 31 bales
- Representatives of displaced Paramount Chiefs 10 bales

BO

400 booths constructed at Kendeyella site2 have been allocated to IDPs. OXFAM is doing work on the water facility at the camp whilst ACF is taking care of sanitation. Cause Canada has constructed over 700 skeletal booths on site 2 of Kendeyella camp.

KENEMA

OXFAM and MERLIN continue to provide humanitarian assistance in Watsan and Health respectively at Lebanese Camp.

OXFAM and AFRICARE continue to provide health and Watsan facilities for Nyandeyama camp. A 9-man management committee (3 each from Kono, Kailahun and Kenema Districts) has been elected to address IDP concerns.

IRC provided 2 rolls of plastic sheets for roofing the school and a football to children.

The transit centre for abductees at Dauda in Kenema is now complete. 8 booths to house 150 prisoners of war/Abductees. Each shelter is estimated to hold 50 released abductees.

OXFAM has completed 2 toilet structures with 4 squat holes each and 2 laundries and shower sites at Dauda. 1 traditional well has been rehabilitated. The fencing of whole campsite started on 11 November. There are no prisoners/abductees at the site; Agricultural Production Extension and General Services (APEGS) a local NGO has offered to manage the camp.

FREETOWN

- Amputee Camp: There are presently 1,500 Amputees and family members at the site and 371 war victims. Representatives of the Multi-Donor Mission to Sierra Leone paid a visit to the camp on 9 November to assess their needs. Handicap International are running the prosthetists centre at the camp and have Dave Evans from the Vietnam Veterans Foundation training amputees and other people in the construction of prosthetic limbs for amputees. The camp manager pleaded on behalf of the amputees for donors to assist their return home and help in getting an education.
- National Stadium: GOAL has moved a total of 4,738 registered IDPs to Grafton. There remains 240 unregistered IDPs and 55 polio and leprosy victims at the stadium that need to be moved to some other location; the matter has been referred to NCRRR.
- Parade Grounds: The monthly food distribution by WFP has been completed; 26 cartoons of vegetable oil, 138 bags of bulgur and 58 bags of peas for 764 IDPs.
- Mandela Camp: Monthly food distribution by WFP has been completed for 434 IDPs.
- National Workshop: On 16 November UNICEF immunized children against measles. There are still illegal occupants at the camp, which is creating a problem for the legal occupants.
- Trade Centre: EFSL has disinfected all sheds and toilets against bed bugs. CHASL is planning a micro-credit program at the camp for single mothers and orphans.
- Approved School: The International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) is planning on phasing out camp management at Approved School by December 1999.
- Grafton: There are a total of 10,710 IDPs at Grafton who need to be verified. GOAL is having some problems in doing this and this is causing a delay for food distribution at the camp.
- Waterloo: ADRA hopes to complete the booths for IDPs staying at the make shift in Waterloo and have them moved out. ADRA is still under-going problems with abductees at the transit centre especially with food as is appealing to WFP to help out in this regard.

4. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTERGRATION (DDR)

Status Report: Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants

Location of demobilisation Centre	Assigned groups for centres	Fully operational	Ready for Use	No. of Ex-combatants Registered
Lungi	RUF	Yes		0
	CDF			0
	AFRC			63
	CHILD			7
Port Loko	RUF	Yes	Yes	90
	CDF			372
	AFRC			262
	CHILD			5
Hastings	RUF	Yes	Yes	2
	CDF			24
	AFRC			168
	CHILD			70
Kenema	RUF	Yes	Yes	1
	CDF			81
	AFRC			0
	CHILD			14
Daru	RUF	Yes	Yes	0

Source: UNAMSIL - Sierra Leone

There are a total of 1,063 ex-combatants at the various centres around the country.

Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma has visited field commanders in the Okra hills and asked them to register for the DDR programme. He assured them that there were provisions for them to join the new army, however it was important that they give up their weapons by 15 December the end of the disarmament period. In this same light Chairman Sankoh sensitized his men in Makeni and Kailahun about the importance of the DDR programme. He urged his men to turn away from war and work towards peace.

The demobilisation site at Daru continues to remain empty contrary to some reports.

5. HUMAN RIGHTS

There have been repeated reports of human rights abuses of civilians by former rebel elements. There have been daily reports of attacks on villages, and associated rape, abduction, looting, and various forms of intimidation. These incidents are reported to be more prevalent in the Port Loko - Lungi axis. Also, civilians continued to be levied with taxes and general harassment in RUF controlled areas as well as in Bo and Northwest area by CDF elements.

Amnesty International called upon Commonwealth member states to help restore good governance, the rule of Law, and respect of human rights in Sierra Leone. In order to end human rights abuses effective implementation of the peace accord has to take place. This can only be effective with a strong commitment from the international community. They recommend support of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in investigating human rights abuses. Recommendations are also made that those helping to bring peace in the region be properly trained about international human rights and humanitarian law.

13 Walpole Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone
Tel: +232 22 227759/227764, Fax: 228720, E-mail:
rpainter@sierratel.sl/aeziaki@hotmail.com

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Number	Item	Content
172	United Nations Document	Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 7 August 2000

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Date: 7 Aug 2000

Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 25 Jul - 07 Aug 2000

A. SECURITY

The security situation was relatively calm during the reporting period, characterized by the disarming of a number of West Side Boys (WSBs) and RUF fighters. The only clashes with the RUF occurred around Mange Bridge in the northwest, with the advance of SLA troops from Port Loko.

Northern Region

UNAMSIL troops occupy Masiaka and regularly patrol the roads. Since UNAMSIL's "Operation Thunderbolt", which aimed at clearing the WSBs out of the area, 130 of them have disarmed in Mile 38 and Port Loko. However, others who refused to disarm are continuing to man three checkpoints on the Mile 38/Masiaka road, and are harassing civilians. Four relief workers of the Christian Health Association of Sierra Leone (CHASL) are among the latest victims of abductions by the WSBs. They went missing on 21 July, and were only released on 31 July, unharmed, but their vehicle and its contents (food supplies etc) remain unaccounted for. Although the Masiaka-Mile 91 route has been reopened, caution is advised due to the continuing presence of elements of armed WSBs.

The security situation in Mile 91 remains relatively calm but fluid. UNAMSIL has assured residents that the situation there is under control. They however confirmed rebel activities in Mayibin village, across the Mabang River, where 24 houses were reportedly burnt down and a few civilians killed during a recent incident that took place at the beginning of the month. UNAMSIL expects to deploy one full Indian Battalion in Mile 91 before the end of the month.

The Bo-Mile 91 route is reported safe with a constant flow of vehicular traffic. Road access via the Mabang Bridge continues to be hindered by the poor state of repair and CDF harassment. Work is programmed to start on the bridge in the near future and UNAMSIL has promised troops to guard the bridge once work commences. The difficulty experienced on this route prompted the first use of a UNAMSIL escort by an NGO food convoy on 28 July, taking 500 mt of food to Mile 91 and Kenema. Humanitarian agencies remain concerned about the issue of access and security for aid workers and beneficiaries in the area, and are arranging a series of meetings with UNAMSIL and government authorities to address the matter.

There has been continuing violence in Port Loko between CDF and the SLA, with sporadic shooting after dark. Defense HQ has deployed a new Battalion Commander to rectify the situation.

Western Area

An increase in search and cordon operations by UNAMSIL and the Police within Freetown, and the movement of CDF out of the Brookfields Hotel, has seen positive results in reducing crime in the city.

Eastern Province

Daru continues to see the disarming of a small number of RUF fighters, but the agreement between the RUF and CDF, to allow commercial trucks to use the road from Kenema to Daru, seems to have fallen through, with the report of six vehicles captured by the RUF at Segbwema on Saturday 6 August. Save the Children Fund (SCF) reported that the vehicles (3 trucks and 3 taxis) were traveling from Kenema to Daru and Daru to Kenema respectively, when they were seized and taken to an unidentified RUF base. One of the vehicles is said to be a large commercial truck carrying rice and palm oil. With the exception of one passenger who escaped, the whereabouts of the people on the vehicles were still unknown at the time of writing.

Southern Province

The region was generally calm. However, aid agencies continue to express serious concerns about a number of security incidents involving Kamajors, which are hindering smooth delivery of humanitarian assistance in the region. The authorities are currently investigating a number of cases reportedly linked to the Kamajors, including the death of an MSF-B national officer; the looting of ACF/WFP food in Moyamba district and the commandeering of relief vehicles belonging to the Lutheran World Federation in Sorogbema, Pujehun district.

The recent decision of CDF authorities to organize a workshop in Freetown, with the participation of all its members, is viewed by the humanitarian community as a welcome and timely initiative. Humanitarian organizations urge the CDF to discuss as a matter of priority, strategies to end the continuing harassment and intimidation of aid workers and the civilian population at large by its members.

Military Expansion

UNAMSIL troop strength in the country now stands at 12,500, recently boosted by the arrival of a Russian aviation unit with four Helicopter Gun Ships. The SLAs have also expanded, with 1000 troops now undertaking continuation training after passing out of the Benguema Training Camp. A new group of recruits are now undergoing training.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

UN Security Council extends UNAMSIL mandate

On Friday, 4 August, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a British-sponsored resolution to extend UNAMSIL's mandate until 8 September 2000 and to strengthen its capacity. The original six-month mandate was due to expire on Monday 7 August. The

resolution said UNAMSIL's military component "should be reinforced through accelerated troop rotations, with further aviation and maritime assets, a strengthened force reserve, upgraded communications, and specialist combat and logistic support assets." According to the resolution, U.N. peacekeepers would help the Sierra Leone government to extend its authority over areas of the country under RUF control by deploying at key locations and main population centres. The Council also agreed that the peacekeeping force would "deter, and where necessary, decisively counter, the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions" or threat of imminent use of force.

The resolution calls on the U.N. force to maintain security around Freetown and at Lungi International Airport as a priority, to patrol main access routes to the capital, and to promote efforts to disarm and demobilise combatants. "Widespread and serious violations" by the RUF of the Lomé Peace Accord "constitute a breakdown of the prior generally permissive environment based on the agreement" and predicated on the cooperation of the warring parties, the resolution said. Until security conditions allow progress toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict, "there will continue to be a threat to UNAMSIL and the security of the state of Sierra Leone," it added.

An initial draft of the resolution called for UNAMSIL's strength to be increased from 13,000 to 16,500 troops, but given disagreement among Council Members on various issues, the resolution was amended to call on the Secretary-General to recommend measures to strengthen and restructure the Force. Meanwhile, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, Major General Vijay Jetley is due back in the country on Tuesday, 8 August after an official mission to New York to brief troop contributing countries and the UN Secretary-General on military developments and issues relating to the mandate of the peacekeeping force.

The Quest for an RUF Leader continues

UNAMSIL reported on Monday, 7 August, that efforts were underway to identify a new RUF leader to facilitate renewed dialogue between the RUF and the GOSL. The RUF is yet to finalize their decision on the matter. Meanwhile, the UN Special Representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji visited Monrovia on Wednesday, 2 August for consultations with President Charles Taylor on this and other matters relating to the Sierra Leone conflict. The SRSG is due to travel to Bamako, Mali, on Tuesday 8 August to hold discussions with the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Alpha Oumar Konare on the same issue.

C. DDR - Learning the Lessons

Deviation should not be tolerated in new DDR process - UN SRSG:

Disarmament should no longer be left to the discretion of the leadership of armed groups. Rather it should follow a generally agreed timetable and an agreed sequence. Any deviation should immediately be exposed as sabotage and as an indication of a hidden

agenda, said the SRSG, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji at the opening session of the workshop. The SRSG, who chaired the occasion, stressed the need for political, military, humanitarian/development agencies, Donors as well as civil society movements, to work in full partnership in order to achieve the common goal.

Humanitarian Agencies will play their part - UN Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator

Speaking along the same lines, and in his capacity as UN Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, Mr. Kingsley Amaning said humanitarian agencies saw the meeting as an opportunity to expand the ongoing collaboration with the NCDDR and its partners in the pursuit of the common goal - a successful DDR programme. In this regard, he said the Programme "should be anchored within a framework of a wider simultaneous and collective effort targeted at the resolution of conflict through: political arbitration; the enhancement of security; the provision of basic social safety nets and humanitarian assistance." While recognizing the role of political and military protagonists in providing a permissive environment, Mr. Amaning noted that, "without a well planned and efficient DDR and other humanitarian programmes to guide and encourage the peace process, an opportunity for real peace and stability can be easily lost." "For the UN humanitarian and operational agencies," he concluded, "this meeting is a timely invitation to us to join in biblical terms, the five wise maidens in putting oil in our lamps to keep them burning in readiness for the arrival of the bridegroom."

To do nothing is not an option for DDR - World Bank Director for Sierra Leone

"DDR is central and fundamental to Sierra Leone's transition from war to peace." "To do nothing, is not an option," declared Mr. Peter Harold, the new World Bank Director for Sierra Leone. Mr. Harold recognized the need to safeguard investments already made, while preparing for a full resumption of the Programme. Commenting on the controversial issue of the Transitional Safety Net Allowance (TSA) for ex-combatants, the Bank Director conceded that it was important to correct the erroneous image of a cash-for-guns policy, but underlined the continuing need for "cash", which he described as "cash-for-peace." "Without the early provision of development support, there will be no transition," Mr. Harold stressed, noting that the ultimate challenge was the Reintegration aspect of the programme. He observed that the Bank's contribution to reintegration was contingent on the support of humanitarian agencies, UNAMSIL, bilateral partners and civil society organizations.

GOSL still committed to the Lome Peace Accord

The Minister of Presidential Affairs declared that the GOSL was still committed to the Lome Accord, and that the government had gone one step further to outline the conditions for a resumption of peace talks with the RUF. He appealed to all stakeholders to fully support the DDR process and other instruments of peace.

Challenges for the future -- Dr Francis Kai-Kai, Executive Secretary of NCDDR

Dr Francis Kai-Kai, the Executive Secretary of NCDDR outlined a number of key challenges facing the DDR programme since May 2000, including: Status of the Lome Peace Agreement and its key structures; Status of political and military leadership of all fighting forces; Clarification of strategy to end the conflict and implications for DDR; Establishment of a security framework for DDR; Securing military compliance; and Clarifying the policy on encampment and specific incentives for D&D.

Summary of specific recommendations from discussion groups

Status of the DDR Programme

Before the resumption of hostilities in May, 24,285 combatants had been disarmed including 1,743 child combatants. Some 14,807 weapons and 255,719 ammunitions were collected. Since then, some of the disarmed soldiers have been re-armed and have returned to the war front. Only the Lungi and Daru camps are currently operational. On 7 August, the Executive Secretariat of NCDDR reported a total of 260 ex-combatants at the Lungi camp, including some of the newly disarmed Westside Boys. They are currently screening the ex-combatants for appropriate action. The Executive Secretary said NCDDR had embarked on a sensitization campaign to inform ex-combatants that they would not receive TSA payments while they were encamped -- rather, payments would be made in communities -- to ensure that the money is utilized for community-based reintegration programmes.

At the Daru camp, there are now 582 RUF and SLA ex-combatants. It is increasingly difficult for NCDDR to plan community-based reintegration activities for the ex-combatants there, as the town remains surrounded by a hostile environment, dominated by the RUF. The Commission however hopes to be able to move the SLAs from the area and to find ways of reintegrating the RUF.

In Port Loko, 299 ex-combatants are said to have returned to the DDR camp. These are mainly ex-RUF fighters who were being protected by UNAMSIL. Some of them are finding it difficult to return to their home areas due to insecurity and lack of acceptance by community members.

The NCDDR is currently sensitizing previously registered ex-combatants under the reintegration programme to re-register so they could be considered for assistance. They have appealed to agencies planning rehabilitation projects to include ex-combatants in their beneficiary caseloads.

Meanwhile, World Vision, in collaboration with NCDDR-eastern region, has started a three-week training programme for community volunteers to assist over 300 ex-combatants and affected youths from seven chiefdoms in the Kenema district. This programme, which is sponsored by the USAID/Office for Transitional Initiatives (OTI), is aimed at empowering the youths to become better-adjusted citizens. OTI is also supporting apprenticeship programmes to rehabilitate schools, wells and other community projects, in collaboration with UNICEF and other partners.

D. HUMANITARIAN HIGHLIGHTS

1. Eastern Province

Daru - Relief activities expand

Further to our report on the Daru displaced in the last SITREP (10-24 July), subsequent inter-agency missions have confirmed the presence of around 5,000 new IDPs who arrived in Daru from nearby chiefdoms in Kailahun district. Agencies are gradually expanding activities in the area, with UNICEF and OXFAM supporting Watsan activities, IMC and ICRC providing health services, and NRC addressing education needs with UNICEF support. SCF continues to assist separated children and other children associated with the fighting forces.

Although food prices are reported to be high, WFP maintains that the situation does not yet warrant emergency food aid intervention. The IDPs are said to be in good condition with no visible signs of malnutrition. Agencies are closely monitoring the situation for any significant changes. In this regard, IMC, WFP and MERLIN will conduct a quick nutritional survey in the affected areas on Saturday 12 August, which will help determine the appropriate level of intervention required at this stage.

On the health side, IMC continues to run two clinics - one in the main town and the other in Malema (see Sitrep 10-24 July). They have commenced routine EPI activities for U5s and women of childbearing age. On Tuesday, 8 August, MERLIN and IMC will organize a Lassa fever workshop in Daru town, as Daru is part of the Lassa belt and could be at greater risk of an outbreak due to recent population movements.

Kenema - overcrowding in camps due to new influxes

The humanitarian situation in Kenema remains under control despite the latest population influx resulting from UNAMSIL/GOSL military operations in the east last month. Existing camps are however overcrowded, straining current facilities and services. The regional inter-agency committee in Kenema estimates that more than 7,000 of the new IDPs have settled in IDP camps - (Blama - 747; Gofor - 2,000; Nyandeyama camp - 100; Lebanese camp - 1000; Konia - 2000 and Refugee returnees residing in different camps - 2000). CRS has agreed to provide a one-month VGF distribution to the new IDPs in camps after they have been verified. WFP will also distribute food to the new caseload at the Blama camp. In order to help relieve the overcrowding in the camps, agencies are mobilizing resources to construct a new camp either at the Gofor site or near the Blama camp.

Meanwhile, MERLIN has now completed a nutritional survey of IDPs in four of the camps. They are currently analyzing the results, which will be made available in our next report.

2. Northern Province

Mile 91 area - Inter-agency coordination intensifies

Efforts are underway by CARE and WFP to re-register and verify IDPs in Mile 91 for further clarification on the numbers currently in the area. OCHA is now chairing a weekly inter-agency meeting in the town to improve coordination of activities between sectors and among agencies. The meetings are held every Friday.

Shelter: The immediate priority is to relocate IDPs currently occupying school buildings in Mile 91 town, as schools are due to resume by mid September. CARITAS reports significant progress in the construction of the transit camp in the town, which will accommodate about 4,000 IDPs. They have completed the clearing of the site and have pre-positioned construction materials in the area. Construction is expected to begin during the week of 7 August. UNICEF has already started digging wells at the camp location.

Health: As a follow up to the recommendations of a joint rapid assessment mission, UNICEF has distributed a consignment of drugs, medical equipment and EPI supplies to the District Medical Officer of Tonkolili District for IDPs in the township. Meanwhile, at the U5 clinic, ICRC/SLRC immunised 1,356 children (DPT & BCG) and treated 670 children for malaria, Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) and diarrhea. Some 405 expectant mothers were immunized against Tetanus. At the SLMB clinic supported by MSF-H, a dehydration and observation unit has been temporarily set up to treat severe bloody diarrhea cases until the isolation treatment centre for Shigella, currently under construction is completed. MSF-H has already trained medical personnel to attend to patients in the new centre. Meanwhile, the agency continues outreach programmes within the township and in surrounding villages.

Nutrition: ACF is treating 151 severely malnourished children at its Therapeutic Feeding Centre in Yonibana, while 654 moderate cases are benefiting from dry ration programmes at the Supplementary Feeding Centre in Mile 91 town.

Non-food Items: ICRC/SLRC have completed distribution of Non-Food-Items (NFI) to 2,642 families on the Roruks-Yobinana axis who had not benefited from earlier distributions.

WATSAN: Water and sanitation needs remain acute in the township. UNICEF is supporting the construction of 25 pit latrines as well as cleaning and chlorination of 572 traditional wells in the town. In Gbonkenlenken chieftdom, ACF has resumed well rehabilitation and will begin hygiene education for the population there in the immediate future.

Agriculture: In Gbonkenlenken chieftdom, Tonkolili district, CARE is following up an earlier VGF distribution to about 12,000 new IDPs, with FFAg assistance to 750 farm families in the villages there. Meanwhile, CARE together with other agencies has commenced a re-registration of new IDPs in Yele.

In Kholifa chiefdom, also in Tonkolili district, CARITAS distributed 500 kits of vegetable seeds and 1,500 bushels of rice seeds to 100 farming families in 14 communities.

Kabala - Poor road conditions hinder food assistance to new IDPs

During the reporting period, hundreds of new IDPs were reported in the Kabala area, coming from the Makeni and Kono axis. The food security situation there is of major concern as the Christian Relief Services (CRS) has now run out of food stocks there. Food aid agencies are having difficulties re-supplying the area due to poor road access. A cross-border operation via Guinea is being considered, but might prove impossible for movement of large trucks, as the roads are extremely bad at this time. The only viable option appears to be airlift operations. However, the Humanitarian Helicopters managed by WFP and MSF do not have the needed capacity to lift large volumes of food stocks at a time. Negotiations are ongoing with UNAMSIL on the possible use of their MI26 Helicopter, which has the capacity to lift up to 25mt of food stocks at a time. According to MSF-B, which is operational in the area, the IDPs are presently coping with the host communities, but their conditions will most certainly deteriorate if a solution is not found in the next two weeks.

Bumbuna - humanitarian situation worrying

More than 7,000 newly displaced people are reported to have arrived in Bumbuna, (northeast of Makeni) in the last week. MSF-B undertook a one-day assessment mission to the town on Monday, 7 August and reported that the new IDPs were in desperate need of humanitarian assistance, particularly food aid. About 20 mt of food aid will be required to address the current needs. At present, food can only be transported to the area by air. Efforts are being made by various agencies to find ways of responding to the immediate needs of the IDPs.

The IDPs interviewed by MSF said they fled from Makeni and Magburaka to escape RUF forced recruitments and continuing attacks. Some of them also fled due to the helicopter gunship attack in Makeni in June, and had been hiding in bushes until their arrival in Bumbuna.

The American Ambassador, Amb. Joseph Melrose and the Catholic Bishop of Makeni, Bishop Biguzzi, visited the town on 4 August and donated some medical kits and BP5, which MSF said would help a great deal, as the bulk of the IDPs are children. Nearly 400 of the new arrivals are occupying a school building and an uncompleted hospital, while the rest are staying with host families. MSF conducted a quick nutritional screening of about 350 children during their visit. They are currently analyzing the results. Some of the children showed signs of malnutrition, particularly the new arrivals. MSF has opened a clinic in the town and plans to support MOHS health officials in the area to operate the facility. Some cases of diarrhea were identified, but no evidence of a major outbreak.

Port Loko - More IDPs reported

Within the Port Loko Township, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) has registered a total of 25,200 IDPs, of which 5,499 arrived between 18 July and 1 August. Upon registration, the IDPs are reporting to the Police for further screening and security clearance. A significant number of the IDPs 10,831, have been absorbed into the local communities, while another 10,612 people have taken refuge in the camp. Due to the congestion in the camp, 3,241 of the IDPs have moved into the local primary school, while another 516 relocated to the Barracks. Meanwhile, WFP plans to undertake a re-registration and verification exercise in Port Loko town starting Tuesday, 8 August.

NRC began the construction of an additional 100 two-room booths at the camp on 31 July. Despite the continuing tense security situation, humanitarian activities are gradually being reactivated in Port Loko town, with OXFAM resuming WATSAN activities, which will help alleviate the suffering of many of the IDPs. The one-month VGF distribution by WFP in July has had a considerable impact on the food security status of the IDPs. However food shortages are reported in the camps due to continuing influxes. Non-food items have not been provided for new arrivals. IMC continues to maintain health programmes at the IDP clinic where they see an average of 120 patients per day. They identified about 40 malnourished children during the period under review, mainly among the newly displaced.

NRC continues the Rapid Response Education classes. They will soon complete the construction of two additional temporary school structures for the students. A total of 970 children are enrolled in the programme. NRC is currently conducting a three-week teacher training for the teachers attached to the camp school.

Lungi Area/Tasso Island/Kakum Island - boosting coping mechanisms

IMC continues to support the outpatient clinic at the Lungi hospital, while providing medical screening services to children in the Interim Care Centre in Lungi. In Tasso Island, where at least 8,000 IDPs and residents are considered vulnerable, IMC is maintaining health services and supplementary feeding programmes. They are currently distributing plastic sheeting donated by ICRC to cover 97 booths in a makeshift camp constructed by IDPs on Kakum Island. As a follow-up to a one-month VGF distribution to 8,116 IDPs and residents in Tasso Island, WFP is now focusing on FFW & FFAg interventions aimed at reducing the population's dependency on VGF. In Lokomassama, which also hosts a large number of IDPs, CARITAS is supporting agricultural production. They distributed 500 bags of seed rice and 500 hoes to help boost the production capacity of the farming community there.

3. Western Area

IDP relocation ongoing

CARE, WFP, OCHA and NCRRR continue to facilitate the relocation of IDPs in National Workshop to the expanded sections of Waterloo and Grafton camps. As of the time of reporting, a total of 1,675 IDPs had been relocated. The relocation exercise will

resume on Friday, 11 August. Plans are underway to further expand camp facilities to ease the overcrowding situation in IDP camps. Concern Worldwide and GOAL are currently working on the site expansion, while ACF is helping to upgrade and extend WATSAN facilities in the expanded sites. Meanwhile, MSF-H reports an increase in watery and bloody diarrhea in the camp clinics in Freetown.

Gambia donates money to IDPs

The Gambian President, President Yahya Jammeh, donated US\$10,000 to IDPs in the Western Area during a visit to Sierra Leone on 26 July. Discussions are ongoing with the IDPs on how best to allocate the funds. The Gambian leader also donated US\$10,000 to the amputees at the Murray Town camp in Aberdeen, Freetown.

Enhancing women's capacity

After an assessment of women's associations and war-affected youths, ICRC/SLRC together with the Ministry of Agriculture are planning to establish a community-based vegetable production programme, initially targeting 11,722 women and children in the Western Area and in Port Loko district. Meanwhile, UNICEF has distributed six sets of food processing equipment through AFRICARE & Action Aid for women's groups involved in food security activities in the Western Area and in Bo.

4. Southern Province

Flood victims targeted in Bonthe District

WVI has completed a second distribution of 42.75mt of FFAg to 1,000 flood victims in the Kwame Bai Krim chiefdom, Bonthe district. Meanwhile, ACF has completed a food security assessment in five flood-affected chiefdoms in the Bonthe and Pujehun districts.

E. SECTORAL HIGHLIGHTS

Child Protection

The Minister of Social Welfare Gender & Children's Affairs (MSWGCA), in a press conference held on 27 July reported that the Sierra Leone government was working on modalities to ratify the two optional protocols approved by the UN General Assembly in May. The Minister also stated that the "Rights of the Child Act" has been drafted and is awaiting review. The Ministry is yet to organise a stakeholder's workshop to develop the mandate and structure for a Commission of War Affected Children in the country. UNICEF reports that the special rapporteur on "violence against women" will visit Sierra Leone by the end of the month.

During the past week, UNICEF and MYES along with other child protection agencies conducted a two-day mass tracing exercise in the Western Area, including cross-border tracing. Meanwhile, CRS has registered 28 separated children in Mile 91, while

CARITAS is undertaking a registration and verification exercise for more than 400 separated children in Yele.

Below is a summary of family tracing and reunification activities in the South for the month of July.

	Separated children	Families traced	Reunifications effected	Follow-up visits made
Bo	7	15	11	11
Moyamba	3	2	2	-
Bonthe	3	-	-	-
Pujehun	7	-	1	13

Education

MYES in collaboration with UNICEF has conducted a 10-day training of trainer's workshop for the first batch of 20 trainers to implement the Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP). The ALP is meant to cater for over-age children wishing to complete primary schooling in half the normal time. UNICEF is also working with other partners to facilitate integration of amputee children and the children of amputees living in Murray town camp into neighbouring schools for the ensuing year. Meanwhile, WFP has offered to extend its school feeding programme to UNICEF-supported formal schools and non-formal centres.

Food Aid

During the reporting period, WFP distributed a total of 445.879mt of assorted food-aid commodities to 39,447 beneficiaries countrywide.

Health

According to a health information bulletin recently published by the MOHS, health facilities operational in the Western Area and northern province have declined from 356 institutions in 1997, to 154 to date; (Western Area-76; northern province- 78). Meanwhile, UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA continue to undertake activities to strengthen the MOHS capacity to respond to health challenges in different regions.

UNICEF recently supplied 1,800 EPI manuals for the training of PHU staff in accessible districts. They also launched a community-based Anemia & Prevention Control Project in Bo, aimed at targeting 12,000 pregnant and breast-feeding women. They continue with chlorination, water trucking, and cesspit emptying activities in IDP camps and in accessible areas. In collaboration with local contractors, UNICEF is constructing wells in

Moyamba, Port Loko, Tonkolili and Kenema districts to service schools, PHUs and vulnerable communities.

F. HUMAN RIGHTS

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports continuing violations committed against civilians by armed groups. According to a report sent to OCHA on 6 August, "of particular concern is the plight of civilians attempting to flee RUF areas to escape attacks, forced recruitment, and GOSL gunship attacks." HRW said it has collected testimonies of civilians who were tortured by the RUF or killed for attempting to flee (Makeni, Lunsar, Kambia). Given the massive displacement of populations within RUF areas, the organization said it has reason to believe that the RUF is trying to terrorize the remaining civilian population in their areas of control to prevent them from leaving. "We've also documented many cases of civilians being severely maltreated by CDF members, particularly the Gbethis who routinely extort money from civilians and beat and torture those accused of being RUF combatants or collaborators," the report said.

Gunship Attacks: Furthermore, testimonies of victims and witnesses from Tongo Field recounted serious civilian casualties resulting from gunship attacks near the market place. "While other RUF targets were also hit, and while there were reported to be RUF combatants in and around the crowded market place, the attack resulted in 14 civilian deaths and at least a dozen wounded," said the HRW report. HRW said it was yet to confirm which gunship was responsible for these attacks.

Forced Recruitment: HRW has recorded witness accounts of a recent RUF recruitment drive in Makeni and in Yeliboya, near Kambia. "We have credible evidence to suggest a small number of children as young as 10 were recruited in Makeni between July 11 and 15." There are (unconfirmed) similar reports from Kono.

Food Raids: The RUF continues to commit serious violations in raiding villages in Makeni, Lunsar, Kambia and Kabala for food. HRW said it has documented at least 15 murders and several rapes, which occurred during such raids (in June and July).

Westside Boys: HRW reported at least eight cases of abductions along the Freetown-Masiaka highway, including the four aid workers of the Christian Health Association of Sierra Leone (CHASL) who were abducted on 21 July and released a week later.

CDF: There are continuing reports of extortion and lawlessness within the areas of Moyamba, Kenema and Bo. HRW has also documented several cases of excessive use of brutality against suspected RUF rebels by the CDF.

For comments/questions/contributions please contact, Ahunna Eziakonwa, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA, Sierra Leone. Email: aeziaki@hotmail.com/Tel: 232-22-227759/23223-501302.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/975
21 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to a number of requests from members of the Security Council. It covers the period since my good offices were formally requested by the Government of Sierra Leone in November 1994.
2. The conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, when the forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks to overthrow the Government of the All People's Congress (APC) headed by former President Joseph S. Momoh. The conflict has so far caused the deaths of thousands of civilians, while many thousands more are internally displaced or are refugees in Guinea and Liberia.
3. On 29 April 1992, the Government of President Momoh was overthrown by a military coup and the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) was established. Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser became the Chairman of NPRC and Head of State. After the coup, RUF made additional demands and continued its conflict with the new Government.
4. Towards the end of 1993, NPRC regained control of areas held by RUF in the southern and eastern parts of the country and subsequently announced a unilateral cease-fire in December 1993. Nevertheless, attacks on towns, villages and major highways escalated to unprecedented levels and spread throughout the country.
5. In a letter addressed to me on 24 November 1994, Chairman Strasser formally requested my good offices to bring the Government and RUF to negotiations, with the United Nations serving as an intermediary in that process. I dispatched a member of the Department of Political Affairs, Mr. Felix Masha, to Sierra Leone to explore the possibilities of dialogue between the Government and RUF. He held a series of discussions from 15 to 22 December 1994 with Government officials, prominent citizens, religious leaders, resident diplomats and representatives of all United Nations bodies and agencies in Sierra Leone. He was not able, however, to establish contact with RUF in order to assess its

attitude towards negotiations. In a letter to me dated 28 December 1994, Chairman Strasser expressed his appreciation and full support for the mission and requested that I continue my efforts.

6. The findings of the exploratory mission convinced me of the need to establish a more permanent presence in Freetown. I therefore appointed Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) as my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone and communicated this to the President of the Security Council on 7 February 1995 (S/1995/120).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

7. During the last three years, while taking military measures against RUF, the Government has followed a two-track political approach: a negotiated settlement with RUF and democratization of the political process, including transition to an elected civilian Government within a fixed time-frame. These two political approaches are intended to reinforce each other.

A. The pursuit of negotiations

8. Prior to requesting my good offices, the Government had dispatched a delegation of prominent Sierra Leoneans to the border with Liberia to establish contact with RUF and pave the way for peace talks. The delegation met with the representatives of RUF on the Mano river bridge and held meetings with them on 24 November and 4 and 7 December 1994. Since then, there have been no follow-up meetings and each side has blamed the other for the non-resumption of talks. RUF accused the Government of sabotaging the process by issuing derogatory statements while the talks were being held. The Government alleged that the talks were discontinued because RUF took hostage three members of the Government delegation and continues to hold them.

9. My Special Envoy has spared no effort to establish contact with RUF. He has closely collaborated with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth Secretariat and other organizations supporting negotiations in Sierra Leone. Along with the OAU and Commonwealth delegations, he issued a tripartite statement in Freetown in February 1995, calling on RUF to meet with them. He has since kept in constant communication with officials of these two organizations.

10. In his attempts to establish contact with RUF leadership, my Special Envoy has sought and received assistance from official bodies, private individuals and non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leone and throughout the subregion. This has enabled him to communicate with Mr. Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUF, and some of its senior members. In May 1995, Mr. Sankoh invited my Special Envoy to visit him at his base but later changed his mind. In a similar vein, at the beginning of September 1995, he invited, through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Freetown, a number of prominent Sierra Leoneans to meet him. The Government agreed to allow those invited to proceed to the meeting. On 18 September, ICRC informed RUF of the Government's

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agreement and requested RUF to fix the date and venue. No response has yet been received.

11. My Special Envoy is still continuing his efforts through various channels to meet face-to-face with the RUF leader. In addition to these efforts, he has been assisting and encouraging the Government in its democratization process.

B. Democratization

12. On 26 November 1993, Chairman Strasser issued a declaration setting out a programme of transition to democratic constitutional rule. According to the schedule, registration of voters was to have been completed from March to June 1994 and presidential elections were to have taken place in November 1995. However, the continued conflict and limited State resources have delayed the implementation of the transition programme by one year.

13. On 27 April 1995, on the occasion of the thirty-fourth anniversary of independence, Chairman Strasser reaffirmed the commitment of NPRC to the transition programme, pledging that everything possible would be done to complete its implementation by January 1996, when a democratically elected President would be sworn in. Several important steps have followed that pronouncement.

14. The Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC), which was established by Decree No. 1, 1994, has intensified its activity under the chairmanship of Mr. James O. C. Jonah. Its sister organization, the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), established by Decree No. 15, 1994, promotes civic and voter education throughout the country.

15. At the request of the Government, the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division conducted a needs assessment mission from 22 November to 2 December 1994, in close collaboration with the National Electoral Commission, to identify the technical requirements for organizing the electoral process, including voter registration, polling, civic education, training of electoral officers, legal issues and the electoral timetable.

16. On 20 June 1995, the Government issued Decree No. 7, 1995, lifting the ban on political activities, which it had imposed when it came to power, and empowered INEC to register political parties. Fifteen political parties have so far been issued with final certificates of registration and have begun campaigning (see annex I).

17. In order to build broad-based support for the electoral process, a National Consultative Conference on Elections was held in Freetown from 15 to 17 August 1995 with the participation of all the political parties, representatives of the Government and 78 different organizations representing a wide spectrum of civil society. The Conference adopted a system of elections based on proportional representation, a code of conduct for political parties and rules to govern campaign financing. The Conference overwhelmingly agreed to hold elections by the end of February 1996. The date has since been set for

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26 February 1996. The vigorous debate and the consensus that emerged indicate wide support for the democratic process.

18. As a result of these decisions, INEC is ready to begin voter registration and to finalize preparations for the elections. However, there are serious financial constraints that endanger this process: the total budgetary requirement is US\$ 10,730,219, but only US\$ 1,125,005 in cash and kind has so far been raised from external sources (see annex II). Unless additional financial support is made available, the electoral timetable will not be met.

19. Postponement of the elections could result in escalating violence and halt altogether the process of democratization. There are some elements within Sierra Leone that seek to derail the electoral process, as was attested by the attempted coup of 2 October 1995.

20. Various efforts have been made to raise resources. At a briefing of donor countries on the electoral and political situation in Sierra Leone on 2 November 1995, the response was very positive. I am convening a donors' conference on electoral assistance to Sierra Leone in New York on 30 November and I urge Member States to respond generously.

21. I have instructed my Special Envoy to follow closely all aspects of the democratization process. I have also instructed him to encourage the Government and leaders of the political parties to safeguard the integrity of the process, ensuring that the elections are free and fair and that their outcome is not contested.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

22. When NPRC took power, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces numbered 3,000. A massive recruitment drive increased their total strength to around 14,000. After the December 1994 offensive by RUF, however, it became clear that the forces were inadequate to confront the challenges they faced. In addition, some soldiers have been implicated in illegal activities.

23. Given the links between the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, certain regional and other countries have taken the decision to provide military assistance to Sierra Leone. In addition, NPRC has been using non-Sierra Leonean advisers to improve the fighting skills of its troops, instil discipline and upgrade command and control.

24. The situation on the ground has not changed dramatically. Foreign and Sierra Leonean nationals, including seven nuns, were taken hostage in different parts of the country in early 1995 and subsequently released on 21 March 1995. In addition, RUF began moving closer to Freetown and captured several villages in Kono District, an area rich in diamonds and therefore of great economic importance.

25. Recently, morale and discipline within the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces appear to have improved. The diamond fields of Kono and a number of villages were retaken by Government forces in July and August 1995.

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The frequency of ambushes on the highways has decreased in the last few weeks and, if the present trend continues, the delivery of relief assistance to the countryside, as well as registration and voting, will be facilitated.

26. The majority of the combatants on both sides are young men with no employable skills other than soldiering. The Government has expressed its desire to demobilize part of its army. This is imperative, but it is also vital to reintegrate the demobilized soldiers into society as productive citizens. Sierra Leone lacks the resources to accomplish this task and the international community needs to assist the processes of demobilization and reintegration. While this programme will initially cover only members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces and those RUF combatants who are already in the hands of the Government, it must be designed to cover those still in the field as soon as a cease-fire and peace agreement are in place.

27. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces held a seminar on 16 and 17 November 1995 with civilians and representatives of political parties to discuss the differences of perception and mutual suspicion between the military and the civilian population. It hopes that this seminar will create a harmonious environment in preparation for the forthcoming transition to civilian rule.

IV. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The socio-economic costs of the war

28. Much of the fighting has taken place in the mineral-rich areas in the south and east and the agriculturally viable regions where cocoa, coffee and other cash crops are grown. As a result, production of gold and diamonds dropped from 43,000 tons in 1991 to 38,000 tons in 1994. This was reflected in a \$30 million decline in exports. Income from the production of cash crops has declined from \$21 million in 1990 to \$7.6 million in 1993, a fall of 64 per cent. At the same time, government expenditures have risen as a result of the war; it is estimated that some 75 per cent of total revenue is now spent on the war effort.

29. Infrastructure damage has been enormous, with academic institutions, government offices, banks, health centres, schools and hospitals in a state of severe disrepair. Roads, bridges and construction equipment have been destroyed, while the Government, the churches, NGOs and mining companies have closed or scaled down operations and laid off thousands of workers as part of the austerity measures.

30. The Government has been credited with stabilizing the economy. However, the formal economy accounts for only 25 to 30 per cent of the country's total economic activities. As economic opportunities in the formal sector decline, people have little choice but to participate more fully in the informal economy, including resorting to acts of banditry.

31. Much of the war is being fought in the rural areas, particularly in the south and east, affecting semi-subsistence farmers who make up the bulk of the rural population. Farms have been destroyed, food stores burnt, domestic

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animals stolen or killed and agricultural tools looted. Attacks have consistently taken place during the dry season, preventing farmers from harvesting their crops. As a result, 248,800 tons of cereals were imported in 1992, an 80 per cent increase over the previous year. Continued food shortages are likely to perpetuate the war.

V. HUMANITARIAN

32. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone remains critical. Nearly 2 million people have been internally displaced, the majority flocking to major towns, including Bo, Kenema and Makeni. This represents close to 50 per cent of the country's estimated population of 4,477,000. Only about 1.1 million persons from this group receive assistance with any degree of regularity, owing to security constraints. Highways linking Freetown to key population centres have been usable only sporadically for much of this year and the impact on civilian populations has been severe. In the eastern and south-eastern areas of the country, which have been totally inaccessible for more than eight months, it is feared that malnutrition will soon reach life-threatening levels. Beginning in September 1995, however, there has been a relative improvement in access, allowing humanitarian organizations to deliver relief without armed escorts. Areas in the eastern portion of the country, however, remain inaccessible.

33. The gap between the resources made available by the international community for humanitarian assistance and the unmet needs of the affected population continues to be great. In March 1995, I launched the United Nations inter-agency consolidated appeal for humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, covering the period from March to December 1995 and requesting \$14.7 million for the emergency activities of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Only 41 per cent of the funds requested has been received. This pattern is particularly worrying with respect to the status of WFP food stocks and anticipated needs for the coming year. Resources are required as soon as possible to prevent an even more precarious food aid situation next year.

34. The emergency situation has prevented development organizations from carrying out any sustained activity outside the Freetown area. Programmes have now been reoriented to address the emergency. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs will establish a humanitarian assistance coordination unit in Freetown, staffed by three experienced officers, to support the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

35. While the situation in Sierra Leone is generally characterized by conflict, human suffering and economic decline, there are some positive emerging trends which, if assisted, would contribute to the re-establishment of peace and stability. The ongoing process of democratization, particularly the elections set for 26 February 1996, is a significant element in this development and worthy of the international community's support.

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36. The internal conflict that has raged for the last four years has damaged or destroyed much of the vital physical and social infrastructure of the country. In order to consolidate the democratic process and support the incoming elected civilian Government, I urge the international community to demonstrate its solidarity with the people of Sierra Leone, many of whom believe that the world has abandoned them. Some initial steps must be taken now to signal the international community's commitment to assist this democratization process.

37. Given the importance of the issue, I am instructing the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to field a team of experts to prepare, in collaboration with the Government, a coordinated and workable action plan for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. The team will take into account the experiences gained by the United Nations in El Salvador and Mozambique, as well as the present effort in Liberia, to identify sources of funds so that implementation can begin expeditiously.

38. I have also instructed the Electoral Assistance Division to work closely with other United Nations agencies and programmes, in particular UNDP, to assist INEC in coordinating international observers during the elections and in strengthening national observer groups.

39. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone is a cause for concern because of the widening gap between the needs of the war-affected population and the resources available to humanitarian agencies. Unless the international community responds quickly to enhance the humanitarian agencies' capacity to deliver relief assistance in time and in sufficient quantity, the situation may become desperate. In this connection, I should like to commend all United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations operating in Sierra Leone for their response to the emergency situation by reorienting their various programmes.

40. Delivering relief assistance to the needy is not an easy task even at the best of times. It becomes almost impossible when humanitarian convoys are targeted. Members of the Security Council may consider admonishing those responsible for attacking relief convoys and urging them to refrain from such deplorable actions.

41. Despite all efforts to contact it, the RUF leadership has remained elusive and unresponsive to initiatives for a meeting or negotiations. While commending those Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals that have been supporting the efforts of my Special Envoy, the time has come for the international community to urge RUF to take advantage of my good offices and to initiate a process of negotiation.

42. I intend to retain my Special Envoy in Sierra Leone for the time being. He will continue his efforts to establish a dialogue between RUF and the Government and to support the process of democratization. His efforts will be coordinated with OAU and the Commonwealth.

43. In conclusion, I should like to call upon Member States to provide the fullest possible material and financial support to INEC so that the elections

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can be held on schedule. Although there are legitimate security concerns, experience has shown in other places, such as Cambodia and South Africa, that the democratic process should not be held hostage to the intransigence of any particular group.

Annex IList of registered political parties in Sierra Leone

<u>Name of political party</u>	<u>Name of leader</u>
1. People's Progressive Party (PPP)	Edward Bundu-Kamara
2. National Unity Movement (NUM)	Desmond Luke
3. People's National Convention (PNC)	Ibrahim Ben Kargbo
4. United National People's Party (UNPP)	John Karafa-Smart
5. People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Thaimu Bangura
6. All People's Congress (APC)	S. A. T. Koroma
7. National Unity Party (NUP)	A. O. D. George
8. Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)	Rev. Paul Dumbar
9. National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	Foday B. Mansaray
10. National People's Party (NPP)	Alimamy Yamba Komeh
11. National Republican Party (NRP)	Sahr Steven Mambu
12. Democratic Centre Party (DCP)	Abu A. Koroma
13. Coalition for Progress Party (CPP)	Ms. Jeredine Williams Sarho
14. National Alliance Democratic Party (NADP)	Mohamed Y. Sillah
15. Social Democratic Party (SDP)	Andrew Lungay

Annex II

Interim National Electoral Commission

Electoral assistance budget (November 1995-March 1996)

Funding status as at 24 October 1995

Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
Coordination	Chief technical adviser	108 000	108 000 a/		
	Legal adviser	60 000	60 000 b/		
	United Nations Volunteers	55 000			55 000
	Electoral coordinator	30 000			30 000
	Admin. support personnel	36 000	36 000 a/		
	Mission costs/duty travel	25 000	25 000 a/		
	Reports sundries	18 000	18 000 a/		
	Subtotal	332 000	247 000		85 000
Voter education	International personnel				
	Media coordinator	60 000	60 000 b/		
	Civic education consultant	120 000	120 000 c/		
	National personnel				
	Civic education consultants	12 000	10 000 a/		2 000
	Publicity supervisors	14 667			14 667
Materials rental	Publicity officers	175 000			175 000
	Publicity assistants	400 000			400 000
	Audiovisual productions	55 556	20 000 d/		35 556
	Theatre productions	100 000	63 000 e/		37 000
	Design/graphic materials	83 333			83 333
	Vehicle rental	100 000			100 000

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Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
	Launch/other rental	5 556			5 556
	Mobile radio communications	300 000	50 000 a/		250 000
	Training	50 556			50 556
	Equipment materials	100 687			100 687
	Audiovisual communication vehicles	250 000	250 000 f/		
	Fuel and maintenance	106 500			106 500
	Subtotal	1 933 855	573 000		1 360 855
	<u>International personnel</u>				
Voter registration	Logistics coordinator	60 000	60 000 g/		
	Team leaders	40 000			40 000
	Database expert	17 555	17 555 a/		
	Registration coordinators	7 200	7 200 a/		
	Registrars	500 000			500 000
	Data editors	25 667			25 667
	Revision personnel	250 000			250 000
	Data entry personnel	20 000			20 000
	Logistics assistants	6 000			6 000
Training	Registration officials	100 000		63 000 h/	37 000
Rentals/others	Vehicles for registration	166 667			166 667
	Vehicles for revision	83 333			83 333
Materials	Registration	400 000		100 000 h/ 100 000 i/	300 000
	Computerization	220 250	8 500 e/ 211 750 h/		
	Subtotal	1 896 672	305 005	263 000	1 328 667

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Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
Polling	<u>International and national personnel</u>				
	Nomination day	20 767			20 767
	Election day	900 638			900 638
	INEC supervisory personnel	100 000			100 000
	Trainees, monitors	533 333			533 333
	Training coordinator	7 200			7 200
	Training assistants	10 800			10 800
	Election officers training	250 000			250 000
	Materials/rentals	85 000			85 000
	Vehicle rentals	233 333			233 333
	Election day materials	851 067		c/	851 067
	Food/materials for brigades	109 667			109 667
	United Nations Secretariat equipment	69 220			69 220
	Helicopter lease	1 000 000			1 000 000
Subtotal	4 171 025			4 171 025	
Transportation	<u>Purchases</u>				
	Field vehicles (6)	240 000			240 000
	Light vehicles (14)	560 000			560 000
	Trucks (5)	266 667			266 667
	Minibuses (5)	400 000			400 000
	Motor bicycles/bicycles	150 000			150 000

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Category	Description	Amount	Funded	Promised	Not funded
	Operation/maintenance	500 000			500 000
	Air transport fuel/operations	300 000			300 000
	Subtotal	2 416 667			2 416 667
	Grand total	10 750 219	1 125 005	263 000	9 362 214
Summary					
Coordination		332 000	247 000		85 000
Voter education		1 933 855	573 000		1 360 855
Voter registration		1 896 672	305 005	263 000	1 328 667
Polling		4 171 025			4 171 025
Transportation		2 416 667			2 416 667
	Grand total	10 750 219	1 125 005	263 000	9 362 214

- a/ United Nations Development Programme.
- b/ Commonwealth.
- c/ European Union.
- d/ Greece.
- e/ United States of America.
- f/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
- g/ Canada.
- h/ Sierra Leone.
- i/ Sweden.

Annex III
Resource mobilization for the Sierra Leone emergency

Agency	Requirements	Pledges	Shortfall	Percentage of needs covered
United Nations Children's Fund	2 799 000	1 100 000	1 699 000	39.3
World Health Organization	1 325 000	759 856	565 144	57.3
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	4 648 800	336 538	4 312 262	7.2
Department of Humanitarian Affairs	237 500	8 772	228 728	3.7
World Food Programme (non-food)	450 000	0	450 000	0
(food and ITSH) a/ Vegetable oil	3 503 640	1 455 000	2 048 640	41.5
Corn-soya blend	686 280	592 800	93 480	86.4
ITSH a/	493 038	278 460	214 578	56.5
Subtotal	4 682 958	2 326 260	2 356 698	49.7
Total for consolidated appeal	14 143 258	4 531 426	9 611 832	32.0
United Nations Development Programme b/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations b/ United Nations Population Fund b/ Grand total	4 104 000 356 000 100 000 14 143 258	4 104 000 356 000 100 000 9 091 426	4 104 000 356 000 100 000 9 611 832	

a/ Internal transport, stores and handling.

b/ Not included in the March-December consolidated appeal.

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Number	Item	Content
174	United Nations Document	Second Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 5 December 1997 (S/1997/958)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1997/958
5 December 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON
THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 and to the Presidential statement of 14 November 1997.¹ It covers developments in Sierra Leone since my first report, dated 21 October 1997.²

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

Action taken by the military junta, the Economic Community of West African States and the Special Envoy

2. On 23 October 1997, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) regime in Sierra Leone, held talks at Conakry and signed a six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone³ which was to take effect from that date. The United Nations was represented at the signing of the Conakry Agreement by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. A representative of the Organization of African Unity also attended.

3. The Agreement calls, *inter alia*, for the cessation of hostilities as from 23 October 1997, to be monitored by an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) verification mechanism to be assisted, subject to the approval of the Security Council, by United Nations military observers; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, which is to take place from 1 to 31 December; the resumption on 14 November of humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, to be monitored by ECOMOG and United Nations military observers; commencing 1 December, the return of refugees and displaced persons, with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the provision of immunities and guarantees for the coup leaders; the restoration of the constitutional government of President Kabbah by 22 April 1998; and the broadening of the government's power base. Under the Agreement, Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was expected to

return to Sierra Leone to make his contribution to the peace process. The ECOWAS Committee and the junta's representatives also agreed to continue negotiations towards the effective and prompt implementation of the Agreement.

4. On 5 November, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah issued a statement⁴ indicating his acceptance of the Conakry Agreement, and stated his Government's willingness to cooperate with ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the United Nations and UNHCR in the implementation of their respective roles in accordance with the Agreement.

5. Although the junta publicly committed itself to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and has held discussions with ECOMOG on the modalities for the disarmament process and for the provision of humanitarian assistance, it has issued several statements criticizing key provisions of the Agreement, and raised several important issues (see para. 6 below), which may seriously affect, if not undermine, its implementation.

6. On 11 November, the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Victor Malu, met with representatives of the junta at Kossoh Town, Sierra Leone, to discuss the modalities for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. The meeting reportedly resulted in a number of provisional agreements, including those on the deployment of ECOMOG troops throughout Sierra Leone and the cessation of all hostile propaganda. However, three major points of disagreement - the role of Nigeria within ECOMOG, the modalities and timing of the return of Corporal Sankoh and whether or not disarmament should extend to the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFSL) - remained.

7. Members of the Council were briefed on the Conakry Agreement on 11 November by representatives of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Ghana, Chief Tom Ikimi and Mr. Victor Gbeho, and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mr. Lansana Kouyaté.

8. On 14 November, the Security Council adopted a Presidential statement expressing its full support and appreciation for the continued efforts of the ECOWAS Committee of Five to seek a peaceful settlement of the crisis, and welcoming the Conakry Agreement.¹ The statement noted with satisfaction President Kabbah's acceptance of the peace plan. On 17 November, members of the Council received the first report of ECOWAS, submitted pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997).⁵

9. In order to assess conditions on the ground and formulate recommendations as to the form that United Nations assistance in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement might take in terms of humanitarian aid, the deployment of military observers and support for ECOWAS and its Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, I requested my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone, Mr. Francis Okelo, to lead a small exploratory team which visited the subregion during the second half of November.

10. The team met with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Liberia, Mr. Monie Captan, and with senior ECOMOG officers at Monrovia, as well as with President Kabbah and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guinea, Mr. Aliou Camara, at Conakry. The team also met with refugees at Forecariah refugee camp near the border between Guinea and Sierra Leone, and visited the border crossing point at Pamelap.

11. Foreign Minister Captan stated his Government's support for the restoration of constitutional rule in Sierra Leone but expressed concern at the danger of the conflict in Sierra Leone spilling over into Liberia. These concerns were stated previously in a letter dated 31 October 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council.⁶

12. It was intended that the team would accompany the ECOWAS Committee of Five ministerial assessment visit to Freetown, which, under the Conakry Agreement, was scheduled for 20 November. However, following the cancellation of that visit, the ECOMOG Force Commander, General Malu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mr. Kouyaté, and my Special Envoy, met with junta representatives at Freetown on 27 November to discuss the modalities for the implementation of the Agreement.

13. It should be noted that the route from Kossoh to Freetown, where my Special Envoy and Mr. Kouyaté met with Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the Chairman of the AFRC, was lined with thousands of Sierra Leoneans who were waving banners demanding peace. At the meeting with Major Koroma, my Special Envoy and Mr. Kouyaté stressed the commitment of the international community to the restoration of the constitutional order in Sierra Leone and the need for the junta to cooperate fully in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. Major Koroma did not express any objections.

14. However, at a meeting held at Jui on the same day between General Malu and the military representatives of the junta, including the AFRC Secretary-General, Colonel Sessay, and its Chief of Staff, Colonel Williams, very little progress was made in discussing the practical modalities for the implementation of military provisions of the Agreement. Colonel Williams insisted that no progress could be made in implementing the decisions reached at the military talks on 11 November until the following issues had been resolved: the release of Corporal Sankoh; the removal of the Nigerian troops from ECOMOG; and the exclusion of the AFSL troops from the disarmament exercise. It was, however, decided that the three committees established at the meeting held on 11 November to deal with disarmament, ceasefire violations and humanitarian assistance, should start operating from 1 December 1997 but, so far, no progress has been made in that regard. A further meeting with the junta to review the situation is expected to be held in the near future, following consultations.

15. It should be noted that while the junta appears to be in control of Freetown, the extent to which it is willing, or able, to negotiate the implementation of the Conakry Agreement is not clear. There have been reports of recent difficulties in the relationship between the AFRC and the RUF. Moreover, on 16 November, Mr. Steven Bio, a close relative of Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, the former National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) Chairman, who had been working closely with the AFRC/RUF junta, was arrested along with the RUF spokesman, Mr. Massaquoi, for allegedly trying to persuade some AFRC and RUF members to oppose the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. In addition, eight members of the AFRC Supreme Council have reportedly been detained for engaging in illegal diamond-mining activities.

16. Although the ceasefire between ECOMOG and the junta's troops in the Freetown area appears to be largely holding, heavy fighting has been reported

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between the Kamajors, a traditional hunter militia, and the AFRC/RUF in the south-east and in the diamond-producing areas around Tongo in the east. Clashes between rival factions within the AFRC/RUF have also reportedly taken place, and there are numerous reports that all armed elements in Sierra Leone are recruiting, training and acquiring weapons. Insecurity and armed robberies continue in Freetown, where the warehouses of the non-governmental organization World Vision and that of the United Nations Children's Fund were looted by armed men. The junta has acknowledged the lack of security and has threatened looters with summary execution.

17. ECOMOG is continuing its preparations to implement the military provisions of the Conakry Agreement, including the identification of possible sites for the disarmament and demobilization of all Sierra Leonean armed elements. However, the success of the peace process depends on the creation of conditions that would enable the deployment of ECOMOG throughout the country and to begin the demobilization exercise as soon as possible. In turn, the elaboration of a United Nations concept of operations in Sierra Leone depends on the formulation by ECOMOG of a detailed implementation plan of the Conakry Agreement.

Other action taken pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)

18. By paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997), the Security Council requested States to report to the Secretary-General within 30 days of the date of adoption of the resolution on the steps they had taken to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution. At the time of writing, the following 13 countries have provided information on the measures they have taken in order to give effect to those provisions, namely, Chile, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Japan, Lebanon, Malta, New Zealand, Oman, Monaco, Singapore and Sweden. The Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) visited the region from 4 to 7 December to review the status of implementation of the sanctions.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

19. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone has deteriorated since the coup of 25 May 1997. The health and nutritional status of the population has been especially affected, owing to a combination of insecurity, a drastic breakdown in public services and limited supplies of essential drugs, vaccines and food. Approximately 157,000 people have been displaced by the conflict associated with the coup. Over 21,000 families are registered as eligible for food aid under various humanitarian projects. There has been a significant increase in the incidence of communicable diseases, especially measles. Furthermore, there are still areas of the country that, for reasons of insecurity, remain inaccessible to the humanitarian community and where the gravity of the emergency situation is unknown.

20. In the rural areas, where armed conflict has not significantly disrupted agriculture, a good rice harvest is expected during December. The distribution of seeds and tools, undertaken by humanitarian organizations between January and June 1997 in two thirds of the country's chiefdoms, contributed significantly to

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this encouraging picture. However, in the areas north of Bo, there are reports of some harvests being looted by armed elements.

21. In Freetown, commercial food stocks have dwindled considerably and prices have started to rise as the sanctions take effect. These price increases have affected most the vulnerable groups with limited purchasing power but they are also affecting the majority of the capital's population. It is projected that the remaining commercial food stocks will be severely depleted in approximately two weeks. Furthermore, the supply of food to all towns from rural and coastal areas is now seriously constrained by an increasingly acute shortage of petrol, resulting from the embargo on petroleum and petroleum products.

22. The start of cross-border relief operations, particularly operations involving food aid, has been delayed owing to difficulties in implementing certain aspects of the Conakry Agreement, including the full deployment of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and, in particular, by the absence of ECOMOG and its inspection teams at the border between Guinea and Sierra Leone, which are required for cross-border deliveries to proceed. At the end of November, there were fewer than 2,000 metric tons of food aid in stock in the country.

23. While the implementation of disarmament and demobilization, as scheduled by the Conakry Agreement, is still under negotiation, the RUF has started releasing to non-governmental child protection organizations some of the children under its control. Once released, these children are given special care until reunification with their families is possible.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

24. The coup of 25 May 1997 was a serious blow to Sierra Leone and also to the subregion. Sierra Leone and its people have suffered greatly from the overthrow of the democratically elected Government of President Tejan Kabbah and continue to suffer harm from its effects on their security and living conditions. It is evident that the international community is determined that the coup must be reversed and the constitutional order restored as soon as possible.

25. The signing of the Conakry Agreement was a significant step towards resolving the crisis in Sierra Leone, and I commend the countries of ECOWAS for their initiative. However, despite some encouraging indications, little concrete progress has been made so far in the implementation of the Agreement which should be pursued with a sense of urgency, with pressure being exerted on the Freetown junta. Meanwhile, the military, political and humanitarian aspects of the Agreement require further clarification and negotiation, as well as the early formulation of the practical modalities for its implementation. These aspects should include the development of a concept of operations for the deployment of ECOMOG throughout the country, the conduct of disarmament, and the timing and modalities of implementation of an effective national reconciliation process. While these efforts must be pursued vigorously, the junta should not be allowed to manipulate the talks and to procrastinate in carrying out its commitments under the Agreement. Disarmament should, of course, be followed by the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, which would require adequate assistance from the international community.

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26. The United Nations should be prepared, where appropriate, to take an active part in such negotiations and to help to ensure the proper implementation of the Conakry Agreement. The Abidjan accord⁷ which was signed on 30 November 1996 but remained unimplemented in part because of the coup of 25 May 1997, also provides a broader framework which can be utilized, as appropriate, to promote the overall settlement of the crisis.

27. Accordingly, if the steps outlined above are taken, and should security conditions on the ground permit, it would be my intention, with the support of the Security Council, to dispatch promptly a technical survey team to Sierra Leone. Its findings would enable me to present to the Security Council considered recommendations concerning the role that could be played by the United Nations in assisting in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.

28. In the meantime, I have requested my Special Envoy for Sierra Leone to make arrangements to reopen a small liaison office in Sierra Leone, subject, of course, to acceptable security conditions and the availability of funds. The functions of this office would include liaison with ECOMOG and with the various political forces in Sierra Leone. In accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1132 (1997), my Special Envoy would continue to assist the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and, to that end, to participate in discussions with all parties concerned. The United Nations will also continue its efforts to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid to populations in need.

29. In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation to ECOWAS for the close cooperation it has extended to my Special Envoy. The efforts of ECOWAS and its Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, in resolving the crisis in Sierra Leone through the peaceful restoration of the constitutional order deserve the active support of the international community.

Notes

¹ S/PRST/1997/52.

² S/1997/811.

³ S/1997/824, annex II.

⁴ See S/1997/886.

⁵ See S/1997/895.

⁶ S/1997/835.

⁷ See S/1996/1034.

Number	Item	Content
175	United Nations Document	Third Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 5 February 1998 (S/1998/103)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/103
5 February 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THIRD REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 and to the presidential statement of 14 November 1997 (S/PRST/1997/52). It covers developments in Sierra Leone since my second report, dated 5 December 1997 (S/1997/958).

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

Dispatch of a technical survey team

2. By a letter dated 16 December 1997 (S/1997/980), the President of the Security Council conveyed to me the support expressed by members of the Council for the implementation of the two proposals I had made in my previous report, namely, the dispatch of a technical survey team to Sierra Leone and the reopening of a small liaison office in Sierra Leone.

3. Between 10 and 17 January 1998, a technical survey team led by my Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, visited Conakry, Monrovia and Freetown. The objectives of the visits were to assess the political, military and security situation in Sierra Leone, to discuss with the junta the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Conakry on 23 October 1997, to consult with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the planning undertaken so far by its Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, to carry out the military tasks listed in the Conakry Agreement and to examine installations and infrastructure in the subregion, including airports and seaports, medical facilities, engineering works and the availability and reliability of equipment, supplies and services that might be used by a future United Nations military presence, should the Security Council decide to deploy one.

4. During its visit, the team met three times in Conakry with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and members of his Cabinet, who welcomed the proposals

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contained in my previous report, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guinea and other Guinean government officials. With the full cooperation of the Guinean Government and the assistance of Guinean officials, the team also inspected the airport, seaport and medical facilities in Conakry.

5. In a statement issued in Conakry on 17 January 1998, President Kabbah welcomed the efforts of my Special Envoy to secure the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the visit of the technical survey team to Freetown. He placed particular emphasis on the need for an early deployment of ECOMOG troops and United Nations military observers in Sierra Leone. On 24 January, Mr. Okelo met in Lungi, Sierra Leone, with Vice-President Albert Demby and held extensive discussions with him on the various aspects of the peace plan. As part of his consultations with all parties involved in the Sierra Leonean peace process, my Special Envoy also held meetings with representatives of Sierra Leonean civil society and organizations based in Conakry in order to apprise them of the efforts the United Nations was making to help implement the Conakry Agreement.

6. In Monrovia, members of the team met with ECOMOG High Command officers to discuss the concept of operations drawn up for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, including the development of plans for the deployment of ECOMOG troops inside Sierra Leone beyond their present bases, and for disarming and demobilizing the Sierra Leonean combatants.

7. In their discussions with the ECOMOG Force Commander and other senior officers, members of the team found that some effort had been made to identify the logistical and equipment requirements of the ECOMOG force, and some preliminary planning had been initiated. On 24 January 1998, my Special Envoy received an outline plan for ECOMOG deployment and the ECOMOG concept of operations, but much remains to be done before the United Nations could be in a position to draw up its own comprehensive plans, which, in accordance with the Conakry Agreement, must be based on an ECOMOG concept of operations.

8. In Freetown, the team met with the political and military leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) for a series of general and technical discussions. The team also visited United Nations House in the centre of the city. While the vehicles and some other equipment that had been previously positioned in the United Nations warehouse for use in a possible peacekeeping operation had been looted, the United Nations offices, including the office of my Special Envoy, had been maintained in working condition by the local staff.

9. The team performed the necessary technical on-site inspections, including inspection of the seaport, heliport and airfield infrastructure, warehouses and storage facilities and locations for office accommodation and living quarters in Freetown. While many of these had suffered looting and sustained damage and neglect, the team considered that with a certain amount of rehabilitation work they could be rendered usable in the event of a United Nations deployment.

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Security situation

10. The technical survey team found that while the junta appeared to be in control of Freetown, the security situation in the countryside remained highly volatile and did not allow the United Nations group to travel outside the capital. In its discussions with its various interlocutors, the team received reports that military activity was persisting in the east and south of the country, particularly around Bo and Kenema. Intensified guerrilla-style actions against the junta forces were being conducted by an organization called the Civil Defence Unit (CDU). CDU, which apparently comprises the Kamajors and similar groupings of traditional village-based hunters in the north and centre of the country, claims to control all major roads in Sierra Leone.

11. In a statement released on 9 January 1998, CDU indicated that it would cooperate with the implementation of the Conakry Agreement only in the event of a firm commitment by the junta to abide by its provisions, the rapid deployment of ECOMOG throughout Sierra Leone and the disarmament of all combatants, including RUF and the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLMF). The representative of CDU whom the technical survey team met in Conakry, citing security considerations, declined to give the team any detailed indication of the size, armament or distribution of the CDU forces, which are led by Chief Hinga Norman, the Deputy Defence Minister in President Kabbah's Government.

12. According to information received from a variety of sources familiar with conditions in the countryside, the situation in and around the southern town of Bo is extremely tense. The food situation gives rise to particular concern, since the food stocks on which the civilian population of the town depends are running low. Attacks on civilians using the road to Bo have reportedly led to fatalities. In the meantime, fighting has also escalated in other parts of the country.

Meetings between the technical survey team and the junta

13. In his meetings with the Chairman of AFRC, Mr. Johnny Paul Koroma, and other military and political leaders, my Special Envoy reaffirmed the commitment of the United Nations to the full and timely implementation of the Conakry Agreement and of Security Council resolution 1132 (1997), as well as the need to adhere strictly to the timetable for the restoration of constitutional government on 22 April 1998. Mr. Koroma and other members of the junta claimed that, in their view, three issues stood in the way of the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, namely:

(a) The need for the immediate release of Corporal Foday Sankoh, the Deputy Chairman of the junta and head of RUF, who is currently in Nigeria;

(b) The need to exempt RSLMF from the disarmament exercise;

(c) The need to address the "dominant role played by the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG".

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14. In renewing the formal commitment of the junta to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, Mr. Koroma stressed the need for concrete and timely action to achieve its objectives within the six-month time frame set out therein. He put forward proposals that he claimed were aimed at addressing the three issues mentioned above, as well as other outstanding matters not dealt with in detail in the Agreement. According to the junta, the proposals would require the establishment of the following four committees:

- (a) A coordinating and general-purpose committee;
- (b) A disarmament, demobilization and reintegration committee;
- (c) A humanitarian assistance coordinating committee;
- (d) A committee on the formation of a broad-based government of national unity.

Mr. Koroma proposed that, in addition to the junta, the membership of the committees would include, as appropriate, representatives of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, ECOMOG, international and national non-governmental organizations and the United Nations.

15. The junta also asserted that the confidence-building measures contained in the Conakry Agreement had not been carried out, including the assessment visit that was to have been conducted on 20 November 1997 by the ECOWAS Committee of Five Ministerial Assessment Team and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The junta expressed its readiness for dialogue with ECOWAS, as provided for in the Agreement, to resolve the issues it said were blocking the implementation of the Agreement and, in that context, welcomed the arrival of the technical survey team and the proposal to reopen a liaison office. It indicated that the deployment of United Nations military observers would also be welcome.

16. The junta also made strong representations to the team concerning what it considered to be the use of excessive force by ECOMOG in subjecting Freetown and other locations in Sierra Leone to naval and aerial bombardment. It also complained of the harmful effects on the civilian population of what it considered to be overly vigorous enforcement of both ECOWAS and United Nations sanctions by ECOMOG forces.

17. The technical survey team presented to the junta a detailed list of questions concerning plans that should have been made by the junta for the disarmament and demobilization of its combatants and confidence-building measures that the junta itself could take in order to demonstrate its commitment to the implementation of the Agreement. In reply to those questions, the junta, in reaffirming its commitment to the Conakry Agreement, cited numerous provisions of the Abidjan Peace Agreement (S/1996/1034, annex) signed by the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF on 30 November 1996, as well as of the Conakry Agreement. The junta's reply also recalled the proposals made by Mr. Koroma, which are outlined in paragraphs 13 to 15 above. The junta's reply to the technical questions posed by the team, which was received on 20 January 1998, will be taken into account in future discussions of the role to

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be played by the United Nations based on the comprehensive concept of operations to be finalized by ECOMOG (see para. 36 below).

18. The team requested from the junta further information concerning reports that it had enlarged an airstrip at Magburaka and had received deliveries of weapons there in violation of the embargo imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1132 (1997). Those deliveries reportedly included surface-to-air missiles and other matériel allegedly paid for by the sale of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone. The junta has denied those reports, and the team was unable to verify them. During and after its stay in Freetown, the team encountered persistent reports that illegal arms sales were being paid for by the sale of diamonds. Members of the junta have also travelled outside the country in violation of the travel ban imposed by the Council in resolution 1132 (1997).

Other action taken pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)

19. On 8 January 1998 the Chairman of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, wrote to inform me of the outcome of the seventh meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held in Abuja on 19 December 1997.

20. The ministers noted that there had been some violations of the ECOWAS and United Nations sanctions imposed on the junta in Sierra Leone. Those violations related specifically to the arms embargo and travel restrictions imposed on members of the illegal regime and their families. The ministers therefore called upon all countries and, in particular, ECOWAS member States, to adhere strictly to those sanctions. They also requested countries harbouring members of the military junta, their families and all others on the restricted list to repatriate such persons to Sierra Leone.

21. The Ministers were informed of the upgrading of an airstrip at Magburaka into a full-fledged airport by the illegal regime for the illegal importation of arms and other supplies in violation of the sanctions. The ministers mandated ECOMOG to ensure that the airstrip was not used. General Abacha stated in his letter that the delays in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement were attributable solely to lack of cooperation on the part of the junta and its continued intransigence, and he accused them of stalling for time. In addition, he said, the junta had continued to carry out unprovoked attacks on ECOMOG peacekeepers.

22. Stating the need for ECOWAS and the United Nations to implement the Agreement without further delay, General Abacha requested that I help accelerate efforts towards the deployment of a United Nations military observer mission to Sierra Leone and to solicit the assistance of the international community for the operations of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

23. Since my previous report, a number of States have reported to me, in compliance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997), concerning the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution relating to the sanctions imposed by the Council on Sierra Leone. Those countries are Australia, Austria, Brazil, Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Greece, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg (on behalf of

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the European Union), Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

24. On 15 January 1998, the United Kingdom Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Mr. John Flynn, visited United Nations Headquarters to participate in an ad hoc meeting of donors and other interested parties convened by the British Government. The purpose of the meeting was to consider what additional steps could be taken by the international community to support the work of ECOWAS in facilitating the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.

25. The parties reached a number of conclusions concerning the finalization by ECOMOG of a comprehensive concept of operations and the identification of its logistical and equipment requirements; the establishment of a trust fund to assist ECOMOG; the deployment of United Nations military personnel, subject to authorization by the Security Council; and the serious humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone.

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

26. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone has continued to deteriorate. In the absence of new supplies of food aid, commercial food is increasingly scarce and expensive in urban areas. This is primarily attributable to the overall decline in the country as a result of the 25 May 1997 coup as well as the scarcity of fuel, which has a direct impact on food prices because of increased transportation costs. In Freetown, the price of the main staple, rice, has tripled since the coup, severely affecting the population. Attempts by the authorities to fix the price of rice at an artificially low level have proved unsuccessful, since wholesalers have merely withheld stocks, preferring to sell in more attractive consumer markets in mining areas or to trade on the black market. The reduced purchasing power of the civilian population since the coup has exacerbated the already precarious situation.

27. In rural areas in the southern and eastern provinces the situation is particularly acute, as food distribution has also been affected by the deteriorating security situation resulting from intensified conflict between the Kamajors and the AFRC/RUF, now known as the People's Army, during December 1997. The benefits of the abundant rice harvest have been negated by looting and the increased incidence of rural "food taxes" imposed on civilians by armed elements, which cause farmers to hoard their harvest rather than risk transporting it to market. In the towns of Bo and Kenema the situation is particularly severe, as the amount of food being imported into those areas is negligible. As a result, the civilian population is entirely dependent on existing supplies.

28. Existing stocks of relief food within Sierra Leone are almost exhausted, as no food aid has entered Sierra Leone since the coup. The resulting virtual halt in food aid distribution has already had an impact on the beneficiaries of vulnerable group feeding programmes, institutions such as hospitals and the internally displaced, currently estimated at 150,000 people. The 5,500 Liberian

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refugees in Freetown are particularly vulnerable, since they lack the family support structures available to Sierra Leoneans.

29. Although humanitarian agencies have continued to transport modest quantities of medical and other non-food supplies across the Guinean border, those operations have been insufficient to meet the growing needs of a collapsing primary health care system. Significant quantities of supplies, together with logistics and personnel support, are required to conduct a much-needed child immunization campaign.

30. The requirement that ECOMOG inspect humanitarian shipments at the border of Sierra Leone and Guinea has now been entrusted by ECOWAS to the Guinean army. However, the Government of Guinea has also requested that ECOWAS provide inspectors to supervise the task of the Guinean troops. ECOWAS has requested United Nations assistance in financing this deployment of inspectors, and United Nations agencies have indicated that they will do this on a cost-sharing basis.

31. In view of the concerns expressed in the Security Council and by others, a United Nations inter-agency assessment mission will be sent to Sierra Leone at the beginning of February to undertake a technical analysis of the humanitarian situation, including the humanitarian impact of sanctions, and to consider the difficulties encountered by humanitarian agencies in providing assistance to vulnerable groups.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

32. Although the junta claims that it remains committed to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, the situation in Sierra Leone remains deeply preoccupying and requires the urgent attention of the international community. In particular, it is important to develop and finalize the necessary deployment, disarmament and demobilization plans if the Conakry Agreement is to be implemented and the constitutional order restored in accordance with the timetable envisaged in the Agreement. It would therefore be premature at this stage to present to the Security Council a full concept of operations or an estimate of force size and structure in respect of a possible United Nations military presence in Sierra Leone.

33. My Special Envoy stands ready to assist in efforts to overcome the obstacles blocking the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. In this context, I welcome the proposed convening in New York of the Ministerial Meeting of the Committee of Five, which could give a much-needed impetus to the process of dialogue as well as to the full and timely implementation of the Conakry Agreement.

34. I also intend to re-establish the United Nations liaison office in Sierra Leone, initially staffed with a political officer, a military adviser and a humanitarian officer under the direction of my Special Envoy and supported by the necessary staff, including a security officer. In due course, the liaison office could be expanded to comprise human rights and information officers. The staff of the office would maintain contacts with the members of the junta and civil society in Sierra Leone. The Special Envoy and his staff would also

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facilitate talks with the junta and with ECOWAS and ECOMOG on various aspects of the implementation of the Agreement. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Development Programme in Freetown and to all United Nations staff members there for their steadfastness in remaining at their posts in often trying conditions.

35. At the same time, I invite the Security Council to consider the deployment of a small military liaison cell of up to 10, with the necessary support staff, to assess and report on the military situation within Sierra Leone and coordinate with ECOMOG and with other United Nations agencies in the areas of ECOMOG deployment, in the capital and, conditions permitting, in other areas of the country. I will seek the necessary security guarantees from all parties. In my view, the presence of the military liaison cell, which would operate under the authority of my Special Envoy, would also signal the commitment of the Council and the international community to the implementation of the Conakry Agreement and would serve as an important confidence-building measure. I recommend that the costs related to the military liaison cell be met through peacekeeping assessments, and I intend to present this recommendation to the General Assembly in due course.

36. My Special Envoy and his staff will also maintain the contacts they have established both with the ECOMOG High Command and the junta with a view to assisting in the finalization of a comprehensive concept of operations for deployment throughout Sierra Leone and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Sierra Leonean combatants into civilian life. United Nations planning would be completed on the basis of such a concept as well as the operational data acquired during the visit of the technical survey team.

37. The United Nations will work with the international community to try to generate the logistical, technical and financial support that will be required for ECOWAS to pursue its efforts to carry out the Conakry Agreement. I call upon Member States to stand ready to offer generous assistance in this regard.

38. I note that the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone on 19 December 1997 called upon all countries and, in particular, on ECOWAS member States to adhere strictly to the sanctions. Reports of persistent violations of the Security Council arms embargo are of great concern, as such violations could seriously impede the peace process.

39. The continuing efforts being made by the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone and its Chairman, Chief Tom Ikimi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, deserve commendation and support. Particular appreciation is also due to the Government of Guinea for the preparations it has been making for the long-awaited launch of cross-border humanitarian operations in Sierra Leone and for the support and assistance it extended to my Special Envoy and to the technical survey team during its visit.

40. At the same time, I am concerned at the plight of civilians affected by the strict enforcement of sanctions on Sierra Leone and by the conduct of hostilities within the country, including in the area around Bo. The report of the inter-agency humanitarian assessment mission that will visit Sierra Leone early in February to analyse the humanitarian situation and the effect of

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sanctions on the civilian population should facilitate the early start of cross-border humanitarian relief efforts in order to alleviate the suffering of innocent civilians. I salute the people of Sierra Leone for the forbearance with which they are enduring their ordeal, and wish to assure them that the United Nations, in close cooperation with ECOWAS, will continue to do everything in its power to facilitate the restoration of the constitutional order in their country.

41. I will keep the Security Council informed of further United Nations activity and other developments in Sierra Leone in the weeks to come.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/1176
16 December 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THIRD PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 19 of resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and its progress in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and describes developments since my second progress report on UNOMSIL (S/1998/960) of 16 October 1998. The present report is also submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. Since my second progress report, the Government of Sierra Leone has continued its efforts to consolidate its position, to restore the stability of the country and to improve relations with its neighbours. The Government has launched initiatives to strengthen the civil service and to fight corruption. Sierra Leone is also increasingly active in the regional and international arena.

3. On 30 October 1998, the Government launched a nationwide consultative exercise, organized with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), aimed at enhancing the capacity of Government ministries, other national institutions and civil society to take charge of the development process. The consultations exercise is expected to conclude on 14 December with the adoption of a national consensus on major policy issues, including national reconciliation.

4. The Government has also pursued legal proceedings against both military and civilian supporters of the illegal coup of May 1997 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). On 19 October 1998, after a court martial had sentenced 34 officers found guilty of treason to death, 24 of them were executed by firing squad. The executions took place despite appeals from the United



Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and others, including myself, for a stay of execution and the grant of the right of appeal. On 23 October 1998, a jury at the High Court in Freetown found Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), guilty of treason and related offences and sentenced him to death by hanging. Corporal Sankoh, who had not been legally represented during his trial, has now selected legal advisers to undertake his appeal following efforts by the Government, with UNOMSIL assistance, to secure legal representation for him.

5. At their summit meeting in Abuja on 30 and 31 October 1998, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed to combine the strengthening of its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) with efforts at dialogue to achieve lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. The Heads of State and Government also expressed gratitude to Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria for contributing troops to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, encouraged Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Mali and Niger to deploy the troops they had promised to contribute as soon as possible and appealed to the international community to provide the necessary logistical support. The arrival of these additional troops is still being awaited.

6. On 7 December 1998, the Chairman of the Security Council Sanctions Committee and Permanent Representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hans Dahlgren, arrived in Freetown for a four-day assessment mission. Ambassador Dahlgren met with President Kabbah; the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Timothy Shelpidi; the ECOMOG Task Force Commander, Brigadier-General Abu Ahmadu and others from the United Nations and the international community. During his visit to the front-line areas, the local authorities conveyed to Ambassador Dahlgren their requests for United Nations assistance in controlling the border with Liberia through the establishment of a buffer zone, the deployment of United Nations military observers and assistance to ECOMOG in patrolling the frontier. Ambassador Dahlgren also visited Monrovia.

7. Following his visit to the Gambia on 9 December, President Kabbah reportedly accepted an offer from the President of the Gambia to mediate a peace agreement with the rebels.

Follow-up to the Special Conference on Sierra Leone

8. As called for by the Special Conference on Sierra Leone held at United Nations Headquarters on 30 July 1998, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland convened a meeting of the International Contact Group of donors to Sierra Leone in London on 5 November. The objectives of the meeting were to build up international support for Sierra Leone's efforts to restore peace, democracy and human rights; to encourage further assistance to ECOMOG and contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone; to try to match specific ECOMOG requirements to donor offers; and to encourage the Government of Sierra Leone to develop political dialogue and national reconciliation beyond the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and to encourage participation in it.

9. The London meeting, which was opened by Mr. Tony Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was attended on behalf of the Government

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of Sierra Leone by Mr. James Jonah, the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mr. Lansana Kouyate, and my Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Mr. Francis G. Okelo. The meeting expressed strong support for the dual-track approach (military and diplomatic) agreed upon at the ECOWAS summit on 31 October, by which efforts to strengthen ECOMOG would be accompanied by the opening of dialogue to achieve lasting peace and national reconciliation.

10. The meeting agreed on a series of next steps to be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS and ECOMOG and the international community. In particular, the Government would pursue the above-mentioned dual track approach for restoring peace and stability in Sierra Leone. Troop contributors would continue their efforts to augment ECOMOG, with the aim of completing the additional deployments by the end of 1998. For its part, the international community would press on with financing and other support to help ECOMOG remain in Sierra Leone and expand its operations, including through contributions to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone, as well as bilateral contributions.

11. It has provisionally been decided that the next meeting of the International Contact Group will be held in New York in January 1999. In Sierra Leone, a Government working group chaired by the Minister of Finance is continuing to follow up on the commitments and pledges made by donors. The membership of the working group also includes UNOMSIL and donor representatives.

Relations between Sierra Leone and its neighbours

12. On 12 November 1998, at the invitation of President Lansana Conte of Guinea, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone and President Charles Taylor of Liberia participated in an extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union in Conakry. The summit was also attended by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, the Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights in Africa, as well as my Special Representative for Sierra Leone and my Representative for Liberia, Mr. Felix Downes-Thomas.

13. In a communiqué issued after the meeting, the three Heads of State announced their decision to rejuvenate the Mano River Union. They further pledged to ensure the strict observance of the 1986 Non-Aggression and Security Cooperation Agreement between Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea that had been signed and ratified by the three member States. The three Heads of State agreed to work collectively to restore peace in Sierra Leone and maintain stability in the subregion.

14. After the summit, in a meeting with President Kabbah in Freetown, Reverend Jackson stressed the advantage of negotiations over confrontation and called for a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Sierra Leone. A Liberian delegation, led by the Minister of National Security, concluded a two-day visit to Sierra Leone on 9 December. The Liberian Government subsequently announced that President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for cooperation on joint border patrols.

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Activities of the Mission relating to the security situation

15. While reaffirming its commitment to end the ongoing rebel war as soon as possible, the Government has expressed its readiness to address any grievances the rebels might have on condition that they first stop fighting, lay down their arms and surrender to ECOMOG or UNOMSIL. There has also been discussion in Government circles of a possible offer to provide safe passage to five persons identified as leaders of the two factions comprising the rebel forces - Johnny Paul Koroma and S. A. J. Musa of the AFRC and Sam Bockarie, Dennis Mingo and Eldred Collins of the RUF - to leave the country for a non-neighbouring country of their choice.

16. In this context, UNOMSIL has cooperated closely with the Government and with ECOMOG in following up indications that S. A. J. Musa, along with several of his supporters, might be prepared to surrender to UNOMSIL. Despite suspicions that this reported offer might be a feint, UNOMSIL has made provisional preparations to accept the surrender of individuals or groups of rebels if this can be arranged under proper security conditions. UNOMSIL has also been in contact with S. A. J. Musa to try to secure the release of a Catholic priest, Father Mario Guerra, who was kidnapped near Makeni on 17 November 1998 by elements of the AFRC.

17. Since the establishment of UNOMSIL, my Special Representative has consulted the resident agencies, funds and programmes on a regular basis and has instituted weekly United Nations coordination meetings to address issues covered under the respective mandates of the organizations. Moreover, a joint security committee meets weekly to share and assess information about the situation on the ground. UNOMSIL has also actively pursued close contact with representatives of civil society, including good working relations with local non-governmental organizations and participation in civic events, such as symposia and workshops.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

Rebel activities

18. On the basis of the information received by UNOMSIL on the strength, organization and activities of the rebels, there appear to be six rebel battalion-type formations comprising approximately 300 fighters each. Two of these are primarily AFRC and are based in the north. The other four, believed to be RUF with some AFRC elements, are deployed around Kailahun. It is believed that the AFRC units receive supplies of arms and ammunition from the Kailahun district.

19. In the north of the country, and especially in the north-west, rebel attacks against civilians have persisted and have recently intensified. In the first few days of December 1998, a large rebel force moving southwards and westwards launched coordinated and well-planned attacks on several locations near the road from Freetown to the Guinean border, including Mange, Lunsar and Masiaka, inflicting heavy casualties on civilians and property damage and causing thousands to flee and take refuge in the capital and surrounding

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districts. This rebel force is believed to be under the command of S. A. J. Musa.

20. There is much speculation concerning the motive behind these attacks, which have taken place at a time when Musa has publicly offered to surrender to UNOMSIL. These atrocities are taking place against the background of a rift which appears to have arisen between the AFRC remnants in the north and the RUF in the east. ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) have done much to disrupt the supply of arms and ammunition from Kailahun to the rebels in the north.

21. In the north-east, the rebel capacity to concentrate and coordinate their forces appears to have eroded since the time of their attack on Kabala in July. The rebel concentration in Koinadugu area was broken up by combined efforts of reconstituted battalions of former soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and ECOMOG, thus reducing the threat to Makeni and to the Koidu-Lunsar road. Repeated rebel attempts to gain control of the diamond-rich Koidu area have been unsuccessful. However, the situation remains unpredictable and the area is still in danger from rebel attacks.

22. In the south-east, rebel attacks during October and November 1998 seemed designed to surround and cut off Kenema both from Freetown and from the Liberian border by controlling the road that links Daru with Joru and Zimmi. UNOMSIL, in close collaboration with ECOMOG and CDF units based at Kenema, is standing by in case the rebels' failure to achieve their objective should lead some of them to open talks with the Government.

23. The south and south-west of the country, including Freetown, have remained calm, though tension in the capital rose during December following a rebel attack on the road linking Masiaka and Rogberi.

Civil Defence Forces/ECOMOG/RSLMF

24. In the north, ECOMOG has shown increased willingness to engage the rebels in the bush, while the CDF, which essentially originated in southern Sierra Leone, has begun to operate in the north. These developments, as well as the reinduction of former RSLMF soldiers into combat alongside ECOMOG, appear to have taken a toll on rebel strength in the north-east. As noted above, an important objective of the pro-Government forces has been to disrupt ammunition supply lines between the main rebel stronghold in the Kailahun district and rebel units in the north of the country. In the south-east, the CDF, with ECOMOG support, has now established fairly effective control of the area south of Kenema after stemming the rebel offensive along the Daru-Joru-Zimmi road.

25. The CDF in both the north and the east has, however, been hampered by serious shortages of ammunition, communications, food, transportation and medicines. In addition to logistical shortages, there have been occasional lapses in coordination between ECOMOG and the CDF. Air strikes launched by ECOMOG to disperse rebel preparations for an attack on Joru on 15 November reportedly caused casualties among a CDF concentration nearby, underlining the need for improved coordination between the two forces.

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26. Despite efforts to organize and fund the deployment of reinforcements, ECOMOG also remains overstretched in terms of manpower and requires urgent logistical support. Nevertheless, there are indications that ECOMOG has been concentrating its resources to support operations into Kailahun district, apparently in preparation for more intensive activity now that the rainy season has ended. The Government continues to be fully committed to concluding the war as soon as possible.

Deployment of the Mission

27. Since my second progress report, UNOMSIL's military deployment has remained unchanged, with 40 observers, in addition to the Chief Military Observer, General Subhash C. Joshi (India), and the medical team of 15 personnel (see annex). The observers based at Lungi, Hastings, Makeni, Bo and Kenema have continued to maintain close liaison with local government authorities, ECOMOG and the CDF, to gather information through contacts and regular patrols, and to keep my Special Representative fully informed of developments. The UNOMSIL observers also give advice on humanitarian law in the field, provide security advice to other United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian agencies and assist them in their liaison with ECOMOG and the CDF as necessary.

28. In view of S. A. J. Musa's reported offer to surrender and the prospect of ECOMOG's increased activity in the east, UNOMSIL, notwithstanding the continued volatility of the situation in the north, has prepared contingency plans to deploy teams in Kabala, Kambia, Koidu and Kailahun in order to be able to respond rapidly to any willingness on the part of the rebels to surrender. The presence of UNOMSIL observers in these tense areas, to encourage and facilitate humanitarian activities and to monitor the human rights situation, would also be important. Thus, additional observers may have to be deployed expeditiously when conditions permit, within the limits authorized by the Security Council in resolution 1181 (1998).

29. In addition to making regular visits to the military observers' team sites, some members of the medical team, over and above their normal duties, have also undertaken honorary teaching assignments in the local medical college and have offered advice to local hospitals and clinics, especially those treating amputees. These contacts and services are clearly appreciated by the general public.

Creation of a new Sierra Leonean army

30. The Government of Sierra Leone is continuing to develop its plans to rebuild the armed forces under civilian management and the overall democratic control of the Government. Since October 1998, two visits to Sierra Leone have been undertaken by a British joint security sector mission to assess the Government's plans for the creation and training of new armed forces and to produce an assessment of the prospects for assistance from the United Kingdom. The Government has also requested UNOMSIL's assistance in this process, while the Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, is currently engaged in a sensitization tour of the country to prepare for new recruitment.

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IV. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

31. The first phase of the Government's programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as described in my last report, was to cover the demobilization of former RSLMF and RUF personnel who were captured and disarmed by ECOMOG and later encamped at Lungi. The total number of ex-combatants so far registered at Lungi is 2,973. Pre-discharge orientation activities have been held since October, but the actual reintegration process, including such programmes as vocational training, will commence as and when the funding contributed for these purposes has been made available.

32. Following the registration of 52 children at Makeni, another group of 33 child ex-combatants, mainly from the RUF, were registered at Lakka near Freetown on 21 November 1998. A further group of 94 children, mainly from the RUF, were registered at Bo on 3 December. There are also some 70 RUF and CDF child ex-combatants to be registered at Port Loko as soon as the security situation improves. Once the registration is completed, social services will take over the reintegration of the children into society. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is closely involved with this exercise to ensure the proper treatment of the children during demobilization and reintegration.

33. Following commitments made to my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara Otunnu, during his visit to Sierra Leone in May 1998, the Executive Committee of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has agreed to ensure that the CDF do not initiate persons under the age of 18 and that they cooperate with the registration of children already within their ranks. They also agreed to request that ECOMOG release children in detention to UNICEF, UNOMSIL or the Ministry of Social Welfare.

34. A national sensitization programme on this subject has also been under way since early October with full radio and television coverage and a nationwide arts competition on the theme "Join Hands for Peace". The Lungi ex-combatants have embarked on community welfare work in the area, which has been well received by the local community. This, together with the programme of pre-discharge orientation, has gone a long way towards facilitating the acceptance of the ex-combatants in the Lungi area.

35. The National Committee, chaired by President Kabbah, is continuing its activities and its secretariat is functioning well. The Committee has now also identified two additional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites at Magburaka and Gerihun and preparations for their opening are under way. However, the pace of the programme continues to lag behind the original goals since the intensity of the war effort has not yet subsided. A further 830 ex-RSLMF soldiers are being prepared for re-induction into combat as a fifth battalion fighting alongside ECOMOG. As with the other four battalions re-inducted from among the ex-RSLMF personnel at Lungi, it is understood that most of these soldiers will undergo the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process once the war has been concluded. There has been no progress in the demobilization of CDF fighters in safe areas. Apart from the registration of CDF personnel in a few localities, there are no indications yet

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that the CDF are ready to begin the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, since they are still fighting.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

Conflict-related human rights abuses and violations

36. Widespread rebel attacks on civilian populations have characterized the period since my last report. Attacks and forms of abuse of civilians exhibited a characteristic modus operandi: amputation of limbs, mutilation, actual or attempted decapitation, rape, burning alive of men, women and children, destruction of homes, abduction and looting. In one typical incident, at the end of October, five farmers were burned alive by rebels in a house some ten miles from the town of Alikalia, in the north-east. In early November, the entire northern township of Bafodia was destroyed. At the end of November, the northern town of Yifin was again devastated in a rebel attack, during which up to 50 youths were abducted.

37. During September and October 1998, the incidence of hospital admissions for amputations and mutilations reached levels similar to those during May and June, with 71 admissions in just two hospitals in the west of the country and an unverifiable number in other regions. It is likely that the hospital admission figures are much lower than the actual levels of civilian fatality and injury. During November, although the overall number of atrocities reportedly fell, there was an escalating rate of reports of actual and attempted decapitation. Particularly since late October, rebel elements have indicated that attacks were motivated by a desire for revenge against the sentencing to death of Corporal Foday Sankoh.

38. Since my last report, there have been further complaints regarding the behaviour of certain CDF contingents. One incident, investigated and confirmed by UNOMSIL, involved the killing by the CDF of four captured alleged rebels at Romeni, near Port Loko. UNOMSIL has indicated to the Government of Sierra Leone its willingness to assist in the training of key CDF personnel regarding provisions of human rights and humanitarian law applicable to their activities. There have also been reports of inappropriate behaviour by certain elements of ECOMOG, including unlawful detention. My Special Representative has taken this matter up with the Force Commander of the Monitoring Group.

39. Since my last report, there have been frequent reports of children being sent into combat environments, notwithstanding indications of some ECOMOG commanders refusing to allow under-age CDF combatants to serve under them. However, on 25 November, the Government reiterated its commitment to non-recruitment and demobilization of combatants aged under 18.

Treason trials

40. In the absence of an appeals process under court martial proceedings, most of the 34 military personnel sentenced to death in the first court martial sought recourse through petitioning the United Nations Human Rights Committee pursuant to the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the International

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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Despite the Committee's formal request for a stay of execution pending its consideration of the petitions, 24 officers were executed by firing squad on 19 October 1998. On 4 November, the Human Rights Committee adopted a strongly worded decision and requested the submission of a report by Sierra Leone pursuant to the provisions of article 40 of the International Covenant. At the request of the Committee, I brought its decision to the attention of President Kabbah in a letter to him dated 16 November 1998. In the same letter, I appealed to President Kabbah to give every consideration, once the appeals process had been exhausted, to extending mercy to those who had been condemned to death.

41. Two separate group treason trials ended, on 21 October and 5 November 1998, respectively, with the sentencing to death of a further 26 civilians, with right of appeal. Among those given prison sentences was a former Head of State of Sierra Leone, Joseph Momoh. All of those convicted have appealed their sentences.

Technical cooperation

42. UNOMSIL continues, within the limits of its resources, to advise and assist the Government and civil society in matters relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This includes advising the Government on how to meet its reporting obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. For instance, UNOMSIL has facilitated the donation to the Government of law books for use by the legal profession and has hosted a seminar on judicial reporting for the Sierra Leone media. The human rights component has also provided other forms of advice to the United Nations community in Sierra Leone.

43. Human rights technical assistance and training support continues to be extended to the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Sierra Leone police force and civil society, including the community of non-governmental organizations, as well as UNOMSIL military observers. During November 1998, UNOMSIL facilitated the most ambitious human rights monitoring and reporting skills training programme ever implemented in Sierra Leone, with 70 participants from all parts of the country. The trainees will now replicate the training nationwide. Other training activities since my last report include facilitation of the project of human rights training for religious leaders, primarily implemented by the World Conference for Religion and Peace and partially funded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

44. In order to offer a broad range of human rights related services, UNOMSIL has sought funding under the 1999 consolidated humanitarian appeal for Sierra Leone for four human rights projects: to enhance monitoring capacity regarding rebel activities, to provide enhanced human rights training for the police and for the humanitarian community and to further strengthen the capacity of civil society to monitor human rights. Other project proposals, in course of completion in close consultation with the Government and other stakeholders, address the human rights training and resources needs of the judiciary, legal profession and prison personnel.

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45. On 24 November 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone reaffirmed its regulations on the manner in which the media may report on conflict-related issues. The regulations are based on the provisions of the state of emergency instituted in March 1998, elements of which may not be in compliance with applicable provisions of international human rights law. On 9 December, the Government arrested three journalists on charges related to these regulations. UNOMSIL is monitoring the situation.

VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

46. UNOMSIL has now deployed its full complement of five civilian police advisers and they are working closely with advisers deployed by the Commonwealth and with the Government of Sierra Leone and the police force in the reform and restructuring process.

47. Policing suffered a major setback during and immediately after the junta period. Many police officers had collaborated with the junta and others were killed or forced to flee, leaving much of the country without a police service. Following the reinstatement of the Government, the poor relationship between the police and public obliged the Government to undertake a comprehensive restructuring of the police force. Although policing activities have now returned to normal, many police stations are still not functional and will have to be rebuilt. Policing has not been reintroduced in certain areas of the country owing to rebel activity and/or the shortage of funds to reconstruct buildings. The CDF has established its own police force in some of the areas under its control, which operates independently of the Sierra Leonean police force.

48. The reintroduction of policing throughout the country also requires the retraining of police officers, a process hampered by a shortage of funds. The provision of minimal financial assistance would allow the introduction of limited training programmes. Towards this end, UNOMSIL civilian police have assisted in the development of a decentralized training programme, the production of training manuals and the conduct of refresher training.

49. After the introduction of the Government Policy Statement, the Police Mission Statement and the Strategic Development Plan (1998-2001), the civilian police advisers, in collaboration with the Commonwealth, have held detailed discussions with the Sierra Leonean police force on the restructuring process, the importance of respect for human rights, the role of the police in a democratic society and the disciplinary code of conduct. After consultations with all concerned, and with the financial support of the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, pilot projects have been introduced in certain police areas to improve communications and equipment and to introduce effective and efficient policing based on local needs and community involvement.

50. As part of the effort to improve the effectiveness of the Sierra Leonean police force, restructuring has begun in the departments of human resources management, personnel development, financial and logistical accountability, operations and crime management, with the aim of streamlining and restructuring

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the departments and ensuring that police officers are carefully selected, properly trained, directed by highly motivated officers and financially and logistically supported so as to be able to render acceptable service.

VII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

51. Since my second progress report, humanitarian agencies have managed to maintain the delivery of relief assistance to populations fleeing insecurity in the north and east of the country. Most of the displaced are concentrated in a string of settlements between Makeni and Koidu in the centre of the country, in Kenema in the east and in Freetown. Fighting in the east has limited access to populations around Kenema, while hostilities in the north-west near the end of the reporting period have curtailed access there, as well as road access to Makeni. Growing insecurity along the arterial road network bodes ill for continued access and the delivery of assistance.

52. Displacement of civilian populations continued during the period under review. By mid-November, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit estimated that 308,695 persons had been displaced since February 1998, an increase of 58,000 internally displaced persons since my last report. The hostilities, which have continued since mid-November, have driven approximately 6,000 additional persons from their homes. As fighting continues into the dry season, the optimum period for military operations, the humanitarian community is concerned that access will continue to be constrained while displacement increases.

53. In an effort to further ensure the impartiality of relief operations and advocate for access, the Sierra Leonean humanitarian community came together at a workshop held from 19 to 23 November that resulted in a revised code of conduct for humanitarian agencies. The UNOMSIL human rights component also participated in the elaboration of the revised code, which is designed to reinforce a self-regulatory and coordinated approach for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to ensure that the parties to the conflict recognize and observe the impartiality and inviolability of humanitarian principles.

54. Despite the prevailing hostile environment and logistical constraints, the humanitarian community has been able to avert potential humanitarian disasters through the provision of a wide range of relief programmes to the most affected war victims in Masingbi, Kambia, Kenema and Freetown.

55. A good harvest is expected in most secure areas as a result of the distribution of agricultural support packages to vulnerable farmers. Discussions are taking place in all agencies with respect to their 1999 food aid programmes, which are expected to equal the 1998 levels.

56. The delay in the issuance of transport clearances to food aid agencies by ECOMOG continues to constrain the movement of humanitarian food aid to vulnerable groups. There has also been an increase in harassment, abuse and intimidation of aid workers at some security checkpoints. Instances of ECOMOG personnel commandeering aid vehicles, including a World Food Programme (WFP) truck at Masingbi, have been raised with ECOMOG by UNOMSIL. Interventions

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relating to a similar situation at the port in Freetown have led to significant improvements. Ms. Catherine Bertini, the Executive Director of WFP, will visit Sierra Leone from 10 to 12 December 1998 to assess food security issues in the country and the requirements for WFP assistance.

57. UNICEF undertook mass immunization campaigns in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Kambia, Port Loko and Kabala, covering an estimated 1.1 million people, about 25 per cent of Sierra Leone's population. UNICEF and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) are supporting the Ministry of Health and Sanitation in trying to reduce the maternal mortality rate, which currently averages 1,800 per 100,000 live births. A UNFPA consultant is in the country to examine various aspects of UNFPA's planned activities and issues of coordination between the relevant United Nations agencies and the Ministry of Health.

58. A World Health Organization (WHO) consultant has been working with the Ministry of Health to address future outbreaks of cholera. WHO has also provided drugs and supplies intended to further strengthen the Ministry's preparedness to cope with public health challenges. As a result, the cholera outbreak referred to in paragraph 41 of my last report is now under control. No deaths have been recorded since mid-October.

59. On 14 November 1998, President Kabbah launched activities for the forthcoming National Immunization Days, which will target polio. WHO and UNICEF, along with other agencies, are providing financial and technical support to the polio eradication drive. The first round of immunizations will take place on 19 December and the second round on 2 February. WHO has also taken steps to deal with outbreaks of meningitis.

60. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has continued to facilitate the repatriation of students and professional civil servants to Sierra Leone. During October and November, UNHCR repatriated about 1,660 Sierra Leoneans from Guinea. In close consultation with the Government and others, UNHCR is continuing to develop a reintegration strategy for returnees and internally displaced persons.

61. United Nations agencies, in consultation with the Government, national and international non-governmental organizations and donors, have completed the 1999 consolidated inter-agency appeal for Sierra Leone in the amount of \$28 million. The 29 projects in the appeal range from immediate life-saving needs to longer-term projects aimed at creating a favourable environment for the promotion of peace and sustainable socio-economic development. The appeal was released in Geneva on 3 December by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and will be launched on 17 December 1998.

VIII. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

62. On 23 November 1998, the European Union signed an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to provide 111.5 million European currency units (\$124.88 million) to help rebuild its economy. The funds, to be disbursed over five years, are to support rehabilitation of infrastructure, the development of social and public sectors and good governance. The aid will include eight

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million European currency units (\$8.92 million) in risk capital, provided by the European Investment Bank, for projects in power supply, mining and private sector investment.

63. On 27 November, the Government presented the budget and statement of policies for the financial year 1999 to Parliament. The budget, which is being debated by Parliament, focuses on continuing the process of rehabilitating basic infrastructure and rebuilding dislocated institutions, as well as pursuing stabilization and economic reform policies.

64. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund has approved the Government's request for assistance under the post-conflict emergency assistance policy for Sierra Leone in the amount of approximately \$15 million.

65. According to Government data, there are encouraging signs of a steady recovery in economic output. This is reflected in the 0.7 per cent growth rate in the gross domestic product in real terms, compared to negative 22 per cent for the same period last year. Increased activity in the manufacturing, services and construction sectors reflect the return of consumer and investor confidence. On the other hand, output in mining and agriculture continues to be depressed owing to persistent insecurity, especially in the east and north.

66. The generally weak economy has contributed to the continued pressure on the exchange rate. Gross external reserves have dwindled to 1.8 months of imports in 1998 compared to 5.7 months in the corresponding period for 1997. Consequently, the exchange rate, which had strengthened from 2,340 leones to the dollar in January 1998 to about 1,630 in March, depreciated to 1,850 leones in January 1998 to about 1,630 in March, depreciated to 1,850 leones in November. It is anticipated that increased donor support, particularly balance-of-payments assistance from the international financial institutions, the European Union and the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, will reduce the pressure on the exchange rate. The Government's economic management policies have helped contain inflation and restore confidence in the private sector, bringing about the present decline in the inflation rate to 12.5 per cent as at December 1998.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

67. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/29 of 20 November 1998, appropriated an amount of \$22 million gross for the establishment and operation of the Observer Mission for the period of 13 July 1998 to 30 June 1999. This amount includes \$9.1 million gross for the period from 14 January to 30 June 1999, equivalent to some \$1.6 million gross per month, subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Observer Mission beyond 13 January 1999.

68. Should the Council decide to extend the mandate of the Observer Mission as recommended in paragraph 76 below, it is anticipated that the estimated additional requirements of some \$0.6 million gross arising during the 1998-1999 financial period in connection with the modest expansion of civilian staff of UNOMSIL recommended in paragraphs 78 and 79 below, would be met from resources already provided by the General Assembly.

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69. As at 30 November 1998, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1,642.2 million.

70. Pursuant to the Council's Presidential statement of 26 February 1998 (S/PRST/1998/5), on 26 March 1998 I established the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone. As at 11 December 1998, voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund totalled \$1.79 million from the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (\$0.83 million) and Japan (\$0.96 million). In addition, the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has pledged to the Fund an amount of \$1 million.

X. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

71. Despite the progress made by the Government in consolidating its authority, I am disturbed at the continuing attacks inflicted by the rebels on civilians in the north and the atrocities and abductions that accompany such attacks. I condemn these serious violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law and call again on the RUF and the AFRC to desist from attacks against their unarmed compatriots and to lay down their arms and surrender.

72. The elaboration of a dual-track approach to the resolution of the conflict following the ECOWAS summit of 31 October 1998 and the London meeting of the International Contact Group of 5 November is a welcome development, and UNOMSIL will work with the Government to pursue this approach. ECOMOG, the CDF and the re-inducted Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces personnel have done much to defend the Government and people of Sierra Leone against rebel attacks and should continue to do so. At the same time, I call on the Government to explore ways to encourage the rebels to lay down their arms and surrender in order to avoid more bloodshed.

73. Clear evidence has emerged during the national consultative process described in paragraph 4 above to demonstrate that the people of Sierra Leone are willing to reconcile themselves with the rebels, on condition that they accept the authority of the Government, lay down their arms and surrender. UNOMSIL will continue to offer its services to the Government in facilitating such surrenders, provided this can be done under acceptable security conditions. UNOMSIL is also prepared to work with the Government concerning assurances that those who surrender will be humanely treated, in accordance with internationally accepted standards, and that any rebels who face criminal prosecution for their acts receive a fair trial.

74. I am particularly encouraged by the outcome of the extraordinary summit meeting of the Mano River Union on 12 November 1998, at which President Kabbah, President Taylor and President Conte agreed to continue to strengthen the Union and improve their mutual relations. The importance of this subregional approach to the strengthening of stability and security in all three countries cannot be overemphasized. I look forward to further steps by all three Governments to prevent the use of their territory by armed groups who would seek to undermine stability and would use their territory for the illegal transit of weapons and ammunition, especially where this is in violation of United Nations resolutions. I am prepared to assist, through my Special Representative in Sierra Leone and

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my Representative in Liberia, in developing and implementing a viable strategy for a subregional approach.

75. The onset of the dry season in Sierra Leone has opened the way for more effective action by ECOMOG, the CDF and the re-inducted personnel of the RSLMF. In order to maintain the pressure they have exerted to split the rebel forces, the military forces assisting the Government need to continue to receive adequate logistical support. In this context, I would like to express my appreciation to those Governments that have already made contributions to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone and to encourage others to make similar contributions or to consider providing the necessary assistance bilaterally to ECOMOG or to individual ECOWAS countries.

76. UNOMSIL has proved its value to the Government and people of Sierra Leone as they pursue their recovery from the illegal seizure of power by the military junta, in May 1997, and all its nefarious consequences. In particular, the deployment in the countryside of United Nations military observers has demonstrated to the Government and people of Sierra Leone the commitment of the broader international community to the restoration of order and peace in the country under the legitimate Government. UNOMSIL has also provided crucial support for humanitarian operations in the countryside. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone be extended for a further period of six months, until 13 July 1999.

77. The uncertain security situation in parts of the country and the delays to which the government's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme have consequently been subjected make it premature at this stage to proceed with further deployments of United Nations military observers, as authorized by resolution 1181 (1998). However, in view of the prospect that rebel fighters might begin surrendering as a result of the military operations directed against them in the east and the north, and the Government's willingness to accept their surrender under the conditions outlined above, UNOMSIL will continue to stand ready to deploy the additional observers rapidly as and when they may be required. I will keep the Security Council fully apprised of any developments in this regard and of any action I decide to take in response.

78. However, in order to address the growing demands on the ground and to be able to assist the Government and people of Sierra Leone in their efforts to normalize the situation, I am planning a modest expansion of the civilian staff of UNOMSIL. In particular, the enormity of the human rights abuses the rebels have perpetrated on the people of Sierra Leone and the large scope of human rights tasks to be performed have underlined the need for a strong human rights component. The deployment of five additional human rights officers in the provinces, in addition to the five now operating in the country, would do much to assist the Government to maintain and improve its commitment to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Sierra Leone. I also urge Member States to consider contributing bilaterally to UNOMSIL's human rights activities in Sierra Leone.

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79. UNOMSIL could also help the government develop more fully a dialogue with the rebels in keeping with the dual-track approach. To this end, I intend to deploy three additional public information officers to develop radio programmes and other information activities aimed at reaching out to rebels in the countryside to persuade them to surrender and generally to pursue the goal of national reconciliation. The additional public information staff could also help to explain the role of UNOMSIL and the international community. At the same time, the addition of another political officer in the Office of my Special Representative would assist him to coordinate these activities.

80. The restoration of stability in Sierra Leone will be a long and arduous process and will continue to require military support as well as various other forms of assistance. In particular, the Government needs assistance in its efforts to establish a new professional armed force under civilian control, as well as an effective and well-motivated police force. The commitment of all Sierra Leoneans to achieving peace through dialogue and national reconciliation will also be essential. The United Nations, through UNOMSIL, is ready to play its part in that process.

81. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi, and all the military and civilian personnel of UNOMSIL. My thanks also go to the Government of Sierra Leone and to ECOMOG, as well as to Sierra Leonean civil society, for their continuing cooperation with the United Nations.


Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone:
contributions as at 10 December 1998

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	3		3
Egypt	2		2
India	6	15	21
Kenya	4		4
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	5		5
Russian Federation	7		7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7		7
Zambia	4		4
Total	41^b	15	56

^a Medical team.

^b Including Chief Military Observer.




13° 30' 13° 00' 12° 30' 12° 00' 11° 30' 11° 00' 10° 30' 10° 00' 9° 30' 9° 00' 8° 30' 8° 00' 7° 30' 7° 00' 6° 30' 6° 00'

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

UNOMSIL
Deployment as of
December 1998

- National capital
- ⊙ Provincial capital
- Town, village
- · — International boundary
- · — Provincial boundary



Number	Item	Content
180	United Nations Document	Fifth Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 4 March 1999 (S/1999/237)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/237
4 March 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On the basis of my reports dated 16 December 1998 (S/1998/1176) and 7 January 1999 (S/1999/20), the Security Council, on 12 January 1999, adopted resolution 1220 (1999). By paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Security Council requested me to keep the Council closely informed on the situation in Sierra Leone and to submit a further report, by 5 March 1999, with recommendations on the future deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the implementation of its mandate. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

Rebel attack on Freetown and its aftermath

2. As described in my report of 7 January 1999 (see S/1999/20, para. 10), rebel fighters belonging to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999. The rebels attacked the city from the east and penetrated as far as the centre, which they held for four days before being forced to withdraw by a counterattack. The fighting resulted in the deaths of between 3,000 and 5,000 persons, including rebel fighters, soldiers of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), members of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) militia who were defending the capital and large numbers of civilian inhabitants. Many civilians were severely mutilated by the rebels. Up to 150,000 people were displaced in and around Freetown, and the rebels burnt down large numbers of public buildings and homes. A fuller description of the atrocities is contained in section IV below.

3. After fierce fighting, ECOMOG forces located in the western part of Freetown, reinforced from the main ECOMOG base at Lungi, managed to expel the rebels and regain control of the city. However, several thousand rebels are thought to remain in the Peninsula Mountains surrounding Freetown, despite ECOMOG and CDF efforts to dislodge them. It is also believed that unknown numbers of rebels might have infiltrated the city and remain there ready to



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English

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launch further attacks. Consequently, the security situation in Freetown, despite recent improvements, should still be considered volatile. On 24 February, ECOMOG succeeded in expelling the rebels from Waterloo, although they remain in a position to cut the main road from Freetown to Bo and Kenema.

4. The rebels are now thought to control much of the north of the country, though ECOMOG has, with varying success, contested rebel control around Lunsar, Port Loko and Kambia, and retains possession of Kabala and Bumbuna. In the south, ECOMOG has repulsed several rebel attacks on Kenema. Around Bo, the second largest city in Sierra Leone, the situation remains calm but tense. Rebel forces reportedly rely on some foreign mercenaries, including Europeans and Liberians, and are reported to be receiving weapons from outside the country.

5. During the crisis, which began in mid-December, ECOMOG received several thousand reinforcements from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali. However, some doubt has been cast over the longer-term future of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone in the light of statements made by candidates in the Nigerian elections. The contribution of Nigeria to ECOMOG has been so central that ECOMOG's military viability could be threatened if that contribution were reduced. Though efforts to create a Sierra Leonean army deserve further support, the army is unlikely to be able to bear the burden alone, at least for the foreseeable future.

6. UNOMSIL evacuated all its international personnel, many of its vehicles and much of its equipment immediately prior to the 6 January attack, as did other United Nations agencies, Governments and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) represented in Sierra Leone. The relocation was followed by a substantial reduction in the number of staff, in particular military and civilian police. The remaining staff will stay in Conakry until the security situation is considered acceptable. My Special Representative, Francis G. Okelo, and members of his civilian and military staff, including the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Subhash Joshi (India), have paid brief visits to Freetown to study the situation first-hand and to maintain contacts with the Government of Sierra Leone and with ECOMOG, as well as with civil society. On 3 March, following improvements in the security situation, it was decided to permit the return of a limited number of United Nations personnel as soon as possible. The security situation will continue to be kept under close review.

Disarmament and demobilization

7. Following the rebel offensive in December and January, ex-soldiers in the disarmament and demobilization camp at Lungi were relocated by the Government in Freetown. The majority of them appear to have either joined the rebels or disappeared, while some lost their lives during the rebel attack on Freetown. On 4 February 1999, the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration held an emergency meeting to examine the situation regarding ex-combatants. During the meeting, the Vice-President stated that there was no change in the Government's policy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. As of February 1999, approximately 1,000 of the 3,000 ex-combatants originally at the Lungi Demobilization Centre had reported to ECOMOG and now are temporarily located within Freetown. At the meeting it was

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decided that these ex-combatants should be accommodated and cared for separately. It welcomed the offer by the Department for International Development of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to provide food and medical treatment for ex-combatants in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and to assist in measures to improve the camp security. The Department for International Development has also been providing food, at Lungi Garrison, for 600 dependants of ex-combatants in the programme. The meeting also agreed that ex-combatants would be relocated to Lungi following an overall improvement in the security situation.

8. It may be noted that the two remaining UNOMSIL medical doctors have provided medical assistance to some of the ex-soldiers in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. This humanitarian gesture has been appreciated by the Government, ECOMOG, ex-soldiers in the programme and the public.

Civilian police

9. As described in my earlier reports, prior to the rebel attack on Freetown, UNOMSIL civilian police had undertaken a wide range of activities to promote the reconstitution of the police force in Sierra Leone. During the rebel attack on Freetown, more than 200 policemen and members of their families were killed, and police equipment and infrastructure were destroyed, including the Criminal Investigation Department headquarters and all its files, records and documentation. The Pademba Road prison was also broken into and all of the prisoners escaped, a situation which poses a serious security threat. This has significantly impaired the Government's efforts to maintain law and order in the city. As a result, the Government's plans to reorganize the police force will require substantial external assistance.

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Activities of the Government of Sierra Leone

10. The Government of Sierra Leone has continued to refine its policy with regard to negotiations with the rebels, and to take initiatives accordingly. On 7 January 1999, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah met with Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUF, in an effort to arrange a ceasefire. On 16 January, the President issued a statement reiterating his readiness to pursue political dialogue and repeating his offer of amnesty to the rebels.

11. On 7 February 1999, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah delivered a radio broadcast in which he again indicated his readiness to engage in a dialogue with the rebel leaders, and to allow Foday Sankoh to meet other RUF leaders, provided that RUF accepted the legitimacy of the Government. The President stated that the Abidjan Peace Agreement of November 1996 (S/1996/1034) could be used as a frame of reference for such a dialogue.

12. On 21 February, President Kabbah addressed the people of Sierra Leone in a nationwide radio broadcast in which he called on the Security Council,

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especially its permanent members, to exert pressure on those States and individuals who continue to supply the weapons and logistics which are being used to kill Sierra Leoneans. President Kabbah stated that it was no longer enough for the Council to condemn the activities of the rebels, but to consider the possibility of taking further action, not excluding the threat of force, against the rebels in order to give effect to the Council's previous demands that the rebels cease all violence and seek genuine dialogue for the restoration of lasting peace and stability in Sierra Leone. President Kabbah also reasserted his Government's determination to defend the territory of Sierra Leone. President Kabbah's address has been circulated as a document of the Security Council (S/1999/186).

13. On 25 February, the Minister of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture reaffirmed the Government's commitment to dialogue with the rebels, stressing the crucial importance of seeking the views and suggestions of the civil society and expressing the Government's readiness to review the Abidjan Peace Agreement in the light of the prevailing situation.

14. On 28 February, President Kabbah again addressed the nation in a radio broadcast in which he agreed that Foday Sankoh and RUF members could hold their internal consultations in Lomé or Bamako. He stressed that, following these consultations, the RUF leader should be returned to Freetown to resume his appeal against his conviction for treason and related offences (see S/1998/1176, para. 4). The President also called for the immediate release of all civilians being held in detention by the rebels, including children and women whom they had abducted during the recent attack on Freetown.

Activities of the United Nations

15. In the aftermath of the rebel attack, my Special Representative, in close consultation with the Governments of Sierra Leone and of a number of countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), initiated or participated in a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at strengthening ECOMOG while opening up dialogue with the rebels. Following the initial involvement of the Government of Togo, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, and the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, my Special Representative visited Abuja, Lomé and Accra towards the end of January in order to help coordinate the ECOWAS response to the crisis.

16. These diplomatic activities culminated in the meeting, in Conakry, on 29 January, of the Heads of State of the three troop-contributing countries of ECOMOG: Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria. At that meeting, President Rawlings, President Conte and President Abubakar agreed on the need to convene an ECOWAS summit meeting on Sierra Leone, to be followed by a visit by representatives of the ECOWAS Committee of Six on Sierra Leone to New York to brief the Security Council. The Committee of Six on Sierra Leone comprises those three countries, as well as Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. The three Heads of State also instructed their Ministers for Foreign Affairs to develop a strategy for pursuing the dual-track approach outlined in paragraph 15 above.

17. Following a visit to Freetown, from 13 to 16 February, for consultations with the Government, my Special Representative met with representatives of RUF

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in Abidjan on 21 February to ascertain the RUF commitment to the dialogue and the peace process and to discuss how best to expedite the internal RUF consultations pursuant to President Kabbah's offer of a dialogue. These discussions also dealt with a number of issues, including the venue, format and duration of the internal RUF consultations; a ceasefire; respect for human rights; and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The outcome of these preliminary discussions is now being reviewed by the Government of Sierra Leone and other members of ECOWAS. Should agreement be reached on a venue for talks outside Sierra Leone, it would be necessary to temporarily lift the ban on the travel of RUF leaders imposed by Security Council resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997.

Relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia

18. In response to repeated allegations that the Government of Liberia was supporting the Sierra Leonean rebels (see S/1999/20, paras. 14 and 15), the Liberian Government issued a statement, circulated as document S/1999/193, on the conflict in Sierra Leone. In the statement, the Government reaffirmed its recognition of the Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone, and stated further that it had not and would not support, nor be a party to, any attempt to destabilize the Republic of Sierra Leone or any other country.

19. The Government of Liberia also announced in its statement that it had launched an effort to repatriate and offer amnesty to Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone and, as a matter of urgency, requested the United Nations to assist the Governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia in identifying, documenting and processing Liberians fighting in Sierra Leone for an organized repatriation. The Government of Liberia also renewed its request to the Security Council to approve the deployment of United Nations monitors along with ECOMOG forces at the Liberia/Sierra Leone border in the light of repeated allegations of illegal shipments of arms to the rebels.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS

20. In late January and early February, UNOMSIL human rights officers visited Freetown to conduct an assessment of the situation there. The assessment team travelled extensively within the city and interviewed numerous people, including victims of mutilations and other human rights violations. Members of the team witnessed violations during their visit. UNOMSIL human rights officers have also continued to monitor the situation in the rest of the country and have undertaken a range of technical assistance activities.

21. The team found that the ultimate responsibility for the fighting, for most of the civilian casualties and for the related humanitarian emergency in Freetown rested with the rebel forces. Though it was impossible to state with precision the actual number of civilian casualties, most estimates put the total casualty figure at between 3,000 and 5,000, including rebel fighters and ECOMOG and CDF combatants. It is feared that at least 2,000 of those casualties were civilian inhabitants of Freetown. Many civilians were killed while being used by the rebels as human shields in combat, or because they reportedly refused to

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come out into the streets to demonstrate in favour of the rebels. Many were killed while trying to protect family members from death or rape, or while trying to protect their property from looting and destruction.

22. Much of the killing seems to have been arbitrary and to have been carried out by child fighters or rebel fighters under the influence of drugs or alcohol. However, there is also evidence that some of the murders were targeted, including, reportedly, the murder of 200 police personnel. The Solicitor General was killed during the fighting, as were the Resident Minister for the North, an adviser to President Kabbah and at least two journalists. Other victims who appear to have been deliberately targeted include senior officials of the Sierra Leonean National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Council of Churches and the National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reintegration, as well as Nigerian nationals.

23. According to medical sources interviewed by the human rights assessment team, many hundreds of civilians were treated for the amputation of limbs or other forms of mutilation, including some 70 at Connaught Hospital alone. It is feared that hundreds of other victims of mutilation did not survive to seek treatment. Victims of amputation and mutilation included men, women and children, some as young as six years old. The mutilations were usually inflicted with machetes or axes. During February, there was a sharp drop in reported incidents of mutilation by rebel elements in areas where they are located.

24. There have been reports of widespread rape and other forms of sexual abuse by rebel elements in Freetown and Makeni. In Freetown, eyewitnesses reported incidents of violent group rape of young women and girls rounded up by the rebels for that heinous purpose. Many rape victims were reported to have been subsequently abducted, mutilated or killed.

25. A significant number of the rebel combatants were children. Reports were received of death and injuries being inflicted by boys as young as eight to 11 years old.

26. The rebels abducted a large but unverifiable number of people in Freetown and other places they attacked. By mid-February, child care agencies reported that some 2,000 children had gone missing in Freetown alone since 6 January. Agency staff said they had witnessed the abduction by rebels of some 300 of these children. Escapees reported that abducted boys were selected for training as fighters, or used as porters. Women and girls were taken for sexual purposes or to cook food. A small number of prominent Sierra Leonean personalities and foreigners were also abducted, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Freetown. Foreign abductees included several Indian workers, Roman Catholic nuns of Indian and Kenyan nationality and one Spanish and one French journalist. Though some managed to escape, at least eight abductees were killed and two seriously injured. Rebels continue to hold Roman Catholic Mission personnel abducted at Makeni and Kambia.

27. Rebel forces were also responsible for the deliberate widespread destruction of civilian property and public utilities in Freetown and other locations, such as Makeni and Kambia. In the centre of Freetown, about

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20 per cent of the housing stock was destroyed, with as much as 90 per cent destroyed in the eastern outskirts of the city. Some public facilities appear to have been deliberately demolished, including police stations, the Pademba Road prison, the Nigerian High Commission and UNOMSIL headquarters. The residences of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and Government officials were also targeted, as well as churches, mosques and hospitals.

28. Eyewitnesses interviewed by the assessment team also reported summary executions of alleged rebels or rebel sympathizers by ECOMOG soldiers. Persistent reports were received of executions in various parts of Freetown, sometimes carried out after a cursory interrogation. One alleged victim of summary execution was an eight-year-old boy caught in possession of a pistol. Members of the assessment team witnessed an execution at Connaught Hospital on 3 February by men in ECOMOG uniforms. Members of CDF are also accused of mistreating civilians during the crisis in Freetown. ECOMOG jets attacking Freetown during the fighting are also reported to have caused civilian casualties. ECOMOG soldiers also detained and physically mistreated national staff members of a number of humanitarian NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross, apparently accusing them, without evidence, of being rebel collaborators. ECOMOG High Command has subsequently indicated to my Special Representative their intention to investigate these allegations and to take corrective action as necessary.

29. UNOMSIL continues to provide technical assistance to the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and the National Forum for Human Rights to assist them in carrying out their human rights monitoring, reporting and advocacy activities within Sierra Leone. It also works closely with the humanitarian community to ensure that they integrate issues of human rights into their current activities.

30. Facilitated by UNOMSIL, a Human Rights Committee for Sierra Leone has been temporarily established in Conakry, comprising the Sierra Leonean National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the National Forum for Human Rights, United Nations agencies, humanitarian organizations and UNOMSIL. The Committee is facilitating the active participation of the human rights community in the process of peace-building in Sierra Leone. In the coming weeks, if possible, significant activities of the Committee will be re-located to Freetown.

V. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

31. Since my previous report, the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone has drastically deteriorated, following the latest round of fighting, which culminated in the rebel attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999. The number of refugees in neighbouring countries has increased to an estimated 450,000, with an estimated 700,000 internally displaced persons. With ECOMOG expanding its hold on the capital, the number of known vulnerable displaced persons in Freetown is now estimated at 200,000, out of which some 60,000 have sought refuge in the national stadium. Many more are living in abandoned churches and schools.

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32. Following a recent eight-day tour of the region that included Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, has called for more support for repatriation programmes in the region. She also discussed plans with Guinean authorities to move 50,000 Sierra Leonean refugees away from the Guinean border to prevent the camps from becoming rear bases for the rebels. The European Union and the United States of America have promised 4 million dollars to aid this operation. The estimated number of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea today stands at 350,000.
33. UNOMSIL has facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid by making its helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft available, to the extent possible, to United Nations agencies and international NGOs.
34. Outside Freetown, OXFAM has identified 30,000 displaced persons living in the Lungi peninsula. Further up country, approximately 50,000 internally displaced persons, who were reported to have fled Kenema during heavy fighting between the rebel forces and ECOMOG in early February 1999, appear to be returning to the area. While there are no reliable reports from further inland because of the insecure situation, thousands more are believed to have fled into the bush.
35. The suffering of vulnerable civilian populations is exacerbated by increasing levels of malnutrition, especially among children under five years of age. Preliminary surveys show that in some areas, as many as 25 per cent of the children are suffering from acute malnutrition. Furthermore, appalling sanitation conditions are rampant and health care is inadequate. Diarrhoeal diseases are on the rise in almost all the accessible areas. In addition, the disruption of routine vaccination activities has increased the risk of epidemics. The town of Kailahun is believed to be the origin of the more than 400 measles cases now being identified among displaced persons in Kenema. While a vaccination campaign has begun in Kenema, with 10,000 doses of antigen provided by UNICEF, many children are out of reach of the humanitarian community. Meanwhile, doctors and nurses at Connaught Hospital and elsewhere are struggling to treat about 500 victims of amputation and mutilation requiring extreme surgery. Lastly, approximately 1,750 children have been reported missing by their families. Very few have been reunited, while many are believed to be trapped in inaccessible areas.
36. The humanitarian community's ability to provide relief to these populations continues to be impaired by the ongoing hostilities and resultant insecurity. Following the widespread looting and destruction of humanitarian offices, warehouses, vehicles and relief supplies, humanitarian activities remain drastically reduced. Approximately two thirds of the country, roughly all of the territory north of Port Loko, Bo and Kenema, remains inaccessible by road. This has confined humanitarian interventions to the peninsula and the southern and western provinces, leaving thousands of Sierra Leoneans without basic assistance. The provision of humanitarian assistance to the needy is today being carried out, at great cost, by air. Meanwhile, the World Food Programme (WFP) has warned that if the roads to Freetown are not opened soon, allowing the free flow of commercial imports and food from upcountry, food shortages in the city could become more acute within one to three weeks.

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37. Despite these constraints, the international humanitarian community has continued operations in accessible areas, particularly in the south where programmes continue in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Moyamba. From Conakry, international humanitarian staff continue to make day trips into the capital while national staff maintain a permanent presence in the city, where they work in collaboration with their governmental humanitarian counterparts. The humanitarian community's capacity to carry relief supplies and personnel to accessible areas of the country has been improved by the leasing of a helicopter for that purpose by the European Community Humanitarian Office and the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (ECHO/OFDA).

38. In order to streamline operations, a 60-day humanitarian plan of action is being finalized by the international humanitarian community in consultation with the Government. The plan is based on five basic operational requirements. These include: full access by all humanitarian organizations to communications equipment; cooperation between the Government and humanitarian agencies; unhindered access for humanitarian assistance; effective coordination with military and security forces; and the establishment of a forward logistics base at Lungi Airport. Because the plan uses existing assets, considerable progress has already been achieved. Approximately 140,000 metric tons of food has been distributed to vulnerable groups in Freetown with an additional 100,000 reaching accessible upcountry populations. A total of 21 clinics and four hospitals in Freetown are fully operational with support from United Nations agencies and partners, and more than 1,300 rolls of plastic sheeting and 40,000 blankets are now available in Freetown for distribution.

39. The humanitarian community is committed to continuing its work of providing assistance in spite of insecurity and the difficult working environment. Relief workers and the civilian population need your support in continuously calling on all parties to the conflict to re-commit themselves to respecting international humanitarian law by: recognizing the neutrality and impartiality of all humanitarian organizations; fully guaranteeing the absolute safety and security of humanitarian personnel, including relief items and equipment; and calling upon the Government of Sierra Leone to confirm its willingness to permit the unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance to all parts of the country.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

40. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/29 of 20 November 1998, appropriated an amount of \$22 million for the establishment and operation of the Observer Mission for the period ending 30 June 1999. The resources provided by the Assembly covered the Observer Mission's start-up costs as well as its maintenance at the full strength authorized by Security Council resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998.

41. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMSIL, as recommended in paragraph 51 below, the cost of maintaining the Observer Mission during the extension period will be well within the resources already provided by the General Assembly.

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42. As at 15 February 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMSIL special account amounted to \$12.5 million. As at the same date, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to \$1,666.6 million.

43. With regard to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts in Sierra Leone, contributions received as at 28 February 1999 amounted to some \$2.1 million, with authorized expenditure amounting to some \$0.1 million.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

44. Sierra Leone continues to face an extremely complex and difficult situation fraught with serious risks. Though ECOMOG has succeeded in driving the rebels from Freetown and restoring order in its immediate vicinity, the capital is still threatened by rebel forces in the peninsula.

45. I unreservedly strongly condemn the merciless murders, inhuman mutilations and other appalling human rights violations perpetrated by the rebels on the innocent civilian inhabitants of Freetown, and the widespread property damage they have inflicted. In the light of some allegations that members of pro-Government forces may also have been guilty of violations, I hope that the Government will fulfil its assurances that such allegations will be investigated and welcome its assurances that these forces will adhere to international human rights standards in the future.

46. Concern over violations of human rights and the prevention of further violations stand at the heart of the Sierra Leonean conflict. For that reason, and in view of the scale and enormity of the violations inflicted recently in Freetown, I intend to deploy an additional human rights officer to UNOMSIL. This will enable the human rights component to expand its reporting and deepen its coverage of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, as well as to maintain its technical cooperation activities with Sierra Leonean human rights organizations.

47. ECOMOG is to be congratulated on its success in repelling the rebels from Freetown and restoring a measure of order to the city. I also commend the Government of Mali for providing additional troops to ECOMOG and donor Governments, in particular the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, for the logistical support they have provided and continue to provide to ECOMOG.

48. In the meantime, I would urge the international community to continue to support ECOMOG logistically and to consider the provision of prompt bilateral assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone in the creation of a new Sierra Leonean army to defend the country. The Governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom have taken the first steps in this regard.

49. The possible partial withdrawal of Nigerian forces from ECOMOG following the elections in that country and the consequent effects on ECOMOG's military effectiveness in Sierra Leone could require a major reappraisal of the situation. In particular, the dual track approach pursued so far, which

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combines support for ECOMOG military action to maintain law and order with a willingness to negotiate with the rebels, may need to be reviewed. The Security Council may wish to consider the implications of this important new potential development.

50. I intend to pursue further with President Taylor some of the suggestions contained in the statement of the Government of Liberia (S/1999/193). Since practical obstacles to the proposal to deploy United Nations monitors at the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia remain, as deployment of the ECOMOG forces required to protect them is unlikely, the steps taken by the Government to encourage the repatriation, disarmament and demobilization of Liberian fighters in Sierra Leone are welcome.

51. President Kabbah's decision to allow the leader of RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh, to meet with rebel leaders in order to develop a coherent set of political demands, which would form the basis of subsequent negotiations with the Government, is a bold and valuable initiative. The United Nations will continue to facilitate the conduct of talks through the provision of its good offices as required.

52. The preliminary meeting my Special Representative held with representatives of RUF in Abidjan on 21 February may have helped lay the groundwork for further negotiations, which might be based on the Abidjan Peace Agreement signed in November 1996 by the Government and RUF. In order to proceed, RUF must recognize the legitimacy of the Government, agree to a ceasefire, renounce violence, especially attacks on civilians, and permit humanitarian access to the areas they control under conditions of adequate security.

53. As I indicated in my report of 7 January (S/1999/20, para. 37), UNOMSIL has been substantially scaled back since its relocation to Conakry and now comprises only a small core of essential civilian and military personnel under the leadership of my Special Representative (see annex). The recent decision of the Government to allow Foday Sankoh to meet with the RUF leaders in Lomé or Bamako opens prospects for the start of a dialogue which should be encouraged. Should negotiations between the Government and the rebels take a favourable turn, UNOMSIL should remain in a position where it is capable of rendering further assistance to the peace process. I therefore recommend the extension of UNOMSIL's mandate for a further period of three months, until 13 June 1999. Its mandate will continue to be to provide information to me, and through me to the Security Council, about the situation in Sierra Leone in its political, military, security, human rights and humanitarian aspects; to continue to liaise closely with the Government of Sierra Leone and with ECOWAS and ECOMOG; to explore, in close consultation with the Government, ways of pursuing dialogue with the rebels aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict; to advise me on further actions the United Nations could take in the event of developments in and around Sierra Leone; and to stand ready to take quick action, on the basis of such expansion as the Security Council may authorize, to assist the implementation of any peace agreement.

54. In view of the improvement in the security situation in and around Freetown achieved during the past few days, it is my intention to re-establish UNOMSIL in Freetown as soon as possible. At least initially, the re-establishment will

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take place on a small scale and with strict attention to the security situation. I therefore intend to increase the current number of military observers from 8 to 14, and to redeploy the necessary staff to support the relocation to Freetown. In the meantime, the United Nations Development Programme and other United Nations programmes and agencies have also been authorized to re-establish a limited presence in Freetown.

55. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Francis G. Okelo, and his staff. My thanks also go to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi and the military observers of UNOMSIL, including those who have been repatriated following the relocation to Conakry. The valuable contribution made by the five civilian police advisers, who have now been repatriated, also deserves recognition.

AnnexUnited Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions
as at 1 March 1999

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	-		-
Egypt	-		-
India	2	2	4
Kenya	1		1
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	-		-
Pakistan	1		1
Russian Federation	1		1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1		1
Zambia	-		-
TOTAL	7 ^b	2	9

^a Medical team.

^b Including the Chief Military Observer.



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Number	Item	Content
181	United Nations Document	Sixth Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 4 June 1999 (S/1999/645)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/645
4 June 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 11 of resolution 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999, the Security Council requested me to keep the Council closely informed on the situation in Sierra Leone and in this regard to submit a report, by 5 June 1999, with recommendations on the future deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and the implementation of its mandate. The present report is submitted in accordance with that request.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Dialogue process

2. Since my report of 4 March 1999 (S/1999/237), the peace process in Sierra Leone has made significant progress, culminating in the signing of a ceasefire agreement on 18 May 1999 (see S/1999/585, annex) and the start of dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) at Lomé on 25 May.

3. The signing of the ceasefire agreement and the inception of talks with RUF to a large extent reflect the outcome of a number of important initiatives undertaken by the Government of Sierra Leone. In early to mid-March, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah visited several key countries in the subregion, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo, to discuss the situation in Sierra Leone and possible ways forward with the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In a radio address to the nation on 14 March, President Kabbah expressed his appreciation for the assistance provided by those countries and reaffirmed his commitment to the dual-track approach, which involves strengthening ECOMOG while being prepared to talk to RUF and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

4. The Government's initiatives were accompanied by considerable diplomatic activity in the subregion on the part of a number of Governments and organizations in the subregion and elsewhere, including the current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo; the ECOMOG troop-contributing



countries, namely Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali; the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and the United States Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, the Rev. Jesse Jackson; and my Special Representative for Sierra Leone, Francis G. Okelo.

5. The opening of talks between the Government and RUF at Lomé on 25 May followed internal consultations there between the RUF leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, and a delegation of 14 RUF representatives from within Sierra Leone. At the Government's request, UNOMSIL transported Corporal Sankoh from Freetown to Lomé on 18 April. Subsequently, UNOMSIL also transported the 14 other RUF representatives from other parts of Sierra Leone to Lomé via Monrovia with the cooperation and support of the Government of Liberia and the assistance of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia. UNOMSIL has also provided some logistical support for the Government of Togo, which is hosting the talks, through the use of the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Activities in Sierra Leone.

6. Although Corporal Sankoh was still pursuing his appeal against his conviction and sentence to death for treason, the Government granted him judicial leave to pursue the dialogue process. On 29 May, the Government and the RUF delegation reached an understanding on the status of Corporal Sankoh. The Government undertook to take the appropriate legal steps to grant him an absolute and free pardon, and Corporal Sankoh said that his delegation would proceed with the dialogue.

7. The internal RUF talks lasted from 26 April to 10 May and resulted in a position paper reflecting the RUF/AFRC views and demands. The position paper calls, inter alia, for a blanket amnesty for all personnel of RUF and AFRC, which had organized the coup d'état in Sierra Leone in May 1997; and the establishment of a four-year transitional Government. The main functions of the transitional Government would include the drafting of a new constitution; the reform of the national security forces and civil service; the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants; and the establishment of a national electoral commission. RUF expressed readiness to convert itself into a political party.

8. RUF stipulated that a neutral peace monitoring group should be deployed as part of the ceasefire arrangements following the signing of a peace agreement. Other demands include the departure of all foreign troops and mercenaries from Sierra Leone within 14 days of the signing of the agreement, and the termination of the Status of Forces Agreement between the Governments of Sierra Leone and Nigeria.

9. On 14 May, the Government of Sierra Leone issued a response to the RUF position paper, stressing the unconstitutional nature of the proposal for a transitional Government. At the same time, the Government emphasized that the proposal for an amnesty for all combatants would be examined with a view to achieving permanent peace, while taking into account gross human rights violations committed against the citizens of Sierra Leone. The government statement endorsed the importance of the transformation of RUF into a political party and pledged the Government's full support for that process.

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10. In order to help create conditions conducive to the success of the Government-RUF talks, my Special Representative proposed a cessation of hostilities for the duration of the dialogue process. This proposal was strongly supported by the Government of Togo and resulted in the signing, on 18 May, of an agreement between the Government and RUF to cease fire (S/1999/585, annex). According to the agreement, which came into effect on 24 May, both parties were to maintain their respective positions and refrain from hostile or aggressive acts. Other provisions included the guarantee of safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants; and the deployment, subject to the authorization of the Security Council, of United Nations military observers to observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement.

11. The peace talks have started off well, with the two parties expressing their firm commitment to the peace process and determination to work together to resolve the conflict. The dialogue process is being guided by a Facilitation Committee chaired by the Foreign Minister of Togo, with the participation of ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and my Special Representative. Within Sierra Leone, the dialogue process has benefited from the active involvement of the Parliament and civic groups. Among these, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, supported by the World Conference on Religion and Peace, has played a particularly active role. President Kabbah has proposed that the Council, whose role has been appreciated by both sides, should become one of the moral guarantors of a future peace agreement.

12. On 2 June, the Government and RUF decided to ask UNOMSIL to establish a committee to effect the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants in accordance with the 18 May ceasefire agreement. The committee, which is to be chaired by the UNOMSIL Chief Military Observer, comprises representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

Relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia

13. There have been continued allegations of arms shipments reaching the rebels in Sierra Leone either through or from Liberia. On 8 April, the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Felix Mjukperuo, announced that ECOMOG had confirmed the involvement of the Governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso in the shipment and delivery of arms to the rebels on 14 and 15 March. The details of this incident and another alleged incident on 20 April were brought to the attention of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone. The Government of Liberia has denied the allegations.

14. Given the persistent tension between Sierra Leone and Liberia resulting from allegations of arms supplies to the rebels, the Security Council requested me, in resolution 1231 (1999), to consider, in coordination with the countries of the Mano River Union and other States members of ECOWAS, the practicality and effectiveness of the deployment of United Nations monitors, along with ECOMOG forces, at the Sierra Leone/Liberia border. Such a presence could improve the security climate and build confidence between the two countries. Accordingly, I wrote to both the Chairman and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS on 12 April,

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seeking their views on the possible deployment of ECOMOG troops and the subsequent deployment of United Nations personnel along the border.

15. In his reply, dated 26 April 1999, the Executive Secretary, Lansana Kouyaté, stated that the Chiefs of Staff of the countries contributing troops to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, who had discussed my letter at their meeting at Abuja, welcomed the proposal in principle. However, citing the difficult terrain along the border and the consequent need for adequate equipment, Mr. Kouyaté proposed that the United Nations should assist in providing the necessary logistical equipment, including helicopters, communications and ground transportation. He requested the United Nations to dispatch a technical team to discuss with ECOMOG the modalities and requirements of deployment. On 7 May, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Bernard Miyet, invited ECOWAS to indicate how many ECOMOG troops would be required, and the time needed for their deployment, and requested a detailed statement of ECOMOG's logistical requirements. This information can be provided to the Security Council as soon as it is received.

16. There have also been positive developments in the relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. For example, there is increased contact among civic groups in both countries as demonstrated by the visits to Liberia of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone and the National Union of Sierra Leone Students. Moreover, a delegation of the Liberian Senate met with President Kabbah in Freetown in early April to offer the support of the Government and people of Liberia for the resolution of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The delegation proposed that the three parliaments of the countries of the Mano River Union should work together, under the coordination of Mali, to help to end the conflict.

17. On 27 May, the first annual conference of the Mano River Parliamentary Union opened in Monrovia. Although no Sierra Leonean representative attended the conference, President Taylor stated in his address to the delegates of Liberia, Guinea and Mali that he would do his utmost to ensure peace and security in Guinea and Sierra Leone, since peace in Liberia could be assured only if its neighbours were also at peace.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

18. The military and security situation in Sierra Leone has remained fluid and complex. Following his assumption of the command of ECOMOG in late March, the new Force Commander, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, launched an offensive to provide a larger security cordon around Lungi and Freetown. As a result, ECOMOG succeeded in opening the roads connecting Freetown with Lungi, Port Loko and Kambia in the western and north-western parts of the country. Moreover, the clearance of a subsidiary road from Freetown to Bo via Moyamba opened up a land route for supplies to Bo and Kenema. ECOMOG also retains its positions at Kabala and Bumbuna. Since my previous report, ECOMOG's military capabilities have been further strengthened with a substantial increase in communications facilities and air assets.

19. However, RUF/AFRC continue to dominate many areas of Sierra Leone, particularly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. They also have considerable freedom of movement in parts of the Western Area and the Southern Province, where they retain the capability to interdict ECOMOG lines of communication and carry out raids. The Kono diamond mining area is also still under RUF/AFRC control. Two attacks on Kenema have recently been repulsed, although a large rebel group has advanced to around 15 miles north of the town. Continued reports of arms supply reaching RUF/AFRC indicate that their fighting capacity remains strong. In addition, they have significantly strengthened their anti-aircraft capabilities, an achievement attributed to the use of foreign expertise. The existence of pockets of forces behind the other party's lines, especially around the north-south Bo-Kabala axis, is expected to complicate the monitoring of the ceasefire.

20. Both before and after 24 May, when the ceasefire took effect, rebel activity in the north-west increased considerably, amid mutual accusations by the parties of violations. A rebel group, largely composed of troops of the former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), has been detected in the area north of Occra Hills/south of Port Loko, and there is a large build-up of RUF/AFRC in the area north of Lunsar and Port Loko. This build-up poses a threat to Port Loko/Rogberi and possibly to Lungi, which ECOMOG has warned it will forcibly resist. Prior to the ceasefire, RUF/AFRC attacked some ECOMOG positions in the area of Port Loko, including Port Loko itself, and in the Occra Hills where both sides have suffered casualties. RUF/AFRC also undertook raids on undefended villages, committing atrocities at a scale not seen since their retreat from Freetown in January (see sect. V below). Freetown remains subject to a curfew, albeit at reduced hours, and ECOMOG continues to operate checkpoints to curb rebel infiltration.

Creation of a new Sierra Leone armed forces

21. As detailed in my second progress report on UNOMSIL of 16 October 1998 (S/1998/960), the Government's efforts to improve security involve the creation of a new armed forces of 5,000 troops, the restructuring of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and the reform of the Sierra Leone Police Force.

22. On 10 May, the first 562 troops completed three months of elementary training and, at the initiative of the Government of Nigeria, elementary cadet training has been provided for 81 future officers at the Nigerian Defence Academy. The efforts to create a new Sierra Leone army have received significant support from the Government of the United Kingdom, which is providing both training assistance and equipment.

Reconstitution of the Sierra Leone Police Force

23. Another aspect of these efforts concerns the rebuilding of the Sierra Leone Police Force, which suffered severely during the rebel invasion of Freetown, with some 200 officers being killed and many police stations destroyed. With donor assistance, the Government has made considerable progress in reconstituting a functioning police presence in the capital, but reversing the extent of the damage and the collapse of the police structure in most parts of the country will require substantial external assistance.

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24. As noted in my earlier reports, the support provided by the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force and the UNOMSIL civilian police advisers had contributed significantly to the Sierra Leone Police Force reform efforts. In April 1999, two Commonwealth police advisers visited Sierra Leone with a view to the eventual resumption of their activities. I will present to the Security Council at an appropriate time in the near future my plans for a resumption of activity in Sierra Leone by United Nations civilian police advisers to render tangible assistance in cooperation with bilateral donors.

IV. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

25. Since my report of 4 March 1999 (S/1999/237), the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has been at a near standstill. A joint World Bank/British Department for International Development team found in March that some of the original programme assumptions and guiding principles were no longer applicable and that the programme would have to be re-adjusted to reflect the changed political environment and security situation. Based on their recommendations, the pilot phase of the programme, which was designed to accommodate existing ex-combatants as well as those who might surrender before the signing of a new peace agreement, has since resumed. However, any subsequent large-scale disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activity will require the implementation of a peace agreement and the stabilization of the security situation. This matter is still under consideration by the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

26. The approximately 1,300 ex-combatants, who had been originally part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process at Lungi, continue to be housed under appalling conditions in Freetown. Despite a decision on 12 April by the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration to move them to Lungi, ECOMOG opposes their relocation because of continued insecurity in the area. As a result, plans are under way to improve their current living conditions. This matter is also under consideration by the National Committee.

27. Meanwhile, under the framework of its child protection network, UNICEF, in cooperation with ECOMOG and UNOMSIL, has been providing services to children released by RUF/AFRC as part of the overall peace negotiations. Child welfare agencies have also begun developing strategies and policies for child soldiers within the overall framework of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is reviewing its involvement in the reintegration phase of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Other specialized agencies of the United Nations system and humanitarian organizations have started conceptualizing and examining possible links to humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation programmes.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

28. The reporting period has been marked by a resurgence of rebel atrocities against civilians, most of them reported from the provincial towns of Masiaka

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and Port Loko. Based on eyewitness accounts, the human rights abuses by RUF/AFRC have included significant numbers of summary executions, mutilations, limb amputations, abductions and sexual abuse, as well as the large-scale destruction of property. Civilians in the affected areas are also suffering significant humanitarian deprivation.

29. Although there was a drop in the number of reported cases of gross human rights violations during March, escapees from rebel-held territories continued to provide disturbing accounts of abusive rebel behaviour against civilians, including physical and psychological torture and harassment. In Makeni and Koinadugu, escapees reported that RUF/AFRC had imposed punitive food taxes, restricted the movement of civilians and operated a harsh justice system. A UNOMSIL investigation team that visited Masiaka after the town's recapture by ECOMOG/CDF received testimonies of ill-treatment of civilians, some of whom were killed or mutilated after being accused of sympathizing with pro-government forces. Moreover, a large number of boys and male adolescents in the area had the letters "RUF" engraved across their chests with razor blades.

30. During a rebel attack on Port Loko on 7 May, over 20 civilians are believed to have been summarily executed by a group of RUF/AFRC at nearby Mangarma village. Survivors also reported summary executions in other areas around Port Loko, which were attributed in at least two villages to a well-orchestrated rebel strategy carried out at the orders of rebel commanders. In the Masiaka area, the UNOMSIL team observed a number of bodies and received credible reports that eight decapitated bodies and severed heads of civilians had been displayed on the roadside by retreating RUF/AFRC. In one incident in Masumana village between Masiaka and Mile 38, eye witnesses described the murder of several infants by RUF/AFRC.

31. RUF/AFRC forces have also continued their practice of limb amputations, and at least a dozen victims have suffered this form of torture over the past month alone. In Mangarma village, RUF/AFRC reportedly amputated the arms of two of their civilian captives and then instructed them to walk to Port Loko town to alert the Malian contingent of ECOMOG of the RUF/AFRC impending attack. One victim, a male teacher, was hospitalized in Freetown after RUF/AFRC cut off both his arms, as well as his ears and lips.

32. A large number of civilians are believed to have been abducted by RUF/AFRC over the past three months. The abductions have reportedly followed a consistent pattern where RUF/AFRC retreating from a town or village have forced men, women and children to go with them to serve as porters, potential recruits or sex slaves. Most of these abductees are still being held by RUF/AFRC. In Matteh village near Masiaka, the section chief estimated the number of abductees in the area to be in the thousands. Most of the people interviewed in the Port Loko and Masiaka areas said they had lost close family members through abduction. One man told UNOMSIL that 15 members of his immediate family had been abducted by RUF/AFRC.

33. My Special Representative in Sierra Leone has already expressed to RUF/AFRC the deep concerns of the United Nations over the reported abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law. Following the fact-finding visit by UNOMSIL human rights officers to Masiaka, the Special Representative

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shared the findings of the mission with Corporal Foday Sankoh, and presented the RUF delegates with an aide-mémoire on human rights issues. RUF has since pledged to set up an internal investigation to probe these allegations and has requested support from the international community.

34. After concerns had been raised by my Special Representative and others regarding human rights violations attributed to ECOMOG and CDF soldiers in the wake of the rebel incursion into Freetown in January (see S/1997/237), the ECOMOG High Command has taken concrete positive steps to address this issue. In April, the ECOMOG Force Commander initiated the formation of a Civil/Military Relations Committee which will, inter alia, investigate allegations of human rights violations against individual members of ECOMOG and CDF and recommend appropriate action to the higher authorities. Membership in the Committee includes representatives of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Bar Association, the police, the media, civil society and the Government, with UNOMSIL participating in an observer capacity.

35. In spite of the goodwill exhibited by the ECOMOG High Command, there have been a few reports of ill-treatment of the civilian population by ECOMOG, CDF and Civil Defence Units (CDU). It is also reported that detainees from rebel-controlled areas face a high risk of intimidation and even execution as alleged rebel collaborators. For instance, information has been received of the execution of up to 30 escapees by CDF forces (Kaprás) at Kagbantama, near the town of Gbinti in the Northern Province. In a separate report, a woman from Moyamba District in the south-west provided detailed information on an alleged attack on the town of Bradford by CDF forces (Kamajors) in which at least six civilians are believed to have lost their lives. In April, a reliable informant reported the severe beating and detention for two days of a man and a woman in central Freetown.

36. Various sources, including United Nations agencies, report that there is continued widespread recruitment of children by CDF in the Southern and Eastern Provinces, especially at Bo and Kenema. Agencies also report that a number of children who had been demobilized from CDF are known to have been subsequently re-recruited. This is an issue of great concern, especially considering the promise made last year by the Government of Sierra Leone to my Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict to demobilize and discontinue the practice of recruiting children under 18 years of age into the armed forces of Sierra Leone. My Special Representative in Freetown continues to monitor the situation closely and raises the relevant issues with the Government. Government officials in the Southern Province have reportedly acted to halt underage recruitment by CDF elements.

37. On 27 April, President Kabbah announced the establishment under statute of a new Human Rights Commission for Sierra Leone, replacing the human rights role of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. The body will have some form of adjudicatory authority and considerable implementation powers. UNOMSIL has informed the Government of its support for this initiative and has promised to provide, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the necessary technical assistance.

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38. In the context of its technical cooperation activities, UNOMSIL also continues to provide full secretariat support to the Sierra Leone Human Rights Committee, comprising the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, national non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies. Membership also includes the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone and Human Rights Watch. The Committee remains a valuable forum for the exchange of information and for strategy development. In this context, UNOMSIL is assisting the non-governmental organization community to develop positions on the role to be played and issues of human rights within the peace process. Renewed efforts are being made to identify funding whereby the Committee can develop its own institutional identity.

39. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, has accepted the invitation of the Government of Sierra Leone to visit the country towards the end of June, accompanied by a panel of prominent human rights personalities. The purpose of the visit will be to support the peace process, to encourage future programmes for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country, and to draw attention to the plight of children, women and civilians bearing the brunt of the excesses in Sierra Leone. With the coordination of UNOMSIL, which is hosting the visit, a range of civil society actors in Sierra Leone are already exploring ways to maximize the impact of the visit of Mrs. Robinson with regard to both the short- and long-term human rights needs of the country.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

40. Since my previous report, an already desperate humanitarian situation has worsened. Rebel gains have increased the number of needy people while at the same time limiting aid workers' access to affected areas. At present, nearly half, or 2.6 million, of the Sierra Leonean population in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is effectively out of the reach of humanitarian agencies. Another 480,000 have become refugees. While the number of internally displaced persons in accessible areas remains relatively constant, at about 370,000, there are many more civilians countrywide who have been directly affected by the war in and around their own homes and villages. Many of these have been forced to live under rebel control and denied their right to sufficient food, shelter and health care. In addition, it is estimated that well over one million civilians countrywide still require some form of humanitarian assistance.

41. Even in government-controlled areas, despite some successes, obtaining access to civilians remains a challenge. For instance, it has been possible to access areas such as Pujehun, Bonthe and Bo districts in the Southern Province as well as parts of Kenema district in the Eastern Province. Additionally, owing to recent ECOMOG advances, agencies have assessed needs in a few towns in the north, such as Yele, by road from Bo. However, it remains impossible to move humanitarian goods to the east and south by road owing to RUF blockades of key junctions on the Freetown-Bo highway. While some aid can reach the provincial capitals of Bo and Kenema by air, the inability to transport food by road has led to a depletion of stocks in these areas. Additionally, the security situation in the immediate environs of Kenema remains unclear, and has prevented humanitarian intervention in many chiefdoms.

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42. Given these difficulties, urgent measures are now being taken in cooperation with the Government to explore other ways of transporting food aid. At present, food agencies have leased a ship to transfer food to Nitti port, where it can then be driven by road to Bo. If successful, this route will allow for the supply of food to war-affected people. The World Food Programme has also requested to send food along the Freetown-Bo highway, which was recently re-opened by commercial transporters, but had not received clearance from the Government at the time of the present report. In the meantime, the remaining limited amount of food in these areas has been prioritized for therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres as well as camps for internally displaced persons.

43. Meanwhile, in government-controlled areas, including Freetown and parts of the southern and eastern areas, the humanitarian community has mobilized to provide some form of support to about 370,000 individuals. At present, more than 120,000 registered internally displaced persons living in camps are receiving a comprehensive package of assistance, including food, shelter and health services. However, with more than 80 per cent of the buildings destroyed in some parts of Freetown, many thousands more are squatting in other areas or staying with relatives. A war-ravaged economy, characterized by low incomes and high costs for food and other basic items, has compounded their suffering.

44. To address chronic food insecurity, emergency seeds and tools have been distributed to farmers who lost their property to armed groups in Port Loko, Kenema and Bo districts as well as the Western Area. The United Nations continues to support the Government in its efforts to buy imported rice and to access food on a bilateral basis from donor Governments.

45. Basic support for clinics and hospitals has continued to come from UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the medical non-governmental organizations. Some 25 health centres and eight mobile clinics are now functioning in Freetown, with 25 operating in southern Bo, Pujehun and Bonthe districts. Large-scale expanded programme of immunization campaigns have successfully headed off a measles epidemic around Freetown, Kenema and Bonthe, with more than 65,000 children vaccinated in those areas.

46. As of mid-May, UNICEF had registered a total of 3,384 children who had been missing since January 1999 from the Freetown area. More than 500 of these have been traced and reunified with their families. However, abductions of large numbers of children persist. The Child Protection Network continues to trace such incidents and to provide programmes to help unaccompanied children, demobilized child soldiers and other children with special needs.

47. Finally, water trucking, well chlorination and waste management activities in most camps for internally displaced persons have reduced the level of waterborne diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea. Plastic sheeting, nails, wood and kitchen sets have been provided to some urban households and to displaced persons in camps in the west, east and south. The needs in this area, however are considerable and require continued intervention as well as resources.

48. While the humanitarian situation remains dire, the recent ceasefire and initiation of dialogue between the parties to the conflict has been welcomed by

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the humanitarian community as the best possible means for resolution of the long-standing crisis. The provision in the recent ceasefire agreement for safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations to all people in need is a significant step towards ensuring the countrywide delivery of assistance. However, turning the combatants' humanitarian commitment into a reality requires careful planning, good faith and confidence-building. As noted earlier in the present report, my Special Representative has provided the parties to the conflict with a proposal on humanitarian access, detailing, *inter alia*, the obligations of the parties under international humanitarian law to provide the enabling environment for humanitarian intervention. This proposal, prepared by the United Nations country team under the guidance of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, is seen as a first step towards building with the parties to the conflict a dialogue on access. In order to further the humanitarian imperative and to ensure the smooth delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance, it is necessary that:

(a) The issue of humanitarian access must be on an equal footing with, and not contingent upon, the military and political elements of the peace process. Moreover, as the combatants' observance of the right of civilians in need to humanitarian assistance is based upon international law, the concept is non-negotiable and can only be discussed in terms of mechanisms for access;

(b) Given the fragile state of the peace process and the steadily degrading humanitarian situation, it is imperative that the humanitarian community has immediate and independent access to the parties to the conflict, in order to establish working modalities for accessing all Sierra Leoneans in need.

VII. FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

49. UNOMSIL currently consists of 24 military observers, including two medical personnel, as well as 29 international and 24 national staff members. This includes 10 military observers recently deployed to assist in the expanded tasks of the Mission. The planned deployment of a further 16 observers during the month of June, together with the necessary support personnel, vehicles, communications and other essential equipment, will restore the mission's military capacity to the level it had attained last December. The security situation permitting, I would then proceed to deploy additional observers up to the limit of 70, with an additional 15 medical personnel, as authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998. In view of the security considerations, the need to improve medical and casualty evacuation capacity and the enhanced monitoring and observation role being played by UNOMSIL, an additional helicopter will be required.

50. UNOMSIL's intensive preparations for the intra-RUF and RUF-Government talks have required my Special Representative and his immediate staff to travel to Monrovia and Lomé, in addition to consulting closely with the Government in Freetown. In view of the likelihood that the peace talks and related activity will require a high level of United Nations involvement, I intend to increase the civilian staff in the office of my Special Representative by two political

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officers. The human rights section also needs to be restored to its previous staffing level of five persons in view of the significant human rights monitoring and technical cooperation requirements in Sierra Leone. In this connection, there is a need for forensic experts, and I would ask donors to consider making available their services.

51. UNOMSIL's military component, thus restored to its former strength, will continue to monitor the ceasefire within the limits of its resources. It will also continue to establish, maintain and improve contacts with local RUF commanders with a view to establishing joint military commissions. The functions of these commissions will include identifying and locating forces on the ground; obtaining written assurances from rebel commanders of their commitment to the ceasefire and guarantees of security for United Nations personnel; and generally to build confidence, facilitate contacts and resolve disputes. Provision would also be made for deploying teams of five or six members to Lungi, Hastings, Port Loko and Bo, depending on the security situation. Observers outside Freetown would be co-deployed with ECOMOG to ensure their security.

52. I have given much thought to activities that might be carried out by an expanded UNOMSIL presence in the event of a peace agreement. To that end, I dispatched a military assessment and planning team to Sierra Leone at the end of May to develop a revised concept of operations for a possible enlargement of the Mission.

53. My detailed recommendations to the Council on the size, mandate and configuration of an eventual expanded UNOMSIL will depend on the provisions of any peace agreement that the Government and RUF may sign in Lomé, and on the considerations on the ground, notably security.

54. One important consideration in redefining UNOMSIL's tasks would be the future strength, activities and state of deployment of ECOMOG. While these are not yet known, I would anticipate that ECOMOG would remain in Sierra Leone as a stabilizing influence, with a well-defined mandate that would include ensuring the security of vital areas of the country.

55. At this point, however, I envisage the need for UNOMSIL itself to be prepared to ensure the security of United Nations personnel if it is to deploy effectively to assist in the implementation of an eventual peace agreement. To this end, bearing in mind the likely security situation and the confused and unpredictable nature of the conflict, there might well prove to be a need for the deployment of a sizeable number of infantry and additional observers, along with the necessary equipment and military logistical support. Subject to Council authorization, these troops would be deployed in phases to accomplish a range of possible tasks.

56. These can be more precisely defined only in the light of an eventual peace agreement, but are likely to include the following:

- (a) Monitoring and supervising the ceasefire;

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(b) Supervising, monitoring and assisting in the encampment, disarmament and demobilization of former combatants;

(c) Providing security to United Nations personnel, including military observers;

(d) Providing assistance to humanitarian efforts;

(e) Providing planning and logistical support for an eventual election.

57. I will revert to the Council with detailed proposals for a revised mandate and concept of operations for its consideration as soon as a peace agreement has been signed. However, in addition to the military requirements outlined above, I would also envisage a significant expansion of the civilian personnel, including those engaged in political, human rights and logistical support functions. Moreover, any enhanced role that UNOMSIL might play, whatever the final shape of the peace agreement, will benefit greatly from the acquisition of a nationwide broadcasting capacity. Experience has shown the clear advantages to a United Nations peacekeeping mission of access to its own radio facility. I would therefore appeal to donors to consider making such equipment available, and would envisage a modest increase in UNOMSIL's public information staff accordingly.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

58. As indicated in my previous report (S/1999/237), the General Assembly, by its resolution 53/29 of 20 November 1998, appropriated an amount of \$22 million for the establishment and operation of UNOMSIL for the period ending 30 June 1999. With regard to the subsequent 12-month period beginning on 1 July 1999, my budget submitted to the Assembly in February 1999 (A/53/454/Add.1) amounts to \$16.4 million and provides for the maintenance of the Mission at the strength authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1181 (1998). I intend to seek authorization from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to use the budgeted resources once the Council takes action on my recommendation contained in paragraph 71 below as to the extension of the Observer Mission's mandate.

59. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMSIL, the cost of restoring the Mission's military capacity to the level it had attained in December 1998 as well as its subsequent maintenance at the restored strength will be within the resources already provided by the General Assembly and my budgetary projections for the 1999/2000 financial period.

60. With regard to the estimated costs associated with the expansion of UNOMSIL, I shall submit my proposals to the General Assembly at a later date, when my detailed proposals for a revised mandate and concept of operations of the Mission will have been finalized and submitted to the Security Council for its consideration.

61. As at 31 May 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNOMSIL special account amounted to \$4.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions

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for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$1.6 billion. Contributions to the Trust Fund to Support United Nations Peacekeeping-related Efforts amounted to \$2.8 million, with expenditures authorized in the amount of \$1.1 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

62. Despite the continued unpredictability of the conflict situation in Sierra Leone, I am encouraged by the significant progress that has been made in the pursuit of dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF. This is the first time in three years that a political settlement might be within reach to break the cycle of violence that has held the country in its grip since 1991. I welcome the Government's readiness to open talks with RUF, and call upon the latter to seize this opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to show flexibility in the interest of peace in Sierra Leone. In particular, as I stated publicly at the time, I welcome the signing on 18 May of the ceasefire agreement, which has helped to create an atmosphere conducive to the success of the peace talks. I reiterate my call to RUF/AFRC, CDF, the Government and ECOMOG to adhere strictly to its terms. I wish to express my appreciation to all the Governments concerned, in particular the Government of Togo and President Gnassingbe Eyadema, the current Chairman of ECOWAS, for hosting the talks, as well as the national and international organizations which have facilitated the dialogue process.

63. Nevertheless, the killings, mutilations and other human rights abuses perpetrated by rebel forces against the civilian population in Sierra Leone as well as the widespread destruction of property wreaked on a country which already ranks among the poorest in the world are deeply deplorable. Any armed opposition that expects to gain legitimacy and recognition in the eyes of the world must be prepared to renounce and atone for inflicting such suffering on non-combatants. I call upon the RUF leadership to prove its sincere commitment to peace and ensure the compliance of all its fighters with international human rights standards and humanitarian law, including the release of all abductees. In this context, I note the announcement made by the RUF leadership of its intention to investigate abuses committed by its troops and to invite international observers to take part in this process, and call upon them to demonstrate without delay their will and capacity to do so.

64. Concern about the extent of human rights violations in Sierra Leone has received increasing international attention. I welcome the intention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to visit Sierra Leone in late June to examine the situation on the ground and to obtain tangible commitments regarding the prevention of abuses and accountability of perpetrators. I am also gratified by the proposal by President Kabbah to establish a national Human Rights Commission in Sierra Leone as well as the creation of a truth and reconciliation mechanism as part of a peace agreement. These are important steps in acknowledging the pain of the victims and restoring national dignity and faith as part of efforts to achieve lasting peace, and these measures should receive all possible support from the donor community.

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65. In this context, I also wish to commend the initiative of the ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, in establishing a Civil-Military Relations Committee to investigate allegations of human rights violations by pro-Government forces. These investigations are being undertaken with the full participation of representatives of all sectors of Sierra Leonean society, with the United Nations in an international observer role.

66. In line with the dual-track approach, ECOMOG deserves praise for its continued efforts in support of the Government and people of Sierra Leone, as do the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali for their steadfast commitment towards restoring security and stability in Sierra Leone, with the assistance of donor countries, including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. I call upon the international community to continue supporting ECOMOG logistically and also to assist the process of the rebuilding of the Sierra Leone armed forces.

67. There is also an urgent need to resume the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the current ex-combatants and to prepare the groundwork for an expansion of such activities as part of a peace agreement. I hope that the Government of Sierra Leone will continue to provide the necessary impetus to the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and ensure its viability as an incentive for all rebel fighters willing to lay down their arms at this critical juncture in the peace process. It is also important for the Government to work closely with donors on the development of a revised disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, with a well-defined operational plan and clear funding arrangements, to be put into effect in the context of a peace agreement.

68. There is an urgent need to consider how RUF/AFRC might be transformed into a legitimate political party in parallel with the process of reintegrating former combatants into society. I would also call for an end to all recruitment of children as soldiers, and would hope that any eventual peace agreement would embody commitments on the part of all parties to demobilize their child participants immediately. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes should consider giving priority to children under 18.

69. The persistent reports of arms supplies reaching the rebel forces are disturbing. Any support for RUF/AFRC by outside parties serves to perpetuate the conflict in Sierra Leone, whether it be motivated by economic interests or other strategic aims. I reiterate my call to all States to comply strictly with the embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 1171 (1998).

70. The dire humanitarian situation underscores the need to establish mechanisms to ensure unhindered humanitarian access to all parts of the country and to promote effective coordination and cooperation between humanitarian agencies, the Government and RUF. There is a critical need to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to people in need, which requires the protection of and respect for humanitarian relief workers, goods and properties. Negotiation for humanitarian access should be guided by the code of conduct for humanitarian agencies operating in Sierra Leone. While recognizing the considerable

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constraints of the present situation and from lessons learned negotiating humanitarian access in the Sierra Leone context, the humanitarian community is encouraged by the present political climate, and calls upon the international community for its continued support for humanitarian action. Specifically, the international community is urged to continue its support for dialogue with the aim of achieving unhindered humanitarian access to all areas of the country and, once granted, for their continued support of humanitarian assistance.

71. The recent political developments, including the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the start of the dialogue, have significant implications for the work of UNOMSIL. It is critical that the Mission, under the leadership of my Special Representative, should remain in a position to render effective assistance to the peace process in Sierra Leone. I therefore recommend the extension of UNOMSIL's mandate for a further period of six months, until 13 December 1999, along the lines described above. However, I would hope well within that time period to be in a position to revert to the Council with recommendations for an expanded mandate in implementation of a peace agreement.

72. I take this opportunity to express appreciation to my Special Representative, Francis G. Okelo, the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier General Subhash C. Joshi, and the staff and military observers of UNOMSIL for their tireless efforts and dedication to advance the peace process in Sierra Leone.

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Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone:
contributions as at 8 June 1999

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	2		2
Egypt	2		2
India	2	2	4
Kenya	2		2
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	2		2
Russian Federation	3		3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4		4
Zambia	2		2
Total	22 ^b	2	24

^a Medical team.

^b Including the Chief Military Observer.

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


The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

HQ
UNMO

UNOMSIL
Deployment as of
June 1999

- National capital
- ⊙ Provincial capital
- Town, village
- International boundary
- - - Provincial boundary



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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/836
30 July 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

In my sixth report to the Security Council on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) dated 4 June 1999, I indicated my intention to revert to the Council with recommendations on an expanded UNOMSIL presence in Sierra Leone with a revised mandate and concept of operations in the event of a successful outcome to the negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and rebel representatives in Lomé (S/1999/645, paras. 52-57). By paragraph 4 of its resolution 1245 (1999) of 11 June 1999, the Security Council took note of my intention and underlined that security conditions should be considered in any further eventual deployment.

2. On 7 July 1999, representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) signed a peace agreement in Lomé after several weeks of negotiations (see S/1999/777). The present report sets out the main provisions of the agreement and contains recommendations for the immediate measures that should be taken to strengthen the Mission. Such measures would enable the United Nations to provide initial support to the process of implementation. Following discussions with all interested parties, I intend to submit additional recommendations to the Security Council on the overall activities of the United Nations, including the mandate and structure of a United Nations peacekeeping presence in the country.

II. STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

3. As described in my report of 4 June 1999, peace negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF began on 25 May 1999 in Lomé, Togo, hosted and mediated by President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo in his capacity as Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The proceedings were supported by a Facilitation Committee consisting of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations under the chairmanship of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Togo, Joseph Koffigoh, assisted by my Special Representative, Francis Okelo. The negotiations benefited from the active involvement and support of a number of international and national observers, including representatives of the



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Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, ECOWAS and OAU, as well as members of the humanitarian community, including the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sierra Leone. Representatives of Sierra Leonean civil society also provided support.

4. The Lomé Peace Agreement was signed by President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on behalf of the Government of Sierra Leone and by Corporal Foday Sankoh on behalf of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, as well as by President Eyadema, President Compaore of Burkina Faso, President Taylor of Liberia, President Obasanjo of Nigeria and high-level representatives of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, ECOWAS, OAU, the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations.

5. My visit to Freetown on 8 July 1999 took place immediately after the signing of the agreement and allowed me to convey the hopes of the United Nations for its effective implementation and the return of lasting peace to Sierra Leone. During my recent travels in Africa, as well as during the OAU summit held at Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999, I had the opportunity to hold extensive discussions with regional leaders on the peace process and on the ways and means to assist the people of Sierra Leone in achieving a lasting solution to the conflict in their country. I informed the Security Council of these discussions at its informal consultations of 27 July 1999.

Main provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement

6. The agreement provides for the permanent cessation of hostilities, to be monitored at provincial and district levels through Ceasefire Monitoring Committees and, at the national level, through a Joint Monitoring Committee. Governance provisions include, inter alia, the transformation of RUF/SL into a political party and its access to public office; the creation of a broad-based Government of National Unity through cabinet appointments for representatives of RUF/SL; the creation of a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to supervise the implementation of the peace agreement; the establishment of a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, to be chaired personally by the leader of RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh, with the status of Vice-President of Sierra Leone; and the establishment of a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders to mediate any disputes arising from differences in the interpretation of the agreement.

7. The agreement provides for the pardon of Corporal Foday Sankoh and a complete amnesty for any crimes committed by members of the fighting forces during the conflict from March 1991 up until the date of the signing of the agreement; a review of the present Constitution of Sierra Leone; and the holding of elections in line with the Constitution, to be directed by a National Electoral Commission. I instructed my Special Representative to sign the agreement with the explicit proviso that the United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in article IX of the agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

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8. Regarding post-conflict military and security issues, the agreement stipulates the revision of the mandate of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); a request for a new mandate for UNOMSIL; the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; the restructuring and training of a new Sierra Leone armed forces; and the withdrawal of mercenaries.

9. Concerning humanitarian, human rights and socio-economic issues, the agreement provides for the release of all conflict-related prisoners and abductees; the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; the guarantee and promotion of human rights, including the establishment of a Human Rights Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; the safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all parts of the country; the security of humanitarian goods and personnel; and post-war rehabilitation and assistance to victims of war.

10. Periodic reviews of the implementation of the agreement will be undertaken by a Joint Implementation Committee, consisting of members of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace and the ECOWAS Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the moral guarantors of the agreement, namely the Government of the Togolese Republic, the United Nations, OAU and the Commonwealth of Nations. The Joint Implementation Committee will be chaired by ECOWAS and meet at least once every three months. The first meeting of the Committee is planned to be held on 9 August 1999 in Freetown, on the occasion of the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone.

11. In accordance with the agreement, the parties have requested ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG to cover four areas: peacekeeping; security of the State of Sierra Leone; protection of UNOMSIL; and protection of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration personnel. The Government is to request ECOWAS to provide troops from at least two additional contributing countries. The Security Council is to be requested to provide assistance in support of ECOMOG.

12. At the same time, a timetable is to be drawn up for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, to be closely linked to the creation and deployment of restructured national armed forces. However, the agreement also makes reference to a "neutral peacekeeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG" (article XVI). The parties also request the Security Council to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the agreement.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

13. Article XVI of the agreement calls for the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to start within six weeks from 7 July 1999. After the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, the World Bank and the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom recommended that the original disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme be maintained only to deal with current ex-combatants, a second phase to be contingent on a peace agreement and the subsequent formulation of a revised disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan. The first phase of the programme was completed on 14 July with the discharge of 1,408 ex-soldiers housed in Freetown.

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14. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement, representatives of the Department for International Development and the World Bank met with the delegations in Lomé to brief them on the basic assumptions underlying the revised disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, which is to assume responsibility for the needs of an estimated 33,000 to 40,000 combatants. The United Kingdom has pledged \$10 million and the World Bank a further \$9.1 million towards an estimated total requirement of \$33 to \$45 million for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities.

15. In addition, the World Bank has opened a multi-donor trust fund for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and has called on donors to contribute. A proposal under review by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration envisages the establishment of about 10 demobilization sites to cover the main areas where the respective fighting forces are currently deployed.

16. Obviously, an effective programme will play a key role in the success of the Sierra Leonean peace process, given the vast proliferation of small arms, the fractured nature of the fighting forces consisting of the ex-Sierra Leone Army, the Civilian Defence Forces (CDF) and RUF/SL, the extent of foreign intervention and the supply of weapons. The agreement stipulates that the present Sierra Leone Army be restricted to their barracks and their arms and ammunition placed under constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping force (referred to in para. 12 above) during the process of disarmament and demobilization, and that UNOMSIL shall be present at all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants.

Human rights

17. The Lomé Peace Agreement contains three articles addressing commitments in the area of human rights, including the full protection and promotion of basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of human rights adopted by the United Nations and OAU (article XXIV). The other articles provide, respectively, for the creation of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission and the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission not later than 90 days from 7 July 1999.

18. While the Human Rights Commission is designed to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people of Sierra Leone with respect to human rights violations, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will deal specifically with the question of human rights violations committed since the beginning of the armed conflict in 1991. It is intended to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators to tell their stories and facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation. The Commission will also recommend measures for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.

19. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be composed of a cross-section of the society of Sierra Leone, with the participation and technical support of the international community, and is expected to submit its report to the Government within 12 months after the commencement of its work.

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20. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs. Mary Robinson, visited Sierra Leone on 24 and 25 June 1999, accompanied by a high-level delegation. In a statement dated 25 June 1999, the High Commissioner said that Sierra Leone required urgent international attention if it were to overcome its recent history of horrendous human rights abuses. In the same statement, she said that among the measures that could be taken in the short term were international assistance to document the human rights violations as a step towards accountability; increasing the number of human rights monitors in the country, and working with the Government and Sierra Leonean civil society to create a "human rights infrastructure" in the country. The High Commissioner, together with the Government of Sierra Leone, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, representatives of civil society and my Special Representative, adopted the Human Rights Manifesto, which contains and reaffirms wide ranging commitments for immediate and sustained promotion and protection of human rights, such as the non-recruitment in the armed forces of children under the age of 18 years. The manifesto commits the United Nations to provide appropriate support to Sierra Leonean human rights institutions, as well as for other elements of technical assistance.

Protection of children

21. The agreement also refers to the vulnerability of the children of Sierra Leone, who have suffered disproportionately and on an unprecedented scale throughout the war and who require special attention to ensure their protection and welfare during the consolidation of peace. The agreement acknowledges the children's entitlement to special care and protection of their inherent right to life, survival and development.

III. POLITICAL, MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

22. The Government has taken steps to ensure the acceptance of the agreement in Sierra Leone, including a personal address by President Kabbah to Parliament when the agreement was submitted for ratification, and the development of a sensitization campaign by the Information Ministry based on the translation of the agreement into several local languages. Internationally, President Kabbah took the initiative to travel to Conakry and brief President Lansana Conte personally about the events in Lomé and the contents of the agreement. He continued to mobilize support at the OAU summit in Algiers from 12 to 14 July, which was attended also by Corporal Foday Sankoh.

23. The Parliament of Sierra Leone unanimously ratified the peace agreement on 15 July. On 20 and 21 July, it adopted legislation necessary for the implementation of the agreement. This legislation paved the way for the transformation of RUF/SL into a political party, for the participation of senior members of RUF/SL to hold public office and for the establishment of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, to be chaired by Mr. Sankoh. Mr. Sankoh, for his part, indicated that he was ready to come to Freetown, pending arrangements for accommodation and security.

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24. The military and security situation in Sierra Leone has improved significantly since the ceasefire agreement took effect on 24 May and has remained generally calm since the signing of the agreement. While some, mostly minor, ceasefire violations have occurred, including reports of rebel raids on villages, the number of incidents of open hostilities has dropped considerably. ECOMOG, CDF and RUF and former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) forces have generally remained within their areas of control.

25. RUF/SL and AFRC continue to dominate much of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In the western parts of the country, their forces are concentrated in the areas west of the main highway from Freetown between Occra Hills, Port Loko and Kambia. The road to Guinea via Kambia is also controlled by RUF/SL and AFRC personnel, but they have assured UNOMSIL that an unhindered flow of traffic will be allowed.

26. A few military confrontations between CDF and RUF/SL-AFRC groups occurred in the northern, central and eastern parts of the country prior to the signing of the agreement, but there have been no reports of major combat since 7 July. However, both sides have continued to conduct troop movements throughout their respective areas of control. ECOMOG remains firmly in control of the Freetown peninsula and of a security cordon east of the capital, including the main highway providing access to Lungi and to Bo/Kenema, as well as Bumbuna and Kabala in the Northern Province.

27. ECOMOG continues to experience shortages of essential goods and supplies. The immediate requirements of ECOMOG include office equipment, various vehicles (trucks, ambulances, tankers), generators, communications equipment, helicopters, uniforms, medical supplies and other vital items. The Secretary-General of ECOWAS has requested me to impress on the Security Council and the international community the need to provide logistical and other necessary support for the deployment of additional ECOMOG troops, as envisaged in the agreement. The details of such support are still to be specified.

28. UNOMSIL has developed a system of reporting allegations of ceasefire violations and has shared all relevant information with the parties. To the extent possible, military observers have been dispatched to verify allegations in the areas accessible to them. UNOMSIL military observers have also been active in facilitating meetings between the parties on the ground in the accessible areas and have successfully mediated a number of disputes.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

29. In the wake of the agreement, unprecedented cooperation between RUF/SL, the Government and the aid community has put the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the country within grasp for the first time in years. Despite initial delays, humanitarian assessment missions have been completed or are under way in the rebel controlled areas of Makeni, Kailahun, Buedu, Rokupr and Lunsar. Civilian needs have also been assessed in recently accessible Government-controlled areas, such as Yele, Port Loko, Daru, Kabala, Songo and the Rogberi-Masiaka corridor. These assessments have revealed acute shortages of basic, life-sustaining items such as food and medicine and subsequent

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malnutrition, as well as outbreaks of dysentery, cholera, measles and meningitis.

30. As humanitarian access throughout the country increases, the caseload of those needing assistance - currently limited to 500,000 - is expected to triple. Needs have also increased in Government-controlled areas. Difficult overland access continues to cause delays in food shipments to areas such as Kenema and Bo. Combined with the onset of the rainy season, cases of severely malnourished infants nearly doubled in the last month. Obviously, as humanitarian agencies gain access to larger areas of the country, their need for adequate staffing and logistic support will increase significantly.

31. As the first tangible sign of the international community's commitment to the agreement, the rapid country-wide delivery of humanitarian assistance is a key aspect of the consolidation of peace. At present, the 1999 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal, which requested \$27.9 million for humanitarian programmes in Sierra Leone, is only 26 per cent funded. It is hoped that donors will contribute generously to meet humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone.

32. The peace agreement may also bring an end to the circumstances that forced some 470,000 Sierra Leoneans to live in exile. In the coming months, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will develop a strategy for the repatriation of refugees and increase its capacity to monitor possible spontaneous returns, as well as the security, socio-economic and humanitarian conditions in the areas of return. These activities will be carried out in close coordination with other relief agencies as well as with the parties to the peace agreement.

V. FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER
MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

33. The signing of the agreement requires UNOMSIL to perform significantly expanded as well as new tasks, in close coordination with ECOMOG, whose presence in Sierra Leone remains, in this critical period, indispensable. It is obvious that, in addition to the major disarmament and demobilization effort, the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement will require the presence of a substantial number of peacekeepers throughout the country, together with the deployment of additional United Nations military observers, in mutually supporting roles.

34. In accordance with the peace agreement, the mandate of ECOMOG will need to be revised by ECOWAS, in consultation with the United Nations and, as appropriate, with the parties. Among the issues that require detailed discussion are the division of labour between the United Nations and ECOWAS, the need to provide a credible level of security throughout the country (including the rebel-controlled areas), the appropriate size and composition of the required neutral peacekeeping force, the deployment of units to the various regions of the country and arrangements for logistical support.

35. Once these consultations, which are ongoing, have produced an understanding of the respective tasks, strength and mandates of ECOMOG and the United Nations,

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I will be in a position to make comprehensive proposals to the Security Council concerning a new mandate and concept of operations for UNOMSIL. In the interim, however, it will be necessary to act expeditiously in order to offer maximum support to the parties and ECOMOG, and maintain momentum in the peace process. I believe that the most immediate and practical way of providing such support would be the deployment to Sierra Leone of additional United Nations military observers, along with the necessary equipment and administrative support. The number of UNOMSIL military observers required would increase to 210, based on an assessment of the tasks described below. It should be clearly understood, however, that the presence and operations of these observers alone would not be sufficient to ensure the implementation of the agreement. For this, it will be necessary to deploy large numbers of peacekeepers throughout the country. I would also propose that UNOMSIL be strengthened with additional civilian staff in the fields of political and civil affairs, as well as human rights, to allow it to cope with the increased responsibilities which flow from the agreement. An elaboration of these requirements is given below.

36. In order to support the effective functioning of an expanded mission, it is critical that the necessary administrative and logistical support services are made available. To this end, an adequate increase in administrative and technical personnel as well as resources should be provided. The estimated costs of the additional military and civilian staff, as well as of the required logistical support, will be submitted to the Council shortly, in an addendum to the present report.

Military aspects

37. As noted in paragraph 49 of my report of 4 June 1999 (S/1999/645), additional military observers are now being deployed to restore the strength of UNOMSIL to its authorized strength of 70 military observers. The current strength of UNOMSIL is approximately 50 military observers.

38. The envisaged tasks of an expanded UNOMSIL military observer component would be as follows:

(a) To strengthen and expand the contacts already established by UNOMSIL with RUF/SL troops in the countryside since the ceasefire agreement came into effect;

(b) To extend UNOMSIL's ceasefire monitoring activities to a wider geographical area, security conditions permitting;

(c) To strengthen and assist the Ceasefire Monitoring Committees and the central Joint Monitoring Committee established pursuant to the peace agreement to help maintain the ceasefire;

(d) To monitor the military and security situation in the country and report thereon to my Special Representative;

(e) To assist and monitor the disarmament and demobilization of combatants in areas where adequate security is provided;

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(f) To work closely with humanitarian organizations to exchange information on security conditions with a view to ensuring the widest possible access for humanitarian assistance to populations in need;

(g) To work closely with human rights officers, as required, in their visits throughout the country;

(h) To maintain liaison and coordinate closely with ECOMOG;

(i) To assist in the preparation of plans for the deployment of neutral peacekeeping troops, as envisaged in the agreement.

39. The additional military observers would be deployed to Sierra Leone in a gradual manner. At present, it is envisaged that UNOMSIL military observers would maintain a strengthened headquarters in Freetown and would deploy to team sites initially in Lungi, Hastings, Port Loko and Bo. For the time being, these military observers would operate under security provided by ECOMOG. It would also be necessary to ensure enhanced logistical support for an expanded UNOMSIL. A key requirement would be the introduction of a second-line medical capability to provide basic and emergency health care. Such a capability would require up to 35 military (or civilian) medical personnel. It would also be crucial for an expanded UNOMSIL to have an aviation capability to provide 24-hour medical evacuation as well as daytime monitoring and observation.

Political and civil affairs

40. The Lomé Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone includes numerous requests for international involvement, specifically that of the United Nations, in implementing provisions contained therein. This would require a substantial increase in the role of UNOMSIL and, accordingly, in its human and administrative resources.

41. In view of the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the peace process and the increased responsibilities arising from an expanded UNOMSIL presence to assist the implementation of the peace agreement, it would be advisable to upgrade the level of that post. Accordingly, it is envisaged that the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will be expanded to include a deputy Special Representative and additional staff for coordination, public information and legal affairs.

42. The envisaged political affairs office of UNOMSIL would consist of up to eight officers and would be responsible for liaison with the parties; government ministers and parliament; United Nations programmes; non-governmental organizations; and provincial and district representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone. The political affairs office would also assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the development and implementation of the Strategic Framework for Sierra Leone (see para. 44 below).

43. The requirement for a civil affairs component derives from the need for UNOMSIL to participate in the various bodies charged with the implementation and monitoring of the agreement and to assist in the phased reintegration of members

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of RUF/SL, the Sierra Leone Army and CDF into civil society. The civil affairs component, which would consist of 10 civil affairs officers, would maintain nine field sites located in Freetown, the three provincial capitals and major towns such as Kabala, Kailahun, Kambia and Koidu. Offices would also maintain liaison with provincial and district government representatives. In addition, the civil affairs component would also liaise with appropriate government bodies on matters relating to economic reconstruction and investment and monitor adherence to international law governing compensation in reference to article VII of the peace agreement. It is also envisaged that a small secretariat for the Joint Implementation Committee would be established to monitor respective areas of concern, mainly human rights, refugees and displaced persons, elections and education and health.

44. The successful implementation of the peace agreement will also require a coherent and comprehensive response involving the Government and its international and domestic partners. Following consultations with all relevant partners in the United Nations system, I have decided that a strategic framework be developed for Sierra Leone, encompassing political, assistance and human rights aspects. Through this framework a mutually reinforcing comprehensive political strategy and assistance programme would be developed. Its development and implementation is envisaged as a primarily field-driven exercise, led by my Special Representative working in close consultation with national and international partners. A small United Nations mission visited Sierra Leone from 14 to 19 June to help launch the Framework. As a first step, a steering group has been set up in Freetown, chaired by my Special Representative, with representatives of the concerned United Nations entities. The establishment and implementation of the strategic framework will be facilitated at Headquarters under the guidance of the Deputy Secretary-General.

45. With the signing of the peace agreement, the increased dissemination of information will be crucial in sensitizing public opinion after eight years of civil war. The present UNOMSIL information capacity should be expanded with three additional international staff and an appropriate number of local staff. The functions to be carried out include the production of radio programmes in indigenous languages for broadcast on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service and other existing radio stations. United Nations radio programming for local distribution is also required. Consideration should also be given to video production for audiences in Sierra Leone, focusing on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, as well as on issues affecting the population relating to the agreement.

Human rights

46. The human rights component will continue to play a key role in the future operations of UNOMSIL and will strengthen its monitoring and reporting activities in all parts of Sierra Leone. This critical task will include a broad range of human rights issues that encompass the rights of women and children and economic and social rights. In particular, the human rights abuses suffered by women during the conflict will constitute a major focus of the work of human rights officers.

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47. In support of the human rights provisions in the agreement, it will be necessary to expand the human rights component to enable it to cover all parts of the country, including the areas previously under RUF/SL control, to collect testimonies, document abuses and bring forward witnesses and survivors of atrocities. A thorough fact-finding process will be critical to the effective functioning of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other efforts to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone. In order to ensure that there will be appropriate accountability for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the Security Council may wish to consider various steps to address this question, including the establishment in due course of a commission of enquiry, as recommended to the Government of Sierra Leone by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Such a commission would investigate and assess human rights and humanitarian law violations and abuses perpetrated by all parties since the commencement of the conflict in 1991. At the same time, technical cooperation will have to be increased to ensure that the judicial system resumes operations throughout the country and that human rights training is extended to public office holders of RUF/SL. These additional functions will require a significant expansion in the current strength of the UNOMSIL human rights component to assist the parties in the implementation of the human rights provisions of the agreement.

48. It is envisaged that additional human rights officers will be deployed to the main provincial centres and towns to carry out comprehensive monitoring, fact-finding, documentation and analysis on the observance of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties throughout Sierra Leone. Their co-deployment with military observers will also ensure adequate attention to human rights issues and child protection in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

49. Human rights technical cooperation programmes conducted by UNOMSIL, with support from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, will be directed towards the following sectors: (a) human rights training and skills development; (b) promotion of the rule of law; (c) support to and capacity-building for human rights institutions, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and civil society; (d) promotion of child rights; and (e) mainstreaming of attention to gender rights. Generous financial assistance from the international community will be required for the implementation of these activities.

50. To enable it to carry out an expanded role, it is proposed that the present human rights component be augmented immediately by 10 international human rights officers, including two child protection officers.

Protection of children

51. The protection of the rights of children will require immediate and special attention during the process of disarmament and demobilization and beyond, given the particular needs of child combatants during their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The United Nations Children's Fund is playing a leading role, in close coordination with my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, in the protection of children and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers. Among the many other

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pressing needs are the support of child victims of mutilations and sexual exploitation and the rehabilitation of primary health and educational services. Additional financial, material and human resources will need to be mobilized by the relevant agencies in support of these activities. A child protection adviser should be added to the Mission to ensure that these issues are dealt with in a comprehensive manner and are given due attention at the national and international levels.

VI. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

52. The signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front is a great step forward for Sierra Leone. It provides the Sierra Leonean people a unique opportunity to bring an end to the conflict, which has caused them untold suffering and has registered deeply in the conscience of the international community. Both sides are to be congratulated for showing the flexibility that has made this agreement possible. Credit is due also to the international community and, in particular, to ECOWAS, for their leadership in bringing both sides together and facilitating the conclusion of the peace agreement.

53. Special recognition is also due to ECOMOG. Its troops and, in particular, the Governments of Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali that provided them, are to be commended for their steadfast courage in the face of considerable hardship and sacrifice. ECOMOG can and should take pride in what it has achieved. I call upon the international community to provide strong and continuous support to this regional force so that it can maintain its critical presence in Sierra Leone. The main requirements of ECOMOG are listed in paragraph 27 above.

54. As in other peace accords, many compromises were necessary in the Lomé Peace Agreement. As a result, some of the terms under which this peace has been obtained, in particular the provisions on amnesty, are difficult to reconcile with the goal of ending the culture of impunity, which inspired the creation of the United Nations Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, and the future International Criminal Court. Hence the instruction to my Special Representative to enter a reservation when he signed the peace agreement, explicitly stating that, for the United Nations, the amnesty cannot cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. At the same time, the Government and people of Sierra Leone should be allowed this opportunity to realize their best and only hope of ending their long and brutal conflict. During my short visit to Sierra Leone on 8 July 1999, I witnessed tremendous destruction, suffering and pain, particularly on the faces of the victims of wanton and abhorrent violence. I took the opportunity to encourage all Sierra Leoneans to seize this opportunity for peace, to rally behind the agreement, seek reconciliation, and to look and work towards the future.

55. By all accounts, the challenges ahead are daunting. Among these are the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, their reintegration into society, the restoration of State authority in territories now held by rebel forces, the necessity of addressing humanitarian needs throughout the country, the repatriation of refugees, the building of institutions and the healing of the

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deep wounds caused by the civil war. Strict compliance with the terms of the agreement by both sides, as well as their supporters and all commanders and fighters in the field, is indispensable. The United Nations will, as is customary, exercise its responsibilities in an impartial manner, and calls on both sides to extend to UNOMSIL and ECOMOG their complete cooperation.

56. The international community and the United Nations have an important responsibility to assist Sierra Leone and to ensure that momentum is maintained in this process, especially in the critical phase immediately after the signing of the peace agreement. I therefore recommend that the Security Council approve, as an immediate first step, the provisional expansion of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), along the lines set out in paragraphs 33 to 51 above. As indicated in the present report, I hope to revert to the Security Council as soon as possible with an additional report on the situation in Sierra Leone, which will include recommendations for the mandate and structure of the enhanced United Nations peacekeeping presence that may be required in the country.

57. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Francis G. Okelo, the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi, and the staff and military observers of UNOMSIL for their tireless efforts and dedication to bring the difficult negotiation process to a successful conclusion and thereby continue to advance the peace process in Sierra Leone.

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Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone:
contributions as at 29 July 1999

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
Bangladesh	2		2
China	3		3
Egypt	2		2
India	2	2	4
Jordan	2		2
Kenya	4		4
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
Malaysia	4		4
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	5		5
Russian Federation	8		8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8		8
Zambia	5		5
Total	48 ^b	2	50

^a Medical team.

^b Including the Chief Military Observer.

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Map No. 4065 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS July 1999

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

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Number	Item	Content
177	United Nations Document	First Progress Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 (S/1998/750)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/750
12 August 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 19 of its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and its progress in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented. The present report, which is submitted pursuant to that request, describes developments since my fifth report on the situation in Sierra Leone (S/1998/486) dated 9 June 1998.
2. The present report is also submitted in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1162 (1998) of 17 April 1998 and paragraph 8 of resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998.

II. SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

Activities of the Government of Sierra Leone

3. Since my last report, the Government of Sierra Leone has continued to strengthen its authority and improve its organization and functioning, including through the adoption, following a wide-ranging parliamentary debate, of a budget for the remainder of 1998. On 7 August, President Kabbah visited the provincial towns of Bo, Kenema and Makenie. Some 45 of the 52 paramount chiefs have returned to their districts in the south of the country.
4. Significant improvements have occurred in relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. On 22 and 23 June, a Liberian delegation led by Senator Kekura Kpoto visited Freetown to deliver a special message from President Taylor to President Kabbah concerning ways to promote peace between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Mano River Union countries. The delegation also denied allegations that the Liberian Government was supporting the remnants of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and expressed concern that some Liberian dissidents were reported to be



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planning to use Sierra Leone as a base from which to attack Liberia. At the conclusion of the meeting, President Kabbah issued a statement reaffirming his commitment to subregional peace and security and calling for strict adherence to the existing non-aggression pact and good neighbourliness treaty contained in the Mano River Union Agreement.

5. On 1 July 1998, during my visit to Abuja, together with the President of Nigeria, General Abdulsalam Abubakar, I jointly convened a meeting between President Taylor and President Kabbah, the Heads of State of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The two Heads of State reached agreement at that meeting on a number of confidence-building measures to improve relations between their countries. The Presidents, inter alia, strongly condemned the continued rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as the horrendous atrocities committed there, and agreed to exchange official visits. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting was circulated as document S/1998/629.

6. On 20 July 1998, President Kabbah paid a one-day visit to Monrovia at the written invitation of President Taylor to attend the Liberian National Reconciliation Conference. The meeting of the two Presidents was held in the presence of the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Special Envoy of the President of the United States of America to Africa. In a joint communiqué issued after the meeting, President Taylor and President Kabbah again condemned all atrocities and violations of human rights committed by combatants in Sierra Leone against civilians, as well as the continued rebel activities in that country. They reaffirmed their commitment to non-aggression against the territorial integrity of each other's country and pledged to continue their cooperation towards peace and security in the subregion. Both leaders renewed their call to the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to deploy observer units on the Liberia/Sierra Leone border and agreed to coordinate border security activities. President Taylor accepted an invitation from President Kabbah to visit Sierra Leone at a date to be announced.

7. In a later development, the Government of Sierra Leone has denied any involvement in an alleged plot to overthrow the Government of Liberia, which has been widely reported in Monrovia.

8. On 25 July 1998, the Nigerian Government released the leader of RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh, to Sierra Leonean custody in Freetown. The Government of Sierra Leone has now detained Corporal Sankoh and issued a public statement calling on his supporters, who are still fighting, to surrender to ECOMOG, to my Special Representative or to any religious organization by 8 August 1998. The Government statement called for an end to fighting and urged Sierra Leoneans to turn their attention and energies to the elimination of poverty, disease and illiteracy. In a television appearance with the Sierra Leonean Minister of Information, Corporal Sankoh appealed to the remnants of RUF to halt atrocities against the people of Sierra Leone and to surrender to United Nations observers or to the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG). A subsequent Government statement issued on 3 August reiterated the 8 August deadline for the amnesty. There has been no significant response to the Government's call.

9. Following the visit to Sierra Leone of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, in May, the Government has

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accorded special attention, and has welcomed efforts by United Nations agencies, to promoting the welfare, rights and protection of children and to addressing challenges posed by the "youth crisis" and the high growth rate of the population. In July, Vice-President Albert Joe Demby publicized the 1998 edition of the UNICEF report, The Progress of Nations, while the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, Mr. James Jonah, delivered a radio address on World Population Day, in which he highlighted the Government's intention to rehabilitate and reconstruct all war-affected areas, increase the rate of economic growth faster than population growth and reduce poverty.

Activities of the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States and the military and security situation in Sierra Leone

10. Since the end of June, the military and security situation in Sierra Leone has improved somewhat as reports of atrocities committed by elements of the former junta have markedly declined. Despite the onset of the rainy season, ECOMOG, has maintained its pressure on Kailahun district, the remaining stronghold of the former junta in the eastern part of the country. At the same time, ECOMOG positions in Koidu, also in eastern Sierra Leone, have repeatedly come under mortar attack during the last few weeks and the situation in the north-east remains volatile and unpredictable, as was shown by the rebels' capture and brief occupation of Kabala.

11. Security in Freetown has generally been good. However, on 19 July 1998, a gun battle lasting approximately one hour broke out in Freetown between ECOMOG and a band of 15 men described as robbers. The men were all captured the same day without bloodshed.

12. In the countryside, elements of the former junta are concentrated around Kailahun and Koidu in relatively large numbers, while smaller groups have been operating in northern and central Sierra Leone. Sometimes these groups have harassed ECOMOG units and the civilian population, perpetrating atrocities and destroying property, but on a much smaller scale than was the case in June. Attacks by ECOMOG, including air strikes, are thought to have inflicted significant casualties on the rebels and broken them up into smaller groups, curtailing their activities. Reported shortages of food and ammunition among the rebels have increased the risk that they could attack ECOMOG convoys and isolated settlements in order to resupply themselves. The southern part of the country and the area around Freetown in the west have been calm, except for the incident described above.

13. On 27 July 1998, apparently after seizing weapons and ammunition in an attack on ECOMOG units at Bendugu in north-eastern Sierra Leone, junta supporters attacked ECOMOG troops in the town of Kabala. The attack, which was preceded by a feigned offer to surrender, was well-coordinated and launched from three sides. The rebels succeeded in taking the town and temporarily driving out the ECOMOG defenders. At about the same time, the rebels attacked a civilian bus about 10 kilometres south of Kabala, killing seven passengers.

14. By 31 July, ECOMOG troops moved back in force into Kabala as rebel forces withdrew. The rebels caused extensive property damage, including the destruction of some 200 houses, plundered the town and extorted money from the

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civilian population, whom they threatened to use as human shields in the event of a counter-attack. No mutilations have been reported.

15. During the past few weeks, ECOMOG has inducted fresh troops into the Kenema sector in south-eastern Sierra Leone, with a view to reinforcing its presence near Kailahun. The deployment of an additional brigade, comprising three battalions, has enabled ECOMOG to mount more aggressive patrols, at times in conjunction with the Sierra Leonean Civil Defence Force. ECOMOG has also reinducted former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSMLF) personnel, amounting to approximately three battalions, or 2,500 men, alongside its own troops to assist with the protection of supply lines and, in some cases, in combat duties. The provision of logistical assistance to ECOMOG, thanks to the bilateral contribution of the United States of America, has helped to improve operational capacity. ECOMOG has also been withdrawing exhausted troops with a view to rotating them. Nonetheless, ECOMOG, with an estimated 10,000 troops in theatre, is still overstretched and in need of significant additional logistical support, in order to contain the rebels and restore and maintain order in the eastern and northern parts of the country.

16. While the Civil Defence Force is nominally under the command and control of ECOMOG, reports continue to be received of unruly or criminal behaviour on the part of some members of the Force outside their own home districts. Strains that developed between ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Force in some places appear to have been successfully resolved or contained through the intervention of senior commanders. Some members of the Force have also been accused of human rights violations and criminal acts, including looting, confiscation of vehicles and civil disturbances, although allegations of summary killings and the torture of prisoners have dropped sharply since the end of May, apparently as a result of intervention by the Government and ECOMOG. The Civil Defence Force has made a commitment to end its practice of recruiting and initiating child soldiers, who comprise a high proportion of their ranks and who have been sent into combat.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Deployment of UNOMSIL

17. Pursuant to the creation of UNOMSIL by the Security Council by resolution 1181 (1998), I wrote to the President of the Council on 16 July 1998 to inform him of the countries that were contributing observers to the mission (see S/1998/673 and S/1998/674) and of the appointment of Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi (India) as Chief Military Observer. In accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 1181 (1998), I took advantage of the presence of President Kabbah at the special conference on Sierra Leone, held at Headquarters on 30 July 1998, to propose to him the terms of a status of mission agreement. As I informed the President of the Security Council in my letter of 3 August 1998 (S/1998/714), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, Mr. Sama Banya, at once replied indicating his Government's acceptance. As I also mentioned in my 3 August letter, on the basis of the Government of Sierra Leone's programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, issued to participants at the special conference, I have

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written to the Chairman of ECOWAS proposing arrangements by which ECOMOG would be responsible for the security of United Nations personnel in Sierra Leone.

18. In accordance with resolution 1181 (1998), the eight military liaison personnel already deployed in Sierra Leone since May 1998 pursuant to resolution 1162 (1998) have now been redesignated United Nations military observers. The additional 32 officers who are in the process of being deployed, including those in the first phase, are from China, Egypt, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Zambia. As of 10 August 1998, a total of 26 officers have been deployed in Sierra Leone, with more to come over the next few days (see annex). The medical unit is expected to arrive in the country by 20 August.

19. As indicated in my report of 9 June and as outlined in the Government plan mentioned in paragraph 17 above, one of the priority tasks of the military observers, in accordance with the mandate set out in resolution 1181 (1998), is to monitor the demobilization of former combatants already disarmed by ECOMOG and concentrated in secure areas of the country, primarily at Lungi. In addition, in order to continue to monitor and report on the military and security situation, two observers are already deployed at Bo and two at Makeni, with the headquarters of ECOMOG brigades based there.

20. The Chief Military Observer and his staff will continue to be based at Freetown and an observer team will cover the area around the capital, including Hastings. The largest deployment outside Freetown will be at Lungi, with smaller teams deployed to the ECOMOG brigade headquarters at Bo, Kenema and Makeni, as the security situation permits and as the Government makes progress in the implementation of its disarmament and demobilization plan. Further deployments are planned in due course to cover locations in the north, south and centre of the country, co-deployed with ECOMOG units, including in Sumbuya, Sulima, Zimmi, Joru and Kabala. Eventually, as order is restored to the parts of the country where fighting has been taking place and subsequent phases of deployment take place, it is envisaged that United Nations observers would also be co-deployed with ECOMOG units at Kailahun and Koidu.

21. As I informed the Council in my report of 9 June (S/1998/486, paras. 78-79), I have pursued with President Taylor the possibility of an eventual co-deployment of United Nations military observers with ECOMOG troops at the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. This proposal was reiterated in the communiqués following the meetings between President Taylor and President Kabbah at Abuja on 1 July 1998 and at Monrovia on 20 July 1998. My Special Representative will, at the appropriate time, dispatch a small team of observers from Freetown to examine the feasibility of such a deployment and I will revert to the Council accordingly.

22. In accordance with resolution 1162 (1998), a civilian police adviser, Deputy Commissioner Maritz du Toit (Namibia), was deployed in Sierra Leone in July. Following the adoption of resolution 1181 (1998), four more advisers will be deployed as soon as possible. Their role will be to assist in restoring the confidence of the Government and people of Sierra Leone in the police force, which incurred widespread public contempt for its role in supporting the junta,

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and to advise the Government on training and re-equipment needs. The United Nations civilian police will work closely with a team of police advisers deployed at the request of the Government from Commonwealth countries.

23. Since his arrival, Deputy Commissioner du Toit has established close relations with the Government and with his counterparts and has paid extensive visits to Sierra Leonean police stations within and outside the capital. He has also met with the Commonwealth police advisers to discuss cooperation between the Commonwealth and the United Nations in the conduct of their respective mandates.

Special Conference on Sierra Leone

24. As outlined in my report of 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486, para. 64), on 30 July 1998 I convened a high-level conference at Headquarters to mobilize assistance for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan, for the provision of logistical support to ECOMOG, for immediate humanitarian needs and for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sierra Leone. The conference was preceded by an organizational meeting on 24 June.

25. President Kabbah, accompanied by the Minister of Finance, Development and Economic Planning, Mr. James Jonah, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sama Banya, made a statement before the Conference, setting forth his plans for national reconciliation and rehabilitation, including improvements in internal security and the Government's plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Sierra Leonean former combatants. Representatives of some 55 countries, including the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Gambia, Guinea and Liberia, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ghana, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and the Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration of the United States of America attended the Conference. Other participants included the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, as well as the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. United Nations specialized agencies and the relevant departments also sent representatives. The ECOMOG Force Commander, General Timothy Shelpidi, addressed the Conference on ECOMOG's needs.

26. Participants agreed on the need to establish an international contact group to mobilize and coordinate further support for Sierra Leone. I am presently reporting in greater detail on the conference, directly to the President of the Security Council, in a letter to be circulated as a document of the Council.

IV. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

27. In a letter dated 11 August 1998 (S/1998/741), the Government of Sierra Leone conveyed to the President of the Security Council the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone. The programme describes in detail the institutional structures established by the Government to carry out its provisions, the financial management arrangements, the implementation schedule

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and the roles of UNOMSIL and ECOMOG in the reinsertion and reintegration of former combatants. The disarmament process will be carried out by ECOMOG, with the monitoring of UNOMSIL, in accordance with its mandate as set out in resolution 1181 (1998).

28. The essentials of the Government's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan were described in my report of 9 June (S/1998/486, paras. 53-62). The objective of the exercise is to consolidate the security of the State through the disarming, demobilization and reintegration into society of an estimated total of 33,000 former combatants (8,000 RSLMF and RUF and 25,000 CDF) in three phases between July 1998 and June 2001, at an estimated cost of \$33.6 million, of which \$17.3 million would be required for phase one. It is anticipated that the first phase would comprise the demobilization of the disarmed former RSLMF and RUF personnel now in detention and an estimated 5,000 CDF combatants. Particular emphasis will be devoted to the psychosocial reintegration of former child combatants from all sides.

29. The programme will be implemented under the guidance of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, under the chairmanship of President Kabbah and comprising representatives of the Government, ECOMOG, donors and my Special Representative on behalf of the United Nations community. The Committee will operate, in collaboration with other Government departments, donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), through an Executive secretariat responsible for overall programme planning and implementation, as well as the transparent and accountable administration of the programme and the monitoring and evaluation of its progress.

30. Following the formal adoption by the Government of the programme, the National Committee has commenced work and the members of the Executive secretariat, which will be assisted by a technical adviser, have been nominated. On 16 July 1998, a team representing the Committee, including the Ministers of the Interior and Information, the National Security Adviser and my Special Representative, visited the camp site at Lungi where more than 4,000 disarmed former members of RSLMF are currently detained by ECOMOG, awaiting demobilization and reintegration. The object of the visit was to explain the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process to the disarmed men and to the local community. Similar visits to other locations are planned for the future.

31. RSLMF has effectively been disbanded and is in a state of disgrace as a result of its participation in the illegal military coup of May 1997 and the subsequent junta rule. Though consideration is being given to reconstituting the Sierra Leone armed forces, it is considered unlikely that many of the ex-RSLMF personnel will be accepted for membership in it. The men detained at Lungi appeared to be well-treated, disciplined and receptive to the prospect of demobilization and rehabilitation. They were also aware of the intense hostility felt towards them by the general public and none have attempted to escape. Recently, some of the former RSLMF personnel have been reinducted into the ECOMOG force to assist in military operations.

32. One aspect of the reintegration process that has given cause for concern is the hostile attitude of the general public to former RSLMF personnel.

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Resentment at the atrocities inflicted by the junta and its supporters is so widespread as to pose a threat to the physical safety of anyone associated with the junta. As I have reported earlier, a number of revenge killings have been reported throughout the country since the recapture of Freetown in February. My Special Representative will assist the Government in carrying out a vigorous sensitization and education campaign to increase public acceptance of former army personnel undergoing reintegration, an effort that could also be supported by donor contributions.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

Abuses committed during and since the junta period

33. The human rights adviser working with my Special Representative for Sierra Leone has continued to compile accounts of atrocities committed both during and after the period of junta rule. Though some of these have yet to be rigorously examined, there is strong evidence of the systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population, including rape. In recent weeks, elements of the former junta have continued to shell population centres such as Koidu and Daru and have used civilians as human shields in their military operations. There have been numerous instances of arbitrary execution, including of women and children, followed in some cases by mutilation of the bodies.

34. Though incidents of mutilation appear to have greatly declined since the end of June, it is feared that for each of the 600 or so persons attacked since March 1998 who survived and sought medical attention, at least 4 others are either dead or unaccounted for. The victims of these attacks are still making their way in small numbers to medical centres.

35. A survey of 9 of Sierra Leone's 150 chiefdoms indicates that some 700 civilian war-related deaths have occurred since February, including 200 in one village, Yifin, in late April. About 1,600 people have suffered war-related injuries in these chiefdoms since February, of whom 30 per cent are children. In Koidu, a reliable source has stated that 663 bodies were buried following the fighting in the area in mid-June. A significant percentage of the dead were women and children. At the same time, the killing of some 44 of the 144 paramount chiefs during that period indicates a deliberate attempt to target them.

36. The rebels are estimated to hold several thousand civilian captives, including women and children. They are used as porters, human shields and for forced sexual activity. Abductions continue to be reported in the north. It is believed that many RUF/AFRC fighters were themselves abducted as children and subjected to brutal initiation ceremonies.

37. Rebel forces tend to destroy property and homes in the villages they attack. Though no precise figures are available, there are indications of extensive damage to the housing stock in all areas that they have ravaged. The study of the 9 chiefdoms referred to above found that 1,619 homes had been destroyed. A survey of 3 other chiefdoms identified 600 destroyed houses and,

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on 12 July alone, in a village near Masingbi, some 40 houses were destroyed. As noted above, the rebels also destroyed property in Kabala at the end of July.

38. The rebel campaign of terror and their military activities have resulted in the displacement of at least 350,000 people since February. Some 250,000 of these are now in Guinea and Liberia and the remainder are internally displaced in Sierra Leone. The persistence of the rebellion not only prevents their return, but also causes grave humanitarian problems for a significant element of the displaced population, as described in more detail below.

Treason trials and the administration of justice

39. The State is prosecuting 58 persons in the regular courts on a range of charges including treason, murder and arson, and two further trials are scheduled to begin soon. All defendants, if found guilty, face the possibility of the death penalty. The trials are proceeding against a background of widespread public anger and a desire for quick justice.

40. The court martial of 38 soldiers has begun before a judicial panel comprising Sierra Leonean army officers and presided over by a Judge Advocate who is an ECOMOG officer. Early concerns regarding procedure were speedily rectified by the Government after they had been raised by UNOMSIL, which continues to monitor both the courts martial and the proceedings in the regular courts. UNOMSIL is also continuing to persuade the Government to establish a channel for judicial appeals from court martial findings.

41. The Government concedes that the judicial system in Sierra Leone is entirely inadequate. Outside Freetown, the courts are not functioning at all and the traditional court system has collapsed. Sustained support will be needed to restore the judicial system in keeping with Sierra Leone's distinguished legal traditions.

42. There are six functioning prisons in Sierra Leone, but prisoners are also held in an unverifiable number of other facilities, including military camps. Most detainees in civilian facilities are being held pursuant to the emergency powers legislation introduced by the Government shortly after its restoration in March 1998. Conditions in many facilities are overcrowded and unsanitary and the food and medical care are inadequate. About 2,000 prisoners are being held in Freetown.

43. Reliable reports are being regularly received of poor discipline within the Civil Defence Force. In various locations throughout the country they have been accused of harassing the local population and engaging in extortion. It has also been reported that the initiation of new members, including children between the ages of 15 and 17, occurred near Magburaka during the third week of July. ECOMOG has established a complaints procedure to investigate any allegations of harassment of the local population by ECOMOG troops.

44. UNOMSIL has commenced a human rights technical cooperation needs assessment and has already identified widespread requirements, many of which should be addressed as a matter of urgency. These include the need for human rights education for government officials, traditional leaders, police officers,

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teachers of civic education, lawyers, journalists and NGO personnel. It is also necessary to provide technical support to the Government and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights to facilitate the application of human rights principles to State policy and practice. United Nations military observers will also receive training in aspects of international humanitarian law relevant to their duties.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

45. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone continues to give cause for concern, especially in the light of the poor response to the Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone. To date, only 5 per cent of the \$20.5 million requested has been received. Humanitarian organizations in Sierra Leone continue to face fundamental questions on the modalities for the delivery of relief assistance in an environment characterized by unpredictable hostilities and systematic human rights abuses. The effort to balance the rights of civilians in need of assistance with the requisite level of operational security has required the constant review and modification of the United Nations and NGO codes of conduct and protocols for humanitarian agencies operating in Sierra Leone, in order to reflect the current situation.

46. Despite the ongoing debate, humanitarian assistance continues to have a significant impact on the dire health and nutritional status of hundreds of thousands of war-affected Sierra Leoneans. The most significant humanitarian activities since my last report include efforts to address the serious humanitarian crisis at Masingbi in north central Sierra Leone, the influx of spontaneous returnees from Liberia and the repatriation by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Freetown now estimates that the number of internally displaced persons since the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998 has grown to more than 166,000. The recent clashes between rebel forces and ECOMOG around Kabala have provoked further displacements.

47. A rapid nutritional assessment carried out in Masingbi by the NGO, Action Contre la Faim, for children under the age of five revealed a global malnutrition rate of 39 per cent. Owing to insecurity in the Masingbi area during July, humanitarian organizations were forced to suspend operations and withdraw to Makeni. However, the United States NGO, CARE, succeeded in distributing assistance to more than 16,000 beneficiaries. Internally displaced persons continue to flow into Masingbi at a rate estimated at between 50 and 100 persons a day.

48. In collaboration with the Ministry of Health, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) is supporting the health care delivery system in Masingbi as well as in western Kono district, where they are providing drugs and basic medical equipment. The latest data on morbidity from Masingbi and Kono district have shown that the measles outbreak that was prevalent in the area is now under control as a result of the vaccination campaign carried out by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF.

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49. Masingbi remains a critical focus for humanitarian intervention in terms of shelter for the current rainy season and coordination of other sectoral activities. The NGO, Concern Worldwide, has recently agreed to support shelter activities, while UNICEF and Action Contre la Faim will collaborate on water and sanitation matters. Food distributions by CARE and health activities by UNICEF, NGOs and the Government have had a significant impact in contributing to reducing the death rate in Masingbi and its environs from 899 deaths during June to 29 in July.

50. A joint Government, UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) mission to Pujehun district in southern Sierra Leone has confirmed that there has been an influx of returnees from Liberia, who are thought to be crossing the border at the rate of some 90 per day. The most urgent needs of the returnees are food, health and shelter, which are to some extent being met by WFP and by NGOs.

51. UNHCR has continued to repatriate Sierra Leonean refugees to Freetown. A total of some 7,500 Sierra Leoneans, mainly from Guinea and Gambia, have been assisted in returning home. Furthermore, it is planned to bring 3,000 Sierra Leoneans home by air from Guinea during the month of August. UNHCR has also repatriated some 440 Liberian refugees from Sierra Leone.

52. A United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit database has been established to detail the condition of more than 166,000 internally displaced persons, the number of people displaced since the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998. However, this figure represents only a portion of the total number of internally displaced persons in the country. UNHCR estimates that, during the same period, more than 250,000 Sierra Leoneans have sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

53. A mission to Kabala, undertaken only days before the 27 July attack, estimated that some 18,000 civilians were residing in the town, including a large number of internally displaced persons from Kono district. As a result of the hostilities, unconfirmed reports indicate that the majority of the civilians were displaced to villages to the north and north-west of Kabala. It has been reported that large numbers of civilians were abducted from Kabala, as has been the practice of the RUF in the past. Furthermore, all reports indicate that all relief goods, medical supplies and logistics for humanitarian efforts were looted or destroyed during the brief occupation. Now that the situation has calmed, the humanitarian community is assessing the damage and making efforts to meet the needs.

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

54. The decision by the Security Council to create UNOMSIL and to expand its functions has been warmly welcomed by the Government and people of Sierra Leone, and the early signing of the status of mission agreement between the Government and UNOMSIL has also been of great assistance in providing a firm basis for our activities there. The adoption by the Government of Sierra Leone of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, containing clearly defined roles for ECOMOG and the United Nations, has set the tone for UNOMSIL's future efforts.

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55. The deployment of the first phase of UNOMSIL's 70 military observers and their equipment is also well under way. I am grateful to the troop-contributing countries for the dispatch with which they have acted in making these personnel available.

56. In my report of 9 June (para. 69), I identified three criteria which would govern subsequent deployments of military observers: the security situation, the progress of implementation of the Government's disarmament and demobilization plan and the availability of the necessary logistical equipment and resources. As I indicated then, I am keeping all three criteria under very close review and will keep the Council informed of all relevant developments while preparing for the next phase of the deployment. I am heartened by the progress made by ECOMOG in improving the security situation in the countryside, especially in eastern Sierra Leone, and renew my call to donors to contribute to ECOMOG's logistical requirements.

57. In this context, I am gratified by the success of the special conference on Sierra Leone, held at Headquarters on 30 July 1998, and look forward to working closely with the international contact group to be established to coordinate further support for Sierra Leone. In the meantime, I reiterate my call to donors to contribute to the Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone in order to assist Sierra Leoneans in meeting their most basic and urgent needs.

58. The sharp reduction in human rights violations perpetrated by elements of the former junta since the end of June is to be welcomed, but I remain deeply concerned about the plight of innocent civilians in the country, who may still be suffering from the depredations of the rebel forces or at risk from future attacks. In parallel with the efforts being made by ECOMOG to restore law and order throughout the countryside, I continue to believe that every effort should be made to end the threat posed by the rebels.

59. For this reason, I believe that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan adopted by the Government, and to be implemented with the assistance of ECOMOG and UNOMSIL, represents the best hope in the immediate future for consolidating the stability of the country and bolstering the authority of the Government throughout the territory of Sierra Leone. I therefore reiterate the plea I made on 30 July at the special conference for the donor community to lend every possible assistance to the Government in carrying out its plan. I welcome the commitment of the Government and the Civil Defence Force not to recruit children under the age of 18 as soldiers or to send them into combat, and urge them to implement their undertaking to demobilize any children currently under arms as soon as possible.

60. The development of technical capacity by the Government in the field of human rights deserves support. The results of a technical cooperation needs assessment performed by the office of my Special Representative reveal training needs. I encourage donors to assist the Government in meeting these needs.

61. Pursuant to resolution 1181 (1998), I will continue to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and report to the Council on developments there and on the progress made by UNOMSIL.

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62. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier Subhash C. Joshi, and to the civilian and military personnel of UNOMSIL for the efforts they are continuing to make to deploy the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council.

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ANNEX

The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra LeoneContributions as at 10 August 1998

<u>Country</u>	<u>Currently in position</u>
China	3
Egypt	-
India	5
Kenya	2
Kyrgyzstan	-
New Zealand	2
Pakistan	5
Russia	5
United Kingdom	2
Zambia	<u>2</u>
	26*

* In addition to the Chief Military Observer, India.



Map No. 4065 UNITED NATIONS August 1998

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

Number	Item	Content
178	United Nations Document	Second Progress Report of the UN Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 16 October 1998 (S/1998/960)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/960
16 October 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 19 of its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, the Security Council requested me to submit an initial report within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and its progress in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and describes developments since my first progress report on UNOMSIL (S/1998/750), of 12 August 1998.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. The Government and Parliament of Sierra Leone have continued to take steps to extend their authority and to reform and strengthen national institutions, with a view to increasing efficiency and eliminating corruption and duplication, as well as enhancing security and stability.

3. On 2 September 1998, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah outlined plans for the creation of a new national security system, based on the reconstitution of national armed forces, the reform of the police force and the integration of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Under this policy, the new armed forces would comprise a total of 5,000 troops under effective civilian management and constitutional control.

4. Another prominent issue is the handling of the trial of the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Corporal Foday Sankoh. After Corporal Sankoh had been brought back from Nigeria and placed in Government custody, RUF announced on 17 August 1998 a terror campaign against civilians, CDF and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) if the Government failed to release Corporal Sankoh within seven days, suggesting that peace negotiations could resume only thereafter. However, the Government has made it clear that Corporal Sankoh will stand trial and that there will be no resumption of negotiations or peace talks in view of the failure of RUF and the



junta in the past to comply with the provisions of the Abidjan and Conakry peace agreements.

5. Vice-President Albert Joe Demby and the Deputy Minister for Defence and CDF Coordinator, Chief Hinga Norman, have temporarily relocated their offices to Kenema in the eastern province in order to organize and direct the large-scale mobilization of the Civil Defence Forces for the operations aimed at clearing the remaining rebel-controlled areas. The Vice-President has reaffirmed the Government's determination to pursue the military option against the elements of the former junta. His statement has been reinforced by a call from Chief Norman to all CDF members to report for combat duty.

Relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia

6. In my report of 12 August, I mentioned the improvements that had occurred in the relations between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Since then, relations between the two countries, after a period of improvement following the meeting of President Kabbah and President Taylor in Abuja in July, have recently experienced complications arising in part from the continuing armed conflict in the east of Sierra Leone.

7. On 13 October 1998, President Kabbah informed me of alleged preparations by Liberia for the dispatch of fighters for an incursion into Sierra Leone. The allegations were vigorously denied by President Taylor. United Nations military observers also detected no evidence of an armed incursion from Liberia. On 16 October the two Presidents were reported to have spoken by telephone, and to have described the matter as "a misunderstanding that has been clarified". The two leaders were reported to have agreed to be in regular telephone contact in order to work towards strengthening relations. I welcome this constructive approach.

Follow-up to the Special Conference on Sierra Leone

8. Following the Special Conference on Sierra Leone held at United Nations Headquarters on 30 July 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone has established a 10-member working group charged with following up on the commitments and pledges made at the Special Conference. The Working Group met for the first time on 28 August 1998 and discussed possible steps for approaching donor countries and funding agencies that had agreed to support the reconstruction of Sierra Leone. As called for by the Special Conference, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has taken the initiative of convening an international contact group on Sierra Leone in London early in November. The Working Group will meet again beforehand, probably in late October, to assess the progress made.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

Rebel activities

9. Since my last report, the security situation in Sierra Leone has experienced considerable fluctuations. A relatively quiet phase in July was

followed by some volatility in late August and September, marked by a considerable increase in rebel attacks. These were accompanied by a resurgence of atrocities of the nature and scale last observed during the period from April to June, including the complete destruction of villages, and the torture, mutilation and execution of large numbers of civilians. These disturbing developments are reflected in more detail below.

10. The rebel build-up has been most significant in the north and brought the area of rebel activity closer to the centre of the country. Activity around the Koinadugu area has also intensified, as well as around Kambia and Kabala. The current concentration of rebels in the north-west indicates that they may be preparing for a major strike against Makeni or Port Loko. Such operations would sever ECOMOG's main supply route between Guinea, Freetown and Makeni and provide the rebels with a foothold close to the capital city. On 8 October, the rebels attacked Mange, between Port Loko and Kambia on the road between Lungi and the Guinean border, but were driven off. The situation in Freetown itself has remained safe and stable, and the whole of the southern province has remained free of rebel activity.

Civil Defence Forces/ECOMOG offensive into Kailahun district

11. On 1 October 1998 the Civil Defence Forces, with strong ECOMOG support, launched an offensive to capture one of the rebels' main strongholds in Kailahun district and thus disrupt their operations elsewhere in the country. The effects of the offensive are starting to be reflected in a reduction of the intensity of rebel activities in the north. Reports of the dispersal of the rebel stronghold at Koinadugu have also been received. Continued logistics support to ECOMOG is needed from the international community in order to ensure the effectiveness of those operations.

12. Several countries in the region have already pledged to contribute some of the additional 6,000 ECOMOG troops required to assist ECOMOG troops already in the country, whose number has been estimated at 10,000 to 12,000. The Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea, Mali and the Niger have indicated their readiness to provide contingents, stating that they could be deployed if the international community is prepared to bear the costs of transporting them to Sierra Leone. My Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, has initiated discussions on this matter, and the Chief Military Observer of UNOMSIL has been meeting with contingent commanders from the countries involved concerning their deployment and related expenses for in-country maintenance and other needs.

Deployment of the Mission

13. At the end of August 1998, UNOMSIL completed the first phase of the deployment of its military component, consisting of 40 military observers, the Chief Military Observer and a medical team of 15 personnel. In addition to mission headquarters in Freetown, UNOMSIL has deployed military observers to five team sites, namely, the three provincial capitals Bo, Kenema and Makeni, the main demobilization site at Lungi, and Hastings airport (see map). The observers have been well received by the communities and have established good relations with the local authorities as well as with ECOMOG and CDF personnel.

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Though there have been occasional restrictions on their movement for security reasons, the observers have not so far experienced any disruption in their operations or threats to their personal safety.

14. Over and above their tasks of closely monitoring developments in the military situation, the military observers play an important role in the monitoring of international humanitarian law and promote humanitarian assistance through the investigation of incidents. They also provide security advice to humanitarian personnel and liaise between them and ECOMOG, CDF and the local authorities. They have been frequently called upon to intervene with ECOMOG and CDF on behalf of other United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations.

15. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 1181 (1998), I wrote on 3 August 1998 to General Abdulsalámi A. Abubakar, Head of State of Nigeria, to propose that, in conformity with the disarmament and demobilization programme adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG forces assume responsibility for the security of United Nations personnel in Sierra Leone. On 28 September 1998 General Abubakar replied, stating that ECOWAS was perfectly amenable to the proposals set out in my letter, which therefore constituted the terms of an agreement between our two organizations. General Abubakar confirmed in his letter that the ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone included the protection of all United Nations personnel and all staff of humanitarian and aid agencies.

IV. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

16. As described in my report of 12 August, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme targets an estimated total of 33,000 ex-combatants, most of whom are members of the Civil Defence Forces, and is scheduled to be completed in three phases by June 2001. The first phase covers the demobilization of former Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and RUF personnel who were captured and disarmed by ECOMOG and later encamped at Lungi. Their screening and registration commenced on 2 September. UNOMSIL deployed additional military observers to the Lungi team site to assist in several aspects of the registration, including the initial assessment of the candidates. While these activities go beyond the monitoring role of UNOMSIL, the additional effort was required to ascertain the identity and eligibility of the ex-combatants since UNOMSIL was not present during the initial disarmament by ECOMOG. The exercise was completed on 25 September with a total of 2,145 persons screened and registered. The full demobilization of those ex-combatants is scheduled to be completed in December 1998.

17. While the registration and screening process was implemented fairly smoothly, the pace of the programme lags behind the original goals since it is now being implemented against the background of a continued war effort. Since most of the ex-RSLMF soldiers, amounting to four battalions, who had been encamped at Lungi have been reinducted by ECOMOG, the number of individuals to be demobilized during the first phase of the programme has been considerably reduced. It is expected, however, that these soldiers, who are currently fighting alongside ECOMOG, will eventually undergo the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In addition, though 5,000 members of

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the Civil Defence Forces were expected to be demobilized during the first phase, there is no indication to date that any CDF units have started the process, although in some areas registration exercises have been initiated.

18. As I mentioned in my last report, there is still concern about the hostile attitude of the general public towards former RSLMF personnel, which could potentially derail the reintegration process. Given the continued volatility of the overall security situation, it is important to ensure that former soldiers are not cast out of society because they may, as a group, turn into a destabilizing factor in the long run. A sensitization campaign under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture is now under way to increase public acceptance of ex-combatants. Successful reintegration will also depend on the benefits extended to those communities to which ex-combatants return in order to avoid the perception of a preferential treatment for the former soldiers.

19. A major challenge also remains concerning the start of the pre-discharge orientation programme which is to follow the screening and registration process. An initial programme of pre-discharge activities will be established at Lungi by the Executive Secretariat of the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. These will include workshops for community sensitization, attitudinal education for ex-combatants, and general information on reinsertion and reintegration.

20. Regarding the future of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the Executive Secretariat of the National Committee has already indicated its intention to open a disarmament and demobilization centre in the interior in preparation for the next phase of the programme. A team composed of National Committee staff, UNOMSIL and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), in collaboration with ECOMOG, is currently undertaking reconnaissance visits to identify suitable sites for the exercise.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights abuses

21. Since my last report there has been a resurgence of human rights abuses committed by the rebel forces. During the month of September, UNOMSIL received an escalating number of reports of mutilations, amputations, summary executions, abductions and house burnings. For instance, in just a single week, 20 villages were attacked and destroyed in four small chiefdoms in the north-west of the country. The attacks were preceded by the destruction of the principal local population centre, Kamalu, on 6 September. Forty people, including children, died in that attack. Photographic evidence suggests that a number of the dead had first been subjected to forms of extreme torture and sexual abuse; others appear to have been burned alive. It is reported that no less than 50 people were abducted. The rising incidence of mutilations and amputations is also illustrated by the admission to hospital of 14 amputees following just one attack on Kokuna on 27 September. From a number of locations UNOMSIL has received reliable reports of other forms of atrocities, including the detention

of elderly or incapacitated men in huts which were then set on fire and the carving of slogans, such as "AFRC", into the flesh of victims.

22. It remains difficult to estimate the exact number of rebel attacks and the casualties inflicted, not least because of the inaccessibility of many of the targeted locations and the high number of victims who never reach medical assistance. There is also very little reliable information regarding the plight of the captives of the rebels and of villagers living in areas under their control. However, interviews with former captives and escapees from those regions report such abuses as multiple rape of women, summary executions and slave labour. In the coming months, the four members of the UNOMSIL human rights unit, in cooperation with the military observers deployed in the provinces, will try in a systematic manner to compile and assess information regarding the human rights situation within the areas under rebel control.

23. There is also continued concern about the ongoing armed deployment of under-age boys and, in some locations, their continued initiation into the Civil Defence Forces. The renewed attention drawn to these matters by the Executive Director of UNICEF, Ms. Carol Bellamy, during a visit to Sierra Leone on 1 and 2 October, has greatly assisted efforts to end the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers by CDF units.

24. The discipline of many CDF units has improved significantly. Nevertheless, there are reports of interference by some CDF elements with the delivery of humanitarian supplies and acts of harassment against the civilian population. Reports of the prevalence of child prostitution in some heavily militarized areas of the countryside have, moreover, been substantiated. Together with UNICEF, the UNOMSIL human rights unit is seeking to assist the Government and ECOMOG in addressing this problem. Some reports have also suggested that certain ECOMOG personnel do not consistently ensure full respect for provisions of international humanitarian law, such as those regarding the protection of non-combatants in combat situations and the proper treatment of combatants during surrender or capture. UNOMSIL is encouraging the ECOMOG leadership to raise awareness among all troops to ensure full respect for all relevant aspects of international humanitarian law. The mission's human rights unit stands ready to assist ECOMOG with technical advice if needed.

Treason trials

25. The State is currently prosecuting, for treason and related charges, some 40 people in two civilian trials. A court martial was concluded on 12 October, and further trials are scheduled to commence in the coming weeks. A separate civilian trial of RUF leader Foday Sankoh commenced on 24 September 1998. Given the highly-charged atmosphere surrounding the trial, the Attorney-General has requested the assistance of the UNOMSIL human rights adviser on several occasions to ensure that Corporal Sankoh's rights are respected. However, the Government's failure so far to persuade a Sierra Leonean lawyer to represent Corporal Sankoh is a cause for concern. All the accused face the possible imposition of the death penalty. Already, 16 civilians and 34 of the defendants in the court martial have been sentenced to death. Under Sierra Leonean law, only the civilians have the right to appeal their sentences to the Sierra Leone Court of Appeal and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court. If the sentences are

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upheld throughout the appeals process, there is still the possibility of a pardon should the Head of State decide to exercise the prerogative of mercy under national law. A further avenue of consideration of the sentences is available by virtue of Sierra Leone's ratification of the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whereby individuals may petition the United Nations Human Rights Committee.

26. So far, UNOMSIL and observers from the International Bar Association have found that the civilian group trials are being conducted in a manner which appears to comply with international procedural standards. It is also apparent that the Government is largely committed to conducting transparent and fair trials. It remains a matter of concern that those tried by court martial are deprived of their right to judicial review of the judgements and sentences. UNOMSIL is also concerned as to whether the manner in which a number of defendants were repatriated to Sierra Leone from neighbouring countries was in accordance with applicable international standards. The concerns of UNOMSIL continue to be conveyed to the Government in a timely and forthright manner. On 15 October 1998 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote to President Kabbah, asking him to intervene in the process to show mercy.

Training initiatives

27. The UNOMSIL human rights unit also plays an important role in improving coordination and exchange among the different public and private institutions involved in human rights work in Sierra Leone. Moreover, special attention is given to the provision of technical assistance to help the Government meet its reporting obligations under the international human rights treaties, commencing with those arising under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UNOMSIL also seeks to facilitate national efforts to re-establish a functioning judicial system in provincial areas.

28. In line with the institution-building aspects of the UNOMSIL human rights mandate, the Mission has started several training initiatives in close collaboration with the Government and with national and international human rights non-governmental organizations and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. In September, UNOMSIL has successfully undertaken the training of the National Commission's human rights monitoring committees, and it has facilitated the first inter-non-governmental organization human rights training workshop. The Mission's human rights unit is also facilitating preparations for a major human rights monitoring and training programme to be implemented in November and provides a human rights module as part of the ongoing programme of retraining the police force.

29. These activities aim to strengthen local capacity to monitor, report on and promote human rights in the country, by both Government representatives and members of civil society. It is particularly important that training initiatives should be continued and consolidated.

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VI. CIVILIAN POLICE

30. In accordance with resolution 1181 (1998), UNOMSIL has to date deployed a total of three civilian police advisers, and two additional officers are under recruitment. In carrying out their mandate, the civilian police advisers work closely with the UNOMSIL human rights unit and the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force for Sierra Leone, which is advising and assisting the Government in police training.

31. In order to assess the current situation, the UNOMSIL advisers have undertaken visits to different police regional headquarters, divisional headquarters, departments, courts, police stations and posts, assisted in determining work methods, logistical and training needs, and identified a number of problem areas. In addition, they met with President Kabbah, the Chief Justice, various Members of Parliament, ambassadors, the commanders of ECOMOG and the Civil Defence Forces and various non-governmental organizations to discuss their activities in assisting the Sierra Leone police force. UNOMSIL has distributed to all concerned a report containing preliminary findings and recommendations.

32. The reform of the police force in Sierra Leone poses great challenges. As a result of the wanton destruction caused by the rebel war, many police stations in the country have been severely damaged or destroyed, and equipment vandalized. Parts of the country are without police presence, since many officers were killed or abandoned their posts during and after the conflict. Moreover, little or no training has been available for years, which has affected not only the skill level and capacity for policing but also the quality of leadership and strategic planning. Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of the force over the last few years, the police suffer from inadequate logistical support, lack of equipment, unattractive salaries and poor conditions of service. No vehicles or other means of transport are available to ensure the effective mobilization of officers to prevent and investigate crimes. This situation is exacerbated by the breakdown of the general law enforcement system. Outside Freetown, the courts are hardly operational except for the magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Makeni, and detention facilities are in poor condition.

33. The Government has outlined the principles and priorities which will guide the reform process, including specific steps based on the recommendations made by the UNOMSIL civilian police advisers and the Commonwealth Task Force. Moreover, a police mission statement has been announced, emphasizing the need to balance respect for human rights with law enforcement and to take account of local concerns through community consultation by the police force. Implementation of the reform process began in August, and a three-year draft plan, for the period 1999-2001, is currently under discussion. Strong emphasis is being placed on the development of police training initiatives, some of which are already being implemented.

34. While the progress made to date is impressive, resource constraints present serious obstacles to the effective and fast implementation of the reform. The Governments of Germany and the United Kingdom have already provided funds and equipment in support of these efforts, but further donor assistance will be required.

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VII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

Humanitarian crisis

35. A humanitarian crisis of serious proportions is developing in isolated areas of Sierra Leone, particularly the north-east. Since the incursion of former junta elements into Kabala at the end of July 1998, humanitarian agencies have been unable to assess needs there because of unpredictable security. The countryside between Kabala and Koidu, up to the border with Guinea, is also out of reach owing to insecurity and inadequate roads and airstrips. Similar conditions apply, inter alia, to the area east of Kambia in the north-west and in the Kailahun district.

36. Continuing insecurity has resulted in increased displacement of populations. During the reporting period, some 14,000 Sierra Leoneans were displaced from south Kenema district into Kenema Town. At the same time, the number of needy beneficiaries in Masingbi has swollen from 16,000 to more than 35,000. The United Nations Humanitarian Coordination Unit/Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that up to 250,000 persons have been displaced in the fighting that followed the ECOMOG intervention in February 1998, an increase of about 70,000 persons since my last report. It is feared that a considerable number of internally displaced persons remain unrecorded.

37. The number of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea is now 357,000, of which an estimated 217,700 have arrived since February 1998. Most of these fled to the Guékédou area, but some 7,700 have recently arrived in Forécariah following a rebel attack on 28 September at Kukuna near the border with Guinea. There are also 90,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, including 40,000 new arrivals. Another 10,000 Sierra Leoneans have taken refuge in other countries in the region, mainly in Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia and Senegal, for a total of 457,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the subregion. So as to determine more accurately the number of refugees in Liberia, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will carry out a registration exercise in November 1998.

38. In response to the newly emerging internally displaced person situation in both the eastern and northern parts of the country, UNICEF, in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, is providing high-energy biscuits to counter malnutrition and providing support to malnourished children referred to therapeutic feeding centres and supplementary feeding programmes.

Activities of United Nations organizations and non-governmental organizations

39. The World Food Programme (WFP) continues to provide humanitarian food assistance to vulnerable groups, farmers and institutions in accessible areas of the country. During August and September, WFP distributed over 4,641 tons of assorted food commodities, of which over 76 per cent benefited community farmers in their efforts to grow more food and become self-sufficient. Over 22 per cent of the quantity distributed during the reporting period went to support vulnerable groups escaping from the war as well as therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes. WFP targeted an estimated 62,000 vulnerable persons, over

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70,000 farmers, 12,600 nutritionally vulnerable persons and 6,823 refugees in food-for-work and training programmes in August and September 1998.

40. However, food assistance has encountered some constraints in supplies because of unacceptably high levels of losses from recent shipments, practically all in the port area. A meeting with the port authorities and security officers has led to proposals for improvements, and the situation is being monitored closely.

41. The intervention of the World Health Organization (WHO) proved crucial in the confirmation of vibrio cholera 0.1 as the causative agent responsible for the unusual increase in incidences of acute watery diarrhoea syndrome, which has caused a number of deaths. A total of 1,170 cases and 55 deaths were recorded from 19 July to 20 September 1998. The epidemic now appears to be on the decline, with the support of UNICEF and WHO, which have provided medical supplies to combat the outbreak. UNICEF is also coordinating cholera prevention through regular chlorination of wells and protection of water sources.

42. The maternal mortality rate is at a world record high of 1,800 per 100,000 live births and remains a primary concern. UNICEF is targeting 1.5 million children and women by revitalizing more peripheral health units to respond to the increasing demand for services.

43. Following an appeal by the Government of Sierra Leone for UNHCR to assist in the repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries, a UNHCR delegation visited Sierra Leone from 25 to 27 September. As a result, UNHCR is in the process of opening a new office in Kenema. Additional offices will be reopened in Bo, Segbwema and Zimmi once security permits. Moreover, UNHCR has started to facilitate the return of Sierra Leonean refugees. So far, a total of 11,000 refugees have been repatriated to Freetown where, at the request of the Government, priority has been given to the return of skilled professionals, civil servants and students, who could contribute to the ongoing reconstruction efforts. Finally, it should be noted that in August 10,000 refugees returned spontaneously from Liberia to Zimmi and Kenema and, in late September, according to reports yet to be confirmed, some 20,000 refugees returned from Liberia to Zimmi.

44. The World Health Organization commissioned a consultant in August to assess the magnitude of the problem of increased numbers of victims of amputation and has proposed rehabilitative measures to the Government.

45. To help better plan for relief and longer-term development intervention, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has begun discussions with the objective of helping the Government to undertake a national demographic and health survey.

VIII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

46. While a humanitarian emergency still prevails in the north and east of Sierra Leone, the southern and western parts have experienced a certain amount of stability and security. However, they must cope with the continuing influx

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of displaced populations and the challenges of reconstruction after the trauma and devastation brought on by the junta. The United Nations development system, under the leadership of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is therefore supporting peace-building efforts within the context of preventive development.

47. To this end, UNDP funds three large-scale programmes, including a programme for support to resettlement, reconstruction and rehabilitation through a preventive development approach. This \$4 million programme links emergency humanitarian assistance with the resumption of productive activities for longer-term development. Beneficiaries of the programme include internally displaced persons, returnee refugees, ex-combatants and host communities. UNDP is also funding a \$2.5 million programme aimed at raising public awareness of issues of national reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

IX. FURTHER ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS

48. In my fifth report on the situation in Sierra Leone, of 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486, para. 69), I stated that additional deployments of United Nations military observers beyond the first phase would depend on the security situation within the country and the progress made by the Government in carrying out its disarmament and demobilization plan.

49. The security situation in Sierra Leone has not improved significantly since my last report and, in some parts of the country, may have deteriorated. In the last two months the northern province has seen a resurgence of rebel activity, including atrocities, with no sign of weakening in rebel resolve, numbers or organization.

50. Largely for this reason, the progress made by the Government in carrying out its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has been less than was hoped for. The intensification of fighting caused by the launching of the CDF/ECOMOG offensive and the consequent large-scale mobilization of both CDF and re-inducted RSLMF personnel do not at present provide the best conditions for the rapid progress of disarmament and demobilization.

51. On the other hand, should the CDF/ECOMOG offensive lead to large-scale surrenders among the former junta elements and their participation in the disarmament and demobilization programme, it may be necessary to deploy United Nations observers very rapidly.

52. I am therefore keeping the situation under careful review, and intend to deploy additional observers only after taking full account of the security situation. I am, however, prepared to deploy observers rapidly if the situation so permits.

53. Against the background of the continuing military conflict and its effects on security, the need for the Government to improve the functioning of the Sierra Leonean police force has become all the more acute. In view of the success already achieved in implementing its current mandate, I recommend that my Special Representative, assisted by the Mission's civilian police component,

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now proceed to seek donor funding for the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leonean police force, while continuing to work closely with the Government in carrying out the three-year strategic plan referred to in paragraph 33 above.

X. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

54. The continuing conflict in Sierra Leone imposes immense suffering on the people of that country. I strongly condemn the summary executions, torture, mutilations, rapes, looting and other acts of barbarism carried out by former junta elements and call on them to lay down their arms and surrender. I am particularly outraged by the senseless acts of terror perpetrated against children, such as the amputation of limbs of boys and girls as young as six years of age, and support the efforts to bring to justice the authors of these especially abhorrent crimes.

55. The human rights abuses committed by the rebels also give rise to the humanitarian emergency in Sierra Leone, as they continue to cause the widespread dislocation of local populations. Though United Nations humanitarian personnel and non-governmental organizations have done much to aid the victims of attacks and displacement, more needs to be done as a matter of urgency, especially in regard to the provision of medical and surgical capacity, specific services for amputees and psychosocial treatment for the trauma suffered by the victims and their families. To this end, I reiterate my call to donors to contribute to the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance to Sierra Leone in order to meet the basic needs of the people.

56. The continuing commitment of ECOMOG has been essential in assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peace and security throughout the country, and the efforts being made to deploy additional troops from ECOWAS countries are welcome. In view of the importance of the present offensive into the east and the wresting of the initiative from the rebels, I appeal to the members of the Security Council and the international community to extend all possible technical and logistical support to achieving the successful conclusion of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

57. At the same time, I am encouraged by the focus of the Government on strengthening democratic control over the reconstituted armed forces. Equally commendable is the thoroughness applied to the restructuring of the police force and its reform in line with the standards of democratic societies. In this context, I should like to express my appreciation to the Governments of Germany and the United Kingdom for the support they have lent to the Government's efforts.

58. The long-term stability of the country will also depend vitally on the successful implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme adopted by the Government. I therefore reiterate the plea I made on 30 July at the Special Conference on Sierra Leone for the donor community to lend every possible assistance to the Government in carrying out its plan. I look forward to working closely with donors to ensure that the commitments made in this and other respects at the Special Conference will be honoured. I wish to commend the United Kingdom for the important role it has played by providing

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equipment and logistical support for the screening and registration exercise, and by continuing to provide food and emergency medical assistance to the ex-combatants as well as water to the larger community at Lungi.

59. The Government of Sierra Leone has made commendable efforts to ensure that the procedural aspects of the civilian group trials are in conformity with international human rights standards. However, I must express my concern that those sentenced to death in the recently concluded court martial have no right of legal appeal under Sierra Leonean law. Accordingly, in the light of the human rights issues which arise, I urge the Government, at a minimum, to consider a stay of execution of sentences pending review of the proceedings before relevant international monitoring bodies. I also encourage the Government to continue to take all reasonable steps to ensure that persons facing serious criminal charges are legally represented.

60. I should like to express my appreciation for the generous manner in which the International Bar Association has provided expert trial observers who have worked closely with UNOMSIL. I also encourage the international community to support human rights training programmes, to be carried out in close consultation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, for the benefit of those involved in law enforcement, as well as members of the legal profession and the judiciary.

61. The latest developments in the situation between Sierra Leone and Liberia are a cause for deep concern. I urge the Governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia to continue to exercise maximum restraint, pursue dialogue and implement the confidence-building measures aimed at improving relations between the two countries which they agreed upon in July 1998. In doing so, the two Governments would continue to show their commitment to subregional peace and security and their adherence to the Non-aggression Pact and Good Neighbourliness Treaty contained in the Mano River Union Declaration of 1973. In this context, should both parties agree, the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the border, subsequently accompanied by United Nations military observers, could help to stabilize the situation and restore mutual confidence.

62. Finally, I wish to thank all Member States which have contributed military observers for deployment with UNOMSIL for the speed with which the officers were dispatched. I hope that, under the right conditions and the necessary improvements in security, the second phase of deployment can be implemented with equal success.

63. Pursuant to resolution 1181 (1998), I will continue to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and report to the Council on developments on the ground as well as the continued work of UNOMSIL. In particular, I will examine with great care any realistic proposal to end the armed conflict with minimal further loss of life to combatants and to innocent civilians, and to promote lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

64. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, to the Chief Military Observer, Brigadier Subhash C. Joshi, and to the military and civilian personnel of UNOMSIL for their work in accordance with the mandate provided by the Security Council.

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
Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions
as at 1 September 1998

	Military observers	Others ^a	Total
China	3		3
Egypt	2		2
India	6	15	21
Kenya	4		4
Kyrgyzstan	1		1
New Zealand	2		2
Pakistan	5		5
Russian Federation	7		7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7		7
Zambia	4		4
Total	41 ^b	15	56

^a Medical team.

^b Including Chief Military Observer.



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Number	Item	Content
183	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1346 (30 March 2001)

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Security Council

Distr.: General

30 March 2001

Resolution 1346 (2001)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4306th meeting, on
30 March 2001**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Expressing its continued concern at the fragile security situation in Sierra Leone and neighbouring countries, and in particular at the continued fighting on the border regions of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia and at the grave humanitarian consequences for the civilian, refugee and internally displaced populations in those areas,

Recognizing the importance of the progressive extension of State authority throughout the entire country, political dialogue and national reconciliation, the full implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, the legitimate exploitation of the natural resources of Sierra Leone for the benefit of its people, full respect for the human rights of all and the rule of law, effective action on the issues of impunity and accountability, the voluntary and unhindered return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the holding by the Government of Sierra Leone of free, fair and transparent elections, and the formulation of a long-term plan for the peace process in order to achieve sustainable peace and security in Sierra Leone, and *stressing* that the United Nations should continue to support the fulfilment of these objectives,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 March 2001 (S/2001/228),

1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established in its resolutions 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

2. *Further decides* to increase the military component of UNAMSIL to a strength of 17,500, including the 260 military observers already deployed, as recommended by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 99 and 100 of his report;



3. *Welcomes* the revised concept of operations for UNAMSIL as set out in paragraphs 57 to 67 of the report of the Secretary-General and the progress already made towards its implementation, and *encourages* the Secretary-General to proceed to its completion;
4. *Expresses* its appreciation to those Member States providing additional troops and support elements to UNAMSIL and those who have made commitments to do so, *encourages* the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to seek, if necessary, further properly trained and equipped forces to strengthen the military components of UNAMSIL in order to enable the mission to implement fully its revised concept of operations, and *requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council upon receipt of firm commitments to that end;
5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to inform the Council at regular intervals on progress made by UNAMSIL in the implementation of key aspects of its concept of operations, and *further requests* him to provide an assessment in his next report on steps taken to improve the effectiveness of UNAMSIL;
6. *Expresses* its deep concern at the reports of human rights abuses committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and others, including other military groups, against the civilian population, in particular the harassment and forced recruitment of adults and children for fighting and forced labour, *demands* that these acts cease immediately, and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure all human rights monitoring positions within UNAMSIL are filled in order to address the concerns raised in paragraphs 44 to 51 of the report of the Secretary-General;
7. *Expresses also* its deep concern that the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000 (S/2000/1091) between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF has not been fully implemented, and *demands* that the RUF take immediate steps to fulfil its commitments under that Agreement to ensure full liberty for the United Nations to deploy its troops throughout the country, the free movement of persons and goods, unimpeded movement of humanitarian agencies, refugees and displaced persons and the immediate return of all seized weapons, ammunition and other equipment, and to recommence active participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;
8. *Requests*, in this respect, UNAMSIL to maintain its support, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, for returning refugees and displaced persons and to encourage the RUF to cooperate to this end in fulfilment of its commitments under the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement;
9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Council his views on how to take forward the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons, including their return;
10. *Calls upon* all the parties to the Sierra Leone conflict to intensify their efforts towards the full and peaceful implementation of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and the resumption of the peace process, taking into account the basis of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement and relevant Security Council resolutions, and *urges* Governments and regional leaders concerned to continue their full cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations to promote these efforts, and, in particular, to use their influence with the leaders of the RUF to obtain their cooperation towards achievement of the above-mentioned goals;

11. *Encourages* the efforts of ECOWAS towards a lasting and final settlement of the crisis in the Mano River Union region caused by the continued fighting in the border areas of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, and *underlines* the importance of the political support that the United Nations can provide to these efforts in order to stabilize the region;

12. *Takes note* of the responsibilities to be undertaken by UNAMSIL in support of the Government of Sierra Leone's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, notably the decision to provide an enhanced management role as referred to in paragraphs 76 to 79 of the report of the Secretary-General, *commends* the Government of Sierra Leone for the improvements it has already brought about in the programme, *encourages* it to take the necessary urgent decisions to allow finalization of the programme and dissemination of information on its benefits and conditions to proceed expeditiously, and *also encourages* international organizations and donor countries to support generously the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone in this regard;

13. *Emphasizes* that the development and extension of the administrative capacities of Sierra Leone are also essential to sustainable peace and development in the country, and therefore *urges* the Government of Sierra Leone to take the necessary practical steps to prepare for and bring about the restoration of civil authority and basic public services throughout its territory, including in the locations where UNAMSIL is expected to deploy in accordance with its concept of operations, and *encourages* States, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations to provide appropriate assistance in this regard;

14. *Encourages* the Government of Sierra Leone, together with the Secretary-General, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other relevant international actors, to expedite the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000, bearing in mind in particular the need to ensure the appropriate protection of children;

15. *Welcomes* the Secretary-General's intention to keep the security, political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to report to the Council, after due consultations with troop-contributing countries, with any additional recommendations, including, if necessary, for a further strengthening of the military component of UNAMSIL for the completion of the planned concept of operations to fulfil the overall objective of assisting the Government of Sierra Leone to re-establish its authority throughout the country, including the diamond-producing areas, and to create the necessary conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections in due course under the authority of the Government of Sierra Leone;

16. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Number	Item	Content
184	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1220 (12 January 1999)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1220 (1999)
12 January 1999

RESOLUTION 1220 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3964th meeting,
on 12 January 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998 and the statement of its President of 7 January 1999 (S/1999/PRST/1),

Expressing its deep concern over the recent deterioration of the situation in Sierra Leone, and encouraging all efforts aimed at resolving the conflict and restoring lasting peace and stability,

Having considered the Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (S/1998/1176) and his Special Report on UNOMSIL of 7 January 1999 (S/1999/20), and noting the recommendations contained therein,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 March 1999;
2. Takes note of the intention of the Secretary-General, as set out in paragraph 37 of his Special Report, to reduce the number of military observers in UNOMSIL and to retain in Conakry a small number who would return to Sierra Leone when conditions permit together with the necessary civilian substantive and logistical support staff under the leadership of his Special Representative;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council closely informed on the situation in Sierra Leone and to submit a further report to the Council with recommendations on the future deployment of UNOMSIL and implementation of its mandate by 5 March 1999;
4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Number	Item	Content
185	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1270 (1999)
22 October 1999

RESOLUTION 1270 (1999)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4054th meeting
on 22 October 1999

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999 and 1260 (1999) of 20 August 1999 and other relevant resolutions and the statement of its President of 15 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/13),

Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 8 September 1999 (S/1999/957) and its resolution 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict,

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999 (S/1999/1003),

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. Welcomes the important steps taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) towards implementation of the Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) since its signing in Lomé on 7 July 1999, and recognizes the important role of the Joint Implementation Committee established by the Peace Agreement under the chairmanship of the President of Togo;

2. Calls upon the parties to fulfil all their commitments under the Peace Agreement to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, national reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone;

3. Takes note of the preparations made for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers, by the Government of Sierra Leone through the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, and urges all concerned to make every effort to ensure that all designated centres begin to function as soon as possible;

4. Calls upon the RUF, the Civil Defence Forces, former Sierra Leone Armed Forces/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and all other armed groups in Sierra Leone to begin immediately to disband and give up their arms in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement, and to participate fully in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

5. Welcomes the return to Freetown of the leaders of the RUF and AFRC, and calls upon them to engage fully and responsibly in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to direct the participation of all rebel groups in the disarmament and demobilization process without delay;

6. Deplores the recent taking of hostages, including UNOMSIL and ECOMOG personnel, by rebel groups and calls upon those responsible to put an end to such practices immediately and to address their concerns about the terms of the Peace Agreement peacefully through dialogue with the parties concerned;

7. Reiterates its appreciation for the indispensable role which ECOMOG forces continue to play in the maintenance of security and stability in and the protection of the people of Sierra Leone, and approves the new mandate for ECOMOG (S/1999/1073, annex) adopted by ECOWAS on 25 August 1999;

8. Decides to establish the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with immediate effect for an initial period of six months and with the following mandate:

(a) To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement;

(b) To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan;

(c) To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres;

(d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;

(e) To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein;

(f) To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning;

(g) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

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(h) To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers;

(i) To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone;

9. Decides also that the military component of UNAMSIL shall comprise a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, and takes note of paragraph 43 of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999;

10. Decides further that UNAMSIL will take over the substantive civilian and military components and functions of UNOMSIL as well as its assets, and to that end decides that the mandate of UNOMSIL shall terminate immediately on the establishment of UNAMSIL;

11. Commends the readiness of ECOMOG to continue to provide security for the areas where it is currently located, in particular around Freetown and Lungi, to provide protection for the Government of Sierra Leone, to conduct other operations in accordance with their mandate to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement, and to initiate and proceed with disarmament and demobilization in conjunction and full coordination with UNAMSIL;

12. Stresses the need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in carrying out their respective tasks, and welcomes the intended establishment of joint operations centres at headquarters and, if necessary, also at subordinate levels in the field;

13. Reiterates the importance of the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, notes that the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF have agreed in the Peace Agreement to provide guarantees in this regard, and calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel;

14. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that in the discharge of its mandate UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG;

15. Underlines the importance of including in UNAMSIL personnel with appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination;

16. Requests the Government of Sierra Leone to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such an agreement

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the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

17. Stresses the urgent need to promote peace and national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, underlines in this context the key role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace established under the Peace Agreement, and urges the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure the prompt establishment and effective functioning of these bodies with the full participation of all parties and drawing on the relevant experience and support of Member States, specialized bodies, other multilateral organizations and civil society;

18. Emphasizes that the plight of children is among the most pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone, welcomes the continued commitment of the Government of Sierra Leone to work with the United Nations Children's Fund, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and other international agencies to give particular attention to the long-term rehabilitation of child combatants in Sierra Leone, and reiterates its encouragement of those involved to address the special needs of all children affected by the conflict;

19. Urges all parties concerned to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons are protected and are enabled to return voluntarily and in safety to their homes, and encourages States and international organizations to provide urgent assistance to that end;

20. Stresses the urgent need for substantial additional resources to finance the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and calls upon all States, international and other organizations to contribute generously to the multidonor trust fund established by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for this purpose;

21. Stresses also the continued need for urgent and substantial humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra Leone, as well as for sustained and generous assistance for the longer term tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone, and urges all States and international and other organizations to provide such assistance as a priority;

22. Calls upon all parties to ensure safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Sierra Leone, to guarantee the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and to respect strictly the relevant provisions of international humanitarian and human rights law;

23. Urges the Government of Sierra Leone to expedite the formation of professional and accountable national police and armed forces, including through their restructuring and training, without which it will not be possible to achieve long-term stability, national reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country, and underlines the importance of support and assistance from the international community in this regard;

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24. Welcomes the continued work by the United Nations on the development of the Strategic Framework for Sierra Leone aimed at enhancing effective collaboration and coordination within the United Nations system and between the United Nations and its national and international partners in Sierra Leone;

25. Notes the intention of the Secretary-General to keep the situation in Sierra Leone under close review and to revert to the Council with additional proposals if required;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council every 45 days to provide updates on the status of the peace process, on security conditions on the ground and on the continued level of deployment of ECOMOG personnel, so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed can be evaluated as outlined in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the report of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999;

27. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Number	Item	Content
186	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1181 (13 July 1998)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1181 (1998)
13 July 1998

RESOLUTION 1181 (1998)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3902nd meeting,
on 13 July 1998

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions and the statements of its President,

Welcoming the continued efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peaceful and secure conditions in the country, to re-establish effective administration and the democratic process and to embark on the task of national reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation,

Recognizing the important contribution of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in support of these objectives,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486 and Add.1),

Noting the objectives set by ECOWAS for its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) as described in paragraph 17 of the report of Secretary-General,

Gravely concerned at the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone, including refugees and displaced persons, as a result of the continuing rebel attacks, and in particular at the plight of children affected by the conflict,

1. Condemns the continued resistance of remnants of the ousted junta and members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to the authority of the legitimate government and the violence they are perpetrating against the civilian population of Sierra Leone, and demands that they lay down their arms immediately;

2. Emphasizes the need to promote national reconciliation in Sierra Leone, encourages all parties in the country to work together towards this objective, and welcomes the assistance of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy in that regard;

3. Welcomes the proposal in the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1998 on the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL);

4. Notes that the Government of Sierra Leone has adopted a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan agreed with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United Nations Development Programme and other donors;

5. Commends the positive role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their efforts to restore peace, security and stability throughout the country at the request of the Government of Sierra Leone, and notes the role of ECOMOG in assisting the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone, including the provision of security and responsibility for arms collection and destruction;

6. Decides to establish UNOMSIL for an initial period of six months until 13 January 1999, and further decides that it shall include up to 70 military observers as well as a small medical unit, with the necessary equipment and civilian support staff, with the following mandate:

(a) To monitor the military and security situation in the country as a whole, as security conditions permit, and to provide the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with regular information thereon in particular with a view to determining when conditions are sufficiently secure to allow subsequent deployments of military observers beyond the first phase described in paragraph 7 below;

(b) To monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country, including monitoring of the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security and in the collection and destruction of arms in those secure areas;

(c) To assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization sites, where security conditions permit;

(d) To monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), as security conditions permit;

7. Decides further that the elements of UNOMSIL referred to in paragraph 6 above shall be deployed as outlined in the Secretary-General's report, with approximately 40 military observers deployed in the first phase to ECOMOG-secured areas, and that subsequent deployments shall take place as soon as security conditions permit, and subject to progress on the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan and the availability of the necessary equipment and resources;

8. Decides further that UNOMSIL shall be led by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, who will be designated Special Representative for Sierra Leone, that UNOMSIL shall subsume the office of the Special Envoy and its civilian staff, and that the augmented civilian staff, as recommended by the

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Secretary-General in paragraphs 74 and 75 of his report, shall perform, inter alia, the following tasks:

(a) To advise, in coordination with other international efforts, the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies, to advise on the planning of the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leone police force, and to monitor progress in that regard;

(b) To report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone, and, in consultation with the relevant United Nations agencies, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs;

9. Welcomes the commitment of ECOMOG to ensure the security of United Nations personnel, and in this regard welcomes also the intention of the Secretary-General to establish security arrangements for United Nations personnel with the Chairman of ECOWAS and to conclude a status of mission agreement with Government of Sierra Leone;

10. Decides that the elements of UNOMSIL referred to in paragraph 6 above shall be deployed when the Secretary-General informs the Council that security arrangements and the status of mission agreement have been concluded, and further decides to keep the deployment of UNOMSIL under review in the light of the prevailing security conditions;

11. Stresses the need for full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMSIL and ECOMOG in their respective operational activities;

12. Demands that all factions and forces in Sierra Leone strictly respect the status of UNOMSIL personnel, as well as organizations and agencies delivering humanitarian assistance throughout Sierra Leone, and that they respect human rights and abide by applicable rules of international humanitarian law;

13. Expresses its serious concern at the reports of cross-border arms flows and support to the rebels in Sierra Leone, welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as indicated in his report, to pursue with all parties concerned steps to eliminate these activities, and in that regard reaffirms the obligation of all States to comply strictly with the terms of the embargo on the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to Sierra Leone imposed by resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, and to bring all instances of violations of the arms embargo before the Committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997;

14. Welcomes the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to coordinate an effective national response to the needs of children affected by armed conflict, and the recommendation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict that Sierra Leone be made one of the pilot projects for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children in the context of post-conflict peace-building;

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15. Further welcomes the decision of the Secretary-General to convene a high-level conference to mobilize assistance for peacekeeping activities, emergency and humanitarian needs and reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sierra Leone;

16. Reiterates its urgent appeal to States to make contributions to the Trust Fund which has been established to support peacekeeping and related activities in Sierra Leone, to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOMOG to carry out its peacekeeping role, and to help facilitate other ECOWAS member States to provide additional troops to strengthen the deployment of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone;

17. Urges all States and international organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, in response to the consolidated inter-agency appeal launched on 24 June 1998;

18. Encourages all States and international organizations to assist and participate in the longer term tasks of reconstruction and economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an initial report to the Council within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter on the deployment of UNOMSIL and on the progress of UNOMSIL in carrying out its mandate, and also to inform the Council on plans for the later phases of the deployment of UNOMSIL when security conditions permit these to be implemented;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Number	Item	Content
187	United Nations Document	Security Council Resolution 1132 (8 October 1997)



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1132 (1997)
8 October 1997

RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3822nd meeting,
on 8 October 1997

The Security Council,

Recalling the statements of its President of 27 May 1997 (S/PRST/1997/29), 11 July 1997 (S/PRST/1997/36) and 6 August 1997 (S/PRST/1997/42) condemning the military coup in Sierra Leone,

Taking note of the decision of the thirty-third summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 2 to 4 June 1997 concerning the situation in Sierra Leone,

Taking note also of the Communique issued at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Sierra Leone, held in Conakry, Guinea on 26 June 1997 (S/1997/499), the Declaration of the ECOWAS Committee of Four Foreign Ministers on Sierra Leone (the ECOWAS Committee) of 30 July 1997 (S/1997/646), and the final Communique of the summit of ECOWAS held at Abuja on 28 and 29 August 1997 and the Decision on sanctions against the military junta in Sierra Leone issued at the summit (S/1997/695, Annexes I and II),

Taking note also of the Secretary-General's letter of 7 October 1997 (S/1997/776),

Expressing its full support and appreciation for the mediation efforts of the ECOWAS Committee,

Reaffirming its view that the Abidjan Agreement (S/1996/1034) continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone,

Deploing the fact that the military junta has not taken steps to allow the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order,

Gravely concerned at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and the consequences for neighbouring countries,

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order;

2. Reiterates its call upon the junta to end all acts of violence and to cease all interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra Leone;

3. Expresses its strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone and encourages it to continue to work for the peaceful restoration of the constitutional order, including through the resumption of negotiations;

4. Encourages the Secretary-General, through his Special Envoy, in cooperation with the ECOWAS Committee, to assist the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis and, to that end, to work for a resumption of discussions with all parties to the crisis;

5. Decides that all States shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of members of the military junta and adult members of their families, as designated in accordance with paragraph 10 (f) below, provided that the entry into or transit through a particular State of any such person may be authorized by the Committee established by paragraph 10 below for verified humanitarian purposes or purposes consistent with paragraph 1 above, and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals;

6. Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territory;

7. Decides that the Committee established by paragraph 10 below may authorize, on a case-by-case basis under a no-objection procedure:

- (a) applications by the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone for the importation into Sierra Leone of petroleum or petroleum products; and
- (b) applications by any other government or by United Nations Agencies for the importation of petroleum or petroleum products into Sierra Leone

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for verified humanitarian purposes, or for the needs of the Military Observer Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG),

subject to acceptable arrangements for effective monitoring of delivery;

8. Acting also under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this resolution relating to the supply of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related matériel of all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with applicable international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, and calls upon all States to cooperate with ECOWAS in this regard;

9. Requests ECOWAS to report every 30 days to the Committee established under paragraph 10 below on all activities undertaken pursuant to paragraph 8 above;

10. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

- (a) to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
- (b) to consider information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above and to recommend appropriate measures in response thereto;
- (c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;
- (d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
- (e) to consider and decide expeditiously requests for the approval of imports of petroleum and petroleum products in accordance with paragraph 7 above;
- (f) to designate expeditiously members of the military junta and adult members of their families whose entry or transit is to be prevented in accordance with paragraph 5 above;
- (g) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraphs 9 above and 13 below;

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(h) to establish liaison with the ECOWAS Committee on the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

11. Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee established by paragraph 10 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for this purpose;

13. Requests States to report to the Secretary-General within 30 days of the date of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

14. Requests all those concerned, including ECOWAS, the United Nations and other international humanitarian agencies, to establish appropriate arrangements for the provision of humanitarian assistance and to endeavour to ensure that such assistance responds to local needs and is safely delivered to, and used by, its intended recipients;

15. Urges all States, international organizations and financial institutions to assist States in the region to address the economic and social consequences of the influx of refugees from Sierra Leone;

16. Requests the Secretary-General to submit an initial report to the Council within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution on compliance with paragraph 1 above, and thereafter every 60 days after the date of adoption of this resolution on its implementation and on the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone;

17. Decides, if the measures set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above have not been terminated in accordance with paragraph 19 below, to conduct, 180 days after the adoption of this resolution and on the basis of the most recent report of the Secretary-General, a thorough review of the application of these measures and of any steps taken by the military junta to comply with paragraph 1 above;


18. Urges all States to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOWAS to carry out its responsibilities in the implementation of this resolution;

19. Expresses its intention to terminate the measures set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above when the demand in paragraph 1 above has been complied with;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Number	Item	Content
188	United Nations Document	UNICEF Press Release, "Stop Using Child Soldiers, Sierra Leone Told," 19 June 1997

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Stop using child soldiers, Sierra Leone told

Thursday, 19 June 1997: As diplomatic efforts continued to seek a lasting resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone, UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy called on all sides to put an end to the use of children as combatants, and to incorporate provisions for their physical and emotional welfare in a future peace settlement.

Since May 25, when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) took power in a coup, witnesses have reported seeing hundreds of armed children in the streets of the capital, Freetown. Many are former child soldiers, who had returned to their communities during a country-wide demobilization programme, which began in 1993. They have now been recruited and rearmed again by the AFRC and their allies. More than 60 per cent of the 1,000 fighters recently screened by the Disarmament, Demobilization and Resettlement Unit, set up by the ousted government, were women and children.

"Children should have no part in war," said Ms. Bellamy. "By making them agents of civil conflict and depriving them of their childhood, the vicious cycle of violence is perpetuated."

Sierra Leone has one of the world's worst records for recruiting child soldiers. Between 1992 and 1996, in the previous period of civil unrest between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an estimated 4,500 children were forced to fight on

both sides. Children were abducted and forced to commit atrocities in order to turn them into ruthless fighters. Some were ordered to torture and murder their own relatives before being taken to neighbouring villages to slaughter others.

"Child soldiers are a symptom of the wider problem, the complete neglect of a whole generation," Ms. Bellamy said. "Every single child has felt the impact of this war, whether or not he or she has been forced to carry a gun."

Since fighting began, several children have been found among the dead. Young girls have been raped and sexually abused during the attacks. Many children have been stranded without parents or relatives. A Save the Children (UK) survey of 1,400 people, who crossed from the Kailahun district into Liberia following the coup, registered 42 unaccompanied children. They will join the 8,000 children who are still separated from their families as a result of previous civil unrest.

Children will also be hardest hit by the gradual collapse of basic services. Food distribution has been disrupted, and the price of staple foods in many areas of the country has doubled. Immunization campaigns have been halted, leaving children susceptible to epidemics of measles, typhoid and whooping cough. Health workers have also expressed fear of an imminent cholera epidemic. Schools are closed and most teachers have fled the country.

The disruption in basic services is likely to push Sierra Leone back once again into a desperate situation, reversing significant advances that had been made during the brief period of peace.

"The right of every child to basic education, health care and other services must be part of a lasting peace settlement," Ms. Bellamy said.

She called for the immediate demobilization of all child soldiers. The proposals outlined in the 1996 Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children by Graça Machel, should be urgently implemented, said Bellamy, including the

adoption of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which would raise the minimum age of recruitment and participation in armed forces from 15 to 18 years.

Please email media@unicef.org with comments or requests for more information, quoting CF/DOC/PR/1997/22.

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Number	Item	Content
189	United Nations Document	UNICEF Monthly Report, "Events Pertaining to Children," 31 July 1999

CPF/RVF 4595



SIERRA LEONE

31 July, 1999

MONTHLY REPORT

SIEREP-NO 3/99

EVENTS PERTAINING TO CHILDREN

Human Rights Manifesto Highlights CRC

The Human Rights Manifesto of Sierra Leone issued during visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that "Children have been the most grievous victims of human rights abuse in Sierra Leone." As a sign of its commitment to review and upgrade its laws to international human rights standards, the Government announced its intent to speedily finalize and table before Parliament the 'Draft Bill on The Rights and Welfare of the Sierra Leonean Child'. This bill will incorporate into national law, the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Government also expressed its intent to table before

Parliament a bill for the raising of the age of military recruitment to 18 years in line with the Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Also in this Issue

Togo Peace Accord and Children	2
Bloody Diarrhoea Decreasing	5
ECOMOG Field Commanders briefed on child protection	7
Head of State launches Progress of Nations Report	8



1st official release by the Revolutionary United Front following the Peace Accord, was a group of 187 persons including 130 children, 25% of whom were under ten years (story on page 6).

EVENTS CONTINUED



CDF Pledges Non-Initiation of Children

On 28th June the Civil Defence Force pledged to stop the recruitment of children and to send home those already within their ranks. These commitments were part of the seven-point action plan developed at the two-day workshop in Bo town organised by the European Union as part of its relief and rehabilitation programme. The Kamajor Action Plan was signed by Chief Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence and the Kamajor Force Commander, with assurances that it will be implemented at district and chiefdom levels. Chief Norman also called on all aid organizations to "do everything possible to provide support to ex-combatants in the form of education and non-formal skills training".

UN Assessment Team visits Makeni

The UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator led a team of UN and NGO specialists on a mission to Makeni in the Northern Province on Thursday 22nd July. During the one-day visit, procedures to provide humanitarian assistance to the northern and north-eastern parts of the country were established. The RUF Commanders pledged to (i) vacate all UN and NGO premises, (ii) hand over stolen property in order to facilitate resumption of services, (iii) permit a nutritional assessment of children by Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) and Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and (iv) to participate in the National Immunization Days planned for 9th October, 6th November and 11th December.

(EVENTS continues on page 8)

PROGRAMME

Health

Strengthening District Medical Services

Three months supply of miscellaneous drugs, 51 MCH kits and other medical supplies (including 573 TBA kits) were handed over to District Medical Health Teams (DHMT) in Port Loko, Bo, Pujehun and Kenema, to strengthen medical services at district level.

The cold room in the Port Loko district is being refurbished and supplied with a generator to support routine EPI activities.

The Emergency Health Task Force has also been holding regular co-ordination meetings to plan for an expansion of primary health care activities in Port Loko. The district is opening up after having been largely inaccessible since January.

Oral Rehydration Corners For Schools

Three hundred (300) oral rehydration kits have been placed in established ORT corners in 150 schools in the Western Area for first line treatment until referral is made. Two Teachers per school were trained to train other teachers in the schools and to supervise the services. School facilities, under the school health program, will soon be supplemented by the provision of First Aid kits. The ORT and Ist AID services will be monitored through the School Inspectorate System.

Kabala Hospital Resumes Service

The Kabala Government Hospital has resumed operations with drugs and medical supplies provided by UNICEF and MSF-Belgium. The hospital was vandalised by RUF rebels about eight months ago.

Number	Item	Content
190	United Nations Document	UNOMSIL – Human Rights Assessment Mission to Freetown 25 January and 1 to 4 February 1999, Findings and Recommendations.

UNOMSIL

HUMAN RIGHTS ASSESSEMENT MISSION TO FREETOWN25 JANUARY AND 1 TO 4 FEBRUARY 1999FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONSINTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998 and 1220 (1999) of 12 January, 1999, the Human Rights Section of UNOMSIL was instructed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to conduct an investigation mission in Freetown (hereinafter, "the mission"). The mission occurred on 25 January and from 1 to 4 February. The mission sought to assess the nature and extent of violations and/or abuses of international human rights law and international humanitarian law perpetrated in the period since the rebel offensive on the city on 6 January 1999.

The mission was tasked with an assessment of the actions of all relevant actors in the light of applicable law. For purposes of this report applicable law is considered to include, inter-alia, the Geneva Conventions, including Common Article 3, customary and other non-conventional international human rights law, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (all these instruments have been ratified by Sierra Leone).

Practices detailed in the report are referred to on the basis that they indicate violations, on the one hand, or abuse (i.e. actions which do not technically constitute violations), on the other, of international standards. Almost all such practices impugn or are inconsistent with multiple conventional and non-conventional standards. Accordingly, the report does not itemise the applicable legal provisions.

The report does not name victims, witnesses or alleged perpetrators. Some names or pseudonyms are on file with UNOMSIL. UNOMSIL is also in possession of or has access to documentary and photographic evidence of abusive activities.

MISSION ACTIVITIES

I. ADVANCE ACTIVITIES

Prior to the conducting of the mission, and during the period intervening between the two visits to Freetown, UNOMSIL interviewed some 35 persons, including religious and civil society leaders, who had left Freetown since January 6. These included former captives of the rebels, as well as witnesses to abusive activities of various armed forces. UNOMSIL also, to the extent possible, maintained contact with persons remaining in Freetown. Information was also provided on a regular basis by persons returning from brief visits to the city - including UNOMSIL personnel, UN agency staff and representatives of the NGO community.

II. FREETOWN PROGRAMME

The mission travelled throughout the city, visiting locations from Laka, in the Southwest, to Calaba Town in the East. Sites of incidents were visited and an overview of property damage was undertaken. Members of the mission also witnessed the perpetration of grave violations of human rights, including the right to life (see below).

Meetings were held with some 100 persons, including victims and witnesses of abusive behaviour, Government and ECOMOG officials, civil society and religious leaders, representatives of the human rights and humanitarian NGO communities, national staff of UNOMSIL and UN agencies, journalists and medical personnel. Information and views were also provided by CDF and Civil Defence Unit (CDU) personnel, medical patients, police officers and business people. The local print and broadcast media was surveyed on a daily basis.

The mission benefited from information and support provided by UNOMSIL military personnel and a UN Security Assessment Team, which were also present in Freetown during the mission dates.

III. FOLLOW UP ACTIVITIES

Following its return to Guinea, the team continued to interview persons arriving in Conakry from Freetown. Findings based on these interviews are taken account of in this report.

FINDINGS

I. REBEL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFLICT AND THE HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY

Ultimate responsibility for the fighting, most civilian casualties and the related humanitarian emergency in Freetown rests with the rebel forces. It was the rebel forces who undertook the assault on the city and who persisted in resisting ECOMOG, thereby extending the period of fighting and destruction within an area densely populated with civilians.

The actual number of civilian casualties will never be known. One mortuary worker in Freetown stated on 25 January that over 2,000 bodies of men, women and children had already been disposed of. Observers are also of the view that a large number of bodies remain in ruined or burned buildings in the centre and east of the city. Many others have been hastily buried on waste ground or in residential compounds. Multiple reports have also been received of bodies floating in the sea and its inlets within the city, as well as on the beaches. The mission observed some body parts remaining on beaches and other locations. Most estimates put the total casualty figure conservatively at between 3 and 5,000, including up to 1,000 rebel fighters and an unknown number of ECOMOG and CDF combatants.

It is difficult to assess the extent of damage done to civilian properties. In the city centre up to 20% of the property stock may be seriously damaged. In the east the figure rises to up to 90% at locations such as Calaba Town. (See further below)

The rebel campaign, including its terrorisation elements, caused the displacement of at least 150,000 people into the city, before, during and since the battle for Freetown. The displacement has been responsible for an exacerbation of the humanitarian emergency (see the Humanitarian Plan of Action for Sierra Leone, February 1999) and the exposure of still greater numbers of civilians to conflict-related risk.

It should also be observed that abusive behaviour of rebel forces (see below) as well as the ongoing threat which they pose to Freetown form part of the background to the current perpetration by ECOMOG and CDF forces of unacceptable acts (see below)

II. KILLING OF CIVILIANS BY REBEL FORCES

Rebel forces advancing into the and through the city on 6 and 7 January frequently forced civilians into the streets for use as human shields. People who refused to comply were either killed or had their properties destroyed. Many reports have also been received of the killing of persons who refused to obey instructions to dance and make music on the streets. A number of interviewees describe the execution of the entire populations of residential compounds for such misdemeanours. There are reports of compounds housing up to 50 people being targeted in this manner. Similar reports indicate that then and later people were executed because of their efforts to deter looting and to protect family members from assault or rape (see below). Persons caught attempting to escape from rebel custody were frequently killed. One witness saw six children killed at Wellington in mid-January in one such incident.

Much of the killing also seems to have been entirely arbitrary. Witnesses report such killings of men, women and children by rebel fighters, including an instance in which the perpetrator is stated to have been about ten years old, and another implicating an eight year old boy. It is frequently stated that perpetrators of such acts were under the influence of cocaine and other drugs, including alcohol. Killing occasionally occurred in the context of games in which people were lined up and the executioners teasingly chose who to kill and who to spare. In one such incident at Fourah Bay Road, around 21 January, three children were executed and their three sisters had limbs amputated or mutilated (see below). One man has described how he was ordered to choose between the execution of his entire family and the surrender of his daughter to a rebel fighter.

Some of those who were burned to death in their homes had been locked in or first been disabled by gunshot. A number of elderly people and infants also died in this manner. Others died while attempting to jump from burning buildings or after being shot while attempting to escape. One five-year-old girl survived being thrown into a fire at Blackhall Road on 28 January. A six-year-old girl was executed, together with her mother, on 23 January, at Wellington.

Rebel forces targeted many individuals and categories of person for execution. It is reported that over 200 police officers were killed, either at home or at their barracks in such locations as CID headquarters, Kingtom and Kissy. The means of execution included knives, machete and gunshot. One incident, on January 6, at the city-centre Cotton Tree, involved the killing by stabbing of eleven policemen. A number of prison officials appear to have been killed during and after the assault on Pademba Road Prison on 6 January.

An escapee from Pademba Road is reported to have allegedly led an attack on the Solicitor General, who was killed and decapitated. Two senior Government officials, the Resident Minister for the North and an Advisor to the President, were captured and killed. At least two journalists were sought out and killed

(while other journalists, including foreign nationals, though not specifically targeted, were killed, injured or abducted).

A senior member of the human rights monitoring committees of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) was killed together with her husband. They had been apprehended after a servant of theirs was tortured into revealing their whereabouts. Prior to her killing, the female victim, a diabetic, was denied access to her insulin medication. Commissioners of the NCDHR and leaders of Human Rights NGOs report that they successfully evaded attempts by rebels to locate and most-likely kill them. A group of senior human rights NGO officers subsequently escaped execution when a shell blast frightened away their would be killers. Executed senior officers of the Council of Churches and the NCRRR may have been targeted on the basis of their positions. A senior judge was shot but survived. Nigerian nationals also appear to have been targeted. One witness, on 8 January, observed two Nigerian traders whose throats were cut apparently on the basis of their nationality.

It is reported, but unconfirmed, that rebels in search of a medical doctor who is a well-known advocate of democracy, having failed to locate her at the small hospital which she runs in the east of the city, killed most of the patients and nurses. Also, reports that the patients of the psychiatric hospital at Kissy have been killed and that up to 200 hundred people were executed at a Kissy Mosque remain unverified at this time.

III. REBEL PERPETRATION OF MUTILATIONS AND AMPUTATIONS

In the first days of the fighting there were very few reports of amputations or mutilations. Some incidents did occur of amputation of limbs and degradation of the bodies of ECOMOG soldiers, such as at Ferry Junction, sometime between 6 and 8 January. By 10 January, civilians were being targeted. Exact figures for the rate of amputations and mutilations are unavailable. However, by 25 January, medical sources were indicating that many hundreds of such cases had been admitted for treatment. By that date, some 70 had been treated at just one medical facility, Connaught Hospital. Doctors emphasise that many victims either fail to seek medical attention or die following the attacks.

Amputation / mutilation victims include men, women and children. One of the youngest recorded victims is a six-year-old girl whose left arm was severed by an axe at Ashobi Corner, Blackhall Road, on 21 January. Most amputations are of one or both arms. Some victims have also lost a leg. One nine-year-old boy had his right leg amputated and was shot in the other leg in an incident at Circular Road on 14 January. Mutilations are commonly of the arms and often appear to be failed attempts at amputation of the hands. Some victims have lost fingers - one 9-year-old girl had four fingers severed by machete blows in an incident at Personage Street on 15 January.

The mission witnessed a woman being admitted to Connaught Hospital, on 3 February, who reported that she had been injured in an otherwise unreported mutilation variant - the pouring over her body of boiling water.

IV. REBEL PERPETRATION OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ABUSE

Rape of females, including children, appears to have been a standard practice of the rebel combatants. Many people report that they witnessed acts of violent group rape, including in public places, including Kroc Town Road and Kissy. Persistent reports have been received from victims and witnesses indicating that young women and girls were rounded up in neighbourhoods of the city and obliged to report nightly to be sexually abused by rebel fighters.

The mission interviewed some of the victims of one well-documented incident of repeated rape which occurred in the Cline Town area, commencing on 8 January. The local rebel commander ordered that all virgin girls report for a physical examination. A female companion of the commander then checked the girls in order to verify their status as virgins. Those who passed the test, mostly aged between 12 and 15, were ordered to report each night for sexual abuse by the commander and his men. Some of the girls were subsequently abducted and taken away by the retreating rebels. A high incidence of rape of children is also reported from the Clay Factory Displaced Persons Centre from 15 to 25 January. Other reports have been received from the Pademba Road area, the city centre and Kingtom. One policeman in Kingtom reportedly saw his three daughters raped before they were abducted.

Former abductees of the rebels indicate that women captives were raped as a matter of course. One witness reported that female captives were told to submit or be killed. He saw three girls raped in these circumstances on 8 January. Many women and girls admitted to hospital with war-related injuries also report that they were raped.

A reliable report has been received that one pregnant woman lost her child after being raped and was paid "compensation money" by the perpetrator. Another informant reported the death of another pregnant women after she had been raped.

V. REBEL DEPLOYMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS

A number of witnesses and victims report that a significant number of the rebel combatants were children. One military official puts the figure at some 10% of the rebel force. A patient at one hospital reports that his gunshot wound was inflicted by a boy aged no more than 8 years old. Another witness states that he saw a boy of about 11 years in command of a small group of fighters active in the city centre on 7 January. There are widespread reports that the rebels used

children as snipers - one child fighter in ECOMOG custody confirmed that he had been a sniper.

A number of those reportedly summarily killed by ECOMOG for alleged rebel activities were children. An informant, described by UN officials as "reliable", states that an 8-year-old boy was executed by ECOMOG having been found with a pistol. A 14 year old boy was reportedly executed on 13 January, at Customs Post, Susan's Bay, and a 16 year old boy on 18 January, at Port Loko Wharf. (See below).

While most of the child combatants are assumed to be members of the RUF, former captives of the rebels state that a significant number of children of former SLA soldiers were active.

Many informants, including former abductees of the rebels, report that rebel child combatants were frequently under the influence of drugs and that their commanders encouraged this practice. A number of reports have been received of a high usage of cocaine, self-administered in open wounds on the arm which were then covered with adhesive tape.

VI. PERPETRATION OF ABDUCTION BY REBEL FORCES

The rebels abducted a large but unverifiable number of people. These include staff of UN agencies and NGOs, students, and people from all social backgrounds. One indication of the scale of the abductions is that childcare agencies had, by February 4, received 1192 reports of children who had gone missing since January 6. 300 of these had been physically taken from their parents by rebels. Another indication is the report of a reliable informant who escaped from the rebels that some 500 people were held together with him in just one camp in the hills to the east of Freetown. He states that 75% of the captives were women aged from 12 to 20. The youngest abductee reported to the mission is a 9-year-old girl, taken from the Clay Factory Displaced Persons Centre on 23 January. A number of abductees either escaped or were released. A number of them have provided to the mission comprehensive information on their captivity.

Escapees report that young boy abductees tended to be used as porters or were selected for training as fighters. Older men were retained solely for portage. Women and girls were retained to cook and for sexual purposes. One former abductee displayed to the mission the "brand" which rebels had applied to his arm with burning plastic.

A small number of prominent Sierra Leone personalities and foreigners were abducted and kept under close guard. The Sierra Leoneans included the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Freetown. Former President Momoh was also detained by the rebels following his removal from Pademba Road Prison. Foreign

detainees, at one time or another, included 13 Indian workers, 6 Indian and one Kenyan Roman Catholic Sisters, five Italian and one Spanish Roman Catholic priests (including Fr. Mario Guerra who had been abducted during 1998), one Spanish and one French journalist. At least eight of the abductees were killed and two others seriously injured. At least two others of the abductees were subjected to ill treatment. Most of the remainder, including the Archbishop, have either escaped or been released. It is reported that forces unknown may have killed former President Momon. The situation of another prominent Sierra Leonean abductee is unknown.

VII. DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIAN AND UTILITY PROPERTIES AND LOOTING

Rebel forces are responsible for the deliberate widespread destruction of civilian property and public utilities. Rates of destruction of the property stock have been noted above as some 20% in the city centre and rising to some 90% in the most easterly of hinterland population centres. In the city centre, however, some streets, such as Pademba Road, near the prison, Canton Street, parts of Kissy Road and West Street have been comprehensively destroyed. Destruction extends to the simple dwellings of indigent people, as well as churches, mosques, schools, orphanages, medical facilities, community centres, police stations, the City Hall, Pademba Road Prison, New England Prison, SLBS and other non-military service facilities.

Many of the destruction sites appear to have been arbitrarily chosen. Others were reportedly picked out because of the refusal of the residents to hand over sufficient cash or goods to looting rebels or because the occupants failed to obey instructions to come out on the streets, serve as "human shields" or hand over girls for sexual purposes.

Some other homes, businesses and public utilities appear to have been targeted because of their function or the public profile of the occupants. These include public utility buildings and the residences and offices of human rights activists, lawyers, journalists and Government officials. The UNOMSIL headquarters was largely destroyed by fire, including the offices and library of its Human Rights Section, and severe fire damage was done to UN House and other UN facilities. A number of diplomatic facilities were attacked, including the Nigerian High Commission, which was entirely destroyed.

It is reported that a large but unverifiable number of people were killed in the process of destruction of buildings (see above).

An unascertainable degree of the damage to the property stock was inflicted by ECOMOG, including as a result of aerial bombardment. It is reported, for instance, that aerial attacks inflicted damage in Fisher Street, Nicol Street, Coker Lane, Bombay Street, Wilberforce Street, Clay Factory Displaced Persons Centre and at the Basharia Mosque in Susan's Bay.

In the first days of the rebel offensive witnesses report that some rebel commanders executed fighters who engaged in looting. However, during that period and subsequently, rebel forces did engage in widespread theft of money and looting of residences and business properties. Witnesses report that rebels came to steal or loot from residential compounds in wave after wave over a period of days. An unverifiable number of people were killed due to their failure to satisfy the looters. There are also widespread reports of people being abducted to transport looted property to rebel camps.

The looting and destruction of commercial properties and food stores has exacerbated the humanitarian situation in Freetown and renders more problematic the restoration of the essential commercial infrastructure.

VIII. ACTIVITIES OF ECOMOG

(a) Summary Executions

Since the first days of the combat in Freetown there have been reports that ECOMOG was summarily executing detainees who were allegedly either rebels or rebel sympathisers. One of the earliest reliable reports was provided by a senior official of an international organisation who witnessed an execution on 14 January. From then persistent reports were received of executions at such locations as Aberdeen Bridge, Kingtom, Brookfields, Siaka Stephens Street, Ferry Junction, Connaught Hospital, Kissy Road, Susan's Bay, the National Stadium and Lumley. Witnesses of the highest probity state that they were present at executions. One such observer noted that at the three executions he had seen on 24 January, at Ferry Junction and Connaught Hospital, the victims were given a cursory interrogation and immediately shot. It is reported that a large number of executions have been perpetrated at Aberdeen Bridge. Witnesses report the killing or disposal of up to 40 bodies at that location. It is stated that the victims at Aberdeen Bridge are the overflow population of a police holding facility at Aberdeen village. The Mission observed extensive blood stains at Aberdeen Bridge on 25 January. Another reliable witness observed the bodies of seven execution victims at Kingtom on 3 February. Ten people were reportedly executed at the National Stadium on 30/31 January.

Reference has been made above to the alleged execution of an eight-year old boy caught in possession of a pistol. Humanitarian agencies report that a 14-year-old boy was executed at the Customs Post, Susan's Bay, on 16 January. On 23 January, at the same location, ECOMOG is reported to have executed a 17-year-old girl.

The mission directly witnessed an execution at Connaught Hospital on 3 February. The following day a senior officer of an international NGO witnessed another execution at exactly the same site. In both cases the perpetrators were

in ECOMOG uniform and onlookers stated their view that the victims were rebel collaborators.

Witnesses make clear that, in all cases, the interrogation process was entirely inadequate and that there was no real effort to establish the guilt or innocence of executions victims. In one well-documented incident, on 10 January, three teenage boys were executed on Kissy Road after locals told ECOMOG that the boys were strangers to the area. The boys, all residents of Fisher Street, were returning from having buried their friend who had been killed earlier in the day.

It is reported that ECOMOG regained control of Connaught Hospital on 12 January. Well-considered witnesses allege that ECOMOG summarily executed some 20 patients who were pointed out to them to be rebels. The exact circumstances of the battle for control of the hospital and the behaviour of entering troops requires further investigation.

(b) Methods of warfare

ECOMOG jets have been employed in the conflict within the city. Certain civilian targets are listed above. Certain of the incidents have been partially documented by humanitarian workers. The bombing of a crowd of people on Wilberforce Street on 7 January resulted in the deaths of at least 20 civilians. ECOMOG described the incident as, "regrettable". The youngest reported victim of the bombing, on 14 January, of the Basharia Mosque was a ten-year-old girl. The youngest recorded victim of the 7 January bombing at Wilberforce Street, was an 8 year old girl.

On 3 February, Brigadier-General Khobe, Chief of the Sierra Leone Defence Staff, said that from now on ECOMOG would shoot at "human shields" and that, "if they try it again, we'll kill everything from the opposite direction".

(c) Other matters

ECOMOG has detained and physically mistreated national staff of a number of humanitarian NGOs and the ICRC, on the reportedly baseless grounds that they were rebel collaborators. Some are now released and the whereabouts of others are unverifiable at this time. UNOMSIL is in possession of detailed testimonies.

The mission has observed numerous incidents of ill treatment of persons detained at joint ECOMOG / CDF checkpoints. Among the forms of punishment observed are whipping, beating, varying types of public humiliation, and being bound extremely tightly.

In a welcome development, on 2 February, ECOMOG released to the care of humanitarian agencies some seven former rebel child combatants.

IX. ACTIVITIES OF CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES

Civil Defence Forces also bear responsibility for summary executions. On 3 February senior UN staff observed and photographed a newly severed human head displayed on a stick at a CDF checkpoint at Brookfields. A highly reliable witness observed the execution of a man at a checkpoint in Kingtom on 15 January. He reported that the CDF perpetrator was very excited and made no effort to interrogate the victim. Witnesses have reported a number of other such incidents to the mission. See above regarding activities at checkpoints.

X. USE OF THE MEDIA BY THE GOVERNMENT

The mission received repeated complaints that the Government, especially Minister Spencer, used the radio media to instil a false sense of security in residents of areas which had not yet been cleared of rebel activity. A number of informants state that relatives, friends and neighbours were killed by rebels, at locations such as Kissy, when they left their homes having heard the broadcast assurances that the areas were again under Government control.

XI. STATUS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMUNITY

This report has detailed the manner in which rebel forces targeted the lives and property of the leadership of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the human rights NGO community and civil society leaders. The destruction of the UNOMSIL human rights offices and library has also been described.

UNOMSIL facilitated the evacuation of a number of human rights activists on 27 December and was planning to extend the facility further at the time of the rebel offensive of 6 January.

Notwithstanding the difficult operational environment, the human rights community is currently active in Freetown. There is ongoing but limited monitoring of the human rights situation and chronicling of the period of rebel occupation. It is noteworthy that the human rights community is employing monitoring methodologies imparted in the various training programmes which were largely facilitated by UNOMSIL during 1998. The human rights community is also volunteering to assist in humanitarian activities, such as registration of displaced persons and distribution of food.

UNOMSIL continues to support and provide technical assistance to the activities of the human rights community. There is also an active Sierra Leone human

rights community temporarily in Conakry, Guinea. Conakry-based activities are focussed within the Human Rights Committee of the Humanitarian community and they benefit from support and assistance of UNOMSIL. The work of the Committee is described elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations focus exclusively on the recent and current situation in Freetown. Broader issues of the human rights role and activities of UNOMSIL and the human rights requirements of Sierra Leone are not addressed

It is recommended:

1. That UNOMSIL continue to closely monitor and report on the human rights situation in Freetown, including by continuation of the process of chronicling the events of the period of the rebel incursion. A comprehensive evaluation of the period will ultimately contribute to the process of peace building and effective reconciliation.
2. That UNOMSIL monitoring activities should continue to be conducted in accordance with the collaborative methods which have been developed during 1998. These methods can be rendered more effective by UNOMSIL support for the various data-gathering and analysis proposals being developed by the Human Rights community active in and concerning Sierra Leone.
3. That support and assistance continue to be provided by UNOMSIL to the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the human rights NGO community and all other elements of the human rights community both in Sierra Leone and temporarily located in Conakry. Support can be evidenced by frequent visits to Freetown and active participation in the activities of the Conakry-based Human Rights Committee.
4. That consideration be given to the deployment to Freetown of a human rights /criminal investigation team to identify and secure evidence of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law with a view to eventual prosecution of perpetrators.
5. That UNOMSIL advise that any future peace settlement should not purport to confer immunity from prosecution for the perpetrators of any grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law.
6. That UNOMSIL continue to urge the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG to ensure their forces operate in conformity with the letter and spirit of international human rights and humanitarian law by, inter-alia, an immediate

cessation of summary executions; and that UNOMSIL call on the authorities to detain and prosecute the alleged perpetrators of such acts.

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AIIDE MEMMOIRE
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW

PRESENTED BY
THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

FOR USE BY
DELEGATES TO THE TALKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED
FRONT

TOGO, APRIL 1999

INTRODUCTION

1. On this important occasion of intra-RUF consultations in Lome, Togo, UNOMSIL would like, on behalf of the entire United Nations system, to raise some issues regarding the respect for International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law by rebel forces in Sierra Leone. This note is inspired by the desire of the UN and the rest of the international community to ensure that warring parties in the Sierra Leone conflict endeavor to respect existing international and domestic laws in order to minimize suffering especially to the civilian population.
2. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established by Security Council resolution on July 13 1998 and was mandated to, inter alia: "report on violations of international law and human rights in Sierra Leone". Since its arrival in Sierra Leone, UNOMSIL has, in consultation with the relevant UN agencies, endeavored to address the country's human rights/humanitarian needs and has assisted both Government and non-governmental agencies in formulating policies and programs aimed at protecting, enforcing and promoting international human rights and humanitarian laws and principles. UNOMSIL also continues to voice its concern in a constructive manner intended to assist in the correction of problems. It is in this spirit that UNOMSIL welcomes the opportunity to raise and possibly discuss these same issues with members of the RUF. We hope that this may be the first of a series of constructive discussions between the UN and RUF and we thank the RUF delegation for the attention given to these issues.

APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAWS

3. As you are aware, there exists an elaborate body of international and domestic laws that regulate the treatment of human beings and civilian property both in peacetime and during armed conflict. At the heart of these laws is the recognition of the inherent dignity of the human person. All human beings are born with certain fundamental and inalienable rights

which no person, government or authority should take away or attempt to limit without due process of law. These rights accrue to human beings universally and the role of governments and non-governmental entities exercising control over these human beings is to respect, protect and indeed promote them.

4. As a rebel movement exercising control over territory within Sierra Leone, you have an obligation under international law to ensure maximum protection of civilians and demobilized enemy soldiers within your control and others to whom you may come into contact from time to time during the course of the conflict.
5. International Humanitarian Law lays down the rules and general principles applicable in armed conflict. The main sources of this law are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two corresponding protocols signed in 1977. The aim of the Conventions is to reduce unnecessary suffering (both to civilians and soldiers) during armed conflict and to ensure the respect of the inherent dignity of the human person at all times. The Geneva Conventions cover conflicts both of an international and of a non-international character such as the one in Sierra Leone. With regard to human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly outlines most of the rights to which all human beings are entitled and which should be respected and protected both during peacetime or war. You may also wish to bear in mind that there are serious criminal sanctions in place internationally for all perpetrators of gross human rights violations and that the international community has firmly resolved to bring to justice all such perpetrators in order to break the cycle of impunity that has spurred the commission of human rights violations in many parts of the world.

TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS DURING ARMED CONFLICT

6. There have been persistent reports throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone of unarmed civilians being targeted by warring sides. International humanitarian law strictly prohibits this conduct and provides for the full protection of the civilian population and individual civilians during armed conflict. According to the Geneva Conventions, civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations and must never be the object of attack under any circumstances. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
7. International humanitarian law makes it unlawful to use civilians as human shields during armed conflict. There have been some reports suggesting that some rebel units in Sierra Leone have been engaged in this conduct. It is claimed that during the recent rebel incursion into Freetown, some rebel units forced civilians into the frontline in order to shield themselves from enemy fire. Reports from Makeni also indicate the continuation of this conduct. It is hoped that the RUF hierarchy will see to it that civilians within RUF-held territory are protected at all times and that the practice of using civilians as human shields will not be encouraged within the organization.
8. The Geneva Conventions also provide for the protection of objects indispensable to the

survival of the civilian population. Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. In this regard it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless things such as foodstuffs and food stores, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and irrigation works. Again, the aim here is to ensure that the civilian population is kept as much as possible from harm arising out of an armed confrontation. During the recent attack into Freetown, a significant portion of the civilian population was rendered homeless after rebels indiscriminately burned down private houses. This is prohibited under international law.

- 9. Under international humanitarian law, combatants shall refrain from ordering the displacement of civilian populations unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand.
- 10. During armed conflict, only armed individuals, units or military facilities should be considered targets; it is prohibited for any combatant to order that there shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or conduct hostilities on this basis. Last year, there were reports of a rebel offensive in some part of Sierra Leone known as "Operation no living thing". This policy contravenes the letter and spirit of international humanitarian law as it lumps together combatants and civilians with no special protection for civilian non-combatants.
- 11. The Sierra Leonean conflict has outraged the international community's conscience mainly due to the degree of brutality often meted out to civilians. There have been widespread reports of abductions, mutilations and amputations of people who were clearly not combatants. This conduct is clearly in contravention with international humanitarian law and the RUF must ensure that its forces disassociate themselves publicly from those engaged in those practices.

ABUSES AGAINST CHILDREN

- 12. Both international human rights and international humanitarian legal regimes accord special protection to children, in most cases the most vulnerable members of society. The Geneva Conventions contain provisions prohibiting the abuse of children, and there exists a special international convention (Convention on the Rights of the Child) which spells out rights to which all children under the age of 18 are entitled. The international community calls on the RUF and other rebel groups in Sierra Leone to respect these laws and ensure that children are not affected in any adverse way during this armed conflict.
- 13. There have been reports of systematic recruitment of children into the rebel army in Sierra Leone. This is unlawful under both international and domestic law. The Geneva Conventions make it illegal for children to be recruited in any armed force or group or to be allowed to take part in hostilities. Further, the Convention on the Rights of the Child describes a child as being any person below the age of 18. According to eyewitness accounts, the rebel army which entered Freetown in January of this year was dominated by children, some former abductees, under 18 years of age. The RUF should make it a firm policy not to recruit

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children within its ranks and an effort must be made to discharge all the children fighters still operating within the organization.

14. The use of children as sexual slaves or porters has also been attributed to rebel forces operating within Sierra Leone. This too is a violation of international humanitarian law and should be publicly and officially denounced by the RUF.

SEXUAL ABUSE

15. Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been systematically perpetrated by rebel forces in Sierra Leone. In many incidents women and young girls have been targeted by combatants and rape used as a means of warfare, sometimes to terrorize civilian communities or to punish the victims for their perceived political beliefs. Again, this is clearly in contravention with international and domestic law. The Geneva Conventions also prohibit enforced prostitution and all other forms of indecent assault.

RIGHT OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS DURING ARMED CONFLICT

16. International humanitarian law makes it illegal for groups controlling territory to hamper efforts to provide medical, humanitarian or spiritual assistance to civilian populations trapped in war zones. In Sierra Leone, there have been instances of priests being abducted, medical personnel arrested or humanitarian workers being denied access. The RUF has to ensure that its combatants respect the neutrality and dignity of aid workers as well as recognize the non-negotiable right of civilian populations to receive humanitarian assistance. In this regard we wish to refer you to a statement issued recently by the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Sierra Leone which calls on "all parties to the conflict to fulfil their humanitarian obligations by facilitating the creation of an enabling environment within which humanitarian agencies can effectively and appropriately respond to the emergency needs of Sierra Leoneans whose lives and livelihoods have been devastated by the ongoing conflict".
17. Acts of terrorism against caregivers, especially the practice of taking hostages, are prohibited under international humanitarian law. Parties to all conflicts are under an obligation to provide protection to aircraft, vessels or vehicles belonging to non-parties to the conflict such as the UN or the ICRC provided the said aircraft, vessel or vehicle is clearly marked and is not being used to further the military agenda of any one party to the conflict.

OPERATION OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN REBEL-CONTROLLED AREAS

18. Under the Constitution of Sierra Leone only the systems of courts recognized in law may carry out the administration of justice. However, it is known that some traditional courts continue to function in rebel controlled areas and that, de-facto, there are certain other quasi-

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judicial activities. Without prejudice to their status in law, these courts and activities should strictly adhere to international standards, especially with regard to fairness and transparency in the formulation, interpretation and application of the rules. Furthermore, any courts or adjudicatory structures must possess clear prosecutorial, defense and appellate procedures and guarantees. RUF members should also benefit from fair procedures before they are disciplined or punished for infractions. The UN actively promotes abolition worldwide of the death penalty. In any case, no execution should ever be carried out except under the law of the land.

TREATMENT OF DEMOBILIZED ENEMY SOLDIERS

19. According to the Geneva Conventions, it is unlawful to attack, kill or otherwise cause suffering to enemy forces who have, through sickness or incapacitation, ceased to take part in hostilities. You have the duty wherever possible to either care for sick or wounded enemy soldiers or to facilitate the provision of care by a party neutral to the conflict. All persons not in active combat are entitled to respect for their person, honor and convictions and shall in all circumstances be treated humanely and without any adverse distinction. Discrimination based on race, tribe, color, gender or other criteria is prohibited under international human rights law whether exercised against demobilized enemy soldiers or civilians.
20. Surrendered enemy soldiers and prisoners of war are to be treated with due regard to their inherent dignity as members of the human race and should not be subjected to cruel or humiliating treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment. This prohibition echoes that contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment under all circumstances.

PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

21. During a recent public statement, Cpl. Foday Sankoh expressed regret for the atrocities caused on civilians by rebel soldiers in Sierra Leone and indicated that the RUF would play its part in putting an end to the egregious human rights violations in the country. The UN welcomes this statement and invites the RUF to take this opportunity to make this position clear to all rebel combatants and to assure both Sierra Leoneans and the international community that they will respect international and domestic laws currently in force.
22. A policy memorandum to this effect should be drafted and disseminated to all field commanders and combatants to ensure that the message is received all the way down to the rank and file. The memorandum should contain an acknowledgement that violations of international humanitarian law attributed to the rebels are destroying the name and reputation of the RUF and other rebel groups in Sierra Leone and internationally.
23. Further, as a gesture of goodwill and commitment to the rules and principles of international law outlined above, the RUF should consider taking the following actions immediately:

- releasing all abductees currently under their control
- demobilizing and releasing to UNICEF all children serving as fighters within their ranks
- guaranteeing immediate and unrestricted humanitarian access to civilian populations within rebel-held areas.

24. UNOMSIL assures RUF delegates that the United Nations stands ready to help in any way possible to ensure that all parties to the Sierra Leone conflict abide by all international legal principles and laws. In this regard, UNOMSIL offers to provide training on internationally humanitarian law for key RUF commanders at a neutral location within the sub-region.

25. UNOMSIL encourages the RUF hierarchy to designate a high official within the organization to act as a focal point on issues relating to the observance of international humanitarian/human rights law by RUF. This would further demonstrate the RUF's commitment to finding a lasting solution to the Sierra Leonean crisis.

26. UNOMSIL would welcome the opportunity to further discuss this note and its proposals with the RUF Delegation.

Number	Item	Content
191	Accord	The Abidjan Peace Accord, 30 November 1996, The Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL).

Moved by the imperative need for a just and durable peace in Sierra Leone;

Inspired by the equally imperative need for genuine national unity and reconciliation to end the fratricidal war in Sierra Leone;

Committed to promoting popular participation in governance and full respect for human rights and humanitarian laws;

Dedicated to the advancement of democratic development and to the maintenance of a socio-political order free of inequality, despotism and corruption;

Convinced that a sense of common purpose and patriotism is the need of the hour;

HEREBY AGREE as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two foes will ensure that a total cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE 2

The Government and the RUF/SL undertake that no effort shall be spared to effect the scrupulous respect and implementation of the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement to ensure that the establishment and consolidation of a just peace becomes a priority in Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE 3

A national body to be known as the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established within two weeks of the signing of this Agreement. The Commission shall be a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement.

The Commission, in fulfilment of this task during the period of consolidating the peace, shall co-ordinate and facilitate the work of the following bodies which will proceed to establish:

- (i) Socio-Economic Forum;
- (ii) Citizen's Consultative Conferences;
- (iii) Multi-partisan Council;
- (iv) Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace;
- (v) Demobilization and Resettlement Committee;
- (vi) National Budget and Debt Committee.

The Commission shall comprise representatives of the Government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, drawing on the resources of state and civic institutions as and when necessary.

The Commission shall have the power to recommend the preparation of enabling measures contained in this Peace Agreement. It shall have the power to issue publicly its conclusions. The parties undertake to comply with the conclusions of the Commission.

The Commission shall have the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the implementation and development of the provisions contained in the present Peace Agreement.

The Parties undertake to consult the Commission before taking decisions on measures relating to the present Peace Agreement.

The Commission may similarly consult the Parties at the highest level whenever it is appropriate.

The Commission shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Peace Agreement. The Commission shall have full powers to organise its work in the manner in which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it may deem useful in the discharge of its functions.

The Commission shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and adequate secretariat support staff.

A Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established to provide funding for the implementation of the present Peace Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Citizens' Consultative Conferences shall be organised once a year the first of which shall be organised within one hundred and twenty days of the signing of the present Peace Agreement in order to encourage people's participation and to invite recommendations for the formulation of guidelines and their implementation that will ensure truly fair and representative political processes.

ARTICLE 5

The disarmament of combatants will be effected upon their entry into the designated assembly zones, and demobilization and reintegration as soon as practicable thereafter.

The upkeep and welfare of the encamped combatants shall be the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, assisted by the international community.

ARTICLE 6

The Parties commit themselves to a well planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement linked to national development objectives. To that end, a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall be established within a month of the signing

of the present Peace Agreement.

The Committee shall coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of RUF/SL combatants. The Committee shall work in coordination with all the relevant institutions and agencies.

Both Parties shall consult on the nomination of the membership of the Committee which shall not exceed seven persons.

The Committee shall be provided with adequate funding.

ARTICLE 7

The Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall identify assembly zones and camp areas for RUF/SL combatants where they shall be registered, encamped and disarmed. The movement into the Assembly Zones shall commence within once month of the signing of this Agreement and be completed as soon as practicable but no later than three months from this date.

ARTICLE 8

The Parties shall request the international community to help supervise and monitor the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Joint Monitoring Group shall have observers at any of these processes.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, as a priority, make recommendations on the restructuring and re-orientation of the military as well as its leadership. In this context, members of the RUF/SL who may wish to be part of the country's military can become part of the new unified armed forces within a framework to be discussed and agreed upon by the Commission.

ARTICLE 10

The Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure the return to barracks of those units of the army not required for normal security duties and the downsizing of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF), taking into account the security needs of the country.

ARTICLE 11

A Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) from the international community shall be responsible for monitoring breaches provided under this Peace Agreement.

Both Parties upon signing this Agreement shall request the international community to provide neutral monitors.

Such monitors when deployed shall be in position for an initial period of three months.

The Neutral Monitoring Group shall report any violations of the ceasefire to its headquarters which shall in turn communicate the same to the headquarters of the Joint Monitoring Group

comprising of representative of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF based in Freetown.

ARTICLE 12

The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group. Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier.

ARTICLE 13

The Parties agree that immediately following the signing of the present Peace Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to function as a political movement with the rights, privileges and duties provided by law; and that within thirty days, following that, the necessary conditions shall be created to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political movement according to law.

ARTICLE 14

To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE 15

The mandate and membership of the existing National Unity and Reconciliation Commission shall be expanded in consultation with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to enable it to undertake a sustained and effective campaign of civic education aimed at enhancing national unity and reconciliation, taking into account the imperative need to heal the wounds of the conflict.

ARTICLE 16

The Parties agree that the standards of accountability, integrity and probity in the public services of Sierra Leone shall be raised. To that end, immediate steps shall be taken to establish the office of Ombudsman to promote the implementation of a professional code of ethics, and the integrity and patriotism of all public servants. It shall also seek to eradicate all forms of corruption.

ARTICLE 17

The Parties shall approach the international community with a view to mobilizing resources which will be used to establish a trust fund to enable the RUF/SL to transform itself into a

political party.

ARTICLE 18

The Parties agree to the principle of reforming the present electoral process in Sierra Leone. There shall, in that regard, be the full participation of citizens and their organizations in formulating electoral reforms.

The independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission shall be guaranteed to ensure fair and acceptable electoral exercise.

In reconstituting the National Electoral Commission, the President shall consult all political parties and movements including the RUF/SL to determine the membership and terms of reference of that Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nation's electoral politics.

Both the Government and the RUF/SL shall, together with other political parties, nominate men and women of professionalism, integrity and objectivity to the National Electoral Commission, not later than three months after the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

It is hereby agreed that no member of the National Electoral Commission shall be eligible for appointment to a political office by any government formed as a result of an election they were mandated to conduct.

ARTICLE 19

The Parties agree that the basic civil and political liberties which are recognised by the Sierra Leone legal system and are contained in the Declarations and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the UN and the OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully guaranteed and promoted within Sierra Leone society.

These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture; the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

To foster national reconciliation and ensure the full and unrestricted participation of the RUF/SL in the political process, the RUF/SL shall enjoy:

- (i) freedom of the press and access to the media in order that they may be heard and informed.
- (ii) freedom of association, expression, assembly and the right to mobilise and demonstrate freely, and to communicate politically in order that they may organise effectively and set up appropriate infrastructure.

All political prisoners and prisoners of war, if any, shall be released.

ARTICLE 20

To monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement, as well as to promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including schools, the media, the police and the military, an independent National Commission on Human Rights shall be established.

In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN Special Commission on Human Rights, UN Centre for Human Rights, African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organisations.

The National Commission on Human Rights shall have the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate.

Further, a consortium of local human rights groups shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE 21

The Parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

ARTICLE 22

In the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of Sierra Leone as a matter of the utmost priority, special attention shall be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups. The Government in conjunction with the Committee for Demobilization and Resettlement shall co-operate with all political parties and movements, including the RUF/SL, to raise resources internationally for these objectives during the initial phase of the consolidation of peace.

ARTICLE 23

The Government shall do all in its power to mobilize resources internally and externally to meet the needs of the post-war reconstruction and socio-economic development.

ARTICLE 24

The Parties agree that the independence of the Judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order. The composition of the present Judicial and Legal Service Commission shall be determined so as to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the other organs of state as well as the political parties. Its membership shall include, in addition to judges and representatives of the legal profession and public services, representatives of other sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice.

ARTICLE 25

The Police Force shall be strengthened to ensure that the rule of law is upheld throughout Sierra Leone. To that end, the present Police Force shall be vetted. Furthermore, the professional training of the Police Force shall henceforth assure a new orientation, but emphasizing professionalism, the importance of human dignity and democratic values and respect and

protection of human rights. It shall, further, emphasise that the conduct of members of the Police Force shall be free from all partisan considerations of politics, ideology and social position and that the Police Force shall avoid and combat corruption.

Nominations for the Police Council will come from wider sectors of society prior to their appointment so as to ensure their truly civilian and non-partisan character.

ARTICLE 26

It is recognised that there is a socio-economic dimension to the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidate the foundation of peace. Accordingly, the socio-economic policy of Sierra Leone shall be guided among other things, by the following principles, taking into account available resources:

- i. Enhancement of the nation's productive capacity through meaningful grassroots participation in the reconstruction and development of the country;
- ii. The provision of equal opportunities to all Sierra Leoneans especially those in the countryside and the urban poor, with the aim of equitable distribution of the nation's resources thereby empowering them to contribute effectively to decisionmaking and implementation of policies which affect their lives;
- iii. Improving the quality of life of the people through the provision of, inter alia,
 - a. primary health care in all villages and towns;
 - b. affordable and quality housing, especially in the countryside and poor urban areas;
 - c. improved educational services to enable all children of primary and junior-secondary school age to receive free and compulsory schooling as well as provide the opportunity for the youth and all other Sierra Leoneans to receive affordable quality education;
 - d. clean drinking water and sewerage system in every village and town;
 - e. provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, especially the youth;
 - f. promote and sustain rural development and support agriculture in terms of technical, credit and marketing facilities;
 - g. provide support for production and provision of basic food and nutritional requirements of the people and food security in general;
 - h. protect the environment and regulate the exploitation of natural resources in the interest of the people, as well as prohibit monopolies;
 - i. provide the required infrastructure such as roads, transport and communications, energy and rural electrification, for improved living conditions, especially of the

rural people;

j. seek to obtain debt relief in order to transfer funds from debt servicing to meet the urgent requirements of rebuilding a war-torn society.

ARTICLE 27

A broad-based Socio-Economic forum, in which the RUF/SL shall participate, shall be established with a view to enriching policy formulation and execution in the socio-economic sector.

ARTICLE 28

The Government of Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth shall stand as moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

Annex to this Agreement:

A nationwide sensitization programme for the peace process shall be pursued by the Parties, using all available means of communication to impress upon their combatants and the nation at large:

- the fact that hostilities have ended;
- the reasons for demobilization;
- the opportunities for reintegration of combatants; and
- the need for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Done in Abidjan this 30 day of the month of November, 1996.

Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Henri Konan Bedie
President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

Berhanu Dinka
Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Sierra Leone

Adwoa Coleman (M/S)
Representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Moses Anafu (DR)
Representative of the Commonwealth Organization

Number	Item	Content
192	Accord	The Conakry Accord: 23 October 1997 - ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan For Sierra Leone 23 October 1997 - 22 April 1998

**ECOWAS SIX-MONTH PEACE PLAN FOR SIERRA LEONE
23 OCTOBER 1997 - 22 APRIL 1998**

(SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION)

PREAMBLE:

Pursuant to the ECOWAS mandate to implement proposals for the resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis contained in the Final Communique of 26 June, 1997 in Conakry, a seven-point peace plan has been devised for the early return of constitutional governance to Sierra Leone. These are:

1. Cessation of hostilities throughout Sierra Leone

- i. With immediate effect
- ii. Establish monitoring and verification mechanism

Note: Process to be undertaken by ECOMOG, and the UN military observers. Participation of UN military observers needs the agreement of the UN Security Council.

2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants: 1 to 31 December, 1997

Note: ECOWAS Committee of Five Ministerial Assessment visit (20 November, 1997)

3. Commencement of Humanitarian Assistance: 14 November 1997

Note: ECOMOG to monitor the process

4. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons

Commencement date: 1 December, 1997

UNHCR assisted repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons

5. Restoration of the constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base: Takes effect from 22 May, 1998.

6. Immunities and Guarantees: Takes effect from 22 May, 1998

ELABORATION OF ECOWAS PEACE PLAN

1. Cessation of Hostilities:

It is considered that cessation of hostilities should come into force immediately. However, this will have to be accompanied by a monitoring and verification regime. Leaders of the various combatant units will be expected to disseminate information concerning these measures and ensure compliance with them. These measures will be supervised by ECOMOG, assisted by UN military observation group. The verification process will continue right up to the termination of the peace plan, i.e. 22 April 1998.

2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants:

It is considered that a minimum of 30 days would be required to conduct an effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. This should take place from 1 to 31 December, 1997. Given the nation-wide dislocation of infrastructures and administration, a simple and uncomplicated procedure is envisaged. Combatants will be directed to report at designated centres in order to be engaged in the disarmament process. ECOMOG will supervise the entire process of disarmament and demobilisation. Where necessary, incentives may have to be provided to encourage the voluntary participation of combatants in all this process.

3. Humanitarian Assistance:

Considering that sanctions/embargoes will be strictly enforced throughout the period of the implementation of the Sierra Leone peace plan, the flows of humanitarian assistance beginning 14 November 1997 will continue to be monitored by ECOMOG and UN military observers. To this effect, a mechanism will be established by ECOMOG to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. All this will be worked within the context of UN Security Council Resolution.

4. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons:

Recognising that refugees, particularly those in neighboring countries, may wish to voluntarily return following the cessation of hostilities, UNHCR assistance should begin from 1 December, 1997.

5. Restoration of Constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base:

The restoration of constitutional order to Sierra Leone is at the heart of the ECOWAS peace plan. Consequently, it is considered necessary that the Government of Tejan Kabbah should be enabled to exercise effective control once he is restored to office on 22 May 1998. Nevertheless, it is recognised that for an enduring peace to be restored which will enjoy the support of the majority of Sierra Leoneans and the confidence of the subregion, efforts should be made to ensure that an all-inclusive government is evolved. In this regard, the goodwill and assistance of the international community, both financial and material, would be necessary.

The interest of the various parties in Sierra Leone should be suitably accommodated. Accordingly, it is recommended that the new Cabinet should be a cabinet of inclusion.

Furthermore, in order to accommodate the aspirations of their supporters, Board and Senior Civil Service appointments are to reflect broad national character.

All the above power sharing formulas should come into effect 22 May 1998.

It is recognised that Corporal Foday Sankoh as a leader of RUF could continue to play an active role and participate in the peace process.

In the spirit of the Abidjan Accord and in the context of this Agreement, Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected to return to his country to make his contribution to the peace process.

6. Reintegration of Combatants:

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All those who disarm as a result of the implementation of the peace process, should be provided with either job training to fit them for alternative employment or given scholarships and grants for further education. Access to education at all levels should be made available to all demobilised persons. Ex-combatants should be provided with assistance to facilitate their re-integration into their communities. We strongly appeal to the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and indeed the international community to render appropriate assistance to achieve this objective.

7. Donor Appeals for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation:

The United Nations and the OAU in cooperation with ECOWAS are requested to launch these appeals as soon as hostilities cease.

8. Immunities and Guarantees:

It is considered essential that unconditional immunities and guarantees from prosecution be extended to all involved in the unfortunate events of 25 May, 1997 with effect from 22 May 1998.

DONE AT CONAKRY, THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER 1997

FOR THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE
OF ECOWAS ON SIERRA LEONE

Chief Tom Ikimi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Federal Republic of Nigeria

Lamine Kamara
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Guinea

FOR THE DELEGATION REPRESENTING
MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMAH

Col Abdul Karim Sesay
Secretary General AFRC

Alimamy Pallo Bangura
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

WITNESSES

For U.N.

Prof. Ibrahima Fall
Asst. Secretary-General UN

For O.A.U.

Ms. Adwoa Coleman

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OAU Representative

Number	Item	Content
193	Ceasefire Agreement	Ceasefire Agreement Between Government and the Revolutionary United Front, 18 May 1999

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THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND RUF,

Reaffirming their determination to establish sustainable peace, stability and security in Sierra Leone;

Also reaffirming their commitment to the Lome Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 as the framework for the restoration of genuine and lasting peace to the country;

Desirous of adopting effective confidence-building measures so as to create a conducive environment for fresh application of the Lome Peace Agreement which constitutes the most appropriate framework for the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone;

Welcoming the emergence of a new leadership within the RUF and noting its stated commitment to work towards the restoration of peace to Sierra Leone

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1. To declare and observe a cease-fire and to halt hostilities with effect from Friday 10th November 2000 starting at 23:59 hours.
2. The parties agree to refrain from committing any acts or carrying out any activities that might constitute or facilitate a violation of the cease-fire.
3. They agree that the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone shall supervise and monitor the cease-fire. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone shall also investigate and report on any acts of cease-fire violation.
4. Both parties agree that UNAMSIL shall have full liberty to deploy its troops and other personnel throughout Sierra Leone including the diamond producing areas in the discharge of its responsibilities.
5. The parties undertake, with a view to restoring the authority of the Government throughout the entire territory of Sierra Leone, to ensure free movement of persons and goods, unimpeded movement of humanitarian agencies, and of refugees and displaced persons.
6. The RUF commits itself to the immediate return of all weapons, ammunitions and other equipment seized by the RUF.
7. The two parties agree to recommence immediately the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.
8. The Government of Sierra Leone reaffirmed its commitment to accelerate the process of restructuring and training of the Sierra Leone armed forces open to all Sierra Leoneans eligible to enrol.
9. The following shall constitute a violation of this Agreement:
 - i. all illegal importation of arms, ammunitions and other weapons of war;
 - ii. any attack by one of the parties against the positions of the other party before, during or after the deployment of UNAMSIL troops;
 - iii. laying of mines or incendiary devices after the entry into force of this Agreement, the refusal to disclose the existence of such mines or explosives and their location, and the deliberate refusal to cooperate by turning over the maps indicating such locations;
 - iv. harassment or attacks, hostage taking, and seizure of arms and equipment belonging to troops serving under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, or under the authority of the Government of Sierra Leone;
 - v. obstructing the activities of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.
10. The ultimate objective of the present Agreement is to ensure a cease-fire and to bring an end to the hostilities. Consequently, the parties agree to undertake with the participation of the ECOWAS Committee of six of the Medication and Security Council on Sierra Leone and the United Nations, a review of the implementation of this Agreement, thirty (30) days after its entry into force, to evaluate the timeliness of commencing fresh application of the Lome Peace Agreement.

Done at Abuja this 10th Day of November, 2000

Number	Item	Content
194	Accord	The Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) "The Lome Peace Accord" 7 July 1999

PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND
THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE and
THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF/SL)

Having met in Lome, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 July 1999 under the auspices of the Current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema;

Recalling earlier initiatives undertaken by the countries of the sub-region and the International Community, aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and culminating in the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 23 October, 1997;

Moved by the imperative need to meet the desire of the people of Sierra Leone for a definitive settlement of the fratricidal war in their country and for genuine national unity and reconciliation;

Committed to promoting full respect for human rights and humanitarian law;

Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the advancement of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and corruption;

Concerned with the socio-economic well being of all the people of Sierra Leone;

Determined to foster mutual trust and confidence between themselves;

Determined to establish sustainable peace and security; to pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone;

Reaffirming the conviction that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that Government derives all its powers, authority and legitimacy from the people;

Recognising the imperative that the children of Sierra Leone, especially those affected by armed conflict, in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care and the protection of their inherent right to life, survival and development, in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child;

Guided by the Declaration in the Final Communiqué of the Meeting in Lome of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS of 25 May 1999, in which they stressed the importance of democracy as a factor of regional peace and security, and as essential to the socio-economic development of ECOWAS Member States; and in which they pledged their commitment to the consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights while reaffirming the need for all Member States to consolidate their democratic base, observe the principles of good governance and good economic management in order to ensure the emergence and development of a democratic culture which takes into account the interests of the peoples of West Africa;

Recommitting themselves to the total observance and compliance with the Cease-fire Agreement signed in Lome on 18 May 1999, and appended as Annex 1 until the signing of the present Peace Agreement;

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

PART ONE

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

ARTICLE 1

CEASE-FIRE

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE II

CEASE-FIRE MONITORING

1. A Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed the CMC) to be chaired by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, the Civil Defence Forces (hereinafter termed the CDF) and ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and district levels with immediate effect to monitor, verify and report all violations of the cease-fire.
2. A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JMC) shall be established at the national level to be chaired by UNOMSIL with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, CDF, and ECOMOG. The JMC shall receive, investigate and take appropriate action on reports of violations of the cease-fire from the CMC. The parties agree to the definition of cease-fire violations as contained in Annex 2 which constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.
3. The parties shall seek the assistance of the International Community in providing funds and other logistics to enable the JMC to carry out its mandate.

PART TWO

GOVERNANCE

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recognizing the right of the people of Sierra Leone to live in peace, and desirous of finding a transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF/SL into governance within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, agree to the following formulas for structuring the government for the duration of the period before the next elections, as prescribed by the Constitution, managing scarce public resources for the benefit of the development of the people of Sierra Leone and sharing the responsibility of implementing the peace. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in a separate Article of this Part of the present Agreement; and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to it.

Article III Transformation of the RUF/SL Into a Political Party

Article IV Enabling Members of the RUF/SL to Hold Public Office

Article V Enabling the RUF/SL to Join a Broad-Based Government of National Unity Through Cabinet Appointment

Article VI Commission for the Consolidation of Peace

Article VII Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development

Article VIII Council of Elders and Religious Leaders.

ARTICLE III

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUF/SL INTO A POLITICAL PARTY

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process. To that end:
2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to organize itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political parties in Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered access to the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to mobilize and associate freely.
3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political party.
4. The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilizing resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF/SL to function as a political party. These resources may include but shall not be limited to:
 - (i) Setting up a trust fund;

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- (ii) Training for RUF/SL membership in party organization and functions; and
- (iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section.

ARTICLE IV

ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE RUF/SL TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to enable those RUF/SL members nominated by the RUF/SL to hold public office, within the time-frames agreed and contained in the present Agreement for the integration of the various bodies named herein.
2. Accordingly, necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, to amend relevant laws and regulations that may constitute an impediment or bar to RUF/SL and AFRC personnel holding public office.
3. Within seven days of the removal of any such legal impediments, both parties shall meet to discuss and agree on the appointment of RUF/SL members to positions in parastatals, diplomacy and any other public sector.

ARTICLE V

ENABLING THE RUF/SL TO JOIN A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH CABINET APPOINTMENTS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opportunity to the RUF/SL to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointments. To that end:
2. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.
3. The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial positions to the RUF/SL in a moderately expanded cabinet of 18, bearing in mind that the interests of other political parties and civil society organizations should also be taken into account, as follows:
 - (i) One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and justice;
 - (ii) Three other cabinet positions.
4. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the same spirit, make available to the RUF/SL the following senior government positions: Four posts of Deputy Minister.
5. Within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to remove any legal impediments that may prevent RUF/SL members from holding cabinet and other positions.

ARTICLE VI

COMMISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE

1. A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (hereinafter termed the CCP), shall be established within two weeks of the signing of the present Agreement to implement a post-conflict programme that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of all parties to the conflict, especially the victims of war. The CCP shall have the overall goal and responsibility for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the present Agreement relative to the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace.
2. The CCP shall ensure that all structures for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace already in existence and those provided for in the present Agreement are operational and given the necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall comprise:
 - (i) the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development;
 - (ii) the Joint Monitoring Commission;

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- (iii) the Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring Committees;
 - (iv) the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants;
 - (v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance;
 - (vi) the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration;
 - (vii) the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
 - (viii) the Human Rights Commission; and
 - (ix) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
3. The CCP shall have the right to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.
 4. The CCP shall have full powers to organize its work in any manner it deems appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it deems necessary in the discharge of its functions.
 5. The Commission shall be composed of the following members:
 - (i) Two representatives of the civil society;
 - (ii) One representative each named by the Government, the RUF/SL and the Parliament.
 6. The CCP shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and secretarial support staff.
 7. Recommendations for improvements or modifications shall be made to the President of Sierra Leone for appropriate action. Likewise, failures of the structures to perform their assigned duties shall also be brought to the attention of the President.
 8. Disputes arising out of the preceding paragraph shall be brought to the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders for resolution, as specified in Article VIII of the present Agreement.
 9. Should Protocols be needed in furtherance of any provision in the present Agreement, the CCP shall have the responsibility for their preparation.
 10. The mandate of the CCP shall terminate at the end of the next general elections.

ARTICLE VII

COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES,

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Given the emergency situation facing the country, the parties agree that the Government shall exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter termed the CMRRD) shall be established and charged with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leone's gold and diamonds, and other resources that are determined to be of strategic importance for national security and welfare as well as cater for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, as provided for under Article XXVIII of the present Agreement.
2. The Government shall take the necessary legal action within a period not exceeding two weeks from the signing of the present Agreement to the effect that all exploitation, sale, export, or any other transaction of gold and diamonds shall be forbidden except those sanctioned by the CMRRD. All previous concessions shall be null and void.
3. The CMRRD shall authorize licensing of artisanal production of diamonds and gold, in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. All gold and diamonds extracted or otherwise sources from any Sierra Leonean territory shall be sold to the Government.
4. The CMRRD shall ensure, through the appropriate authorities, the security of the areas covered under this Article, and shall take all necessary measures against unauthorized exploitation.

5. For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the CMRRD shall authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more reputable international and specialized mineral companies. All exports of Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the Government, under these agreements.

6. The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.

7. The Government shall, if necessary, seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and their instruments of law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this Article.

8. The management of other natural resources shall be reviewed by the CMRRD to determine if their regulation is a matter of national security and welfare, and recommend appropriate policy to the Government.

9. The functions of the Ministry of Mines shall continued to be carried out by the current authorized ministry. However, in respect of strategic mineral resources, the CMRRD shall be an autonomous body in carrying out its duties concerning the regulation of Sierra Leone's strategic natural resources.

10. All agreements and transactions referred to in this Article shall be subject to full public disclosure and records of all correspondence, negotiations, business transactions and any other matters related to exploitation, management, local or international marketing, and any other matter shall be public documents.

11. The Commission shall issue monthly reports, including the details of all the transactions related to gold and diamonds, and other licenses or concessions of natural resources, and its own administrative costs.

12. The Commission shall be governed by a Board whose Chairmanship shall be offered to the Leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. The Board shall also comprise:

- (i) Two representatives of the Government appointed by the President;
- (ii) Two representatives of the political party to be formed by the RUF/SL;
- (iii) Three representatives of the civil society; and
- (iv) Two representatives of other political parties appointed by Parliament.

13. The Government shall take the required administrative actions to implement the commitments made in the present Agreement; and in the case of enabling legislation, it shall draft and submit to Parliament within thirty days of the signature of the present Agreement, the relevant bills for their enactment into law.

14. The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and to determine that the proceeds be used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public education, public health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war victims as well as post-war reconstruction and development.

ARTICLE VIII

COUNCIL OF ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS

1. The signatories agree to refer any conflicting differences of interpretation of this Article or any other Article of the present Agreement or its protocols, to a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders comprised as follows:

- (i) Two members appointed by the Inter-Religious Council;
- (ii) One member each appointed by the Government and the RUF/SL; and
- (iii) One member appointed by ECOWAS.

2. The Council shall designate its own chairperson from among its members. All of its decision shall be taken by the concurrence of at least four members, and shall be binding and public, provided that an aggrieved party may appeal to the Supreme Court.

PART THREE

OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES

The Part of the present Agreement Consists of the following Articles

Article IX Pardon and Amnesty

Article X Review of the Present Constitution

Article XI Elections

Article XII National Electoral Commission

ARTICLE IX

PARDON AND AMNESTY

1. In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.

2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.

3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE X

REVIEW OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

In order to ensure that the Constitution of Sierra Leone represents the needs and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone and that no constitutional or any other legal provision prevents the implementation of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to establish a Constitutional Review Committee to review the provisions of the present Constitution, and where deemed appropriate, recommend revisions and amendments, in accordance with Part V, Section 108 of the Constitution of 1991.

ARTICLE XI

DATE OF NEXT ELECTIONS

The next national elections in Sierra Leone shall be held in accordance with the present Constitution of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

1. A new independent National Electoral Commission (hereinafter termed the NEC) shall be set up by the Government, not later than three months after the signing of the present Agreement.

2. In setting up the new NEC the President shall consult all political parties, including the RUF/SL, to determine the membership and terms

of reference of the Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nation's elections.

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3. No member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any government formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct.

4. The NEC shall request the assistance of the International Community, including the UN, the O.A.U, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations, in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone.

PART FOUR

POST-CONFLICT MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recognizing that the maintenance of peace and security is of paramount importance for the achievement of lasting peace in Sierra Leone and for the welfare of its people, have agreed to the following formulas for dealing with post-conflict military and security matters. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to the Agreement.

Article XIII Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMOG

Article XIV New Mandate of UNOMSIL

Article XV Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors

Article XVI Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Article XVII Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces

Article XVIII Withdrawal of Mercenaries

Article XIX Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission

Article Notification to Military Commands.

ARTICLE XIII

TRANSFORMATION AND NEW MANDATE OF ECOMOG

1. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the parties shall request ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as follows:

(i) Peacekeeping;

(ii) Security of the State of Sierra Leone;

i. Protection of UNOMSIL.

i. Protection of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration personnel.

2. The Government shall, immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, request ECOWAS for troop contributions from at least two additional countries. The additional contingents shall be deployed not later than 30 days from the date of signature of the present Agreement. The Security Council shall be requested to provide assistance in support of ECOMOG.

3. The Parties agree to develop a timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, including measures for securing all of the territory of Sierra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The phased withdrawal of ECOMOG will be linked to the phased creation and deployment of the restructured armed forces.

ARTICLE XIV

NEW MANDATE OF UNOMSIL

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1. The UN Security Council is requested to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XV

SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR PEACE MONITORS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL agree to guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNOMSIL Military Observers throughout Sierra Leone. This guarantee shall be monitored by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

2. The freedom of movement includes complete and unhindered access for UNOMSIL Military Observers in the conduct of their duties throughout Sierra Leone. Before and during the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, officers and escorts to be provided by both Parties shall be required to facilitate this access.

3. Such freedom of movement and security shall also be accorded to non-military UNOMSIL personnel such as Human Rights Officers in the conduct of their duties. These personnel shall, in most cases, be accompanied by UNOMSIL Military Observers.

4. The provision of security to be extended shall include United Nations aircraft, vehicles and other property.

ARTICLE XVI

ENCAMPMENT, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

1. A neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment, disarmament and demobilization process shall commence within six weeks of the signing of the present Agreement in line with the deployment of the neutral peace keeping force.

2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and their arms in the armoury and their ammunitions in the magazines and placed under constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping force during the process of disarmament and demobilization.

3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants.

4. Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other emoluments due to former members of the SLA.

ARTICLE XVII

RESTRUCTURING AND TRAINING OF THE SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES

1. The restructuring, composition and training of the new Sierra Leone armed forces will be carried out by the Government with a view to creating truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the State of Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role.

2. Those ex-combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF and SLA who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria.

3. Recruitment into the armed forces shall reflect the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength.

ARTICLE XVIII

WITHDRAWAL OF MERCENARIES

All mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement. Their withdrawal shall be supervised by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

ARTICLE XIX

NOTIFICATION TO JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION

Immediately upon the establishment of the JMC provided for in Article II of the present Agreement, each party shall furnish to the JMC information regarding the strength and locations of all combatants as well as the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded bombs (UXBs), explosive ordnance devices (EODs), minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military hazards. The JMC shall seek all necessary technical assistance in mine clearance and the disposal or destruction of similar devices and weapons under the operational control of the neutral peacekeeping force. The parties shall keep the JMC updated on changes in this information so that it can notify the public as needed, to prevent injuries.

ARTICLE XX

NOTIFICATION TO MILITARY COMMANDS

Each party shall ensure that the terms of the present Agreement, and written orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its forces.

PART FIVE

HUMANITARIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL recognizing the importance of upholding, promoting and protecting the human rights of every Sierra Leonean as well as the enforcement of humanitarian law, agree to the following formulas for the achievement of these laudable objectives. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement

Article XXI Release of Prisoners and Abductees

Article XXII Refugees and Displaced Persons

Article XXIII Guarantee of the Security of Displaced Persons and Refugees

Article XXIV Guarantee and Promotion of Human Rights

Article XXV Human Rights Commission

Article XXVI Human Rights Violations

Article XXVII Humanitarian Relief

Article XXVIII Post War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Article XXIX Special Fund for War Victims

Article XXX Child Combatants

Article XXXI Education and Health

ARTICLE XXI

RELEASE OF PRISONERS AND ABDUCTEES

All political prisoners of war as well as all non-combatants shall be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties, in accordance with the Statement of June 2, 1999, which is contained in Annex 3 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XXII

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The Parties through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction agree to seek funding from and the involvement of the UN and other agencies, including friendly countries, in order to design and implement a plan for voluntary repatriation and reintegration of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in conformity with international conventions, norms and practices.

ARTICLE XXIII

GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED

PERSONS AND REFUGEES

As a reaffirmation of their commitment to the observation of the conventions and principles of human rights and the status of refugees, the Parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to ensure that the right of Sierra Leoneans to asylum is fully respected and that no camps or dwellings of refugees or displaced persons are violated.

ARTICLE XXIV

GUARANTEE AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society.
2. These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

ARTICLE XXV

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. The Parties pledge to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people in respect of alleged violations of their basic human rights by the creation, as a matter of urgency and not later than 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement, of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission.
2. The Parties further pledge to promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including the schools, the media, the police, the military and the religious community.
3. In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant international organisations.
4. A consortium of local human rights and civil society groups in Sierra Leone shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights

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observance.

ARTICLE XXVI

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.

2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991.

This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.

3. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some technical support of the International Community. This Commission shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its recommendations.

ARTICLE XXVII

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to their Statement on the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Sierra Leone of June 3, 1999 which is contained in Annex 4 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. To this end, the Government shall request appropriate international humanitarian assistance for the people of Sierra Leone who are in need all over the country.

2. The Parties agree to guarantee safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian organizations throughout the country in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms which govern humanitarian operations. In this respect, the parties agree to guarantee the security of the presence and movement of humanitarian personnel.

3. The Parties also agree to guarantee the security of all properties and goods transported, stocked or distributed by humanitarian organizations, as well as the security of their projects and beneficiaries.

4. The Government shall set up at various levels throughout the country, the appropriate and effective administrative or security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the implementation of these guarantees of safety for the personnel, goods and areas of operation of the humanitarian organizations.

ARTICLE XXVIII

POST - WAR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

1. The Government, through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and with the support of the International Community, shall provide appropriate financial and technical resources for post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

2. Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XXIX

SPECIAL FUND FOR WAR VICTIMS

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The Government, with the support of the International Community, shall design and implement a programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a special fund shall be set up.

ARTICLE XXX

CHILD COMBATANTS

The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

ARTICLE XXXI

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

The Government shall provide free compulsory education for the first nine years of schooling (Basic Education) and shall endeavour to provide free schooling for a further three years. The Government shall also endeavour to provide affordable primary health care throughout the country.

PART SIX

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

ARTICLE XXXII

JOINT IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE

A Joint Implementation Committee consisting of members of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and the Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the Moral Guarantors, provided for in Article XXXIV of the present Agreement and other international supporters shall be established. Under the chairmanship of ECOWAS, the Joint Implementation Committee shall be responsible for viewing and assessing the state of implementation of the Agreement, and shall meet at least once every three months. Without prejudice to the functions of the Commission for

the Consolidation of Peace as provided for in Article VI, the Joint Implementation Committee shall make recommendations deemed necessary to ensure effective implementation of the present Agreement according to the Schedule of Implementation, which appears as Annex 5.

ARTICLE XXXIII

REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The parties request that the provisions of the present Agreement affecting the United Nations shall enter into force upon the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the request made in this Agreement. Likewise, the decision-making bodies of the other international organisations concerned are requested to take similar action, where appropriate.

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PART SEVEN

MORAL GUARANTORS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

ARTICLE XXXIV

MORAL GUARANTORS

The Government of the Togolese Republic, the United Nations, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations shall stand as Moral Guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

ARTICLE XXXV

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Both parties call on the International Community to assist them in implementing the present Agreement with integrity and good faith. The international organisations mentioned in Article XXXIV and the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are facilitating and supporting the conclusion of this Agreement. These States and organisations believe that this Agreement must protect the paramount interests of the people of Sierra Leone in peace and security.

PART EIGHT

FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XXXVI

REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION

The Sierra Leone Government shall register the signed Agreement not later than 15 days from the date of the signing of this Agreement. The signed Agreement shall also be published in the Sierra Leone Gazette not later than 48 (Forty - Eight) hours after the date of registration of this Agreement. This Agreement shall be laid before the Parliament of Sierra Leone not later than 21 (Twenty-One) days after the signing of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXXVII

ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signing by the Parties.

Done in Lomé this seven day of the month of July 1999 in twelve (12) original texts in English and French, each text being equally authentic.

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Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

His Excellency Gnassingbe Eyadema
President of the Togolese Republic
Chairman of ECOWAS

His Excellency Blaise Compaore
President of Burkina Faso

His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr. Charles Ghankey Taylor
President of the Republic of Liberia

His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

His Excellency Youssoufou Bamba
Secretary of State at the Foreign Mission in charge of
International Cooperation of Cote d'Ivoire

His Excellency Victor Gbeho
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana

Mr. Roger Laloupo
Representative of the ECOWAS Special Representative
Ms. Adwoa Coleman
Representative Organization of African Unity

Ambassador Francis G. Okelo
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Secretary General
Dr. Moses K.Z. Anafu
Representative of the Commonwealth of Nations

ANNEX 1

AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE IN SIERRA LEONE

President Ahmed Tejan KABBAH and Rev. Jesse Jackson met on 18 May 1999 with Corporal Foday Saybana SANKOH, under the auspices of President Gnassingbe EYADEMA. At that meeting, the question of the peace process for Sierra Leone was discussed.

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL),

- Desirous to promote the ongoing dialogue process with a view to establishing durable peace and stability in Sierra Leone;
and

- Wishing to create an appropriate atmosphere conducive to the holding of peace talks in Lome, which began with the RUF internal consultations to be followed by dialogue between the Government and the RUF;

- Have jointly decided to:

1. Agree to ceasefire as from 24 May 1999, the day that President EYADEMA invited Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS to discuss problems pertaining to Sierra Leone. It was further agreed that the dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would commence on 25 May 1999;
2. Maintain their present and respective positions in Sierra Leone as of the 24th of May 1999; and refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which could undermine the peace process;
3. Commit to start negotiations in good faith, involving all relevant parties in the discussions, not later than May 25 in Lome;
4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines;
5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants;
6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Council's authorisation, to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement.

This agreement is without prejudice to any other agreement or additional protocols which may be discussed during the dialogue between the Government and the RUF.

Signed in Lome (Togo) 18 May 1999, in six (6) originals in English and French

For the Government of Sierra Leone

ALHADJI Dr. Ahmad Tejan KABBAH
President Of The Republic Of Sierra Leone

For the Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, Leader of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

WITNESSED BY:

For the Government of Togo and Current Chairman of
ECOWAS

GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo

For the United Nations

Francis G. Okelo
Special Representative of the Secretary General

For the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

Adwoa COLEMAN
Representative of the Organization of African Unity

US Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of
Democracy in Africa

Rev. Jesse JACKSON

ANNEX 2

DEFINITION OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

1. In accordance with Article II of the present Agreement, both parties agree that the following constitute cease-fire violations and a breach of the Cease-fire Agreement:

a. The use of weapons of any kind in any circumstance including: -

- (i) Automatic and semi-automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns and any other small arms weapon systems.
- (ii) Heavy machine guns and any other heavy weapon systems.
- (iii) Grenades and rocket-propelled grenade weapon systems.
- (iv) Artillery, rockets, mortars and any other indirect fire weapon systems.
- (v) All types of mine, explosive devices and improvised booby traps.
- (vi) Air Defence weapon systems of any nature.
- (vii) Any other weapon not included in the above paragraphs.

b. Troop movements of any nature outside of the areas recognized as being under the control of respective fighting forces without prior notification to the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee of any movements at least 48 hours in advance.

The movement of arms and ammunition. To be considered in the context of Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998).

d. Troop movements of any nature;

d. The construction and/or the improvement of defensive works and positions within respective areas of control, but outside a geographical boundary of 500m from existing similar positions.

f. Reconnaissance of any nature outside of respective areas of control.

g. Any other offensive or aggressive action.

2. Any training or other military activities not provided for in Articles XIII to XIX of the present Agreement, constitute a cease-fire violation.

3. In the event of a hostile external force threatening the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Sierra Leone, military action may be undertaken by the Sierra Leone Government.

ANNEX 3

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND NON-COMBATANTS

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL) have agreed to implement as soon as possible the provision of the Cease-fire Agreement which was signed on 18 May 1999 in Lome, relating to the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of this provision in the interest of the furtherance of the talks.

They therefore decided that an appropriate Committee is established to handle the release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Both the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone decided that such a Committee be established by the UN and chaired by the UN Chief Military Observer in Sierra Leone and comprising representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF and other relevant UN Agencies and NGOs.

This Committee should begin its work immediately by contacting both parties to the conflict with a view to effecting the immediate release

of these prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Lomé - 2 June 1999

ANNEX 4

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SIERRA LEONE

The parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone meeting in Lomé Togo on 3rd June 1999 in the context of the Dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone (GSL) and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL):

Reaffirm their respect for international convention, principles and norms, which govern the right of people to receive humanitarian assistance and the effective delivery of such assistance.

Reiterate their commitment to the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement signed by the two parties on 18th May 1999 in Lomé.

Aware of the fact that the protracted civil strife in Sierra Leone has created a situation whereby the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans in need of humanitarian assistance cannot be reached.

Hereby agree as follows:

1. That all duly registered humanitarian agencies shall be guaranteed safe and unhindered access to all areas under the control of the respective parties in order that humanitarian assistance can be delivered safely and effectively, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms govern humanitarian operations.

2. In this respect the two parties shall:

a. guarantee safe access and facilitate the fielding of independent assessment missions by duly registered humanitarian agencies.

b. identify, in collaboration with the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Sierra Leone and UNOMSIL, mutually agreed routes (road, air and waterways) by which humanitarian goods and personnel shall be transported to the beneficiaries to provide needed assistance.

c. allow duly registered humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance according to needs established through independent assessments.

d. guarantee the security of all properties and of goods transported, stocked or distributed by the duly registered humanitarian agencies, as well as the security of their project areas and beneficiaries.

3. The two parties undertake to establish with immediate effect, and not later than seven days, an Implementation Committee formed by appropriately designated and mandated representatives from the Government of Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the Civil Society, the NGO community, and the UNOMSIL; and chaired by the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator, in co-ordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra Leone.

The Implementation Committee will be mandated to:

a. Ascertain and assess the security of proposed routes to be used by the humanitarian agencies, and disseminate information on routes to interested humanitarian agencies.

b. Receive and review complaints which may arise in the implementation of this arrangement, in order to re-establish full compliance.

4. The parties agree to set up at various levels in their areas of control, the appropriate and effective administrative and security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in all approved points of delivery, and ensure the security of the personnel, goods and project areas of the humanitarian agencies as well as the safety of the beneficiaries.

Issued in Lomé
June 3 1999

ANNEX 5

DRAFT SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

1. ACTIVITIES WITH SPECIFIC TIMING:

TIMING	ACTIVITIES	ACTION REQUIRED	FOLLOW-UP ACTION
DAY 1	Signing of the Peace Agreement:		
	Amnesty	The Government to grant absolute and free pardon to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh through appropriate legal steps	
	Transformation and new mandate of ECOMOG	Request to ECOWAS by the parties for revision of the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone Request to the UN Security Council to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement; Request to the international community to provide substantial financial and logistical assistance to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement. Request to ECOWAS by the parties for contributions of additional troops.	
	Transformation of the RUF into a political party	RUF/SL to commence to organize itself to function as a political party	
	Encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)	Request for international assistance in adapting and extending the existing DDR programme	
	Withdrawal of mercenaries	Supervision by Joint Monitoring Commission	
	Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission	Communication by the parties of positions and description of all known warlike devices/materials	
	Notification to Military Commands	Communication by the parties of written orders requiring compliance	
DAY 15	Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office, and to join a broad-based Government of National Unity through Cabinet appointments	Removal by the Government of all legal impediments	
	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)	Creation of the Commission to implement a post-conflict reconciliation and welfare programme	Mandate of the Commission to terminate at the end of next general elections Jan - Feb. 2001
	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRDD)	Ban on all exploitation, sale, export, or any transaction of gold and diamonds except those sanctioned by the CMRDD	
DAY 22	Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office	Discussion and agreement between both parties on the appointment of RUF/SL members to positions of parastatal, diplomacy and any other public sector	For a period of fourteen days
DAY 31	Transformation of the RUF into a political party	Necessary legal steps by the Government for the registration of the RUF as a political party	
	Commission for the management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRDD)	Preparation and submission by Government to the Parliament of relevant bills for enabling legislation commitments made under the peace agreement	
	Transformation, new mandate, and phased withdrawal of ECOMOG	Deployment of troops from at least two additional countries	
DAY 60	Completion of encampment, disarmament and demobilization	Restriction of SLA soldiers to the barracks and storage of their arms and ammunition under constant surveillance by the Neutral Peace-Keeping Force during the disarmament process Monitoring of disarmament and demobilization, by UNOMSIL	
DAY 90	Human Rights Commission	Creation of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission Request for technical and material assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African	


		Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights and other relevant organizations
		Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
	Elections	Establishment of a new independent National Electoral Commission (NEC) in consultation with all political parties including the RUF/SL Request for financial and logistical support for the operations of the NEC Request for assistance from the international community in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone
DAY 456	Human Rights Violations	Submission by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of its report and recommendation to the Government for immediate implementation

II. ACTIVITIES WITHOUT SPECIFIC TIMING: (SHORT/MEDIUM/LONG TERM):

SERIAL NO.	ACTIVITIES	ACTION REQUIRED	FOLLOW-UP ACTION
1.	Ceasefire monitoring (Ceasefire Agreement signed on 18 May 1999)	Establishment of a Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at provincial and district levels Request for international assistance in providing funds and other logistics for the operations of the JMC	JMC already established and operational
2.	Review of the present Constitution	Establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee	
3.	Mediation by the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders	Appointment of members of the Council by the Interreligious Council, the Government, the RUF and ECOWAS	
4.	Timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG	Formulation of the timetable in connection with the phased creation and deployment of the restructured Armed Forces	
5.	Security guarantees for peace monitors	Communication, in writing, of security guarantees to UNMILOBS	
6.	Restructuring and training of the SLA	Creation by the Government of truly national armed forces reflecting the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established	

Number	Item	Content
195	Map	Sierra Leone, Scale 1:350,000


Sierra Leone



- Legend**
- Primary Roads
 - Sector Boundary
 - Secondary Roads
 - District Boundary
 - Airport
 - Railroad
 - Proposed Place
 - Canal
 - International Boundary
 - Primary Road
 - Secondary Road
 - Tertiary Road
 - Track
 - Man-made Area
 - Lake/river
 - Swamp
 - Settlement Area
 - Shrubland

Sierra Leone
Scale 1:350,000

Produced by
Sierra Leone Geographical Information System
1 May 2021



Number	Item	Content
196	Record of States Party to Geneva Conventions	ICRC, States party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977



ICRC

States party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977

Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols

The list of all ratifications, accessions and successions is based on information received from the Depository of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols: The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in Bern.

This list is updated everytime that a State is known to have deposited an instrument of ratification, accession or succession to the following treaties.

Contents:

- 1. Abbreviations
- 2. Dates
- 3. Entry into force
- 4. Names of countries
- 5. Ratifications
- 6. Notes
- 7. Totals

1. ABBREVIATIONS

R/A/S = Ratification : a treaty is generally open for signature for a certain time following the conference which has adopted it. However, a signature is not binding on a State unless it has been endorsed by ratification. The time limits having elapsed, the Conventions and the Protocols are no longer open for signature. The States which have not signed them may at any time accede or, in the appropriate circumstances, succeed to them.

Accession : instead of signing and then ratifying a treaty, a State may become party to it by the single act called accession.

Succession (declaration of) : a newly independent State may declare that it will abide by a treaty which was applicable to it prior to its independence. A State may also declare that it will provisionally abide by such treaties during the time it deems necessary to examine their texts carefully and to decide on accession or succession to some or all of the said treaties (declaration of provisional application of the treaties). At present no State is bound by such a declaration.

R/D = Reservation/Declaration : unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State when ratifying, acceding or succeeding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State (provided that such reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty).

D90 = Declaration provided for under article 90 of Protocol I (prior acceptance of the competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission).

2. DATES

The dates indicated are those on which the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs received the official instrument from the State that was ratifying, acceding to or succeeding to the Conventions or Protocols or accepting the competence of the Commission provided for under Article 90 of Protocol I. They thus represent neither the date on which ratification, accession, succession or acceptance of the Commission was decided upon by the State concerned nor that on which the corresponding instrument was sent.

N.B.: The dates given for succession to the Geneva Conventions by CONGO, JAMAICA, MADAGASCAR, MAURITANIA, NIGER, NIGERIA, RWANDA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE and ZAIRE used to be those on which the corresponding instruments had been officially adopted. They have now been replaced by the dates on which the depositary received those instruments.

3. ENTRY INTO FORCE

Except as mentioned in footnotes at the end of the tables, for all States the entry into force of the Conventions and of the Protocols occurs six months after the date given in the present document; for States which have made a declaration of succession, entry into force takes place retroactively, on the day of their accession to independence.

The 1949 Geneva Conventions entered into force on 21 October 1950.
The 1977 Protocols entered into force on 7 December 1978.

4. NAMES OF COUNTRIES

The names of countries given in the following list may differ from the official names of States.

5. RATIFICATIONS

COUNTRY	GENEVA CONVENTIONS		PROTOCOL I			PROTOCOL II				
	R/A/S	R/D	R/A/S	R/D	D90	R/A/S	R/D			
Afghanistan	26.09.1956	R								
Albania	27.05.1957	R	X	16.07.1993	A	16.07.1993	A			
Algeria	20.06.1960; 03.07.1962	A		16.08.1989	A	X	16.08.1989	A		
Andorra	17.09.1993	A								
Angola	20.09.1984	A	X	20.09.1984	A	X				
Antigua and Barbuda	06.10.1986	S		06.10.1986	A		06.10.1986	A		
Argentina	18.09.1956	R		26.11.1986	A	X	11.10.1996	26.11.1986	A	X
Armenia	07.06.1993	A		07.06.1993	A		07.06.1993	A		
Australia	14.10.1958	R	X	21.06.1991	R	X	23.09.1992	21.06.1991	R	
Austria	27.08.1953	R		13.08.1982	R	X	13.08.1982	13.08.1982	R	X
Azerbaijan	01.06.1993	A								

Bahamas	11.07.1975	S		10.04.1980	A			10.04.1980	A
Bahrain	30.11.1971	A		30.10.1986	A			30.10.1986	A
Bangladesh	04.04.1972	S		08.09.1980	A			08.09.1980	A
Barbados	10.09.1968	S	X	19.02.1990	A			19.02.1990	A
Belarus	03.08.1954	R		23.10.1989	R		23.10.1989	23.10.1989	R
Belgium	03.09.1952	R		20.05.1986	R	X	27.03.1987	20.05.1986	R
Belize	29.06.1984	A		29.06.1984	A			29.06.1984	A
Benin	14.12.1961	S		28.05.1986	A			28.05.1986	A
Bhutan	10.01.1991	A							
Bolivia	10.12.1976	R		08.12.1983	A		10.08.1992	08.12.1983	A
Bosnia-Herzegovina	31.12.1992	S		31.12.1992	S		31.12.1992	31.12.1992	S
Botswana	29.03.1968	A		23.05.1979	A			23.05.1979	A
Brazil	29.06.1957	R		05.05.1992	A		23.11.1993	05.05.1992	A
Brunei Darussalam	14.10.1991	A		14.10.1991	A			14.10.1991	A
Bulgaria	22.07.1954	R		26.09.1989	R		09.05.1994	26.09.1989	R
Burkina Faso	07.11.1961	S		20.10.1987	R			20.10.1987	R
Burundi	27.12.1971	S		10.06.1993	A			10.06.1993	A
Cambodia	08.12.1958	A		14.01.1998	A			14.01.1998	A
Cameroon	16.09.1963	S		16.03.1984	A			16.03.1984	A
Canada	14.05.1965	R		20.11.1990	R	X	20.11.1990	20.11.1990	R X
Cape Verde	11.05.1984	A		16.03.1995	A		16.03.1995	16.03.1995	A
Central African Republic	01.08.1966	S		17.07.1984	A			17.07.1984	A
Chad	05.08.1970	A		17.01.1997	A			17.01.1997	A
Chile	12.10.1950	R		24.04.1991	R		24.04.1991	24.04.1991	R
China	28.12.1956	R	X	14.09.1983	A	X		14.09.1983	A
Colombia	08.11.1961	R		01.09.1993	A		17.04.1996	14.08.1995	A
Comoros	21.11.1985	A		21.11.1985	A			21.11.1985	A
Congo	04.02.1967	S		10.11.1983	A			10.11.1983	A
Congo (Dem. Rep.)	24.02.1961	S		03.06.1982	A		12.12.2002	12.12.2002	A
Cook Islands	11.06.2001	S		07.05.2002	A		07.05.2002	07.05.2002	A
Costa Rica	15.10.1969	A		15.12.1983	A		02.12.1999	15.12.1983	A
Côte d'Ivoire	28.12.1961	S		20.09.1989	R			20.09.1989	R
Croatia	11.05.1992	S		11.05.1992	S		11.05.1992	11.05.1992	S
Cuba	15.04.1954	R		25.11.1982	A			23.06.1999	A
Cyprus	23.05.1962	A		01.06.1979	R		14.10.2002	18.03.1996	A
Czech Republic	05.02.1993	S	X	05.02.1993	S		02.05.1995	05.02.1993	S

Denmark	27.06.1951	R		17.06.1982	R	X	17.06.1982	17.06.1982	R	
Djibouti	06.03.1978	S		08.04.1991	A			08.04.1991	A	
Dominica	28.09.1981	S		25.04.1996	A			25.04.1996	A	
Dominican Republic	22.01.1958	A		26.05.1994	A			26.05.1994	A	
East Timor	08.05.2003	A								
Ecuador	11.08.1954	R		10.04.1979	R			10.04.1979	R	
Egypt	10.11.1952	R		09.10.1992	R	X		09.10.1992	R	X
El Salvador	17.06.1953	R		23.11.1978	R			23.11.1978	R	
Equatorial Guinea	24.07.1986	A		24.07.1986	A			24.07.1986	A	
Eritrea	14.08.2000	A								
Estonia	18.01.1993	A		18.01.1993	A			18.01.1993	A	
Ethiopia	02.10.1969	R		08.04.1994	A			08.04.1994	A	
Fiji	09.08.1971	S								
Finland	22.02.1955	R		07.08.1980	R	X	07.08.1980	07.08.1980	R	
France	28.06.1951	R		11.04.2001	A	X		24.02.1984	A	X
Gabon	26.02.1965	S		08.04.1980	A			08.04.1980	A	
Gambia	20.10.1966	S		12.01.1989	A			12.01.1989	A	
Georgia	14.09.1993	A		14.09.1993	A			14.09.1993	A	
Germany	03.09.1954	A	X	14.02.1991	R	X	14.02.1991	14.02.1991	R	X
Ghana	02.08.1958	A		28.02.1978	R			28.02.1978	R	
Greece	05.06.1956	R		31.03.1989	R		04.02.1998	15.02.1993	A	
Grenada	13.04.1981	S		23.09.1998	A			23.09.1998	A	
Guatemala	14.05.1952	R		19.10.1987	R			19.10.1987	R	
Guinea	11.07.1984	A		11.07.1984	A		20.12.1993	11.07.1984	A	
Guinea-Bissau	21.02.1974	A	X	21.10.1986	A			21.10.1986	A	
Guyana	22.07.1968	S		18.01.1988	A			18.01.1988	A	
Haiti	11.04.1957	A								
Holy See	22.02.1951	R		21.11.1985	R	X		21.11.1985	R	X
Honduras	31.12.1965	A		16.02.1995	R			16.02.1995	R	
Hungary	03.08.1954	R		12.04.1989	R		23.09.1991	12.04.1989	R	
Iceland	10.08.1965	A		10.04.1987	R	X	10.04.1987	10.04.1987	R	
India	09.11.1950	R								
Indonesia	30.09.1958	A								
Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	20.02.1957	R	X							
Iraq	14.02.1956	A								
Ireland	27.09.1962	R		19.05.1999	R	X	19.05.1999	19.05.1999	R	X
Israel	06.07.1951	R	X							
Italy	17.12.1951	R		27.02.1986	R	X	27.02.1986	27.02.1986	R	

Jamaica	20.07.1964	S		29.07.1986	A			29.07.1986	A
Japan	21.04.1953	A							
Jordan	29.05.1951	A		01.05.1979	R			01.05.1979	R
Kazakhstan	05.05.1992	S		05.05.1992	S			05.05.1992	S
Kenya	20.09.1966	A		23.02.1999	A			23.02.1999	A
Kiribati	05.01.1989	S							
Korea (Dem. People's Rep.)	27.08.1957	A	X	09.03.1988	A				
Korea (Republic of)	16.08.1966	A	X	15.01.1982	R	X		15.01.1982	R
Kuwait	02.09.1967	A	X	17.01.1985	A			17.01.1985	A
Kyrgyzstan	18.09.1992	S		18.09.1992	S			18.09.1992	S
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	29.10.1956	A		18.11.1980	R		30.01.1998	18.11.1980	R
Latvia	24.12.1991	A		24.12.1991	A			24.12.1991	A
Lebanon	10.04.1951	R		23.07.1997	A			23.07.1997	A
Lesotho	20.05.1968	S		20.05.1994	A			20.05.1994	A
Liberia	29.03.1954	A		30.06.1988	A			30.06.1988	A
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	22.05.1956	A		07.06.1978	A			07.06.1978	A
Liechtenstein	21.09.1950	R		10.08.1989	R	X	10.08.1989	10.08.1989	R X
Lithuania	03.10.1996	A		13.07.2000	A		13.07.2000	13.07.2000	
Luxembourg	01.07.1953	R		29.08.1989	R		12.05.1993	29.08.1989	R
Macedonia	01.09.1993	S	X	01.09.1993	S	X	01.09.1993	01.09.1993	S
Madagascar	18.07.1963	S		08.05.1992	R		27.07.1993	08.05.1992	R
Malawi	05.01.1968	A		07.10.1991	A			07.10.1991	A
Malaysia	24.08.1962	A							
Maldives	18.06.1991	A		03.09.1991	A			03.09.1991	A
Mali	24.05.1965	A		08.02.1989	A		09.05.2003	08.02.1989	A
Malta	22.08.1968	S		17.04.1989	A	X	17.04.1989	17.04.1989	A X
Mauritania	30.10.1962	S		14.03.1980	A			14.03.1980	A
Mauritius	18.08.1970	S		22.03.1982	A			22.03.1982	A
Mexico	29.10.1952	R		10.03.1983	A				
Micronesia	19.09.1995	A		19.09.1995	A			19.09.1995	A
Moldova (Republic of)	24.05.1993	A		24.05.1993	A			24.05.1993	A
Monaco	05.07.1950	R		07.01.2000	A			07.01.2000	A
Mongolia	20.12.1958	A		06.12.1995	R	X	06.12.1995	06.12.1995	R
Morocco	26.07.1956	A							
Mozambique	14.03.1983	A		14.03.1983	A			12.11.2002	A

Myanmar	25.08.1992	A								
Namibia	22.08.1991	S	17.06.1994	A		21.07.1994	17.06.1994	A		
Nepal	07.02.1964	A								
Netherlands	03.08.1954	R	26.06.1987	R	X	25.06.1987	26.06.1987	R		
New Zealand	02.05.1959	R	X	08.02.1988	R	X	08.02.1988	08.02.1988	R	
Nicaragua	17.12.1953	R		19.07.1999	R			19.07.1999	R	
Niger	21.04.1964	S		08.06.1979	R			08.06.1979	R	
Nigeria	20.06.1961	S		10.10.1988	A			10.10.1988	A	
Norway	03.08.1951	R		14.12.1981	R		14.12.1981	14.12.1981	R	
Oman	31.01.1974	A		29.03.1984	A	X		29.03.1984	A	X
Pakistan	12.06.1951	R	X							
Palau	25.06.1996	A		25.06.1996	A			25.06.1996	A	
Panama	10.02.1956	A		18.09.1995	R		26.10.1999	18.09.1995	R	
Papua New Guinea	26.05.1976	S								
Paraguay	23.10.1961	R		30.11.1990	A		30.01.1998	30.11.1990	A	
Peru	15.02.1956	R		14.07.1989	R			14.07.1989	R	
Philippines	06.10.1952	R						11.12.1986	A	
Poland	26.11.1954	R	X	23.10.1991	R		02.10.1992	23.10.1991	R	
Portugal	14.03.1961	R	X	27.05.1992	R		01.07.1994	27.05.1992	R	
Qatar	15.10.1975	A		05.04.1988	A	X	24.09.1991			
Romania	01.06.1954	R		21.06.1990	R		31.05.1995	21.06.1990	R	
Russian Federation	10.05.1954	R	X	29.09.1989	R	X	29.09.1989	29.09.1989	R	X
Rwanda	05.05.1964	S		19.11.1984	A		08.07.1993	19.11.1984	A	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	14.02.1986	S		14.02.1986	A			14.02.1986	A	
Saint Lucia	18.09.1981	S		07.10.1982	A			07.10.1982	A	
Saint Vincent Grenadines	01.04.1981	A		08.04.1983	A			08.04.1983	A	
Samoa	23.08.1984	S		23.08.1984	A			23.08.1984	A	
San Marino	29.08.1953	A		05.04.1994	R			05.04.1994	R	
Sao Tome and Principe	21.05.1976	A		05.07.1996	A			05.07.1996	A	
Saudi Arabia	18.05.1963	A		21.08.1987	A	X		28.11.2001	A	
Senegal	18.05.1963	S		07.05.1985	R			07.05.1985	R	
Seychelles	08.11.1984	A		08.11.1984	A		22.05.1992	08.11.1984	A	
Sierra Leone	10.06.1965	S		21.10.1986	A			21.10.1986	A	
Singapore	27.04.1973	A								
Slovakia	02.04.1993	S		02.04.1993	S		13.03.1995	02.04.1993	S	

Slovenia	26.03.1992	S		26.03.1992	S		26.03.1992	26.03.1992	S
Solomon Islands	06.07.1981	S		19.09.1988	A			19.09.1988	A
Somalia	12.07.1962	A							
South Africa	31.03.1952	A		21.11.1995	A			21.11.1995	A
Spain	04.08.1952	R		21.04.1989	R	X	21.04.1989	21.04.1989	R
Sri Lanka	28.02.1959	R							
Sudan	23.09.1957	A							
Suriname	13.10.1976	S	X	16.12.1985	A			16.12.1985	A
Swaziland	28.06.1973	A		02.11.1995	A			02.11.1995	A
Sweden	28.12.1953	R		31.08.1979	R	X	31.08.1979	31.08.1979	R
Switzerland	31.03.1950	R		17.02.1982	R	X	17.02.1982	17.02.1982	R
Syrian Arab Republic	02.11.1953	R		14.11.1983	A	X			
Tajikistan	13.01.1993	S		13.01.1993	S		10.09.1997	13.01.1993	S
Tanzania (United Rep. of)	12.12.1962	S		15.02.1983	A			15.02.1983	A
Thailand	29.12.1954	A							
Togo	06.01.1962	S		21.06.1984	R		21.11.1991	21.06.1984	R
Tonga	13.04.1978	S		20.01.2003	A		20.01.2003	20.01.2003	A
Trinidad and Tobago	24.09.1963	A		20.07.2001	A		20.07.2001	20.07.2001	A
Tunisia	04.05.1957	A		09.08.1979	R			09.08.1979	R
Turkey	10.02.1954	R							
Turkmenistan	10.04.1992	S		10.04.1992	S			10.04.1992	S
Tuvalu	19.02.1981	S							
Uganda	18.05.1964	A		13.03.1991	A			13.03.1991	A
Ukraine	03.08.1954	R	X	25.01.1990	R		25.01.1990	25.01.1990	R
United Arab Emirates	10.05.1972	A		09.03.1983	A	X	06.03.1992	09.03.1983	A X
United Kingdom	23.09.1957	R	X	28.01.1998	R	X	17.05.1999	28.01.1998	R
United States of America	02.08.1955	R	X						
Uruguay	05.03.1969	R	X	13.12.1985	A		17.07.1990	13.12.1985	A
Uzbekistan	08.10.1993	A		08.10.1993	A			08.10.1993	A
Vanuatu	27.10.1982	A		28.02.1985	A			28.02.1985	A
Venezuela	13.02.1956	R		23.07.1998	A			23.07.1998	A
Viet Nam	28.06.1957	A	X	19.10.1981	R				
Yemen	16.07.1970	A	X	17.04.1990	R			17.04.1990	R

Yugoslavia	16.10.2001	S	16.10.2001	S	16.10.2001	16.10.2001	S
Zambia	19.10.1966	A	04.05.1995	A		04.05.1995	A
Zimbabwe	07.03.1983	A	19.10.1992	A		19.10.1992	A

6. NOTES

Djibouti. Djibouti's declaration of succession in respect of the First Convention was dated 26.01.78.

France. On accession to Protocol II, France made a communication concerning Protocol I.

Ghana. Entry into force of Protocols I and II on 07.12.78.

Namibia. An instrument of accession to the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols was deposited by the United Nations Council for Namibia on 18.10.83. In an instrument deposited on 22.08.91, Namibia declared its succession to the Geneva Conventions, which were previously applicable pursuant to South Africa's accession on 31.03.52.

Palestine. On 21 June 1989, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs received a letter from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations Office at Geneva informing the Swiss Federal Council "that the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, entrusted with the functions of the Government of the State of Palestine by decision of the Palestine National Council, decided, on 4 May 1989, to adhere to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the two Protocols additional thereto". On 13 September 1989, the Swiss Federal Council informed the States that it was not in a position to decide whether the letter constituted an instrument of accession, "due to the uncertainty within the international community as to the existence or non-existence of a State of Palestine".

Philippines. The First Geneva Convention was ratified on 7.03.1951.

Republic of Korea. The Geneva Conventions entered into force on 23.09.66, the Republic of Korea having invoked Art.62/61/141/157 common respectively to the First, Second, Third and Fourth Conventions (immediate effect).

Sri Lanka. Accession to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 23 February 1959 (Ceylon had signed only the First, Second, and Third Conventions).

Switzerland. Entry into force of the Geneva Conventions on 21.10.50.

Trinidad and Tobago. Accession to the First Geneva Convention on 17.03.1963.

7. T O T A L S

Number of States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949	:	191
Number of States Parties to the Additional Protocol I	:	161
Number of States having made the declaration under Article 90	:	65
Number of States Parties to the Additional Protocol II	:	156
Number of States Members of the United Nations	:	191

States Members of U.N. or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, not being Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions : MARSHALL, NAURU.

death, the will shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a certified copy shall be sent to the Central Agency.

Death certificates in the form annexed to the present Convention, or lists certified by a responsible officer, of all persons who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established in accordance with Article 122. The death certificates or certified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the third paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of death, the cause of death, the date and place of burial and all particulars necessary to identify the graves.

The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded by a medical examination of the body with a view to confirming death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary, establishing identity.

The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war who have died in captivity are honourably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and marked so as to be found at any time. Wherever possible, deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power shall be interred in the same place.

Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his express wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate of the deceased.

In order that graves may always be found, all particulars of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Registration Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in cemeteries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to the Power on which such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care of these graves and for records of any subsequent moves of the bodies shall rest on the Power controlling the territory, if a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also apply to the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the wishes of the home country.

Article 121

Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.

A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. Statements shall be taken from witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war, and a report including such statements shall be forwarded to the Protecting Power.

If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all measures for the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.

PART V

INFORMATION BUREAUX AND RELIEF SOCIETIES FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

Article 122

Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict shall institute an official Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers who may have received within their territory persons belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, shall take the same action with respect to such persons. The Power concerned shall ensure that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau is provided with the necessary accommodation, equipment and staff to ensure its efficient working. It shall be at liberty to employ prisoners of war in such a Bureau under the conditions laid down in the Section of the present Convention dealing with work by prisoners of war.

Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to the conflict shall give its Bureau the information referred to in the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding any enemy person belonging to one of the categories referred to in Article 4, who has fallen into its power. Neutral or non-belligerent Powers shall take the same action with regard to persons belonging to such categories whom they have received within their territory.

The Bureau shall immediately forward such information by the most rapid means to the Powers concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise of the Central Agency provided for in Article 123.

This information shall make it possible quickly to advise the next of kin concerned. Subject to the provisions of Article 17, the information shall include, in so far as available to the Information Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number, place and full date of birth, indication of the Power on which he depends, first name of the father and maiden name of the mother, name and address of the person to be informed and the address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.

The Information Bureau shall receive from the various departments concerned information regarding transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospital, and deaths, and shall transmit such information in the manner described in the third paragraph above.

Likewise, information regarding the state of health of prisoners of war who are seriously ill or seriously wounded shall be supplied regularly, every week if possible.

The Information Bureau shall also be responsible for replying to all enquiries sent to it concerning prisoners of war, including those who have died in captivity; it will make any enquiries necessary to obtain the information which is asked for if this is not in its possession.

All written communications made by the Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a seal.

The Information Bureau shall furthermore be charged with collecting all personal valuables, including sums in currencies other than that of the Detaining Power and documents of importance to the next of kin, left by prisoners of war who have been repatriated or released, or who have escaped or died, and shall forward the said valuables to the Powers concerned.

Such articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by statements giving clear and full particulars of the identity of the person to whom the articles belonged, and by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Other personal effects of such prisoners of war shall be transmitted under arrangements agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict concerned.

Article 123

A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be created in a neutral country. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization of such an Agency.

The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the information it may obtain through official or private channels respecting prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power on which they depend. It shall receive from the Parties to the conflict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.

The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.

The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief Societies provided for in Article 125.

Article 124

The national Information Bureaux and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free postage for mail, likewise all the exemptions provided for in Article 74, and further, so far as possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly reduced rates.

Article 125

Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may consider essential to ensure their security or to meet any other reasonable need, the representatives of religious organizations, relief societies, or any other organization assisting prisoners of war, shall receive from the said Powers, for themselves and their duly accredited agents, all necessary facilities for visiting the prisoners, distributing relief supplies and material, from any source, intended for religious, educational or recreative purposes, and for assisting them in organizing their leisure time within the camps. Such societies or organizations may be constituted in the territory of the Detaining Power or in any other country, or they may have an international character.

The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and organizations whose delegates are allowed to carry out their activities in its territory and under its supervision, on condition, however, that such limitation shall not hinder the effective operation of adequate relief to all prisoners of war.

The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.

As soon as relief supplies or material intended for the above-mentioned purposes are handed

over to prisoners of war, or very shortly afterwards, receipts for each consignment, signed by the prisoners' representative, shall be forwarded to the relief society or organization making the shipment. At the same time, receipts for these consignments shall be supplied by the administrative authorities responsible for guarding the prisoners.

PART VI

EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION

SECTION I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 126

Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labour, and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.

Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted. Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure.

The Detaining Power and the Power on which the said prisoners of war depend may agree, if necessary, that compatriots of these prisoners of war be permitted to participate in the visits.

The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.

Article 127

The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces and to the entire population.

Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.

Article 128

The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities, through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the

present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.

Article 129

The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.

Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.

In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the present Convention.

Article 130

Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.

Article 131

No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.

Article 132

At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.

If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.

Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least possible delay.

SECTION 11

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 133

The present Convention is established in English and in French. Both texts are equally authentic. The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official translations of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish languages.

Article 134

The present Convention replaces the Convention of 27 July 1929, in relations between the High Contracting Parties.

Article 135

In the relations between the Powers which are bound by The Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of July 29, 1899, or that of October 18, 1907, and which are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention shall be complementary to Chapter II of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of The Hague.

Article 136

The present Convention, which bears the date of this day, is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva on April 21, 1949; furthermore, by Powers not represented at that Conference, but which are parties to the Convention of July 27, 1929.

Article 137

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.

A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and certified copies of this record shall be transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.

Article 138

The present Convention shall come into force six months after not less than two instruments of ratification have been deposited.

Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting Party six months after the deposit of the instrument of ratification.

Article 139

From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to any Power in whose name the

present Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention.

Article 140

Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, and shall take effect six months after the date on which they are received.

The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.

Article 141

The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the beginning of hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate by the quickest method any ratifications or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.

Article 142

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce the present Convention.

The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after operations connected with the release and repatriation of the persons protected by the present Convention have been terminated.

The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.

Article 143

The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Swiss Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received by it with respect to the present Convention.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have signed the present Convention.

DONE at Geneva this twelfth day of August, 1949, in the English and French languages. The original shall be deposited in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the signatory and acceding States.

ANNEX I

Model agreement concerning direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries
of wounded and sick prisoners of war

(see Article 110)

**I.-PRINCIPLES FOR DIRECT REPATRIATION
AND ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES**

A. DIRECT REPATRIATION

The following shall be repatriated direct:

1. All prisoners of war suffering from the following disabilities as the result of trauma: loss of limb, paralysis, articular or other disabilities, when this disability is at least the loss of a hand or a foot, or the equivalent of the loss of a hand or a foot.

Without prejudice to a more generous interpretation, the following shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of a hand or a foot:

- (a) Loss of a hand or of all the fingers, or of the thumb and forefinger of one hand; loss of a foot, or of all the toes and metatarsals of one foot.
- (b) Ankylosis, loss of osseous tissue, cicatricial contracture preventing the functioning of one of the large articulations or of all the digital joints of one hand.
- (c) Pseudarthrosis of the long bones.
- (d) Deformities due to fracture or other injury which seriously interfere with function and weight-bearing power.

2. All wounded prisoners of war whose condition has become chronic, to the extent that prognosis appears to exclude recovery-in spite of treatment-within one year from the date of the injury, as, for example, in case of:

- (a) Projectile in the heart, even if the Mixed Medical Commission should fail, at the time of their examination, to detect any serious disorders.
- (b) Metallic splinter in the brain or the lungs, even if the Mixed Medical Commission cannot, at the time of examination, detect any local or general reaction.
- (c) Osteomyelitis, when recovery cannot be foreseen in the course of the year following the injury, and which seems likely to result in ankylosis of a joint, or other impairments

equivalent to the loss of a hand or a foot.

(d) Perforating and suppurating injury to the large joints.

(e) Injury to the skull, with loss or shifting of bony tissue.

(f) Injury or burning of the face with loss of tissue and functional lesions.

(g) Injury to the spinal cord.

(h) Lesion of the peripheral nerves, the sequelae of which are equivalent to the loss of a hand or foot, and the cure of which requires more than a year from the date of injury, for example: injury to the brachial or lumbosacral plexus, the median or sciatic nerves, likewise combined injury to the radial and cubital nerves or to the lateral popliteal nerve (*N. peroneus communes*) and medial popliteal nerve (*N. tibialis*); etc. The separate injury of the radial (musculo-spiral), cubital, lateral or medial popliteal nerves shall not, however, warrant repatriation except in case of contractures or of serious neurotrophic disturbance.

(i) Injury to the urinary system, with incapacitating results.

3. All sick prisoners of war whose condition has become chronic to the extent that prognosis seems to exclude recovery-in spite of treatment-within one year from the inception of the disease, as, for example, in case of:

(a) Progressive tuberculosis of any organ which, according to medical prognosis, cannot be cured, or at least considerably improved, by treatment in a neutral country.

(b) Exudate pleurisy.

(c) Serious diseases of the respiratory organs of non-tubercular etiology, presumed incurable. for example: serious pulmonary emphysema, with or without bronchitis, chronic asthma;* chronic bronchitis* lasting more than one year in captivity; bronchiectasis,* etc.

(d) Serious chronic affections of the circulatory system, for example: valvular lesions and myocarditis* which have shown signs of circulatory failure during captivity, even though the Mixed Medical Commission cannot detect any such signs at the time of examination; affections of the pericardium and the vessels (Buerger's disease, aneurism of the large vessels); etc.

(e) Serious chronic affections of the digestive organs, for example: gastric or duodenal ulcer-, sequelae of gastric operations performed in captivity; chronic gastritis, enteritis or colitis, having lasted more than one year and seriously affecting the general condition: cirrhosis of the liver, chronic cholecystopathy;* etc.

(f) Serious chronic affections of the genito-urinary organs, for example: chronic diseases of the kidney with consequent disorders; nephrectomy because of a tubercular kidney; chronic pyelitis or chronic cystitis: hydronephrosis or pyonephrosis; chronic grave gynaecological conditions-, normal pregnancy, and obstetrical disorder, where it is

impossible to accommodate in a neutral country; etc.

(g) Serious chronic diseases of the central and peripheral nervous system, for example: all obvious psychoses and psychoneuroses, such as serious hysteria, serious captivity psychoneurosis, etc., duly verified by a specialist;* any epilepsy duly verified by the camp physicians.' cerebral arteriosclerosis- chronic neuritis lasting more than one year. etc.

(h) Serious chronic disease of the neuro-vegetative system, with considerable diminution of mental or physical fitness. noticeable loss of weight and general asthenia.

(i) Blindness of both eyes, or of one eye when the vision of the other is less than 1 in spite of the use of corrective glasses; diminution of visual acuity in cases where it is impossible to restore it by correction to an acuity of 1/2 in at least one eye;* other grave ocular affections, for example: glaucoma, iritis, choroiditis; trachoma, etc.

(k) Auditive disorders, such as total unilateral deafness, if the other ear does not discern the ordinary spoken word at a distance of one metre;* etc.

(l) Serious affections of metabolism, for example: diabetes mellitus requiring insulin treatment; etc.

(m) Serious disorders of the endocrine glands, for example: thyrotoxicosis; hypothyrosis; Addison's disease; Simmonds' cachexia; tetany; etc.

(n) Grave and chronic disorders of the blood-forming organs.

(o) Serious cases of chronic intoxication, for example: lead poisoning, mercury poisoning, morphinism. cocainism, alcoholism; gas or radiation poisoning; etc.

(p) Chronic affections of locomotion, with obvious functional disorders, for example: arthritis deformans, primary and secondary progressive chronic polyarthritis; rheumatism with serious clinical symptoms; etc.

(q) Serious chronic skin diseases. not amenable to treatment.

(r) Any malignant growth.

(s) Serious chronic infectious diseases, persisting for one year after their inception, for example: malaria with decided organic impairment, amoebic or bacillary dysentery with grave disorders; tertiary visceral syphilis resistant to treatment; leprosy; etc.

(t) Serious avitaminosis or serious inanition.

*The decision of the Mixed Medical Commission shall be based to a great extent on the records kept by camp physicians and surgeons of the same nationality as the prisoners of war, or on an examination by medical specialists of the Detaining Power.

B. ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

The following shall be eligible for accommodation in a neutral country:

1. All wounded prisoners of war who are not likely to recover in captivity, but who might be cured or whose condition might be considerably improved by accommodation in a neutral country.
2. Prisoners of war suffering from any form of tuberculosis, of whatever organ, and whose treatment in a neutral country would be likely to lead to recovery or at least to considerable improvement, with the exception of primary tuberculosis cured before captivity.
3. Prisoners of war suffering from affections requiring treatment of the respiratory, circulatory, digestive, nervous, sensory, genito-urinary, cutaneous, locomotive organs, etc., if such treatment would clearly have better results in a neutral country than in captivity.
4. Prisoners of war who have undergone a nephrectomy in captivity for a nontubercular renal affection; cases of osteomyelitis, on the way to recovery or latent; diabetes mellitus not requiring insulin treatment; etc.
5. Prisoners of war suffering from war or captivity neuroses.

Cases of captivity neurosis which are not cured after three months of accommodation in a neutral country, or which after that length of time are not clearly on the way to complete cure, shall be repatriated.

6. All prisoners of war suffering from chronic intoxication (gases, metals, alkaloids, etc.), for whom the prospects of cure in a neutral country are especially favourable.
7. All women prisoners of war who are pregnant or mothers with infants and small children.

The following cases shall not be eligible for accommodation in a neutral country:

1. All duly verified chronic psychoses.
2. All organic or functional nervous affections considered to be incurable.

3. All contagious diseases during the period in which they are transmissible, with the exception of tuberculosis.

II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. The conditions given shall, in a general way, be interpreted and applied in as broad a spirit as possible.

Neuropathic and psychopathic conditions caused by war or captivity, as well as cases of tuberculosis in all stages, shall above all benefit by such liberal interpretation. Prisoners of war Who have sustained several wounds, none of which, considered by itself, justifies repatriation, shall be examined in the same spirit, with due regard for the psychic traumatism due to the number of their wounds.

2. All unquestionable cases giving the right to direct repatriation (amputation, total blindness or deafness. open pulmonary tuberculosis, mental disorder. malignant growth, etc.) shall be examined and repatriated as soon as possible by the camp physicians or by military medical commissions appointed by the Detaining Power.

3. Injuries and diseases which existed before the war and which have not become worse. as well as war injuries which have not prevented subsequent military service, shall not entitle to direct repatriation.

4. The provisions of this Annex shall be interpreted and applied in a similar manner in all countries party to the conflict. The Powers and authorities concerned shall grant to Mixed Medical Commissions all the facilities necessary for the accomplishment of their task.

5. The examples quoted under (1) above represent only typical cases. Cases which do not correspond exactly to these provisions shall be judged in the spirit of the provisions of Article I 10 of the present Convention, and of the principles embodied in the present Agreement.

ANNEX II

Regulations concerning Mixed Medical Commissions
(see Article 112)

Article 1

The Mixed Medical Commissions provided for in Article 112 of the Convention shall be composed of three members, two of whom shall belong to a neutral country, the third being appointed by the Detaining Power. One of the neutral members shall take the chair.

Article 2

The two neutral members shall be appointed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, acting in agreement with the Protecting Power, at the request of the Detaining Power. They may be domiciled either in their country of origin, in any other neutral country, or in the territory of the Detaining Power.

Article 3

The neutral members shall be approved by the Parties to the conflict concerned, who notify their approval to the International Committee of the Red Cross and to the Protecting Power. Upon such notification, the neutral members shall be considered as effectively appointed.

Article 4

Deputy members shall also be appointed in sufficient number to replace the regular members in case of need. They shall be appointed at the same time as the regular members or, at least, as soon as possible.

Article 5

If for any reason the International Committee of the Red Cross cannot arrange for the appointment of the neutral members, this shall be done by the Power protecting the interests of the prisoners of war to be examined.

Article 6

So far as possible, one of the two neutral members shall be a surgeon and the other a physician.

Article 7

The neutral members shall be entirely independent of the Parties to the conflict, which shall

grant them all facilities in the accomplishment of their duties.

Article 8

By agreement with the Detaining Power, the International Committee of the Red Cross, when making the appointments provided for in Articles 2 and 4 of the present Regulations, shall settle the terms of service of the nominees.

Article 9

The Mixed Medical Commissions shall begin their work as soon as possible after the neutral members have been approved, and in any case within a period of three months from the date of such approval.

Article 10

The Mixed Medical Commissions shall examine all the prisoners designated in Article 113 of the Convention. They shall propose repatriation, rejection, or reference to a later examination. Their decisions shall be made by a majority vote.

Article 11

The decisions made by the Mixed Medical Commissions in each specific case shall be communicated, during the month following their visit, to the Detaining Power, the Protecting Power and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Mixed Medical Commissions shall also inform each prisoner of war examined of the decision made, and shall issue to those whose repatriation has been proposed, certificates similar to the model appended to the present Convention.

Article 12

The Detaining Power shall be required to carry out the decisions of the Mixed Medical Commissions within three months of the time when it receives due notification of such decisions.

Article 13

If there is no neutral physician in a country where the services of a Mixed Medical Commission

seem to be required, and if it is for any reason impossible to appoint neutral doctors who are resident in another country, the Detaining Power, acting in agreement with the Protecting Power, shall set up a Medical Commission which shall undertake the same duties as a Mixed Medical Commission, subject to the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of the Present Regulations.

Article 14

Mixed Medical Commissions shall function permanently and shall visit each camp at intervals of not more than six months.

ANNEX III

Regulations concerning collective relief
(see Article 73)

Article 1

Prisoners' representatives shall be allowed to distribute collective relief shipments for which they are sible, to all prisoners of war administered by their camp, including those who am in hospitals or in prisons or other penal establishments.

Article 2

The distribution of collective relief shipments shall be effected in accordance with the instructions of the donors and with a plan drawn up by the prisoners' representatives. 'Me issue of medical stores shall. however, be made for preference in agreement with the senior medical officers, and the latter may. in hospitals and infirmaries, waive the said instructions, if the needs of their patients so demand. Within the limits thus defined, the distribution shall always be carried out equitably.

Article 3

The said prisoners' representatives or their assistants shall be allowed to go to the points of arrival of relief supplies near their camps. so as to enable the prisoners' representatives or their assistants to verify the quality as well as the quantity of the goods received, and to make out detailed reports thereon for the donors.

Article 4

Prisoners' representatives shall be given the facilities necessary for verifying whether the distribution of collective relief in all sub-divisions and annexes of their camps has been carried out in accordance with their instructions.

Article 5

Prisoners' representatives shall be allowed to fill up, and cause to be filled up by the prisoners' representatives of labour detachments or by the senior medical officers of infirmaries and hospitals, forms or questionnaires intended for the donors, relating to collective relief supplies (distribution, requirements, quantities, etc.). Such forms and questionnaires, duly completed, shall be forwarded to the donors without delay.

Article 6

In order to secure the regular issue of collective relief to the prisoners of war in their camp, and to meet any needs that may arise from the arrival of new contingents of prisoners, prisoners' representatives shall be allowed to build up and maintain adequate reserve stocks of collective relief. For this purpose, they shall have suitable warehouses at their disposal; each warehouse shall be provided with two locks, the prisoners' representative holding the keys of one lock and the camp commander the keys of the other.

Article 7

When collective consignments of clothing are available each prisoner of war shall retain in his possession at least one complete set of clothes. If a prisoner has more than one set of clothes, the prisoners' representative shall be permitted to withdraw excess clothing from those with the largest number of sets, or particular articles in excess of one, if this is necessary in order to supply prisoners who are less well provided. He shall not, however, withdraw second sets of underclothing, socks or footwear, unless this is the only means of providing for prisoners of war with none.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties, and the Detaining Powers in particular, shall authorize, as far as possible and subject to the regulations governing the supply of the population, all purchases of goods made in their territories for the distribution of collective relief to prisoners of war. They shall similarly facilitate the transfer of funds and other financial measures of a technical or administrative nature taken for the purpose of making such purchases.

Article 9

The foregoing provisions shall not constitute an obstacle to the right of prisoners of war to receive collective relief before their arrival in a camp or in the course of transfer, nor to the possibility of representatives of the Protecting Power, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or any other body giving assistance to prisoners which may be responsible for the forwarding of such supplies, ensuring the distribution thereof to the addressees by any other means that they may deem useful.

ANNEX IV.

A. IDENTITYCARD

(see Article 4)

[...]

B. CAPTURE CARD

(see Article 70)

[...]

C. CORRESPONDENCE CARD AND LETTER

(see Article 71)

[...]

D. NOTIFICATION OF DEATH

(see Article 120)

[...]

E. REPATRIATION CERTIFICATE

(see Annex II, Article 11)

REPATRIATION CERTIFICATE

Date:

Camp:

Hospital:

Surname:

First names:

Date of birth:

Rank:

Army number:

P. W. number:

Injury-Disease:

Decision of the Commission:

Chairman of the
Mixed Medical Commission:

A= direct repatriation

B= accommodation in a neutral country

NC= re-examination by next Commission

ANNEX V

Model regulations concerning payments sent by prisoners to their own country

1. The notification referred to in the third paragraph of Article 63 will show:
 - (a) Number as specified in Article 17, rank, surname and first names of the prisoner of war who is the payer;
 - (b) The name and address of the payee in the country of origin;
 - (c) The amount to be so paid in the currency of the country in which he is detained.
2. The notification will be signed by the prisoner of war, or his witnessed mark made upon if it he cannot write, and shall be countersigned by the prisoners' representative.
3. The camp commander will add to this notification a certificate that the prisoner of war concerned has a credit balance of not less than the amount registered as payable.
4. The notification may be made up in lists, each sheet of such lists witnessed by the prisoners' representative and certified by the camp commander.

Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

Adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from 21 April to 12 August, 1949

entry into force 21 October 1950

PART I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.

Article 2

In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.

The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.

Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.

Article 3

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) Taking of hostages;

(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Article 4

Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

Nationals of a State which is not bound by the Convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.

The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application, as defined in Article 13.

Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, shall not be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the present Convention.

Article 5

Where, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State.

Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as

having forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.

In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.

Article 6

The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2.

In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.

In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, and 143.

Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present Convention. Article 7

In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 11, 14, 15, 17, 36, 108, 109, 132, 133 and 149, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other special agreements for all matters concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.

Protected persons shall continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favourable measures have been taken with regard to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict.

Article 8

Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.

Article 9

The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are to carry out their duties.

The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers.

The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their mission under the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they carry out their duties.

Article 10

The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to entrust to an organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers by virtue of the present Convention.

When persons protected by the present Convention do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an organization provided for in the first paragraph above, the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an organization, to undertake the functions performed under the present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the Parties to a conflict.

If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions of this Article, the offer of the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.

Any neutral Power, or any organization invited by the Power concerned or offering itself for these purposes, shall be required to act with a sense of responsibility towards the Party to the conflict on which persons protected by the present Convention depend, and shall be required to furnish sufficient assurances that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate functions and to discharge them impartially.

No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made by special agreements between Powers one of which is restricted, even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the said Power is occupied.

Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a Protecting Power, such mention applies to substitute organizations in the sense of the present Article.

The provisions of this Article shall extend and be adapted to cases of nationals of a neutral State who are in occupied territory or who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent State with which the State of which they are nationals has not normal diplomatic representation.

Article 12

In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected persons, particularly in cases of disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation of the provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the disagreement. For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either at the invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, propose to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their representatives, and in particular of the authorities responsible for protected person, possibly on neutral territory suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose for approval by the Parties to the conflict, a person belonging to a neutral Power or delegated by the International Committee of the Red Cross who shall be invited to take part in such a meeting.

PART II

GENERAL PROTECTION OF POPULATIONS

AGAINST CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Article 13

The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.

Article 14

In time of peace, the High Contracting Parties and, after the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties thereto, may establish in their own territory and, if the need arises, in occupied areas, hospital and safety zones and localities so organized as to protect from the effects of war, wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven.

Upon the outbreak and during the course of hostilities, the Parties concerned may conclude agreements on mutual recognition of the zones and localities they have created. They may for this purpose implement the provisions of the Draft Agreement annexed to the present Convention, with such amendments as they may consider necessary.

The Protecting Powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross are invited to lend their good offices in order to facilitate the institution and recognition of these hospital and safety zones and localities.

Article 15

Any Party to the conflict may, either directly or through a neutral State or some humanitarian organization, propose to the adverse Party to establish, in the regions where fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the effects of war the following persons, without distinction:

(a) Wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants;

(b) Civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they reside in the zones, perform no work of a military character.

When the Parties concerned have agreed upon the geographical position, administration, food supply and supervision of the proposed neutralized zone, a written agreement shall be concluded and signed by the representatives of the Parties to the conflict. The agreement shall fix the beginning and the duration of the neutralization of the zone.

Article 16

The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers, shall be the object of particular protection and respect.

As far as military considerations allow, each Party to the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken to search for the killed and wounded, to assist the shipwrecked and other persons exposed to grave danger, and to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment.

Article 17

The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.

Article 18

Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.

States which are Parties to a conflict shall provide all civilian hospitals with certificates showing that they are civilian hospitals and that the buildings which they occupy are not used for any purpose which would deprive these hospitals of protection in accordance with Article 19.

Civilian hospitals shall be marked by means of the emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, but only if so authorized by the State.

The Parties to the conflict shall, in so far as military considerations permit, take the necessary steps to make the distinctive emblems indicating civilian hospitals clearly visible to the enemy land, air and naval forces in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile action.

In view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed by being close to military objectives, it is recommended that such hospitals be situated as far as possible from such objectives.

Article 19

The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after due warning has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a

reasonable time limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded.

The fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces are nursed in these hospitals, or the presence of small arms and ammunition taken from such combatants which have not yet been handed to the proper service, shall not be considered to be acts harmful to the enemy.

Article 20

Persons regularly and solely engaged in the operation and administration of civilian hospitals, including the personnel engaged in the search for, removal and transporting of and caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, shall be respected and protected.

In occupied territory and in zones of military operations, the above personnel shall be recognizable by means of an identity card certifying their status, bearing the photograph of the holder and embossed with the stamp of the responsible authority, and also by means of a stamped, water-resistant armband which they shall wear on the left arm while carrying out their duties. This armband shall be issued by the State and shall bear the emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949.

Other personnel who are engaged in the operation and administration of civilian hospitals shall be entitled to respect and protection and to wear the armband, as provided in and under the conditions prescribed in this Article, while they are employed on such duties. The identity card shall state the duties on which they are employed.

The management of each hospital shall at all times hold at the disposal of the competent national or occupying authorities an up-to-date list of such personnel.

Article 21

Convoys of vehicles or hospital trains on land or specially provided vessels on sea, conveying wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, shall be respected and protected in the same manner as the hospitals provided for in Article 18, and shall be marked, with the consent of the State, by the display of the distinctive emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949.

Article 22

Aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases, or for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between all the Parties to the conflict concerned.

They may be marked with the distinctive emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949.

Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.

Such aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.

Article 23

Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.

The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the consignments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:

- (a) That the consignments may be diverted from their destination;
- (b) That the control may not be effective; or
- (c) That a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the

enemy or through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise be required for the production of such goods.

The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission conditional on the distribution to the persons benefited there by being made under the local supervision of the Protecting Powers.

Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible, and the Power which permits their free passage shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such passage is allowed.

Article 24

The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure that children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their families as a result of the war, are not left to their own resources, and that their maintenance, the exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated in all circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to persons of a similar cultural tradition.

The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception of such children in a neutral country for the duration of the conflict with the consent of the Protecting Power, if any, and under due safeguards for the observance of the principles stated in the first paragraph.

They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all children under twelve to be identified by the wearing of identity discs, or by some other means.

Article 25

All persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict, or in a territory occupied by it, shall be enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to members of their families, wherever they may be, and to receive news from them. This correspondence shall be forwarded speedily and without undue delay.

If, as a result of circumstances, it becomes difficult or impossible to exchange family correspondence by the ordinary post, the Parties to the conflict concerned shall apply to a neutral intermediary, such as the Central Agency provided for in Article 140, and shall decide in consultation with it how to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under the best possible conditions, in particular with the cooperation of the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Societies.

If the Parties to the conflict deem it necessary to restrict family correspondence, such restrictions shall be confined to the compulsory use of standard forms containing twenty-five freely chosen words, and to the limitation of the number of these forms despatched to one each month.

Article 26

Each Party to the conflict shall facilitate enquiries made by members of families dispersed owing to the war, with the object of renewing contact with one another and of meeting, if possible. It shall encourage, in particular, the work of organizations engaged on this task provided they are acceptable to it and conform to its security regulations.

PART III

STATUS AND TREATMENT OF PROTECTED PERSONS

SECTION I

PROVISIONS COMMON TO THE TERRITORIES OF THE PARTIES

TO THE CONFLICT AND TO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Article 27

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.

Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.

Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.

However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard

to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.

Article 28

The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

Article 29

The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which may be incurred.

Article 30

Protected persons shall have every facility for making application to the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Society of the country where they may be, as well as to any organization that might assist them.

These several organizations shall be granted all facilities for that purpose by the authorities, within the bounds set by military or security considerations.

Apart from the visits of the delegates of the Protecting Powers and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, provided for by Article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers shall facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons by the representatives of other organizations whose object is to give spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.

Article 31

No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third parties.

Article 32

The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents.

Article 33

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

Pillage is prohibited.

Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited.

Article 34

The taking of hostages is prohibited.

SECTION 11

ALIENS IN THE TERRITORY OF A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT

Article 35

All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the State. The applications of such persons to leave shall be decided in accordance with regularly established procedures and the decision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reasonable amount of their effects and articles of personal use.

If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have such refusal reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.

Upon request, representatives of the Protecting Power shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the persons concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any request for permission to leave the territory and be given, as expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have been denied permission to leave.

Article 36

Departures permitted under the foregoing Article shall be carried out in satisfactory conditions as regards safety, hygiene, sanitation and food. All costs in connection therewith, from the point of exit in the territory of the Detaining Power, shall be borne by the country of destination, or, in the case of accommodation in a neutral country, by the Power whose nationals are benefited. The practical details of such movements may, if necessary, be settled by special agreements between the Powers concerned.

The foregoing shall not prejudice such special agreements as may be concluded between Parties to the conflict concerning the exchange and repatriation of their nationals in enemy hands.

Article 37

Protected persons who are confined pending proceedings or serving a sentence involving loss of liberty shall during their confinement be humanely treated.

As soon as they are released, they may ask to leave the territory in conformity with the foregoing Articles.

Article 38

With the exception of special measures authorized by the present Convention, in particular by Articles 27 and 41 thereof, the situation of protected persons shall continue to be regulated, in principle, by the provisions concerning aliens in time of peace. In any case, the following rights shall be granted to them:

1. They shall be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that may be sent to them.
2. They shall, if their state of health so requires, receive medical attention and hospital treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
3. They shall be allowed to practise their religion and to receive spiritual assistance from ministers of their faith.
4. If they reside in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall be authorized to move from that area to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
5. Children under fifteen years, pregnant women and mothers of children under seven years shall benefit by any preferential treatment to the same extent as the nationals of the State concerned.

Article 39

Protected persons who, as a result of the war, have lost their gainful employment, shall be granted the opportunity to find paid employment. That opportunity shall, subject to security considerations and to the provisions of Article 40, be equal to that enjoyed by the nationals of the Power in whose territory they are.

Where a Party to the conflict applies to a protected person methods of control which result in his being unable to support himself, and especially if such a person is prevented for reasons of security from finding paid employment on reasonable conditions, the said Party shall ensure his support and that of his dependents.

Protected persons may in any case receive allowances from their home country, the Protecting Power, or the relief societies referred to in Article 30.

Article 40

Protected persons may be compelled to work only to the same extent as nationals of the Party to the conflict in whose territory they are.

If protected persons are of enemy nationality, they may only be compelled to do work which is normally necessary to ensure the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transport and health of human beings and which is not directly related to the conduct of military operations.

In the cases mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, protected persons compelled to work shall have the benefit of the same working conditions and of the same safeguards as national workers, in particular as regards wages, hours of labour, clothing and equipment, previous training and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases.

If the above provisions are infringed, protected persons shall be allowed to exercise their right

of complaint in accordance with Article 30.

Article 41

Should the Power in whose hands protected persons may be consider the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention to be inadequate, it may not have recourse to any other measure of control more severe than that of assigned residence or internment, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 42 and 43.

In applying the provisions of Article 39, second paragraph, to the cases of persons required to leave their usual places of residences by virtue of a decision placing them in assigned residence elsewhere, the Detaining Power shall be guided as closely as possible by the standards of welfare set forth in Part III, Section IV of this Convention.

Article 42

The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.

If any person, acting through the representatives of the Protecting Power, voluntarily demands internment, and if his situation renders this step necessary, he shall be interned by the Power in whose hands he may be.

Article 43

Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.

Unless the protected persons concerned object, the Detaining Power shall, as rapidly as possible, give the Protecting Power the names of any protected persons who have been interned or subjected to assigned residence, or who have been released from internment or assigned residence. The decisions of the courts or boards mentioned in the first paragraph of the present Article shall also, subject to the same conditions, be notified as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power.

Article 44

In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present Convention, the Detaining Power shall not treat as enemy aliens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of an enemy State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government.

Article 45

Protected persons shall not be transferred to a Power which is not a party to the Convention.

This provision shall in no way constitute an obstacle to the repatriation of protected persons, or

to their return to their country of residence after the cessation of hostilities.

Protected persons may be transferred by the Detaining Power only to a Power which is a party to the present Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the present Convention. If protected persons are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the present Convention rests on the Power accepting them, while they are in its custody. Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the present Convention in any important respect, the Power by which the protected persons were transferred shall, upon being so notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the protected persons. Such request must be complied with.

In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.

The provisions of this Article do not constitute an obstacle to the extradition, in pursuance of extradition treaties concluded before the outbreak of hostilities, of protected persons accused of offences against ordinary criminal law.

Article 46

In so far as they have not been previously withdrawn, restrictive measures taken regarding protected persons shall be cancelled as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.

Restrictive measures affecting their property shall be cancelled, in accordance with the law of the Detaining Power, as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.

SECTION 111

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Article 47

Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.

Article 48

Protected persons who are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied may avail themselves of the right to leave the territory subject to the provisions of Article 35, and decisions thereon shall be taken according to the procedure which the Occupying Power shall establish in accordance with the said Article.

Article 49

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from

occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons do demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated.

The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have taken place.

The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

Article 50

The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children.

The Occupying Power shall take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the registration of their parentage. It may not, in any case, change their personal status, nor enlist them in formations or organizations subordinate to it.

Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative or friend.

A special section of the Bureau set up in accordance with Article 136 shall be responsible for taking all necessary steps to identify children whose identity is in doubt. Particulars of their parents or other near relatives should always be recorded if available.

The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and protection against the effects of war, which may have been adopted prior to the occupation in favour of children under fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.

Article 51

The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.

The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to work unless they are over eighteen years of age, and then only on work which is necessary either for the needs of the army of occupation, or for the public utility services, or for the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health of the population of the occupied country. Protected persons may not be compelled to undertake any work which would involve them in the obligation of taking part in military operations. The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to employ forcible means to ensure the security of the installations where they are performing compulsory labour.

The work shall be carried out only in the occupied territory where the persons whose services have been requisitioned are. Every such person shall, so far as possible, be kept in his usual place of employment. Workers shall be paid a fair wage and the work shall be proportionate to their physical and intellectual capacities. The legislation in force in the occupied country concerning working conditions, and safeguards as regards, in particular, such matters as wages, hours of work, equipment, preliminary training and compensation for occupational accidents and diseases, shall be applicable to the protected persons assigned to the work referred to in this Article.

In no case shall requisition of labour lead to a mobilization of workers in an organization of a military or semi-military character.

Article 52

No contract, agreement or regulation shall impair the right of any worker, whether voluntary or not and wherever he may be, to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Power in order to request the said Power's intervention.

All measures aiming at creating unemployment or at restricting the opportunities offered to workers in an occupied territory, in order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power, are prohibited.

Article 53

Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

Article 54

The Occupying Power may not alter the status of public officials or judges in the occupied territories, or in any way apply sanctions to or take any measures of coercion or discrimination against them, should they abstain from fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience.

This prohibition does not prejudice the application of the second paragraph of Article 51. It does not affect the right of the Occupying Power to remove public officials from their posts.

Article 55

To the fullest extent of the means available to it the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.

The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies available in the occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces and administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods.

The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to verify the state of the food and medical supplies in occupied territories, except where temporary restrictions are made necessary by imperative military requirements.

Article 56

To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.

If new hospitals are set up in occupied territory and if the competent organs of the occupied State are not operating there, the occupying authorities shall, if necessary, grant them the recognition provided for in Article 18. In similar circumstances, the occupying authorities shall also grant recognition to hospital personnel and transport vehicles under the provisions of Articles 20 and 21.

In adopting measures of health and hygiene and in their implementation, the Occupying Power shall take into consideration the moral and ethical susceptibilities of the population of the occupied territory.

Article 57

The Occupying Power may requisition civilian hospitals only temporarily and only in cases of urgent necessity for the care of military wounded and sick, and then on condition that suitable arrangements are made in due time for the care and treatment of the patients and for the needs of the civilian population for hospital accommodation.

The material and stores of civilian hospitals cannot be requisitioned so long as they are necessary for the needs of the civilian population.

Article 58

The Occupying Power shall permit ministers of religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of their religious communities.

The Occupying Power shall also accept consignments of books and articles required for religious needs and shall facilitate their distribution in occupied territory.

Article 59

If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.

Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing.

All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection.

A Power granting free passage to consignments on their way to territory occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to regulate their passage according to prescribed times and routes, and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power that these consignments are to be used for the relief of the needy population and are not to be used for the benefit of the Occupying Power.

Article 60

Relief consignments shall in no way relieve the Occupying Power of any of its responsibilities under Articles 55, 56 and 59. The Occupying Power shall in no way whatsoever divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended, except in cases of urgent necessity, in the interests of the population of the occupied territory and with the consent of the Protecting Power.

Article 61

The distribution of the relief consignments referred to in the foregoing Articles shall be carried out with the cooperation and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. This duty may also be delegated, by agreement between the Occupying Power and the Protecting Power, to a neutral Power, to the International Committee of the Red Cross or to any other impartial humanitarian body.

Such consignments shall be exempt in occupied territory from all charges, taxes or customs duties unless these are necessary in the interests of the economy of the territory. The Occupying Power shall facilitate the rapid distribution of these consignments.

All Contracting Parties shall endeavour to permit the transit and transport, free of charge, of such relief consignments on their way to occupied territories.

Article 62

Subject to imperative reasons of security, protected persons in occupied territories shall be permitted to receive the individual relief consignments sent to them.

Article 63

Subject to temporary and exceptional measures imposed for urgent reasons of security by the Occupying Power:

(a) Recognized National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Societies shall be able to pursue their activities in accordance with Red Cross principles, as defined by the International Red Cross Conferences. Other relief societies shall be permitted to continue their humanitarian activities under similar conditions;

(b) The Occupying Power may not require any changes in the personnel or structure of these societies, which would prejudice the aforesaid activities.

The same principles shall apply to the activities and personnel of special organizations of a non-military character, which already exist or which may be established, for the purpose of ensuring the living conditions of the civilian population by the maintenance of the essential public utility services, by the distribution of relief and by the organization of rescues.

Article 64

The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.

The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.

Article 65

The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.

Article 66

In case of a breach of the penal provisions promulgated by it by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64, the Occupying Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted, non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably sit in the occupied country.

Article 67

The courts shall apply only those provisions of law which were applicable prior to the offence, and which are in accordance with general principles of law, in particular the principle that the

penalty shall be proportioned to the offence. They shall take into consideration the fact that the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power.

Article 68

Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended to harm the Occupying Power, but which does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations used by them, shall be liable to internment or simple imprisonment, provided the duration of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed. Furthermore, internment or imprisonment shall, for such offences, be the only measure adopted for depriving protected persons of liberty. The courts provided for under Article 66 of the present Convention may at their discretion convert a sentence of imprisonment to one of internment for the same period.

The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in accordance with Articles 64 and 65 may impose the death penalty on a protected person only in cases where the person is guilty of espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional offences which have caused the death of one or more persons, provided that such offences were punishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began.

The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person unless the attention of the court has been particularly called to the fact that, since the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance.

In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.

Article 69

In all cases, the duration of the period during which a protected person accused of an offence is under arrest awaiting trial or punishment shall be deducted from any period of imprisonment awarded.

Article 70

Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or convicted by the Occupying Power for acts committed or for opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the laws and customs of war.

Nationals of the Occupying Power who, before the outbreak of hostilities, have sought refuge in the territory of the occupied State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported from the occupied territory, except for offences committed after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences under common law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, according to the law of the occupied State, would have justified extradition in time of peace.

Article 71

No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except

after a regular trial.

Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying Power shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language which they understand, of the particulars of the charges preferred against them, and shall be brought to trial as rapidly as possible. The Protecting Power shall be informed of all proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons in respect of charges involving the death penalty or imprisonment for two years or more; it shall be enabled, at any time, to obtain information regarding the state of such proceedings. Furthermore, the Protecting Power shall be entitled, on request, to be furnished with all particulars of these and of any other proceedings instituted by the Occupying Power against protected persons.

The notification to the Protecting Power, as provided for in the second paragraph above, shall be sent immediately, and shall in any case reach the Protecting Power three weeks before the date of the first hearing. Unless, at the opening of the trial, evidence is submitted that the provisions of this Article are fully complied with, the trial shall not proceed. The notification shall include the following particulars:

- (a) Description of the accused;
- (b) Place of residence or detention;
- (c) Specification of the charge or charges (with mention of the penal provisions under which it is brought);
- (d) Designation of the court which will hear the case;
- (e) Place and date of the first hearing.

Article 72

Accused persons shall have the right to present evidence necessary to their defence and may, in particular, call witnesses. They shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate or counsel of their own choice, who shall be able to visit them freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing the defence.

Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting Power may provide him with an advocate or counsel. When an accused person has to meet a serious charge and the Protecting Power is not functioning, the Occupying Power, subject to the consent of the accused, shall provide an advocate or counsel.

Accused persons shall, unless they freely waive such assistance, be aided by an interpreter, both during preliminary investigation and during the hearing in court. They shall have the right at any time to object to the interpreter and to ask for his replacement.

Article 73

A convicted person shall have the right of appeal provided for by the laws applied by the court. He shall be fully informed of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within which he may do so.

The penal procedure provided in the present Section shall apply, as far as it is applicable, to appeals. Where the laws applied by the Court make no provision for appeals, the convicted person shall have the right to petition against the finding and sentence to the competent authority of the Occupying Power.

Article 74

Representatives of the Protecting Power shall have the right to attend the trial of any protected person, unless the hearing has, as an exceptional measure, to be held in camera in the interests of the security of the Occupying Power, which shall then notify the Protecting Power. A notification in respect of the date and place of trial shall be sent to the Protecting Power.

Any judgment involving a sentence of death, or imprisonment for two years or more, shall be communicated, with the relevant grounds, as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power. The notification shall contain a reference to the notification made under Article 71, and in the case of sentences of imprisonment, the name of the place where the sentence is to be served. A record of judgments other than those referred to above shall be kept by the court and shall be open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power. Any period allowed for appeal in the case of sentences involving the death penalty, or imprisonment for two years or more, shall not run until notification of judgment has been received by the Protecting Power.

Article 75

In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived of the right of petition for pardon or reprieve.

No death sentence shall be carried out before the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date of receipt by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judgment confirming such death sentence, or of an order denying pardon or reprieve.

The six months period of suspension of the death sentence herein prescribed may be reduced in individual cases in circumstances of grave emergency involving an organized threat to the security of the Occupying Power or its forces, provided always that the Protecting Power is notified of such reduction and is given reasonable time and opportunity to make representations to the competent occupying authorities in respect of such death sentences.

Article 76

Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein. They shall, if possible, be separated from other detainees and shall enjoy conditions of food and hygiene which will be sufficient to keep them in good health, and which will be at least equal to those obtaining in prisons in the occupied country.

They shall receive the medical attention required by their state of health.

They shall also have the right to receive any spiritual assistance which they may require.

Women shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be under the direct supervision of women.

Proper regard shall be paid to the special treatment due to minors.

Protected persons who are detained shall have the right to be visited by delegates of the Protecting Power and of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in accordance with the provisions of Article 143.

Such persons shall have the right to receive at least one relief parcel monthly.

Article 77

Protected persons who have been accused of offences or convicted by the courts in occupied territory shall be handed over at the close of occupation, with the relevant records, to the authorities of the liberated territory.

Article 78

If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment.

Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a competent body set up by the said Power.

Protected persons made subject to assigned residence and thus required to leave their homes shall enjoy the full benefit of Article 39 of the present Convention.

SECTION IV

REGULATIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF INTERNEES

Chapter I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 79

The Parties to the conflict shall not intern protected persons, except in accordance with the provisions of Articles 41, 42, 43, 68 and 78.

Article 80

Internees shall retain their full civil capacity and shall exercise such attendant rights as may be compatible with their status.

Article 81

Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance, and to grant them also the medical attention required by their state of health.

No deduction from the allowances, salaries or credits due to the internees shall be made for the repayment of these costs.

The Detaining Power shall provide for the support of those dependent on the internees, if such dependants are without adequate means of support or are unable to earn a living.

Article 82

The Detaining Power shall, as far as possible, accommodate the internees according to their nationality, language and customs. Internees who are nationals of the same country shall not be separated merely because they have different languages.

Throughout the duration of their internment, members of the same family, and in particular parents and children, shall be lodged together in the same place of internment, except when separation of a temporary nature is necessitated for reasons of employment or health or for the purposes of enforcement of the provisions of Chapter IX of the present Section. Internees may request that their children who are left at liberty without parental care shall be interned with them.

Wherever possible, interned members of the same family shall be housed in the same premises and given separate accommodation from other internees, together with facilities for leading a proper family life.

Chapter II

PLACES OF INTERNMENT

Article 83

The Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the dangers of war.

The Detaining Power shall give the enemy Powers, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful information regarding the geographical location of places of internment.

Whenever military considerations permit, internment camps shall be indicated by the letters IC, placed so as to be clearly visible in the daytime from the air. The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. No place other than an internment camp shall be marked as such.

Article 84

Internees shall be accommodated and administered separately from prisoners of war and from persons deprived of liberty for any other reason.

Article 85

The Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected persons shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigours of the climate and the effects of the war. In no case shall permanent places of internment be situated in unhealthy areas or in districts the climate of which is injurious to the internees. In all cases where the district, in which a protected person is temporarily interned, is in an unhealthy area or has a climate which is harmful to his health, he shall be removed to a more suitable place of internment as rapidly as circumstances permit.

The premises shall be fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufficiently spacious and well ventilated, and the internees shall have suitable bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate, and the age, sex, and state of health of the internees.

Internees shall have for their use, day and night, sanitary conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are constantly maintained in a state of cleanliness. They shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities necessary for this purpose shall be granted to them.

Showers or baths shall also be available. The necessary time shall be set aside for washing and for cleaning.

Whenever it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to accommodate women internees who are not members of a family unit in the same place of internment as men, the provision of separate sleeping quarters and sanitary conveniences for the use of such women internees shall be obligatory.

Article 86

The Detaining Power shall place at the disposal of interned persons, of whatever denomination, premises suitable for the holding of their religious services.

Article 87

Canteens shall be installed in every place of internment, except where other suitable facilities are available. Their purpose shall be to enable internees to make purchases, at prices not higher than local market prices, of foodstuffs and articles of everyday use, including soap and tobacco, such as would increase their personal well-being and comfort.

Profits made by canteens shall be credited to a welfare fund to be set up for each place of internment, and administered for the benefit of the internees attached to such place of internment. The Internee Committee provided for in Article 102 shall have the right to check the management of the canteen and of the said fund.

When a place of internment is closed down, the balance of the welfare fund shall be transferred to the welfare fund of a place of internment for internees of the same nationality, or, if such a place does not exist, to a central welfare fund which shall be administered for the benefit of all internees remaining in the custody of the Detaining Power. In case of a general release, the said profits shall be kept by the Detaining Power, subject to any agreement to the contrary between the Powers concerned.

Article 88

In all places of internment exposed to air raids and other hazards of war, shelters adequate in number and structure to ensure the necessary protection shall be installed. In case of alarms, the internees shall be free to enter such shelters as quickly as possible, excepting those who remain for the protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards. Any protective measures taken in favour of the population shall also apply to them.

All due precautions must be taken in places of internment against the danger of fire.

Chapter III

FOOD AND CLOTHING

Article 89

Daily food rations for internees shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep internees in a good state of health and prevent the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the customary diet of the internees.

Internees shall also be given the means by which they can prepare for themselves any additional food in their possession.

Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to internees. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.

Internees who work shall receive additional rations in proportion to the kind of labour which they perform.

Expectant and nursing mothers and children under fifteen years of age shall be given additional food, in proportion to their physiological needs.

Article 90

When taken into custody, internees shall be given all facilities to provide themselves with the necessary clothing, footwear and change of underwear, and later on, to procure further supplies if required. Should any internees not have sufficient clothing, account being taken of the climate, and be unable to procure any, it shall be provided free of charge to them by the Detaining Power.

The clothing supplied by the Detaining Power to internees and the outward markings placed on their own clothes shall not be ignominious nor expose them to ridicule.

Workers shall receive suitable working outfits, including protective clothing, whenever the nature of their work so requires.

Chapter IV

HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION

Article 91

Every place of internment shall have an adequate infirmary, under the direction of a qualified doctor, where internees may have the attention they require, as well as an appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall be set aside for cases of contagious or mental diseases.

Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious diseases, or whose condition requires special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any institution where adequate treatment can be given and shall receive care not inferior to that provided for the general population.

Internees shall, for preference, have the attention of medical personnel of their own nationality.

Internees may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The medical authorities of the Detaining Power shall, upon request, issue to every internee who has undergone treatment an official certificate showing the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and nature of the treatment given. A duplicate of this certificate shall be forwarded to the Central Agency provided for in Article 140.

Treatment, including the provision of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of internees in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances and spectacles, shall be free of charge to the internee.

Article 92

Medical inspections of internees shall be made at least once a month. Their purpose shall be, in particular, to supervise the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of internees, and to detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria, and venereal diseases. Such inspections shall include, in particular, the checking of weight of each internee and, at least once a year, radioscopic examination.

Chapter V**RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES****Article 93**

Internees shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the services of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the detaining authorities.

Ministers of religion who are interned shall be allowed to minister freely to the members of their community. For this purpose, the Detaining Power shall ensure their equitable allocation amongst the various places of internment in which there are internees speaking the same language and be longing to the same religion. Should such ministers be too few in number, the Detaining Power shall provide them with the necessary facilities, including means of transport, for moving from one place to another, and they shall be authorized to visit any internees who are in hospital. Ministers of religion shall be at liberty to correspond on matters concerning their ministry with the religious authorities in the country of detention and, as far as possible, with the international religious organizations of their faith. Such correspondence shall not be

considered as forming a part of the quota mentioned in Article 107. It shall, however, be subject to the provisions of Article 112.

When internees do not have at their disposal the assistance of ministers of their faith, or should these latter be too few in number, the local religious authorities of the same faith may appoint, in agreement with the Detaining Power, a minister of the internees' faith or, if such a course is feasible from a denominational point of view, a minister of similar religion or a qualified layman. The latter shall enjoy the facilities granted to the ministry he has assumed. Persons so appointed shall comply with all regulations laid down by the Detaining Power in the interests of discipline and security.

Article 94

The Detaining Power shall encourage intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst internees, whilst leaving them free to take part in them or not. It shall take all practicable measures to ensure the exercise thereof, in particular by providing suitable premises.

All possible facilities shall be granted to internees to continue their studies or to take up new subjects. The education of children and young people shall be ensured; they shall be allowed to attend schools either within the place of internment or outside.

Internees shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and outdoor games. For this purpose, sufficient open spaces shall be set aside in all places of internment. Special playgrounds shall be reserved for children and young people.

Article 95

The Detaining Power shall not employ internees as workers, unless they so desire. Employment which, if undertaken under compulsion by a protected person not in internment, would involve a breach of Articles 40 or 51 of the present Convention, and employment on work which is of a degrading or humiliating character are in any case prohibited.

After a working period of six weeks, internees shall be free to give up work at any moment, subject to eight days' notice.

These provisions constitute no obstacle to the right of the Detaining Power to employ interned doctors, dentists and other medical personnel in their professional capacity on behalf of their fellow internees, or to employ internees for administrative and maintenance work in places of internment and to detail such persons for work in the kitchens or for other domestic tasks, or to require such persons to undertake duties connected with the protection of internees against aerial bombardment or other war risks. No internee may, however, be required to perform tasks for which he is, in the opinion of a medical officer, physically unsuited.

The Detaining Power shall take entire responsibility for all working conditions, for medical attention, for the payment of wages, and for ensuring that all employed internees receive compensation for occupational accidents and diseases. The standards prescribed for the said working conditions and for compensation shall be in accordance with the national laws and regulations, and with the existing practice; they shall in no case be inferior to those obtaining for work of the same nature in the same district. Wages for work done shall be determined on

an equitable basis by special agreements between the internees, the Detaining Power, and, if the case arises, employers other than the Detaining Power, due regard being paid to the obligation of the Detaining Power to provide for free maintenance of internees and for the medical attention which their state of health may require. Internees permanently detailed for categories of work mentioned in the third paragraph of this Article shall be paid fair wages by the Detaining Power. The working conditions and the scale of compensation for occupational accidents and diseases to internees thus detailed shall not be inferior to those applicable to work of the same nature in the same district.

Article 96

All labour detachments shall remain part of and dependent upon a place of internment. The competent authorities of the Detaining Power and the commandant of a place of internment shall be responsible for the observance in a labour detachment of the provisions of the present Convention. The commandant shall keep an up-to-date list of the labour detachments subordinate to him and shall communicate it to the delegates of the Protecting Power, of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of other humanitarian organizations who may visit the places of internment.

Chapter VI

PERSONAL PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Article 97

Internees shall be permitted to retain articles of personal use. Monies, cheques, bonds, etc., and valuables in their possession may not be taken from them except in accordance with established procedure. Detailed receipts shall be given therefor.

The amounts shall be paid into the account of every internee as provided for in Article 98. Such amounts may not be converted into any other currency unless legislation in force in the territory in which the owner is interned so requires or the internee gives his consent.

Articles which have above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken away.

A woman internee shall not be searched except by a woman.

On release or repatriation, internees shall be given all articles, monies or other valuables taken from them during internment and shall receive in currency the balance of any credit to their accounts kept in accordance with Article 98, with the exception of any articles or amounts withheld by the Detaining Power by virtue of its legislation in force. If the property of an internee is so withheld, the owner shall receive a detailed receipt.

Family or identity documents in the possession of internees may not be taken away without a receipt being given. At no time shall internees be left without identity documents. If they have none, they shall be issued with special documents drawn up by the detaining authorities, which will serve as their identity papers until the end of their internment.

Internees may keep on their persons a certain amount of money, in cash or in the shape of purchase coupons, to enable them to make purchases.

Article 98

All internees shall receive regular allowances, sufficient to enable them to purchase goods and articles, such as tobacco, toilet requisites, etc. Such allowances may take the form of credits or purchase coupons.

Furthermore, internees may receive allowances from the Power to which they owe allegiance, the Protecting Powers, the organizations which may assist them, or their families, as well as the income on their property in accordance with the law of the Detaining Power. The amount of allowances granted by the Power to which they owe allegiance shall be the same for each category of internees (infirm, sick, pregnant women, etc.), but may not be allocated by that Power or distributed by the Detaining Power on the basis of discrimination between internees which are prohibited by Article 27 of the present Convention.

The Detaining Power shall open a regular account for every internee, to which shall be credited the allowances named in the present Article, the wages earned and the remittances received, together with such sums taken from him as may be available under the legislation in force in the territory in which he is interned. Internees shall be granted all facilities consistent with the legislation in force in such territory to make remittances to their families and to other dependants. They may draw from their accounts the amounts necessary for their personal expenses, within the limits fixed by the Detaining Power. They shall at all times be afforded reasonable facilities for consulting and obtaining copies of their accounts. A statement of accounts shall be furnished to the Protecting Power on request, and shall accompany the internee in case of transfer.

Chapter VII**ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE****Article 99**

Every place of internment shall be put under the authority of a responsible officer, chosen from the regular military forces or the regular civil administration of the Detaining Power. The officer in charge of the place of internment must have in his possession a copy of the present Convention in the official language, or one of the official languages, of his country and shall be responsible for its application. The staff in control of internees shall be instructed in the provisions of the present Convention and of the administrative measures adopted to ensure its application.

The text of the present Convention and the texts of special agreements concluded under the said Convention shall be posted inside the place of internment, in a language which the internees understand, or shall be in the possession of the Internee Committee.

Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind shall be communicated to the internees and posted inside the places of internment, in a language which they understand.

Every order and command addressed to internees individually must likewise be given in a language which they understand.

Article 100

The disciplinary regime in places of internment shall be consistent with humanitarian principles, and shall in no circumstances include regulations imposing on internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving physical or moral victimization. Identification by tattooing or imprinting signs or markings on the body is prohibited.

In particular, prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drill, military drill and manoeuvres, or the reduction of food rations, are prohibited.

Article 101

Internees shall have the right to present to the authorities in whose power they are any petition with regard to the conditions of internment to which they are subjected.

They shall also have the right to apply without restriction through the Internee Committee or, if they consider it necessary, direct to the representatives of the Protecting Power, in order to indicate to them any points on which they may have complaints to make with regard to the conditions of internment.

Such petitions and complaints shall be transmitted forthwith and without alteration, and even if the latter are recognized to be unfounded, they may not occasion any punishment.

Periodic reports on the situation in places of internment and as to the needs of the internees may be sent by the Internee Committees to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.

Article 102

In every place of internment, the internees shall freely elect by secret ballot every six months, the members of a Committee empowered to represent them before the Detaining and the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist them. The members of the Committee shall be eligible for re-election.

Internees so elected shall enter upon their duties after their election has been approved by the detaining authorities. The reasons for any refusals or dismissals shall be communicated to the Protecting Powers concerned.

Article 103

The Internee Committees shall further the physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of the internees.

In case the internees decide, in particular, to organize a system of mutual assistance amongst themselves, this organization would be within the competence of the Committees in addition to the special duties entrusted to them under other provisions of the present Convention.

Article 104

Members of Internee Committees shall not be required to perform any other work, if the accomplishment of their duties is rendered more difficult thereby.

Members of Internee Committees may appoint from amongst the internees such assistants as

they may require. All material facilities shall be granted to them, particularly a certain freedom of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their duties (visits to labour detachments, receipt of supplies, etc.).

All facilities shall likewise be accorded to members of Internee Committees for communication by post and telegraph with the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and their delegates, and with the organizations which give assistance to internees. Committee members in labour detachments shall enjoy similar facilities for communication with their Internee Committee in the principal place of internment. Such communications shall not be limited, nor considered as forming a part of the quota mentioned in Article 107.

Members of Internee Committees who are transferred shall be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint their successors with current affairs.

Chapter VIII

RELATIONS WITH THE EXTERIOR

Article 105

Immediately upon interning protected persons, the Detaining Power shall inform them, the Power to which they owe allegiance and their Protecting Power of the measures taken for executing the provisions of the present Chapter. The Detaining Power shall likewise inform the Parties concerned of any subsequent modifications of such measures.

Article 106

As soon as he is interned, or at the latest not more than one week after his arrival in a place of internment, and likewise in cases of sickness or transfer to another place of internment or to a hospital, every internee shall be enabled to send direct to his family, on the one hand, and to the Central Agency provided for by Article 140, on the other, an internment card similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Convention, informing his relatives of his detention, address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any way.

Article 107

Internees shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. If the Detaining Power deems it necessary to limit the number of letters and cards sent by each internee, the said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards monthly; these shall be drawn up so as to conform as closely as possible to the models annexed to the present Convention. If limitations must be placed on the correspondence addressed to internees, they may be ordered only by the Power to which such internees owe allegiance, possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed with reasonable despatch; they may not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons.

Internees who have been a long time without news, or who find it impossible to receive news from their relatives, or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those who are at a considerable distance from their homes, shall be allowed to send telegrams, the charges

being paid by them in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this provision in cases which are recognized to be urgent.

As a rule, internees' mail shall be written in their own language. The Parties to the conflict may authorize correspondence in other languages.

Article 108

Internees shall be allowed to receive, by post or by any other means, individual parcels or collective shipments containing in particular foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies, as well as books and objects of a devotional, educational or recreational character which may meet their needs. Such shipments shall in no way free the Detaining Power from the obligations imposed upon it by virtue of the present Convention.

Should military necessity require the quantity of such shipments to be limited, due notice thereof shall be given to the Protecting Power and to the International Committee of the Red Cross, or to any other organization giving assistance to the internees and responsible for the forwarding of such shipments.

The conditions for the sending of individual parcels and collective shipments shall, if necessary, be the subject of special agreements between the Powers concerned, which may in no case delay the receipt by the internees of relief supplies. Parcels of clothing and foodstuffs may not include books. Medical relief supplies shall, as a rule, be sent in collective parcels.

Article 109

In the absence of special agreements between Parties to the conflict regarding the conditions for the receipt and distribution of collective relief shipments, the regulations concerning collective relief which are annexed to the present Convention shall be applied.

The special agreements provided for above shall in no case restrict the right of Internee Committees to take possession of collective relief shipments intended for internees, to undertake their distribution and to dispose of them in the interests of the recipients.

Nor shall such agreements restrict the right of representatives of the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or any other organization giving assistance to internees and responsible for the forwarding of collective shipments, to supervise their distribution to the recipients.

Article 110

All relief shipments for internees shall be exempt from import, customs and other dues.

All matter sent by mail, including relief parcels sent by parcel post and remittances of money, addressed from other countries to internees or despatched by them through the post office, either direct or through the Information Bureaux provided for in Article 136 and the Central Information Agency provided for in Article 140, shall be exempt from all postal dues both in the countries of origin and destination and in intermediate countries. To this end, in particular, the exemption provided by the Universal Postal Convention of 1947 and by the agreements of the

Universal Postal Union in favour of civilians of enemy nationality detained in camps or civilian prisons, shall be extended to the other interned persons protected by the present Convention. The countries not signatory to the above-mentioned agreements shall be bound to grant freedom from charges in the same circumstances.

The cost of transporting relief shipments which are intended for internees and which, by reason of their weight or any other cause, cannot be sent through the post office, shall be borne by the Detaining Power in all the territories under its control. Other Powers which are Parties to the present Convention shall bear the cost of transport in their respective territories.

Costs connected with the transport of such shipments, which are not covered by the above paragraphs, shall be charged to the senders.

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reduce, so far as possible, the charges for telegrams sent by internees, or addressed to them.

Article 111

Should military operations prevent the Powers concerned from fulfilling their obligation to ensure the conveyance of the mail and relief shipments provided for in Articles 106, 107, 108 and 113, the Protecting Powers concerned, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization duly approved by the Parties to the conflict may undertake the conveyance of such shipments by suitable means (rail, motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this purpose, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to supply them with such transport, and to allow its circulation, especially by granting the necessary safe-conducts.

Such transport may also be used to convey:

(a) Correspondence, lists and reports exchanged between the Central Information Agency referred to in Article 140 and the National Bureaux referred to in Article 136;

(b) Correspondence and reports relating to internees which the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization assisting the internees exchange either with their own delegates or with the Parties to the conflict.

These provisions in no way detract from the right of any Party to the conflict to arrange other means of transport if it should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts, under mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport.

The costs occasioned by the use of such means of transport shall be borne, in proportion to the importance of the shipments, by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are benefited thereby.

Article 112

The censoring of correspondence addressed to internees or despatched by them shall be done as quickly as possible.

The examination of consignments intended for internees shall not be carried out under conditions that will expose the goods contained in them to deterioration. It shall be done in the

presence of the addressee, or of a fellow-internee duly delegated by him. The delivery to internees of individual or collective consignments shall not be delayed under the pretext of difficulties of censorship.

Any prohibition of correspondence ordered by the Parties to the conflict, either for military or political reasons, shall be only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible.

Article 113

The Detaining Powers shall provide all reasonable facilities for the transmission, through the Protecting Power or the Central Agency provided for in Article 140, or as otherwise required, of wills, powers of attorney letters of authority, or any other documents intended for internees or despatched by them.

In all cases the Detaining Power shall facilitate the execution and authentication in due legal form of such documents on behalf of internees, in particular by allowing them to consult a lawyer.

Article 114

The Detaining Power shall afford internees all facilities to enable them to manage their property, provided this is not incompatible with the conditions of internment and the law which is applicable. For this purpose, the said Power may give them permission to leave the place of internment in urgent cases and if circumstances allow.

Article 115

In all cases where an internee is a party to proceedings in any court, the Detaining Power shall, if he so requests, cause the court to be informed of his detention and shall, within legal limits, ensure that all necessary steps are taken to prevent him from being in any way prejudiced, by reason of his internment, as regards the preparation and conduct of his case or as regards the execution of any judgment of the court.

Article 116

Every internee shall be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, at regular intervals and as frequently as possible.

As far as is possible, internees shall be permitted to visit their homes in urgent cases, particularly in cases of death or serious illness of relatives.

Chapter IX

PENAL AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

Article 117

Subject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the laws in force in the territory in which they are detained will continue to apply to internees who commit offences during internment.

If general laws, regulations or orders declare acts committed by internees to be punishable, whereas the same acts are not punishable when committed by persons who are not internees, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.

No internee may be punished more than once for the same act, or on the same count.

Article 118

The courts or authorities shall in passing sentence take as far as possible into account the fact that the defendant is not a national of the Detaining Power. They shall be free to reduce the penalty prescribed for the offence with which the internee is charged and shall not be obliged, to this end, to apply the minimum sentence prescribed.

Imprisonment in premises without daylight, and, in general, all forms of cruelty without exception are forbidden.

Internees who have served disciplinary or judicial sentences shall not be treated differently from other internees.

The duration of preventive detention undergone by an internee shall be deducted from any disciplinary or judicial penalty involving confinement to which he may be sentenced.

Internee Committees shall be informed of all judicial proceedings instituted against internees whom they represent, and of their result.

Article 119

The disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall be the following:

1. A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the wages which the internee would otherwise receive under the provisions of Article 95 during a period of not more than thirty days.
2. Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the present Convention.
3. Fatigue duties, not exceeding two hours daily, in connection with the maintenance of the place of internment.
4. Confinement.

In no case shall disciplinary penalties be inhuman, brutal or dangerous for the health of internees. Account shall be taken of the internee's age, sex and state of health.

The duration of any single punishment shall in no case exceed a maximum of thirty consecutive days, even if the internee is answerable for several breaches of discipline when his case is dealt with, whether such breaches are connected or not.

Article 120

Internees who are recaptured after having escaped or when attempting to escape shall be liable only to disciplinary punishment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.

Article 118, paragraph 3, notwithstanding, internees punished as a result of escape or attempt to escape, may be subjected to special surveillance, on condition that such surveillance does not affect the state of their health, that it is exercised in a place of internment and that it does not entail the abolition of any of the safeguards granted by the present Convention.

Internees who aid and abet an escape, or attempt to escape, shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment only.

Article 121

Escape, or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence, shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance in cases where an internee is prosecuted for offences committed during his escape.

The Parties to the conflict shall ensure that the competent authorities exercise leniency in deciding whether punishment inflicted for an offence shall be of a disciplinary or judicial nature, especially in respect of acts committed in connection with an escape, whether successful or not.

Article 122

Acts which constitute offences against discipline shall be investigated immediately. This rule shall be applied, in particular, in cases of escape or attempt to escape. Recaptured internees shall be handed over to the competent authorities as soon as possible.

In case of offences against discipline, confinement awaiting trial shall be reduced to an absolute minimum for all internees, and shall not exceed fourteen days. Its duration shall in any case be deducted from any sentence of confinement.

The provisions of Articles 124 and 125 shall apply to internees who are in confinement awaiting trial for offences against discipline.

Article 123

Without prejudice to the competence of courts and higher authorities, disciplinary punishment may be ordered only by the commandant of the place of internment, or by a responsible officer or official who replaces him, or to whom he has delegated his disciplinary powers.

Before any disciplinary punishment is awarded, the accused internee shall be given precise information regarding the offences of which he is accused, and given an opportunity of explaining his conduct and of defending himself. He shall be permitted, in particular, to call witnesses and to have recourse, if necessary, to the services of a qualified interpreter. The decision shall be announced in the presence of the accused and of a member of the Internee Committee.

The period elapsing between the time of award of a disciplinary punishment and its execution

shall not exceed one month.

When an internee is awarded a further disciplinary punishment, a period of at least three days shall elapse between the execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration of one of these is ten days or more.

A record of disciplinary punishments shall be maintained by the commandant of the place of internment and shall be open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power.

Article 124

Internees shall not in any case be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries, convict prisons, etc.) to undergo disciplinary punishment therein.

The premises in which disciplinary punishments are undergone shall conform to sanitary requirements; they shall in particular be provided with adequate bedding. Internees undergoing punishment shall be enabled to keep themselves in a state of cleanliness.

Women internees undergoing disciplinary punishment shall be confined in separate quarters from male internees and shall be under the immediate supervision of women.

Article 125

Internees awarded disciplinary punishment shall be allowed to exercise and to stay in the open air at least two hours daily.

They shall be allowed, if they so request, to be present at the daily medical inspections. They shall receive the attention which their state of health requires and, if necessary, shall be removed to the infirmary of the place of internment or to a hospital.

They shall have permission to read and write, likewise to send and receive letters. Parcels and remittances of money, however, may be withheld from them until the completion of their punishment; such consignments shall meanwhile be entrusted to the Internee Committee, who will hand over to the infirmary the perishable goods contained in the parcels.

No internee given a disciplinary punishment may be deprived of the benefit of the provisions of Articles 107 and 143 of the present Convention.

Article 126

The provisions of Articles 71 to 76 inclusive shall apply, by analogy, to proceedings against internees who are in the national territory of the Detaining Power.

Chapter X

TRANSFERS OF INTERNEES

Article 127

The transfer of internees shall always be effected humanely. As a general rule, it shall be carried out by rail or other means of transport, and under conditions at least equal to those obtaining for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station. If, as an exceptional measure, such removals have to be effected on foot, they may not take place unless the internees are in a fit state of health, and may not in any case expose them to excessive fatigue.

The Detaining Power shall supply internees during transfer with drinking water and food sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to maintain them in good health, and also with the necessary clothing, adequate shelter and the necessary medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall establish before their departure a complete list of all internees transferred.

Sick, wounded or infirm internees and maternity cases shall not be transferred if the journey would be seriously detrimental to them, unless their safety imperatively so demands.

If the combat zone draws close to a place of internment, the internees in the said place shall not be transferred unless their removal can be carried out in adequate conditions of safety, or unless they are exposed to greater risks by remaining on the spot than by being transferred.

When making decisions regarding the transfer of internees, the Detaining Power shall take their interests into account and, in particular, shall not do anything to increase the difficulties of repatriating them or returning them to their own homes.

Article 128

In the event of transfer, internees shall be officially advised of their departure and of their new postal address. Such notification shall be given in time for them to pack their luggage and inform their next of kin.

They shall be allowed to take with them their personal effects, and the correspondence and parcels which have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited if the conditions of transfer so require, but in no case to less than twenty-five kilograms per internee.

Mail and parcels addressed to their former place of internment shall be forwarded to them without delay.

The commandant of the place of internment shall take, in agreement with the Internee Committee, any measures needed to ensure the transport of the internees' community property and of the luggage the internees are unable to take with them in consequence of restrictions imposed by virtue of the second paragraph.

Chapter XI

DEATHS

Article 129

The wills of internees shall be received for safe-keeping by the responsible authorities; and in the event of the death of an internee his will shall be transmitted without delay to a person

whom he has previously designated.

Deaths of internees shall be certified in every case by a doctor, and a death certificate shall be made out, showing the causes of death and the conditions under which it occurred.

An official record of the death, duly registered, shall be drawn up in accordance with the procedure relating thereto in force in the territory where the place of internment is situated, and a duly certified copy of such record shall be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power as well as to the Central Agency referred to in Article 140.

Article 130

The detaining authorities shall ensure that internees who die while interned are honourably buried, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which they belonged, and that their graves are respected, properly maintained, and marked in such a way that they can always be recognized.

Deceased internees shall be buried in individual graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in accordance with his expressed wish to this effect. In case of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the death certificate of the deceased. The ashes shall be retained for safe-keeping by the detaining authorities and shall be transferred as soon as possible to the next of kin on their request.

As soon as circumstances permit, and not later than the close of hostilities, the Detaining Power shall forward lists of graves of deceased internees to the Powers on whom the deceased internees depended, through the Information Bureaux provided for in Article 136. Such lists shall include all particulars necessary for the identification of the deceased internees, as well as the exact location of their graves.

Article 131

Every death or serious injury of an internee, caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another internee or any other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.

A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately to the Protecting Power. The evidence of any witnesses shall be taken, and a report including such evidence shall be prepared and forwarded to the said Protecting power.

If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons, the Detaining Power shall take all necessary steps to ensure the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.

Chapter XII

RELEASE, REPATRIATION AND ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES

Article 132

Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which

necessitated his internment no longer exist.

The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, endeavour during the course of hostilities, to conclude agreements for the release, the repatriation, the return to places of residence or the accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with infants and young children, wounded and sick, and internees who have been detained for a long time.

Article 133

Internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.

Internees, in the territory of a Party to the conflict, against whom penal proceedings are pending for offences not exclusively subject to disciplinary penalties, may be detained until the close of such proceedings and, if circumstances require, until the completion of the penalty. The same shall apply to internees who have been previously sentenced to a punishment depriving them of liberty.

By agreement between the Detaining Power and the Powers concerned, committees may be set up after the close of hostilities, or of the occupation of territories, to search for dispersed internees.

Article 134

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour, upon the close of hostilities or occupation, to ensure the return of all internees to their last place of residence, or to facilitate their repatriation.

Article 135

The Detaining Power shall bear the expense of returning released internees to the places where they were residing when interned, or, if it took them into custody while they were in transit or on the high seas, the cost of completing their journey or of their return to their point of departure.

Where a Detaining Power refuses permission to reside in its territory to a released internee who previously had his permanent domicile therein, such Detaining Power shall pay the cost of the said internee's repatriation. If, however, the internee elects to return to his country on his own responsibility or in obedience to the Government of the Power to which he owes allegiance, the Detaining Power need not pay the expenses of his journey beyond the point of his departure from its territory. The Detaining Power need not pay the costs of repatriation of an internee who was interned at his own request.

If internees are transferred in accordance with Article 45, the transferring and receiving Powers shall agree on the portion of the above costs to be borne by each.

The foregoing shall not prejudice such special agreements as may be concluded between Parties to the conflict concerning the exchange and repatriation of their nationals in enemy hands.

SECTION V

INFORMATION BUREAUX AND CENTRAL AGENCY

Article 136

Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupation, each of the Parties to the conflict shall establish an official Information Bureau responsible for receiving and transmitting information in respect of the protected persons who are in its power.

Each of the Parties to the conflict shall, within the shortest possible period, give its Bureau information of any measure taken by it concerning any protected persons who are kept in custody for more than two weeks, who are subjected to assigned residence or who are interned. It shall, furthermore, require its various departments concerned with such matters to provide the aforesaid Bureau promptly with information concerning all changes pertaining to these protected persons, as, for example, transfers, release, repatriations, escapes, admittances to hospitals, births and deaths.

Article 137

Each national Bureau shall immediately forward information concerning protected persons by the most rapid means to the Powers of whom the aforesaid persons are nationals, or to Powers in whose territory they resided, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise through the Central Agency provided for in Article 140. The Bureaux shall also reply to all enquiries which may be received regarding protected persons.

Information Bureaux shall transmit information concerning a protected person unless its transmission might be detrimental to the person concerned or to his or her relatives. Even in such a case, the information may not be withheld from the Central Agency which, upon being notified of the circumstances, will take the necessary precautions indicated in Article 140.

All communications in writing made by any Bureau shall be authenticated by a signature or a seal.

Article 138

The information received by the national Bureau and transmitted by it shall be of such a character as to make it possible to identify the protected person exactly and to advise his next of kin quickly. The information in respect of each person shall include at least his surname, first names, place and date of birth, nationality, last residence and distinguishing characteristics, the first name of the father and the maiden name of the mother, the date, place and nature of the action taken with regard to the individual, the address at which correspondence may be sent to him and the name and address of the person to be informed.

Likewise, information regarding the state of health of internees who are seriously ill or seriously wounded shall be supplied regularly and if possible every week.

Article 139

Each national Information Bureau shall, furthermore, be responsible for collecting all personal

valuables left by protected persons mentioned in Article 136, in particular those who have been repatriated or released, or who have escaped or died; it shall forward the said valuables to those concerned, either direct, or, if necessary, through the Central Agency. Such articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which shall be accompanied by statements giving clear and full identity particulars of the person to whom the articles belonged, and by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Detailed records shall be maintained of the receipt and despatch of all such valuables.

Article 140

A Central Information Agency for protected persons, in particular for internees, shall be created in a neutral country. The International Committee of the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the organization of such an Agency, which may be the same as that provided for in Article 123 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.

The function of the Agency shall be to collect all information of the type set forth in Article 136 which it may obtain through official or private channels and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to the countries of origin or of residence of the persons concerned, except in cases where such transmissions might be detrimental to the persons whom the said information concerns, or to their relatives. It shall receive from the Parties to the conflict all reasonable facilities for effecting such transmissions.

The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose nationals benefit by the services of the Central Agency, are requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.

The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as restricting the humanitarian activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the relief Societies described in Article 142.

Article 141

The national Information Bureaux and the Central Information Agency shall enjoy free postage for all mail, likewise the exemptions provided for in Article 110, and further, so far as possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly reduced rates.

PART IV

EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION

SECTION I

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 142

Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may consider essential to ensure their security or to meet any other reasonable need, the representatives of religious organizations, relief societies, or any other organizations assisting the protected persons, shall receive from these Powers, for themselves or their duly accredited agents, all facilities for visiting the

protected persons, for distributing relief supplies and material from any source, intended for educational, recreational or religious purposes, or for assisting them in organizing their leisure time within the places of internment. Such societies or organizations may be constituted in the territory of the Detaining Power, or in any other country, or they may have an international character.

The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and organizations whose delegates are allowed to carry out their activities in its territory and under its supervision, on condition, however, that such limitation shall not hinder the supply of effective and adequate relief to all protected persons.

The special position of the International Committee of the Red Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.

Article 143

Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where protected persons are, particularly to places of internment, detention and work.

They shall have access to all premises occupied by protected persons and shall be able to interview the latter without witnesses, personally or through an interpreter.

Such visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure. Their duration and frequency shall not be restricted.

Such representatives and delegates shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The Detaining or Occupying Power, the Protecting Power and when occasion arises the Power of origin of the persons to be visited, may agree that compatriots of the internees shall be permitted to participate in the visits.

The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall also enjoy the above prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power governing the territories where they will carry out their duties.

Article 144

The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population.

Any civilian, military, police or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.

Article 145

The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities, through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the

present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.

Article 146

The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another

High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.

Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in the following Article.

In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.

Article 147

Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

Article 148

No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.

Article 149

At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.

If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.

Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the least possible delay.

SECTION 11

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 150

The present Convention is established in English and in French. Both texts are equally authentic.

The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official translations of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish languages.

Article 151

The present Convention, which bears the date of this day, is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva on April 21, 1949.

Article 152

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.

A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and certified copies of this record shall be transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.

Article 153

The present Convention shall come into force six months after not less than two instruments of ratification have been deposited.

Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting Party six months after the deposit of the instrument of ratification.

Article 154

In the relations between the Powers who are bound by The Hague Conventions respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, whether that of 29 July, 1899, or that of 18 October, 1907, and who are parties to the present Convention, this last Convention shall be supplementary to Sections II and III of the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of The Hague.

Article 155

From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to any Power in whose name the present Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention.

Article 156

Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, and shall take effect six months after the date on which they are received.

The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has been notified.

Article 157

The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the beginning of hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate by the quickest method any ratifications or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.

Article 158

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to denounce the present Convention.

The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notification thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council. However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after operations connected with the release, repatriation and re-establishment of the persons protected by the present Convention have been terminated.

The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.

Article 159

The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Convention with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Swiss Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received by it with respect to the present Convention.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited their respective full powers, have signed the present Convention.

DONE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the English and French languages. The original shall be deposited in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal

Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the signatory and acceding States.

ANNEX I

Draft agreement relating to hospital and safety zones and localities

Article 1

Hospital and safety zones shall be strictly reserved for the persons mentioned in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August, 1949, and in Article 14 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August, 1949, and for the personnel entrusted with the organization and administration of these zones and localities and with the care of the persons therein assembled.

Nevertheless, persons whose permanent residence is within such zones shall have the right to stay there.

Article 2

No persons residing, in whatever capacity, in a hospital and safety zone shall perform any work, either within or without the zone, directly connected with military operations or the production of war material.

Article 3

The Power establishing a hospital and safety zone shall take all necessary measures to prohibit access to all persons who have no right of residence or entry therein.

Article 4

Hospital and safety zones shall fulfil the following conditions:

- (a) They shall comprise only a small part of the territory governed by the Power which has established them.
- (b) They shall be thinly populated in relation to the possibilities of accommodation.
- (c) They shall be far removed and free from all military objectives, or large industrial or administrative establishments.
- (d) They shall not be situated in areas which, according to every probability, may become important for the conduct of the war.

Article 5

Hospital and safety zones shall be subject to the following obligations:

- (a) The lines of communication and means of transport which they possess shall not be used

for the transport of military personnel or material, even in transit.

(b) They shall in no case be defended by military means.

Article 6

Hospital and safety zones shall be marked by means of oblique red bands on a white ground, placed on the buildings and outer precincts.

Zones reserved exclusively for the wounded and sick may be marked by means of the Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) emblem on a white ground.

They may be similarly marked at night by means of appropriate illumination.

Article 7

The Powers shall communicate to all the High Contracting Parties in peacetime or on the outbreak of hostilities, a list of the hospital and safety zones in the territories governed by them. They shall also give notice of any new zones set up during hostilities.

As soon as the adverse Party has received the above-mentioned notification, the zone shall be regularly established.

If, however, the adverse Party considers that the conditions of the present agreement have not been fulfilled, it may refuse to recognize the zone by giving immediate notice thereof to the Party responsible for the said zone, or may make its recognition of such zone dependent upon the institution of the control provided for in Article 8.

Article 8

Any Power having recognized one or several hospital and safety zones instituted by the adverse Party shall be entitled to demand control by one or more Special Commissions. for the purpose of ascertaining if the zones fulfil the conditions and obligations stipulated in the present agreement.

For this purpose, members of the Special Commissions shall at all times have free access to the various zones and may even reside there permanently. They shall be given all facilities for their duties of inspection.

Article 9

Should the Special Commissions note any facts which they consider contrary to the stipulations of the present agreement, they shall at once draw the attention of the Power governing the said zone to these facts, and shall fix a time limit of five days within which the matter should be rectified. They shall duly notify the Power who has recognized the zone.

If, when the time limit has expired, the Power governing the zone has not complied with the warning, the adverse Party may declare that it is no longer bound by the present agreement in respect of the said zone.

Article 10

Any Power setting up one or more hospital and safety zones, and the adverse Parties to whom their existence has been notified, shall nominate or have nominated by the Protecting Powers or by other neutral Powers, persons eligible to be members of the Special Commissions mentioned in Articles 8 and 9.

Article 11

In no circumstances may hospital and safety zones be the object of attack. They shall be protected and respected at all times by the Parties to the conflict.

Article 12

In the case of occupation of a territory, the hospital and safety zones therein shall continue to be respected and utilized as such.

Their purpose may, however, be modified by the Occupying Power, on condition that all measures are taken to ensure the safety of the persons accommodated.

Article 13

The present agreement shall also apply to localities which the Powers may utilize for the same purposes as hospital and safety zones.

ANNEX 11

Draft regulations concerning collective relief

Article 1

The Internee Committees shall be allowed to distribute collective relief shipments for which they are responsible, to all internees who are dependent for administration on the said Committee's place of internment, including those internees who are in hospitals, or in prisons or other penitentiary establishments.

Article 2

The distribution of collective relief shipments shall be effected in accordance with the instructions of the donors and with a plan drawn up by the Internee Committees. The issue of medical stores shall, however, be made for preference in agreement with the senior medical officers, and the latter may, in hospitals and infirmaries, waive the said instructions, if the needs of their patients so demand. Within the limits thus defined, the distribution shall always be carried out equitably.

Article 3

Members of Internee Committees shall be allowed to go to the railway stations or other points of arrival of relief supplies near their places of internment so as to enable them to verify the

quantity as well as the quality of the goods received and to make out detailed reports thereon for the donors.

Article 4

Internee Committees shall be given the facilities necessary for verifying whether the distribution of collective relief in all subdivisions and annexes of their places of internment has been carried out in accordance with their instructions.

Article 5

Internee Committees shall be allowed to complete, and to cause to be completed by members of the Internee Committees in labour detachments or by the senior medical officers of infirmaries and hospitals, forms or questionnaires intended for the donors, relating to collective relief supplies (distribution, requirements, quantities, etc.). Such forms and questionnaires, duly completed, shall be forwarded to the donors without delay.

Article 6

In order to secure the regular distribution of collective relief supplies to the internees in their place of internment, and to meet any needs that may arise through the arrival of fresh parties of internees, the Internee Committees shall be allowed to create and maintain sufficient reserve stocks of collective relief. For this purpose, they shall have suitable warehouses at their disposal; each warehouse shall be provided with two locks, the Internee Committee holding the keys of one lock, and the commandant of the place of internment the keys of the other.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties, and the Detaining Powers in particular, shall, so far as is in any way possible and subject to the regulations governing the food supply of the population, authorize purchases of goods to be made in their territories for the distribution of collective relief to the internees. They shall likewise facilitate the transfer of funds and other financial measures of a technical or administrative nature taken for the purpose of making such purchases.

Article 8

The foregoing provisions shall not constitute an obstacle to the right of internees to receive collective relief before their arrival in a place of internment or in the course of their transfer, nor to the possibility of representatives of the Protecting Power, or of the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other humanitarian organization giving assistance to internees and responsible for forwarding such supplies, ensuring the distribution thereof to the recipients by any other means they may deem suitable.

**Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II)**

**Adopted on 8 June 1977 by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of
International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts**

***entry into force* 7 December 1978, in accordance with Article 23**

Preamble

The High Contracting Parties,

Recalling that the humanitarian principles enshrined in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 constitute the foundation of respect for the human person in cases of armed conflict not of an international character,

Recalling furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person,

Emphasizing the need to ensure a better protection for the victims of those armed conflicts,

Recalling that, in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience,

Have agreed on the following:

PART I

SCOPE OF THIS PROTOCOL

Article 1.-Material field of application

1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.

2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.

Article 2.-Personal field of application

1. This Protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria (hereinafter referred to as "adverse distinction") to all persons affected by an armed conflict as defined in Article 1.

2. At the end of the armed conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction of liberty.

Article 3.-Non-intervention

1. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.

2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.

PART II**HUMANE TREATMENT****Article 4.-Fundamental guarantees**

1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.

2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever:

(a) Violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;

(b) Collective punishments;

(c) Taking of hostages;

(d) Acts of terrorism;

(e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;

(f) Slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;

(g) Pillage;

(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particular:

(a) They shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care;

(b) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated;

(c) Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities;

(d) The special protection provided by this Article to children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are captured;

(e) Measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.

Article 5.-Persons whose liberty has been restricted

1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the following provisions shall be respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained:

(a) The wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance with Article 7;

(b) The persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same extent as the local civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict;

(c) They shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief;

(d) They shall be allowed to practise their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious functions;

(e) They shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and

safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population.

2. Those who are responsible for the internment or detention of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall also, within the limits of their capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such persons:

(a) Except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the immediate supervision of women;

(b) They shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the number of which may be limited by the competent authority if it deems necessary;

(c) Places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat zone. The persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall be evacuated when the places where they are interned or detained become particularly exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict, if their evacuation can be carried out under adequate conditions of safety;

(d) They shall have the benefit of medical examinations;

(e) Their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by an unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the state of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent with the generally accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical circumstances.

3. Persons who are not covered by paragraph 1 but whose liberty has been restricted in any way whatsoever for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be treated humanely in accordance with Article 4 and with paragraphs 1 (a), (c) and (d), and 2 (b) of this Article.

4. If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding.

Article 6.-Penal prosecutions

1. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict.

2. No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In particular:

(a) The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;

(b) No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility;

(c) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;

(d) Anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;

(e) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;

(f) No one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.

3. A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.

4. The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of young children.

5. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.

PART III

WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED

Article 7.-Protection and care

1. All the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, whether or not they have taken part in the armed conflict, shall be respected and protected.

2. In all circumstances they shall be treated humanely and shall receive, to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention required by their condition. There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones.

Article 8.-Search

Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an engagement, all possible measures shall be taken, without delay, to search for and collect the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead, prevent their being despoiled, and decently dispose of them.

Article 9.-Protection of medical and religious personnel

1. Medical and religious personnel shall be respected and protected and shall be granted all available help for the performance of their duties. They shall not be compelled to carry out tasks which are not compatible with their humanitarian mission.
2. In the performance of their duties medical personnel may not be required to give priority to any person except on medical grounds.

Article 10.-General protection of medical duties

1. Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom.
2. Persons engaged in medical activities shall neither be compelled to perform acts or to carry out work contrary to, nor be compelled to refrain from acts required by, the rules of medical ethics or other rules designed for the benefit of the wounded and sick, or this Protocol.
3. The professional obligations of persons engaged in medical activities regarding information which they may acquire concerning the wounded and sick under their care shall, subject to national law, be respected.
4. Subject to national law, no person engaged in medical activities may be penalized in any way for refusing or failing to give information concerning the wounded and sick who are, or who have been, under his care.

Article 11.-Protection of medical units and transports

1. Medical units and transports shall be respected and protected at all times and shall not be the object of attack.
2. The protection to which medical units and transports are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit hostile acts, outside their humanitarian function. Protection may, however, cease only after a warning has been given setting, whenever appropriate, a reasonable time-limit, and after such warning has remained unheeded.

Article 12.-The distinctive emblem

Under the direction of the competent authority concerned, the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun on a white ground shall be displayed by medical and religious personnel and medical units, and on medical transports. It shall be respected in all circumstances. It shall not be used improperly.

PART IV

CIVILIAN POPULATION

Article 13.-Protection of the civilian population

1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against

the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.

2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.

3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Article 14.-Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population

Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.

Article 15.-Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces

Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

Article 16.-Protection of cultural objects and of places of worship

Without prejudice to the provisions of The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort.

Article 17.-Prohibition of forced movement of civilians

1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.

Article 18.-Relief societies and relief actions

1. Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for the

wounded, sick and shipwrecked.

2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.

PART V

FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 19.-Dissemination

This Protocol shall be disseminated as widely as possible.

Article 20.-Signature

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the Parties to the Conventions six months after the signing of the Final Act and will remain open for a period of twelve months.

Article 21.-Ratification

This Protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Swiss Federal Council, depositary of the Conventions.

Article 22.-Accession

This Protocol shall be open for accession by any Party to the Conventions which has not signed it. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the depositary.

Article 23.-Entry into force

1. This Protocol shall enter into force six months after two instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited.

2. For each Party to the Conventions thereafter ratifying or acceding to this Protocol, it shall enter into force six months after the deposit by such Party of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 24.-Amendment

1. Any High Contracting Party may propose amendments to this Protocol. The text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated to the depositary which shall decide, after consultation with all the High Contracting Parties and the International Committee of the Red Cross, whether a conference should be convened to consider the proposed amendment.

2. The depositary shall invite to that conference all the High Contracting Parties as well

as the Parties to the Conventions, whether or not they are signatories of this Protocol.

Article 25.-Denunciation

1. In case a High Contracting Party should denounce this Protocol, the denunciation shall only take effect six months after receipt of the instrument of denunciation. If, however, on the expiry of six months, the denouncing Party is engaged in the situation referred to in Article I, the denunciation shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict. Persons who have been deprived of liberty, or whose liberty has been restricted, for reasons related to the conflict shall nevertheless continue to benefit from the provisions of this Protocol until their final release.

2. The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the depositary, which shall transmit it to all the High Contracting Parties.

Article 26.-Notifications

The depositary shall inform the High Contracting Parties as well as the Parties to the Conventions, whether or not they are signatories of this Protocol, of:

- (a) Signatures affixed to this Protocol and the deposit of instruments of ratification and accession under Articles 21 and 22;
- (b) The date of entry into force of this Protocol under Article 23; and
- (c) Communications and declarations received under Article 24.

Article 27.-Registration

1. After its entry into force, this Protocol shall be transmitted by the depositary to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration and publication, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The depositary shall also inform the Secretariat of the United Nations of all ratifications and accessions received by it with respect to this Protocol.

Article 28.-Authentic texts

The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic shall be deposited with the depositary, which shall transmit certified true copies thereof to all the Parties to the Conventions.

percent were from fifteen to seventeen years old, and 260, or 18 percent, were children under eleven.⁹³ The figures for both the adults and children show the majority of abductees to be female.

As in past offensives, the process of abduction was usually violent and traumatic. Those attempting to resist the abduction of a family member were often beaten, maimed, or killed. They were also often forced to make painful choices between allowing a loved one to be taken or having one or several family members killed. Families who had more than one child abducted were not uncommon, and there are several cases of entire family units being taken. Rebels frequently went to houses and compounds and selected all the young men or women of a certain age. Reports of several residents from a single compound being abducted were not uncommon.

The rebels began abducting people shortly after the offensive began, using them to carry looted goods back to their bases further east. However, the numbers increased dramatically towards the end of the RUF's occupation of Freetown. Residents of Calaba Town, near the easternmost end of Freetown, described rebels going from house to house, hurriedly pulling several people from each house as they fled into the hills. As has already been discussed, abductees were also used as porters and human shields in some of the final battles of the offensive.

Young men and boys abducted during January were witnessed by escaped abductees to be undergoing military training just weeks after their capture. Most were made to carry heavy loads and subjected to forced labor and sometimes physical abuse. One escaped abductee described seeing abductees being trained in February, 1999 by Caucasian soldiers.⁹⁴

Eldred

Eldred, forty, another abductee who was captured on January 22 and spent two months with the rebels, described seeing abductees taken during the January offensive being divided up by age and trained by rebel soldiers. He recounted:

They [the rebels] gathered the abductees together and had them march up and down in the bush; left, right, left, right and so on and then divided them up into groups. They had the small boys from six to ten years old, then those from twelve to fifteen and finally those from fifteen to eighteen. For the older boys, the training was compulsory for all of them. I saw them doing physical exercises, teaching them how to dismantle and clean all kinds of guns, explaining them how many cartridges are in a clip, and all that.

But they didn't trust the new recruits to hold onto the guns for long. They really watched them at first; afraid they would turn the weapons on them and escape. They [the rebels] said if the peace talks failed, they'd come back to Freetown with a vengeance. And that this time they'd go to the west where all the rich people live. They said it'd be called "Operation Westside."⁹⁵

Lansana

Lansana, forty-two, described how on January 20 the rebels abducted two of his three daughters as they swept through their neighborhood. The eleven-year-old has since been released but was raped during her captivity. He recounted:

They usually came at night, when it was easier to hide our three daughters, Jennah, sixteen, Mansa, fourteen, and Sally, eleven, but that day they came in the afternoon. First they fired their guns into our house and then they crashed in and forced us to line up outside. The girls were huddled around my wife.

ECOMOG had started bombarding the hills and they seemed frantic; in a hurry. They went to my wife and told her to give up the girls. One man put a gun to her throat and a few more started pulling the girls. Mansa was able to run but they pulled Jennah and Sally from my wife who was crying and pleading to leave them. The girls were screaming and the rebels just said, "you move, move, move."

⁹³Human Rights Watch interview, Roisin De Burca UNICEF, Freetown, June 7, 1999.

⁹⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 27, 1999.

⁹⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

As they walked away, dragging the girls, my wife followed them up the street, but they told her they'd kill her and one said, "If I look around one more time and see you following me, you're all dead." She broke down when she came back to the house.

And at 8:00 p.m. another group came back. This time I was holding Mansa and I screamed at them "you can beat me, you can kill me but I'm not giving this girl to you." A few of them started hitting me and forced her from me. But, Mansa was really determined; as they took her out the door she somehow squirmed out of their grip and ran to the banana patch.⁹⁶

Josiah

Josiah, forty-one, was shot at as he begged for his sixteen year-old daughter not to be abducted on January 21. He recounted:

Seven of them came asking for money but we didn't have anything left; there was nothing left to loot. We were all in the parlor and they had their guns on us, when one of them looked at my first-born Aminata and said, "if you don't have any money then, we'll take your daughter." I started shouting and said, "no, no, don't take my daughter, I beg you. If I had money I'd give you. I'd give you anything." Then the same rebel turned towards me, raised his gun and shot at me.

He missed and then Aminata, who was crying by this time said, "pa, let me go with them, so that they don't kill you, let me go with them." As they pulled her away I cried bitterly, I cried and the one who shot me said, "why are you crying, You can always get another child." They walked out and that was the last time I saw my daughter.⁹⁷

Miata

Miata, fourteen, was abducted on January 9 but escaped several weeks later as the rebels withdrew to the hills. She was sexually abused by the rebel who abducted her. She described how she was taken after her grandfather couldn't raise the sum of money the rebels demanded:

A rebel came to the house and said he was going to burn it. Then he started searching for hidden Kamajor fighters and lifted all the cushions on the sofa. He struck a match and tried to set the parlor on fire and then went from room to room using abusive language against my grandpa and my mother and President Tejan Kabbah's mother and then he entered the room where me and my cousins were hiding.

So he looked for the smallest one, that was me, and told my grandpa that if he didn't give him 30,000 leones (U.S.\$15) he was taking me to the bush. My mom and grandpa started pleading because they didn't have that money. So he took me away. But before he did he went to the back and took two chickens and told me to hold them. He said if he saw my people following us he would damage them. And then he pulled out a big sword and I started crying. He said if I cried he would kill me with it.⁹⁸

Augustine

Augustine, thirty-nine, was abducted on January 23 with his wife and seven-year-old son. He spent several weeks with the rebels before managing to escape during an ECOMOG bombardment. His wife and child are still missing. He said:

We were hiding in an abandoned house but the rebels caught us...The column was massive and went on for miles; there were thousand of rebels and captives fleeing into the hills. When they saw us they pulled us into the mass and one of them gave me a heavy pipe, one of those used to fire a mortar bomb, and told me if I dropped it he would shoot me.

They ordered my wife and son to walk with the women's group, and I was put in the "G4 group," responsible for taking arms, ammunition, and such. That thing was really heavy. There were many other captives; young men and

⁹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 1, 1999.

⁹⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 8, 1999.

⁹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 27, 1999.

even children in my group as well. Along the way I saw four dead people who the rebels said were killed for dropping their loads. They don't go along any trails; they go straight through the bush. We reached Waterloo two days later and for another day the people were still coming; women, pregnant women, children being carried by abductees.

It was when we came under heavy bombardment a few weeks later that I was able to escape and make it back to Freetown. I try not to think about Sahr; he is my only son. As long as we were in the bush we slept together and he'd tell me he missed his sisters and wanted to go home. But when I had the opportunity to escape, I just had to and now I haven't heard or seen him for over two months.⁹⁹

Treatment of Prisoners

There are several accounts of RUF forces executing captured ECOMOG soldiers and members of the Civil Defense Forces, mainly Kamajors; some after they had clearly attempted to surrender. Some of the prisoners were killed on the spot, and some were executed after having been humiliated and tortured. A few were taken as prisoners and remain under rebel control.

Mariatu

Mariatu, forty-six, described the January 6 execution of three ECOMOG prisoners captured hiding within a storeroom in the "Clay Factory" displaced camp. She recounted:

There was a contingent of ECOMOG soldiers living next to our camp within the Safecon Factory. They were all Nigerians and had their girlfriends in the camp so we got to know them quite well.

On the morning of the attack they tried, but the rebels were too many and when they knew they were being overpowered, they stripped off their uniforms and went into hiding. Many of them fled down to the waterside, hoping to get a boat, some of them ran up the hills and some stripped off their uniforms and went into hiding.

At around 2:00 am or so, about a hundred rebels stormed the camp, and asked us where they [ECOMOG soldiers] were hiding. They hit and slapped us, and took a few of us around as hostages as they searched every corner of the camp. A few hours later they finally found three of them hiding among the bags in the storeroom. They all had tribal markings so it was obvious. They were Sgt. Hassan Orgg, RSM Haruna, and Staff Sergeant Amedu.

When the rebels caught them the Nigerians put up their hands and said, "We want to surrender, take us, we want to surrender!" but the commander said, "Oh fuck off, when our brothers came to you people to surrender you killed them, so now that's what we're going to do to you."

They opened fire on Sgt. Orgg and the Staff Sergeant Amedu right there near the store. But RSM Haruna, who they knew was operating the AA machine gun, they really treated him badly; they tied his hands, beat him horribly, put a pistol in his mouth and shot him through the head. Then they dragged his body out to the middle of the highway and ran over his head with a hi-lux.

The rebels had by this time found the ECOMOG uniforms in the store and put them on. Then a girlfriend of one of the ECOMOG soldiers started pointing out where the others, including her own boyfriend, were hiding and then pointed out the houses of all the girlfriends of the other Nigerians. I guess she was working as a rebel spy because after her ECOMOG boyfriend was killed down by the water, she went into town with the rebels.¹⁰⁰

Aaron

Aaron, forty-eight, witnessed the killing of one ECOMOG soldier, and the brutalization and torture of another on January 6 in central Freetown. He recounted:

On January 9, I saw an ECOMOG prisoner, bloody, stripped naked and with a rope around his waist and his private parts, being led up Pademba Road by a group of rebels. They were pushing him and ordering civilians to touch his

⁹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 7, 1999.

¹⁰⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 11, 1999.

privates. When they reached a rebel checkpoint, they brought out another ECOMOG soldier who was also naked and looked like he'd been horribly beaten up. Then they lay both of them on the ground and some of the rebels started kicking and beating them. Then, a few of them took a machete and started cutting off the head of the second soldier. It took them about ten minutes and when they were finished, they started dancing around and brought it around to show the other soldier. I felt sick.

By this time there was a lot of gunfire and it seemed like the rebels were going really mad. They pushed the other prisoner down and grabbed a long stick and started shoving it up his backside; sodomizing him. They kept doing it for about thirty minutes. The soldier was screaming and crying and eventually just passed out. And then they shot him and just left him in the gutter. He was very bloody and everyone thought he was dead. But, several hours later he regained consciousness and called people to come and help him.¹⁰¹

Violations of Medical Neutrality

There are many accounts of RUF forces storming and occupying both public and private hospitals in which they threatened hospital staff, looted and destroyed hospital property, and in a few cases mutilated and executed patients.

Sierra Leone's biggest public hospital, Connaught Hospital, suffered most from these violations. Doctors, nurses, and patients describe how the hospital was stormed by RUF fighters on January 6, and turned into a rebel base. They described how the hospital filled up with hundreds of rebel fighters who then used the premises for cooking, washing, and cleaning their weapons. The hospital was looted and both ambulances destroyed. Patients were removed from their hospital beds and were then replaced with wounded rebels. Patients' possessions were looted and as wounded civilians entered the hospital they were robbed by rebel fighters.

While most medical personnel ran away, the few doctors and nurses who remained on duty were threatened with death if rebel commanders died, and forced to work long hours under unsanitary conditions. When they tried to rest they were sought after and brought back to work under gunpoint. When wounded civilians entered the hospital, doctors were ordered at gunpoint not to treat them. Most of these patients died.

Nurses describe how on January 6, in the Curney Barnes Memorial Hospital, rebels violently shook the leg of a patient whose fractured leg had just been operated on, whilst accusing him of being an ECOMOG soldier. Five nursing staff were kept at gunpoint while they looted shoes, radios, jewelry, and money from the patients, stole medicines and instruments from the hospital and set the outpatient ward on fire. The hospital closed down the next day.¹⁰²

In Good Shepherd Hospital in Kissy, after removing and executing one Nigerian patient from the hospital on January 18, rebels forced all ambulatory patients, staff members, and other civilians to a nearby wall and then shot some fifteen of them. At least one nurse and a few relatives of the patients were wounded and several others died. Later the same day a fourteen-year-old rebel walked around the wards threatening patients with a hand-grenade. The hospital closed down the following day after rebels threatened to burn it and kill all staff.¹⁰³

In the Summertime Clinic in Kissy, nurses described patients belongings and medicines being looted by the rebels on several occasions. One nurse said, "over the course of a week, we lost seven patients, simply for lack of medicine. They needed antibiotics but the rebels had stolen what we needed to help keep our patients alive."¹⁰⁴

In the Kissy Mental Home, rebel forces killed five patients and attacked several others, including one man whose legs they attempted to amputate with a machete. They also looted and burned part of the hospital.¹⁰⁵

Paul

¹⁰¹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 17, 1999.

¹⁰²Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Curney Barnes Hospital, Freetown, May 10, 1999.

¹⁰³Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Good Shephard Hospital, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

¹⁰⁴Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Summertime Clinic, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

¹⁰⁵Human Rights Watch interview, nurse, Kissy Mental Hospital, May 6, 1999.

Paul, a doctor at Connaught Hospital, described how the rebels threatened to kill him if their wounded commanders died of their injuries or if he treated the civilian wounded:

On January 6 we received the first wounded rebel at around 5:30 a.m.; several rebels brought him in. They told me at gunpoint he was a very important commander and, "if he dies, you too will die because this man is far more important than you are."

By 6:30 I'd received three more rebels with gunshot wounds. By this time there was heavy gunfire all around. Again they threatened me saying they'd kill me if any of them died; that they didn't care how I did it.

Over the next few days the hospital was turned into a command center. The rebels were bringing in bags of rice and cooking, drinking beer, and smoking pot, doing their laundry, coming and going. I saw them telling patients to vacate their beds on wards three, five, and seven, replacing them with their own wounded. They looted from the patients and even stole from the wounded civilians and their families as they entered the hospital.

In the morning hours I also received about ten wounded civilians; all gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. The rebels threatened me, again at gunpoint, not to give medicine to or treat any civilians. And I lost them one after the other—they all died.

By 16:00 I was exhausted. I'd been working non-stop; the conditions were terrible and unsanitary, there was blood everywhere, I had no gloves, it was filthy.

By 20:00 we received the heaviest casualties; three wood carts loaded with over sixty wounded, all of them civilians. Of these I can tell you only fifteen survived. Most of the wounded were head and abdomen injuries but the operating theater wasn't working, no nurse, no medicines. All we could do was stop the bleeding. By the next day there were over 200 corpses in the morgue.¹⁰⁶

V. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY ECOMOG, SIERRA LEONEAN DEFENSE FORCES, AND POLICE

Summary Executions

Human Rights Watch has taken the testimonies of witnesses to over 180 summary executions of rebel prisoners and their suspected collaborators, mostly by ECOMOG forces but also by members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), and the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leonean Police (who when on combat operations are under ECOMOG command). While the victims were overwhelmingly young men, witnesses confirm the execution of some women, and children as young as eight.

It is difficult to ascertain the level at which the ECOMOG, CDF and SLA high command were aware of or sanctioned these killings. As they were often carried out in highly public places and in front of very large groups of people, it is highly unlikely that knowledge of the executions did not reach the highest levels of command. According to witnesses and survivors, the executions were done with the consent and sometimes participation of ECOMOG officers to the level of captain.

ECOMOG soldiers deployed in Sierra Leone have operated under extremely difficult conditions, and many have been traumatized by what they have seen of rebel atrocities. As one ECOMOG soldier participating in an operation in which executions took place said, "we have a proper code of conduct. We know about the Geneva Conventions and have taken prisoners in the past, but this time was different. The things these people do. This time my unit took very few prisoners."¹⁰⁷ Another soldier added, "In many ways we felt we were doing it for the people. Sometimes we wonder if these rebels are human. After everything they've done, it was best to eliminate them."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶Human Rights Watch interview, doctor, Connaught Hospital, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

¹⁰⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

¹⁰⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 30, 1999.

Most Nigerian soldiers, the largest component of ECOMOG, have been deployed in Sierra Leone for at least one year without respite, or visits home. Some soldiers, particularly those that were deployed in Sierra Leone after previously serving in the ECOMOG forces in Liberia, have not been back to Nigeria for over two years. What with the difficulty in communicating through phone or mail, many soldiers complain of losing touch with their families. The soldiers are supposed to be paid a special U.S.\$150 per month allowance in addition to their wages while they are on active duty in ECOMOG, but until recently there have often been delays of up to three months in receiving this money. Commanders cite these difficulties as contributing to problems with low morale among their troops.

These difficulties do not excuse abuses by ECOMOG, and serve rather to reinforce the need for ECOMOG's senior command to improve discipline and morale among their soldiers. Moreover, under international law, abuses by one side in a conflict, however appalling, can never excuse retaliatory abuses by opposing forces.

Prisoners, some of whom had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were frequently executed on the spot. Suspected rebel collaborators or sympathizers were often killed with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Some of the victims were rounded up during small "mopping up operations," and many were executed at ECOMOG checkpoints after being found with weapons, determined to have improper identification, or denounced by the local population.

Scores of executions by ECOMOG and to a lesser extent CDF and SSD forces took place on the Aberdeen Bridge in western Freetown, which during the rebel incursion was under the command of an ECOMOG captain who during this time earned the name of "Captain Evil Spirit" among the local population.¹⁰⁹ Human Rights Watch took testimonies from witnesses who saw at least ninety-eight executions on this bridge from January 7 through January 29. According to these witnesses, small groups of young men were brought to the entrance to the bridge in trucks and cars, and arrived usually stripped down to their underwear and often with their hands tied. They were then marched onto the bridge where they were executed and thrown into the bay. While ECOMOG soldiers, and sometimes "Captain Evil Spirit," did most of the killing, CDF-Kamajors also took part. Members of the SSD were often present and have been seen throwing the bodies into the water.

One witness, who saw scores of executions on the bridge, was told by a soldier that most of the victims had been captured during military operations and at checkpoints in other parts of the capital, and were then handed over by ECOMOG soldiers, CDF-Kamajors, or civil defense unit members to the captain for execution. Another witness said many of those executed formed part of an informal organization of the sons of former SLA soldiers, many of whom lived within either the Murray Town Barracks or Wilberforce Barracks.¹¹⁰ Witnesses said most of the executions on the bridge were done by the same ten soldiers who fell directly under "Captain Evil Spirit's" command.

Several witnesses described the ECOMOG execution of over fifty rebels in and around Connaught Hospital on January 11, in violation of the laws of war protecting those no longer capable of fighting. Wounded rebels were dragged from their beds and executed within the hospital grounds, or shot directly in their beds or as they tried to flee on crutches and in wheelchairs. Others were executed in the morgue where they were caught trying to hide among the corpses.

Another incident involved the January 19 killing of seven civilians who had sought refuge within the Jami Ul-Masjid mosque. Witnesses also saw executions taking place on the wharves around Susan's Bay, in the National Stadium, and near Ferry Junction. Witnesses saw several people, particularly women, executed after trying to smuggle pistols and cartridges in their hair or hidden underneath children strapped to their backs. There were also reports of freshly severed heads being displayed near a CDF-Kamajor base in the Brookfields neighborhood.

The high degree of rebel infiltration into the capital in the months prior to the January 6 incursion heightened the sense of suspicion among the local population. When ECOMOG regained control of the city, anyone unknown to a given neighborhood became suspect. As Freetown residents went out in search of food, to check on relatives, to bury friends, and the like, they were

¹⁰⁹The name of this ECOMOG captain was provided to Human Rights Watch but has been withheld.

¹¹⁰Many of the SLA soldiers had taken part in the 1997 AFRC/RUF coup, and fled to the bush when ECOMOG expelled them from the capital. Their families, many of whom continued to live within the military barracks in the capital, were often accused of collaboration with ECOMOG.

obliged to pass through numerous ECOMOG checkpoints. It was at these checkpoints that young men who were unknown to the local residents were often denounced as rebel collaborators and subsequently executed.

Some victims and witnesses describe going through a brief "trial," either on the street or at a checkpoint during which an alibi was checked out and someone able to verify the suspect's identity was sent for. The "judgment" was then pronounced by an ECOMOG officer, and the execution then carried out by ECOMOG soldiers, or members of the CDF or SSD. Others were given no time to explain themselves and simply executed on the spot. The local population exploited the tense situation to settle personal vendettas against individuals and families by denouncing debtors, love rivals, or those with whom they'd had an argument.

The executions often took place within the context of joint operations usually involving ECOMOG and CDF-Kamajor forces. After ECOMOG identified suspected rebels or collaborators, they were frequently handed over to and executed by the CDF-Kamajors. Also, members of local, unarmed, civil defense units (CDUs), who during the offensive and its aftermath helped to man checkpoints around the city, frequently played a part in identifying rebels and their collaborators.

Dwight

Dwight, twenty-five, lived underneath the Aberdeen Bridge and described witnessing scores of executions, mostly of young men, by ECOMOG soldiers. He recounted:

From where I lived you could see everything. The first time I ever saw a public execution was on January 7, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. I saw Captain Evil Spirit and his boys [soldiers] marching seven young men in their underwear down to the bridge and then as they got closer I recognized several of them to be people from the neighborhood. I saw my friend Ismael and several more. Some of them were the sons of former SLA soldiers and had been living in Murray Town Barracks. Evil did the firing and then the SSD men threw the bodies over the bridge.

On January 8, around 10:00 am, I saw them killing fifteen prisoners. Captain Evil was there and killed some of them this time as well. On January 9 I saw them kill two people and on January 10 I saw them kill a man who had a bullet in his foot. I heard later he was accused of being a rebel and had been brought to Captain Evil by one of the CDU people manning checkpoints in town.¹¹¹ On January 11, we buried sixteen corpses which we fished out of the water underneath the bridge.

On January 14 at around 3:00 p.m. the ECOMOG soldiers brought a big group of prisoners; they were eighteen in number. I saw them [the prisoners] get down from a truck and walk them down to the bridge where the same ten soldiers executed them and threw them over. We were later told they were rebels who'd been captured in the east [of Freetown].

Every day they [the soldiers] killed people—two, three, four a day. We feared that man, Evil. He never gave anybody a chance to explain... some people even called him "Captain No Explain." There was a man from our neighborhood who was caught by him. I was told the other ECOMOGs tried to convince Evil that he was a boy from the neighborhood but he wouldn't listen and killed him anyway. The boy was an only child and his mother went crazy. A few times we saw her go to Evil's house and ask to see him. She started screaming, "You, I want you to kill me too... you've killed my only son. You show me where you've buried my boy."¹¹²

Hassan

Hassan, twenty-nine, who also lived underneath Aberdeen Bridge, witnessed both ECOMOG soldiers and CDF-Kamajor militias killing suspected rebels. He recounted:

¹¹¹The civil defense units are unarmed units made up of local civilians. The CDUs were set up following the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998 which ousted the AFRC/RUF junta and restored elected President Tejan Kabbah to power.

¹¹²Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 7, 1999.

The first time I saw the executions was on January 7 at around 3:00 p.m. I saw eight people being brought down from the guardroom [a checkpoint near the bridge] with their hands tied behind them. They were marched down by two ECOMOGs, Captain Evil Spirit, and another one. But it was Evil who did the firing.

Over the next several weeks I saw them kill at least forty people. And there were a lot more done at night that I couldn't see. It was always the same thing; you'd hear people screaming and begging "no don't kill me, I beg," and then in less than five minutes you'd hear shots and then the splash as they threw them into the bay. And then we'd see their bodies floating in the water the next morning. I buried at least nineteen bodies between January 8 to 22.

I also saw about eight Kamajors execute people on three different days. The first time they killed two people, the second time five people, and the third time ten people. A few ECOMOGs were with them but it was the Kamajors who were in charge of the executions.¹¹³

Tamba

Tamba, forty-five, described witnessing the execution of at least fifty rebels, some wounded, when ECOMOG soldiers stormed Connaught Hospital on January 11. The rebels, who had been occupying the hospital since they entered the city on January 6, were largely caught by surprise. Tamba described how the rebels tried frantically to escape, how hospital personnel were made to identify their rebel patients, and how all those they identified were later executed:

There was a lot of gunfire, and as the rumors about ECOMOG started flying the rebels in the hospital started panicking. Both the wounded ones and the others who'd been hiding in the hospital striped off their fatigues and tried to get away.

A group of about twenty started demanding gauze and tape and then wrapped their arms and feet to try to make it look like they were wounded. Then they slipped out the back entrance to the hospital. After walking a block up Liverpool Street they ran straight into a group of advancing ECOMOG troops who opened up on them; right on the spot. At about the same time I saw a rebel "wife" searching frantically for a wheelchair to move her wounded rebel boyfriend; they got it as well, not far from the first group.

Then, as this was going on, another group of about fifteen—they were hiding near the stairwell under ward ten—started putting white cotton into their noses, and then slipped through the back door and went into the morgue to hide among the corpses. A few minutes later, I think it was around 11:30 a.m., the ECOMOG soldiers rushed into the hospital from several directions. They had their guns out and were pointing and asking all of us to identify ourselves. Someone alerted them about the group that had gone into the morgue and three of them rushed in and started shooting and screaming, "so you're dead— well now you're going to be dead twice."

By this time the ECOMOGs had identified who the hospital staff were and told them they had information there were rebels hiding among the patients and they told them [the hospital workers] to identify which were rebels and which were real patients. So three ECOMOGs, and a few CDUs [civil defense unit members], went from ward to ward, telling the hospital workers to identify the rebels.

Most of the patients weren't killed in their beds; they had the CDUs pull the patients from their beds and drag them to the entrance to the outpatient ward. That's where they killed them. They dragged out one rebel from ward one, four from ward three, four from ward five, and four from the OPD [outpatient department]. And then they shot all thirteen of them.

All of the ECOMOG soldiers took part in the killing. They even killed a small rebel who looked to be about eight and another one who was about thirteen. A few of them tried to surrender. I heard one rebel scream, "I beg you, don't shoot me wait, I'll talk." but they killed them anyway. They even killed some behind the wards and in front of the entrance to the hospital.

¹¹³Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

Anyway, there were a lot of dead rebels that day. I watched as they kept bringing all the bodies into the morgue. I must have counted at least sixty. Even some of the patients were telling the ECOMOGs where the rebels were hiding.¹¹⁴

Moses

Moses, thirty-two, saw a husband and wife pulled out of a line at a checkpoint and executed, after a civilian accused them of being rebels. He recounted:

On January 25, I was waiting in line at a checkpoint near the Congo Cross Bridge with about 200 other people. I was about forty yards back when all of a sudden this woman coming from the other direction starts pointing her finger at another woman, who I later recognized as a friend of mine named Ami, and started screaming, "She's a rebel, I know her, I saw her armed, she's a rebel."

The ECOMOG soldiers then pulled Ami out of the line, who by this time was denying the accusation. But the accuser continued screaming very convincingly that she'd seen Ami armed in Kissy earlier in the month. And then at about this time Ami's husband walked from the back of the line and tried to defend his wife saying it was all a misunderstanding. But the ECOMOG soldiers just pushed both of them to one side and started slapping them. They asked them a few questions, but that woman was accusing them the whole time.

Then about ten minutes after the accusation was made, the ECOMOG officer, he had three stripes [a sergeant rank], gave the command that Ami and her husband should be executed. When they heard this, they started crying and begging, but the soldiers pulled them away from the line, pulled their clothes off, took them to the side of the bridge and shot them. The one who'd ordered it didn't kill them. He just watched. And then he ordered them buried right there.

We heard later from Ami's father who was also in the line, that the accuser had been an old girlfriend of one of Ami's past boyfriends and that they'd never liked each other. Ami's father complained to the ECOMOG people, but by then it was too late.¹¹⁵

Bintu

Bintu, twenty-nine, was nearly executed on January 22 after being unable to verify her identity. She recounted:

I was walking home with my four children when I was stopped and searched at the checkpoint near the Aberdeen Bridge. They asked me where I was coming from and I told them the truth, that I'd been living with a friend of my husband's named Isaac. So, they sent a soldier to check out my story and he came back a few minutes later with Isaac who denied that he knew me. I think he was so traumatized by everything and was just afraid.

The soldiers at the checkpoint then took me to see "Captain Evil Spirit." The soldiers handed him my ID, explained the case and asked Isaac if he knew me, to which he replied, "no" and then Evil said, "well, take this lady for execution." The "trial" lasted three minutes and that was it.

I started screaming, my children started screaming, I begged for my life saying there was no one to take care of my children, I told them it was a mistake, that it wasn't fair and then one of the ECOMOG soldiers hit me on the head with his gun and I started bleeding. And then they started leading me down to the bridge.

A few minutes later one of the ECOMOGs suddenly ran down after us shouting, "leave her, one of her children confirmed the story, don't shoot her." Then the other soldier walked me back up and as I was gathering up my things, another soldier tied up Isaac and shoved him in the back of a pickup. As I was fleeing we heard shots and they saw his body floating in the bay the next day.

¹¹⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 6, 1999.

¹¹⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

Whenever I see Isaac's family I don't know what to say. It wasn't my fault. I don't know why he denied he knew me. I think about it every day and feel broken inside.¹¹⁶

Abu

Abu, eleven, witnessed his mother being executed by an armed SSD policeman after a neighbor with whom they had a business dispute accused her of being a rebel. He recounted:

A few days before it happened my mom had a terrible argument with a guy named Francis over some goods that had gone missing. He accused my mom and our friend Foday of having taken the goods.

At noon on the day it happened, an SSD man and an ECOMOG soldier came and arrested Foday and my mom, and accusing all of us, even me, of being a rebel. Francis was there the whole time, accusing us as well. The SSD man started threatening us and saying "today your life is over, even you small boy; small boys like you even kill our officers."

The community chief tried to help us but an hour later the SSD man and an ECOMOG man took Foday away to the wharf and I saw from a distance I saw the SSD man shot him. The chief finally convinced them to release my mom but as we were walking back I saw Francis and the SSD man talking secretly and then the SSD man said he wanted my mom to walk towards the wharf. My mom got scared and started to run away from them and the SSD man just shot her. Three times he shot her.

That man came back here a few weeks ago and I started yelling at him and said "you, you're the one who killed my mother." He slapped me and told me to "shut up." He's training to be in the new Sierra Leonean army now, so we haven't seen him.¹¹⁷

Helen

Helen, nineteen, witnessed the killing of her friend by a CDF-Kamajor on January 24. She said:

Early in the morning six of us, including my friend Fatmata, went in search of firewood. The situation was still very tense. About thirty minutes later we were stopped by a checkpoint manned by two Sierra Leonean soldiers and two Kamajors.

They started accusing us of being rebels and ordered us at gunpoint to lie face down on the ground. They started insulting us and gave us a real beating. They hardly asked us any questions and just had it in their mind that we were rebels.

Then the Sierra Leonean soldier told Ali, the one man in our group, that they were going to kill him, and fired a shot near his legs. We started begging and telling them we were innocent and then Fati just jumped up and ran to hide in a house about twenty yards away.

One of the Kamajors followed her to the house and ordered her to come out. He threatened to kill her and I guess the lady inside convinced Fati to come out. But as soon as she did the Kamajor just opened up on her. As I was lying on the ground I watched as he just fired and fired and fired. He shot her more than ten times.¹¹⁸

Daniel

Daniel, forty-one, witnessed the killing of seven civilians inside the Jami Ul-Masjid mosque, after an ECOMOG officer ordered their execution. He explained :

¹¹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

¹¹⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 14, 1999.

¹¹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 19, 1999.

On Monday January 18, ECOMOG came to liberate the area. They told the eighty or so civilians inside to leave which all but about ten of us did. It was still very tense. The advancing troops had left eight ECOMOG soldiers in the mosque and they deployed up the tower and around the grounds.

At 6:15 a.m. the next morning, one of the soldiers deployed downstairs went upstairs and as he did there was the sound of a shot. Everyone ran to see what happened and found him lying slumped on the stairs. The stairs were very narrow and blocked with peoples' bags, and the other soldiers surmised that his gun had accidentally gone off as he was climbing up. The other soldiers pulled him down and got on the radio to inform their superiors what'd happened.

Shortly before 9:00 a.m., a lieutenant and captain entered; I could tell by the marks on their uniform. They asked for an explanation and both the soldiers and a few of the civilians told them and showed them the cartridge which they'd found under the stairs. The officers went to inspect the site to see if anyone could've shot him but since the place is in a stairwell surrounded by thick walls, the lieutenant concluded "it must've been the gun that went off," and everybody agreed. Then they left.

And then, not eight minutes later, another officer accompanied by at least eighty soldiers came in and deployed everywhere. By this time all the civilians, there were nine of them, were sitting near where Muslims wash their feet. So the officer in charge—I couldn't see what rank he was because he was wearing green overalls, but he was about forty, had a walkie-talkie and was obviously the man in charge—asked angrily who the soldiers deployed there were.

Several of the new soldiers started accusing the civilians of having killed the soldier and the soldiers who were deployed there started saying, "no, it was an accident." Then the big man ordered that the original lot be disarmed and said, "why are you protecting these people and hiding their act," and as they were being disarmed turned to the civilians and said "we're going to kill all of these people." He then ordered the first one to stand and told a soldier to shoot him. They he told everyone else to lie down which they did. I could hear them praying to Mohammed, to Jesus. They didn't ask for an explanation and blocked the entrance so no one could run and then they shot every one of them. It wasn't five minutes from the time that officer came into the mosque until he ordered them to die. He stormed out taking the disarmed soldiers with him. It was so unfair. I don't know what was wrong with that man.

A few minutes later a few ECOMOG soldiers from the first group came back. They were really upset. I heard them say, "why did he do this—we didn't come to Sierra Leone to kill innocent people."¹¹⁹

ECOMOG military officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch said they took between 200 and 300 RUF rebels as prisoners of war during the January 1999 offensive, and that throughout the offensive they strictly followed the procedures established in the Geneva Conventions and acted in accordance with international humanitarian law on the taking of prisoners and other military conduct of war.¹²⁰

According to Lt. Col. Chris Olukolade, the chief military information officer of ECOMOG, no soldiers or officers have been formally investigated or court martialed as a result of their conduct during the January offensive. He said, "within ECOMOG there is an internal mechanism set up for the investigation of violations of international humanitarian law, and although we've heard of individual complaints, none have been sufficient enough to activate this mechanism."¹²¹

Colonel Buhari Musa, the commander of the Freetown garrison under whose jurisdiction most of Freetown, including the Aberdeen Bridge, falls, said there have been a few lower level investigations of executions following complaints by members of the public, but that the allegations were proven to be baseless and subsequently dropped. He said, "I heard about the allegations of executions and I took it up. There have been a few investigations into accusations of summary executions having been committed by soldiers under my command, which have been conducted at the brigade level, but we didn't find anything

¹¹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 20, 1999.

¹²⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Colonel Buhari Musa, commander Freetown garrison, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

¹²¹Human Rights Watch phone interview, Lt. Colonel Chris Olukolade, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

substantial. There have been no formal inquiries or disciplinary actions taken against any soldier or officers under my command as a result of the what took place during the January rebel offensive."¹²²

Following a United Nations report in February 1999 which expressed concern about summary executions, the ECOMOG high command indicated to the U.N. secretary-general's special representative in Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo, "their intention to investigate these allegations and to take corrective action as necessary."¹²³ In April, the ECOMOG force commander Felix Mujakperuo established a Civil/Military Relations Committee to investigate allegations of human rights violations against individual members of ECOMOG and CDF and recommend appropriate action to the high authorities.¹²⁴ However, the start date for complaints to be investigated is April 1, thus none of the executions committed in January and February will be eligible for investigation under this committee.

Looting and Brutality

Witnesses, particularly from the eastern suburbs of Kissy, Wellington, and Calaba Town observed CDF-Kamajor fighters looting property from the homes of civilians who had fled to get away from the fighting. Thousands of civilians had fled from the eastern areas to take shelter in the homes of relatives and in camps of displaced people, leaving entire neighborhoods largely unoccupied. Witnesses described the CDF-Kamajors going into these areas ostensibly to search and secure them, but then leaving with bundles of clothes, electrical items, radios, and other items. Once civilians reoccupied their homes, the looting decreased significantly.

ECOMOG, CDF-Kamajors, and SSD police in charge of manning the many checkpoints in Freetown were accused of using extreme brutality against the civilian population. Witnesses described people being slapped, pushed, humiliated, and forced to do painful physical exercises as "punishment" for such insignificant "offenses" such as not waiting one's turn in line, not answering questions in sufficient detail, or riding a bike through a checkpoint.

There were reports of mistreatment by ECOMOG soldiers of members of some international nongovernmental organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were accused of being rebel collaborators. Members of ECOMOG confiscated property, including vehicles and radios, and several ICRC expatriate staff were deported after being detained and interrogated.

Detention

Social workers for local humanitarian organizations have documented the mistreatment of suspected child rebels while in the custody of both ECOMOG and CDF-Kamajors. One international NGO received reports of "several" children being beaten while in ECOMOG's Wilberforce Barracks during the months of January and February. A local NGO documented the physical abuse of over thirty street children suspected of being rebel collaborators, both during capture by ECOMOG and Sierra Leonean Police and while in detention in Wilberforce Barracks.

Local social workers also expressed concern about the periodic detention of children and adults by the Kamajor Civil Defense Forces. The Kamajors don't have an official barracks or military headquarters, and have adopted a local hotel as their base, the Bookfields Hotel in central Freetown. It is within this hotel that several witnesses reported to Human Rights Watch seeing detainees held by the Kamajors. As the detentions are not officially acknowledged, they are not subject to governmental regulations and monitoring. They are also illegal.

Execution of a Journalist

There is a highly reliable report of the killing by ECOMOG forces of a journalist named Abdul Jumah Jalloh, who at the time worked for an independent newspaper, the *African Champion*. According to an investigation carried out by the Sierra Leonean Union of Journalists, Mr. Jalloh was publicly accused of being an RUF rebel by a member of a civil defense unit, who then alerted a patrol of ECOMOG soldiers. Mr. Jalloh identified himself as a journalist and produced his press identification card,

¹²²Human Rights Watch interview, Colonel Buhari Musa, commander Freetown garrison, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

¹²³*Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, March 4, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/237, p.7.

¹²⁴The membership in the committee includes representatives of the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, the Bar Association, the police, the media, civil society and the governments. UNOMSIL participates in an observer capacity.

but was later taken to a checkpoint near State House and subsequently executed. His death, which occurred in the last week of January, was denounced by his editor, Mohamed Koroma, who was with him at the time of his detention, and who has since left the country. Human Rights Watch has been unable to find a direct witness to this killing.

Failure to Minimize Civilian Casualties

Joseph

Civilians making up part of a human shield often described feeling surprised when ECOMOG either opened fire on them or bombed them from the air. Joseph, a thirty-five-year-old man, who on January 7 was forced by the RUF rebels to walk down Wilberforce Street as part of a human shield, described his confusion when they were later bombed by an ECOMOG jet:

I was one of several hundred civilians; we'd all been ordered out of our houses at gunpoint and forced to join in a march. They made us put white bands around our heads and told us to shout "we want peace, we want peace" as we walked down the street. The rebels really wanted to infiltrate the west of the city and I later thought their plan had been to use the big "peace march" to break into the west.

When the jets passed over of course we saw them, of course we heard them, but we just never, never thought they would drop those bombs. There were so many of us and even though they were flying fast, they passed at least three times and it must've been obvious we were civilians. When the rebels ran for cover I thought it was because they didn't want ECOMOG to see them. I just didn't think it was because they were going to bomb us.¹²⁵

Brig.-Gen. Maxwell Khobe, a Nigerian seconded to be the Sierra Leonean chief of defense staff, stated to journalists on February 2, 1999 that rebels had managed to enter Freetown in January only because they had used civilians as human shields. He said, "from hindsight, I believe it would have been better to kill all those that have come, even if they were civilians, in order save the majority. That was not done, and that was what was responsible for the entire thing that took place in Freetown." He said that in the future ECOMOG commanders have issued new "shoot the shields" orders and that, "if they try it again, we'll kill everything from the opposite direction."¹²⁶

Colonel Buhari Musa, commander of the Freetown garrison described the difficulty his soldiers faced when fighting an "unorthodox force" who often don't wear uniforms or have any special markings to distinguish them from the civilian population. He said "it's difficult for us to say what are the criteria for identification; both males and females, young and old are combatants. It is difficult and unfortunate. But sometimes you just have to fight and in such situations you will see that some lives are lost. It is unfortunate for whoever is the victim. But we tell our soldiers that everybody, even they have a right to their lives."¹²⁷

International humanitarian law forbids the use of human shields, but also requires that combatants minimize civilian casualties at all times, even if the civilian population is being used as a shield. Attacks on legitimate military targets are limited by the principle of proportionality as set out in Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, article 51. The attacker must choose a means of attack that avoids or minimizes damage to civilians, and in particular should refrain from launching an attack if the expected civilian casualties would outweigh the importance of the military target to the attackers.

VI. CHILDREN AS VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

During the January rebel incursion children were the victims of serious abuses committed by all parties to the conflict. They were not spared from any class of abuse and were, in some cases, purposefully targeted because of their age.

¹²⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 28, 1999.
¹²⁶Nigerian newspaper report posted to "Sierra Leone Web," February 3, 1999. Available at <www.sierraleone.org>.
¹²⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 11, 1999.

Some of the atrocities committed by the RUF rebels were unthinkable. Infants and children were thrown into burning houses, the hands of toddlers as young as two were severed with machetes, girls as young as eight were sexually abused, and hundreds of children of all ages were traumatically separated from their communities and forced to walk into the hills with strangers whom they had seen kill their family members.

In some cases children, many of them originally abductees, participated in the perpetration of these abuses. Child combatants armed with pistols, rifles, and machetes actively participated in killings and massacres, severed the arms of other children, and beat and humiliated men old enough to be their grandfathers. Often under the influence of drugs, they were known and feared for their impetuosity, lack of control, and brutality.

In some cases, ECOMOG and government forces summarily executed rebel child combatants and suspected collaborators they had captured; other children suffered physical abuse while in detention. Some child soldiers were beaten to death after being caught by members of local communities.

As children abducted by the rebels in January have been released or managed to escape, they have described the process of psychological and physical formation used to turn victim into perpetrator. They described a life of physical hardship, forced labor, substance abuse, and military training. In Freetown, parents speak of their frustration and guilt at their inability to protect their children.

For those hundreds of children who witnessed family members murdered in front of them, were forced to watch as a mother or sister was raped, or had to leave a wounded relative behind in a burning house, the events of January 1999 have no doubt produced deep psychological scars they will live with for the rest of their lives.

Two civilians, Adama and Zainab, expressed the ambivalence civilians have about the role of child combatants. On the one hand they are feared and misunderstood, and on the other, pitied as victims themselves.

Adama

Adama, a forty-two year old secretary, described the horror and fear adults felt at seeing children carry out terrible atrocities:

We feared them. They were cruel and hard hearted; even more than the adults. They don't know what is sympathy; what is good and bad. If you beg an older one you may convince him to spare you, but the younger ones, they don't know what is sympathy, what is mercy. Those who have been rebels for so long have never learned it.

Once, a rebel, a small boy in full combats, he couldn't have been more than twelve, called everyone out of the house across the street. The papa of the family, Pa Kamara, said, "please my son, leave my family," but the boy said, "listen, we can do anything we want in Freetown. We don't have mothers, we don't have fathers. We can do anything we wanna do." And that is how Pa Kamara died; the rebel boy shot him, in front of his wife, his children, his grandchildren. They are wicked, those boy soldiers. They spare no human life.¹²⁸

Zainab

Zainab, a twenty-four old market vendor, on the other hand, found that she could pity a child exhausted by combat:

Late one evening, a ten-year-old with a pistol came, alone, into our house. He told my husband his commander was hungry and wanted one of our chickens. While my husband was catching the hen, that boy sat down to wait. He was thin and exhausted. I brought him a biscuit and water. He said he was tired and weak and as he left with the chicken turned to me and said, "thank you, mam."

Later my neighbors criticized me for giving him that biscuit. I said I didn't care if he was a rebel or not. He's still somebody's child. Maybe he was abducted. God knows what they've done to him. I wanted to hide that boy and take him with us as we fled and just knew he would've come with us if he'd had the chance. I could see he wasn't happy.¹²⁹

¹²⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 20, 1999.

¹²⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 14, 1999.

VII. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Since the beginning of the conflict in 1991, the plight of civilians in Sierra Leone has had to compete with the other refugee-related emergencies on the African continent and elsewhere for the attention of the international community. Insofar as Sierra Leone has attracted international interest, attention has focused on the humanitarian needs of the displaced—or on the protection of mining concerns in Sierra Leone's diamond fields. As one human rights worker observed in 1998, "half the battle [has been] keeping Sierra Leone on the world's radar screen."¹³⁰ The January 1999 RUF occupation of Freetown brought more condemnation from the international community, but little more action. Only Sierra Leone's West African neighbors, in particular Nigeria, have put substantial resources into an attempt to keep the peace and restore respect for human rights and the rule of law.¹³¹ It is to be hoped that the visit of U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson to Sierra Leone in June 1999 will contribute to a reversal of this neglect.

ECOWAS, ECOMOG, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

In accordance with bilateral security accords, Nigerian and Guinean forces from ECOMOG have been stationed in Sierra Leone since 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government fight the RUF rebels. After the May 25, 1997 military coup of the AFRC, and its establishment of a coalition government with RUF rebels, hundreds of additional Nigerian soldiers assigned to ECOMOG in Liberia moved to Sierra Leone to defend the Freetown airport from attack. The Nigerian troops attempted to take Freetown itself, but were forced to withdraw. On June 26, 1997, ministers of foreign affairs from ECOWAS countries, supported by the OAU, demanded the reinstatement of the elected government of President Tejan Kabbah and formed a ministerial committee to monitor the situation in Sierra Leone. When negotiations with the new rulers in Sierra Leone collapsed, ECOWAS imposed an almost total embargo on Sierra Leone, enforced by the Nigerian navy, which was later reinforced by an October 1997 U.N. Security Council global arms and oil embargo and restrictions on international travel by families of the rebel leaders.¹³²

With the failure of diplomatic efforts for the restoration of peace and the reinstatement of the Kabbah government, ECOMOG's mandate was changed from sanction enforcement to actual military intervention to oust the rebel government. In February 1998, ECOMOG drove the AFRC/RUF forces away from the capital city of Freetown and reinstated President Kabbah, though it could not reestablish government control over the whole country; thus allowing the RUF resurgence and attack on Freetown in January 1999. ECOMOG now maintains security in and around Freetown, and has been able to expand its control to some other areas, although the rebels maintain their grip on much of the country.

Presently the ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone is led by Nigerian Major-General Felix Mujakperuo (who assumed command in March 1999) and is composed of approximately 14,000 troops, predominantly Nigerian, with Ghanian, Malian, and Guinean support. The cost of maintaining the troops is being borne mostly by Nigeria (which is allegedly spending approximately U.S.\$1 million daily) and the other states that have contributed troops.¹³³

In addition to its peacekeeping role, ECOMOG's mandate also includes the implementation of a program for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (the DDR program), and training the new Sierra Leone army. Although ECOMOG has stated that the new army will be ethnically and regionally balanced,¹³⁴ there is also a need to underscore the importance for UNOMSIL to provide assistance and closely monitor the disarmament, demobilization, and training processes to assure that the new army is founded upon principles of respect for international humanitarian law.

¹³⁰Human Rights Watch interview, relief organization representative, Freetown, June 24, 1998.

¹³¹Nigerian support, through ECOMOG, for President Tejan Kabbah was perhaps motivated partly by domestic politics and by the desire of former military ruler Gen. Sani Abacha to gain credit on the international stage in the face of condemnation of his own dictatorial regime. Nevertheless, and although the ECOMOG intervention has been neither as effective nor as respectful for human rights on its own account as Sierra Leoneans would wish, it is undoubtedly true that the situation for many Sierra Leoneans has been significantly ameliorated by the presence of the ECOMOG forces.

¹³²See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition or Travesty," pp.38-41, for a discussion of the Nigerian role in the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone.

¹³³InterPress Service, May 31, 1999.

¹³⁴Press conference led by Brig. Gen. Maxwell Khobe, Wilberforce military base, June 25, 1998, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

On the humanitarian front, ECOWAS and the OAU have been consistent in their condemnation of the atrocities of the rebels. For example, in December 1998, the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee on Sierra Leone issued a communiqué deploring the torture, mutilations, amputations, and mass killings of innocent civilians. In March 1999, Salim Ahmed Salim, the secretary-general of the OAU, delivered a report to a session of the Council of Ministers, in which he condemned the January offensive on Freetown by the rebels. The OAU also reaffirmed its absolute support for the efforts of ECOWAS and ECOMOG.

ECOWAS has played an important role in facilitating peace negotiations between the RUF leaders and representatives of the government of President Kabbah, which are taking place in Togo, whose president is the current chair of ECOWAS.

The United Nations

The United Nations' initial reaction to the 1997 military coup by the Armed Forces Ruling Council was to condemn it and to place sanctions against the government formed by the rebels. The United Nations Security Council commended ECOWAS on its efforts to restore the ousted government of President Tejan Kabbah and urged member states to assist ECOMOG with financial and logistical support. It also condemned the atrocities perpetrated by the rebels, in particular against women and children.¹³⁵ The Security Council also made the determination that the crisis in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and that it would remain actively seized of the matter.

In July 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), increasing the United Nations' military observer presence already in the country from approximately ten to seventy officers, along with civilian support and medical staff. UNOMSIL's mandate includes responsibility for monitoring and helping ECOMOG with the implementation of a program for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants (the DDR program); reporting on the security situation; monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization sites; and advising the government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment, and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies.¹³⁶

As RUF forces approached Freetown in late December 1998, the U.N. and other international agencies and foreign governments began withdrawing their staff from the country. On January 6, as the rebels entered the city, UNOMSIL completed its evacuation.¹³⁷ The relocation to Conakry, the capital of neighboring Guinea, was followed by a substantial reduction in the number of staff, in particular military and civilian police. On March 3, the decision was made to allow the return of a limited number of staff to Freetown.¹³⁸

On June 4, 1999, the U.N. secretary-general released his sixth report on UNOMSIL. The report noted a resurgence in rebel atrocities against civilians in recent months; the secretary-general's fifth report, issued in March, described similar atrocities committed during the rebel invasion and occupation of Freetown in January. Both reports also noted serious allegations that members of ECOMOG and the CDF had carried out summary executions of suspected rebels. The secretary-general described the worsening of an already desperate humanitarian situation across much of the country, noting that 2.6 million Sierra Leoneans, nearly half the population, were out of reach of humanitarian agencies, and that even where there was access, humanitarian efforts were still unable to reach all those in need.

The secretary-general also noted that ECOMOG had confirmed the involvement of the governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso in the shipment and delivery of arms to the forces of the RUF. Accordingly, the secretary-general had proposed the deployment of ECOMOG troops and U.N. personnel along the Sierra Leone border. Welcoming the proposal in principle, the

¹³⁵United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, October 8, 1997, U.N. document S/RES/1132 (1997).

¹³⁶United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181, July 13, 1998, U.N. document S/RES/1181 (1998) (sponsored by the U.K.).

¹³⁷*Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, January 7, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/20, section II.

¹³⁸*Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, March 4, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/237, paragraph 6.

executive secretary of ECOWAS had responded that U.N. logistical support would be necessary, including helicopters, communications, and ground transportation.

As of June 4, 1999, UNOMSIL consisted of twenty-four military observers, including two medical personnel, as well as twenty-nine international and twenty-four national staff members. The secretary-general's sixth report stated that it was planned to deploy additional observers up to the maximum of seventy set by U.N. Security Council resolution 1181 of July 13, 1998, to increase the civilian staff by two political officers, and to restore the human rights section to its previous staffing level of five persons. The secretary-general drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, depending on the progress of the peace talks, it might well be necessary to deploy "a sizeable number of infantry and other observers, along with the necessary equipment and military logistical support," if the U.N. were to deploy effectively to assist in the implementation of an eventual peace agreement.¹³⁹ The secretary-general also "envisage[d] a significant expansion of the civilian personnel, including those engaged in political, human rights and logistical support functions."¹⁴⁰ On June 11, 1999, the Security Council extended the mission of UNOMSIL for a further six months, until December 13, 1999.¹⁴¹

The Sierra Leone Contact Group

In July 1998, a Sierra Leone Contact Group was established, following a special conference on Sierra Leone held at U.N. headquarters in New York. The first meeting of the Contact Group, chaired by the United Kingdom, took place on November 5, 1998, with objectives "to build up support for Sierra Leone's efforts to restore peace, democracy and human rights; to encourage further assistance to ECOMOG and contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone; to try to match specific ECOMOG requirements to donor offers; and to encourage the Government of Sierra Leone to develop political dialogue and national reconciliation beyond the programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and to encourage participation in it."¹⁴² The meeting expressed strong support for a "dual track" approach endorsed by the ECOWAS summit held in October, "by which efforts to strengthen ECOMOG would be accompanied by the opening of dialogue to achieve lasting peace and national reconciliation."¹⁴³

On April 4, 1999, the Contact Group held its second meeting, attended by representatives of twenty-two countries, the U.N., ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the European Commission, the Commonwealth, the World Bank and IMF, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and once again reaffirmed support for the "dual track" approach and for the 1996 Abidjan Accord as a framework for a negotiated settlement. The group condemned atrocities committed by the rebels, called on all sides to investigate abuses, and expressed concern at support coming to the RUF through Liberia and Burkina Faso.¹⁴⁴

The United Kingdom, European Union, and United States

The United Kingdom has provided more assistance to the ECOMOG and Sierra Leonean government forces than any other government from outside the region, and has also been the largest national donor to Sierra Leone of reconstruction aid and humanitarian assistance, committing more than £30-million in total to Sierra Leone since the restoration of President Kabbah in March 1998.¹⁴⁵ The assistance the U.K. has provided has included training and equipment for a new Sierra Leonean army.

The U.K.'s record on Sierra Leone has been tarnished by the government's handling of contacts between the government of President Kabbah and a U.K.-based private security company, Sandline International, during 1997 and 1998, which included

¹³⁹*Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, June 4, 1999), U.N. document S/1999/645, paragraph 55.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, paragraph 57.

¹⁴¹United Nations Security Council Resolution 1245, June 11, 1999, U.N. document [S/RES/1245(1999)].

¹⁴²*Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone* (New York: United Nations, December 16, 1998), U.N. document S/1998/1176, paragraph 8.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, paragraph 9.

¹⁴⁴Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Sierra Leone Contact Group Meeting: Chairman's Concluding Statement* (London, April 19, 1999).

¹⁴⁵Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Statement on Sierra Leone* (Private Notice Question Answered by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Robin Cook, House of Commons, London January 1, 1999), and Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Cook Welcomes Nigerian Support for Peace in Sierra Leone* (Edited transcript of Press Conference by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, Nigerian Head of State General Abubakar and President Kabbah of Sierra Leone, Abuja, Nigeria, March 9, 1999).

the supply of a shipment of arms to Sierra Leone in late February 1998 in breach of the U.N. arms embargo (which applied to government as well as rebel forces). In February 1999, the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a report, itself based on an investigation ordered by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and carried out by Sir Thomas Legg Q.C. Both the Legg report and the Foreign Affairs Committee were highly critical of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the foreign secretary, though they concluded that the violation of the embargo was due to incompetence and mismanagement rather than intent.

According to the U.S., its policy towards the crisis in Sierra Leone is designed to achieve four goals: increase international support for ECOMOG; help ECOWAS leaders coordinate a negotiated settlement; curtail external support for the rebel forces; and provide humanitarian relief. To that end, the U.S. provided U.S.\$3.9 million in equipment and logistical support to ECOMOG, and contributed over U.S.\$55 million in humanitarian assistance in 1998. In 1999 it committed U.S.\$5 million for logistical support and medical supplies and planned to seek approval for a further U.S.\$5.8 million from Congress.¹⁴⁶ In May 1999, the U.S. government promised to double its commitments to assist ECOMOG and the Sierra Leonean Government.¹⁴⁷ The U.S. has also condemned external support for the rebels from Liberia. However, in a letter dated February 4, 1999 sent by seven members of the U.S. Congress to President Clinton, the members expressed dismay by the limited U.S. support for the efforts of ECOMOG.¹⁴⁸

Through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the E.U. has been an important donor of non-food humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, having contributed over 20 million ECUs (over U.S.\$22 million) by 1998, mostly to support the activities of international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In November 1998, the E.U. made a grant of 860,000 ECU to the OAU partly to support any post-conflict reconstruction that it undertakes in Sierra Leone. In April 1999, the E.U. approved Euro 5 million to cover emergency aid for displaced persons in Sierra Leone (and Guinea). The E.U. states that it has given Sierra Leone more than 111 million ECUs (U.S. \$140 million) in emergency aid and for reconstruction of infrastructure and rehabilitation of victims of the war.¹⁴⁹

The Commonwealth

The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), formed in November 1995 at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Auckland, New Zealand, has consistently followed the situation in Sierra Leone, condemning the 1997 military coup and suspending the right of the junta to participate in Commonwealth debates until the restoration of President Kabbah. CMAG has also denounced atrocities committed against civilians by the rebels. Since the restoration of President Kabbah, the Commonwealth has assisted with the reorganization and training of the Sierra Leone police force, together with UNOMSIL civilian police advisers.

¹⁴⁶U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan E. Rice speech to the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, March 23, 1999.

¹⁴⁷The U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs, Ambassador Thomas Pickering, made this pledge to the Nigerian President on May 5, 1999.

¹⁴⁸The letter was signed by Alcee L. Hastings, Cynthia Mckinney, Eva M Clayton, Amo Houghton, Vernon Ehlers, Albert Wynn, and Tom Lantos.

¹⁴⁹DG VIII Press Releases. Confirmed by Ms. Hals (DGVIII) on May 19, 1999.

VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written and researched by Corinne Dufka, Sierra Leone researcher. Chinedu Ezetah of Davis Polk Wardwell contributed to the writing of the international legal aspects of the report. The report was edited by Bronwen Manby, legal counsel to the Africa Division; Peter Takirambudde, executive director of the Africa Division; Mike McClintock, deputy program director; Wilder Taylor, general counsel; and LaShawn Jefferson and Regan Ralph of the Women's Rights Division. Production assistance was provided by Zachary Freeman, associate for the Africa division; Patrick Minges, publications director; and Fitzroy Hopkins, mail manager.

Research for this report was conducted by Human Rights Watch during the months of April, May, and June 1999. Several hundred witnesses and victims were interviewed, within their homes and centers for the displaced, in hospitals and clinics, market places, churches, mosques, and places of work. Interviews were conducted with government and United Nations officials, journalists, human rights activists, social workers, and members of national and international nongovernmental organizations. The names of all witnesses and survivors, except where noted, have been changed in order to protect their identity and ensure their privacy.

We would also like to thank several people and organizations in Sierra Leone for their assistance given to Human Rights Watch: Helen Bash Taki from the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL), Francis Kai-Kai from the Pioneers for Development and Sanitation (PIDESU), Beatrice Parkinson from the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Isaac Lapia from Amnesty International, Muctarr Jalloh from Murray Town Camp, The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR), Network Movement for Justice and Development, Médecins Sans Frontières, UNOMSIL, particularly the members of the Human Rights Section, UNICEF, Handicap International, the staff at Connaught Hospital, the members of the Sierra Leone Human Rights Committee, and lastly, and especially to so many people who were willing to relive their pain to tell their story.

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The fourteen-year-old boy on the right was shot four times by Revolutionary United Front rebels and is now paralyzed from the waist down. The rebels gathered up everyone in his house and opened fire on them. Three of his family members were killed and several others wounded. He is now living in a camp for the displaced. The man on the left lost his leg to a gunshot wound.

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199	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror, Atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone," Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) July 1998.

4890

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SOWING TERROR

1630 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
TEL (202) 612-4821
FAX (202) 612-4835
E-mail: hrw@hhrw.org

33 Islington High Street
London N1 9LH UK
TEL (44171) 713-1995
FAX (44171) 713-1800
E-mail: hrwatchuk@gn.apc.org

15 Rue Van Campenhout
1000 Brussels, Belgium
TEL (322) 732-2009
FAX (322) 732-0471
E-mail: hrwatcheu@skynet.be

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SOWING TERROR

Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CDFs	Civilian Defense Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
LRRRC	Liberian Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Committee
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone

I. SUMMARY

Since losing political power in February 1998, members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) have been engaging in a war of terror against civilians in Sierra Leone. With no recognizable political platform, the AFRC/RUF rebel alliance is committing widespread and egregious atrocities against unarmed civilians in an attempt to regain power. As the violence in Sierra Leone continues, grave abuses continue to take place. Human Rights Watch interviewed civilian men, women, and children who had been intentionally mutilated or shot as recently as June 12, 1998 in eastern Sierra Leone.

Many thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians have been raped; deliberately mutilated, often by amputation; or killed outright in a campaign by the AFRC/RUF between February and June 1998 alone. Men, women and children, probably numbering in the thousands, have been abducted by the AFRC/RUF for use as combatants, forced laborers, or sexual slaves. Women have been actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. Children have been targets of killings and violence and are forcibly recruited as soldiers. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, innumerable Sierra Leoneans suffer from psychological trauma due to intentionally cruel methods of inflicting harm against these individuals and their communities.

These atrocities committed against civilians are the latest cycle of violence in the armed conflict that has devastated Sierra Leone for seven years. The fighting has caused the displacement of more than a million Sierra Leoneans. Most have become internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands have fled the country as refugees, predominantly to neighboring Guinea and Liberia.

The AFRC—led by a group of military officers—took power forcibly on May 25, 1997. During the nine months it was in power, the AFRC joined forces with the armed rebel group, the RUF, to form a regime characterized by serious human rights violations and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. In February 1998, a Nigerian-led peacekeeping force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), forced the AFRC/RUF out of power and reinstated former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected president in March 1996 in the first multi-party elections for almost three decades in Sierra Leone. Since the reinstatement of Kabbah, the AFRC has joined forces with the RUF to wage a war against ECOMOG and the Kabbah government.

Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has endured a series of military regimes and rebellions in struggles over economic and political power. However, the latest round of violence is unique in the scale and grotesque nature of the attacks on civilians. Much of rural Sierra Leone is inaccessible due to the ongoing war, and information is available for the most part only through health facilities where victims seek care in Sierra Leone and through the testimonies of witnesses and survivors in neighboring Guinea and Liberia. Of the hundreds of testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch, many described situations in which the interviewee was the sole survivor among many victims. The cases reported in this document represent only a small fraction of the actual number of victims. The true number may never be known.

Human Rights Watch compiled information regarding the experiences of more than 500 survivors of atrocities committed in Sierra Leone between February and June of 1998. The vast majority of these abuses were perpetrated by members of the AFRC/RUF. Of this number, over 425 survivors of gunshot wounds, amputations and other mutilations, or rape were registered in Connaught, Magburaka, and Makeni hospitals in Sierra Leone. Approximately eighty-two survivors of the same types of abuse were identified in Guinea at Conakry, Faranah, Kissidougou, and Guéckedou hospitals during roughly the same period. In the Liberian refugee camps, Human Rights Watch interviewed victims of the conflict and former AFRC/RUF combatants living alongside one another.

Forces fighting on behalf of President Kabbah have also committed human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law. Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who support the Kabbah

government, have committed numerous abuses including indiscriminate killings and torture. These killings are on a smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF and are of a different nature: the CDFs were created in order to assure local security, and they generally limit their abuses to those they claim are AFRC/RUF combatants and to a lesser extent, those perceived as their supporters. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, have been responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government since February 1998. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors have also been responsible for obstructing humanitarian assistance and demanding money or other payment at roadblocks. There are many child soldiers among the Kamajors, and despite promises by the government to demobilize all combatants under the age of eighteen, recent reports indicate that the CDFs continue to recruit children.

According to international humanitarian groups, the shelling by ECOMOG during its assault on Freetown in early February 1998 took a high toll on civilians. ECOMOG forces have also obstructed humanitarian assistance by commandeering vehicles from aid agencies. Information from ECOMOG regarding the security situation in Sierra Leone has often been unduly positive, leading to the repatriation of refugees to unsafe areas. ECOMOG has been widely praised for ousting the AFRC/RUF and conducting itself with greater discipline than was the case in Liberia. However, international observers in Sierra Leone have expressed concerns that some members of ECOMOG may seek to prolong its mission in order to exploit the conflict for economic incentives, as was the case involving some ECOMOG contingents in Liberia.

The atrocities that drive civilians into flight are only the first chapter of hardship for many Sierra Leoneans affected by the crisis. Approximately one-quarter million Sierra Leoneans have fled to refugee camps in neighboring Guinea and Liberia to escape the abuses and fighting. The location of the camps in border areas presents problems of security for and access to the camps, which in turn have impaired assistance and protection for refugees. Security conditions in many of the camps are precarious, and humanitarian assistance has been hampered by difficult access to the camps, a lack of resources at the disposition of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and aid agencies, and in some instances, poor coordination of relief efforts.

Protecting refugees in this context remains a challenge for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. In the Guinean camps, many unaccompanied women, children, and other war victims suffer from inadequate protection. Delays in the distribution of identity cards for refugees have led to restricted movement for refugees, as well as extortion and arbitrary arrest by Guinean authorities. Despite repeated requests from UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Guinean authorities have denied access to detained asylum seekers they are holding as suspected combatants.

In the Liberian camps, the presence of former combatants among the refugee population has hampered humanitarian assistance and protection. The proximity of the camps to the fighting in Sierra Leone and the permeable nature of the Sierra Leonean-Liberian border present a clear security risk for refugees and for the delivery of aid to the Vahun camp, located eight to twelve kilometers from the border. Former combatants in the camps stated that the AFRC/RUF are taking advantage of the porous border situation to resupply and to recruit combatants. Assistance and protection has been further compromised by difficult access to the camps, the onset of the rainy season and poor road conditions, a lack of resources for UNHCR and aid groups, and an insufficiently rapid and well-coordinated effort to relocate refugees and separate combatants. The generally weak assistance and protection provided to the Vahun camp has increased tension and the risk of insecurity in the camp and its environs. By June 1998, most refugees in Vahun had received only one fourteen-day ration since their arrival in February and March.

Sierra Leone has been largely ignored by much of the international community, with the exception of those attempting to exploit its rich diamond and mineral deposits. This mix of exploitation and indifference, combined with a history of weak respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions, has repeatedly permitted military leaders to hold power and divert revenue from the mines for their own benefit. In attempts during recent years to gain

political and economic control, both government and rebel groups have sought to tip the balance of power by employing private security firms or mercenaries, often in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions.

A major challenge to the new Kabbah government will be to promote respect for the rule of law and the establishment of institutions of justice in the midst of the present public outcry for revenge and threats against those who defend the human rights of the accused. While demanding accountability for crimes committed by all sides, the Kabbah government must assure due process for the accused, especially the fifty-nine civilians currently being prosecuted for collaboration with the AFRC/RUF. These trials constitute the first major test of the justice system under Kabbah. The government has made repeated gestures in favor of human rights, such as its pledge to provide amnesty for child soldiers and to demobilize all child soldiers; it must now follow through on these commitments. In conjunction with ECOMOG, the government must also assure that the CDFs respect international humanitarian law, are demobilized as soon as possible or integrated into the new army, and are held accountable for their abuses.

In order to end the cycles of violence in Sierra Leone, perpetrators of human rights violations must be held accountable for their actions. AFRC/RUF members suspected of having committed human rights abuses and former AFRC/RUF collaborators must be given fair trials and punished according to national and international law.

Although influencing the actions of the AFRC/RUF has proven to be difficult, international pressure must be maintained to convince them to immediately cease indiscriminate killings, rape, and mutilation of civilians, the abduction of civilians, especially children, for use as soldiers, laborers, sexual slaves or other purposes, and other violations of the laws of war.

The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have condemned violations by the AFRC/RUF, undertaken high-level assessment missions, and provided humanitarian aid. Despite the blatant disregard of the AFRC/RUF for international humanitarian and human rights law, the U.S., U.K. and E.U. should continue to denounce the atrocities and seek means to stop them. This should include cutting the supply lines of the AFRC/RUF and stating unequivocally that no group or individual associated with these abuses will receive any international support. The international community should call upon the government of Liberian President Charles Taylor to immediately allow ECOMOG in Liberia to monitor the border area with Sierra Leone. This operation should be reinforced by simultaneous monitoring on the Sierra Leonean side of the border by ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). President Taylor should also be called upon to prevent the use of Liberian territory for any support to the AFRC/RUF.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should assure that human rights concerns are integrated into ECOMOG's mandate, as well as into its own initiatives to promote peace and stability in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG should desist from obstructing humanitarian aid and take measures to minimize the impact of their military initiatives on civilian populations and structures. ECOMOG should work closely with UNOMSIL, UNHCR, and humanitarian agencies to assure that accurate and neutral information regarding security is provided to the public, especially to refugees, displaced populations, and aid workers.

The international community also has a crucial role to play in order to promote human rights, the rule of law, and stability in Sierra Leone. United Nations agencies are well placed to implement programs and policies to meet these ends in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL should closely monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian law and assure that ECOMOG's mandate to train the new Sierra Leonean army results in an ethnically and geographically balanced force, and includes adequate training in the laws of war. UNOMSIL should reinforce and integrate human rights into its existing mandate, primarily through further support for its human rights office. This office should be given the resources necessary at U.N. headquarters as well as in the field to monitor and report publicly on the human rights situation throughout the country. Additionally, the office must have the capacity to provide technical assistance and training to the Sierra Leonean government and local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Finally, UNOMSIL must carefully monitor the Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration (DDR) program for combatants, developed by the World Bank and the Sierra Leonean government. UNOMSIL should provide oversight to ensure that ECOMOG, responsible for the implementation of the DDR program, treats captured or surrendered combatants, especially the large number of child soldiers, in a humane fashion, and works closely with other agencies to facilitate the reintegration of children and other former combatants into civilian communities.

As resources permit, UNHCR should assure that refugees be moved in a timely and humane fashion from insecure camps near the border areas in both Liberia and Guinea. UNHCR should increase its protection of the most vulnerable refugees, in particular the significant number of unaccompanied minors, unaccompanied women, and victims of atrocities. In Guinea, UNHCR should insist upon access to asylum seekers in detention, the screening and registration process at border areas, and, in a manner compatible with security concerns, access to the refugee camps. In Liberia, former AFRC/RUF combatants should be separated from civilian refugees and registered into programs for their reintegration into civil society or prosecuted where appropriate.

In order to put an end to the cycles of violence and atrocities against civilians, the international community will have to focus and sustain its attention on the root causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. With the democratically elected Kabbah government reinstalled, the international community should seize the occasion to make the respect for human rights an integral part of its presence and programs in Sierra Leone. International interventions should support the government's efforts to establish institutions of justice and the rule of law, as well as promote a vibrant civil society with full respect for human rights. If human rights issues are not tackled head-on, the international community and Sierra Leonean people will continue to bear the high cost of further conflict and providing relief for victims.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

To All Parties Involved in the Present Conflict in Sierra Leone:

- Despite the apparent intransigence of the AFRC/RUF and its leaders' willful disregard for international humanitarian and human rights law, Human Rights Watch continues to call on all parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone to immediately cease from committing human rights abuses, including killings, rape, and mutilation of civilians. Combatants should respect the laws of war, particularly those norms related to the protection of noncombatants and civilian infrastructure.
- All parties should desist from the recruitment, forced or otherwise, of child soldiers. The AFRC/RUF in particular should cease abductions of civilians for use as soldiers, laborers, or other reasons. The AFRC/RUF should halt gender-based violence and the abduction of women and girls as sexual slaves.

To the Sierra Leonean Government:

- Perpetrators of atrocities against civilians should be held accountable for their actions. This should be achieved through arrest, prosecution, and, where appropriate, punishment according to international humanitarian and human rights law.
- In order to establish principles of accountability and the rule of law, respect for due process should be enforced by an independent judiciary. This will be extremely important in the ongoing trials of fifty-nine civilians accused of collaborating with the AFRC/RUF regime, as well as for upcoming court martial trials and the future treatment of war criminals. International observers should immediately be brought in to monitor the ongoing trials. In order to strengthen the neutrality and independence of the judiciary, the government should consider incorporating international judges into its judicial system, in particular for cases regarding war crimes.

- The government should immediately ensure that the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program underway incorporates human rights concerns. Particular attention should be paid to (1) the humane treatment of captured and surrendered combatants; (2) psychological and social preparation for the reintegration of combatants into communities; and (3) training in human rights and humanitarian law for those combatants wishing to enlist in the new Sierra Leonean army. Demobilized combatants suspected of having committed war crimes or human rights abuses should be screened by the government in compliance with international standards, and investigated and prosecuted where appropriate.
- The government should follow through on its commitments made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict, including to stop the recruitment of children under the age of eighteen and to create a Joint Task Force to oversee the demobilization and reintegration of child combatants from all sides.

To the Liberian Government:

- The government of Liberia should respect the international arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF and assure that Liberia is not used as a point of supply or transit for combatants, arms, ammunition, food or other supplies to support the AFRC/RUF. To this end, President Charles Taylor should facilitate border monitoring by ECOMOG. The government should investigate, arrest, and hold accountable anyone on Liberian territory engaged in arms trafficking or other support to the AFRC/RUF.
- The Liberian government, through the Liberian Repatriation, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation Committee (LRRRC) and its security forces, should cooperate with UNHCR in the development and implementation of a program to screen and separate combatants from civilian refugees. This program should be in accordance with international refugee law and UNHCR's guidelines on the application of the exclusion clauses to the 1951 Refugee Convention and to the 1967 Protocol.
- Individuals suspected of having committed a war crime, crime against humanity, or any other crime which would exclude them from protection under international refugee law, should be investigated, and where warranted, prosecuted for the violations they are accused of in accordance with international standards of due process.

To the Guinean Government:

- The Guinean government should facilitate the maximum possible access for humanitarian organizations to refugee camps in the Guéckedou area.
- The Guinean government should maintain its generous asylum policy for refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia, while taking actions to ensure local Guinean border authorities immediately cease to demand money or seize property from Sierra Leoneans who seek to enter Guinea.
- The Guinean government should give UNHCR full and unimpeded access to border entry points and allow UNHCR to monitor access to asylum procedures; conduct prima facie refugee status determination screening; and participate in pre-screening to identify refugees who may be suspected of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other such crimes which would exclude them from international refugee protection. The latter should be done with a view to investigate and prosecute where appropriate in accordance with international standards.

- Individuals suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, or any other crime which would exclude them from protection under international refugee law, should be held accountable for the violations they have committed in accordance with international standards of due process.
- The Guinean government should allow UNHCR full and unimpeded access to places of detention for refugees and asylum seekers.
- The Guinean government should continue to work closely with UNHCR to register all refugees and issue them identification cards. Police and military should immediately cease the arbitrary arrest, extortion, and harassment of refugees who do not have identification cards.
- The government should maintain the arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF and assure that Guinea is not used as a supply or transit point for arms, ammunition, food or other supplies to these forces. Authorities should arrest and hold accountable any Guinean military personnel or civilians found to have violated the arms embargo to the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone or those involved in trade with AFRC/RUF forces.

To the United Nations:

United Nations Security Council

The United Nations should integrate human rights into its programs and further expand the capacity of the human rights office of UNOMSIL. This should include adequate resources and additional staff to monitor and report publicly on the human rights situation throughout the country, implement technical assistance programs with the government of Sierra Leone, and provide support and training to Sierra Leonean human rights groups.

- UNOMSIL should carry out its mandate of assuring that ECOMOG respect international humanitarian law during the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program. It should further monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian and human rights law during all of its activities, especially military operations.
- The U.N. Security Council should call upon Liberia to not allow their territory to be used in support of the AFRC/RUF activity in Sierra Leone. It should urge the Liberian government to take all measures necessary to assure that present and former Liberian military or rebels are not supporting AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone. Such measures should include the deployment of ECOMOG and U.N. military observers in the border area.
- Similarly, the Security Council should call upon all governments to respect the international arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF and, in particular, assure that Liberia is not used as a point of supply or transit for arms, ammunition, food or other supplies to or from the AFRC/RUF.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

- Refugee camps most at risk should be relocated to secure, accessible areas a safe distance from the borders of Guinea and Liberia, as soon as the availability of resources permits this. Where not already developed, plans for relocation should be designed and implemented as soon as possible.
- UNHCR should maintain a permanent presence at border entry points to Guinea and Liberia in order to monitor access to asylum determination procedures for those fleeing Sierra Leone; conduct basic screening to determine group-based prima facie refugee status; and conduct pre-screening of those suspected of having committed a war crime, a crime against humanity, or any other such crime which would exclude them from international refugee protection.

- UNHCR should seek access in writing and in practice to all detention centers in Guinea and Liberia where asylum seekers and refugees are held, including those where refugees suspected of being former combatants are held. UNHCR should monitor conditions of detention and ensure, to the extent possible, that its own guidelines on detention of asylum seekers are applied.
- UNHCR should seek a presence at screening interviews to identify refugees who are suspected of committing crimes that would deem them undeserving of international refugee protection. UNHCR should monitor screening for exclusion and ensure necessary safeguards. UNHCR should advise the governments of Guinea and Liberia on fair and just criteria and procedures for the application of the exclusion clauses, according to international refugee law and its own guidelines.
- In collaboration with the governments of Guinea and Liberia, UNHCR should ensure that an efficient and effective registration program for Sierra Leonean refugees is in place in both countries. Registered refugees should be provided with identity cards.
- UNHCR should provide refugees in Liberia and Guinea with accurate, neutral, and objective information about security conditions in Sierra Leone, to enable refugees to make informed choices about repatriation.
- UNHCR should rapidly implement an evaluation of the psychological and medical needs of the large numbers of refugee victims of psychological and physical trauma. In particular, UNHCR should respect and implement its own guidelines regarding assistance and protection for women who are victims of rape, sexual violence, or survivors of trauma. UNHCR and other relief agencies should have qualified personnel to implement these guidelines and programs and promote a general awareness and sensitivity to these issues among refugees and local authorities.
- Special considerations in programming should be made to protect the large numbers of vulnerable refugees among the new Sierra Leonean caseload, including unaccompanied children, unaccompanied women, single parents, victims of atrocities, the elderly and the infirm. Funding should be provided for the implementation of education programs for reconciliation, conflict resolution and human rights education in refugee camps, especially for youth.

To ECOWAS and ECOMOG:

- While its record in Sierra Leone has improved from past performances, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should closely monitor ECOMOG's respect for international humanitarian and human rights law in all aspects of its mandate, especially while conducting military operations, as well as during its retraining of the new army and its implementation of the DDR program. In accordance with international humanitarian law, ECOMOG should take measures to reduce the toll of its military operations on civilians and civilian structures.
- ECOMOG should produce accurate, neutral and objective information about security conditions in Sierra Leone to enable refugees to make informed choices about repatriation.

To the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and other Members of the International Community:

- In order to end cycles of violence in Sierra Leone, the international community should maintain a strong focus on Sierra Leone and assure that respect for human rights and the rule of law are foundations of the newly reinstated government.

- The arms embargo against the AFRC/RUF should be strictly enforced. States, arms dealers, private security firms or others found in violation of the embargo should be held accountable. The international community should state unequivocally that no group or individual associated with abuses committed by the AFRC/RUF will receive any international support.
- Members of the international community should respond to UNHCR's \$7.3 million emergency appeal for assistance to Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia. Funds are needed for food, shelter and sanitation, medical, educational, psychological and social services, the relocation of camps, transportation and logistical support.
- Donors should also respond to bilateral requests for assistance in addressing Guinea's environmental and infrastructure damage resulting from the refugee flow. International donors should provide funds in response to OCHA's request for \$11.2 million to meet humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone. Without these funds, the UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies will not have the human or financial resources to provide basic assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons, and other Sierra Leoneans affected by the crisis.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED AGAINST CIVILIANS

Human Rights Abuses Committed by Members of the AFRC/RUF

A War of Terror against Civilians

Human Rights Watch took testimony from dozens of survivors and witnesses of gross violations of human rights committed by the AFRC/RUF,¹ involving the physical mutilation, torture and murder of Sierra Leonean civilians. They included: amputations by machete² of one or both hands, arms, feet, legs, ears and buttocks and one or more fingers; lacerations to the head, neck, arms, legs, feet and torso; the gouging out of one or both eyes; rape; gunshot wounds to the head, torso and limbs; burns from explosives and other devices; injections with acid; and

¹The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was formed in 1991 and entered eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. Originally, the RUF was a mix of members of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), NPFL-trained Sierra Leoneans and others. Since its inception, the RUF has failed to publicly and clearly articulate a political agenda other than ousting successive governments and has committed atrocities from the beginning. Abdul Koroma in "Sierra Leone: The Agony of a Nation," (Andromeda Publications, 1996) reports that during one of their first attacks in 1991 in eastern Kailahun district, the RUF decapitated civilian leaders and placed their heads on sticks. Over the next seven years, the RUF attempted to gain power through guerrilla warfare and attacks against civilians. RUF leader Foday Sankoh is a former colonel in the Sierra Leonean military. He was imprisoned in 1971 for his alleged involvement in a coup attempt, released seven years later and dishonorably dismissed from the army. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed by a group of military officers who took power in a coup on May 25, 1997 ousting President Kabbah. Its chairman, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, had been in detention in Freetown awaiting trial for alleged involvement in a prior attempted coup in September 1996. The AFRC invited RUF forces to join them in the new government. The AFRC cited the government's failure to implement a peace agreement with the RUF and the practice of ethnic favoritism as reasons for assuming power. They also called for the release of Foday Sankoh, who had been detained in Nigeria on March 2, 1997, charged with possession of arms and ammunition. Upon taking power, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties, public meetings, and demonstrations and announced rule by military decree. Many judges, attorneys and police were among those who fled the country, causing a total collapse of the judiciary. The AFRC established the People's Revolutionary Courts, whose staff had little or no legal training. The government arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics. In indiscriminate attacks on villages, AFRC/RUF forces amputated, raped, killed and abducted civilians to use as laborers and fighters.

²Also referred to as "cutlasses" by the survivors.

beatings. Human Rights Watch also received unconfirmed reports of sexual mutilation such as the cutting off of breasts and genitalia, among other atrocities.

This is a war being waged through attacks on the civilian population. AFRC/RUF soldiers typically capture civilians, round them up from their hiding places in the forest or in villages and commit atrocities against them in an effort to instill terror. The AFRC/RUF appears to use this campaign of fear as a means of exerting political and military control. They often summarily execute civilians, accusing them of being Kabbah or Kamajor³ supporters, or Kamajor relatives. The soldiers further terrorize their victims by forcing them to participate in their own mutilation, asking them to make choices about which finger, hand or arm, for example, to have amputated. They also use mutilation and other forms of physical abuse as punishment for refusing to follow their instructions.

The AFRC/RUF uses the civilians it abuses to "send messages" to its opponents. Victims of amputations or other mutilations are frequently told that they should take their amputated limb and a verbal or written message to ECOMOG or the Kabbah government. The messages are typically demands that ECOMOG should "leave the country to Sierra Leoneans" or that Kabbah should replace the limbs of amputees. The AFRC/RUF also state that they will keep fighting until Kabbah is gone and their leaders are restored to power. They call for the release of RUF leader Fodey Sankoh, imprisoned in Nigeria. According to testimony from other victims and witnesses, many victims die from complications related to their wounds before their messages of horror can be heard.

Since February 1998, attacks on civilians have occurred in almost all regions of the country but with a particularly high concentration in the Koidu diamond-mining area in the east, where the AFRC/RUF maintain a strong presence. The vast majority of victims are males between the ages of sixteen and forty-five, but women, children, and the elderly are not spared. For example, testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch included male and female amputees over the age of sixty, as well as from a three-year-old boy with a gunshot wound. Attacks on villages or civilians hiding in the forest are seemingly carried out without regard for ethnic or religious affiliation. Perpetrators and victims come from diverse ethnic and religious groups, and ethnicity is seldom invoked as a motivating factor in killings or abuse.

Men of voting and fighting age are particularly targeted in order to discourage them from giving political or military support to President Kabbah or the Kamajors. When the RUF committed atrocities prior to elections in 1996, they told victims that their hands were being amputated so that they could not vote. Women and girls are also frequently subject to rape and other forms of gender-based violence, including sexual slavery. Pregnant women and nursing mothers are also targets of the AFRC/RUF.

The AFRC/RUF led at least two loosely organized campaigns of terror, "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself." These campaigns, both of which originated in the Koidu area in February 1998 and then spread throughout the country, were designed to loot, destroy, or kill anything in the path of the combatants. Operation Pay Yourself included AFRC/RUF roadblocks where civilians were forced to place their belongings into two piles, one for civilians to keep, to "pay themselves," and one to be handed over to the soldiers. One witness who fled Koidu described what happens at the road blocks:

³"Kamajors," meaning traditional hunter in Mende, are among the Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs) which fight on behalf of Kabbah's government. CDFs evolved as local protection responses to insecurity and violence throughout Sierra Leone. The Kamajors are the largest and most powerful of these groups, and most Kamajors are from the Mende ethnic group. They dress in traditional clothing, often wearing charms and mirrors. Other ethnic groups, including the Temne, Mandingo and Kuranko have also formed CDFs known as "traditional hunters" in their respective languages. The Kamajors became an important fighting force under the previous government of Captain Valentine E.M. Strasser, helping to combat the RUF, but also committing human rights violations. The Kamajors were armed by and grew in number under the first Kabbah government, allegedly fueling resentment among the Sierra Leonean military and leading to the subsequent AFRC coup.

Ten of them [AFRC/RUF soldiers] in a van with weapons—RPGs, AK47s—stopped us and told us to put down our bags. They searched us from shirt to pants. They told us to make two piles and put all the best of what we had—money, rice—into one pile, and the rest in another. They took all the best and gave us the one that wasn't good. That's "Operation Pay Yourself!"⁴

These operations were apparently designed to force the local populations to provide them with economic support and to assert their position as political and military players in Sierra Leone.

Although the attackers claim to be seeking out supporters of President Kabbah or the Kamajors, which have fought on behalf of Kabbah, there is often no distinction being made by AFRC/RUF forces. A small minority of victims are, in fact, Kabbah supporters or Kamajors; most are subsistence farmers, miners or small merchants with no history of political activity. One witness to atrocities near Koidu said, "They don't ask you if you're a Kabbah supporter; they just kill randomly... they just kill anyone. But if they know you are a Kabbah supporter, they will kill you faster."⁵

Actual supporters of President Kabbah and those who served under his first administration, in particular civilian administrators, paramount chiefs, traditional section chiefs, Catholic priests, other religious figures and other community leaders, are actively sought out by AFRC/RUF for intimidation, extortion, or abuse. Several traditional chiefs and Catholic priests interviewed by Human Rights Watch explained that the AFRC/RUF perceives them as supporters of the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. Many traditional chiefs, often with ethnic ties to Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), fled after learning that the AFRC/RUF was looking for them. One Catholic priest who was captured by the AFRC/RUF and later escaped stated that his captors planned to execute him. They told him, "Look here's one Kamajor to take care of. You priests are supporting the SLPP government and the Kamajors. Stand here because we are going to kill you."⁶ The AFRC/RUF takes whatever money and property these individuals have and brutalizes them to show the population how they will treat their opponents.

International Law Governing the Crisis

The hostilities in Sierra Leone constitute an internal armed conflict under the laws of war, also known as humanitarian law. Sierra Leone is a party to the Geneva Conventions and both optional protocols. Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions sets out fundamental rules applicable to internal armed conflicts that are not subject to suspension under any circumstances, and that are widely accepted as constituting customary international law. Virtually a convention within a convention, Common Article 3 provides in relevant part:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including those placed *hors de combat* by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Koundou Lengo Bengo Refugee Camp, Republic of Guinea, June 6, 1998.

⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 9, 1998.

- (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- (b) taking of hostages;
- (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
- (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

The 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions is also directed at internal armed conflicts, and elaborates these fundamental guarantees of humane conduct and protection of civilians. In particular, Article 4 of this protocol provides in relevant part:

- (1) All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take direct part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honor and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
- (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and whatsoever:
 - (a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
 - (b) collective punishments;
 - (c) taking of hostages;
 - (d) acts of terrorism;
 - (e) outrages on personal dignity, in particular humiliating or degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
 - (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
 - (g) pillage;
 - (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.

The principle of protection of civilians is at the core of both provisions, and indeed, is fundamental to all humanitarian law. For the purposes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, a civilian is anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organized armed group of a party to the conflict. Included as protected persons are also members of government or insurgent forces who are wounded, sick, unarmed or in captivity. Both Common Article 3 and Protocol II bind all parties to the internal armed conflict, including the insurgent party.⁷

The government of Sierra Leone is also bound by the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the state is a party. That treaty, at Article 4(1), provides that states parties may take measures derogating from certain rights "in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed". On March 10, 1998, President Kabbah declared a state of emergency which was communicated to the office of the Secretary-General to the United Nations. Even for rights the derogation of which is permitted, however, any derogation may be only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" and must not "involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour sex, language, religion or social origin." Some of the rights that may not be derogated even during a state of emergency include the right to life

⁷ The commitment of a state to these provisions applies also to private individuals in that state's territory who are thereby bound by the same rights and obligations. International Committee of the Red Cross, *Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987) p. 1344-45. The government's application of these provisions does not confer on the insurgents any international recognition on the insurgent party. Nor do Common Article 3 and Protocol II provide any special status for insurgents in internal armed conflict such as the combatants privilege to kill or capture enemy troops, or prisoner-of-war status when captured. *Ibid.* at 1344.

(Article 6), the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7), the ban on slavery in all its forms (Article 8) and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18).

Killings, Mutilations, Sexual Abuse, and Enslavement by the AFRC/RUF

As mentioned above, it is impossible to determine the precise number of victims of these types of abuse due to a lack of access to much of Sierra Leone and the fact that most deaths occurred without record. Human Rights Watch collected testimonies from hundreds of Sierra Leoneans who survived or witnessed these types of atrocities.⁸ A few of the countless examples follow:

Ike C. was a reporter for the *Herald Guardian* newspaper in Koidu town, Kono. He is thirty-two years old and fled the AFRC/RUF's attack on Koidu on February 21 but was captured, held by the AFRC/RUF, and threatened with death. He ultimately escaped. Among other atrocities he witnessed, he described the following:

I saw them kill two people right before my face at Tomboudou, in front of the residence of the Paramount Chief of Tomboudou.⁹ One man they arrested at a village called Nemessedu. They brought him to Tomboudou along with his wife. He was killed before his wife. They tied him up and shot at him in his chest three times. Then they took his wife as their own.

The second executed was a youth. He was tall, and before killing him, they told him, "You're too tall." So, they chopped off his foot, and he fell to the ground. Later, they shot him three times in the chest, too, and he died. After that, they agreed to set Tomboudou on fire as a part of Operation Non-Living Thing.¹⁰

Helen C. was a fish seller in Koidu. She claims that she lost her two children in chaos related to an attack by the AFRC/RUF near Koidu in May 1998. Later that month, she was caught by the AFRC/RUF in Tumbodu, Kono district, where she saw them kill approximately fifty people. The AFRC/RUF caught her and cut off her hand and forearm.

They captured me and said lie on the floor. I was reluctant; they cut me on the neck with a machete. I was cut by a small boy. Then they put my hand on a stone and cut me. They told me to go to Kabbah and tell him what happened.

They left me there. They said they would go to the bush and kill anyone they found there. I walked eleven days to Forekonia [the border with Guinea]. I left my belongings with my hand. I had to bury my own hand.¹¹

Franklin M., a farmer from Sinekoro town, Kabalah district, was returning from his fields around May 21, 1998 when he saw members of the AFRC/RUF coming toward him.

⁸The names of all the refugees interviewed have been changed in order to protect their safety and privacy.

⁹Ike C. provided this information for purposes of describing the location of the killings only, not to imply involvement of the Paramount Chief in the killings of these two individuals.

¹⁰Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Gueckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 25, 1998. Survivors referred to this military offensive both as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Non-Living Thing."

¹¹Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Guinea, June 3, 1998.

I saw people with cutlasses and guns. So I started to run; they caught me and cut off both of my hands. Then they left me. Some of them wore uniforms, some were in plainclothes. They said I was a supporter of Tejan Kabbah.¹²

Human Rights Watch interviewed Franklin M. in Faranah Hospital, Guinea where he sought refuge and health care. He further described his dilemma as a refugee and victim of a double arm amputation.

My family is here. How can I hope to feed my family? My mother is here. My wife is here. My children are here. I have no hands.¹³

Timothy C., a history teacher from Koidu, was one of two survivors of a group of ten civilians captured near his home by the AFRC/RUF on June 10, 1998. The other eight were killed with machetes. He was cut so deeply on his forearms that it is likely that both will have to be amputated.¹⁴

In March 1998, **Catherine M.**, an administrator from Segbwema, was shot in the back by the AFRC/RUF as they fled from ECOMOG. Her husband and son were shot dead in front of her. She was stripped and forced to flee with the AFRC/RUF. She witnessed the killing of many children and a nursing mother as she fled.¹⁵

Atrocities Against Children

Children are the frequent targets of brutal, indiscriminate acts of violence by the AFRC/RUF.¹⁶ Children are murdered, mutilated, tortured, beaten, raped, enslaved for sexual purposes, forced to work, and forced to become soldiers by the AFRC/RUF.

In addition to violating the instruments of international humanitarian law cited above, these crimes violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which makes explicit children's right to life and freedom from sexual abuse, abduction and forced recruitment, among other rights.¹⁷

Examples of these types of violations were frequent. **Sam R.**, a farmer in the Koidu area, saw six of his children and his wife attacked in front of his house on June 12. He recalled,

They accused me of being a Kamajor. When they want to kill you, they accuse you of anything. There is no reason. I am a farmer. I don't vote. I have no money. They burnt my house.¹⁸

At about 4.00 a.m., I heard bombs and gunshots outside my house. The rebels came and banged on the door. They said they would kill us all outside. My wife took five of the children outside. I stayed inside with one. My wife threw herself on top of two of the children to protect them.

¹²Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Guinea, June 4, 1998.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Connaught Hospital, June 24, 1998.

¹⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Kolahun refugee camp, Lofa county, Liberia, June 12, 1998.

¹⁶Children are considered persons below the age of eighteen, as defined in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, September 2, 1990.

¹⁷All states are party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child except for the United States of America and Somalia.

¹⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Guinea, June 3, 1998.

They shot my wife, killed two of the children, shot my seven-year-old through the stomach, and cut another one on the buttocks. Two got away.¹⁹

Human Rights Watch received documentation on dozens of similar cases. According to medical records, out of 265 war wounded patients admitted to Connaught hospital from April 1 through June 20, approximately one-quarter were children. According to reports from humanitarian agencies, 111 children died between February 15 and 24, 1998 during AFRC/RUF attacks in the Bo area.²⁰

Gender-based Violence

Women and girls are the primary targets of widespread rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual violence.²¹ Although the exact number of those raped will never be known, testimonies from survivors confirm that sexual violence has been widespread, against thousands of women and girls. Furthermore, no comprehensive medical statistics have been compiled on rape-related injuries or on pregnancies as a result of rape. Those who have witnessed, or endured and survived these and other atrocities are suffering enormous psychological trauma.

Women and girls are brutally raped and gang-raped at gunpoint and knife point by AFRC/RUF soldiers or raped with objects, such as sticks. Often, the rapes occur in front of family members and others, and in some cases relatives are forced to rape their sisters, mothers or daughters. Women and girls are frequently abducted individually or collectively and kept as so-called "wives" for members of the AFRC/RUF. Some suffer rape or gang rape multiple times as they escape one AFRC/RUF group, only to be caught by another. Rape is also used as an immediate punishment for refusing to follow instructions or in retaliation for the acts of others held in captivity.

These crimes, and other forms of sexual violence, are explicitly and implicitly condemned under international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions prohibit rape in both international and internal conflicts.²² Likewise, rape, when committed on a mass scale against a civilian population, constitutes a crime against humanity. The Convention on the Rights of the Child further protects children from "all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse."²³

The crimes of sexual violence committed by the AFRC/RUF against women and girls are often accompanied by other forms of violence. Murder or mutilation frequently follows these rapes. Many are forced to work as porters for the AFRC/RUF and witness their children being abducted, abused, or killed. Some women and young girls are abducted to care for the many young children captured by the AFRC/RUF.

Pregnant women are not spared from attacks by the AFRC/RUF. In light of the gruesome nature of the atrocities committed against them, these women seem to be targeted because of their status as pregnant women.

¹⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Connaught Hospital, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 24, 1996.

²⁰Internal survey conducted in Bo, Sierra Leone, by humanitarian organizations, March 19-21, 1998.

²¹Human Rights Watch also received an account of boys having been sexually abused alongside women and girls; while sexual abuse of males has occurred, it has not occurred to the extent of the abuse of women and girls.

²²Rape in internal armed conflict is prohibited under Article 3, subparagraphs (a) and (c), common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and by Article 2(e) of Protocol II. For international armed conflict, this is established in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 [Fourth Geneva Convention], Arts. 27 and 147, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

²³Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 34.

Witnesses report having seen the mutilated bodies of pregnant women whose fetuses had been cut out of their wombs or who died of gunshot wounds to the abdomen. Some pregnant women are also forced into labor due to the extreme physical hardship of having to flee their homes, and at times die in flight due to complications in childbirth.

The AFRC/RUF's rape and enslavement of women and girls for sex is not only a vicious expression of power over the individual, but also a means of expressing dominance over the community. Throughout the world, sexual violence is routinely directed against women and girls during situations of armed conflict as a weapon to terrorize a community and to achieve a political end. The humiliation, terror and pain inflicted by the rapist is meant to harm not only the individual victim but also to strip the humanity from the larger group of which she is a part. The rape of one person can be translated into an assault upon the community through the emphasis placed in every culture on women's sexual virtue; the shame of the rape humiliates the family and all those associated with the survivor.

The following are some of the testimonies of Sierra Leonean women who survived or witnessed sexual violence, and of some of the service providers and others who witnessed the abuse or assisted them once they reached refugee camps in Guinea and hospitals in Sierra Leone.²⁴

Ruth B. is a thirty-six-year-old farmer from Gandorhun, in Kono District. She fled her village when it was attacked by the AFRC/RUF, but was captured, beaten, raped, and forced to work. She ultimately escaped and made her way to Guinea. When Ruth described her one-month ordeal in captivity, she was visibly traumatized, in poor health and still bore scars on her back and legs. The back of her ankles had been sliced just below the Achilles tendon to prevent her from escaping:

They took three of my children and killed my husband. The rest of us ran away. But we were captured by the junta,²⁵ and they took the women away to carry their loads. I was with them one month. They held us in a house. One day while we were there and they were away, another group came from Gongo and asked us what our mission was. We told them we were from Gandorhun, and they beat us. They beat us severely. They stomped on my stomach, and the next day, I was bleeding from my vagina as if I had had an operation. Now, I have a serious backache.

Later the two groups came together, and the second group told the first group that we were family members of the Kamajors. They used me for sex, and they cut my heels with their bayonets so I wouldn't run or walk off. But I escaped into the bush even though I was wounded...

I didn't know who captured me. They were older and younger—adults and children. Some had uniforms and machetes, and some wore ordinary clothes, like jeans, and had guns. There were lots of nicknames: one of them was called "Blood." They said they didn't like Kabbah and said, "If

²⁴The majority of women Human Rights Watch interviewed fled villages in the diamond-rich Kono district of Sierra Leone and became refugees across the border in the Guéckedou area of Guinea, which is now home to over 200,000 Sierra Leonean refugees. The names of all the rape survivors interviewed have been changed in order to protect their safety and privacy.

²⁵Witnesses often referred to their attackers as "rebels" or "juntas," common terminology for the RUF and the AFRC respectively. Human Rights Watch interviews revealed that attackers were in most cases a mix of plainclothes "rebels" and uniformed AFRC/RUF soldiers. They also sometimes disguised themselves as Kamajor or ECOMOG forces. For these reasons and a lack of a reliable method of distinguishing former government soldiers from rebels in Sierra Leone, this report refers to them collectively as AFRC/RUF.

he's there, we will continue to fight." They were both Liberian and Sierra Leonean. I could tell from their language.²⁶

Finda T. is a forty-five-year-old woman from Koidu town, Kono who fled with her family when the AFRC/RUF attacked at the end of February. She told Human Rights Watch how her family had been killed and how she had been raped by rebel soldiers:

The rebels caught us in the bush after my family and I had fled one Saturday in February. They killed my brother immediately, and they took my two children. One of them raped me. He used me as his wife, and another one beat me with a gun. They made me and others carry their loads. They told us to take their bags of rice back to Koidu town. They seriously used us. In Koidu, they took our clothes and freed us. I lived in the bush for two months using leaves to cover myself. Eventually, I found some people who showed me the way to Guinea. A child gave me her clothes, and I have only one dress now.²⁷

In April, medical staff in Connaught Hospital, Freetown reported that they were witnessing an alarming number of patients suffering mutilations. A number of the female patients they interviewed were raped and had foreign objects inserted in their vaginas. They had been attacked by AFRC/RUF between April 15-25 in villages between Njaiama Sewafe and Koidu. The patients said the AFRC/RUF rounded up civilians in groups or lines, put them to a cutting block and commenced limb amputations with a cutlass. Doctors reported:

In some villages, after the people were rounded up, they were stripped naked and ordered to "use their women;" men were ordered to "use" their sister. When men refused to do so, their arm was amputated, and the women were raped by the attackers.²⁸

Alice M. is a forty-one-year-old former police officer from Jabwema Fiama, Kono, Sierra Leone, who is now a refugee in Guinea. On March 10, 1998, she and her family fled their home into the forest two days after the AFRC/RUF began to attack and loot her town. The AFRC/RUF captured her with her husband in the forest, but didn't catch her children. They let her husband go, but seeing her police identification, they kept her. She remembered:

Commander Steven Gbenya and Sergeant Moussa captured me. They had also captured other police officers, whom they killed. The commander said he wasn't going to kill me, and instead, he raped me all night. I cried and cried and prayed. I don't know why, but early in the morning, about 6:00 a.m., he let me go. I think he felt sorry for me. He and Moussa escorted me out without telling anyone else and took me to a place in the bush. They deliberately raped many women. To save your life, you have to agree, or they will kill you. They are beastly.²⁹

²⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Mangay Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 15, 1998. Many refugees interviewed described their captors as having spoken with Liberian accents. They were not able to say whether or not they were Liberian fighters or Sierra Leonean fighters from the Kailahun region of Sierra Leone, closest to Liberia, who would have spoken with the same accent. Nonetheless, many believed them to be Liberians.

²⁷Human Rights Watch interview, Sowadou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 14, 1998.

²⁸"Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone." Médecins Sans Frontières, May 1998, p. 4.

²⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Fangumadou, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 14, 1998.

Abductions

The abduction of civilians by the AFRC/RUF is commonplace. People of all ages are abducted, but witnesses point to young men, women, and girls and boys as preferred targets. The soldiers capture individuals and groups to labor for them and in general perform tasks necessary for their subsistence and advancement.³⁰ Women and girls are taken as "wives," or sexual slaves, to cook and perform other domestic tasks. Young men and boys are also abducted for forced recruitment as soldiers. It is unclear whether or not they have designated large-scale holding centers, although at least one witness testified to this effect.

Human Rights Watch received reports that the AFRC/RUF abducts these groups for use as human shields against attacking ECOMOG forces, in the belief that ECOMOG would hesitate to target civilians, particularly women and children, or that in the event of an attack, the "shield" would be hit first.

As described below, many witnesses are under the impression that abductions number in the thousands. The AFRC/RUF captures many civilians apparently with the intention of holding them permanently to reinforce their numbers and ensure their future existence. Others abducted are executed or ultimately allowed to go free after having suffered a number of abuses.

Forced Labor

Many who had been captured by the AFRC/RUF and either escaped or were released testified to Human Rights Watch that they were forced to "carry loads" and perform other tasks for them. The civilians were collected or called upon individually to transport items that the fighters looted from town to town and from one point to another within villages. They prepared food for the soldiers and performed any task required of them to contribute to meeting the daily needs of the soldiers.

Mary F., a nine-year-old girl who fled Koidu town, Kono, was captured by AFRC/RUF soldiers and forced to work. She was freed by the soldiers but was separated from her parents and is now an unaccompanied minor in a refugee camp in Guinea. Upon finishing her story, her steady, serious mood changed, and she burst into tears.

A group of about eleven junta soldiers captured me, my parents and others. They killed one person in our group in front of us. The group split, and I lost my parents. They took us back to Koidu and released us but arrested us again and used us to carry their loads. We were adults and children. They didn't tell us anything about why they were making us do this. Eventually they let us go...³¹

Sia T., who is eighteen and the mother of one, fled the fighting in Koidu town and hid in the forest for three months before making her way to Guinea. She witnessed the murder, rape and abduction of civilians and was herself captured and forced to work for the AFRC/RUF. Some of her captors were children. She remembered:

We were hiding in the bush, not too far from where some of the junta stayed. They knew where people were. They would go into the bush and get some of them, take them to town, make them work and let them go. Then they'd go back and get more. They made me pound rice. We were afraid. They said they weren't going to do anything, but we were working at gunpoint. They were

³⁰Other civilians were forced to labor for the AFRC/RUF, but weren't abducted per se. Survivors testified that often the soldiers would know where their hide-outs were in the forest and would regularly call upon them to perform tasks or subject them to other forms of abuse, under threat of additional physical harm. Although these civilians were not held inside AFRC/RUF installations, it was difficult for them to flee.

³¹Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998.

as young as the boys here. [She gestures at three young boys, approximately five to seven years old, sitting nearby the interview setting]. The small ones had guns, too. They even fought between themselves over whose girls were whose.³²

Sexual Slavery

Human Rights Watch documented repeated accounts of women and girls being abducted by the AFRC/RUF in large numbers for sexual and other purposes. The AFRC/RUF holds these women and girls indefinitely and requires them to perform a variety of tasks, such as preparing food. Women and girls may also have been abducted to care for the many young children captured by the AFRC/RUF. Some who have escaped report that the soldiers divide them up amongst themselves and refer to them as their "wives." They have sex with them at will and at times brutalize them with other forms of physical violence. The AFRC/RUF move these women and girls with them from one location to another. Targeting women and girls in these ways serves the AFRC/RUF practically, in terms of meeting their own daily needs, and strategically, as they coopt their labor and destroy local family and economic structures.

Grace M. is from Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District. She is twenty-one years old. When the AFRC/RUF attacked Koidu in February and launched "Operation Pay Yourself," Grace fled to Kombayendeh (thirty-two miles from Koidu) to find rice. She stayed there for a while but was forced to flee again, first to Bovoma and finally into the forest. AFRC/RUF soldiers captured her along with seventeen other women and kept them as so-called "wives." She ultimately escaped and made her way to Guinea. She believes the other women who did not escape are probably still with the AFRC/RUF, perhaps in Kailahun. She said:

It was on a Monday mid-day, that the junta stormed where we hid. They arrested eighteen of us, and we were taken to Koidu town again. We spent sixteen days with them in the township. While in Koidu town, I saw dead bodies littered all over the place. I also saw some of the soldiers' captives, regardless of age, carrying looted items from the surrounding villages; they took them to Kailahun. We were eighteen in number, all females. It was this same day that the soldiers shared us amongst themselves as wives. Each of us got a man as a husband. It was indeed horrible as one soldier that I was assigned to sexually abused me. He had sex with me any time he wished—at night, mid-day and anywhere. I can still remember his name, Alie, Mende tribe.³³

Ike C., the newspaper reporter from Koidu town, fled the AFRC/RUF's attack on Koidu and was caught. He was able to escape, however, and among many atrocities he witnessed, he said this about sexual violence:

There was rampant raping. I saw a fifteen-year-old girl raped right before me. They left her, but they captured others, and among them was a seven-year-old girl. I also saw many girls held in vehicles, ready to be transported. They force them to carry loads, use them as "wives" and encourage them, saying, "I will give you everything, stay with me." But they have no alternative but to stay.³⁴

Forced Recruitment

³²Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

³³Center for Rural Adult Education (CREA) interview, conducted the week of June 15, 1998, Kissidougou, Republic of Guinea. Also, Human Rights Watch interview, Kissidougou, Republic of Guinea, June 17, 1998.

³⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998.

The AFRC/RUF is using and forcibly recruiting children and young men to engage in armed attacks against Sierra Leone civilians, Civilian Defense Forces, and ECOMOG soldiers.³⁵ Many witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they had seen AFRC/RUF soldiers abducting and holding young men and boys to use as child soldiers and that child soldiers had been among their AFRC/RUF attackers.

The forced recruitment of boys as child soldiers by the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone is not new. As armed conflict in Sierra Leone has intensified in recent years, the social fabric of the country has unraveled, and children have increasingly seen their rights erode. Many children have lost or been separated from their parents in the fighting, do not have enough to eat and do not have schools and other basic structures in place to meet their needs. They are particularly vulnerable to forced recruitment and have clearly been targeted by the AFRC/RUF as it seeks to reinforce its ranks.³⁶

Young boys are targeted in part because their captors consider them to be less afraid to fight; they likely do not have children or wives to consider in risking their lives. They are readily manipulated because they are vulnerable and without protection. Child soldiers are often placed at the front line and forced to commit atrocities against their own communities. This establishes a sense of culpability in them, as well as traumatization, and makes it less possible for them to be accepted back into society or to be psychologically prepared to return.

Little is known about the condition of the young men and children abducted since February by the AFRC/RUF for use as soldiers; few have escaped to tell the story. Over the past few years, however, child recruits were typically provided with food, mind-altering drugs and firearms and were forced to fight and commit atrocities alongside the AFRC/RUF soldiers. The demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of these children will ultimately present an enormous challenge to all those involved in healing the wounds of war and building a future for Sierra Leone.

Alice M. is a forty-one-year-old former police officer in Jabwema Fiama, Kono. While she was held captive by two members of the AFRC/RUF, she was confined to a room with a ten-year-old boy. She said:

Commander Steven Gbenya and Sgt. Moussa were also holding a ten-year-old boy in the room I was held in. They didn't release him. The house we were in was full of rebels. The room next to mine was the Liberian commando room.³⁷ The commander said that they no longer planned to kill children below fifteen, pregnant women, or old men and women. They said they were going

³⁵Although prevailing international law sets fifteen as the minimum age for military recruitment and participation in armed conflict, Human Rights Watch shares a growing consensus among independent, nongovernmental sources which believe that this age is too low and must be raised to eighteen. Not only does the Convention on the Rights of the Child define a child as any human being under the age of eighteen, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier, but eighteen is the voting age in the vast majority of countries. Establishing eighteen as the minimum age for participation in hostilities would be consistent with existing international norms and offer greater protection for children in situations of particularly grave risk. In Sierra Leone, Human Rights Watch also noted the problem of birth registration; individuals often did not know their own age or the age of their children. The lack of records makes it easier for those who forcibly recruit children to do so by claiming the recruits were older than they actually were.

³⁶The Child Protection Committee, a United Nations-Nongovernmental Organization group established to address child protection issues in Sierra Leone, estimated the number of children in armed groups in Sierra Leone in September 1997 at approximately 3,000. (Inter-agency strategy paper for Child Protection Activities in Sierra Leone, Child Protection Committee, Camp Conakry, September 1997.) The actual number is not known, but has increased significantly since the renewal of fighting in February.

³⁷The interviewee claimed that there were Liberian fighters among the AFRC/RUF.

to train-up those children because they knew they were going to die themselves. They encouraged the boy not to be afraid. They cooked for us, but I couldn't eat. The boy didn't say much, but he was hungry, and he ate.³⁸

Ike C., the reporter for the *Herald Guardian* in Koidu town who was captured by the AFRC/RUF, also testified to the role of child soldiers. Some of his captors were under ten years old and wielded guns. He said:

I was captured by Gittaboi, who said he'd execute me because I am a press man. There were little kids, boys, around seven, nine, twelve years old who were among the soldiers. They had guns and felt they had power.... I saw girls held in vehicles ready to be transported. The last group of kids I saw were held at the Branch Energy mining group office in Koidu town. They had 1,500-2,000 of them there. I saw them. In Koidu, the junta forces shouted for kids and gathered them. A soldier told me they are holding those kids as a shield in the event of an ECOMOG attack. They also use them as soldiers, for labor, and for sexual purposes.³⁹

Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law

In addition to the abuses described above, members of the AFRC/RUF flagrantly violated other provisions of international humanitarian law. The AFRC/RUF regularly showed a gross disrespect for principles granting protection to hospitals, places of worship, and other non-military structures providing public services.⁴⁰

The private property of civilians was frequently looted and their homes intentionally burned.⁴¹ Witnesses spoke regularly of theft and mass destruction by the AFRC/RUF as they retreated from ECOMOG forces. Members of the AFRC/RUF completely stripped civilians of their belongings on a regular basis. Many of those fleeing Sierra Leone arrived in refugee camps with little more than their clothing; and several witnesses explained how they had been left naked by the AFRC/RUF and spent days in flight without clothing.

In February 1998, in Lunsar town of Porto Loko district, as a part of their "Operation Pay Yourself," members of the AFRC/RUF raided the Magbesemi hospital. Medicines and equipment were taken, patients were forced to flee, and some medical personnel reportedly abducted by the AFRC/RUF. One patient being treated for a gunshot wound described their actions:

The AFRC/RUF soldiers came to Magbesemi Hospital, fleeing the ECOMOG advance. They took the doctors away. There were many rebels—in several trucks with arms and heavy weapons. They took all the drugs. We were about twenty-five patients. They said, "this is Operation Pay Yourself."⁴²

³⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Fangamadou, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 14, 1998.

³⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Boodou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 23, 1998.

⁴⁰Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, Article 52, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, Articles 9, 10, 11, and 16.

⁴¹Protocol II, Article 4 (2) (g).

⁴²Human Rights Watch interview, Faranah Hospital, Faranah, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 5, 1998.

Abuses Committed by Members of Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs)

Human Rights Watch documented numerous abuses, including killings and torture, by members of the Civilian Defense Forces, frequently referred to in local dialects as "traditional hunters." Civilian Defense Forces were developed primarily in the early 1990s as local protection responses to insecurity and violence throughout Sierra Leone. The largest and most powerful of these groups, the Kamajors, were responsible for the majority of the most serious abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government since February 1998. In recent months, Kamajors have also been responsible for obstructing humanitarian assistance and demanding money or compensation at roadblocks.

Humanitarian and United Nations organizations complain that Kamajors frequently obstruct the delivery of aid to IDPs and civilian groups in need. Humanitarian agency vehicles were frequently commandeered by Kamajors, and aid workers were occasionally detained by Kamajors, two as recently as June 1998.⁴³ Groups providing assistance to the interior of Sierra Leone reported in June that the Kamajors had become increasingly demanding at checkpoints, often insisting that they be compensated for having "liberated" the country from the AFRC/RUF.

Killings and Mutilation

The scale and nature of abuses committed by Kamajors and other members of CDFs differ significantly from atrocities carried out by the AFRC/RUF, but the abuses are often no less horrific. Many witnesses of abuses committed by Kamajors spoke of the grotesque nature of killings, at times including disembowelment followed by consumption of vital organs, such as the heart. Acts such as these were intended to transfer the strength of the enemy to those involved in the consumption. Killings by Kamajors usually targeted people they believed to be members of the AFRC/RUF and their civilian supporters.

A Sierra Leonean Catholic priest described how the Kamajors reacted to the presence of the AFRC/RUF in Koidu in early February, just following ECOMOG's takeover of Freetown:

On February 7th, they [the AFRC/RUF] started "Operation Pay Yourself." On Friday the 13th, I went back to the mission. The youths had called the Kamajors who started arriving on the 11th, 12th, a day or two after "Operation Pay Yourself" had ended. They came from Sewafe, Punduru, Gondama... When they found AFRC, they would kill them immediately. The Kamajors and youths started burning [AFRC/RUF] soldiers and collaborators. On about February 11th, they [Kamajors] called a meeting at the town counsel. They said it was to restore law and order—they said if anyone knows where they are, they should tell us. They decapitated one surrendered soldier and I saw them eat his raw liver and heart.⁴⁴

Another witness from Koidu remembered:

After the first night of "Operation Pay Yourself," the youths and the Lebanese businessmen called the Kamajors. The Kamajors came, and if they and the youths caught soldiers, they burned them alive with tires and petrol.⁴⁵

⁴³Human Rights Watch interview with humanitarian agency whose staff had been detained by Kamajors to "make a point." Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 25, 1998.

⁴⁴Human Rights Watch interview, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 9, 1998.

⁴⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

Several foreign residents of Sierra Leone that had worked with or observed Kamajors in the field concurred that this "take no prisoners" policy was widespread. One foreign trainer of the Kamajors claimed that the fighters were as "malicious as the AFRC/RUF"⁴⁶ but committed fewer abuses due to their supervision, even though this was limited. The Kamajors have been led by Capt. Samuel Hinga Norman, deputy defense minister, who in recent months repeatedly stated that all CDFs were now under the control of ECOMOG.⁴⁷ With their knowledge of the local terrain, Kamajors are frequently relied upon by ECOMOG as combatants and guides in unfamiliar rural areas.

Recruitment of Child Soldiers

CDFs, especially the Kamajors, have contributed to one of the most urgent human rights problems involving children in Sierra Leone: the recruitment of child soldiers. Children have been recruited by the CDFs for many of the same reasons that the AFRC/RUF abduct them into their ranks: children are often easily indoctrinated, fearless, have little sense of what is morally right or wrong, and, according to Kamajor leaders, are more likely to be "unadulterated."⁴⁸ While no one knows the number of children fighting among the CDF forces, one field commander estimated that their forces in the eastern Kailahun district alone numbered 3,000.⁴⁹

The situation for child combatants provoked a mission to Sierra Leone from Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunnu. Otunnu urged that, "the international community make Sierra Leone a pilot project for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children effected by war."⁵⁰ During his visit, Otunnu obtained commitments from the government to assure that the CDFs would cease recruitment of children under the age of eighteen, begin demobilization of child soldiers, provide special protection to child combatants, and create a Joint Task Force comprising representatives from the government, ECOMOG, U.N. agencies, and relevant NGOs. On June 25, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Hinga Norman, also declared that the government was committed to demobilizing CDF child combatants.⁵¹ In mid-July, however, aid agencies and press reports concurred that the CDFs were still recruiting children in northern Sierra Leone.⁵²

National and international human rights and humanitarian workers in Sierra Leone expressed their concern to Human Rights Watch that Civilian Defense Forces, such as the Kamajors and loosely organized bands of youths, represent a serious and growing human rights issue in Sierra Leone today. Like the AFRC/RUF, these groups are able to act largely with impunity. This trend, when considered in the context of past practices of armed groups in Sierra Leone, underscores the need to develop a comprehensive program to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate all combatants into the new national army or Sierra Leonean society.

Many former combatants, mostly from the AFRC/RUF, are presently being retrained by ECOMOG and integrated into the new national army. This training should be carried out by qualified ECOMOG personnel and

⁴⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 23, 1998.

⁴⁷Human Rights Watch interview with deputy defense minister, June 25, 1998.

⁴⁸According to Kamajor rules of conduct, combatants must refrain from drugs, sex, looting, and other illicit acts in order to maintain their magical powers, including being bulletproof, on the battlefield.

⁴⁹Lansana Fofana, "Militia Admits Recruiting Child Soldiers," IPS, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 29, 1998.

⁵⁰Press release, "Mr. Olara A. Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict urges the international community make Sierra Leone a pilot project for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children effected by war," New York, New York, June 2, 1998.

⁵¹Human Rights Watch interview with Deputy Minister of Defense, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 25, 1998.

⁵²Ibid. and phone conversations with aid agencies in Sierra Leone, July 27, 1998.

monitored by UNOMSIL observers. Diplomats and aid workers in Sierra Leone have noted the lack of support for the approximately 3,000 ex-combatants in an encampment in dire conditions in the Lungi area outside of Freetown. Former combatants wishing to be reintegrated into the new national army will need appropriate support in order to complete their retraining. Those who are screened out as possible war criminals should be investigated and prosecuted where appropriate according to international standards. Those who wish to return to civilian life will require appropriate assistance to reintegrate into communities, including programs to encourage a return to farms, schools, or micro-economic activities. The reintegration aspects of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program must emphasize a respect for the laws of war and human rights. As combatants from rebel groups, CDFs and government forces have comprised the principal perpetrators of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, the success of this program could play a crucial role in preventing future human rights abuses.

IV. SIERRA LEONEAN REFUGEES

The atrocities and violence described above are unfortunately only the first chapter of hardship for many Sierra Leoneans. Approximately one-quarter million Sierra Leoneans have fled to neighboring Guinea and Liberia in order to escape the abuses and fighting. The continuing conflict in Sierra Leone prevents them from leaving the refugee camps in these countries.

The Situation of Sierra Leonean Refugees in the Republic of Guinea

Since February 1998, the refugee situation in the Republic of Guinea has reached a state of emergency. As the AFRC/RUF attacked and committed atrocities in villages and towns in Sierra Leone's Kono and Kailahun districts, civilians fled by the thousands and crossed the border into Guinea. UNHCR puts the total number of new arrivals since May 1997 at over 200,000.⁵³ The new Sierra Leonean refugees have joined thousands who had fled fighting at earlier points in Sierra Leone's seven-year internal armed conflict.

Refugees poured out of Sierra Leone, sometimes at the rate of 3,000 per day, primarily into Faranah, Guéckedou, Kissidougou, and Macenta prefectures, in the forest area of eastern Guinea known as Guinée Forestière. The largest number of this population are settled in approximately 124 camps, or local settlements,⁵⁴ in Guéckedou, where refugees now outnumber Guinea nationals.⁵⁵

⁵³According to UNHCR, there are approximately 255,000 new Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea and Liberia, over 185,000 of whom arrived in Guinea since August 1997. They joined 121,000 Sierra Leoneans already in Guinea as of June 1997. An additional 128,000 Liberian refugees are also in Guinea.

⁵⁴Many of the refugees spontaneously settled in Guinea in areas abandoned by refugees from previous years and in new areas. Other refugee sites were planned by UNHCR, creating more traditional camp settings for larger numbers of people. Regardless of size, shape or history of formation, in the field the settlements are referred to by UNHCR, aid agencies, Guinean authorities and refugees alike as "camps." For the purposes of this report, the term camps will therefore be used to describe all refugee settlements. All of the camps are named after the local villages they are attached to, or are near to. In many cases, the camps are much larger than their namesakes. None of the camps are enclosed or are guarded by the Guinean military, although the border region of Guéckedou has been increasingly militarized with the increase in conflict across the border. Many military checkpoints have been established along the roads in the area. If security issues arise within the camp, they are currently dealt with by refugee camp committee authorities, who may consult with UNHCR and may refer issues to the Guinean police.

⁵⁵Sierra Leonean refugees and members of the local Guinean population do mix. Although the refugees' movement is restricted, trading does occur and the refugees sell their labor, food obtained from UNHCR, wood, kerosene and other items to nationals. They also trade their rations for a variety of other items, such as salt or rice. This interaction is made easier by similarities in the tribal languages and heritage of the groups, and many share family relationships.

Assistance

The refugees arrive in terrible shape after days, weeks, and sometimes months hiding and walking in the forest with little to eat, little to wear, and no health care. They suffer great trauma and urgently need food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention. From the outset, the crisis placed immense pressure on the Guinean civil and health authorities,⁵⁶ along with UNHCR and its implementing partners,⁵⁷ who struggled to respond.

Although UNHCR and its implementing partners in Guéckedou reported to Human Rights Watch that the situation has improved somewhat, the humanitarian response to the refugee emergency was slow and disorganized.⁵⁸ Humanitarian organizations working with UNHCR to address the crisis cite a lack of resources, particularly trucks for food distribution, and a general lack of emergency preparedness as the main factors contributing to the poor initial response.⁵⁹ Prolonged exposure to the elements during flight in Sierra Leone and in Guinea, the continuing uneven distribution of food, the lack of medical attention, and insufficient shelter have led to severe health problems, especially in the under-five population, including malnutrition, malaria, acute respiratory afflictions, and diarrhea. Infant mortality is high.

The situation became worse on June 14, 1998 when fighting intensified on the Sierra Leone side of the border with Guéckedou. Ostensibly for security reasons, the government of Guinea on June 15 blocked access to roads leading to approximately fifty refugee camps, housing over 150,000 newly arrived refugees. The lack of access made it impossible to provide adequate services to the refugees and infringed upon UNHCR's ability to provide protection over four weeks. The Guinean government's refusal to provide even limited access on a regular basis risked a humanitarian disaster and the possibility of increased insecurity and unrest among the refugee and local populations—a situation no one would have been prepared to adequately address. The World Food Program was finally permitted to deliver a week's worth of rations on July 14, feeding approximately 130,000 refugees.

The closing of access to refugee encampments and consequent blockage of humanitarian supplies can result in a severe violation of the rights to adequate food, clothing and housing, and to medical care. Guinea is a party to

⁵⁶Health services for refugees are provided through Guinea's health authority—Le Département Publique de la Santé (DPS). Refugees can report to often overcrowded and sometimes distant health posts where they can receive treatment for minor ailments and/or referrals to hospitals. At the time of Human Rights Watch's visit, hospitals were overflowing and lacked adequate medical supplies, including medicines, and had limited surgical capacity.

⁵⁷UNHCR contracts local and international nongovernmental organizations to provide food, shelter, water, health, educational, counseling, and other services to refugees. UNHCR also works with Guinean authorities, particularly in the areas of refugee security and protection and health.

⁵⁸The principal problems that refugees reported to Human Rights Watch include lack of food, medical care, shelter and the provision of non-food items. The distribution of corn meal as the main food item for refugees poses a problem for many. The staple food in Sierra Leone is rice, and refugees have difficulty preparing and digesting the corn meal. Intermittent and delayed deliveries of food have left many hungry and struggling to find sustenance. Longer-term assistance challenges include the need for adequate programs to address the psychological and social needs of survivors of trauma and sexual violence. Culturally appropriate counseling and other activities, particularly for single women, single mothers, and children should be a priority. Women alone also face ongoing self-sufficiency problems, and programs for these women with real income-generating potential are needed.

⁵⁹At the time of Human Rights Watch's visit, the arrival of a UNHCR Emergency Response team to Guéckedou in late April, along with weekly interagency coordination meetings and additional support from the international community, had gone a long way to improving the situation.

the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR) which guarantees these rights in articles 11 and 12.⁶⁰

Refugee Protection

Location of the Camps

The most immediately striking refugee protection concern in Guéckedou is the proximity of the refugee camps to the Sierra Leone border. Many of the camps, in particular those that were cut off from humanitarian assistance in June and July, are located in the area of Guéckedou which forms a peninsula-like territory stretching into eastern Sierra Leone. They are extremely close to the border with Sierra Leone; some are as little as three kilometers away.⁶¹ A river running along the border forms a natural barrier between Guinea and Sierra Leone, providing minimal protection to refugees who are in gunshot range of the AFRC/RUF soldiers, located just on the other side. Pressure on the border is growing as ECOMOG forces continue to attack AFRC/RUF-held territory in Kono and Kailahun districts, squeezing AFRC/RUF soldiers further north. In addition, the roads leading to many of the camps are extremely treacherous, even for four-wheel-drive vehicles. Once Guinea's June-November rainy season begins, the roads often become impassable.

Although all of the Guinean military and civil authorities Human Rights Watch spoke with rejected the possibility of a cross-border attack by the AFRC/RUF, the risk is clear. AFRC/RUF soldiers are located dangerously close to the border and, on several occasions in mid-June, gunfire was exchanged across the border in the Nongoa village area, resulting in casualties among the Guinean military and small numbers of civilians.⁶² Refugees from a camp in Nongoa fled the fighting.

Access to Asylum, Screening and Registration

Although Sierra Leonean refugees are granted group-based prima facie refugee status in Guinea,⁶³ and in many respects, Guinea stands out as a generous host nation, obtaining asylum is not without obstacles. Refugees

⁶⁰Although the covenant stipulates that developing countries "with due regard to human rights and their national economy" may determine to what extent they guarantee these rights to non-nationals, the Refugee Convention requires that refugees be accorded treatment in these areas not less favorable than that accorded to nationals. (Refugee Convention, Article 23 relating to public relief and assistance. Guinea is also a party to this treaty.). Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which all states are deemed to accept and adhere by virtue of their membership in the United Nations, explicitly guarantees the right to food, clothing, housing and medical care to "everyone" (Article 25).

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is charged with interpreting these economic, social and cultural rights under the ICESCR, has stated in General Comment 3 that a state party which allows any significant number of individuals to be deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, or of basic shelter and housing is "prima facie failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant." Although states parties are required to guarantee only the "progressive" realization of these rights, "[i]f the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être." The state must use "all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations." Such resources would also include proffered humanitarian assistance.

⁶¹Article 11 (6) of the OAU Convention states that "For reasons of security, countries shall as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin." This has generally been understood to mean a minimum of fifty kilometers from the border.

⁶²Human Rights Watch interviewed a ten-year-old refugee victim of a bullet wound and observed several wounded Guinean soldiers at Guéckedou Hospital, all casualties from this exchange of fire.

⁶³Lists of new arrivals are compiled by Guinean officials at the sub-prefecture and prefecture levels and given to UNHCR, which then goes out to the field, identifies, and registers the refugees.

consistently testified to Human Rights Watch that they receive a mixed welcome when they reached the Guinea border. There are no reports of forced return—*refoulement*— by the Guinean military patrolling the border, but the refugees are routinely subjected to summary searches, and border authorities extort fees and property from them prior to entry into Guinea.⁶⁴ Sixty-year-old Fea R. from Kuyoh, Kono, and her husband entered Guinea at Bakador after one month in the forest in Sierra Leone. She remembered: “We met Guinean military at the border, and they were making people pay. The soldiers took the palm oil we were traveling with.”⁶⁵

Refugees, however, also frequently expressed their appreciation for the assistance the Guinean military provided to the most vulnerable arrivals, particularly survivors of gross human rights violations, such as amputations. The soldiers transported refugees in dire need of medical assistance to hospitals in military vehicles or to places of temporary shelter.

UNHCR does not maintain a presence at border crossings, and UNHCR protection officers have rarely monitored the treatment of refugees as they seek to enter Guinea. In part, this is due to the fact that Guinean authorities have in many areas recently barred access to the border, citing security concerns. To ensure the protection of refugees seeking to enter Guinea, UNHCR should work with the government of Guinea to establish a presence at border crossing points to monitor access to asylum.

Detention and Exclusion

Human Rights Watch has received reports that possibly hundreds of suspected AFRC/RUF soldiers trying to enter Guinea have been detained by Guinean military authorities. Unlike the situation in Liberia described below, infiltration of the camps by AFRC/RUF members is not known to have happened to a large extent. Suspected AFRC/RUF members have reportedly turned up in refugee camps in small numbers and have been identified by the refugees and handed over to the Guinean authorities. For example, refugees in Fangamadou told Human Rights Watch that six suspected AFRC/RUF soldiers had been turned over to Guinean authorities, who reportedly detained them and later transferred them to jails in Conakry.

UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have both been denied access to detainees to determine whether or not they actually have bona fide asylum claims and whether they are being treated as candidates for exclusion.⁶⁶ The government of Guinea has provided no information about the detainees or the procedures and criteria used to screen, detain, and seemingly exclude these persons from protection in Guinea. The Guinean government should give UNHCR unlimited full access to entry points and places of detention of refugees and asylum seekers, including potential exclusion candidates, in order to determine their status and provide assistance and protection where appropriate.

⁶⁴ “Guinean border authorities behaved similarly with Liberian refugees returning to Liberia in 1997.”

⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Fandouyema II Refugee Camp, Republic of Guinea, June 12, 1998.

⁶⁶ UNHCR and governments are obliged under international refugee law to deny the benefits of refugee status to persons who would otherwise qualify as refugees if they have committed certain human rights violations. These provisions are commonly referred to as “exclusion clauses.” Article 1(F) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees states that the Convention “shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering” that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; (b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; (c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 1(5) of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa contains identical language and excludes from refugee status any person who “has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Organization of African Unity.”

These concerns underline the need for UNHCR to maintain a presence at entry points into Guinea, where protection officers can monitor access to asylum for new arrivals, conduct basic screening to determine group-based, prima facie refugee status and pre-screen those who may be potential exclusion candidates.⁶⁷ UNHCR should also advise the Guinean government on criteria and procedures for exclusion.

Freedom of Movement

The Guinean government has thus far failed to issue refugee identification cards to the refugees, which has created a number of problems. Without an identification card, the refugees' freedom of movement is constrained, and they risk arrest should they be stopped by Guinean military or police authorities at various checkpoints along the road. Refugees are frequently stopped, threatened with arrest, and pressured to pay what little they have in money or goods for failure to present an identification card.

William S., a refugee from Sierra Leone in Nyeadou Refugee Camp, said:

I was arrested two days ago by a police officer while I was walking along the road for not having an identification card. I had the piece of paper saying I'm a refugee from Sierra Leone, my *auto-collant* and my fixing token,⁶⁸ but he said I need an ID card. He said if I didn't pay him he was going to take me to the jail. He said if I pay FG5,000, I can get a small receipt and go by. I produced FG1,000 to get released and came straight back to the camp fast. And he didn't give me any receipt.⁶⁹

A form of identification which the Guinean authorities do recognize is available for a hefty fee (FG5,000, approximately U.S.\$5.00) from the Sierra Leonean Refugee Coordinating Committee. But the price is too high for most. UNHCR is reportedly in continued negotiations with the Guinean government regarding issuance of these cards. The slow process may be an indication of the government's desire to keep the refugee population as separate from the local population as possible.

Security

There have been few reports of crimes being committed in the refugee camps. The only incidents reported to Human Rights Watch involved refugees stealing property, such as tarpaulins, from the houses of "vulnerable"⁷⁰ refugees during the night. "Vulnerable" populations are still in the process of being identified and situated within

⁶⁷Screening for exclusion should take place after screening for refugee claims, as a person may have a valid fear of persecution but not be deserving of international protection for the reasons described. Efforts should be made, however, to ensure as much as possible that combatants and war criminals are not mixed in with the rest of the refugee population, as is currently the case in refugee camps in Liberia. Those excluded are still entitled to protection under international human rights law. For example, the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides protection against *refoulement* to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be subjected to torture.

⁶⁸The *auto-collant* is a temporary card issued to new Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea to facilitate distribution of supplies, including food. Refugees later receive a temporary card and a "fixing token," which is also used to identify refugees for distribution. The temporary card is meant ultimately to be replaced with a refugee identification card, but none have been issued. Refugees also receive a copy of their UNHCR registration form, issued by UNHCR, which identifies all of the members of their family.

⁶⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Nyeadou Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 20, 1998.

⁷⁰Certain members of the refugee population have special needs, are deemed "vulnerable" by UNHCR, and receive targeted assistance. "Vulnerable" populations include such groups as unaccompanied minors; single female heads of household; victims of torture; sexually abused; chronically ill; handicapped; mentally disturbed; blind; and others.

the camps. The location and security of these populations in the camps are ongoing concerns, as is assistance to this community.

There have also been no reports of abductions by any party taking place in the camps. Sexual attacks on women in the camps, if occurring, have not been reported. However, women alone, or with children, have been subjected to another form of sexual abuse. Human Rights Watch received reports that fellow male refugees often tell women that they will assist them in the camp only in exchange for sex.⁷¹ Volunteer social workers who work with UNHCR to identify, counsel and assist "vulnerable" refugees in Nyeadou Refugee camp said:

There are more women than men here. Women have children to take care of and no husbands. There is little money and no one to help with the family. Many women tell us that men tell them, "I'll help you if you sleep with me." This is practiced widely in all the camps. Many women agree because they are in need. It is against their real will, but they don't want to starve.⁷²

A number of refugees have been arrested for crimes committed in Guinean villages and cities. Lists of these individuals, their crimes, terms of imprisonment and location have been compiled and made available to UNHCR. UNHCR protection officers have been allowed to visit these refugees, and provide them with one meal per day.

Situation for Sierra Leonean Refugees in Liberia

From February through April 1998, approximately 42,000 Sierra Leoneans fled fighting in the eastern part of the country for Liberia, joining an existing Sierra Leonean refugee population of about 11,000.⁷³ Sierra Leonean civilians have fled on repeated occasions to western Liberia since 1991. Armed rebel groups from both Liberia and Sierra Leone have also moved back and forth across the border on numerous occasions, in order to find refuge, get supplies, such as food, and seek new recruits.⁷⁴ The refugees face serious security and assistance problems in two main camps in Liberia.

Separation of Ex-combatants from Civilian Refugees

The situation for Sierra Leoneans who fled to Liberia is different in several regards from the conditions in the refugee camps in Guinea. Aside from the smaller numbers of refugees in Liberia, the most striking contrast is the presence of former combatants among the refugee populations in the two main camps in Liberia, located at Vahun and Kolahun in northwestern Liberia. According to witnesses at the border, a large number of AFRC/RUF soldiers, perhaps over 2,000, arrived in Vahun from Sierra Leone during the months of February and March 1998. The fighters reportedly entered without weapons. At least one large group was allegedly escorted from the border at Vahun to the interior of Liberia by members of the Liberian military; some may even be Liberian nationals. Others were integrated into the general refugee or local populations. Refugees and aid workers both report that the combatants have gradually slipped away as time passed; by June 1998, a large number had either moved elsewhere in Liberia, or had returned to Sierra Leone. A significant number, probably at least several hundred, remain in the Kolahun and Vahun camps at the time of this writing.

⁷¹Human Rights Watch also received unconfirmed reports of women and girls entering into prostitution in Guinean cities and villages in order to survive.

⁷²Human Rights Watch interview, Nyeadou Refugee Camp, Republic of Guinea, June 20, 1998.

⁷³These statistics were provided by UNHCR field staff in Liberia. Other estimates varied.

⁷⁴The border between Sierra Leone and Liberia, like many in the region, is poorly controlled and subject to much traffic, both legal commerce and illegal crossings. Members of the Mende ethnic group live on both sides of the border, resulting in additional cross-border ties and regular movement between families.

Human Rights Watch interviewed Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, and foreign agency staff who, on multiple occasions, had witnessed interaction between Liberian military and members of the AFRC/RUF in the Vahun and Kolahun areas. Witnesses concurred that, in general, the interaction appeared to have been friendly, including encounters with one of the key RUF commanders, Sam Bouckarie, also known as "Mosquito."⁷⁵

Human Rights Watch also spoke with former combatants in the Vahun camp who stated that members of the AFRC/RUF had come from Sierra Leone into the camps on numerous occasions to encourage them to return to the fighting in Sierra Leone. In addition to recruitment, members of the AFRC/RUF cross the border at unofficial crossing points to sell looted goods from Sierra Leone and to purchase supplies, such as food and clothing.⁷⁶ The AFRC/RUF conduct their business in broad daylight but in civilian clothing. On June 13, Human Rights Watch observed one group of young men transporting goods on the Vahun-Kolahun road that, according to Liberians from the area, were members of the AFRC/RUF on their way back to Sierra Leone. This type of traffic is apparently frequent, according to refugees and Liberians.

Assistance and Protection in Vahun

The presence of former combatants among the refugee population has hampered humanitarian assistance for refugees, as well as their protection. In February 1998, UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), and other humanitarian organizations became aware of former combatants among the refugee population in Vahun. In view of the proximity of the Vahun camp to AFRC/RUF-controlled territory in Sierra Leone, members of the international aid community attempted to develop a plan to assist refugees as well as transfer them to a safe and accessible area in Kolahun. Much debate ensued among the international humanitarian community regarding how to avoid the danger of creating a "Goma-like" situation.⁷⁷

The proximity of the camp to AFRC/RUF fighters in Sierra Leone and the permeable nature of the border presents a clear security risk for refugees in the Vahun camp. The remote location and vulnerability of the Vahun camp has made it a target in the past: in 1993, armed rebel groups operating in the border area attacked the camp, looted UNHCR facilities, and forced the evacuation of aid workers.

Refugees in the Vahun camp also suffer from abuses by the Liberian military. Upon arrival at the Liberian border, refugees are regularly stripped of their belongings by authorities and subject to beatings if they resist. Refugees claim that Liberian military frequent the camps and openly steal from them, at times in the presence of international aid workers.⁷⁸ Refugees face the constant risk of theft, rape, or other abuse especially when traveling to fields that they till, nearby markets, or other destinations outside the camps. Refugees and medical workers in Vahun also claim that rape, often by Liberian military, is a serious problem for refugees.

Some members of international agencies and nongovernmental organizations have expressed strong criticism at the disjointed and very slow response to the present precarious situation in Vahun. By June 1998, refugees in Vahun had received only one fourteen-day ration from UNHCR since their arrival (most refugees had arrived in

⁷⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 14, 1998.

⁷⁶Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 14, 1998.

⁷⁷The reference is to Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire, near the border town Goma. The international community was widely criticized for allowing camps in this area to be set up too close to the border with Rwanda and for not taking steps to separate out armed elements and those responsible for the genocide from civilian refugees. This allowed for aid to benefit combatants and war criminals, and exacerbated insecurity in the region.

⁷⁸Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 13, 1998.

February and March), and no concrete plan to separate combatants from civilian refugees had been put into place by the Liberian authorities or UNHCR. Refugees also complained that mixed signals from UNHCR had left them confused as to whether they should stay in Vahun or relocate to Kolahun. Human Rights Watch repeatedly heard reports from refugees who said they had been told by UNHCR to build their shelters in Vahun in order to receive tarpaulins and other assistance, only to be told later that they need to move to Kolahun in order to receive assistance.

According to medical aid workers, by June 1998 the lack of humanitarian assistance to the Vahun camp had led to a serious decline in the nutritional health of the refugees. The shortage of assistance created enormous tension in the refugee camps. Refugees and aid workers noted that as pressure on the refugee and local populations increased, theft was rising and it was likely that many of the former combatants would return to Sierra Leone to rejoin the fighting, or else resort to banditry in Liberia. Refugees also claimed that they would at times risk crossing back into AFRC/RUF territory across the border in Sierra Leone to search for food. At least one refugee single mother of three had disappeared while seeking palm oil in Sierra Leone; the caretaker of her children claimed that the woman had been abducted by AFRC/RUF while in Sierra Leone.⁷⁹

Assistance and protection has further been compromised by the onset of the rainy season and poor road conditions,⁸⁰ as well as a lack of resources for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. UNHCR was able to maintain only one field officer at the Vahun camp, home to some 42,000 refugees in June 1998.

Kolahun Camp

Protection, security, and humanitarian conditions in the Kolahun camp, some fifty kilometers from the border, are far better than in the Vahun camp. Some refugees have been hesitant to move to the Kolahun camp, however, due to cultural and family ties with the local Mende population in Vahun. These ties create better opportunities for crop cultivation and small business ventures for those who stay in Vahun. Refugees also explained that they do not want to relocate to Kolahun, first, because of the forbidding prospect of establishing new shelters and fields (already established in Vahun) during the rainy season; second, many are unable to make the three-day journey due to age, illness, or nutritional status; and third, they are receiving unclear messages regarding where and when aid will be delivered. By mid-June 1998, some 10,000 refugees had relocated to Kolahun; while approximately 32,000 remained in Vahun, waiting for clearer signals from UNHCR as to future assistance.⁸¹

V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Overshadowed by conflict in Liberia and events elsewhere on the continent, Sierra Leone has largely escaped the attention of the international community. Over the past seven years, aside from the involvement of diamond mining firms, international interest has focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of the internal conflict and, to a lesser extent, finding political or military solutions to end the violence. Until recently, human rights concerns have largely taken a back seat to emergency relief, support for military interventions, or efforts to negotiate peace between the various warring parties.

⁷⁹Human Rights Watch interview, Vahun, Liberia, June 14, 1998.

⁸⁰Deteriorating road conditions due to heavy rain are likely to cut off road access to the Vahun and Kolahun camps and also to camps in Guinea.

⁸¹According to statistics from UNHCR field office, Vahun, Liberia, June 13, 1998.

The recent surge in atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has raised a limited level of awareness from the international community regarding the human rights implications of the crisis. In general, the plight of civilians in Sierra Leone has had to compete with other refugee-related emergencies for the attention of international players. This competition, often with crises in Europe, combined with a general lack of funds for UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies, has resulted in insufficient responses to the political, humanitarian, and human rights situation in Sierra Leone. In the words of one human rights worker, "half the battle is keeping Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia on the world's radar screen."⁸²

In June 1998, a team of three experts from the World Bank visited Sierra Leone to discuss and refine a program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) with the Sierra Leonean government. The World Bank, UNDP, and other donors have agreed to fund this program, to be carried out by ECOMOG. The United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) will have the critical role of monitoring and assisting with the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants and assuring the respect for international humanitarian law during this process.⁸³ The success of this program and the humane treatment of former combatants from all sides will be crucial to bring about an end to the conflict in Sierra Leone.⁸⁴

A major challenge to the international community is developing policies and providing assistance that protect human rights and promote peace and stability in the long run. Some past and present policies of governments and international organizations, as discussed below, have targeted only short-term political, economic, or military objectives, while ignoring fundamental human rights concerns. As the reinstated Kabbah government rebuilds national institutions of justice, and ECOMOG creates a new national army, the international community is presented with a unique opportunity to promote human rights in Sierra Leone.

The United Nations

In response to political, military, humanitarian, and human rights developments since February 1998, the U.N. presence in Sierra Leone is undergoing significant expansion. In early July, following a report on Sierra Leone from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved a measure to establish the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL),⁸⁵ subsuming and expanding the office of the U.N. Special Envoy to Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL's role will increase the present U.N. military observer presence from approximately ten to seventy officers along with support and medical staff. Its mandate will include monitoring and helping ECOMOG with the DDR program for combatants; reporting on the security situation; and "monitoring respect for international humanitarian law at disarmament and demobilization sites."⁸⁶

The secretary-general's June report also calls for adding three human rights officers to support the existing human rights advisor in the Office of the Special Envoy. These officers "would have a monitoring role and the task of addressing the country's long-term human rights institution building needs."⁸⁷ A July 13 U.N. Security Council

⁸²Human Rights Watch interview, relief organization representative, Freetown, June 24, 1998.

⁸³Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998.

⁸⁴Lawyers and international observers in Freetown have called into question the respect for due process in the ongoing trials of fifty-nine civilians being tried on various charges related to collaboration with the AFRC/RUF. Whether or not these fifty-nine are given a fair trial may send a strong message to AFRC/RUF members considering laying down their arms and enrolling in an eventual DDR program.

⁸⁵United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.

⁸⁶Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, June 9, 1998.

⁸⁷Ibid.

Resolution further states that UNOMSIL should advise the "Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies."⁸⁸ The Security Council also reiterated the secretary-general's report in calling for UNOMSIL to "report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in Sierra Leone, and in consultation with the relevant U.N. agencies, to assist the government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs."

In addition to these statements, United Nations officials have paid significant attention to the human rights situation in Sierra Leone in recent months, largely due to the scale and horrific nature of atrocities committed against civilians. Several agencies have sent high-level delegations to the region, while five senior U.N. officials issued an unprecedented joint statement calling for an end to the atrocities and impunity, and underscoring the need for an International Criminal Court to hold perpetrators accountable for the atrocities.⁸⁹

The current crisis in Sierra Leone is a brutal reminder to the delegations now meeting in Rome of the urgent need for an effective international criminal court to provide justice for the appalling violations of human rights in that country and elsewhere. Since April this year, rebel forces in the east, north and, more recently, the west of Sierra Leone have engaged in a terror campaign involving the systematic laceration, mutilation or severing of limbs of non-combatants, including children and the elderly.

In addition to the office of the special envoy, other U.N. agencies in Sierra Leone have engaged in a number of initiatives in recent months designed to protect rights and promote reconciliation and peace. In conjunction with the U.N. special envoy for Sierra Leone and the U.N. special representative for children in armed conflict, UNICEF has pushed for the creation of a joint task force for the demobilization of child combatants and other measures to protect the rights of children. Among other U.N. initiatives in human rights and civic education, UNDP approved a \$2.5 million support program in June to the Sierra Leonean National Commission on Democracy and Human Rights to promote reconciliation, forgiveness, and civic education.⁹⁰

It will be critical that these programs put into practice the principles that they preach. ECOMOG's poor human rights record in the past raises questions about its appropriateness as trainer of the new Sierra Leonean army, unless it is closely monitored and assisted by qualified UNOMSIL personnel. The National Commission on Human Rights and Democracy has also been widely criticized for being corrupt and inefficient. Donors must ensure that implementing organizations or government ministries have the technical expertise, capacity, and will to implement these and other programs that promote or protect human rights. Monitoring and coordination among the various implementing U.N. agencies, government ministries, and NGOs will be critical to making good use of funds dedicated to rights issues.

As required by its mandate, UNOMSIL should insist that ECOMOG respect the rights of demobilized combatants and that high standards are maintained throughout the training of the new Sierra Leonean army in international humanitarian law. Linked with this responsibility, UNOMSIL should work closely with ECOMOG to

⁸⁸United Nations Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), S/RES/1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.

⁸⁹Sergio Vieira de Mello, the under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, Olara Otunnu, the special representative of the secretary-general for children in armed conflict, and Soren Jensen Peterson, the assistant high commissioner for refugees, have all recently visited the region. Mr. Vieira de Mello and Mr. Otunnu were joined by Carol Bellamy, executive director of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Mary Robinson, United Nations high commissioner for human rights, and Sadako Ogata, United Nations high commissioner for refugees, in making the joint declaration on June 18, 1998.

⁹⁰"UNDP approves USD 2.5 million Awareness Plan." *For di People*, Freetown newspaper, June 24, 1998.

monitor arms flows and recruitment in support of AFRC/RUF. Human Rights Watch received numerous allegations that the AFRC/RUF was continuing to receive arms from outside the country, via land and air. In order to monitor and deter military support to the AFRC/RUF, a strong presence of UNOMSIL will be necessary to monitor arms trafficking, in particular along the porous border with Liberia. The monitoring of the Liberian border should be performed in conjunction with ECOMOG forces in Liberia.

The Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS, and ECOMOG

ECOWAS and ECOMOG have played key roles in recent political negotiations and military interventions respectively in Sierra Leone. As part of bilateral security accords, Nigerian forces and Guinean forces have been in Sierra Leone since 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government to fight the RUF. The Nigerian and Guinean forces were in Sierra Leone at the time of the May 25, 1997 coup, and later reinforced ECOMOG's efforts to oust the AFRC/RUF.

Following the 1997 coup, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on ECOWAS to restore constitutional order to Sierra Leone. When their negotiations with the AFRC/RUF failed to achieve progress, ECOWAS imposed an economic embargo, which was later reinforced by an October 1997 U.N. Security Council global arms and oil embargo⁹¹ and restrictions on international travel by AFRC/RUF members and their families.⁹² ECOMOG enforced these sanctions with the permission of ECOWAS and the Security Council. With the failure of diplomatic efforts and the escalation of tension, ECOMOG's mandate was upgraded from sanction enforcement to actual military intervention to oust the AFRC/RUF. The ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone is led by Nigerian Commander Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe and composed of approximately 9,000 troops, predominately Nigerian with several Guinean support battalions. As of June 23, Gambia, Ghana⁹³ and Niger⁹⁴ had all promised to send troops to reinforce ECOMOG. In late July, ECOMOG announced that it was finishing the transfer of its headquarters from Monrovia to Freetown and that an additional 3,500 troops would soon arrive.⁹⁵

While residents of Freetown and Sierra Leonean refugees consistently stated that ECOMOG's role in ousting the AFRC/RUF and enabling a return to civilian rule was welcome, international humanitarian groups complained that shelling by ECOMOG led to a high number of civilian casualties. One humanitarian organization in Freetown at that time stated that even after ECOMOG had been provided with maps of high-density population zones and medical structures, shelling continued in these areas for several days, resulting in over 600 war-wounded hospital admissions during a nine-day period in early February.⁹⁶

Despite these serious allegations, ECOMOG has been praised by the Sierra Leonean press and international community, largely due to its military success in Sierra Leone and significant improvements in its conduct since its intervention in Liberia. United Nations military observers and aid workers attributed the improvements in ECOMOG's human rights record to improved supervision, more regular payment of salaries, and a sensitivity to past

⁹¹Petroleum for humanitarian purposes was permitted.

⁹²U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Situation Report #1, January 28, 1998.

⁹³Integrated Regional Information Network, Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN-West Africa Update 169, March 19, 1998.

⁹⁴"More ECOMOG Troops Due," page 1, *Daily Mail*, Freetown newspaper, June 23, 1998.

⁹⁵Integrated Regional Information Network, Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, IRIN-West Africa Weekly Roundup, July 24, 1998.

⁹⁶Human Rights Watch interview, New York, July 15, 1998.

criticisms.⁹⁷ ECOMOG has also evacuated dozens of war victims via helicopter and road, saving many civilian lives. However, ECOMOG and Kamajor commandeering of humanitarian vehicles has been, in the words of the director of one aid organization, "blatant and prevalent."⁹⁸ In response to this problem, which has significantly obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid, the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (HACU) organized a seminar for ECOMOG and Kamajors in the Bo district in May.⁹⁹ In May and June 1998, ECOMOG and the Ministry of Defense repeatedly declared in public that the Kamajors were entirely under the control of ECOMOG.¹⁰⁰ While the obstruction of aid decreased after this and subsequent seminars and the arrival of logistical support and trucks donated by the United States in May, at least one humanitarian group stated that ECOMOG had yet to return one aid vehicle by late June 1998.

ECOMOG holds the key responsibilities of disarming and demobilizing combatants as well as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. ECOMOG commander Maxwell Khobe has stated that the new army will be ethnically and regionally balanced.¹⁰¹ ECOMOG's past human rights record in Liberia and problems in the present, however, underscore the need for UNOMSIL to provide assistance and closely monitor the disarmament, demobilization, and training processes to assure that the new army is founded upon principles of respect for international humanitarian law.¹⁰²

Misinformation regarding the security situation in Sierra Leone has created serious risks for both Sierra Leonean refugees and civilians within the country. ECOMOG, along with Sierra Leonean government and some U.N. officials, has downplayed the capacity of the AFRC/RUF and portrayed the security conditions in Sierra Leone as safe and returning to normal in many districts. This information has contrasted sharply with reports from aid organizations with a field presence as well as from other U.N. officials. During a humanitarian assessment mission to Koidu on June 10, aid workers were told by an ECOMOG commander on the scene that the area had been entirely secured by ECOMOG and that security was "no problem."¹⁰³ Several hours later, after the mission left Koidu, AFRC/RUF forces began the first of several sustained attacks over four days on the town, temporarily pushing ECOMOG out of strategic positions.¹⁰⁴

Information regarding the security situation in Sierra Leone reaches refugees generally through international radio and new arrivals to the camps. Refugees reported that misinformation regarding security conditions in Sierra

⁹⁷ECOMOG succeeded in Liberia in stopping the bloodshed and ethnic violence on several occasions, and human rights benefits clearly flowed from the intervention. However, ECOMOG did not integrate human rights into its activities, which has been a serious shortcoming. ECOMOG allied itself with other warring factions, which clearly undermined its credibility. It was responsible for extensive looting, harassment and detention of civilians. There were also serious concerns about the civilian toll and violations of medical neutrality by ECOMOG air strikes in Liberia.

⁹⁸Human Rights Watch interviews with aid organizations, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 22-25, 1998.

⁹⁹Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, June 9, 1998.

¹⁰⁰Human Rights Watch interview with Sierra Leone Deputy Minister of Defense, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 25, 1998.

¹⁰¹Press conference led by Brig. Gen. Maxwell Khobe, Wilburforce military base, June 25, 1998, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

¹⁰²See Human Rights Watch, "Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace."

¹⁰³Human Rights Watch interview with aid organization that participated in the mission, Freetown, June 23, 1998.

¹⁰⁴Human Rights Watch interviews with several members of the assessment mission, Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 23, 24, and 25, 1998.

Leone had on several occasions led to voluntary repatriation to zones perceived as safe. Human Rights Watch interviewed refugees in Guinea who claimed that dozens of refugees had been killed while attempting to return to the Koidu area in April.¹⁰⁵ Their decision to repatriate was made following declarations on international radio claiming that area was under the control of ECOMOG. In order to protect refugees, civilians in Sierra Leone, and humanitarian workers, both ECOMOG and UNOMSIL should ensure that accurate information regarding security conditions is provided to the public, especially to refugees, internally displaced persons, and aid workers.

The United Kingdom, European Union and United States

Since May 1998, the United Kingdom, European Union (E.U.), and United States have issued several strong statements denouncing the human rights violations committed by the AFRC/RUF in Sierra Leone. On May 21, 1998, the U.S. Department of State and European Union issued a joint statement which expressed their grave concern over the atrocities.

The European Union and the United States strongly condemn these horrific actions and urge all parties to call an immediate end to the senseless slaughter, mutilation, and torture of the civilian population and show full respect for human rights.¹⁰⁶

In June, the U.S. and E.U. sent a joint high-level assessment mission to the region led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Julia Taft which resulted in financial pledges for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. These calls for an end to atrocities against civilians and financial commitments for humanitarian assistance should be combined with long-term support from the U.S. and the E.U. that promotes human rights and the rule of law.

In addition to its support of elections in 1996, the E.U. has had a significant and growing presence in Sierra Leone and neighboring countries affected by the refugee flows. Through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the E.U. has been the most important donor of non-food humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone, contributing over 20 million European Equivalency Units (ECU) (over U.S. \$22 million), since 1993, mostly to support the activities of international humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). ECHO has also provided aid in response to the refugee crisis in Guinea and Liberia, while the European Commission has been a long-term supporter of development activities and infrastructure projects in Sierra Leone. ECHO is now considering a 6 million ECU (U.S. \$ 6.6 million) global aid package for assistance in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Both the U.S. and U.K. have played significant roles in recent political and military developments in Sierra Leone. The U.S. is the single largest donor in response to the Sierra Leonean crisis, having contributed \$53 million in food, humanitarian and other aid in fiscal year 1998, including support for ECOMOG. The British have led fund-raising efforts at the European Union for the 1996 elections, ECOMOG, and other assistance. Both the U.S. and the U.K. have provided support for the Nigeria-led ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁷ In May, the U.S. State

¹⁰⁵Human Rights Watch interview, Koundou Lengo Bengo Refugee Camp, Guéckedou, Republic of Guinea, June 5, 1998.

¹⁰⁶U.S. Department of State, "Sierra Leone: Rebel Atrocities Against Civilians," May 21, 1998.

¹⁰⁷In a further effort to support ECOMOG and retake power, the Kabbah government engaged Sandline, a private security firm. Sandline claims that it imported between twenty-eight and thirty-eight tons of small arms and ammunition to ECOMOG with the consent of the British government. The arms were impounded by ECOMOG forces and never used. However, a scandal ensued because the shipment could constitute a violation of a U.N. or a U.K. arms embargo against Sierra Leone. U.N. legal analysts subsequently determined that the U.N. embargo had not been broken. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook ordered an investigation into whether anyone in the Foreign Office had knowledge of or gave consent to such a shipment. The investigation is ongoing.

Department announced \$3.9 million for logistical support to ECOMOG through Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE).¹⁰⁸ PAE is a U.S.-based military logistics firm contracted to provide transportation, communication, and other support to ECOMOG. The U.K. has contributed £2 million (U.S. \$ 3.3 million) to a U.N. trust fund for peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone, some of which may be used to support ECOMOG.

This support for ECOMOG should be accompanied by close monitoring of its conduct and complemented by additional efforts to protect human rights. The U.S. and U.K. should closely monitor the performance of ECOMOG in international humanitarian law observance and in its disarmament, demobilization, and training efforts. In particular, the U.S. and U.K. should insist on high-quality training in international humanitarian law for the new Sierra Leonean army and on the humane treatment of demobilized combatants from all sides. The U.K. has sent an evaluation team to Sierra Leone to consider a police training program to Sierra Leone. The success of these types of initiatives in contributing to building institutions that protect human rights will depend largely on their careful design and monitoring of their implementation.

Both the U.S. and the U.K. have encouraged negotiated solutions to end the violence, most recently during talks at Abidjan in November 1996 and at Conakry in October 1997. Since the scale of atrocities has increased, the U.K. has been cautious about promoting negotiations with the AFRC/RUF. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, U.K. High Commissioner Peter Penfold stated that the U.K. was not pushing in "public or in private" for negotiations with the AFRC/RUF. The U.S. has taken a more open stand, stating that it:

did not preclude any possible option that might lead to peace. ECOWAS, with the support of the international community, must explore every political avenue and determine the best way to proceed."¹⁰⁹

The U.S. elaborated that the RUF and former junta leadership must first, however, "unambiguously and honestly renounce" atrocities against civilians before talks could begin.

The U.S. has been a key supporter of humanitarian organizations, including the UNHCR, and has recently promised an additional \$19.5 million to support international humanitarian organizations working in response to the Sierra Leonean crisis and for the repatriation of Liberian refugees. Additional funds have been allocated to supporting civic education, and, to a lesser extent, the initiatives of local human rights groups. Through its Office of Transition Initiatives, the U.S. is providing \$900,000 in programs for war-affected children, the reintegration of former combatants, and to promote reconciliation. The U.S. should continue to expand its funding for well-coordinated training and support programs for civil society, in particular for local organizations promoting human rights and the rule of law.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report, based on findings from a mission to Sierra Leone in June 1998, was written by Scott Campbell and Jane Lowicki, consultants to the Africa division of Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Peter Takirambudde, executive director of the Africa division, Regan Ralph, executive director of the Women's Rights division, Lois Whitman, executive director of the Children's Rights division, Dinah PoKempner, deputy general counsel, Michael McClintock, deputy program director, Reed Brody, advocacy director, Rachael Reilly, refugee policy director, Janet Fleischman, Washington director of the Africa division, and Binaifer Nowrojee, counsel to the

¹⁰⁸Human Rights Watch telephone interview with U.S. Department of State official, May 25, 1998.

¹⁰⁹Hearing on Sierra Leone before the House Subcommittee on Africa, June 8, 1998, Statement of Johnnie Carson, principal deputy assistant secretary for African affairs.

Africa division. Production assistance was provided by Ariana Pearlroth, associate for the Africa division, Patrick Minges, publications director, and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

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200	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "We'll kill you if you Cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict" Vol. 15 No. 1 (A), January 2003.


 HUMAN
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SIERRA LEONE

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New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
<http://www.hrw.org>
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Vol. 15, No. 1 (A) – January 2003



A woman receives psychological and medical treatment in a clinic to assist rape victims in Freetown. In January 1999, she was gang-raped by seven rebels in her village in northern Sierra Leone. After raping her, the rebels tied her down and placed burning charcoal on her body. (c) 1999 Corinne Dufka/Human Rights Watch

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kaiu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

-Testimony to Human Rights Watch

“WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY” SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

1630 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
TEL (202) 612-4321
FAX (202) 612-4333
E-mail: hrwdc@hrw.org

2nd Floor, 2-12 Pentonville Road
London N1 9HF, UK
TEL: (44 20) 7713 1995
FAX: (44 20) 7713 1800
E-mail: hrwuk@hrw.org

15 Rue Van Campenhout
1000 Brussels, Belgium
TEL (32 2) 732-2009
FAX (32 2) 732-0471
E-mail: hrwbe@hrw.org

SIERRA LEONE

“WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY” Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All People's Congress
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CCSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CDF	Civil Defense Forces
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CMRRD	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development
C. O.	Commanding Officer
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
E.U.	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
IRC	International Rescue Committee
FAWE	Forum for African Women Educationalists
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PHR	Physicians for Human Rights
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SBU	Small Boys Unit
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
VRF	Vasico-rectal Fistula
VVF	Vasico-vaginal Fistula
WHO	World Health Organization

DEFINITION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, RAPE AND SEXUAL SLAVERY

In this report:

Sexual violence is an overarching term used to describe “[a]ny violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality.”¹ Sexual violence includes rape and attempted rape, and such acts as forcing a person to strip naked in public, forcing two victims to perform sexual acts on one another or harm one another in a sexual manner, mutilating a person’s genitals or a woman’s breasts, and sexual slavery.

Rape as defined in the appeals chamber judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 2002 *Foca* case is “[t]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) [of] the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The *mens rea* is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”² The appeals chamber rejected the “resistance” requirement argued by the appellants as it is justified neither in law or fact, and stated that the use of force in itself is not a necessary element of rape. The coercive circumstances present in the Foca rapes, which were committed in circumstances similar to the crimes of sexual violence perpetrated in Sierra Leone, made the victims’ consent to the sexual acts impossible. The use or threat of force often removes any requirement that a victim show resistance and most jurisdictions have discarded the idea that a rape victim must resist under all circumstances as impractical, if not absurd. This definition also underscores that rape is an attack on the physical integrity of a woman and not an attack against her honor or that of her family or community.

Rape was defined in the judgment of the *Akayesu* case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as “[t]he physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive” and is not limited to the insertion of a penis into a victim’s vagina or anus or the insertion of a penis in the mouth of the victim.³ This definition, however, has been criticized for being too broad and has not been included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Sexual slavery, defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1953 Protocol amending the same convention, refers to “[t]he status, or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.”⁴ The Statute of the ICC includes the trafficking of women and children in its definition of enslavement.⁵

¹ United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur (New York: United Nations, 1998), E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1998/13, pp. 7-8.

² *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Foca case)*, Appeals Chamber Judgement, June 12, 2002, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, paras. 127-133.

³ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998, para. 688.

⁴ United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, p. 9. Sierra Leone ratified the Slavery Convention on March 13, 1962.

⁵ Article 7 (1) (g) lists enslavement as a crime against humanity with the definition given in Article 7 (2) (c). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, Article 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). The Rome Statute entered into force on April 11, 2002 and the ICC has the authority to prosecute the most serious international crimes from July 1, 2002.

I. SUMMARY

Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2001, thousands of women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including individual and gang rape, and rape with objects such as weapons, firewood, umbrellas, and pestles. Rape was perpetrated by both sides, but mostly by the rebel forces. These crimes of sexual violence were generally characterized by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by other egregious human rights abuses against the victim, her family, and her community. Although the rebels raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, they targeted young women and girls whom they thought were virgins. Many of these younger victims did not survive these crimes of sexual violence. Adult women were also raped so violently that they sometimes bled to death or suffered from tearing in the genital area, causing long-term incontinence and severe infections. Many victims who were pregnant at the time of rape miscarried as a result of the sexual violence they were subjected to, and numerous women had their babies torn out of their uterus as rebels placed bets on the sex of the unborn child.

Thousands of women and girls were abducted by the rebels and subjected to sexual slavery, forced to become the sex slaves of their rebel "husbands." Abducted women and girls who were assigned "husbands" remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. Many survivors were kept with the rebel forces for long periods and gave birth to children fathered by rebels. Some abducted women and girls were forcibly conscripted into the fighting forces and given military training, but even within the rebel forces, women still held much lower status and both conscripted and volunteer female combatants were assigned "husbands." For civilian abductees, aside from sexual violence their brutal life with the rebels included being made to perform forced labor, such as cooking, washing, carrying ammunition and looted items, as well as farm work. Combatants within the rebel forces had considerable latitude to do what they wanted to abducted civilians, who were often severely punished for offenses as minor as spilling water on a commander's shoes. Escape for these women and girls was often extremely difficult: In many instances, the women and girls, intimidated by their captors and the circumstances, felt powerless to escape their life of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels sometimes made escape more difficult by deliberately carving the name of their faction onto the chests of abducted women and girls. If these marked women and girls were caught by pro-government forces, they would be suspected of being rebels, and often killed. Even though many women did manage to escape, some escaped from one rebel faction or unit only to be captured by another. An unknown number of women and girls still remain with their rebel "husbands," although the war was declared over on January 18, 2002.

The main perpetrators of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, were the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC. Human Rights Watch has documented over three hundred cases of sexual violence by the rebels; countless more have never been documented. From the launch of their rebellion from Liberia in March 1991, which triggered the war, the RUF perpetrated widespread and systematic sexual violence. Its ideology of salvaging Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) regime quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's abundant diamond mines. The AFRC, which consisted of disaffected soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who in May 1997 overthrew the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, were also responsible for subjecting thousands of women and girls to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. After the signing of the peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, in July 1999, sexual violence, including sexual slavery, continued unabated in RUF-controlled areas and was also perpetrated by the West Side Boys, who operated outside of the capital, Freetown. The human rights situation worsened after the May 2000 crisis when fighting broke out again, until relative peace was re-established, with U.N. and British assistance, by mid-2001. The prevalence of sexual violence peaked during active military operations and when the rebels were on patrol. Even in times of relative peace, however, sexual violence continued to be committed against the thousands of women and girls who were abducted and subjected to sexual slavery by the rebels. No region of Sierra Leone was spared.

Human Rights Watch has documented only a limited number of cases of sexual violence by pro-government forces, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the militia known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the latter consisting

of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were called upon by the government to defend their native areas. Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the SLA prior to 1997. This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between rebel and government soldiers, as the latter frequently colluded with and disguised themselves as RUF forces. Sexual violence was committed relatively infrequently by the CDF, whose internal rules forbid them from having sexual intercourse before going to battle and who believe their power and potency as warriors depends upon sexual abstinence. Some of this internal discipline, however, was lost as CDF moved away from their native areas and traditional chiefs and were given more responsibility in national security. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the largest and most powerful CDF group, the Kamajors, who operate predominantly in the south and east.

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by peacekeepers with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean contingent and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian soldiers near Kenema. There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by peacekeepers with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the majority of whom were Nigerian, deployed at an earlier stage in the war, were rare. Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women, including the solicitation of child prostitutes, whilst deployed in Sierra Leone.

Rape in wartime is an act of violence that targets sexuality. Moreover, conflict-related sexual violence serves a military and political strategy. The humiliation, pain, and fear inflicted by the perpetrators serve to dominate and degrade not only the individual victim but also her community. Combatants who rape in war often explicitly link their acts of sexual violence to this broader social degradation. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone was no exception. The rebels sought to dominate women and their communities by deliberately undermining cultural values and community relationships, destroying the ties that hold society together. Child combatants raped women who were old enough to be their grandmothers, rebels raped pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, and fathers were forced to watch their daughters being raped.

To date there has been no accountability for the thousands of crimes of sexual violence or other appalling human rights abuses committed during the war in Sierra Leone. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty under Sierra Leonean law for offenses committed by all sides, as the price for the RUF/AFRC agreeing to lay down arms. The United Nations (U.N.) stated that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty insofar as it purported to apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Two important transitional justice mechanisms, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have been established with U.N. assistance and are tasked with investigating the human rights abuses, including sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed by all parties during the war. Both bodies were operational by the third quarter of 2002. The SCSL, a hybrid national and international court, is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law" committed in the Sierra Leonean conflict since November 30, 1996. As the SCSL is likely to try only a very limited number of persons, due to funding constraints, a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy is essential, with a strong affirmation that gender-related crimes will be thoroughly and competently investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The TRC, provided for under the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement partially to offset the controversial amnesty it also included, has the mandate to establish an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law from the outset of the war in 1991, promote reconciliation, and make recommendations aimed at preventing a repetition of the violations committed. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight the crimes of sexual violence committed throughout the entire country during the armed conflict and make recommendations to strengthen the promotion and protection of women's human rights.

Sexual violence has remained Sierra Leone's silent war crime. Until recently, little attention has been paid either nationally or internationally to this less visible human rights abuse, although sexual violence was committed on a much larger scale than the highly visible amputations for which Sierra Leone became notorious. The underreporting is a reflection of the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone as well as the internal shame that survivors suffer and their fear of rejection by family and communities. Women and girls in Sierra Leone are subjected to structural discrimination by practice, custom and law. They face discrimination in terms of education and employment, in the political arena, and in other walks of life. Both customary law, which governs the majority of the population, and general law, which was inherited from the United Kingdom and is primarily applied in Freetown, discriminate against women and girls in terms of family law, as well as property and inheritance rights. In addition, the provisions pertaining to rape under general and customary law offer inadequate protection. The misinterpretation of the complicated provisions of general law by the police and courts means, for example, that those who are alleged to have sexually assaulted a minor are generally charged with "unlawful carnal knowledge of a child," for which the sentence is lighter, rather than rape. Under customary law, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. The victim may also be forced to marry the perpetrator.

The concept of sexual violence as a crime in itself is a very recent one in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society. Only rape of a virgin is seen as a serious crime. Rape of a married woman or a non-virgin is often not considered a crime at all: as in many countries, there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act, or she is seen as a seductress. The virtual destruction of Sierra Leone's already corrupt and inefficient court system and police force during the war, moreover, created a climate of impunity that persists, allowing perpetrators of sexual violence (as well as other crimes) to escape justice.

The lack of attention to conflict-related sexual violence means that few assistance programs have been established for women and girls who were subjected to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. Survivors not only live with the severe physical and mental health consequences of the abuses suffered, but also fear ongoing non-conflict-related sexual violence, largely perpetrated with impunity. International donors and nongovernmental organizations should work together with the government of Sierra Leone to establish programs (health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes) that will help to rehabilitate the survivors of sexual violence. To combat impunity and work toward changing societal attitudes toward sexual violence, the government of Sierra Leone should, with the technical and financial support of the international community, revise its discriminatory laws to ensure that they meet international standards. The constitution also needs to be reviewed and the provision exempting personal and customary law from the prohibition against discrimination removed. In addition, the government should take steps to improve the response of the legal system to ongoing sexual and domestic violence, including strategies for effective prosecution and protection. A nationwide public awareness campaign also needs to be undertaken to educate the general population on women's human rights.

Women have a crucial role to play at this critical phase in Sierra Leone's history, but they will only be able to contribute fully in a civic culture in which women and girls are respected as equal partners and gender-based abuses are not tolerated.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Sierra Leone

- Take all necessary measures to ensure that former rebels release all women and girls abducted during the armed conflict who continue to be held. Provide these women and girls with the necessary social and economic options to enable them to leave these often abusive relationships.
- Prioritize the nationwide establishment of reproductive health clinics for women and girls that can provide testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, along with other services.
- Revoke or revise existing laws (general, customary and Islamic) that discriminate on the basis of gender and ensure that they meet international human rights standards. Take the necessary steps to amend the constitution to remove the provision exempting personal law and customary law from the prohibition on gender-based discrimination. Provide training on these new laws for the judiciary, police, prosecutors, and staff of local courts.
- Establish an inter-ministerial task force with representatives from nongovernmental organizations to deal with the conflict-related sexual violence and related current problems facing women, with the aim of improving the social, medical and legal responses to women's and girls' needs.
- Take steps to improve the response of the legal system to ongoing sexual and domestic violence, including strategies for effective prosecution and protection, such as recruiting and training more female police officers, allowing nongovernment doctors to examine victims and providing legal aid to victims.
- Mainstream gender within the government and government policies. Launch a nationwide public awareness campaign on sexual and domestic violence against women to dispel the prevailing societal attitudes to sexual and domestic violence against women.
- Provide training on human rights and international humanitarian law, with a focus on women's human rights issues and gender-based crimes, to members of the security forces.
- Repeal the provision in the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement Act that grants amnesty to all warring parties, so that individuals who committed acts of sexual violence (and other crimes) during the war may be prosecuted in the domestic courts.
- Cooperate fully with the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- Establish an independent national human rights commission as provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement that will contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights beyond the lifespan of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

To Members of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

- Provide military personnel participating in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone (and elsewhere) with training in human rights and international humanitarian law, including a focus on women's human rights issues, and gender-based crimes. Ensure that peacekeepers understand the U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers, which provides that peacekeepers should not commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children. Prosecute any nationals that have been repatriated from Sierra Leone for crimes of sexual violence in line with the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL.

- Issue a statement, jointly, if possible, declaring your willingness to support the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to surrender any alleged war criminals to it. Commit to extraditing to Sierra Leone individuals indicted by the Special Court, take the legal steps that may be necessary to ensure that this can happen (for example, by amending extradition laws), and otherwise cooperate with the Special Court, for example, by locating witnesses or providing information.

To Members of the International Community

- Prioritize the funding of reproductive health clinics for women and girls that can provide testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, along with other services.
- Greatly increase funding for legal reform programs, including training, to ensure that both the laws and domestic courts meet international standards, as well as for programs that will establish better medical, legal and social support services for survivors of sexual violence.
- Monitor all aspects of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to ensure that cases involving sexual violence and sexual slavery are fully prosecuted and that survivors and witnesses of sexual violence receive necessary protection and support throughout the judicial process and post-trial period. Cooperate with the court and take the necessary steps for the extradition or surrender of persons indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
- Fund the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and monitor it to ensure that conflict-related sexual violence and sexual slavery are fully investigated and properly documented by the TRC in a gender sensitive manner.
- Prosecute military personnel, who have been repatriated from Sierra Leone in line with the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL.

To the Special Court for Sierra Leone

- Conduct thorough investigations into incidents of sexual violence against women and girls including sexual slavery during the war for possible prosecution under the court's mandate. Ensure that gender-integrated teams investigating these acts have competence in investigating rape and conducting interviews with rape victims, who should only be interviewed by experienced female investigators.
- Ensure the gender crimes investigators conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. Ensure the gender crimes investigators have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.
- Recruit a staff member with expertise in juvenile justice who can provide training on juvenile justice issues and interviewing skills for staff dealing most directly with young children.
- Establish a strong Victims and Witnesses Unit with protection and support for prosecution and defense witnesses. Protect and support the victims and witnesses not only during the investigation and trial phase but extend this to post-trial protection, where appropriate.
- Provide judges, prosecutors and defense counsel with strict guidance to prevent them from unnecessarily re-victimizing witnesses on the stand or releasing their identity publicly in violation of protective measures.

To the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

- Recruit an experienced gender advisor with expertise in sexual violence, and ensure staff of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is gender balanced at all levels.

- Recruit a staff member experienced in dealing with child victims and perpetrators who can provide training on how to interview young children.
- Investigate and document fully gender-based abuses committed throughout the country. Ensure survivors of sexual violence are heard in a manner that ensures their dignity and safety, and avoids any re-traumatization. Guarantee the confidentiality of these hearings when confidentiality is requested.
- Highlight gender-specific abuses in the final report on the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as recommendations on legal reform to ensure that the domestic laws and courts meet international standards; on human rights training for the judiciary and law enforcement officers; and on the assistance needs of survivors.
- Promote public awareness of gender-based crimes through the media umbrella organizations, NGOs and mobile community outreach teams as well as the creation of an information and resource center.

To the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

- Investigate fully any allegations of sexual violence by UNAMSIL personnel, which will serve to enforce the policy of zero tolerance for any such acts perpetrated by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL. Establish a mechanism with the Sierra Leone Police whereby cases of sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff member, including the provost marshal and gender specialist in the human rights section. Establish a mechanism to follow up on cases that have resulted in military personnel who commit such crimes being repatriated to their country of origin to ensure that states properly prosecute the offender. Civilian staff that have perpetuated sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file so that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.
- Provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff and ensure the human rights unit systematically monitors and reports on issues of gender-based violence. Ensure that peacekeepers understand the U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers, which provides that peacekeepers should not commit any act that could result in the physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children.
- Collaborate with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to revise the U.N. Code of Conduct and the Military Observer Handbook, ensuring that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Compile similar guidelines for civilian staff.
- Provide capacity building with a focus on women's human rights issues to national women's groups and human rights organizations across the country under the guidance of the gender specialist in UNAMSIL human rights units.

III. METHODOLOGY

Over three hundred women and girls were interviewed by Human Rights Watch as part of ongoing research and for this report. For a variety of reasons, including the lack of an ideological aspect and the limited ethnic dimension to the civil war in Sierra Leone and the all-pervasiveness of abuse, victims of human rights abuses, including survivors of sexual violence, generally feel free to talk very openly about their experiences.⁶

Great care was taken with the victims to ensure that recounting their experience did not further traumatize them. While we sought as much information as possible from each interview, the well-being of the interviewee was always paramount and some interviews were cut short as a result. The interviews were conducted in private settings in the presence of a female interpreter. The interviews with survivors were mostly conducted in Krio, the *lingua franca* of Sierra Leone, or in one of the other languages spoken by the different ethnic groups and interpreted into English. In most interviews only females were present and in the few cases where a man was present, it was with the permission of the interviewee. In order to guarantee the confidentiality of all information, interviewees are not identified by name.

In addition to the survivors, government officials, law enforcement officers, lawyers, key figures from the rebel forces, health personnel, religious leaders, and representatives of local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the areas of human rights, women's rights, and health, as well as U.N. officials were interviewed.

IV. BACKGROUND

The Civil War

Sierra Leone is a coastal West African country that shares borders with Guinea and Liberia. It has a population of close to five and a half million (July 2001 estimate) composed of sixteen ethnic groups.⁷ These are the Fullah, Gola, Koranko, Kissi, Kono, Krim, Krio, Limba, Loko, Mandingo, Mende, Sherbro, Susu, Temne, Vai and Yalunka. The Mende, in the south, and the Temne, in the north, are the largest ethnic groups (around 30 percent each). The Krio, who are descendants of freed slaves, were settled in the area of Freetown (now the capital) in the late eighteenth century and make up 10 percent of the total population. The educated Krio minority generally still occupies a higher social and economic position and has traditionally been resented by the other groups. Sierra Leone was a British colony, and English is Sierra Leone's official language. Krio, largely based on English vocabulary but with its own grammar, is the first language of the Krios as well as Sierra Leone's *lingua franca*. Though there are no reliable figures, Sierra Leone is a predominantly Muslim country (around 60 percent) with the remainder of the population practicing indigenous religions (10 percent) and Christianity (30 percent).⁸

In 1961, Sierra Leone gained its independence from the United Kingdom. For most of the next three decades, Sierra Leone was governed by the All People's Congress (APC), dominated by the northern Temne and Limba ethnic groups, which came into power in 1967.⁹ The corruption, nepotism and fiscal mismanagement under the one-party rule of the APC led to the decay of all state institutions and the impoverishment of Sierra Leone's population, notwithstanding the country's large deposits of diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite. Frustration with government corruption and mismanagement led to the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1984. The RUF claimed to be a political movement with the aim of salvaging the country and overthrowing the APC. Its invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia on March 23, 1991 triggered the civil war that was to last ten years.

⁶ Women and girls who have been raped can be presented and/or perceived either as victims or survivors and there is an ongoing debate as to which is the more appropriate term. In this report, both terms are used interchangeably without significant distinction.

⁷ See <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html>.

⁸ See <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5730.htm>.

⁹ See generally, J.A.D. Alie, *A New History of Sierra Leone* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

At its inception, the RUF consisted of a mixture of middle class students with a populist platform, unemployed and alienated youths, and Liberian fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who had helped Charles Taylor in his quest to become the president of Liberia. A lesser-known covert sponsor of the RUF was the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), with its ethnic base among the Mendes from the south, which also sought the overthrow of the APC.¹⁰ The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal who had been imprisoned in 1971 for his alleged involvement in an attempted coup against the APC. Sankoh had also reportedly received training in Libya with Taylor.¹¹ The RUF initially consisted of two small groups of only 150 combatants in total. As the RUF captured border towns and villages in Kailahun and Pujehun districts, they used tactics similar to those used to terrorize civilians during the Liberian civil war: seizing and summarily executing chiefs, village elders, traders, government agents and suspected SLA collaborators.¹² The violence and looting or "jah-jah," especially by the Liberian mercenaries within the RUF, was sanctioned by Sankoh who justified them as reward for the mercenaries' support.¹³ The RUF's ideology of salvation quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's diamond and other mineral wealth. From the very beginning, the RUF's campaign of terror included sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed on a widespread and systematic basis.

In April 1992, APC President Joseph Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by twenty-six-year-old army captain Valentine Strasser, who formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Strasser vowed to end corruption and create opportunities for all Sierra Leoneans. The new regime, however, was as corrupt as the old. The RUF continued to gain strength and was joined by numerous soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who were disgruntled with their poor conditions. These soldier-rebels or "sobels" discarded their uniforms at night to loot but wore government uniforms and continued to work for the government during the day. The "sobels," who included officers, also provided weapons, ammunition, and intelligence to RUF forces.

Starting in January 1991, Momoh and later Strasser embarked on a recruitment drive that swelled the army's ranks to approximately twelve thousand, aiming to dislodge the RUF including by offering its youthful constituency a lucrative alternative. Many of the new soldiers were unemployed drifters, petty criminals, and street children as young as twelve. Given the inability of the undisciplined and ill-trained SLA to drive out the RUF, in March 1995, Strasser invited Executive Outcomes (E.O.), a South African private security company, to fight the RUF and guard the mining areas, in return for concessions over their production. The RUF was by that time approaching Freetown and controlled most of the diamond mining areas. By December 1995, E.O. had retaken a number of key diamond areas and began to collaborate with the pro-government militia known as the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), of which the Kamajors are the largest and most powerful.

The CDF movement began with the establishment of the Eastern Region Defence Committee in 1993-4 and was greatly expanded in 1996 when regent chief Hinga Norman was appointed deputy minister of defense in Kabbah's government and head of the CDF, with the government providing the CDF with training, weapons and food.¹⁴ The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were used by the government to defend their native areas. The Kamajors operate mainly in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbettis in the north and the Donzos in the far east. Civilians who joined the CDF underwent initiation ceremonies, which were said to bestow magical powers, making them immortal and invincible.¹⁵ Units of fighters were initially deployed only in their own chiefdoms to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the

¹⁰ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (London: The International African Institute in association with James Currey and Heinemann, 1996), p. 7. When the RUF first invaded from Liberia, villagers in Kailahun were ordered to cut palm fronds—the symbol of the SLPP—"in support" of the rebels.

¹¹ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 173-178.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 185. By 1999, the CDF had grown into a movement of an estimated fifteen thousand fighters who had to be disarmed and demobilized.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* This is a throwback to the venerated esoteric Mende cult of invincible traditional hunters who were given power through initiation ceremonies. These powers enabled the hunters, *inter alia*, to turn into an animal in order to catch their prey.

best use of their superior bush knowledge. The CDF, in contrast to the SLA and the RUF, had the support of the local civilians and were very effective, overrunning main RUF camps in late 1996 with the support of E.O. and the army.

In January 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. Bio initiated peace negotiations with the RUF, which had begun to suffer a number of defeats, as well as a program to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule. In March 1996, elections were held, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP, who pledged to bring about an end to the war, became president of Sierra Leone.

In November 1996, the RUF and Kabbah's government signed the Abidjan Peace Accord, which provided for a ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, an amnesty to the RUF, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The ceasefire was broken in January 1997, however, when serious fighting broke out in southern Moyamba district. In January 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria on an arms charge and imprisoned by the Nigerian government.

In May 1997, fourteen months after assuming power, President Kabbah was overthrown in a coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who formed a new government called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Koroma had escaped from prison, where he had been held following an earlier attempted coup in September 1996. The AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and announced rule by military decree. Days of looting by soldiers followed the coup, which also ushered in a period of political repression characterized by arbitrary arrests and detention. An attempt by Nigerian and Guinean troops (who had been in Sierra Leone since 1995 as part of bilateral security accords to give support to the NPRC), supported by South African mercenaries, to oust Koroma failed.¹⁶

The AFRC consisted primarily of disgruntled ex-SLA soldiers who had become disillusioned by President Kabbah's decision to cut back support for the military. Koroma also cited the government's failure to implement the peace agreement as the reason for the coup. The SLA accused Kabbah of having put greater confidence for the country's defense in and giving more economic resources to the CDF than to the army. Formalizing an alliance between the army and the rebels based on joint opposition to President Kabbah and the SLPP, the AFRC invited the RUF to join its government in June 1997.

From exile in Guinea, President Kabbah mobilized international condemnation for and a response to the coup makers. In response to a plea from Kabbah, hundreds of Nigerian troops based in Liberia as part of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) moved to Freetown, reinforcing ECOMOG colleagues already based at the Freetown airport to defend it from attacks by the RUF. Nigerian vessels stationed off Freetown shelled the city, reportedly killing at least fifty people. Nigerian forces were, however, eventually forced to withdraw from around the capital. In August 1997, following the AFRC's announcement of a four-year program for elections and return to civilian rule, which represented a breakdown in negotiations initiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS established a strict economic embargo against Sierra Leone. In October 1997, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution also imposing mandatory sanctions on Sierra Leone, including an embargo on arms and oil imports, which ECOMOG forces were mandated to enforce.

After negotiations in Guinea under the auspices of ECOWAS, the Kabbah government-in-exile and the RUF/AFRC signed an agreement on October 23, 1997, providing for the return to power of President Kabbah by April 1998. The RUF/AFRC, however, undermined the implementation of the accord by stockpiling weapons and attacking the positions of ECOMOG forces. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces together with Kamajor militia launched an operation that drove the RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown. In March 1998, President Kabbah was

¹⁶ See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (A), June 1999, p. 8 for a discussion of the role of foreign mercenaries in the armed conflict. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition or Travesty? Nigeria's Endless Process of Return to Civilian Rule," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 9, no. 6, October 1997, for a discussion of the Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone.

reinstated. Over the succeeding months ECOMOG forces were able to establish control over roughly two-thirds of the country, including all regional capitals: as of mid-1998, the ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone was composed of approximately 12,500 troops, predominantly Nigerian with support battalions from Guinea, Gambia, Ghana and Niger.¹⁷ Sankoh was transferred to Sierra Leone from Nigeria and incarcerated in July 1998. In October 1998, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone tried and sentenced Sankoh to death for his role in the 1997 coup.

Once expelled from Freetown, the AFRC/RUF rebels tried to consolidate their own positions in other parts of the country. The Kabbah government, which had negligible forces of its own, had to rely on ECOMOG to stay in power. Through a series of offensives, the RUF/AFRC managed to gain control of the diamond-rich Kono district and several other strategic towns and areas. By late 1998, the rebels had gained the upper hand militarily and were in control of over half of the country, including all the mineral-rich areas. From this position, the RUF/AFRC launched a major offensive on Freetown in January 1999.

The battle for Freetown and ensuing three-week rebel occupation of the capital were characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of a wide range of abuses against the civilian population, and marked the most intensive and concentrated period of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war. At least five thousand civilians were killed and one hundred civilians had limbs amputated, including twenty-six double arm amputations. Thousands of women and girls, including girls as young as eight, were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence. In addition, the rebels used civilians as human shields, both while advancing towards ECOMOG positions and as a defense against ECOMOG air power. They also burnt whole neighborhoods, often with the residents in their houses.

Government and the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces also committed serious human rights abuses, though on a lesser scale, including over 180 summary executions of rebels and their suspected collaborators. Prisoners taken by ECOMOG, some of who had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were executed on the spot often with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Officers to the level of captain were present and participated in the executions. ECOWAS officials have yet to initiate a formal investigation into these killings.

As the RUF/AFRC were driven out of Freetown in February 1999, they abducted thousands of civilians, who were used to carry looted goods and ammunition, forcibly conscripted into fighting or used for forced labor. Thousands of girls and women were used as sex slaves by the rebels and forced to "marry" rebel husbands. As they moved eastward, the rebels continued to commit egregious human rights abuses, including killings and amputations, particularly in the villages around the towns of Masiaka, Lunsar, and Port Loko.¹⁸

In the months following the January invasion, and as a result of intense international pressure, Kabbah's government and RUF rebels signed a ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999,¹⁹ followed by a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, on July 7, 1999.²⁰ Sankoh was released from prison by the Sierra Leonean government to participate in the peace negotiations. The accord, brokered by the U.N., the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and ECOWAS, committed the RUF/AFRC to lay down its arms in exchange for representation in a new government. Sankoh was given the chairmanship of the board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) and the status of vice-president.²¹ Johnny Paul Koroma was made the chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), provided for under Article 6 of the peace agreement.²²

¹⁷ See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (A), July 1998.

¹⁸ See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," for a comprehensive report on the January 1999 invasion.

¹⁹ See the annex to U.N. Security Council report, S/1999/585, May 18, 1999.

²⁰ Lomé Peace Agreement at <http://sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>.

²¹ Article 5 (2) of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

²² The RUF delegation to the peace talks in Lomé included members of the AFRC who were also appointed as ministers as part of the agreement to share power.

The peace agreement also included a general amnesty for all crimes committed by all parties during the civil war until the signing of the peace agreement.²³ At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general's special representative attending the talks added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, the peace agreement mandated the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a national human rights commission.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), initially established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security conditions, was transformed into a much larger peacekeeping mission.²⁴ In October 1999, months later than had been planned, UNOMSIL, which at its maximum deployment included 192 military observers as well as a small human rights unit of four persons, was transformed into the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was mandated to maintain the peace and monitor the ceasefire and had a maximum authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers.²⁵ The human rights unit was authorized to expand to a total of fourteen human rights officers. Two further Security Council resolutions followed, increasing the authorized troop strength to 11,100²⁶ and then 13,000.²⁷

The peace process was marred by cease-fire violations, missed deadlines and infighting within rebel ranks. The RUF/AFRC failed to comply with several commitments, including the release of all civilian abductees. There was a relative decrease in human rights abuses following the peace agreement, although the RUF/AFRC continued to terrorize the civilian population in the north and east, which largely remained under its control. Sexual violence, in particular against the thousands of abducted women and girls, continued. In addition, a splinter group of the AFRC known as the West Side Boys established numerous bases in the Occra Hills near Freetown, from where they staged looting raids. The West Side Boys abducted hundreds of civilians, including girls and women, whom they raped and kept as sex slaves. In August 1999, they took hostage for one week forty-two members of a U.N.-led delegation composed of ECOMOG soldiers, religious leaders, aid workers, and journalists, who had gone to the Occra Hills to have abducted children released to them.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program progressed slowly, with only 25,000 out of a total 45,000 combatants demobilized by May 2000.²⁸ There was also considerable delay in the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces, with only 8,700 peacekeepers deployed by the same month. The peace process then broke down completely, when, in early May, the RUF captured over five hundred UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers deployed in the north and the east, holding them for several weeks.²⁹ The conflict erupted again throughout the country and many of the combatants, including child combatants, who had been disarmed and demobilized, were re-conscripted. The human rights situation deteriorated sharply with numerous reports of RUF abuses, including murder, widespread rape, abduction, forced labor, and looting. During a demonstration in Freetown to protest the collapse of the peace process and hostage taking of the peacekeepers, twenty-two civilians were killed outside the house of the RUF leader, Sankoh. On May 17, 2000, several days

²³ Lomé Peace Agreement. Under Article 9 (1) of this agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone was required to grant Sankoh absolute and free pardon. Article 9 (3) refers to the amnesty granted to all combatants of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF for any crimes they may have committed in pursuit of their objectives (*See below*, p. 61, for a discussion on the amnesty).

²⁴ U.N. Security Council resolution 1181, S/RES/1181 (1998), July 13, 1998.

²⁵ U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

²⁶ U.N. Security Council resolution 1289, S/RES/1289 (2000), February 7, 2000.

²⁷ U.N. Security Council resolution 1299, S/RES/1299 (2000), May 19, 2000.

²⁸ U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation report, May 29, 2001. *See* <http://www.relief.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B>.

²⁹ The hostages in the north were released on May 28, 2000. The hostages in the east, however, were not released until June 29, 2000. Two hundred and thirty-three peacekeepers and military observers who had been encircled by the RUF were finally freed by the U.N. military operation "Khukri" on July 15, 2000.

after the demonstration, Sankoh was arrested by the government and held in custody, together with over 125 members of the RUF, without charge, using powers under a state of emergency declared in 1998.

There was also a disturbing intensification of abuses by pro-government forces. The Sierra Leonean government caused numerous civilian casualties through helicopter gunship attacks during May and June 2000 against the RUF strongholds of Makeni, Magburaka, and Kambia. Abuses by both the government forces and the RUF caused the displacement of some 330,000 civilians from behind rebel lines. Civilians leaving RUF territory were often captured and accused of being rebel sympathizers by the CDF. Whereas previously sexual violence against women had been very uncommon among the CDF, numerous cases of sexual violence were reported, including gang rape by Kamajor militiamen and commanders.

When, in May 2000, it seemed as though the fighting would threaten Freetown again, several hundred British soldiers were rapidly deployed to Sierra Leone—in the first instance to evacuate foreign nationals who wished to leave, but also to secure the airport, allow reinforcement of the U.N. contingent, and assist in the reorganization of the pro-government forces as an effective fighting force. At their maximum, there were more than 1,200 British soldiers in Sierra Leone, though they began to withdraw within two months of the first deployment. UNAMSIL was rapidly brought up to strength: by June 5, 2000 there were 11,350 U.N. troops in the country.

At the behest of Johnny Paul Koroma, the West Side Boys in May 2000 briefly fought on the government side to prevent the RUF from entering Freetown. However, they continued to commit human rights abuses, and in August 2000 abducted eleven British soldiers of the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) and one SLA officer. In September 2000, the West Side Boys bases were destroyed during an operation by British paratroopers to free the captured soldiers. Numerous West Side Boys, including their leader, were arrested and incarcerated.

From September 2000 through April 2001, RUF rebels and Liberian government forces acting together attacked refugee camps and villages accommodating several hundred thousand Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees just across the border with Guinea. Following the attacks, Guinean security forces and the local population retaliated against the refugees, frequently looting, raping, and unlawfully detaining them. Guinean forces also responded to these RUF raids by killing and wounding dozens of Sierra Leoneans in indiscriminate helicopter and artillery attacks in the rebel-held areas in the north of Sierra Leone. Guinean troops conducted several ground attacks during which several civilians were gunned down and girls and women were raped.

In November 2000, the government and RUF signed a cease-fire, which committed both parties to restarting the disarmament process, the reestablishment of government authority in former rebel-held areas, and the release of all child combatants and abductees. On March 30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council authorized the further expansion of UNAMSIL to 17,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers. These forces, contributed by Bangladesh, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Zambia, were deployed into RUF strongholds, including the diamond-rich Kono district.³⁰ The DDR program recommenced in May 2001, and by the end of 2001 over three thousand child soldiers, abductees, and separated children had been released by the RUF and the CDF.

During this period, serious human rights abuses continued to be committed, though on a reduced scale. Fighting between the RUF and the CDF broke out in the east of the country in June through August 2001, leaving tens of civilians dead. RUF forces committed scores of serious abuses including rape, murder, and abduction. The victims of these abuses included Sierra Leoneans returning from refugee camps in Guinea; Guinean civilians who were attacked during the cross-border raids by the RUF from September 2000 through April 2001; and Liberians fleeing renewed fighting in Lofa county of Liberia from April 2001. While the RUF released or demobilized more than 1,500 male child combatants, they were reluctant to release Sierra Leonean and Guinean female abductees, most of whom are believed to have been sexually abused.

³⁰ U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

The human rights situation continued to improve in 2002, with the disarmament and demobilization phases declared completed. By January 2002, 47,710 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. On January 18, 2002, the armed conflict was officially declared to be over in a public ceremony attended by many dignitaries. In addition, the state of emergency was lifted for the first time in four years on February 28, 2002. Following the end of the state of emergency, the government charged Sankoh, and the other RUF and West Side Boys members held in custody since May 2000, with a number of crimes, including murder and related charges. The resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from Guinea and Liberia was ongoing as of the writing of this report. By July 2002, approximately 250,000 refugees and IDPs had been resettled. The RUF transformed itself into a political party and nominated presidential and parliamentary candidates for elections held on May 14, 2002.

In the elections, President Kabbah's SLPP was re-elected for a second term and faced the challenge of rebuilding the country and its economy. After a decade of war, Sierra Leone ranks last out of 162 countries in terms of life expectancy at birth; adult literacy; combined enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and GDP per capita.³¹ Fifty-seven percent of Sierra Leone's population struggles to survive on only U.S. \$1 per day.³² Unemployment is rampant and the current economy is driven by the presence of UNAMSIL and other international organizations. Investors who could create desperately needed jobs remain cautious given the rampant corruption that permeates all levels of Sierra Leonean society and their concerns about regional security.

Women and Girls under Sierra Leonean Law

The Sierra Leonean Legal system

Three systems of law—general, customary, and Islamic—co-exist in Sierra Leone.

General Law

General law consists of the statutory law (codified) and common law (based on case law) mainly inherited from the United Kingdom, the former colonial power. General law is administered through the formal court system, which follows the usual Commonwealth structure, under which the High Court hears more important cases, and magistrates courts the less important ones, both civil and criminal. There is an appeal system, first to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate court of appeal and also hears cases relevant to the interpretation of the constitution. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court are located in Freetown. A High Court and magistrates courts are constituted in Freetown. The High Court was re-established in Kenema and Bo in 2002 and there are magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Port Loko.³³ The court system in the provinces, which had a limited infrastructure before the war broke out in 1991, was virtually destroyed during the war—the High Court has not held hearings outside Freetown for six years—and was only gradually being rehabilitated from 2002. Access to the judiciary for rural Sierra Leoneans is further limited by their lack of funds for lawyers, or even transport money.

Only a small number of women, primarily those who reside in the Western Area (where Freetown is located) and women with sufficient funds, have access to the formal court system. As many general law provisions have not been updated since colonial days, the protection that general law affords women is often only marginally better than that provided under customary or Islamic law.

Customary Law

Customary law is defined by the 1991 constitution as "the rules of law by which customs are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone."³⁴ Although there are sixteen ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, a general treatment of customary law is justified, as there are many fundamental similarities between the customary laws of

³¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 141-144.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³³ An itinerant judge covers the High Court in both Bo and Kenema.

³⁴ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter XII - The Laws of Sierra Leone, Section 170 (3). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-xii.html>.

these ethnic groups.³⁵ Customary law has not been written down or codified and is only applied by the local courts.³⁶ These courts operate in the provinces and not in the Western Area, which is historically where the Krio and the British colonizers settled. A chairman presides over the local courts with the assistance of chiefdom councilors who are knowledgeable in customary law. The chairmen in theory should be independent from the paramount chiefs who used to preside over the local courts before reforms were introduced both prior to and after independence.³⁷ Customary law officers who are trained lawyers are supposed to review decisions of local courts and provide training to the personnel of local courts. The government Law Officers' Department, however, remains chronically understaffed, and few of the customary law officers' posts are filled.

As the majority of Sierra Leoneans live in the provinces, customary law governs at least 65 percent of the population in relation to issues not reserved by statute to the magistrates courts or High Court. In practice, issues that should be dealt with in the magistrates courts and High Court are also dealt with under customary law. In addition to problems accessing the formal court system, rural Sierra Leoneans, in particular, have historically always preferred to administer justice amongst themselves to ensure that good community relations are maintained in villages where the other residents are invariably relatives by marriage or descent, rather than turning to outsiders.

Although customary law is not applied in the formal court system, it is recognized and there is some interaction between the two systems. There is the right of appeal from the local courts to the District Appeal Court, where a magistrate sits with two assessors who are chiefdom councilors from the given area of the local court and are knowledgeable about the customary law in their respective areas.³⁸ The assessors advise the magistrate on questions of customary law, with the decision remaining with the magistrate. Likewise, a decision of the District Appeal Court can be appealed to the High Court, with the High Court judge being advised by assessors with expertise in customary law.³⁹

Islamic Law

Islamic law has been recognized by statute in Sierra Leone in relation to marriage, divorce, and inheritance among Muslims.⁴⁰ Otherwise, Islamic law, if applicable at all, is considered part of customary law. In this report, Islamic law is therefore treated as part of customary law except when referring to the specific areas dealt with by the Mohammedan Marriage Act, and cases involving Islamic law are heard by the local courts. Criminal *sharia* law is not applicable in Sierra Leone.

Constitutional Status of Women

In theory, Sierra Leonean women are granted equal rights to men under the 1991 constitution, which provides as one of the "fundamental principles of state policy" that the state "... [s]hall discourage discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, sex, religion,..."⁴¹ The equal rights of women are again underscored in the human rights chapter of the constitution.⁴² Under Section 27 of the constitution, however,

³⁵ H. M. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law* (Freetown: Atlantic Printers Ltd., 1983), p. 6.

³⁶ See 1963 Local Courts Act.

³⁷ Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest*, p. 46.

³⁸ Section 29 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

³⁹ Section 31 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act.

⁴⁰ The Mohammedan Marriage Act (Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960) deals with marriage, divorce, and intestate succession. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 20. Intestate successions occur when the deceased did not leave a will.

⁴¹ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter II - Fundamental Principles of State Policy, Section 6 (2). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-ii.html>. Under Section 8 (2) (a), "... [e]very citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the law..." and specific safeguards of equality before the law in terms of health care, employment and education are provided under Section 8 (3) (d); Section 8 (3) (a), (c), (e) and Section 9 (1) (a), (b) and (2) respectively.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Chapter III - The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, Section 15. See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-iii.html>. Section 15 provides that "every person in Sierra Leone is entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public

discrimination is permitted, *inter alia*, under laws dealing with "adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law," which have direct bearing on the rights of women, as well as under customary law.⁴³ This important contradiction in the constitution—similar to that in many African constitutions—has contributed to the low status of women in Sierra Leone, as it legitimizes the application of discriminatory customary law. No protection from discriminatory customary law can be sought under the constitution on the basis of sex. Customary and Islamic laws also continue to be widely applied, notwithstanding the fact that legislation provides that general law should prevail over customary law when customary law is "repugnant to statute or natural justice, equity, and good conscience."⁴⁴

Marriage

The rights of married women remain limited, particularly for those married under customary and Islamic laws, which govern most marriages. Women married under the general law have comparatively more rights.⁴⁵

A married woman's position under customary law is comparable to that of a minor: a woman is generally represented by her husband who has the right to prosecute and defend actions on his spouse's behalf.⁴⁶ Sierra Leonean women can gain status through marriage as well as through their role as mothers: a woman's status within society and the polygynous household increases with the number of children she bears. Sierra Leone has one of the highest birth rates in the world, with the average number of children born to each woman estimated at 6.5.⁴⁷ Most households are polygynous, apart from the monogamous Christians (approximately 30 percent of the population); under customary law, a husband can marry as many wives as he wishes. Muslims (60 percent of the population) can marry up to four wives.

Under customary law, a girl is considered of marriageable age once her breasts have developed, her menses have started and she has been initiated, which could mean as young as twelve. Marriages are usually arranged, and the consent of the bride-to-be is not considered essential in most ethnic groups, but the consent of the girl's/woman's family is required.⁴⁸ The fact that a girl is considered "ready" for marriage at such a young age and her consent is not sought has contributed to the common practice of early forced marriages. Men wishing to marry do not need to seek consent from their own parents. The statutory age of marriage under general law is twenty-one years.

interest, to each and all of the following—(a) life, liberty, security of person, the enjoyment of property, and the protection of law; (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; (c) respect for private and family life, and (d) protection from deprivation of property without compensation."

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Section 27. Subsection 27 (1) provides that "Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5), and (7), no law shall make provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect." Under Subsection 4, however, the protection provided under Subsection 1 does not apply "... (d) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law, or (e) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe or customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons." Discrimination is also permitted against persons who are not citizens of Sierra Leone or naturalized Sierra Leoneans. According to Dr. Tucker, former Chairperson of President's Kabbah's Advisory Committee, the original intent of Section 27 was "to preserve certain areas of segregation which are embedded in traditional practices and are generally acceptable to both sexes, such as the segregation between male and female secret societies. What was taken up in the constitution was more extensive than what was intended." Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Tucker (Consultant on the Law Development Program funded by the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID)); Freetown, April 25, 2002.

⁴⁴ Section 2 of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

⁴⁵ Marriages under the general law are governed, *inter alia*, by the Christian Marriage Act, (Cap. 95), the Civil Marriage Act (Cap. 97), and the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap. 102).

⁴⁶ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 98. Under customary law, a Sierra Leonean woman is always under the guardianship of a male relative.

⁴⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 157. This figure is based on births recorded for 1995-2000.

⁴⁸ Consent is a very relative term, as girls generally will find it very difficult to disobey their parents' wishes, which can result in severe punishment, including ostracism from the immediate and extended family.

Under Islamic law, a male or female dependant can be given in marriage against his or her will, and the legal guardian of an adult woman has the right to object to her choice of husband if the prospective husband is not of equal birth.⁴⁹ Under customary law, a dowry is usually paid to the wife's family. Under Islamic law, the dowry is paid to the bride, although the contract is concluded with the legal guardian of the bride-to-be.⁵⁰

Under customary law, a wife can only refuse to have sexual intercourse with her husband if she is physically ill, menstruating or suckling a young child. She can also refuse intercourse during the daytime, in the bush or during Ramadan.

Under customary law, a wife's decision-making powers are limited since she is obliged to always obey her husband. This lack of decision-making power means that women in families where the breadwinner is the man find it very difficult to influence decisions on how the (generally) little income that the family makes is disbursed. Under customary law, a married woman must ask her husband for permission to work outside the house or visit her family. In families where the woman has been given permission to work outside the house and is the breadwinner, it seems that the added responsibility has not necessarily come with increased decision-making power.

A wife, especially in rural communities, is expected to cultivate food for herself and her children, whilst the husband's responsibility is limited to providing accommodation and clothing.⁵¹ A wife residing in an urban area is generally given a lump sum of money by her husband to start a small business, usually petty trading. If the business fails, the wife must refund the capital to her husband. Given the heavy work burden on women, however, there is little opportunity for women to seek remunerated work outside the house.

Divorce and Death of Husband

Under customary law, both parties can bring divorce proceedings either extrajudicially or judicially before a local court, but in practice women are generally not as free to do so as men.⁵² Only the husband has the right to divorce through unilateral repudiation.⁵³ A wife married under customary or Islamic law may, however, seek dissolution of marriage on grounds of impotence of the husband, for example.⁵⁴

Under customary law, the dowry is refundable upon divorce. Dowries paid to poor families are sometimes set purposely excessively high to ensure that the wife's family will not sanction a divorce given their inability to repay the dowry, again highlighting how little control women married under customary law have over their lives.⁵⁵ Under general law, a husband is expected to pay alimony for his wife and children on divorce, which both parties may initiate.⁵⁶

When a husband dies, the widow is expected under customary law to undergo a mourning period and rituals.⁵⁷ It is only after these rituals that widows are considered purified and can remarry. Some ethnic groups

⁴⁹ Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 161-2.

⁵⁰ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 161.

⁵¹ Full maintenance of his wife is only the responsibility of the husband during the rainy season (approximately between the months of May and November) or when his wife is sick or nursing a baby. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, pp. 106-7.

⁵² Judicial divorces are rare as they are more expensive. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-149.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-4.

⁵⁴ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 165.

⁵⁵ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 79. Strict tribal Muslims do not require that the dowry be repaid on divorce.

⁵⁶ Christian Marriage Act, Cap. 95 of the revised Law of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 7 (2), s. 15 (1) (b), and s. 5 respectively.

⁵⁷ A widow must mourn for forty days. Her head is shaved or, in some chiefdoms, disheveled and her body is washed with the same water used to wash her husband's corpse. In some chiefdoms her body is smeared with mud to indicate her mourning. After either one week or forty days for strict Muslims, widows are taken to a stream to be ceremonially washed.

still insist that if the widow remarries, she does so within her deceased husband's family, otherwise all marriage payments are refundable.⁵⁸

As Sierra Leone is a patrilineal society and the husband has custodial rights over children, children are handed over to the husband's family head upon his death.⁵⁹ Under Islamic law, the mother has the right to care for a boy child until the age of nine and a girl child until she comes of age.⁶⁰

Under customary matrimonial property law, a wife is generally only able to keep her own possessions and her self-acquired property in the event of divorce or death. A wife is generally not entitled to keep property acquired through the joint efforts of husband and wife and has no rights over the matrimonial home.⁶¹ Nor can a wife inherit under Islamic law: either the eldest son or brother or the official male administrator of the deceased inherits.⁶² Under general law, a wife is also only entitled to one third of her deceased husband's property, if he has not made a will.

This denial of inheritance rights of women is a major problem given the large number of war widows who are now able to return to their villages of origin, but have no access to land.

Domestic Violence

Societal attitudes to domestic violence are another indicator of the status of women and girls in society; physical violence against women and children is common in Sierra Leone. Indeed, under customary law, a husband has the right to "reasonably chastise his wife by physical force."⁶³ If the husband is persistently cruel and frequently beats his wife to the point of wounding her or causing her great pain, the wife can divorce her husband, but under customary law a single act of physical and brutal force is permitted. A population-based assessment of war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone carried out by Physicians for Human Rights among 991 female-headed households in camps for displaced people found that, although 80 percent of women surveyed expressed that there should be legal protections for the rights of women, more than 60 percent of the women believed that a husband had the right to beat his wife.⁶⁴

Rape as a Crime under General Law

The laws governing rape in Sierra Leone are very confusing even for persons working in the criminal justice system, such as members of the judiciary and police force. They are also archaic and date back to the British 1861 Offences Against the Person Act. Under this Act, rape is defined as "the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent by force, fear or fraud."⁶⁵ Penetration (however slight) is required to constitute the crime of rape.⁶⁶ In addition, although a child is defined as a person under the age of sixteen,⁶⁷ Sierra Leonean law makes the extremely unhelpful distinction between unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen and

⁵⁸ The Mende, Krim, Sherbro, Vai, Karonko and Yalunka adhere to this custom, whereas the Temne, Susu, Limba, Loko, Kissi and Kono allow a widow to select her own husband and do not require a refund of the marriage payments if she marries outside her deceased husband's family. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 138.

⁵⁹ If the couple was married under general law, the custody of the children is often determined by the courts, which generally grant the mother custody of the children.

⁶⁰ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 167. In practice, the mother and children will stay with whomever has the money to provide for them.

⁶¹ As customary marriages are generally polygynous, a divorce with one of the wives would result in the dissolution of the whole household if she were to ask for a refund for her contribution to building the house. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, pp. 113-120.

⁶² Mohammedan Marriage Act, Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 9.

⁶³ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, p. 152.

⁶⁴ Physicians for Human Rights, *War-related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-based Assessment* (Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002), p. 55 (hereafter referred to as PHR report).

⁶⁵ Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c 100), s. 63. Unlawful carnal knowledge refers to sexual intercourse between unmarried persons. The law does not actually forbid or make sexual intercourse between unmarried persons a punishable crime, but it only recognizes the right to sexual intercourse for married couples.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (1926), Cap. 31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone 1960, s. 2.

unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between thirteen and fourteen years of age. The law is unclear about unlawful carnal knowledge committed against persons aged between fourteen and sixteen, although the few cases involving this age group that have gone to trial have reportedly been prosecuted as rape.⁶⁸

Nor is the age of consent explicitly stated, although it is presumably by necessary implication sixteen years old. Marital rape does not exist under Sierra Leonean statutory law, and most Sierra Leoneans firmly believe that it is the duty of a wife to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to.⁶⁹

Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen, whether with or without her consent, is a felony and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment.⁷⁰ Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between the ages of thirteen and fourteen, whether with or without her consent, is, however, only considered a misdemeanor and carries a maximum sentence of two years.⁷¹ The language "with or without her consent" refers only to cases of unlawful carnal knowledge that do not constitute rape; for example, an eighteen-year-old man who has sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl with her consent.

The police and judiciary seem to have misconstrued the meaning of the law. When an offence of rape against a girl under the age of fourteen is reported, the police and judiciary turn to either Section 6 or 7—depending on the age of the victim—of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act and determine that the girl did not consent. Based on her age, they then charge unlawful carnal knowledge and not rape. This misinterpretation therefore leads to a lesser charge for the rape of a child than for the rape of an adult.⁷²

Rape of a person over the age of sixteen is considered a felony and carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.⁷³ Indecent assault—sexual assault without penetration—on or attempts to have carnal knowledge of girls under the age of fourteen years carry the same maximum sentence as unlawful carnal knowledge of girls between the age of thirteen and fourteen i.e. only two years of imprisonment.⁷⁴ No person can be convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge, indecent assault or attempted unlawful carnal knowledge "upon the evidence of one witness, unless such witness be corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused."⁷⁵

The law pertaining to the abduction of girls for immoral purposes applies to any unmarried girls under the age of sixteen.⁷⁶ Abduction of girls for immoral purposes is a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum sentence of two years of imprisonment.

In addition to the legal confusion that exists in general law concerning rape, attempts by women to obtain the prosecution of rapists are frustrated by the collapsed state of the judiciary and the lack of effective law enforcement, which has contributed to the ongoing climate of impunity for offenders.

⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interviews with Abdul Tejan-Cole (human rights lawyer and acting coordinator for the national nongovernmental organization Campaign for Good Governance), Freetown, February–May, 2002.

⁶⁹ As the right to have intercourse between a husband and wife is recognized, a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife unless he has been legally separated from his wife. See also PHR report, p. 55.

⁷⁰ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 6.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, s. 7. If a man were legally married to a girl under fourteen years of age, sexual intercourse with her would not be an offence.

⁷² Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

⁷³ Offences against the Person Act, s. 48.

⁷⁴ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 9. Section 9 stipulates that "whosoever commits an indecent assault or attempts to have carnal knowledge shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction before the Supreme Court be liable for imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding two years." Consent is no defense to a charge of indecent assault of a child under fourteen years.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 14.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 12. There are also problems with the term "unmarried" because abduction of persons should obviously be prohibited irrespective of their marital status.

Prosecution of Sexual Violence under Customary Law

The manner in which rape is dealt with under customary law is indicative of the societal values towards sexual violence and the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone. Although all serious criminal cases should automatically be tried under general law, rape cases continue to be prosecuted under customary law in the local courts.⁷⁷

Under customary law, when a case is brought to the local court, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. "Virgin money" is payable to the victim's family if the victim was a virgin. In some communities, in particular Muslim communities, the victim is forced to marry the offender, as a girl who is not a virgin is considered less eligible for marriage. Traditionally, in some ethnic groups, both the victim and the perpetrator will be made to undergo a purification ceremony. For the victim, the purification ceremony is supposed to restore her virginity and for the perpetrator to cleanse the guilt. Any man who invades the husband's exclusive sexual rights over a wife compensates the husband, and not the wife, for "woman damage."⁷⁸

In addition to applying discriminatory laws, the local court system is problematic as women of some ethnic groups do not have direct access to the local courts, but must be represented by a male guardian.⁷⁹ The situation is further exacerbated as the chairmen and chiefdom councilors of the local courts are generally all male, which makes it difficult for women to bring cases of sexual violence as the women are often embarrassed and their cases are generally dealt with insensitively by the male court staff. The local courts are also prone to interference by the chiefs as well as the concerned parties, especially in cases dealing with sexual violence.

Many people in rural areas prefer to settle the case between the families and do not go to court. In cases settled between the two families, money or goods are given to compensate the victim's family. Paradoxically, the giving of gifts or money to a rape victim may even elevate her status within her family.

Some families turn to the local chiefs who can arbitrate between the two families but have no right to impose any fines. In practice, however, the local chiefs have been known to impose fines.

Discrimination against Women and Girls in Practice

In addition to being subjected to discriminatory laws, all women and girls face structural discrimination in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society, which accords automatic respect to its older male members. As a result of the low status accorded to them by law and by custom, women in Sierra Leone face substantial discrimination in practice.

Education

Systemic discrimination against women starts in childhood, when many parents prefer to spend their scarce resources on the education of their sons rather than their daughters. According to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Gender-Related Development Index, females account for only 21 percent of the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, compared with 32 percent males.⁸⁰ This gender disparity illustrates not only that fewer girls attend school but also that their education is discontinued at an earlier age than boys. This is reflected in the literacy rate of persons over fifteen years: only 20 percent of females are literate compared to 40 percent of males.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Under Section 13 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act, the local courts have no jurisdiction in seduction actions, which includes any act intended to lead the wife astray. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, footnote 34, p. 121.

⁷⁸ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme (Lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

⁸⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 213.

⁸¹ Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone: A Household Survey Report (MICS-2)* (Freetown: 2000), p. 30. The literate population includes those who are able to read "easily" or "with difficulty." Only 30 percent of the total population over fifteen years is literate.

The high illiteracy rate among women can in part be explained by the higher demand for female labor in the family. Girls are required to work in the house at an early age given that their mothers have to take care of the household and the children and do farm work. Another contributing factor to women's illiteracy is the harmful traditional practice of early forced marriage, which is very common in the provinces (see below).

The Workplace

Sierra Leone has ratified numerous international labor conventions.⁸² Some discriminatory practices, such as restricting the right to maternity leave to married women, which was the norm in the formal sector in the 1970s, have been prohibited by law. Extremely poor working conditions, however, persist in Sierra Leone for the majority of workers. In addition, women working for male bosses continue to be subjected to sexual harassment. According to the president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, the trade union federation, much work remains to be done to ensure the full and even application of the labor laws, especially in the provinces.⁸³

Sierra Leone's rural population is primarily engaged in subsistence farming, with women constituting 80 percent of the labor that produces 70 percent of the nation's food.⁸⁴ This agricultural labor is generally not remunerated by cash wages and women have unequal access to land or technology. In Sierra Leone, the different ethnic groups continue to operate under communal and family land holding systems. Women can use the land for subsistence farming but the control and management of the land and any property on it is vested in the male head of the family. With the post-war resettlement process underway, war widows returning to their villages of origin often lack the legal means or community support to reclaim their families' properties. As women have little or no property to offer as collateral, their access to credit is limited. Women therefore tend to rely on traditional sources of credit such as rotating savings, which only provide small loans.⁸⁵

Due to the limited number of educated women, which is partly the result of the high demand for girls to perform household tasks at a young age, the preference of sending boys to school, and early forced marriages, few women are represented in the better remunerated professional or managerial jobs. Sierra Leone's crushing poverty and high unemployment have also meant that positions that in the West are perceived as women's jobs are often held by men in Sierra Leone, leaving even fewer openings for women. In the formal employment sector, women therefore constitute only 40 percent of the clerical staff and a mere 8 percent of the administrative and managerial cadre.⁸⁶ In the informal sector outside agriculture, where the cash returns are low, women are mainly involved in petty trading, soap making and tie-dyeing. Given the lack of opportunities for remunerated work, women tend to be heavily dependent on their husbands.

The breakdown of community values as the result of the war, combined with cultural practices, also serves to make girls and women vulnerable to abuse and sexual exploitation, which has historically been rampant in Sierra

⁸² Multilateral Convention (no. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 28, 1947); Multilateral Convention (no. 105) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force January 17, 1959); Multilateral Convention (no. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953); Multilateral Convention (no. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960). Sierra Leone has not signed Convention 47 (40 hour week), Multilateral Convention (No. 95) concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949 (entered into force September 24, 1952), Multilateral Convention (No. 102) concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131 (entered into force April 27, 1955) or Multilateral Convention (No. 182) concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labor, although a social security system for both the public and private sector was recently established.

⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with Uriah O. H. Davies, president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, Freetown, April 14, 2002.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on the Advancement of Women* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, 2000), p. 7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15. Rotating schemes are schemes whereby groups of women pool their resources and each member of the group has access to the funds on a rotating basis.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone), p. 3.

Leone.⁸⁷ Many women and girls have been driven to prostitution as a result of the increased poverty caused by the conflict and their lack of other opportunities and skills.

In the Political Arena

Discrimination against women is evident in the political arena. Women were not granted the right to vote or stand for election for any political office until after independence in 1961. Given their economic dependence on men, it is also much more difficult for women to raise the necessary campaign funds. In the Northern Province, women continue to be excluded from contesting and voting for the elections for traditional leadership positions (although there are reportedly several female chieftain councilors).⁸⁸ Out of the 149 paramount chiefs in the country, only three are female, all based in the south.

Under the new block voting system which was introduced for the 2002 elections, 112 parliamentary seats are elected by popular vote. An additional twelve parliamentary seats are reserved for paramount chiefs who are elected in separate elections by chieftain councilors. There are presently only eighteen female parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. This does represent an increase over the previous government, which had a total of eight women parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. At government level, there are only three female ministers and three female deputy ministers, which is a marginal increase from President Kabbah's previous Cabinet.⁸⁹

Harmful Traditional Practices and Their Impact on Women's and Girls' Health

Early forced marriages

The health of many women and girls in Sierra Leone is compromised by early forced marriage.⁹⁰ Early forced marriages are very common in the provinces, where men often sponsor a girl from birth (paying for school fees, clothes, etc.) and marry her after she has been initiated (see below for an explanation of the initiation process).

Early forced marriage is one of the factors contributing to Sierra Leone's high maternal mortality rate, since young girls have several children before their bodies are fully mature. At 1,800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world. This mortality rate translates to approximately 4,000 maternal deaths per year based on a total population of five million.⁹¹

Girls who are forced to marry early not only miss out on education, but also on skills training opportunities and are therefore highly dependent on their husbands.

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with a highly respected international observer who has worked in Sierra Leone for two decades, Freetown, February 27, 2002.

⁸⁸ Only persons paying tax can contest and participate in elections for paramount chiefs who are elected from ruling houses. The paramount chieftaincy system was introduced by the British Colonial Administration to administer the various chiefdoms in the Protectorate (i.e. the whole of Sierra Leone excluding the Western Area). Although there is reportedly no law against women paying taxes, women in the Northern Province have historically not done so probably due to lack of opportunities to find remunerated work. The tax is a negligible amount that women are willing to pay to ensure their eligibility for these elections. Human Rights Watch interview with Joseph Hall and Honerin Muyoyatta from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Freetown, March 22 and 23, 2002.

⁸⁹ The three ministerial posts are Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Minister for Trade and Industry, and Minister of Health and Sanitation. The three female deputy ministers are in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Works, Housing and Technical Maintenance. The new government was sworn in on July 12, 2002.

⁹⁰ Early forced marriages are marriages whereby the consent of either party is not sought or more commonly whereby the consent of the girl is not sought and whereby one or both spouses is/are under the age of consent (which under international law should not be less than fifteen years of age). This harmful traditional practice contravenes article 16(3) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states that the betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, article 16(1) and (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which says that "[n]o marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses."

⁹¹ Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 63.

Female Genital Cutting

Sierra Leonean girls as well as boys are traditionally initiated into secret societies at adolescence. The secret societies that perform the initiation rites take the adolescents into a sacred place in the bush where they are circumcised and taught about traditional practices. The male and female societies are segregated and males are not supposed to know what happens in female secret societies or vice versa.

Traditionally, initiation for girls entailed spending an extended period (up to two years) in the bush with girls of the same age, being taught various cultural skills (dancing, singing, drama, arts and craft, how to use local herbs, how to respect elders, etc.) and being a good wife (cooking, cleaning, child welfare, hygiene, fishing, etc.) by older women. Girls who undergo initiation through the secret societies are treated with deference after having completed the ritual and are feted by their communities.⁹² Today, the duration of the initiation ceremony has been greatly reduced, minimizing the skills transfer aspect, and thus focusing on the cutting itself. Because it was not always possible to hold the ceremonies during the war, initiation rites are now often practiced on adults, girl mothers, and pregnant girls—whereas traditionally it was seen as a rite of passage into adulthood for adolescent girls, who had to be virgins. In recent years, girls and/or adult women who do not wish to be initiated have been abducted and circumcised by force by female members of the community.

Ninety percent of Sierra Leonean women have undergone female genital cutting, which can have major health repercussions, including pain, injury to adjacent tissue of the urethra, hemorrhage, shock, acute urine retention, and infection.⁹³ Longer-term health effects include recurrent urinary tract infections, pelvic infections, infertility, keloid scar, and problems during childbirth.⁹⁴ The high prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence, which causes trauma to the genital area, can only have served to aggravate these health repercussions and both have in turn contributed to the increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).

This harmful traditional practice, which is contrary to provisions of several international human rights instruments, continues to be practiced due to the significant societal pressure exerted by adults as well as peers.⁹⁵ Girls who have not been initiated are seen as less eligible for marriage and many future husbands sponsor the initiation of their bride-to-be.

Societal Attitudes to Sexual Violence against Women and Girls

The low status of women and girls is highlighted by the prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence. The notion of sexual violence as a crime is a very recent concept in Sierra Leone. It is still widely believed that only rape of a virgin is rape, which in Krio is called "to virginate." Rape of a non-virgin, on the other hand, is not considered rape, and there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act or is a seductress. Marital rape is not recognized under either customary or general law in Sierra Leone.

⁹² Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme, (lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

⁹³ Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, *The Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), p. 19. The type of female genital cutting performed in Sierra Leone is clitoridectomy (removal of the prepuce of the clitoris) and excision (removal of the prepuce, the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora). The extreme form of infibulation is not practiced in Sierra Leone.

⁹⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Report on the First Donors Meeting For FGM/FGC Elimination* (Washington D.C.: USAID, 2001), p. 12.

⁹⁵ Female genital cutting violates the right to be free from violence (Article 1 of the CEDAW) and the right to bodily integrity (Article 6 of the CRC). Under Article 5 (a) of the CEDAW, states are called upon "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Article 24 (1) and (3) of the CRC also requires states to abolish traditional practices that are harmful to the health of children. General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee also links traditional attitudes which subordinate women and violent practices, including female genital cutting, that "... justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women."

Given the lack of statistics about rape cases before the war, it is impossible to establish the historical prevalence of sexual violence, but several doctors reported to Human Rights Watch that, before the war, they only treated a limited number of young girls who generally had been raped by older men.⁹⁶ According to the doctors interviewed, many cases of rape before the war occurred within the extended family and were considered family matters. They were rarely discussed or reported, in order to ensure that the victim's chances of marriage and obtaining a good dowry were not destroyed. Rape was also apparently unlikely to occur within a village community, where everyone knew each other and the shame attached to the offender would be too great. Rape outside the extended family was more likely to be committed in environments where there were mixed ethnic groups, such as in mining areas or larger towns. The cultural definition of rape and lack of reporting, however, may have led to the understanding that rape rarely occurred before the war. Sexual exploitation, however, has always been rampant in Sierra Leone, where economic options for women are limited and which has traditionally condoned a high level of promiscuity, despite the high value placed on virginity. With the increased poverty caused by the war, sex has become even more of a commodity.⁹⁷

The societal attitudes to rape and the low status of women have meant that no cases of conflict-related sexual violence and few cases of non-conflict-related sexual violence are prosecuted.⁹⁸ (See also below at p. 61 for a discussion on the amnesty included in the Lomé Peace Agreement.)

V. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Prevalence of Sexual Violence during the War

Throughout the ten-year civil war, thousands of Sierra Leonean women and girls were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. A survey of 991 female heads of households in communities of displaced persons carried out by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in 2002 found that approximately one of every eight household members (13 percent) had been subjected to one or more incidents of conflict-related sexual violence; among the actual respondents to the survey, the prevalence rate of conflict-related sexual violence was 9 percent (94 out of 991).⁹⁹ Based on this prevalence rate, as many as 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced women may have been subjected to sexual violence as a result of the war.¹⁰⁰ Adding extrapolated data for other types of victim, PHR calculated that as many as 215,000 to 257,000 Sierra

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002. The latter two doctors practiced in the provinces as well as in Freetown.

⁹⁷ Sex can be bought for as little as U.S. \$0.50. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children U.K., *Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone* (Geneva/London: UNHCR/SC-UK: 2002). Human Rights Watch has some concerns about this report as the report does not provide an adequate review of the context, including the status of women and girls within the given countries. Given the low status of women and girls in these countries, the sexual exploitation is much wider than reported: the power dynamic means that men of all walks of life, such as teachers, pastors, police, businessmen as well as aid workers or peacekeepers, exploit girls and women. It would also appear that the short-term solutions proposed do not adequately address the underlying structural issues, such as poverty, lack of education or alternative means of income generation for many women.

⁹⁸ It was not possible to obtain reliable statistics as reporting and recording of cases by the police and judiciary are not consistent.

⁹⁹ PHR report, p. 2. The PHR report captures some of the different types of sexual violence that women were subjected to. Of the ninety-four internally displaced women reporting their own experience of sexual violence to PHR, interviewees reported among other things: rape (89 percent); being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37 percent); gang rape (33 percent); abduction (33 percent); molestation (14 percent) and insertion of foreign objects into genital opening or anus (4 percent). It should be noted that the definition of rape used by the PHR report differs from that used throughout this report. The definition used in this report, as mentioned above, is that used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the *Foca* case.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3. As PHR points out this figure might be an underestimate due to deliberate non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts made to ensure privacy.

Leonean women and girls may have been subjected to sexual violence in the conflict period.¹⁰¹ Although these figures are necessarily no more than estimates, they do give an indication of the widespread nature of sexual violence during the war.

Human Rights Watch has primarily documented sexual violence committed during the latter stages of the war when the organization had a full-time presence in the country, beginning April 1999. This does not mean that sexual violence was at its worse during this period. Since that time, Human Rights Watch extensively documented crimes of sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown as well as ongoing human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch has also received numerous reports of sexual violence dating from earlier in the war.

Perpetrators

Survivors of sexual violence mostly reported being raped by rebel forces, but were at times not able to identify which rebel faction the perpetrators belonged to or whether—especially given the frequent collaboration between soldiers and rebels—the perpetrators were indeed rebels or rather soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). In addition, survivors explained that they often deliberately did not want to look at their rapists out of fear and because they did not want to make eye contact. For example, D.T., a twenty-five-year-old woman raped by four rebels, including one child combatant, said that she would not be able to recognize any of the perpetrators, as she was too afraid to look at them (see below at p. 36).¹⁰² A. B., a thirty-year-old who was raped by two rebels, also said that:

When you are with these people [rebels], you do not ask questions. I did not even look into their faces. Many of them rubbed black chalk on their face and when you looked at them would say, "What are you staring at?"¹⁰³

Rebel Forces

The RUF committed crimes of sexual violence—often of extreme brutality—from the very beginning of the war when they invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991. RUF rebels committed crimes of sexual violence in the course of their military operations, during which thousands of women and girls were abducted and forced to "marry" rebel "husbands." These abducted women and girls were repeatedly raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence throughout the duration of their captivity, which in many cases lasted years. During captivity, these women and girls were also made to carry out forced labor, including carrying heavy loads, cooking, cleaning, etc. Many women and girls have given birth to children fathered by rebels. Especially during the early years of the war, the RUF were assisted by Liberian forces, who also committed rape and other sexual violence.

The AFRC committed crimes of sexual violence from May 1997, using the same tactics as the RUF. Sexual violence by the RUF and the AFRC continued to be committed after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999, and they were joined in this by the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC formed after the signing of the Agreement. An unknown number of abducted girls and women still remain under the control of their rebel "husbands" who did not want or feel able to relinquish the "families" they had founded in the bush; in many cases the abductees' own families would not have welcomed them back.

Sexual violence peaked during the rebels' military operations, which occurred countrywide as the rebels sought to capture more territory. After capturing a town or a village, the combatants rewarded themselves by looting and by raping women and girls, many of whom they later abducted. Crimes of sexual violence committed during and following military operations, such as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 3-4. PHR's calculation is not inclusive of all categories of victim: to the IDP women reporting conflict-related sexual violence, PHR added non-conflict-related sexual violence among non-displaced women, assuming a prevalence rate of 9 percent.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

that took place in 1998, have been documented by Human Rights Watch.¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch has also extensively documented the January 1999 invasion of Freetown by the RUF/AFRC, during which sexual violence was systematically committed against women and girls on a massive scale. The sexual violence committed during January 1999 serves as an illustration of the widespread nature of sexual violence committed by the rebel forces. Among the perpetrators were child combatants, and many of the victims were also children. Members of the Small Boys Units (SBUs) within the rebel forces were known to be particularly cruel and committed egregious human rights abuses.

Although there are no exact figures for the number of women and girls subjected to sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Sierra Leone chapter of the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE Sierra Leone), a nongovernmental organization that has been treating survivors of sexual violence since 1999, provided medical treatment and counseling to 1,862 female survivors of sexual violence who had been raped and/or abducted during the invasion. According to MSF, 55 percent of these survivors reported having been gang raped and 200 had become pregnant.¹⁰⁵

As the RUF/AFRC rebels controlled most of the countryside apart from pockets of government-controlled areas in the south and some key towns, including Bumbuna and Freetown, at different times throughout the war, women and girls living in these rebel-held areas were also subjected to sexual violence when the rebels went on patrol or simply sought to assert their domination over the population. Women and girls in government-controlled areas also lived in fear of rebel hit-and-run attacks, during which many women and girls were subjected to sexual violence and abducted. Women and girls residing in Freetown were "spared" until the January 1999 invasion by the RUF/AFRC.

Pro-Government Forces

Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) prior to the time of the 1997 AFRC coup. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, of seventy-five women and girls who reported having been raped and identified the rapists' affiliation, only three said they were raped by SLA soldiers.¹⁰⁶ This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between the rebel factions and the SLA. With the "sobel" phenomenon, the SLA soldiers would disguise themselves as rebels (the rebels were also known to disguise themselves as members of the SLA or the ECOMOG peacekeeping force).

Human Rights Watch has documented only a few cases of sexual violence committed by the pro-government Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men organized into militia. They were initially only deployed by the government in their own chiefdoms, in order to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the best use of their superior bush knowledge.¹⁰⁷ The government provided training, weapons and food to the units. The relatively small number of identified cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the CDF may be related to the CDF's internal rules that stipulate that warriors cannot have sexual intercourse before going to battle, as they would lose some of their protective powers that are bestowed on them during their initiation ceremonies. These powers are meant to make the fighters invincible and immortal. During the initiation ceremonies, the fighters are also instructed not to harm civilians, and required to take an oath to that effect. Thus, it is likely that the pro-government forces did not actually commit sexual violence on a widespread and systematic basis; however, the low number of identified cases may also be partially due to Human Rights Watch's human resource constraints, faced with the overwhelming number of abuses committed by the rebel forces. Research on the CDF was mainly conducted in the south where the Kamajors, the

¹⁰⁴ See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Report*, July 1998.

¹⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with MSF, Freetown, March, 2000.

¹⁰⁶ PHR report, p. 48. and Table 5 on p. 52. See also Binta Mansaray, "The Invisible Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone: Conflict-related Rape, Sexual Slavery and Other Forms of Sexual Violence," June 2001. On file with UNAMSIL human rights section.

¹⁰⁷ The Kamajors operate predominately in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbettis in the north and the Donzos in the far east. See also "Background" section.

largest and most powerful group of the CDF, are based. In recent years, as the Kamajors have been moved away from their villages of origin and the influence of their traditional chiefs, they have become increasingly undisciplined and cases of rape by Kamajors have become more common.

Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by UNAMSIL peacekeepers, including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent in March 2001 and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian peacekeepers in April 2002 near Kenema (see below). There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by ECOMOG peacekeepers, the majority of whom were Nigerian, were rare.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

Sexual Violence Committed by the Rebel Forces

“Virginization”—Targeting Young Girls

The rebel forces subjected women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes to individual and gang rape. Although the rebel forces raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, the rebels favored girls and young women whom they believed to be virgins. This was evident not only by their actions, but was also explicitly stated by them as they chose their victims. As in many countries, Sierra Leonean society places a high value on virginity. Girls who have been “virginized” and are therefore no longer virgins, are considered less eligible for marriage. M.B., a fifteen-year-old girl from Freetown, described how RUF/AFRC rebels deliberately sought out virgins for violation during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

We were hiding in the mosque when two rebels dressed in civilian [clothing] entered. It was dark but they shone their flashlights looking for girls and said, “We are coming for young girls ... for virgins, even if they tie their heads like old grandmothers, we will find them.” They also said that if the people did not hand over the young girls, they would open fire on all of us.¹⁰⁸

Some victims explained that female rebels physically checked girls to see whether they were virgins.¹⁰⁹ M.W., a thirty-eight-year old nurse who was captured by the RUF/AFRC during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown and forced to treat wounded rebels and civilians, said that the youngest rape victim she treated was “a little nine-year-old from Calaba Town [an area of Freetown]. Her perineum was bleeding and had been badly torn. Every day we gave her sit baths and she eventually recovered.”¹¹⁰ The consequences of sexual violence for virgins can be particularly severe as these testimonies highlight, although mature women also reported experiencing similar consequences.¹¹¹

R.T. was about sixteen when she was brutally raped vaginally and anally by ten RUF rebels in the forest near Koidu in Kono district in January 1997. R.T. developed vasico-vaginal fistula (VVF) and vasico-rectal fistula (VRF) from her brutal gang rape:

I was hiding in the bush with my parents and two older women when the RUF found our hiding place. I was the only young woman and the RUF accused me of having an SLA husband. I was still a virgin. I had only just started my periods and recently gone through secret society. There were ten rebels, including four child soldiers, armed with two RPGs [rocket propelled grenades] and AK-47s. The rebels did not use their real names and wore ski masks so only their eyes were

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 1, 1999.

¹⁰⁹ It should be noted that virginity can not be medically proven.

¹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999. The victim probably suffered from vasico-rectal fistula (a tear or opening in the tissue between the rectum and the vagina, usually resembling an open blood vessel), which would have left her incontinent.

¹¹¹ International humanitarian law prohibits all rape and other acts of sexual violence, of course irrespective of whether the victim was a virgin or not.

visible. The rebels said that they wanted to take me away. My mother pleaded with them, saying that I was her only child and to leave me with her. The rebels said that "If we do not take your daughter, we will either rape or kill her." The rebels ordered my parents and the two other women to move away. Then they told me to undress. I was raped by the ten rebels, one after the other. They lined up, waiting for their turn and watched while I was being raped vaginally and in my anus. One of the child combatants was about twelve years. The three other child soldiers were about fifteen. The rebels threatened to kill me if I cried.

My parents, who could hear what was happening, cried but could do nothing to protect me. I was bleeding a lot from my vagina and anus and was in so much pain. My mother washed me in warm water and salt but I bled for three days. I can no longer control my bladder or bowels as I was torn below. We stayed in the bush until ECOMOG took over Koidu. When we came out of the bush, even adults would run away from me and refused to eat with me because I smelled so badly. I had an operation in 2000 but it did not work. Before I got a catheter in 2001, I had no friends, as I smelled too bad. I am still in pain and have a problem with vaginal discharge. I also have nightmares and feel discouraged.¹¹²

This extreme sexual violence is illustrated also by the following testimony by F.B., who describes the resultant deaths of eight young girls in one Liberian refugee camp alone (no doubt many others died from similar treatment during the war). F.B.'s testimony also illustrates the RUF's connection to Liberia and the role of Liberian mercenaries in the RUF movement. F.B. was a ten-year-old girl living in Mano village in Kailahun district near the Liberian border when the RUF accused civilians in her village of helping the SLA. Her family decided to flee to Liberia in November 1991, but was fired upon by the rebels as they fled. At least fifteen civilians were killed, including her father and several women with babies on their backs:

Only six of my family survived; my mother, one brother, two sisters, one uncle, and me. After hiding and fleeing through the bush for three days, Mohammed, my uncle, found someone with a boat to help us cross over to Liberia. We crossed into Vahun where there was a sort of refugee camp. We were there for two weeks and terrible things happened. We thought we had escaped from the rebels but we found many of them there. They controlled the camp. Even though food was being air dropped, the rebels took it all. They took everything we had, our money, salt, and all our food. The rebels were mixed Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.

About a week after arriving, the rebels came into our house in the evening and took my fifteen-year-old sister away. My mother stayed up the whole night. The next day my uncle went from hut to hut looking for her. He called her name and heard her groaning inside a hut. He picked her up and carried her home. When my mom saw her she burst out crying. I was only ten and didn't know anything about man business. My sister was crying all the time and couldn't walk. She cried, "Oh mother, I'm going to die." My mother just held her and told her it would be O.K. My uncle exchanged five gallons of palm oil so we could get some salt, which my mother later mixed with water and had my sister sit in. She was bleeding a lot. She told me they had tied her mouth and raped her many times, but I didn't know what rape was.

After that my uncle shaved my head, gave me trousers and made me look like a boy. When I was walking around a camp I saw a few girls aged under twelve years old, lying on the ground with their legs spread open and blood coming out between their legs. Some had their dresses pulled up and others had cloth stuffed in their mouths. During the two weeks I was in Vahun I saw eight girls like this. Sometimes their family would come and wrap them in white so I knew they had

¹¹² Human Rights Watch interview, IDP camp called "Lebanese Camp," March 2, 2002. Women and girls with obstetric fistulae suffer from a constant wetness that results in genital ulcerations, frequent infections and a terrible odor. These fistulae generally require surgery although occasionally they spontaneously heal.

died. Other times no one picked them up and they stayed there for days until someone buried them. There were so many girls who had lost their parents and were there alone, so no one would come for them.

I saw the rebels catching young and even older women. Once they caught an old woman. She said, "No, leave me. I'm too old for this business." But they made fun of her saying, "Oh look, we have caught a young *Bundu* [initiate into secret society] girl here." Other times I heard women screaming in the middle of the night. Everyday people were dying—from hunger, illness, and this rape. After that I had dreams about a dead person coming to hurt me.

The only reason we stayed that long was because people were still moving across the border and we figured things were even worse in Sierra Leone. Besides, the rebels stopped us from going back home, and we did not know anyone in Liberia so we would have died of hunger.¹¹³

M.M. was only eleven when she was abducted, together with her aunt and her aunt's four children, when Koidu was attacked during the dry season¹¹⁴ in 1994. M.M. had not yet experienced her first period or been initiated into secret society:

I was raped by seven child combatants, who were aged between fifteen and sixteen years old, on the way to Kailahun. I was raped in my vagina and anally. Other rebels and also civilians saw me being raped but the civilians were too afraid to protect me. My aunt put native herbs on my genital area but I bled for five days. The RUF had medicine but would not give it to us civilians. My aunt carried me on her back, as I could not walk because of the pain. It took us five days to reach Kailahun. A rebel commander wanted my aunt to be his wife but she refused so he killed her. In Kailahun, I was not raped again. Since my rape, I have only experienced irregular periods and my belly is always swollen like I am pregnant.¹¹⁵

M.F. was abducted from Koinadugu town in Koinadugu district in September 1998 when the RUF/AFRC attacked the town. She was only thirteen at the time and was brutally raped both vaginally and anally by five RUF rebels. During the same attack, the RUF killed over thirty older women:

I was only thirteen and a virgin. They forced me to go down on my hands and knees with my bottom in the air and raped me both vaginally and anally. Five rebels raped me on that first day. My clothes were bloodied and it hurt to urinate and defecate afterwards. The rebels who raped me promised to take me to Freetown and give me money and dresses. They gave me nothing after they used me. I was given to one of them, Mohammed, as his wife. We stayed in Koinadugu town for four days. I was with my parents but could not tell them about the rapes although my mother heard me being raped.

The RUF said they came to kill civilians who were ungrateful and talked bad about the RUF. The RUF cut my grandmother with a knife and beat her with a pestle. She died. The RUF told the older women to go to the mosque to attend a ceremony. More than thirty women, some of whom had children, went to the mosque. The RUF set fire to the mosque. Another old woman was rolled into a mat and the mat was set on fire.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000. *Bundu* is one of the secret societies that initiate girls and perform female genital cutting.

¹¹⁴ The dry season in Sierra Leone is approximately between November and May.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese Camp, March 2, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.

Rape Victims Subjected to Multiple Human Rights Abuses

Rapes were often preceded by or followed by other human rights abuses against the victim, her family members and/or her community. Hardly any family was unscathed by abuse during the war. The PHR report highlighted that 94 percent of the 991 female-headed households surveyed had experienced at least one serious human rights abuse during the ten-year period.¹¹⁷ M.P., who was twenty-four years old when the RUF attacked Jaiweii village in Kailahun district in May 1991, testified:

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

The rebels, who spoke Liberian English, said they were fighting for the SLPP to be in power. When the RUF first entered Jaiweii, they accused my husband of giving information to the SLA, so they tied his hands behind his back and beat him mercilessly. They kept him tied up and continued to beat him. After six days, he died and they threatened to kill me if I cried. The RUF also shot three other men whom they accused of giving information to the SLA. My three children all died because they became sick and there was no medicine. The older one who was five years died one week before the two younger ones who died on the same day. They were only three and seventeen months old.¹¹⁸

M.P. added that the RUF had said that they could do whatever they want with women whom they "owned." A.J., a fourteen-year-old student, was abducted by the RUF from Pujehun and was held by them from February to May 1994. She was first tortured, caged, and then brutally raped:

On February 3, 1994 at around 8:00 p.m., the RUF attacked Pujehun. There was lots of firing because the SLA was deployed here. As we were fleeing, we ran straight into a group of over one hundred RUF. They were dressed in civilian clothes and nearly all had guns. Among those rebels was one named Maliki, who was actually from Pujehun. RUF Commander Bai Bureh started to select several people from our group. As he was doing the selecting, Maliki told him to choose me because if they let me go, I would go back to Pujehun and tell the SLA that he was there. They chose eight of us, four young men and four young women, including three of my cousins. They told the rest of the civilians to go back into the bush and said that if they found them the next day they would be killed. We were taken to their camp.

Two weeks later, the four young men managed to escape. When the rebels found out, they blamed us for what happened. They said the boys were really SLA soldiers that were there to get information on the RUF. I was then tortured by a Liberian RUF commander named C.O. Rackin. He said I was "bright and bold" and must have known how they escaped. He interrogated me, asking me if the boys were SLA's. During the interrogation he cut me in twenty-one places with a knife including a deep cut on my left breast. He drew a small, small circle in the dirt and told me to step inside and walk around in it. Any part of my body left outside he stabbed with a knife.

Then a commander called Momoh Rogers, who was the battalion commander, ordered that my cousin and I be put in a wooden cage smaller than one square meter. He said that if our brothers

¹¹⁷ PHR gave the following examples of serious human rights abuses: beating, bodily injury, amputation, torture, killing, forced labor, captured for less than one day, sexual assault without rape, rape, abduction, burned dwelling, looting. PHR report, pp. 45-47.

¹¹⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese IDP Camp, March 2, 2002.

who had gone to tell the SLA came to attack, it would be very easy for them to kill us. The cage was what the village people used to store their husk rice in and it had almost no ventilation. We were only let out to defecate. They told me I had to pee on myself in the box. They poured water into the cracks but it was never enough and was dirty. Sometimes they dropped cassava and boiled bananas into the cage, feeding us like we were animals. The stab wounds I had got infected and I got sores all over my body. They were painful and smelled very badly.

After about two weeks in the cage, one of Patrick's bodyguards took me to C.O. Patrick's house. When I saw him, I told him about the sores on my feet and breasts. I told him I was in pain and asked for treatment. C.O. Patrick told me to shut up and ordered me to go into the house. He turned to his bodyguard and said that if I refused, I was to be taken behind the house and executed. When we got inside, Patrick told me to lie down on the floor. Then he forced himself upon me. I was a virgin. He was violent and rough. Then he told me to turn over and give him my behind. But I told him I could not lie down because my breast was so swollen. So he brought a chair and told me to stand up and lean onto the chair. Then he stood behind me and tried to shove his penis into my vagina. The first time he did this I fell over onto my chest, which was so painful. I started bleeding from my chest wound. Then he told me to get up and said if I did not hold the chair firmly he was going to kill me. He took a long time doing that thing to me. I was crying from the pain of my breast and because it was painful, being the first time. He told me to shut up. As he was sexing me he accused my brothers of being spies and said he was going to kill me and that he was only waiting for the others to come from the frontline to do it.

C.O. Patrick asked if I had done sex before and I told him "No, I am a school-going girl." Then he said, "Well, tonight you are going to have sex, because you are going to be killed and you should do it before you die." I was terrified. I started crying. All I could think of was my death and all that guy could do was do that thing to me. After he was satisfied, I was taken back to the cage.¹¹⁹

A.M. was eighteen when she fled Freetown with her two children, two sisters, and brother after the 1997 AFRC coup. Not only was she first forced to watch the execution of three male civilians by Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers in Fadugu, Koinadugu district, but also the rebel execution of her brother and sister. The RUF tried to get her to eat her brother's liver and heart. Her sister's head was also placed on her legs:

After the rebels were driven out of Kabala by ECOMOG, the rebels spread to different towns, including Mongo, Badela, and Dankawali. One day I went with my brother to wash in the stream, as I was afraid to go by myself. We heard shots, which my brother thought must have come from ECOMOG soldiers. I was afraid. We met three rebels with guns who accused my brother of being a SLA soldier. "Superman" was the commander. They beat my brother with their gun butts and took off his clothes. "Superman" forced my brother to go down on his hands and knees and made me sit beside him. They cut his neck from the back and then took an axe and cut his back. They removed his heart and liver and put them on my hands. The heart had more shape and the liver was flat. They tried to force me to eat them but I refused to. Another rebel, Colonel Titus, a mercenary who spoke Liberian English, arrived and told the others not to force me to eat my brother's heart and liver. He said he would show me how they will deal with me. He said they should abduct me. They took me back into the village of Dankawali where we met my grandmother on her veranda. She was tied up and she said that another rebel commander, Hakim, had carried my two children and small sister away in the first group.

The rebels had abducted another group of twenty-five persons and held them by the cotton tree. My big sister was under the cotton tree. I told her that the rebels killed our brother. Colonel Titus slapped my sister and told her not to cry. They killed my sister and two other women and placed

¹¹⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2002.

their cut off heads on my legs. The rebels also locked some villagers in the houses and set all houses on fire.¹²⁰

H.K., a sixteen-year-old student, was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion. She was taken to Makeni where she was "virginated" and forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," a twenty-two-year-old half-Liberian who threatened to kill her entire family if she escaped. H.K. was brutally tortured after Colonel "Jaja" accused her of stealing his money, which was in fact taken at gunpoint from her by "Superman," a notorious rebel commander and his bodyguard called "Yellowman." She described what happened afterwards:

Then the rebels took me into a stream and tied me to a tree in the water. They told people to beat me. I was in water up to my head. "Jaja" said the boys should cut down the tree and let me drown. I was there for several days, maybe up to a week or so. Once a water snake swam by and ate my foot in the water. When I was tied there, Jaja cut my neck and put cocaine into my body. He also gave me marijuana cigarettes to smoke. Finally he untied me and put me in an old container where I stayed for several days. While in the guardroom Jaja and Alhaji "Cold Boots" came several times to give me drugs.¹²¹

The rebels often used psychological torture against civilians by, for example, making them clap or sing in praise while watching family and friends being killed, raped or mutilated. They further exerted their domination over civilians by not allowing them to show any emotion, and threatening to kill anyone who did. In 1997, when K.M. was abducted by the RUF from Kabala in Koinadugu district, her brother was shot in front of her. The RUF accused him of planning to escape. She was not allowed to show any emotion and was forced to throw his body in the river. In 1999, K.M.'s husband was killed in front of her by RUF Captain Solvelar in Yomandu in Tonkolili district, when a child combatant accused her husband of not doing his job properly. As Captain Solvelar shot K.M.'s husband, he warned her not to cry otherwise she would be killed. Later in the same year, K.M.'s baby was killed in front of her in Kambia district by a rebel captain who wanted to rape her:

Captain "Danger" pulled my baby from my back and before I could do anything, he sliced my child in two. I was told not to cry as otherwise I would be killed as well.¹²²

Rape with Objects and Other Sexual Torture, including Sexual Mutilation

The rebels frequently used objects, including weapons, burning wood, and hot oil, to rape or otherwise torture (including sexually torture) women and girls, sometimes resulting in their death. In 1994, J.M., an elderly man from Giehun village in Kailahun district, witnessed the killing of nine civilians accused of plotting to set Foday Sankoh up for a government ambush. One of those civilians, a woman named Janneh, was alleged to have been one of Sankoh's "wives." J.M. described how rebels brought her into the village square, forced her to lie down and then poured boiling palm oil into her vagina and ears:

The RUF rounded up about seventy of us civilians, including Abi and Janneh, and accused us of making a plot to arrest Sankoh. The commander said we were to be killed but that first he would do an investigation. First he called upon Abi who accused Janneh of calling people in Freetown to arrange something against Sankoh. So Janneh was the first to be killed. The rebels grabbed her, stripped her and threw her down in front of the whole village. Several of them pulled her legs apart and held her tightly. They poured a pan of boiling palm oil into her vagina and then into her ears. This terrified us. She started shaking all over and was bleeding from the nostrils and mouth. While on the ground they struck her with a gun and danced around her saying, "When you were loving with the old man [Sankoh], you didn't show us any respect, but now your time for punishment has come." She died about an hour later. The rebels said they were sent by Sankoh who was living in Kailahun about seven miles. Nothing small or big happened without his

¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

¹²¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.

¹²² Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

knowledge. After killing Janneh they poured hot oil in the mouths, eyes and noses of three other villagers, and then shot five others. I guess Janneh must have known all of Sankoh's secrets.¹²³

M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was raped by five rebels (see above, p. 30), witnessed how her stepmother's mother was beaten by the RUF with a long pestle in Momoria village in Koinadugu district in 1998. The rebels then shoved the pestle into her anus. M.F. said that her stepmother's mother was still alive when they left her with the pestle in her anus, which was bleeding.¹²⁴ One woman also reportedly had pepper put in her vagina as the RUF suspected her of being the wife of a SLA soldier. Rebels inserted burning firewood into the vagina of twenty-five-year-old F.T. and another woman during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

On 21 January 1999, I went to a neighbor's house to buy rice, as I had not eaten for over two days. The rebels had been in the area and as I bought two cups from my neighbor, we heard the rebels coming again. My neighbor told me to leave quickly so that he could lock up his house. When I left with another woman and a man, we met a group of ten rebels who surrounded us. They were dressed in full combat [uniform] and asked us where we were going in Krio.

The rebels asked us what we could give them, so the man took out all his money and gave it to them. He was then allowed to go. As the other woman and I did not have any money, they told us to take off our clothes at gunpoint. We begged them not to harm us. The rebels then told us to lie on the dirt ground and open our legs. They put their guns to our throats and stomachs to make sure that we followed their order. Once we were on the ground all the rebels surrounded us, and a tall rebel well over six feet went to the kitchen of Parliament House and took a piece of burning firewood from the fire. He then squatted down and with his two hands inserted it into my vagina. Then he returned to the fire and got another piece and then a third. I felt like I was being stabbed inside.

He did the same to the other woman. While they did this to us, I heard them say "This is the way we are going to fuck you. We are not able to do to you half of the things we do to people in the provinces. You bastard civilians, you hypocrites; as soon as you see ECOMOG, you start to point fingers at us."

They left shortly afterwards and I managed to drag myself to a nearby house with blood gushing from my vagina. I went to a clinic where the doctor removed bits of firewood from my vagina. I feel so unhappy and fear my husband will find another wife to satisfy his sexual desire. The treatment is very slow and I do not have money for treatment. There are sores inside me. I can not sleep at night or walk more than one hundred yards.¹²⁵

H.K., the sixteen-year-old Freetown student forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," had an umbrella shoved up her vagina as part of the torture that followed her being accused by "Jaja" of stealing his money:

When Jaja came home, I told him what happened and instead of believing me, he blamed me and accused me of having stolen the money. He dragged me out of the house into the street and started beating me. He caused a great scene. He stripped me, tied me up and hit me again and again with a stick. He also beat with the butt of his gun. Then he took an umbrella and pushed it up inside me two times—he shoved it up into my privates—hard. Many people were standing around watching and even some of the other rebels told him to leave me. He went crazy. He started shooting up in the air. I lay there for a few days, naked and bleeding. I was three months pregnant but after this I aborted. I bled for over a month. Once a boy named Junior came by and put his hand inside my vagina. He brought out his hand, which was all bloody and said, "Look at

¹²³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 11, 1999.

¹²⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.

¹²⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

your blood, you're sick." All the civilians seeing this felt sorry for me, but of course they couldn't say anything.

Rebel forces were known for mutilating pregnant mothers to find out the sex of the unborn child. According to witnesses, they would bet large sums of money, and the rebel who had rightly guessed the sex of the unborn child after the women's belly had been cut open would keep the money. Some women were cut open alive, but sometimes the women were killed before the rebels cut their abdomens open. K.M. who was abducted during the 1997 attack on Kabala, witnessed the killing and sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman near Kono in Kono district (see above):

They captured a Koranko woman who was pregnant. Two RUF, Captain "Danger" and C.O. "Cut Hand" argued about the sex of the child. They bet 100,000 leones [approximately U.S.\$50] on the sex of the child. Then they shot the woman dead and opened her belly. The RUF held up the baby with the placenta, which they shook in the air. The baby cried and then died. I wanted to run away but my husband said that the civilians would think that I was a rebel and that they would kill me.¹²⁶

Fifteen-year-old F.K. was raped by the RUF in Lunsar in Port Loko district in May 2000 and witnessed the sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman as well as the killing of her three male relatives, and six amputations:

I was raped when the RUF attacked Lunsar in May 2000 by four rebels including one man called "Put Fire," who had made me his rebel wife from 1997 to 2000. One of the other rebels was called "Kill Man No Blood." While I was being raped, the rebels found my three male relatives who were hiding under their beds. They stabbed them with their bayonets and then shot them. They raped me in my bedroom and then brought me into the living room. Three men and three women were also brought into the room. They were put in line and then the rebels gave them the choice between their life or their money. The rebels strip searched each one and then killed them on the spot. The group was forced to watch as each was killed.

One of the women was six months pregnant and slightly disabled. She was last in the row. When it was her turn, she was stabbed in the neck and fell down. The rebels started to discuss whether she was carrying a boy or a girl. They bet on the sex of the baby so they decided to check it. Kill Man No Blood split open her belly. It was a boy. One of the other rebels took the baby out and showed everyone that it was a boy. The baby was still alive when he threw it on the ground next to the woman but died shortly after. As the rebels took me away, I saw six men who had just been amputated. Some had an arm cut off below the elbow, others above the elbow. They were screaming, "Please kill us, don't leave us this way."¹²⁷

Sexual Violence with the Added Element of Violating Cultural Norms

The rebel forces have used sexual violence as a weapon to terrorize, humiliate and punish, and to force the civilian population into submission. The rebels sought complete domination by doing whatever they wanted with women, including sexual acts that, by having the additional element of assailing cultural norms, violated not only the victim but also her family or the wider society. The rebels have forced civilians to commit incest, one of the biggest taboos in any society. One survivor witnessed the RUF trying to force a brother to rape his sister in Sambanya village in Koinadugu district. When the brother refused to do so, the rebels shot him.¹²⁸ Fathers were forced to rape their daughters. Fathers were forced to dance naked in front of their daughters and vice versa. In Sierra Leone, postmenopausal and breastfeeding women are presumed not to be sexually active, but rebels violated this cultural norm by raping old women and breastfeeding mothers. Child combatants also raped women who could have been their mothers or in some instances even their grandmothers. Many rapes were committed in

¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, March 7 and 9, 2002.

¹²⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 25, 2000.

¹²⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

full view of other rebels and civilians. Victims were also raped in mosques, churches, and sacred places of initiation.

During the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, A.C. was forced to watch the rape of his daughter by RUF/AFRC rebels:

The rebel in charge was a thirty-year-old ex-SLA known as "Amos." I knew him from before. He had plasters on his face. The others were called "Junior" and "Blood," who did most of the talking. They gathered five young girls together, including my fifteen-year-old daughter, and put them in the back room. They asked us for five million leones [approximately U.S. \$2,500] otherwise they threatened our girls would be killed. We managed to collect 350,000 leones [approximately U.S. \$175], which we gave to them.

Then they brought out the girls. They pushed my daughter and a seventeen-year-old on the bed in the parlor and started tearing off their clothes. I peeked through a crack in the door and could see them fighting with my daughter. They put clothes in her mouth so she would not scream. The rebels punched, slapped her and knocked her head with the butt of their rifle. Then one of them opened the door and asked who the fathers of the girls were. One of them took us and lined us up right in front of the bed and said, "Don't you want to see what we do to your daughters?" We begged them to leave them alone but they said, "If you continue to talk, we will burn this house and kill everyone of you." A rebel had his gun pointed at us the whole time and there were two more at the door. Amos raped my daughter and Blood raped another girl. Then the rebel with the gun and the one guarding took their turns. My daughter was crying but they covered her mouth and told her to shut up. Blood then told the girls to get dressed and they took them away.¹²⁹

S.G., a fifty-year-old widow, was raped by a teenage rebel called Commander "Don't Blame God" and subsequently had both arms amputated in Matru village in Bo district prior to the 1996 elections:

I pleaded but Commander Don't Blame God said he was going to kill me if I didn't lie down. I told him it had been such a long, long time since I had sex. During the rape I was pleading with him saying, "Don't kill me, please don't kill me." He was so rough with me. Then he took me up a big dune above Matru village. As we were walking, he said he was going to kill me. I pleaded with him and he then said, "I've changed my mind, I'm going to give you a letter." Once we got there I saw many more rebels, about twenty. I was stripped naked down to my underwear. It was humiliating. Then they asked me to sit down and wait. Commander Don't Blame God said: "I have a letter for you but wait for the cutlass man to come." Then the one with the machete came and told me to put out my left arm. It took them three chops with the cutlass to cut off my arm. After this I begged them not to cut my other arm but they struggled with me and a rebel held it down and cut it off. The cutlass man said, "We belong to Foday Sankoh's group." Then one of them took my left arm and put it under my vagina and kicked me twice in the vagina ... very, very hard.¹³⁰

D.T. was gang raped by a child combatant and three other RUF rebels in the rainy season in 2000 near Foriah village in Koinadugu district:

I was hiding in the bush from the rebels with about fifteen other villagers when the rebels found us. The rebels separated me from the others because my nine-month-old son was crying. A child combatant ordered me at gunpoint to put my son down. He then raped me. I do not know how young he was but he had not yet been circumcised. He was maybe as young as twelve. Then three other rebel men raped me. When I was being raped, I made no movement as they might think that

¹²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

¹³⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

I was trying to resist. I was bleeding after being raped by four males. After being raped, the rebels forced me to carry a heavy load and walk to Kania town. I escaped the same day and returned to the farm. I explained to my husband that I had been raped but he was happy to accept me back.¹³¹

R.F., a thirty-three-year-old farmer, explained how she felt after she was gang raped by West Side Boys, including four child combatants, at Petifu village in Port Loko district in November 1999:

Four children between ten and twelve years used me. They were so small I could barely feel them inside me. The small ones tried to imitate the older ones and one of them kept saying, "I'm trying it, I'm trying it." It was the war that brought that humiliation. I kept comparing them to my own children; my first-born son is ten. I forgave them because they are children. It was not of their own making. They must have been drugged.¹³²

In December 1994, thirty-year-old A.B. was abducted with six other women from Yonibani in Tonkolili district by the RUF when they launched a surprise attack with the collusion of the SLA. The RUF made the women carry looted items to their camp, where A.B. stayed for a week before escaping. She herself was repeatedly raped by two rebels, including one Liberian, and witnessed the rape of an old woman with gray hair:

At least four of the women I had been abducted with were raped. Before they raped me, the rebels went for an old woman with white hair. When she realized what they wanted, she took off her headscarf to show her white hair and said, "I'm old, I have stopped having sex." At first the commander said the rebels should not touch her because she was old. But the other rebels got annoyed and started insulting the commander saying, "Fine, you can fuck any woman you want, anytime you want, but now that we have one we want, you say no." The commander finally said that they could go ahead so all five rebels, including a small boy of fifteen years raped her. One was on his knees with his trousers down while the others stood around watching.

When I saw that I felt sick. When I saw a young boy and that old woman, I realized they could do anything and that they were going to do the same thing to me. But I guess I was lucky as only two did it to me.¹³³

S.J., a wealthy forty-five-year-old woman, was raped by RUF rebels, including a child combatant, and then burnt in late January 1999 in Manjoro village in Bombali district:

Thirty rebels attacked our village. The rebels said that we, the civilians don't want peace. I saw them kill three people and were it not for God, I would have been the fourth. Then they burned thirteen houses and looted all our things. I ran with my four children to the house in the bush where we tend to the cows. We slept there with the cows for a few days but then seven rebels surprised us there. The commander of this group was called C.O. Caca Scatter. He was a Mende. Others were speaking Mandingo and Temne.

They started stealing what few possessions I had and then C.O. Caca Scatter said that I should be raped. When I heard that order I pleaded, "Please, don't do that one to me." But they said they would do whatever they wanted. Four raped me and the last one to rape me was a fifteen-year-old. I could have given birth to him, he was so young. He put a knife to my throat and said he was going to kill me but the C.O. said I shouldn't be killed.

Then they tied my hands behind me and C.O. Caca Scatter burnt me. He scooped up hot charcoal from the fire we had been cooking with and tried to burn my face with it. I struggled and turned

¹³¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002. The rainy season starts in May and ends in October.

¹³² Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.

¹³³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

my face so he burned my chest instead. He did this four times on my front and seven times on my back. Each time they picked up the charcoal and held it on my body until it burned deep into my skin. They left me with my skin burning but I could not roll on the ground for fear it would catch fire and burn me even more. When they started to burn me I pleaded for them to kill me. I started screaming and my children came around to try and save me. They took two of my children, gave them looted property to carry and took them away. That is the last I have heard of them.¹³⁴

T.B., a fifty-year-old woman was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion and made to walk to Magburaka in Bombali district. There, a RUF/AFRC rebel raped her until she developed an abscess in her vagina:

In Magburaka, I was first raped by three rebels. While doing it they called me a bastard child and that civilians wanted to burn them all alive. After that I was taken as a wife by a commander called "Bird Bod" who was in his thirties. He raped me every day. They were always on drugs. He said he didn't have a wife so I cooked and washed for him. He roughed and beat me and used to put his fingers violently up inside me. He would get an erection while he was doing this and would sometimes rape me afterwards. I think this is how I started to get boils—I had five or six of them. It started to create an ulcer. Over the two months I was with them it got worse and worse. It was terribly painful but Commander Bird still raped me and put his fingers up me even though I had this problem. I don't know why the RUF would treat an old woman like me in such a way.

The abscess got very swollen and started to hang down between my thighs. I could barely walk. It started to smell very bad and it was then that the commander finally drove me away. I walked for two to three weeks through the bush going from village to village until I got to Masiaka. In every village I went, the women felt for me and would give me food and make a bath of herbs and salt for me to soak in. Then when I felt strong enough, I would walk to the next village. When I reached Freetown, I received medical treatment. My husband has accepted me back and feels sorry for me.¹³⁵

Breastfeeding mothers were also not spared by the rebel factions even though in Sierra Leonean culture, women are not supposed to have sexual intercourse until their children have been weaned and can walk, which can take up to three years.¹³⁶ Sierra Leoneans believe that doing so will weaken the breast milk and the ability of the child to fend off infection. Women whose infants died from malnutrition after they—the mothers—had been raped frequently attributed the death of their child to the fact that they had been raped. It is also a specific crime for a man to commit adultery with another man's wife while she is breastfeeding. Traditionally, the guilty spouses are thought to be under a curse and will suffer misfortune.¹³⁷ A.B., who was raped by two rebels and witnessed the rape of an old woman, tried at first to dissuade the first rebel from raping her by telling him that she was a breastfeeding mother with full breasts, but the rebel said he did not care.¹³⁸ M.C. was breastfeeding her two-week-old baby when she was brutally gang raped by RUF/AFRC rebels in early January 1999 near Mabang in Tonkolili district; she breastfed her baby while being raped. She suffered a prolapsed uterus¹³⁹ as a consequence of the rape:

At the time of the January 1999 offensive, my husband who is a policeman was based in Mile 91. I became very worried about him and decided to travel to find him. I left Bo on January 8. I had just given birth to a baby girl two weeks before so was still feeling very weak but I desperately wanted to find my man.

¹³⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹³⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 8, 1999.

¹³⁶ Mariane C. Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2001), p. 131.

¹³⁷ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Law*, pp. 127-8 and 131.

¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹³⁹ A prolapsed uterus is a condition in which the uterus drops from its normal position. In severe cases, such as those that may be associated with injury from sexual violence, the cervix and uterus may protrude beyond the vaginal opening.

I arrived late in the evening. Then all of a sudden we heard firing. There was confusion and armed rebels captured me. They took me to their bush camp in a place called Mabang. They started sexing me two days later. I tried to fight and told them to leave me, but several times they put a pistol into my vagina. I gave myself up to God and asked that he save me. The first day, about ten sexed me. After the first day there were fewer men, between three and six a day. Every day they came and stood in line waiting to rape me. All together there were over thirty different men. They were aged between seventeen and twenty-five years old. The younger ones were rough and most of them seemed to be on drugs. I think these were RUF people. Most of them seemed to be Mendes. I saw many young girls in their camp. I guess the lucky ones only had one rebel. But I'm from Bo and wouldn't allow myself to be together with one of them. I told them I wasn't a Kamajor and that my husband was a policeman and they said, "Oh policemen are our enemies ... we've killed them all. Forget about your husband."

Sometimes they tied my legs to my arms with my legs spread and raped me one after the other. They said since I was from Bo and I was a Kamajor's wife that they were going to rape me to death. [Sometimes] I held my baby Hawanatu in my arms while they were raping me. When she cried they said they wanted to shoot her so I gave her the breast.

They raped me for two or three weeks and then in early February, my vagina came out [i.e. she suffered a prolapsed uterus]. It was so, so painful. I can't tell you how much it hurt. When this happened, I thought I was going to die. In order to get it to go back in I had to lie down and push it back in. To urinate, I had to lie down. They provoked me and made fun of me. They said now my Kamajor husband will not be able to have sex with me. A wife of one of the commanders told a villager to help me escape which they did. He took me to a nice woman in another village away from the rebel area and after explaining my problem, she helped me so much. She gave me herbs and tried to cure me and my baby who by that time was vomiting and very sick. It's only God that helped keep my little Hawanatu alive. He decided that this little child is mine to keep. Later, when I was stronger, I made it to Freetown and had an operation for my prolapsed uterus. I feel much better now.¹⁴⁰

Rebels also raped pregnant women. In polygynous marriages, pregnant women generally stop having sexual intercourse with their husbands once their pregnancy has been confirmed, to protect the fetus. R.F, the thirty-three-year-old farmer gang raped by West Side Boys at Petifu, Port Loko, in November 1999 (see above, p. 39), was six months pregnant at the time. As the result of the gang rape she delivered prematurely, causing the baby's death:

I went with Isatu, her husband and my five-year-old son to harvest rice in Isatu's village, Petifu. We traveled by boat and at night to avoid the rebels. When we were resting having worked all the next day, we heard the rebels. They were all over the village and told us to give them our rice and palm oil. Several of them started hitting me on the head with their guns. Three were wearing uniform, the others wore civilian clothes. They spoke all different languages.

One of them tied a rope around my waist like a goat and pushed me out of the door screaming, "Show me where your people are." My little boy was left sleeping on the bed. Seven of the rebels then led me about a mile out of the village, screaming at me to tell them where we had hidden the rice and palm oil. I told them I was a stranger there but they did not believe me. They took me into a small farmhouse where they all used me. This went on for a few hours until the cloth I was lying on was soaked. I could barely walk. Then they ordered me to get up and dragged me like a sheep back to the village.

¹⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

Once back in the village, they put me in a house and more of them started raping me. I was used by at least twenty rebels. I think the whole unit raped me throughout the night. The only one who did not use me was the commander. He kept coming in and saying, "Have you had your turn?" He was the one they kept calling "Commander."

When one of the Temne speaking rebels was raping me I said, "Please brother, talk to these people and ask them to leave me." But he said he could not do anything. Another rebel pulled out a knife when he was on top of me and said if I said anything he would kill me. I told them I was pregnant and said, "Can't you see? I have a six month belly." But they said, "We do not care. We see your belly but so what." Two of them told me to stoop down, but I couldn't and they just pushed me down and used me. After many had used me one of them said, "Oh, there is no more sweetness there," so they turned me over and did it to me from behind. Three of them did it to me like that, and now when I go to the toilet it is so painful; I am still bleeding and it feels like my insides are coming out. One rebel had sex with me several times. He said he was punishing me for not having shown him where the rice and palm oil was hidden. I yelled for the commander and complained, saying, "He wants to kill me, tell him to leave me!" but he said, "We have killed others that are better than you." I did not complain after that. They kept saying they were about to stop fighting—that they really want peace and that after peace comes, they won't do these things any more.

In the early hours of the morning, they finally left. They wanted me to carry their looted items but I could not walk. They took other people whom they used to carry the looted goods. At one point I tried to get up but could not, I slipped and fell down to earth. By this time I had started bleeding. I felt my baby trembling in my belly. A few hours later the water broke and then I started to have contractions. I have five children and had never even had a miscarriage. I had about three hours of labor before giving birth. The little thing shook for a minute or so and then it died. It was so beautiful; it had fine hair and the face was so pretty. I wrapped it with a cloth. I could not bear to look whether it was a boy or a girl. I was gushing out blood and shortly after I delivered the placenta. I felt dizzy. I was barely able to walk.

Later when I had a little more strength I covered my baby and threw it in a pit latrine. I felt so bad for throwing it away like that but I did not have the strength to bury it properly. After thinking everything over, I am only angry at this war and thankful that I still have my life and that the life of my child [her five-year-old] was spared. It's only God that saved him. He was lying on the bed the whole time.¹⁴¹

Forced Pregnancies

Many women and girls became pregnant as the result of the rape(s) they were subjected to. Although some women were reportedly able to abort without the knowledge of the rebels using traditional herbal treatments, the majority had no choice but to carry the child to full term. M.W., the abducted nurse already quoted above (see p. 28), said that many girls who had been raped had miscarriages that might have been self-induced with herbs. I.S., a twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC during the January 1999 invasion, tried to abort, but was unsuccessful:

When I got pregnant I didn't tell my rebel husband for months. I asked a woman who knows about medicine to give me herbs to abort the baby, but it never worked and after my belly started to swell, he found out. He warned me that if I tried to flush the baby out, he'd kill me. He said he wanted the baby and that he hoped it would be a boy.¹⁴²

M.W., the abducted nurse, also mentioned that medical personnel were instructed by a rebel doctor, Dr.

¹⁴¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.

¹⁴² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

Lahai, not to perform abortions, give birth control, or advise that traditional herbal treatments be taken, as the rebels felt that too many people had died and they needed to increase the population.¹⁴³ Many women did have miscarriages because of the brutal rapes and trauma they were subjected to by the rebels, as well as the difficult conditions in the bush.

Forced Abortion by West Side Boys

Human Rights Watch has documented one case of forced abortion by the West Side Boys, the splinter group of the AFRC that took power in the 1997 coup. Twenty-year-old M.K. was abducted from Magbele village in Port Loko district in July 2000, when she was four months pregnant. She was raped by four West Side Boys and was made the wife of a rebel who forced her to abort:

I was abducted with two other civilians, including my brother-in-law, by the West Side Boys. They were all wearing uniforms; some uniforms were new, and others wore old ones. We were taken to their base in Magbele Junction where there were many other abductees. At nighttime one of the rebels called Umaro Kamara came to me and said he wanted to have sex with me. He spoke nicely with me and said that he wanted to take me to Makeni and make me his wife. He raped me that day. The rebels saw that I was pregnant and said to Umaro, "We are not going to work along with any pregnant woman, we should kill her." Umaro said that he wanted to take me as his wife and that I should be given an injection instead. Umaro called me and tried to convince me to get rid of the baby. He said, "They will kill you if you do not agree so you better have the injection." I was taken to the doctor who gave me an injection and some pills. Two days later I started bleeding. I felt weak and had pain all over my body. Then I lost the baby.

When Umaro was on patrol, three other rebels raped me. When we moved out to go to another base, I saw the body of my brother-in-law. After one day I started bleeding again so Umaro took me to the doctor who gave me another injection. When we reached Lunsar, Umaro wanted to make me his wife. Even while I was bleeding, Umaro used me. He told me to wash myself before raping me.¹⁴⁴

Rape by Female Combatant

Human Rights Watch has documented a case of a female rebel manually raping female abductees. The virginity checks performed by female rebels on abductees prior to their "virgination" by male rebels, noted above, also constitute rape given that penetration occurred without the consent of the victim. More of such abuses may have been committed but not reported due to shame, as expressed in the testimony below. The rebels captured sixteen-year-old F.P. on January 7, 1999 when—as she was fleeing the fighting in central Freetown with two other girls—she ran into a patrol of five heavily armed rebels, including one female rebel. They knew the female rebel from before as Aminata; she had lived in their neighborhood before the 1997 AFRC coup. She had joined the rebels at that time and had not been seen since the AFRC was driven out of Freetown in February 1998. F.P. remembered having had an argument with her several years ago. The rebels called her "C.O. Sally." F.P. was taken with her sister and another girl whom she did not know to a rebel base. Her friend was raped by five men, which she was made to watch. F.P. was also "virginated" by male rebels and sexually molested by "C.O. Sally," along with another girl, also called Sally:

C.O. Sally came into the room where we were kept and said, "Why are you hollering? These are my boys, why are you refusing them?" Since we knew C.O. Sally, we asked her to help us get away, so finally on January 10 she took us at gunpoint to another house. She made us cook and wash for her. Once she told us to go into a room and take off our clothes. She had an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] on the ground as well as a gun. We took off our clothes and then she took two long sticks and tied our hands to them straight out from our shoulders. She stood us in front of her and asked if we remembered her to which I answered, "No." Then she said that she remembered

¹⁴³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko IDP camp, July 13, 2000.

me and that we had fought last time we had met each other. She made me put one leg up on a drum and then she fingered me with two fingers. I was so embarrassed and ashamed. I asked her why she was doing this but she screamed at me to shut up. She did not touch herself or say anything, but kept on fingering me. Then she called Sally and did the same thing to her. When she was finished, she left us standing there with our arms tied. A little later she fingered us again. It did not seem sexual to me and I do not know why she did it. An hour later a young rebel came and said he thought he was hearing gunshots from ECOMOG. C.O. Sally ordered the boy to untie us as "I have punished these people already."¹⁴⁵

Rape and Other Sexual Violence against Boys and Men by Male and Female Rebels

According to FAWE Sierra Leone, boys and men were also raped by male rebels. FAWE Sierra Leone treated fourteen boys aged between nine and fifteen years old who had been raped, but suspects that there are more cases. Due to the stigma attached to homosexuality in Sierra Leone, male victims of rape feared they would be perceived as homosexuals and therefore few boys were willing to report it. Human Rights Watch has not documented any of these crimes of sexual violence, which were apparently committed on a much smaller scale than sexual violence committed against women and girls. FAWE Sierra Leone did not want Human Rights Watch to interview the boys they had treated as they feared that interviewing them would re-traumatize them.¹⁴⁶

Human Rights Watch documented two cases in which female rebels forced men to have sexual intercourse at gunpoint. One case involved a female rebel forcing a male civilian to have sex during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, and the second involved a RUF female training commander and male conscripts in Kono. Cases of these crimes of sexual violence were also reported by FAWE Sierra Leone. It is impossible to determine the prevalence of this type of sexual violence, but—given the general level of violence within the rebel forces and the power that female combatants had over civilians—Human Rights Watch believes that such incidents did happen more often than has been reported, albeit again on a much reduced scale compared to male combatants raping female civilians.

Abduction, Sexual Slavery, Forced Labor, and Conscription

Abduction

The rebel forces used abduction as their primary method for recruitment. During an attack on a town or village, rebels typically rounded up civilians as they tried to flee or were found hiding. Men were abducted to carry the looted items as well as being forcibly conscripted. The abducted children were also given military training and forcibly conscripted.

In thousands of cases, women and girls were abducted after being subjected to sexual violence. The rebels often killed family members who tried to protect their women and girls. Abducted women and girls described being "given" to a combatant who then took them as their "wives" (see also "Sexual slavery" section, below).¹⁴⁷ Abduction of civilians continued for the duration of the armed conflict. In the early years of the conflict, the RUF went on hit-and-run raids, returning to their base camps with looted items and abducted civilians. As the RUF took over more territory, an increasing number of civilians were abducted. As their ranks increased with more men and boys being forcibly conscripted, so did their abduction of women and girls. The AFRC and West Side Boys used the same tactics. Some women had the extreme misfortune of escaping from one rebel faction, or unit, only to be abducted by another. One such victim, thirteen-year-old M.F. (see above, p. 34), who was first

¹⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding Chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

¹⁴⁷ The PHR report found that 9 percent of women reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence had been forced to "marry" their rebel "husband." PHR report, p. 2. These types of marriage are similar to marriages by capture, which were common at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. In tribal wars, the conquerors would kill the male inhabitants of the vanquished village and capture the women who subsequently became the wives of the conquerors. The "marriage" was validated by the captor's public declaration of his intention to cohabit with his captive. Such a wife was regarded as a slave and her children could not inherit from their father. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 29.

abducted from Koinadugu by the RUF/AFRC and gang raped, was driven out of Makeni in October 1999 when it came under attack by the RUF. She was subsequently abducted by the West Side Boys and raped by two child combatants.¹⁴⁸

Sexual Slavery and Forced Labor

Women and girls were primarily abducted to be the sex slaves of the rebels and to perform slave labor. The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights found that 33 percent of the interviewees reporting war-related sexual violence had been abducted and 15 percent had been subjected to sexual slavery. Consistent with fairly common practice among the Sierra Leonean male population at large, many rebels had polygynous "marriages," including with abducted women whom they had forced to "marry" them. Rebels also changed "wives" frequently when they tired of them or when their "wives" were too ill to perform their tasks (a consequence of the brutality that they were often subjected to). Victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported attaching themselves to one rebel to avoid gang rape and be given a degree of protection. The more highly ranked the commander, the more protection a woman had. Women and girls, however, remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was gang raped by the RUF/AFRC in Koinadugu was raped by two other commanders when her "husband" Mohammed was out on patrol.

Women who were "married" to high-ranking rebels benefited not only from "protection" but also were able to exert power over others. The women and girls often benefited from the looted items that their rebel "husbands" gave them, and took part themselves in looting raids to steal clothes, shoes, and jewelry. Not all were abductees: some women and girls voluntarily joined the rebel forces and sought to benefit from their relationship with the rebels, i.e. from the looted goods or escaping from their parents (some girls would use a relationship with a rebel boyfriend to gain freedom from parental control, by threatening to involve the boyfriend in their dispute over parental restrictions). Such women consenting to marry a rebel were probably still vulnerable to sexual violence from other rebels.

Numerous victims described being subjected to abuse or forced to work by commanders' wives. FAWE Sierra Leone also reported that female combatants "married" to rebels killed new abductees if their "husbands" showed a preference for them. A.J., the fourteen-year-old student who was abducted in Pujehun and tortured by the RUF from February to May 1994 (see above, p. 31) is an example of how some "wives" were treated by other female abductees or combatants:

I was put under the control of Commander Patrick, a Liberian. He was married to a woman called Neneh who was very jealous of me. Once, after the commanders had gone to the war front, Neneh told one of our guards to open up the cage where I was being held and take me out. She said, "My husband is interested in you. If you accept him to have sex with you, I'll kill you, so be forewarned." Neneh and Patrick have one child. She told me she'd joined the rebels voluntarily. She said, "You are just a captive. Do you think I was abducted? I was not abducted. I joined voluntarily. So you have no right to fall in love with my husband."¹⁴⁹

A few victims also described how some of these women, usually the wives of commanders, used their power to try and protect, and at times facilitate the escape, of other abductees. For example, M.C., who was brutally raped by rebels in early 1999 in Mabang and suffered a prolapsed uterus (see above, p. 38) was helped to escape by a commander's wife who felt sorry for her.¹⁵⁰

Abducted women were made to carry out forced labor during their captivity, including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, and carrying heavy loads of ammunition and looted items. In many instances, women—intimidated by their captors and the situation they were in—felt powerless to escape their lives of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels often deliberately

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, 7 March 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

marked abducted civilians with the letters "RUF" or "AFRC" carved mainly onto their chests. This made escape more difficult because, were they to be caught by government forces, they would likely be suspected of being rebels and killed. Some women used traditional herbal remedies to remove their markings, and international organizations have also performed surgery on these victims to remove the scars.

Relationships between Rebels and Abductees

The relationships that developed between the abductees and rebels were very complex and varied. Most relationships were obviously very volatile, as described by I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC in the January 1999 invasion (see above, p. 40). She stayed with the AFRC/West Side Boys until August 1999 when she was able to escape:

We stayed there for months and they were always going on attacks in the Port Loko area. Occasionally C.O. Blood was nice to me and I had to kiss him and play love with him. But I could never tell him what was really in my heart; that I missed my family and wanted to escape. Other days he would beat me for nothing. He did the same thing to his other "wife." Neither of us could complain.¹⁵¹

H.K. was assigned as the wife of "Jaja" and was so badly treated by him that even the other rebels sometimes tried to prevail on him to be less violent:

Jaja was already "married" to another abductee, and when she saw what he had done to me, she escaped. He always beat both of us. He used to sex me twice every night. He made me take his penis in my mouth. I tried to refuse him but he always threatened to kill me. He was actually an SLA soldier but had joined the RUF. His C.O. was Colonel Stagger, who used to criticize him for how he treated us. Colonel Stagger used to say, "Look, when we take these kids, we should take care of them and now you beat her for nothing." Jaja used to say it was not Stagger's business. Stagger's own abductees were treated pretty well. He never beat them.¹⁵²

Some women fled at the first opportunity. Other women, especially those who had children with the rebels, found it difficult to leave these abusive relationships. Many women and girls experienced their first sexual relationship with their rebel "husband" and may have developed aspects of the "Stockholm Syndrome," whereby the hostage identifies with the hostage-taker. They adjusted to the level of violence with the rebels, which over time became "normal," in order to survive.¹⁵³ Others feared that their "husband" might seek revenge if they escaped and returned to their family. The rebels instilled fear in their "wives" by telling them that their families would not accept them back. The abductees also feared to some extent that they would be blamed for what happened to them. For some women who had lost their families, the rebels became a surrogate family. As many rebels had themselves lost their families or could not return to their villages of origin, given that they had in some cases committed human rights abuses in their communities, they did not want to relinquish their surrogate families or their slave labor.

As the women and girls were never registered in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program and there was insufficient documentation of this large category of victims throughout the armed conflict, it is unclear how many girls and women were abducted. It is now impossible to establish how many remain under the control of their rebel "husband" or have returned to their village of origin.

The ones who have remained involuntarily will only re-examine their situation when alternatives become available. Women who wish to sever links with ex-combatants have few alternative economic or social options. They are a very vulnerable group that has little or no means of support. They are often not able to return to their

¹⁵¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹⁵² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.

¹⁵³ A group of female ex-combatants and abducted women, for example, defined to Human Rights Watch domestic violence as "wounding or losing consciousness."

villages out of fear, lack of funds and social stigma, especially if they have given birth to children fathered by rebels. The women are therefore often forced to remain in situations in which they are vulnerable to continuing abuse. Numerous victims end up being commercial sex workers, selling their body for as little as U.S.50¢. Exploited girls and women can end up abandoned with several children to raise by themselves by the time they are in their early twenties.

Rebel Control over Abductees

Life with the rebels was very tough. Civilian abductees, in particular, were treated ruthlessly. The RUF established a military police system and courthouses to administer a form of justice to those who contravened RUF rules of behavior. Some of the RUF rules were written, but the rules, trial and punishment were to a large extent arbitrary, dependent on the particular commander. Interviewees reported that severe punishment was meted out for small incidents such as spilling water on a commander's shoes (one week in a cell with daily beatings) or not lodging complaints through the official channels (imprisonment in a dungeon). "Courthouses" were established to try both combatants and the civilians.¹⁵⁴ A rebel was expected to provide for his "wives" and children during their captivity even if he had taken on another "wife" or "wives." If a rebel reneged on his responsibility, then he could be put in a cell and beaten to death. Civilian women who were tried by the court were raped and beaten if they did not have a commander to stand up for them. According to K.M., who was abducted by the RUF from Kabala, Koinadugu, the three male rebels who presided over the courthouse in Burkina, a training camp in Kailahun, would arrange amongst themselves who could rape the women. She also said that one woman was raped to death by six rebels.¹⁵⁵

Forced Conscription: Female Combatants

Women and girls were also forcibly conscripted into the rebel fighting forces. The RUF established military training camps for women. During active fighting, female combatants were sent into battle after the men and the Small Boys Units (SBUs). There were only very few high-ranking female commanders in the rebel forces and a much smaller number of female combatants than adult men or boys. Female combatants had more power than female civilians: combatants, including female combatants, who had received military training, had substantial power to do whatever they wanted to civilians. Within the rebel forces, however, women still held much lower status: female combatants were assigned "husbands."

Forcibly conscripted female combatants were in many ways as vulnerable as civilian abductees, and may have decided to stay with their rebel "husbands" for the same reasons as their civilian counterparts i.e. shame, lack of alternative options, and economic dependence on their "husbands."

RUF Officers' Responsibility for Sexual Violence

In addition to their individual criminal responsibility, rebel commanders can bear direct command responsibility for crimes of sexual violence and sexual slavery, for ordering the rape and abduction of women and girls (see below, p. 60, for a discussion of the principle of command responsibility in international law). C.O. Caca Scatter, for example, ordered the gang rape of S.J., the wealthy forty-five-year-old woman (see above, p. 37). A.J., the fourteen-year-old student, was tortured, caged and brutally raped by C.O. Patrick (see above, p. 43). S.G., the fifty-year-old widow was raped and had both arms amputated by Commander "Don't Blame God" (see above, p. 36).¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the organized way in which victims frequently describe being rounded up and taken, as well as the number of rebels involved in these abductions and the number of victims abducted, suggests an element of premeditation and planning on the part of the RUF, AFRC and West Side Boys command. Victims also frequently described being specifically selected to be given to a commander or being sexually abused in the presence of commanders, which again suggest that sexual violence was committed under the direction of and with the consent of members of the rebels' hierarchy. I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted and

¹⁵⁴ Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," p. 189.

¹⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999. Under Article 6 (1), persons are held individually responsible for the planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the statute.

gang raped by the West Side Boys from January to August 1999 explained how Commander "Blood" had initiated the "wife" selection process:

One of the commanders said he was going to amputate all of us too. But another commander, C.O. Blood, said, "Don't kill them, let's chose them as wives." Then we were divided up. The one who seemed to be in charge, C.O. Blood, chose me. When he looked at me I was frightened. His pupils were huge—he was high on drugs. He took me to a house and told me to lie down on the ground. He said if I did not allow him to have sex, he would kill me. He took out a knife and said he would not even waste his ammunition on me. He would just chop me to pieces. I knew he meant what he said. He forced my clothes off and used me twice. He was rough and after the second time I begged him to leave me, but he said he did not care. My insides hurt so much. Then he used me from behind. Other women were being raped in the same room. They [the West Side Boys] did not care.¹⁵⁷

According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirty-four of the ninety-four survivors directly reporting sexual violence believed that their attackers' commander was aware of the attack.¹⁵⁸ While it is difficult to generalize from this figure, it does tend to confirm the findings of Human Rights Watch that sexual violence and slavery, which were committed on a widespread and systematic nature, were part of the rebel forces' military strategy to dominate, humiliate and punish the civilian population.

The RUF has made occasional efforts to declare rape a crime within certain areas under their control and disciplined ordinary soldiers accused of raping. The disciplinary measures included summary trials followed by execution. These efforts failed to prevent sexual violence in practice. One commander, for example, prevented at least temporarily the rape of an eight-year-old girl who was abducted by a ten-year-old child combatant by ordering the child combatant to only use the young girl "for cleaning and cooking for now."¹⁵⁹ A.B. witnessed the gang rape of an old woman, which the commander had originally tried to stop but then allowed to happen (see above, p. 37).

Senior male and female figures in the RUF interviewed by Human Rights Watch mainly denied that sexual violence had happened, explaining that the women joined the RUF movement voluntarily and fell in love with their rebel "husbands."¹⁶⁰ A key figure in the AFRC admitted that he had heard of cases of sexual violence and blamed it on the breakdown of law and order.¹⁶¹ He also said that none of his men had expressed any remorse for the human rights abuses they committed. In the vast majority of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, those who committed rape were not disciplined or punished in any way

Sexual Violence Committed by the CDF

As already noted, there are relatively few reported cases of rape committed by the CDF. The CDF were reasonably disciplined during the war, although their discipline deteriorated when they were deployed in chiefdoms outside their own native areas. Sexual intercourse is believed to act against the protection bestowed on the fighters during their initiation ceremonies. However, Human Rights Watch has documented several crimes of sexual violence by the Kamajors, the CDF based in the Southern Province.

In March 1998, a forty-five-year-old Temne man, M.B., witnessed the rape of a young Temne woman called Jeneba by the Kamajors in Kenema town. The Kamajors also mutilated and killed Jeneba. M.B. explained that during the ECOMOG intervention to restore the democratically elected government in 1998, Kamajors accused members of the Temne and Limba ethnic groups of being RUF/AFRC supporters and persecuted them. According to M.B., the Kamajors identified Temnes and Limbas as such by their last names and publicly beheaded or

¹⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹⁵⁸ PHR report, p. 54.

¹⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 16, 1999.

¹⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch interviews, Freetown and Makeni, April 1999 to May 2002.

¹⁶¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 26, 2002.

stabbed to death numerous alleged rebels. The Kamajors also ate some of their victims, believing that this would bestow additional powers to them. The accused had no means to defend themselves, as ECOMOG initially backed the Kamajors and did not realize until later that the killings were carried out along tribal lines. After receiving death threats, M.B. sought refuge in the house of a chief who was Temne and the father of Jeneba. A group of about eight Kamajors came to the house, looking for Jeneba, and accused her of having a sexual relationship with an AFRC fighter:

I saw Jeneba being raped by one Kamajor, while the others were standing around watching. Then the Kamajors threatened to kill us if we did not stop looking at them, so we went into other houses to hide. From there we could not see what was going on but heard Jeneba screaming at the top of her voice, and when the Kamajors had gone we came outside and found Jeneba dead. She was naked and her hands and feet had been mutilated by a machete.¹⁶²

On February 17, 1999, J.K., a thirty-one-year-old woman was raped by two Kamajors in a small village in Bonthe district. A group of Kamajors entered J.K.'s house looking for her brother, who had not been home for the past three years:

One of the Kamajors called Kinie said that they had been told that my brother was in the village and was planning to attack them. I assured them no one knew where he was. During this argument, the other civilians in village became afraid and fled into the bush. As soon as the Kamajors forced their way into my bedroom, I followed them to check up on what they were doing. Kinie and another Kamajor whose name I did not know pushed me to the ground, tearing off my clothes. I screamed for help but no one came to my rescue. Even my father who was in the house was unable to help me. They both raped me while the others stood around laughing. When they left the village, they looted some goats and chickens. There was no one to report the incident to and I had no money to pay for a hospital visit. I decided to leave everything to the Almighty God.¹⁶³

In another incident, at least three female civilians were raped, including by a Kamajor commander. In July 2000, M.S. and twenty-five other passengers were taken off a bus at Bauya in Moyamba district, beaten, and accused of being RUF rebels. All their possessions were taken off the bus and inspected by the Kamajors but they did not find any incriminating goods. Their possessions were stolen by the CDF. In the evening, M.S. was locked in the guardroom at the CDF office with nine other women and her young child:

Twenty CDF came to the guardroom and told us, the women that we could choose between [being] raped or killed. I was raped by a young CDF on the ground of the guardroom. I told him that I was a suckling mother but he did not care. My baby was in the room when he raped me. He made me stoop like an animal. He said, "I am a government man so no one will ask me anything about this." My breast milk has gone bad now. I could hear another woman who initially refused to be raped being beaten with the torch. She was raped by two CDF called Mohammed and Ahmed.¹⁶⁴

In the same incident, an older high-ranking CDF commander raped a thirty-five-year-old trader, R.K.:

Mr. S. raped me all night. He raped me five times. I cried as I was not used to doing that even with my husband. He was rough and did it from behind like an animal in a bad way. He accused me of being a RUF commander's wife. I told him my husband is a Gbetti [part of the CDF].¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Human Rights Watch interview, Kenema, August 12, 2002.

¹⁶³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bonthe district, July 8, 2002.

¹⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

¹⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed B.R., a Kamajor fighter who reported witnessing the rape of two civilians that took place in 1997 and 1998. He also witnessed the killing of a captured RUF female combatant, who died after being raped with a stick. B.R. explained that the rape that took place in 1997 happened when a patrol of six Kamajors, including B.R., met a group of female civilians in the bush:

Some of the women started talking bad things about the Kamajors and said that we were taking food off people. Then one Kamajors went for this woman. I saw him raping her. He had stripped her naked and she was screaming. I did not want to see it or be a witness but I had to rush there. At one point I thought he was killing her.¹⁶⁶

The incident was reported to the high priest, one of the main Kamajor initiators who decided that the offender had to be punished. B.R. explained that the punishment was called "walking the highway," which entailed the offender being made to walk slowly through fifty Kamajors lined up on two sides, with the Kamajors flogging him with canes. B.R. said that the victim would have reported the rape to the Kamajor high priest, but that he and the others on patrol decided to report it first, otherwise it would have made them equally guilty of the crime. The rape committed in 1998 involved a young Kamajor raping a twenty-year-old woman. B.R. explained that the offender was given a trial, during which he admitted to having committed the crime. He was subsequently locked up in prison (probably a local prison).

In another instance, B.R. explained how a twenty-five-year-old female RUF combatant captured in Tongo in Kono district was brutally killed by the insertion of a long stick in her vagina after the Kamajors had cut off her ears and nose and gouged her eyes out with a machete. The Kamajor commander allegedly wanted to teach the woman a lesson and said that: "This stick is your husband and is screwing you. Are you enjoying it? Just say your last prayers, as you are going to die bit by bit."¹⁶⁷

Sexual Violence Committed by International Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the international peacekeeping forces. Human Rights Watch was informed of a rape committed by a Guinean peacekeeper, Sgt. Ballah, by two reliable sources, including the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), who had interviewed the twelve-year-old victim. The victim was raped on March 26, 2001 when she asked for Sgt. Ballah's assistance in securing a ride to Freetown at the checkpoint that he was manning. The rape was perpetrated in Bo, the area of deployment of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent. Sgt. Ballah was charged to court on the same day. Unfortunately, the SLP dropped the case and the offender was sent back to Guinea. Human Rights Watch was not able to locate the victim.

In February 2001, a Nigerian peacekeeper reportedly raped a sixteen-year-old girl in Freetown. When Human Rights Watch investigated the case, the SLP claimed they had not been able to trace the perpetrator for questioning. UNAMSIL claimed that the Nigerian contingent and UNAMSIL Civilian Police Section had investigated the matter and that the plaintiff had subsequently dropped the charge.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a witness to an alleged rape by two Ukrainian peacekeepers that took place on April 3, 2002 in the village of Joru in Kenema district. K.S., a fifty-five-year-old female farmer testified that she as well as others in her village had witnessed the gang rape:

Late at night I came out of my house to ease myself [urinate]. Maybe I had been woken up by a big white truck that had stopped about fifty meters away from my house. I hid and watched what was happening; there were people inside. I noticed two white men and one black lady inside the truck. Clearly there was a struggle going on. I could hear her yelling at them to "leave me alone" in what sounded like a Liberian accent, but I can not be sure. The door was open and one of them was on top of her. The lady was really struggling. I saw that one of them was holding her down while the other was raping her. I was able to see because in the process the men had opened the

¹⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 31, 2000.

¹⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, July 31, 2000. The CDF generally killed any RUF that they had captured.

door to the car and the light had come on. I am sure they were raping her and she was fighting with them to stop it. I stayed and watched this go on for several minutes. I later learned a few more people were also watching what was going on. In fact we talked about it the next morning.

Then, perhaps afraid of being watched, the two whites moved their truck further down the road ... past my house, further down the road going out of town. Maybe they thought that because there were no houses around, we would not see what they were up to. They stayed another thirty or so minutes in this second location. I saw both of them have their turn on her, but I did not see any guns. After they were finished, I saw one of them drag her out of the cabin and put her in the back of the big truck. I can not remember if one of them got in the back with her but I think so. Then they drove off.

The next morning when I went out to go to the mosque, we found one of her black shoes that she must have kicked off while struggling with those men. The shoe was near the first place they had stopped. We took it to the police but they never came to ask us any questions. We are all a bit frightened of those UNAMSIL people now. We tell our girls never to get in a truck with them or the same thing might happen to them.¹⁶⁸

Neither the SLP in Joru or UNAMSIL in Kenema conducted a proper investigation into this alleged gang rape, both claiming that the absence of the victim prevented them from conducting their investigation. The UNAMSIL human rights section was not aware of this alleged gang rape until Human Rights Watch informed them, and to date has also not conducted a thorough investigation.

On June 22, 2002, a fourteen-year-old boy was allegedly raped by a Bangladeshi peacekeeper near the Jui transit camp for Sierra Leonean returnees located outside of Freetown in the Western Area. The rape occurred when the victim and his friends were fishing with several Bangladeshi peacekeepers near the camp. The offender was reported to have taken the boy away from the others in the group before raping him. The victim's friends reported that the boy looked disheveled after rejoining the group and immediately told them what had happened. The offender gave the victim the equivalent of U.S \$0.25 to silence him. The boy reported the rape to the SLP on June 24 and a medical exam carried out on the same day confirmed penetration had taken place.

The SLP were involved in the case for ten days, until the UNAMSIL provost marshal took it over. The provost marshal concluded that there was no conclusive evidence to link the crime to the perpetrator. After reviewing the case, the UNAMSIL force commander concluded that while the evidence was inconclusive, the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to conclude that the peacekeeper had violated military discipline, and as such issued an order of repatriation. It is not clear to Human Rights Watch whether this violation will be recorded on the offender's file. According to a reliable source, the investigation by the police and UNAMSIL was conducted in an insensitive manner and members of the Bangladeshi contingent spoke with the victim while the UNAMSIL investigation was ongoing, even though they should not have had access to him. Nor did UNAMSIL follow up with the victim or his family to apologize, provide compensation, and explain the outcome of the investigation.¹⁶⁹

UNAMSIL investigations into allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers indicate a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the problem of sexual violence. Human Rights Watch urges UNAMSIL to fully investigate any allegations of sexual violence committed by UNAMSIL military or civilian personnel. The human rights section should systematically monitor and report on sexual violence, including cases involving UNAMSIL personnel. UNAMSIL should establish a mechanism with the SLP whereby allegations of sexual violence by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL reported to the police are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff members, including the provost marshal and the gender specialist in the human rights section. UNAMSIL should reciprocate by reporting cases known to it to the SLP. UNAMSIL should ensure that states

¹⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Joru, May 28, 2002. Other villagers did not want to be interviewed.

¹⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 15, 2002

report within the prescribed six months on follow up to cases involving military personnel that have resulted in the alleged perpetrator being repatriated to his country of origin, in order to ensure that states prosecute the accused. This will serve to actually enforce a stated "zero tolerance" for sexual exploitation by UNAMSIL staff and persons affiliated with UNAMSIL, which to date has had no teeth and therefore no impact on changing behavior. Civilian staff who commit sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file to ensure that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.

The UNAMSIL human rights section should also provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff. The training should ensure that the peacekeepers understand the code of conduct and the consequences if they do not adhere to it. The U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers and the Military Observer Handbook need to be revised to ensure that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Similar guidelines for civilian staff need to be widely disseminated to all U.N. missions.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

VI. EFFECTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Health

Sexual violence often continues to impact the physical and mental well-being of survivors long after the abuses were committed. In addition to the reluctance of some survivors to seek medical treatment, the lack of health facilities, especially in the provinces, as well as the survivors' lack of money for transport, medical treatment and drugs has meant that the health status of survivors is poor.¹⁷⁰ Survivors also were often only able to seek medical treatment months after the abuse had happened, for example when they managed to escape rebel captors and make their way to a health center.

The probability of transmission of HIV and certain other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is greatly increased in violent sex and any sex where a woman or girl is injured. Doctors and other health personnel interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported a high prevalence of STDs amongst victims, as the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, like other armed conflicts, served as a vector for sexually transmitted diseases.¹⁷¹

A World Health Organization (WHO) report found an alarmingly high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS amongst Sierra Leone Army soldiers. According to the report, the SLA tested 176 soldiers and eighty-two civilians working for the army who had prolonged diarrhea, tuberculosis, weight loss or pneumonia, and found a HIV-positive rate of 41.9 percent (or 108 persons). Among the group tested were eighty female soldiers of whom thirty tested positive (37.5 percent). As many SLA soldiers defected to the rebel factions, it is likely that victims of sexual violence by them have been infected with the virus.¹⁷² A U.N. report on the impact of conflict on children states that rates of sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers are two to five times higher than those of civilian populations, and that during armed conflict the rate of infection can be up to fifty times higher.¹⁷³ Commercial sexual exploitation of women by soldiers, including peacekeepers, also contributes to the spread of

¹⁷⁰ PHR report, p. 45.

¹⁷¹ Human Rights Watch interviews with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002.

¹⁷² World Health Organization, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake—The Strategic and Organizational Context and Recommendations for Action* (Freetown, 2000), p. 3.

¹⁷³ See United Nations Security Council resolution 1308 on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, July 17, 2000; and Graça Machel, "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: A critical review of progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children," report prepared for and presented at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, September 2000, Winnipeg, Canada, p. 12, at <http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/machel-e.asp>.

STDs, including HIV/AIDS.¹⁷⁴ In 1997, tests showed that 70.6 percent of commercial sex workers in Freetown were HIV positive compared to 26.7 percent in 1995.¹⁷⁵

The 2002 report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) on the global AIDS epidemic estimated that by the end of 2001 there were 170,000 persons aged between fifteen and forty-nine living with HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. UNAIDS estimates that more than 50 percent of this figure (90,000) are women and girls.¹⁷⁶ More accurate figures on HIV/AIDS prevalence in Sierra Leone, as opposed to estimates, should be known when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) publish their report based on a nationwide HIV/AIDS prevalence survey conducted in May 2002.¹⁷⁷ The government of Sierra Leone should ensure that future information campaigns on HIV/AIDS are designed both to impart basic information and to help reduce stigma, especially in light of the large number of survivors of sexual violence who may have been infected with HIV.

Other health problems are vasico-vaginal and vasico-rectal fistulas (VVF's and VRF's), as a result of the rape(s) especially of young girls but also of mature women; complications when giving birth; prolapsed uterus; trauma; and unwanted pregnancies. Health professionals have noted high rates of pregnancies amongst young girls with likely resultant illness, injury, and even death, due to pregnancy-related complications. These girls are likely to experience future complications including uterine problems and scarring, reducing their ability to have a normal sex life or to conceive or carry a child to full term in the future. The health of children born to abducted girls is also likely to suffer as the girls often have no one to teach them motherhood skills, contributing to high rates of infant mortality. The health risks are further exacerbated by various factors that impede safe sex, including lack of information about HIV/AIDS, as well as cultural practices and beliefs that undermine the use of reproductive health services and contraception.¹⁷⁸ The lack of attention paid until recently to conflict-related sexual violence has meant that the health needs of women and girls have not received as much attention or funding as required to adequately address the scale of the problem. In general the Sierra Leonean health services lack trained and motivated personnel, medical equipment and supplies, drugs, and blood for transfusion. The reproductive health infrastructure, which was poor before 1991, virtually collapsed during the war.¹⁷⁹ There are only six specialist obstetricians and gynecologists in Sierra Leone.¹⁸⁰ Treatment for sexually transmitted diseases is limited to the main towns and outreach by mobile clinics in some chiefdoms.

Mental health services for survivors of sexual violence are inadequate and as of 2002 there was only one qualified psychiatrist in the country. FAWE Sierra Leone, which has substantial expertise in treating survivors of

¹⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, UNAMSIL medical personnel, Freetown, April 30, 2002.
¹⁷⁵ Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *National AIDS/STD Control Programme Annual Report for 1998* (Freetown, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 1998), p. 3.
¹⁷⁶ UNAIDS, *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002* at <http://www.unaids.org/>, p. 190. This figure is based on a total population of 4,587,000.
¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Joaquim Saweka (WHO Sierra Leone Representative), Freetown, May 3, 2002. The preliminary results of the CDC showed a prevalence rate of 4.9 percent.
¹⁷⁸ Only 297 of 4,923 women (or 6 percent) surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they used contraceptives. This low prevalence of contraception use is due to lack of access to family planning services within the communities, inadequate health facilities, especially in the provinces, lack of disposable income to pay for these services, and the low education of women. Only 3 percent of women with no education used contraception compared to 8 percent of women with primary education and 14 percent of women with secondary or higher education. Another worrying factor is the unwillingness of partners to use condoms, which does not bode well given the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other STDs. See Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, pp. 55-58.
¹⁷⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 198.
¹⁸⁰ WHO and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *Assessment of District Hospitals in Sierra Leone for the Delivery of Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Services* (Freetown: 2002), p. 10. The Assessment also found that physicians attended only 3 percent of births whereas traditional birth attendants assisted in 38 percent of births nationally. Ibid. pp. 56-57. Only 10 percent of 4,923 women surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they received antenatal care from a physician. See Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 10.

sexual violence, believes that counseling on a massive scale is needed to ensure that the women and girls can face the future.¹⁸¹

Stigmatization and Shame of Survivors

The rebels frequently committed crimes of sexual violence in public places. A.M., a twenty-year-old male, reported that when he was held in captivity in State House in Freetown from January 8, 1999 for three days, he saw from his cell window RUF/AFRC combatants raping about twenty to twenty-five girls each night on the grounds.¹⁸² Given that rape has been committed on such a systematic and widespread scale and was witnessed by many people, it seems that rape survivors, particularly in urban centers, are generally not stigmatized by society. Survivors interviewed have expressed fear of rejection by their families and communities, but in practice it seems that their fears are unfounded. Most survivors are accepted back into their communities, with their families simply overjoyed to find that they are still alive.

Nevertheless, some women, like R.K. who was raped by the CDF (see above, p. 48), have been rejected by their husbands:

I told my husband what happened. He cried and rejected me. He said he will find another wife. My family has begged him to accept me as it was not my fault. He does not love me anymore. I am annoyed because I was the senior wife and now he does not treat me well.¹⁸³

Girls and women who voluntarily joined the rebel forces are less likely to be welcomed back.

The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights gives an indication of survival strategies employed by women who had been raped: of the ninety-four interviewees reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence, sixty-one (or 65 percent) told someone about their case(s) of sexual violence. The majority of these survivors (fifty women and girls or 53 percent) reported their experience to a health care provider in a hospital, health care center or to a traditional healer, albeit on average five months after the incident(s) occurred. Among those not reporting these incidents and who stated a reason (twenty-eight out of thirty-three), the reasons given were feelings of shame or social stigma (eighteen women and girls or 64 percent), fear of being stigmatized or rejected (eight women and girls or 28 percent) and not having trust in anyone (six women and girls or 21 percent). Eighteen women and girls (19 percent) reported that discussions with family members helped them to try to forget about the incident(s). Other survivors reported that what helped most was to try and forget about the incident (46 percent), support of family (35 percent), a health care provider (33 percent) and traditional medicine (32 percent).¹⁸⁴

Human Rights Watch also found that many survivors feel intense personal shame that the rebels have defiled them, and therefore often do not report the crime or seek medical attention. S.G., the fifty-year-old widow who had both arms amputated after being raped (see above p. 36), described the shame and anger she felt after her ordeal:

I didn't even tell my people about the rape. It's such a shameful act. Not just because of the rebel's age, but also because never in my life have I had sex with someone besides my husband. I was a good woman. Can you imagine how I felt when this young boy raped me, kicked me and then told me to get out of his sight after doing this to me? And without my arms, how can I as a woman even clean myself, let alone take care of my affairs. We're farmers and how am I to farm now? Both the rape and amputation are awful ... but later when thinking about what happened, I was even angrier about the rape than the amputation because for him to have done that to me was

¹⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

¹⁸² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

¹⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

¹⁸⁴ PHR report, p. 51 and Table 6 on p. 54. Women could select more than one of the choices given.

like killing me inside because of the shame. Sex is something you should enjoy together with your man. But to do it like that, to handle me like that, to torture me like that and then kick me and leave me like that ... it's too much. But I guess I was somehow lucky. There could have been ten people doing that to me.¹⁸⁵

P.S. twenty-five, who was abducted and gang raped by the West Side Boys in January 2000, explained why she had not reported her rapes:

I didn't want to tell anyone what happened. I was ashamed because it is bad enough being done like this, but having a rebel do it is even worse. I felt so bad because I wanted to save myself for someone special. I went to secret society and they instructed us not to be involved in sex until we were ready to marry. And now I'm afraid because of AIDS. When I think of them I feel so angry.¹⁸⁶

VII. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Introduction¹⁸⁷

Women and girls have, since time immemorial, been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and sexual slavery, during armed conflict. Mass rape of women and girls was documented during the Second World War as well as in more recent conflicts in such diverse countries as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁸⁸ Sexual violence has traditionally been considered as the inevitable by-product of armed conflict and has been mischaracterized by military and political leaders as a private crime or the unfortunate behavior of renegade soldiers. The use of rape as a weapon of war, however, means that rape is not a private or incidental crime. Rape as a weapon of war serves a strategic function and acts as an integral tool for achieving military objectives.

Conflict-related rape is an act of violence that targets sexuality, but it is also a military and political tool. It functions to subjugate and humiliate both the women and men within the targeted community. Furthermore, rape is generally not committed in isolation and victims are often subjected to multiple human rights abuses, which serve to further traumatize the survivor. In conflicts in which civilians are the principal targets, sexual violence has become an even more deliberate and insidious weapon of war. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, rape and other grave abuses committed by Serb forces were with the intent to drive the non-Serb population from their homes and communities. *

¹⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, February 8, 2000.

¹⁸⁷ Some of the information in this section was published previously in Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *The Global Report on Women's Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); and Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, "Rape in War: Challenging The Tradition of Impunity," *SALS Review* (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University Press, Winter-Spring 1994).

¹⁸⁸ See for example Human Rights Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won't Help Banja Luka* Volume 6, Issue 8, June 1994, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/bosnia2/>; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 13, October 1995, <http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html>; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Closed, Dark Place: Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (D), July 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/foca/>; Human Rights Watch/Africa, Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme*, Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, September 1996, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm>; Human Rights Watch, *The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo*, June 2002, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/>; Human Rights Watch, *Democratic Republic of Congo, War Crimes in Kisangani: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny*, Vol. 14, No 6 (A), August 2002, <http://hrw.org/reports/2002/drc2/>; United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, E/CN.4/1995/42* (United Nations, 1994), p. 64.

The ten-year internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses against the civilian population, including the use of sexual violence to achieve military aims.¹⁸⁹ From the testimonies in this report, it is clear that the rebels waged a war through attacking civilians. Sexual violence was therefore used as part of the rebels' military and political strategy, with victims often being used to bring messages to their enemies, including President Kabbah, ECOMOG, the SLA or the CDF. RUF rebels told an older woman whom they first raped and then subjected to amputation that: "There should be peace before the elections. Now you can go and vote. You have got to take a letter to Bo and those hands are the letters."¹⁹⁰ The testimonies also reveal how the rebels sought complete domination over girls and women by doing whatever they wanted to, including breaking numerous cultural taboos, such as raping lactating mothers or elderly women.

Despite being commonplace during armed conflict, rape "remains the least condemned war crime," according to the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women.¹⁹¹ It is only in recent years that it has been exposed and condemned alongside other human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations. Sexual violence remains insufficiently reported, condemned, and prosecuted as war crimes or crimes against humanity. This differential treatment of sexual violence highlights the international community's willingness to tolerate sexual violence against women notwithstanding its obligations under international law.

International law has prohibited rape and other forms of sexual violence against women during armed conflict for over a century.¹⁹² Perpetrators can be held accountable for rape and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and as acts of genocide.¹⁹³ International human rights law, which remains applicable in times of armed conflict, also prohibits sexual violence and sexual slavery.

International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, sets out protections for civilians, prisoners of war and other non-combatants during international and internal armed conflicts.¹⁹⁴ The four Geneva Conventions¹⁹⁵ and their two Additional Protocols¹⁹⁶ implicitly and explicitly condemn rape and other forms of

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2* (United Nations, 2002).

¹⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹⁹¹ United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women*, E/CN.4/1995/42, p. 64.

¹⁹² Some examples of how the law prohibiting war-related rape developed include the Italian lawyer Lucas de Penna advocating in the thirteenth century for the punishment of wartime rape just as severely as rape committed in peacetime, and Hugo Grotius stating in the sixteenth century that sexual violence committed in wartime was a punishable crime. Articles 44 and 47 of the 1863 Lieber Code, which served as the basis for subsequent war codes, also lists rape by a belligerent as a war crime punishable by death. See the Lieber Code of 1863, Correspondence, Orders, Reports, and Returns of the Union Authorities, From January 1 to December 31, 1863.--#7, O.R.--Series III--Volume III [S# 124], General Orders No. 100., War Dept., *Adj. General's Office, Washington*, April 24, 1863. Article 4 of the Hague Convention (1907) provides a general prohibition of torture and abuses against combatants and non-combatants. Article 46 of the same convention prescribes that "[f]amily honour and rights...must be respected," which can be interpreted to cover rape. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed Regulations (Hague Convention IV) of October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force January 26, 1910). Kelly D. Askin and Dorean M. Koenig (eds.), *Women and International Human Rights Law* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), Volume 1, p. 50. See also Kelly D. Askin, *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 18-36.

¹⁹³ Although genocide did not occur in Sierra Leone, rape and other forms of sexual violence can be defined as constituent elements of genocide. Genocide is defined under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as "acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Genocide has attained *jus cogens* status (a norm that preempts other norms) and is prohibited both in its own right and as a crime against humanity.

¹⁹⁴ See the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Other sources of international humanitarian law are the 1907 Hague Convention and Regulations, decisions of international tribunals and customary law.

¹⁹⁵ Sierra Leone became a party to the four Geneva Conventions on June 10, 1965.

sexual violence as serious violations of humanitarian law in both international and internal conflicts. In international armed conflicts, such crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and are considered war crimes. Violations involving direct attacks on civilians during internal armed conflicts are increasingly recognized as war crimes.

Under international humanitarian law, the civil war in Sierra Leone was an internal armed conflict.¹⁹⁷ Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions applies to all parties in an internal armed conflict, including armed opposition groups. Through its prohibition of “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” Common Article 3 implicitly condemns sexual violence.

The Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts provides a basis for defining the protections provided under Common Article 3. Article 27 on the treatment of protected persons states that “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”¹⁹⁸ Article 147 specifies that “torture or inhuman treatment” and “willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” are grave breaches of the conventions.¹⁹⁹ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered to be grave breaches and even a single act of sexual violence can constitute a war crime.²⁰⁰

Article 4 of Protocol II, which governs internal armed conflicts and applied to the conflict in Sierra Leone, expressly forbids “violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment, such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape and enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault” as well as “slavery and the slave trade in all their forms.”²⁰¹ According to the ICRC Commentary, this provision “reaffirms and supplements Common Article 3 ... [because] it became clear that it was necessary to strengthen ... the protection of women ... who may also be the victims of rape, enforced prostitution or indecent assault.”²⁰²

As the above language highlights, crimes of sexual violence under international humanitarian law have been mischaracterized as attacks against the honor of women or an outrage on personal dignity—as opposed to attacks on physical integrity. This mischaracterization diminishes the serious nature of the crime and contributes to the widespread misperception of rape as an attack on honor that is an “incidental” or “lesser” crime relative to crimes such as torture or enslavement.²⁰³ Whilst it is true that rape is an assault on human dignity, rape should primarily be viewed as a violent assault on bodily integrity as well as one that dishonors the perpetrator and not the victim.

Sexual Violence as a Crime against Humanity

Acts of sexual violence committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians in Sierra Leone can be classified as crimes against humanity and prosecuted as such. There is no single international treaty that provides an authoritative definition of crimes against humanity, but such crimes are generally considered to

¹⁹⁶ Sierra Leone ratified the Additional Protocols on October 21, 1986.

¹⁹⁷ The fighting in 1997-98 between West African ECOWAS forces and the RUF/AFRC government may have met the criteria for an international armed conflict.

¹⁹⁸ Geneva Convention IV, Article 27 (2). Article 76 of Protocol I extends this protection of protected persons to all women. Protocol I, Article 76.

¹⁹⁹ Geneva Convention IV, Article 147.

²⁰⁰ Theodor Meron, “Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law,” *American Journal of International Law* (Washington D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1993), vol. 87, p. 426, citing the International Committee of the Red Cross, *Aide Mémoire*, December 3, 1992.

²⁰¹ Protocol II, Article 4 (2) (a), (e) and (f).

²⁰² Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Bruno Zimmerman (eds.), *ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949* (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 1375, para. 4539.

²⁰³ See Catherine N. Niarchos, “Women, War and Rape: Challenges facing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,” *Human Rights Quarterly* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), vol. 17, pp. 672, 674.

be serious and inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, during peacetime or war, and that result from the persecution of a specific group.²⁰⁴

The charter establishing the Nuremberg tribunal after the Second World War did not specify rape under crimes against humanity or list gender as one of the grounds of persecution; the inclusion of rape could however be derived from the charter's general prohibition against "other inhumane acts."²⁰⁵ Resolving this ambiguity, rape (as well as torture) was included in the specific list of crimes constituting crimes against humanity in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)²⁰⁶ and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).²⁰⁷

The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) expands on this by including gender as one of the grounds of persecution, as well as adding rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.²⁰⁸ This definition of gender-based crimes against humanity, which appropriately makes no reference to the outdated notion of "crimes against honor," has been taken up in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see below for a discussion of the Special Court).

Under the evolving case law on crimes against humanity, formal proof of policy, plan or design is no longer an essential element for the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have found that the existence of a plan or policy is sufficient: the policy need not be formalized and may be deduced from the way in which the acts occur.²⁰⁹ The failure to take action to address widespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population can also be considered sufficient to determine the requisite element of policy, plan or design. Both state and non-state actors can be held accountable for crimes against humanity.

An individual case of serious sexual violence can be prosecuted as a crime against humanity if the prosecution can make the link between the single violation and other violations of basic human rights or international humanitarian law that have been committed as a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.²¹⁰ Each enumerated type of act, such as murder, torture, or rape, does not need to be committed on a

²⁰⁴ See, e.g. "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808," 32 I.L.M. at 1159 (1993), para. 48.

²⁰⁵ The Nuremberg Charter, as amended by the Berlin Protocol, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547 (1945), E.A.S. NO. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. Under article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, crimes against humanity included, but were not limited to the following atrocities: "[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds."

²⁰⁶ Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTY (adopted 25/5/93) at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-con.htm>.

²⁰⁷ Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8/11/94) at <http://www.icttr.org>.

²⁰⁸ Article 7 of the Statute of the ICC enumerates crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, Article 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Rome Statute on October 17, 1998 and September 15, 2000 respectively.

²⁰⁹ *Kunarac* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 432.

²¹⁰ "It is sufficient to show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation of acts of violence which, individually, may vary greatly in nature and gravity." *Kunarac* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 419.

widespread or systematic basis—it is the attack that must be widespread or systematic.²¹¹

Human Rights Law

Sierra Leone is party to international human rights instruments that provide safeguards for women and girls at all times, including during armed conflict. These include protection from rape as torture and other mistreatment; slavery and forced prostitution; and discrimination based on sex. Armed opposition groups, particularly those in control of territory, have increasingly been under an obligation to respect international human rights standards.²¹²

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)²¹³ prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by officials or persons acting in an official capacity. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides for the right to freedom from torture, sexual exploitation and abuse as well as liberty and security of person.²¹⁴ The 1991 constitution of Sierra Leone also prohibits “any form of torture or any punishment or other treatment which is inhuman or degrading.”²¹⁵

The United Nations special rapporteur on torture has recognized that rape can constitute torture: “[R]ape is a traumatic form of torture for the victim.”²¹⁶ The ICTY in the *Furundzija* case noted that “[i]n certain circumstances ... rape can amount to torture and has been found by international judicial bodies to constitute a violation of the norm prohibiting torture.”²¹⁷ The ICTR in the *Akayesu* case stated that “Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”²¹⁸

Sexual violence generally violates women’s rights to be free from discrimination based on sex as provided for under the ICCPR.²¹⁹ Under Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),²²⁰ the definition of discrimination is considered to include “gender-based violence precisely because gender-based violence has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the enjoyment by women of human rights” on a basis of equality with men.²²¹ The CEDAW Committee enumerated a wide range of obligations for states related to ending sexual violence, including ensuring appropriate treatment for victims in the justice system, counseling and support services, and medical and psychological assistance to victims.²²² In a 1993

²¹¹ *Prosecutor v. Kupreškic*, Judgement, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000 (*Kupreškic* Trial Chamber Judgement), para. 550.

²¹² Nigel S. Rodley, “Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?” in P. Mahoney and K. Mahoney (eds.) *Human Rights in the 21st Century: A Global Challenge* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 297-318, and International Council on Human Rights Policy, “Hard Cases: Bringing Human Rights Violators to Justice Abroad—A Guide to Universal Jurisdiction,” (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 1999), p. 6.

²¹³ Sierra Leone ratified the CAT on March 1, 2001.

²¹⁴ Sierra Leone ratified the CRC on June 18, 1990. Article 34 protects the child from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Article 37 provides for the freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as liberty and security of person.

²¹⁵ Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, s. 20(1).

²¹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/32, E/CN.4/1995/34*, Paragraph 19, January 12, 1995.

²¹⁷ *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija*, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998, para. 171.

²¹⁸ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998 (the *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgement), para. 687.

²¹⁹ See ICCPR, Articles 2 (1) and 26.

²²⁰ Sierra Leone ratified this treaty on November 11, 1988.

²²¹ Women, Law and Development International, *Gender Violence: The Hidden War Crimes* (Washington D.C.: Women, Law and Development International, 1998), p. 37.

²²² Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, “Violence Against Women,” General Recommendation no. 19 (eleventh session, 1992), U.N. Document CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15.

resolution, the U.N. General Assembly declared that prohibiting gender discrimination includes eliminating gender-based violence and that states "should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women."²²³

The CRC also provides for freedom from discrimination on the basis of gender (Article 2), and the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (Article 24). Under Article 39, states shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social integration of a child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture of any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. The CRC also calls upon states to provide special protection and assistance to a child "temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment."²²⁴ A child's right to "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor" is also guaranteed by the ICCPR.²²⁵

Under both the ICCPR and CEDAW, slavery and forced prostitution in times of armed conflict constitute a basic violation of the right to liberty and security of person.²²⁶ Furthermore, slavery, which is a *jus cogens* norm from which no derogation is permitted, is prohibited under Article 8 of the ICCPR, which also prohibits forced labor, and by the 1926 Slavery Convention.²²⁷ The right to freedom from slavery is also provided under the constitution of Sierra Leone.²²⁸

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, to which Sierra Leone is a party, guarantees the "[e]limination of every discrimination against women ... and protection of the rights of the woman and the child"²²⁹ as well as the right to integrity of one's person, and the right to be free of "... [a]ll forms of exploitation and degradation ..., particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment."²³⁰

Gender Jurisprudence for Crimes of Sexual Violence

Despite the widespread practice of sexual violence during the Second World War, rape did not figure prominently in the prosecutions brought by the two major tribunals established after the war. Rape was not prosecuted at any of the Nuremberg trials notwithstanding the evidence of sexual violence presented. Rape charges were brought in a few cases before the International Military Tribunal in the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal),²³¹ and several accused were convicted of crimes including sexual violence. The Tokyo tribunal was responsible for bringing international attention to atrocities, including sexual violence, committed during the

²²³ United Nations General Assembly, "Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women," A/RES/48/104, December 20, 1993 (issued on February 23, 1994). See Article 4, in particular.

²²⁴ Article 20 (1) of the CRC.

²²⁵ Although the masculine pronoun is used, the ICCPR is applicable without any discrimination to sex as stated in Article 24 (1).

²²⁶ Article 9 of the ICCPR provides for the freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, whilst Article 23 prohibits forced marriage. Under Article 6 of CEDAW, states are required to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.

²²⁷ Slavery Convention, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 212, p. 17., July 7, 1955.

²²⁸ Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, s. 19 (1).

²²⁹ Article 3 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, Organization of African Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 1982. Sierra Leone signed and ratified this treaty on August 27, 1981 and September 21, 1993 respectively.

²³⁰ Articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

²³¹ The Indictment for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) included rape within the crimes charged generally. IMTFE Indictment, p. 31, reproduced in the IMTFE Docs., vol., 20, Annex A-6; See also Appendix D, attached to the Indictment, which provides more detail on the charges. The Indictment stated that the accused were responsible for "mass murder, rape, pillage, brigandage, torture, and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population of the overrun countries." Appendix D alleged responsibility for "inhumane treatment" and "mistreatment" when "civilian internees were murdered, beaten, tortured, and otherwise ill-treated, and female prisoners were raped by members of the Japanese forces" and "female nurses were raped, murdered and ill-treated," and "large numbers of the inhabitants" were also murdered, tortured, raped, and otherwise mistreated.

“Rape of Nanking.” The Tokyo tribunal failed, however, to prosecute members of the Japanese government and military for the 200,000 “comfort women” forced into sexual slavery during the war.²³²

Widespread reports of sexual violence in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were instrumental in the U.N. Security Council decisions authorizing the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. As noted, the statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR make explicit mention of rape as a crime against humanity.²³³ The ICTY also has implicit jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of sexual violence as grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as violations of the laws and customs of war and genocide.²³⁴ The ICTR is explicitly empowered to prosecute rape as a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and can prosecute crimes of sexual violence when they constitute torture or genocide.²³⁵

Both tribunals have played a critical role in setting precedents in the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence, including articulating definitions and elements of many gender-related crimes.²³⁶ As noted at this report’s opening (see “Definition of Sexual Violence, Rape and Sexual Slavery,” p. 2), both the ICTR (in the 1998 *Akayesu* judgment) and the ICTY (in the 2002 *Foca* judgment) defined rape, of which there is no commonly accepted definition in international law, albeit the definition from the *Akayesu* judgment has been criticized as too broad. The *Akayesu* judgment also provided a legal definition of sexual violence: any act of a sexual nature, including rape, committed on a person under coercive circumstances, but which need not include a physical invasion of the body or even contact.²³⁷ The ICTY has found that sexual violence not only constitutes crimes against humanity, war crimes and grave breaches, but can also constitute torture, enslavement, serious bodily injury and other relevant acts as long as the elements constituting these crimes are present in the act of sexual violence.

In general, however, both tribunals have had an inconsistent record on investigating and prosecuting crimes of sexual violence. The ICTR continues to lack a comprehensive approach to the inclusion of sexual violence charges and has failed to include these charges or seek amendments in the original indictments where the Office of the Prosecutor has witness testimony or evidence of sexual violence.²³⁸

²³² See the Appendix entitled “An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for “Comfort Women Stations” Established During the Second World War” to the United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, pp. 38-55.

²³³ Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTY (adopted 25/5/93) at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-con.htm>. Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8/11/94) at <http://www.icttr.org>.

²³⁴ Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the ICTY respectively.

²³⁵ Articles 4, Article 3 (f) and Article 2 respectively of the ICTR Statute.

²³⁶ *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgment; *Prosecutor v. Tadic*; *Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al.*, IT-96-21-A, November 16, 1998; *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija* Judgment, December 10, 1998; *Prosecutor v. Blaskic*, IT-95-14, Judgement, March 3, 2000; *Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Judgement, IT-98-30-T, November 2, 2001. *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic* (Foca case), Appeals Chamber Judgement, June 12, 2002, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1.

²³⁷ *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 688. The ICTR stated: “The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. The incident described by Witness KK in which the Accused ordered the Interahamwe [Hutu militia] to undress a student and force her to do gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of the bureau communal, in front of a crowd, constitutes sexual violence. The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.”

²³⁸ See Human Rights Watch press release “Bosnia: Landmark Verdicts for Rape, Torture, and Sexual Enslavement,” February 22, 2001, at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/02/serbia0222.htm>. These facts were reconfirmed from a reliable source from the ICTR, Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 8, 2002.

Command Responsibility²³⁹

The culpability of superior officers for atrocities that their subordinates commit is commonly known as command responsibility. Although the concept originated in military law, it now also embraces the responsibility of civil authorities for the abuses committed by persons under their direct authority.²⁴⁰

Commanders of armed rebel groups, such as in Sierra Leone, are subject to command responsibility. While Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II on internal armed conflicts do not explicitly mention command responsibility, the application of Protocol II depends on there being organized armed groups "under responsible command."²⁴¹ Command responsibility is now part of customary international law, that is, a universally recognized precept of international criminal law. It is also an explicit feature of many treaties, including the statutes of the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see below, p. 63).

There are two forms of command responsibility. The first is direct responsibility for orders that are unlawful. When an official authorizes or orders rapes, massacres, or other grave abuses, that individual is criminally responsible for these acts, whether the superior who initiated or conveyed the order also carries out the atrocity or has subordinates perform it. The other form of command responsibility is an imputed responsibility for the crimes of subordinates where those crimes are not based on direct orders. In this case, responsibility is determined on the basis of whether the superior knew or should have known of the abuses committed by subordinates.

Knowledge of the abuses may be actual, either by the army officer or rebel commander witnessing the crimes or being informed of them shortly thereafter. It may also be constructive, where the abuses were so numerous or notorious that a reasonable person could come to no other conclusion than that the superior must have known of their commission or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their commission. Another basis of constructive notice is that the officer should have known of the offenses, but displayed such serious personal dereliction as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences, which is an extreme form of negligence. The failure of the commander to take appropriate measures to control the subordinates under his or her command and prevent atrocities, and the failure to punish offenders, are further elements in showing command responsibility.

An individual found to have command responsibility for the crime committed by a subordinate is deemed culpable to the same degree as the subordinate. A commander will therefore be found guilty of murder if he or she stood by while the subordinate committed murder.

With regard to the crime of rape, some courts have been reluctant to impute command responsibility for what is seen as random and a private crime.²⁴² However, the requirements of command responsibility do not vary according to the particular crime; the commander is no more permitted to stand by while rape is committed than to stand by while murder is. If a superior had reason to know that subordinates under his or her command committed rape (such as news reports, or widespread commission of this abuse), and failed to use all feasible means under his or her command to prevent and punish this abuse, he or she may also be found guilty of rape.

²³⁹ The legal analysis in this section was previously published in Human Rights Watch, *Milosevic and the Chain of Command in Kosovo*, July 7, 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/chain-of-command.htm>.

²⁴⁰ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1999), p. 206-7.

²⁴¹ Article 1 (1), Protocol II.

²⁴² See generally Patricia Viseur Sellers and Kaoru Okuizumi, "Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View: Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults," *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems* Volume 7, Number 1 (Spring 1997), p. 45.

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VIII. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR SIERRA LEONE

Two transitional justice mechanisms are currently underway to address the cycle of impunity in Sierra Leone: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Both bodies became operational in the third quarter of 2002.

The Lomé Amnesty

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, controversially provided for amnesty for combatants in the civil war. Under Article 9 (1), Sankoh was granted an absolute and free pardon (he had been convicted and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 1997 coup); and under Article 9 (3) the government was required to ensure that “no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of signing of the present Agreement...”²⁴³ At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general’s special representative attending the talks added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Under international law, states have an *erga omnes* obligation—in other words a duty owed to the whole international community—to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and torture even if this means that amnesty laws are in effect annulled. This means that Sierra Leone therefore has an obligation under international law to prosecute those who committed crimes against humanity and torture, irrespective of the Lomé Amnesty and the setting up of the SCSL. Other states also have an obligation to prosecute these crimes based on the principle of universal jurisdiction (see below at p. 66 for a discussion on this principle). Crimes committed in the post-Lomé period fall outside the amnesty and can be prosecuted under domestic law.

The granting of an amnesty may also be challenged under the Sierra Leonean constitution and international law, as being against the fundamental legal principle of the state’s duty to provide an effective remedy against official violation of guaranteed rights. The U.N. Human Rights Commission has ruled that “States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such rehabilitation as may be possible.”²⁴⁴ A duty to revoke the amnesty retroactively may even arise under international law. Several Sierra Leonean lawyers have discussed the issue of the amnesty’s constitutionality and whether to challenge it in court.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was conceived by nongovernmental organizations attending the peace talks as a counterbalance to the amnesty granted to all parties. Under the peace agreement, the TRC was to be established to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation...”²⁴⁵

The commission should have been established within ninety days after the signing of the peace agreement, but the Sierra Leonean Parliament did not pass the Truth and Reconciliation Act establishing the TRC until February 2000. Its establishment was further delayed due to the renewed outbreak of fighting in May 2000, and lack of political will of both the government and the international community. As the selection process for the commissioners took longer than planned, the government also decided to delay the commencement of the TRC until after the May 2002 elections to ensure that the TRC would not be politicized by the elections. The activities of the TRC may well be further hampered by funding shortfalls. Only U.S. \$1.5 million had been pledged as of June 2002, partially because the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) did not

²⁴³ Article 9 of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

²⁴⁴ Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, p. 260.

²⁴⁵ Article 26 (1) of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

launch the funding appeal until January 25, 2002. Its total planned budget was reduced from almost U.S. \$10 million to U.S. \$6,276,440 in August 2002 and has remained unchanged since then.²⁴⁶

On May 13, 2002, President Kabbah announced the seven commissioners. The four Sierra Leoneans are: Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper; Justice Laura A. E. Marcus-Jones; Prof. John A. Kamara; and Mr. Sylvanus Torto. The three international commissioners are: Madam Ajaaratai Satang Jow (Gambia); Ms. Yasmin L. Sooka (South Africa); and Professor William Schabas (Canada). The commission had a three-month preparatory phase, which started in July 2002, and must wrap up its activities and submit a report within twelve months of the start of hearings, which as of this writing have not yet begun.²⁴⁷ An interim executive secretariat headed by the Sierra Leonean lawyer Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff and staffed with eight other members was established to support the work of the commissioners. The budget will be used to establish the secretariat of the commission in Freetown, which will support the seven commissioners and the office of the executive secretary. In addition, it is likely that six operational units will be established to provide support to the commissioners and the executive secretary.²⁴⁸ The establishment of regional offices is also provided for under the Act and should encourage Sierra Leonean participation and ownership of the process. These offices are expected to begin functioning in early 2003.²⁴⁹

The TRC's mandate is "to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the armed conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the needs of the victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered."²⁵⁰ The commission is called upon to give special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and may also implement "special procedures to address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who have suffered sexual abuse ..."²⁵¹ Any committees formed by the commission to assist it in the performance of its functions should also take into account gender representation.²⁵²

Both the UNAMSIL human rights unit and NGOs have conducted sensitization activities, mainly in the key urban centers, to ensure Sierra Leonean awareness of the process, but at the time of writing, there was still considerable confusion about the role of the TRC, especially in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).

Human Rights Watch believes that the work of the TRC would be greatly enhanced were the staff of the TRC to be gender-balanced with women represented at all levels and to include persons with expertise in sexual and gender-based violence. The gender adviser, expected to take up the post in January 2003, should provide gender sensitization training and ensure that the work of the TRC, including investigations and hearings, are carried out in a sensitive manner. Human Rights Watch recommends that the TRC explore the relationship between the widespread and systematic nature of conflict-related sexual violence and the low status of and discrimination against women. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight gender-specific abuses committed throughout the country during the armed conflict. The TRC should also make recommendations on improvements to the law and judicial system toward eliminating the discriminatory nature of customary and general law, and on legal reform and human rights training for government authorities, including members of the criminal justice system. The report should highlight the need for increased assistance (shelter, medical care, education, skills training, mental health programs, etc.) for women, as well as for strengthening existing women's groups through capacity building.

²⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.

²⁴⁷ The TRC can extend its operations for another six months provided that good cause is shown. TRC Act 2000, Section 5 (1). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>.

²⁴⁸ The six operational units will probably be: Administration and Programming; Public Information and Education; Legal; Investigation; Research; Reconciliation and Protection.

²⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.

²⁵⁰ TRC Act 2000, Section 6 (1). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Section 6 (2) (b) and 7 (4) respectively.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, Section 10 (2).

Special Court for Sierra Leone

Following the hostage taking of over 500 U.N. peacekeepers and the renewed outbreak of fighting between the RUF and government forces in May 2000, the government of Sierra Leone requested that the U.N. assist in establishing a court "to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of U.N. peacekeepers as hostages."²⁵³ The government expressly mentioned that the RUF, in reneging on their obligations under the Lomé Peace Agreement, continued to subject many women and children to human rights abuses, including sexual slavery. On August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1315 requesting the secretary-general to negotiate with the Sierra Leonean government an agreement for the establishment of a special court.

Due to delays in funding contributions and agreement on key substantive matters, the agreement between the government and the U.N. to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone was not signed until January 16, 2002.²⁵⁴ The total budget for the SCSL is U.S. \$56.8 million. The first year of the court has been fully funded and pledges have been received for the second year.²⁵⁵ The secretary-general appointed the prosecutor and registrar on April 19, 2002, and it is hoped that the first trials will commence in the second quarter of 2003.²⁵⁶ Given budgetary constraints, it is likely that only a limited number of persons will be tried, perhaps as few as twenty.

The SCSL differs in notable ways from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Firstly, it is based on an agreement between the government and the U.N. and was not established by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This means that the Special Court does not have the power to require international cooperation.²⁵⁷ Secondly, the SCSL is a hybrid court relying on both international and domestic laws. The professional and support staff of the court will be a mix of Sierra Leonean and foreign nationals.

Article 1 of the SCSL provides that the court has the competence to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996."²⁵⁸

Other crimes that the court has the jurisdiction to prosecute are provided under Article 2 to Article 6. Under Article 2, which defines the crimes against humanity that the SCSL has the power to prosecute, the following crimes of sexual violence are specified: "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence."²⁵⁹ Rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault can also be prosecuted as violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II as stated under Article 3 of the statute. Under Article 4, specific serious violations of international humanitarian law are enumerated, including intentionally attacking civilians and the recruitment of children under fifteen years old into

²⁵³ Letter dated June 12, 2000 and addressed by the president of Sierra Leone to the U.N. secretary-general. Letter and annexed Suggested Framework for the Special Court.

²⁵⁴ Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf>.

²⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Robin Vincent (registrar of the SCSL), U.K., July 4, 2002.

²⁵⁶ S/2002/246, Letter dated March 6, 2002 from the secretary-general addressed to the president of the Security Council. David Crane, a prosecutor for the U.S. Department of Defence, was appointed as prosecutor and Robin Vincent of the U.K. was appointed as the registrar.

²⁵⁷ See also letter from Human Rights Watch to members of the Security Council and other interested states dated September 27, 2001. Under Chapter VII, which is entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," the Security Council can decide to take non-military and/or military action against states that threaten international peace and security. Decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII—which should be read in conjunction with Article 24, which confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council, and Article 25, under which U.N. member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council—are binding on member states.

²⁵⁸ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents-specialcourt.html>.

²⁵⁹ The other crimes against humanity are: murder; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; and other inhuman acts.

the armed forces. With the unanimous adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in May 2000,²⁶⁰ however, the minimum age for any conscription or forced recruitment has been raised to eighteen.²⁶¹ Under Article 5, gender-based crimes can also be prosecuted under domestic law provisions. However, as these provisions do not meet international standards in terms of definition of crimes and punishment, they should not be applied.²⁶²

In accordance with the U.N.'s statement that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty as it purported to apply to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, Article 10 of the court's statute states:

An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.²⁶³

This means that those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity (Article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (Article 3); and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4) can be prosecuted for their crimes.

The issue of command responsibility is of crucial import to the SCSL given that its mandate is to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders, who in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."²⁶⁴ The court therefore will only prosecute the so-called "big fish" and not the "small fry" or those persons who in many instances actually committed the violations. Article 6 of the statute of the SCSL provides that:

3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Special Court determines that justice so requires.²⁶⁵

The failure by rebel commanders and army officers to punish combatants involved in abuses, despite documentation of and international attention to crimes of sexual violence perpetrated by rebels and pro-government forces, indicates that such persons of authority knowingly tolerated and even condoned these abuses. Commanders may also bear individual criminal responsibility for crimes of sexual violence in addition to command responsibility, as the testimonies in this report highlight.

It is highly regrettable that the court's temporal jurisdiction does not extend to the beginning of the conflict (March 23, 1991). Instead November 30, 1996, the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord, was chosen as it was felt that including the whole war would impose too great a burden on the court. The U.N. also felt that this date corresponded to a new phase in the conflict without necessarily having any political connotations, and that this

²⁶⁰ General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, adopted May 25, 2000.

²⁶¹ Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Optional Protocol of the CRC on September 8, 2000 and on August 24, 2001 respectively. The Optional Protocol entered into force on February 12, 2002.

²⁶² Article 5 refers to the sections (6, 7 and 12) of the 1926 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act that relate to abuses committed against girls under the age of fourteen. See above, "Rape as a crime under general law," et seq., for a discussion of these provisions.

²⁶³ Article 10 of the statute of the SCSL.

²⁶⁴ Article 1 of the statute of the SCSL.

²⁶⁵ Article 6 (3) and (4) of the statute of the SCSL.

temporal jurisdiction encompassed the most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups and in all geographical areas of the country.²⁶⁶ The temporal jurisdiction is, however, open-ended as the war was still ongoing at the time of the discussions on the court's establishment. The U.N. states that the lifespan of the court will be determined by "a subsequent agreement between the parties upon completion of its judicial activities, an indication of the capacity acquired by the local courts to assume the prosecution of remaining cases, or the unavailability of funds."²⁶⁷

In terms of prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, the statute specifies that "given the nature of the crimes committed and the particular sensitivities of girls, young women and children victims of rape, sexual assault, abduction and slavery of all kinds, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment of prosecutors and investigators experienced in gender-related crimes and juvenile justice."²⁶⁸ Likewise, Article 16 (4) specifies that personnel of the Victims and Witnesses Unit should include experts in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence and violence against children.

As the TRC and Special Court will be functioning simultaneously, the interaction between the two bodies, whose subject matter as well as personal and temporal jurisdiction intersect, must urgently be clarified. This is crucial in terms of sharing of information, especially confidential information, but also for the sensitization efforts underway. Enabling legislation enacted in March 2002 contains a provision, criticized by many nongovernmental organizations, that establishes the primacy of the SCSL, apparently including over the TRC.²⁶⁹

Given that the SCSL will only try a limited number of alleged perpetrators, it needs to establish a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy from the onset. Within the court's mandate, the prosecutor should ensure that gender-related crimes are thoroughly and sensitively investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The two gender crimes investigators should conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. The gender crimes investigators should also have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.

Principle of Universal Jurisdiction

Given the limited number of persons that the Special Court can prosecute due to funding constraints, it is important to note that the principle of universal jurisdiction applies to war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery,²⁷⁰ and torture.²⁷¹ A resolution passed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in April 1999, specifically reminded all factions and forces in Sierra Leone of this principle, stating that "in any armed conflict including an armed conflict of a non-international character, the taking of hostages, willful killing and torture or inhuman treatment of persons taking no active part in the hostilities constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law, and that all countries are under the obligation to search for such persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their

²⁶⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, para. 25-28. Other dates considered were May 25, 1997, and January 6, 1999, but the U.N. considered that these would be perceived as offering only selective justice.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

²⁶⁸ Article 15 (4) of the statute of the SCSL. A Woman's Task Force for the Special Court and TRC was established with the support of the International Human Rights Law Group to advocate that gender-based crimes be properly investigated by both bodies and—in terms of the Special Court—prosecuted. The Women's Task Force has also advocated for the appointment of staff who are experienced in and sensitive to cases of sexual violence, as well as for gender balance i.e. women should be well represented in positions of authority as well as in positions of support (statement takers, investigators, counselors and interpreters, etc.).

²⁶⁹ Special Court Agreement 2002 (ratification) Act 2002 (March 7, 2002). Article 21 (2) of the Act provides that: "Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court."

²⁷⁰ Slavery can be prosecuted as a war crime and a crime against humanity, but also on an independent basis against both state and non-state actors during wartime and peace given its status as a peremptory norm of customary law.

²⁷¹ Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Articles 8, 9, 17, 19 and 20, *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, para.50 (United Nations, 1996).

nationality, before their own courts.²⁷²

The special rapporteur for violence against women also stressed the principle of universal jurisdiction in her report on her mission to Sierra Leone:

Thus, crimes of gender based violence must be investigated and documented for possible criminal prosecution in the domestic courts of other States which may have jurisdiction ...²⁷³

IX. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

National Response

Climate of Impunity

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any prosecutions in the Sierra Leonean courts of any cases of conflict-related sexual violence or other human rights abuses. The lack of both categories of prosecutions is due to a number of factors. Firstly, many survivors simply want to try to forget about the sexual violence and other human rights abuses they have been subjected to and just get on with their lives in post-conflict Sierra Leone, which for many is a daily struggle. Secondly, some women and girls fear reprisals. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirteen (or 25 percent) of the fifty-one respondents indicating that their perpetrator should not be punished, expressed this fear.²⁷⁴ Thirdly, women and girls are often ashamed of what happened to them and are therefore reluctant to present themselves in court. Fourthly, women and girls have little faith in the criminal justice system or the customary law system, which were never equipped to deal with crimes of such widespread and systematic nature. If a survivor of sexual violence does decide to prosecute, she is likely to be retraumatized by the whole experience given the very poor track record of the Sierra Leonean criminal justice system. Fifthly, many women and girls lack the financial means to access the court system. As women are generally economically dependent on men, many women who have initiated prosecution of non-conflict-related sexual violence, have dropped their cases once they realize that their husband may be sentenced to prison (dependency means that a previously abducted woman or girl who is still with her rebel "husband" is even more unlikely to bring any charges against him). Sixthly, victims are often not even aware of their rights, given high illiteracy rates, prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence, and women's low status in Sierra Leonean society. Many rural women and girls, in particular, see little value in the formal court system as there is often no financial or material benefit from bringing a case. Attitudes towards sexual violence, and the subordinate status of women and girls, mean that there is considerable societal pressure for women not to bring cases before the courts that could bring shame to the extended family, such as sexual violence cases.

The climate of impunity means that violence against women and girls remains a serious problem in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Rape continues to be committed by former rebels, members of the CDF and by civilians who are used to doing what they want with women by force and with impunity. A lawyer who practices in the Eastern Province reported to Human Rights Watch that of the rape victims he was currently representing at least 50 percent had been raped by civilians and the remainder by former combatants.²⁷⁵ Girls continue to suffer the greatest number of sexual assaults: a lawyer who practices in the Freetown area reported to Human Rights Watch that of the at least fifty rape victims she represented at the time of writing, 98 percent are under fourteen years old.²⁷⁶ Although there are no reliable statistics on the incidence of sexual or domestic violence, the police doctor in Connaught Hospital in Freetown, which is the largest government-run hospital in the country, sees about thirty victims of recent rape and sexual assault per month.²⁷⁷ For the reasons enumerated above, this figure is likely to

²⁷² UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/1, April 6, 1999.

²⁷³ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women* E/CN.4/2002/83/Add. 2, 2002, para. 78.

²⁷⁴ PHR report, pp. 53-55 and Table 7 at p. 56. Women could select more than one option.

²⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

²⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Claire Fatu Hanciles (lawyer), Freetown, August 9, 2002.

²⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

be the tip of the iceberg. Physicians for Human Rights found that 39 percent of respondents expressed concern (“quite a bit” or “extremely worried”) about future sexual violence by family members, friends or civilian strangers. Ninety-one women (or 9 percent of all respondents) had experienced sexual abuse, occurring at an average age of fifteen, from family, friends or civilians during their lifetime.²⁷⁸

Despite all these problems, seventeen out of a total of ninety-four respondents (or 18 percent) reporting sexual violence to Physicians for Human Rights supported punishment for “all those involved,” thirty women (or 32 percent) supported punishment for the perpetrators, and seventeen women (or 18 percent) supported punishment for the commanders. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others.²⁷⁹

Corrupt and Ineffective Judiciary

Lack of faith in the system, as the few women who have decided to prosecute non-conflict-related rape have experienced, is fully justified. The judiciary—which, prior to the conflict, barely existed in the provinces, and in Freetown was only accessible to those who had sufficient funds—completely collapsed during the war. Many lawyers fled the conflict, and much of the infrastructure, including the law courts in Freetown, was destroyed. The low salaries of personnel working in the judiciary have meant that magistrates, lawyers, and judges are easy targets for bribery and/or intimidation. In addition to these problems, women who seek justice for crimes of sexual violence have to contend with more gender-specific problems. The judiciary is dominated by men and some of its older members, in particular, do not think rape is a serious crime and that the victims are generally to blame. The legal processes are very cumbersome and open to corruption, factors which favor the perpetrator. At the magistrates court level, it is up to the magistrate to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to submit a case to the High Court and whether to grant bail. As the court system is so overburdened this phase can take weeks or months, and it is not unusual for victims to have to appear over ten times before the case is handed on to the High Court. Magistrates have also been known to grant bail even if the offender and victim live in the same compound, which means that the victim is at risk at least of intimidation and even physical violence.²⁸⁰ Many cases die in the magistrates courts, as victims run out of money, patience, and/or time. Cases at this stage are also frequently dismissed, if, for example, the witnesses do not show in court (after three no shows, the case can be dismissed): witnesses often decide against appearing in court for reasons including intimidation, ignorance of the law, lack of transportation money, and the slow pace at which court cases proceed, or because they simply do not care. The requirement for corroborating evidence is often an obstacle to prosecution and violates international norms.

If the magistrate decides that there is sufficient evidence, the case is handed up to the High Court. Cases in the High Court can also take months especially as there are also continuous indefinite adjournments to contend with. There have been no High Court sittings in the provinces for the past six years, and cases in the provinces have therefore been on indefinite hold. One offender who sexually assaulted two young girls spent five years in pre-trial detention before being sentenced to two years for indecent assault—the five years already served in pre-trial detention were ignored by the court, thus putting the offender in detention for a total of seven years rather than two.²⁸¹

Need for Law Reform

Both general and customary law offer little protection for women and girls (see above, “Women and Girls Under Sierra Leonean Law”). The misinterpretation of the general law provisions pertaining to rape by members of the criminal justice system means that girls are offered even less protection than adults. There is an urgent need for the laws to be revised: the discriminatory provisions in both general and customary law should be removed and brought into line with international standards of human rights, including in relation to the protection of women and girls from violence. The law relating to rape, in particular, should be simplified as well as

²⁷⁸ PHR report, p. 49.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with John Bosco Alieu (lawyer), Freetown, February 26, 2002.

²⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

strengthened. Specific legislation on domestic violence, which currently does not exist, should be introduced as women seeking legal redress for domestic violence generally face even more difficulty in convincing the police and members of the judiciary that their rights have been violated.²⁸² The constitution should also be amended to remove the exemption for customary law and personal law from the prohibition on discrimination. Ending discrimination under customary law in practice will require a major public education exercise, but, as a start, staff of local courts, especially those presiding over them, should be trained in relation to issues of discrimination and the rights of women under the (revised) constitution and international human rights law. The judiciary and the police force need to be trained on the new laws to ensure that they are properly applied.

The Sierra Leone Police

Prior to the civil war, the Sierra Leone Police had been used by politicians for their own purposes and had not received any substantive training for decades. The attitude of the police force to sexual and domestic violence remains insensitive. Police officers, for example, often do not take reports of rape seriously and chastise women who report domestic violence. There are many problems with police investigations of rape cases. Firstly, the police lack basic investigation skills. Secondly, victims must be examined by state-employed doctors, including police doctors, as only a state-employed doctor can present medical evidence in court. Both the police and other state-employed doctors often charge money for these examinations even though they should be free of charge. Thirdly, both the doctors and the police may be intimidated and/or bribed to drop the cases, or police may demand money from plaintiffs before interviewing witnesses and arranging their transport to court. A nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) is in the process of being established with the support of the British-funded Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence.²⁸³ To date, however, only a small number of police officers (approximately sixteen) have received some training and much work remains to be done before the FSUs can deal with victims of sexual and domestic violence in an appropriate manner.

The International Response

In addition to funding UNAMSIL, the international donor community pours approximately U.S. \$70 million a year into Sierra Leone for humanitarian assistance. Within the overall humanitarian assistance program to Sierra Leone, only a small percentage of funding is targeted to gender-related programs, notwithstanding the large number of girls and women who have been affected by gender-specific abuses. This funding has also come very late: there were no services specifically for survivors of sexual violence before 1999. After the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, the international community finally took note of the scale of sexual and gender-based abuses and started funding small-scale programs in accessible areas. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program consistently overlooked the assistance as well as protection needs of abducted women and girls (see below).

Donor funding has contributed to education, adult literacy, health care, trauma counseling, and skills training programs as well as credit and income-generating schemes for a limited number of survivors of sexual violence. These programs need to be expanded into all parts of Sierra Leone, so that more survivors can benefit from these programs. Long-term sexual and gender-based violence programs that aim to educate communities about sexual and domestic violence as well as provide women with health care and some legal aid on a limited scale have been established in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the east and south. These programs have been quite successful in changing the attitudes towards sexual and domestic violence of the IDP communities these programs serviced. They have also empowered rural women to stand up for their rights.

²⁸² Charges of physical assault can be made under the 1861 Offenses Against the Person Act under sections 18 (wounding with intent to maim; causing grievous bodily harm with intent; shooting with intent to maim), 20 (unlawful wounding) and 47 (assault, battery, actual bodily harm).

²⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

To date, funding for the judiciary has focused on the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the judiciary, but as the peace in Sierra Leone takes hold, donors, including the British government and the World Bank, are considering funding desperately needed judicial reform programs.

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program

The extent to which sexual violence, including sexual slavery, has been ignored throughout the war and in the post-conflict phase is most evident by the lack of attention paid to the thousands of abducted women and girls and their children. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process has completely overlooked the protection needs of these women and children. The lack of clear policy and procedural guidelines on these abductees has meant that the responsibility for these women and girls fell between governmental institutions and implementing agencies, resulting in an *ad hoc*, inappropriate and inadequate humanitarian response. Little to no funding was allocated to the protection needs of abducted women and children and only a small number of programs that provide education, skills training and counseling were established for them. This important human rights issue was raised on numerous occasions at different levels with the relevant government institutions, donor governments and the World Bank by UNAMSIL and nongovernmental organizations as well as by World Bank consultants in confidential reports, but did not succeed in bringing about any concrete policy decisions.

The needs of abducted girls and women should, however, be considered an inextricable part of the DDR process and a priority issue that should have been addressed during meetings between the U.N. and government officials or rebel leaders prior to the commencement of disarmament. The abducted girls and women should have been registered and interviewed at the same time that their "husbands" entered the DDR program, with the interviews conducted separately from the "husbands." Information on alternative options could have been disseminated at the DDR camps through social workers and orientation sessions. Alternatively, if it had been possible to gain access to the abducted women and children in rebel-held areas before or during the DDR process then contact should have been established to determine total numbers and inform them of the reintegration support and alternative options available to them. Female social workers in the DDR camps could also have counseled the abductees to help them understand the implications of their decisions, and that the decision is theirs. Basic reproductive health services, including testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, should also be provided at DDR camps.

Donors and the government of Sierra Leone must redress their neglect of survivors' protection needs by drastically increasing funding for women's programs and providing women with desperately needed assistance in terms of health, education, trauma counseling, adult literacy and skills training to promote their rehabilitation into society. In addition, donors should fund legal reform and training programs for the judiciary and police, which will contribute to increase the protection of women's human rights. Donors should also learn from their failure in Sierra Leone and ensure that DDR programs in other countries where large numbers of women and girls have been abducted by the fighting forces, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, do integrate the protection needs of these abducted women and girls.²⁸⁴

United Kingdom

The U.K. has played a key role in restoring peace to Sierra Leone. During the May 2000 crisis, British troops deployed to Sierra Leone, and a standby force was deployed offshore ready to provide additional support to UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army, if required. Since the May 2000 crisis, it has provided technical assistance to most government departments and military training to the new SLA, and has publicly committed itself to remain closely involved in Sierra Leone.

The U.K. is the biggest donor in Sierra Leone, and in 2002 contributed £100 million (approximately U.S. \$145 million) of which about £50 million (approximately U.S. \$73 million) was disbursed through its development agency, the Department for International Development (DFID). DFID-funded programs aim at

²⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch, *The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

strengthening the protection and promotion of women's human rights. Since September 2001, the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which is funded by DFID and staffed only by British nationals, has been working to establish a nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence. Under this system, only female police officers are supposed to interview female victims, while both male and female police officers are responsible for interviewing suspects and witnesses. More officers need to be trained in addition to the sixteen who have received training. As the force has few women, more females need to be recruited so only female police officers interview victims of sexual and domestic violence. The police officers in the FSUs lack strong leadership and require more training and close supervision to ensure that victims are dealt with in a professional and sensitive manner.

DFID also funds a program to promote the participation of women in politics, especially in Parliament, as well as university research into conflict-related sexual violence committed in January 1999.²⁸⁵ DFID has provided £2.5 million (about U.S. \$3.5 million) for a three year Law Development Program which aims at rehabilitating the physical infrastructure of the court system, as well as providing training to administrative staff to ensure proper record-keeping of cases. The Law Development Program is under review to determine its future strategy, in particular with relation to legal reform, including customary law. DFID is currently considering funding a three-year program that will establish sexual and physical assault referral centers across the country.

The U.K. has contributed a total of over U.S. \$500,000 to the operations of the TRC and its Interim Secretariat. The U.K. has also pledged U.S. \$9,110,000 over three years to the Special Court.

United States

In 1999, the U.S. put considerable pressure on the warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement. However, following the breakdown of the peace process in 2000, U.S. policy revolved around ending external support for the RUF, supporting British military actions and transitional justice mechanisms as well as providing humanitarian aid. From 2000 to 2002, the United States contributed a total of U.S. \$170 million to Sierra Leone, which was primarily disbursed on food-for-peace programs, the resettlement of displaced persons, and reintegration of former combatants. The U.S. has funded several women's programs, notably in the field of health, including the provision of obstetric surgery and HIV/AIDS education, a sexual and gender-based violence program, a program aimed at promoting women in politics, and micro-finance schemes for women. The Senate's Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) expand services to rape victims and fund a public education program on women's rights. The U.S., which is a strong supporter of the Special Court, has contributed U.S. \$5 million to this body, and pledged an additional \$10 million. The U.S. has contributed \$500,000 to the TRC.

After the May 2000 crisis, the U.S. initiated a program called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) to train and equip seven battalions of West African troops for peacekeeping with UNAMSIL. In July 2002, the U.S. pledged to help ECOWAS set up military bases for the rapid deployment of troops in conflict areas. The first steps in this assistance program include the installation of a U.S. \$5.3 million early-warning satellite communications system, which will link the ECOWAS secretariat with observation centers in four ECOWAS countries.

European Union

The E.U. did not play a key role in responding to the armed conflict and to date has not been a major donor. Since May 2000, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has disbursed approximately €30 million (roughly the same in U.S. dollars) in Sierra Leone. Few ECHO-funded programs have directly targeted women. ECHO has funded child protection programs, which have assisted child-mothers who became pregnant as the result of conflict-related sexual violence.

²⁸⁵ A survey of 226 victims, conducted by the University of Sierra Leone Gender Research and Documentation Centre in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUW), Médecins Sans Frontières, UNICEF and FAWE Sierra Leone.

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As the situation in Sierra Leone stabilizes, the E.U. will increase its funding to Sierra Leone through the European Development Fund (EDF), which from 2000 to 2002 disbursed €38 million on activities that supported the return to democracy, rehabilitation of infrastructure and resettlement. From 2002 to 2007, a total of €144 million will be made available for disbursement through the EDF on activities that focus on the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, good governance and institutional capacity building. An additional €76 million can be spent on activities outside of these two focal areas.

In 2002, the European Commission funded a two-year program that supports the reintegration of rape victims and other war-affected persons through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Human rights-related programs funded through the EIDHR, which has €6 million for disbursement over the next three years (2002-5), should include women's rights issues, which the EIDHR seeks to mainstream in all its programs.²⁸⁶

In addition to the U.K., other member states of the E.U. have bilaterally contributed to Sierra Leone. The Netherlands, in particular, has since 1999 funded sexual and gender-based violence programs. The Dutch government has also been a strong supporter of the Special Court and has contributed U.S. \$11.4 million, which is approximately 20 percent of the total budget. A donation for the TRC is being prepared at the time of writing, but has not yet been formalized. A small budget for human rights programs was made available for 2002.

United Nations

Security Council, Secretary-General, and UNAMSIL

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the members of the Security Council have devoted much attention to the conflict in Sierra Leone. Kofi Annan visited the country in July 1999 and December 2000. The Security Council has frequently denounced the egregious human rights abuses committed during the conflict, in particular by the rebel factions, and has stressed the importance of protecting women in armed conflict.²⁸⁷

Following the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda, there was substantial pressure on the U.N. to ensure that the UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission would succeed when it was established in October 1999.²⁸⁸ After the slow initial deployment of peacekeepers, which led to the May 2000 crisis, the U.N. committed itself to deploy 17,500 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL is the world's largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission, costing the international community over U.S. \$700 million annually.²⁸⁹ As of March 31, 2002, there were 17,455 peacekeepers, 259 military observers, 87 civilian police officers as well as 322 international and 552 local civilian staff in Sierra Leone. The mission is now being hailed as a great success, although Human Rights Watch has criticized UNAMSIL on numerous occasions for failing to fulfill its mandate to protect the civilian population.²⁹⁰ In a June 19 report to the Security Council on UNAMSIL, the secretary-general stated that the government security apparatus was not yet capable of protecting Sierra Leone from both internal and external threats and warned that the international community must protect the major investments that had made possible the progress achieved so far.²⁹¹ On September 24, the Security Council extended UNAMSIL's mandate for a further six months, but envisaged a reduction of 4,500 troops in the peacekeeping mission within eight months. The resolution was based on the recommendation of a further report on UNAMSIL which laid out benchmarks to govern the withdrawal of the U.N. from Sierra Leone, including the ability of the police and army

²⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with EIDHR representatives Andrew Kelly and Irene Corcillo and the Economic Adviser to the E.U., René Mally, Freetown, April 10, 2002.

²⁸⁷ In resolution 1370, the Security Council expressed "... its continued deep concern at the reports of human rights abuses and attacks by the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) ... against the civilian population, in particular the widespread violation of the human rights of women and children, including sexual violence, [and] demands that these acts cease immediately..." U.N. Security Council resolution 1370, S/RES/1370 (2001), September 18, 2001, para. 4.

²⁸⁸ U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

²⁸⁹ U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

²⁹⁰ See Human Rights Watch letter addressed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan at <http://www.org/press/2001/11/annanltr.htm>.

²⁹¹ *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/679, June 19, 2002.

to maintain security, the successful re-integration of ex-combatants, and the situation in the broader sub-region. The resolution also encouraged the government of Sierra Leone to "pay special attention to the needs of women and children affected by the war," and welcomed "the steps taken by UNAMSIL to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of women and children," and encouraged the mission to continue to enforce a policy of "zero tolerance" for such acts. The Security Council also called on states to bring to justice their own nationals responsible for such crimes in Sierra Leone.²⁹²

UNAMSIL was initially authorized to field fourteen human rights officers, but for the first two years of UNAMSIL's existence, the human rights unit remained understaffed, which meant that human rights abuses were not effectively monitored. At various times during the lifespan of UNAMSIL, the gender specialist post was not filled. When UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded to 17,500, the human rights unit was authorized to recruit six additional human rights officers and most positions are currently filled. The Physicians for Human Rights report on conflict-related sexual violence was produced in collaboration with the UNAMSIL human rights section and has contributed to focusing the attention of the international community on the issue of sexual violence.

In October 2000, the Security Council held an Open Session on Women and Armed Conflict and adopted a resolution calling for documenting the impact of armed conflict on women and the role of women in peace-building.²⁹³ Since then the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has undertaken a major study on the impact of armed conflict on women in more than ten countries around the world, including Sierra Leone. In January 2002, a three-woman UNIFEM team visited Sierra Leone in connection with this study.²⁹⁴ UNIFEM also recently appointed a gender and AIDS adviser in Sierra Leone, who is tasked with strengthening the gender division of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs and local women's groups as well as mainstreaming gender in the TRC and Special Court for Sierra Leone. She will also research the relationship between gender, conflict and HIV/AIDS with the aim to increase protection against HIV infection.²⁹⁵

In November 2001, a team from the Training and Evaluation Service of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted a two-week training on gender in peacekeeping. The program involved over 1,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and civilian personnel from both Freetown and the provinces. Local human rights activists and women's organizations were invited in order to contribute a domestic perspective on gender issues.

UNAMSIL has funded several women's programs for survivors of sexual violence through various trust funds. These trust funds are normally established for quick impact programs whilst the rehabilitation and reintegration of women who have been abducted and subjected to sexual violence and sexual slavery should be seen as long-term projects.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The then U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited Sierra Leone in June 1999, while the Lomé peace negotiations were taking place. The purpose of the mission was "to support the peace process, to encourage future programmes for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country, and to draw attention to the plight of children, women and civilians bearing the brunt of the excesses in Sierra Leone."²⁹⁶ OHCHR has provided technical assistance for the establishment of the TRC, but was very slow to issue the funding appeal for the TRC. OHCHR has also assisted in the drafting of the statute for the national human rights commission provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement, but the establishment of this body has not progressed beyond that point.

²⁹² *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/987, September 5, 2002; U.N. Security Council resolution 1436, S/RES/1436 (2002), September 24, 2002, paragraphs 14 and 15.

²⁹³ U.N. Security Council resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (2000), October 31, 2000.

²⁹⁴ See the summary of the assessment's findings at http://www.unifem.org/gov_pax_assessment.pdf.html.

²⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Jebbeh Forster (Gender and AIDS advisor to UNIFEM Sierra Leone), Freetown, March 11 and April 15, 2002.

²⁹⁶ United Nations, *Sixth Report of the U.N. secretary-general on the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)*, S/1999/645, June 4, 1999, para. 39.

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The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has condemned the human rights situation in Sierra Leone on numerous occasions.²⁹⁷ In August 2001, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the commission's special rapporteur on violence against women, visited Sierra Leone to highlight the gender-specific abuses that thousands of women and girls have been subjected to. She highlighted that "systematic and widespread rape and other sexual violence has been a hallmark of the conflict in Sierra Leone" and noted that "the failure to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence has contributed to an environment of impunity that perpetuates violence against women in Sierra Leone, including rape and domestic violence."²⁹⁸ She therefore stressed the need for accountability for these abuses.

World Bank

The World Bank established a multi-donor trust fund for the DDR program, which is now focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants. As discussed above, the protection needs of abducted women and girls were ignored by the DDR program even though World Bank consultants had raised this issue in their confidential reports. In 2002, the World Bank agreed in principle to allocate U.S. \$140 million to support reconstruction and development efforts in Sierra Leone and U.S. \$15 million to go towards HIV/AIDS prevention projects there.

X. CONCLUSION

The decade-long war in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses committed primarily by the rebel forces against the civilian population. Throughout the conflict, thousands of women and girls were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence of unimaginable brutality, including sexual slavery. The low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone by law, custom and practice remains a contributing factor to their vulnerability and may have contributed to the widespread and systematic sexual violence. In addition to the combatants' motivation to achieve their strategic military objectives through terrorizing the civilian population, the fact that sexual violence during the Sierra Leone conflict predominantly involved *men* raping *women* reveals that conflict-related rape, like most rape, reflects this dynamic of gender inequality and subordination. This assertion by men of their power over women is deeply imbedded in societal attitudes in Sierra Leone. The international community and the government therefore need to think of creative ways to change these deeply embedded attitudes.

The lack of attention paid until recently, both nationally and internationally, to the widespread and systematic acts of sexual violence, sexual slavery and their consequences means that there are few assistance programs for survivors. The international community and the government of Sierra Leone should drastically increase funding to ensure that desperately needed health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes are provided. Nor have there been any prosecutions. Rape therefore continues with impunity and it is little wonder that women and girls in post-conflict Sierra Leone remain vulnerable to non-conflict-related violence, and are reluctant to seek legal redress in the domestic courts or even report the incident given the country's inefficient and corrupt criminal justice system. Although, the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should help to address this climate of impunity, the domestic legal system must urgently be revised to ensure that crimes of sexual violence are prosecuted in a sensitive manner. The international community therefore needs to fund legal reform and training

²⁹⁷ The Commission on Human Rights deplored "... the ongoing atrocities committed by the rebels, including murders, rape, abductions ... calls for an end to all such acts." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/24, April 18, 2000, para. 4. The Commission also expressed its grave concern "...at the targeting and abuse of women and girls that have been committed in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front and others, including other armed groups, in particular murder, sexual violence, rape, including systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced marriages..." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/20, April 20, 2001, para. 2(b).

²⁹⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49*, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2 (United Nations, 2002), p. 2.

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programs for the criminal justice system as a whole, which has a key role in promoting and protecting the rights of Sierra Leonean women and girls.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written by Louise Taylor, a consultant to Human Rights Watch, on the basis of interviews conducted in Sierra Leone from February to June 2002. It is also based on testimonies collected by Corinne Dufka, Human Rights Watch Africa Division researcher based in Sierra Leone, from 1999 to June 2002, and by Ellen Vermeulen, consultant, from February 2000 to April 2001.

The report was edited by Bronwen Manby, deputy director of the Africa Division; James Ross, senior legal adviser; and Ian Gorvin, consultant to the program office. It was also reviewed by Corinne Dufka; Widney Brown, advocacy director in the Women's Rights Division; Zama Coursen-Neff, researcher in the Children's Rights Division; Joanne Csete, director of the program on HIV/AIDS and human rights; and Joanne Weschler, U.N. representative. The final edits were inputted by Max Marcus, consultant. Production and coordination assistance was provided by Jeff Scott, associate in the Africa Division; Patrick Minges, Publications director; and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

We would like to thank all the organizations and individuals interviewed for this report for their invaluable assistance and insights. We particularly thank the survivors who agreed to recount their experiences. The courage and dignity of these women and girls never ceases to amaze and inspire.

Human Rights Watch recognizes with appreciation funding for work on Sierra Leone from the Oak Foundation, Stichting Doen, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

Human Rights Watch Africa Division

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350 Fifth Avenue 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
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New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
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Number	Item	Content
200	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Human Rights Watch, "We'll kill you if you Cry, Sexual violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict" Vol. 15 No. 1 (A), January 2003.

SIERRA LEONE



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350 Fifth Ave 34th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10118-3299
<http://www.hrw.org>
(212) 290-4700

Vol. 15, No. 1 (A) – January 2003



A woman receives psychological and medical treatment in a clinic to assist rape victims in Freetown. In January 1999, she was gang-raped by seven rebels in her village in northern Sierra Leone. After raping her, the rebels tied her down and placed burning charcoal on her body. (c) 1999 Corinne Dufka/Human Rights Watch

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

-Testimony to Human Rights Watch

“WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY” SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

1630 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, DC 20009
TEL (202) 612-4321
FAX (202) 612-4333
E-mail: hrwdc@hrw.org

2nd Floor, 2-12 Pentonville Road
London N1 9HF, UK
TEL: (44 20) 7713 1995
FAX: (44 20) 7713 1800
E-mail: hrwuk@hrw.org

15 Rue Van Campenhout
1000 Brussels, Belgium
TEL (32 2) 732-2009
FAX (32 2) 732-0471
E-mail: hrwbe@hrw.org

SIERRA LEONE

“WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY” Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	All People's Congress
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CCP	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CCSSP	Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project
CDC	Centers for Disease Control
CDF	Civil Defense Forces
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CMRRD	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development
C. O.	Commanding Officer
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
E.U.	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
IRC	International Rescue Committee
FAWE	Forum for African Women Educationalists
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFR	Operation Focus Relief
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PHR	Physicians for Human Rights
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SBU	Small Boys Unit
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
YRF	Vasico-rectal Fistula
VVF	Vasico-vaginal Fistula
WHO	World Health Organization

DEFINITION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, RAPE AND SEXUAL SLAVERY

In this report:

Sexual violence is an overarching term used to describe “[a]ny violence, physical or psychological, carried out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality.”¹ Sexual violence includes rape and attempted rape, and such acts as forcing a person to strip naked in public, forcing two victims to perform sexual acts on one another or harm one another in a sexual manner, mutilating a person’s genitals or a woman’s breasts, and sexual slavery.

Rape as defined in the appeals chamber judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 2002 *Foca* case is “[t]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or (b) [of] the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The *mens rea* is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”² The appeals chamber rejected the “resistance” requirement argued by the appellants as it is justified neither in law or fact, and stated that the use of force in itself is not a necessary element of rape. The coercive circumstances present in the Foca rapes, which were committed in circumstances similar to the crimes of sexual violence perpetrated in Sierra Leone, made the victims’ consent to the sexual acts impossible. The use or threat of force often removes any requirement that a victim show resistance and most jurisdictions have discarded the idea that a rape victim must resist under all circumstances as impractical, if not absurd. This definition also underscores that rape is an attack on the physical integrity of a woman and not an attack against her honor or that of her family or community.

Rape was defined in the judgment of the *Akayesu* case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as “[t]he physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive” and is not limited to the insertion of a penis into a victim’s vagina or anus or the insertion of a penis in the mouth of the victim.³ This definition, however, has been criticized for being too broad and has not been included in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Sexual slavery, defined by the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1953 Protocol amending the same convention, refers to “[t]he status, or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised, including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence.”⁴ The Statute of the ICC includes the trafficking of women and children in its definition of enslavement.⁵

¹ United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur (New York: United Nations, 1998), E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1998/13, pp. 7-8.

² *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Foca case)*, Appeals Chamber Judgement, June 12, 2002, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, paras. 127-133.

³ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998, para. 688.

⁴ United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, p. 9. Sierra Leone ratified the Slavery Convention on March 13, 1962.

⁵ Article 7 (1) (g) lists enslavement as a crime against humanity with the definition given in Article 7 (2) (c). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, Article 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). The Rome Statute entered into force on April 11, 2002 and the ICC has the authority to prosecute the most serious international crimes from July 1, 2002.

I. SUMMARY

Throughout the armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2001, thousands of women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including individual and gang rape, and rape with objects such as weapons, firewood, umbrellas, and pestles. Rape was perpetrated by both sides, but mostly by the rebel forces. These crimes of sexual violence were generally characterized by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by other egregious human rights abuses against the victim, her family, and her community. Although the rebels raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, they targeted young women and girls whom they thought were virgins. Many of these younger victims did not survive these crimes of sexual violence. Adult women were also raped so violently that they sometimes bled to death or suffered from tearing in the genital area, causing long-term incontinence and severe infections. Many victims who were pregnant at the time of rape miscarried as a result of the sexual violence they were subjected to, and numerous women had their babies torn out of their uterus as rebels placed bets on the sex of the unborn child.

Thousands of women and girls were abducted by the rebels and subjected to sexual slavery, forced to become the sex slaves of their rebel "husbands." Abducted women and girls who were assigned "husbands" remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. Many survivors were kept with the rebel forces for long periods and gave birth to children fathered by rebels. Some abducted women and girls were forcibly conscripted into the fighting forces and given military training, but even within the rebel forces, women still held much lower status and both conscripted and volunteer female combatants were assigned "husbands." For civilian abductees, aside from sexual violence their brutal life with the rebels included being made to perform forced labor, such as cooking, washing, carrying ammunition and looted items, as well as farm work. Combatants within the rebel forces had considerable latitude to do what they wanted to abducted civilians, who were often severely punished for offenses as minor as spilling water on a commander's shoes. Escape for these women and girls was often extremely difficult: In many instances, the women and girls, intimidated by their captors and the circumstances, felt powerless to escape their life of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels sometimes made escape more difficult by deliberately carving the name of their faction onto the chests of abducted women and girls. If these marked women and girls were caught by pro-government forces, they would be suspected of being rebels, and often killed. Even though many women did manage to escape, some escaped from one rebel faction or unit only to be captured by another. An unknown number of women and girls still remain with their rebel "husbands," although the war was declared over on January 18, 2002.

The main perpetrators of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, were the rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC. Human Rights Watch has documented over three hundred cases of sexual violence by the rebels; countless more have never been documented. From the launch of their rebellion from Liberia in March 1991, which triggered the war, the RUF perpetrated widespread and systematic sexual violence. Its ideology of salvaging Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) regime quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's abundant diamond mines. The AFRC, which consisted of disaffected soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who in May 1997 overthrew the elected government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, were also responsible for subjecting thousands of women and girls to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. After the signing of the peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, in July 1999, sexual violence, including sexual slavery, continued unabated in RUF-controlled areas and was also perpetrated by the West Side Boys, who operated outside of the capital, Freetown. The human rights situation worsened after the May 2000 crisis when fighting broke out again, until relative peace was re-established, with U.N. and British assistance, by mid-2001. The prevalence of sexual violence peaked during active military operations and when the rebels were on patrol. Even in times of relative peace, however, sexual violence continued to be committed against the thousands of women and girls who were abducted and subjected to sexual slavery by the rebels. No region of Sierra Leone was spared.

Human Rights Watch has documented only a limited number of cases of sexual violence by pro-government forces, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the militia known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF), the latter consisting

of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were called upon by the government to defend their native areas. Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the SLA prior to 1997. This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between rebel and government soldiers, as the latter frequently colluded with and disguised themselves as RUF forces. Sexual violence was committed relatively infrequently by the CDF, whose internal rules forbid them from having sexual intercourse before going to battle and who believe their power and potency as warriors depends upon sexual abstinence. Some of this internal discipline, however, was lost as CDF moved away from their native areas and traditional chiefs and were given more responsibility in national security. Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the largest and most powerful CDF group, the Kamajors, who operate predominantly in the south and east.

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by peacekeepers with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean contingent and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian soldiers near Kenema. There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by peacekeepers with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the majority of whom were Nigerian, deployed at an earlier stage in the war, were rare. Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women, including the solicitation of child prostitutes, whilst deployed in Sierra Leone.

Rape in wartime is an act of violence that targets sexuality. Moreover, conflict-related sexual violence serves a military and political strategy. The humiliation, pain, and fear inflicted by the perpetrators serve to dominate and degrade not only the individual victim but also her community. Combatants who rape in war often explicitly link their acts of sexual violence to this broader social degradation. The armed conflict in Sierra Leone was no exception. The rebels sought to dominate women and their communities by deliberately undermining cultural values and community relationships, destroying the ties that hold society together. Child combatants raped women who were old enough to be their grandmothers, rebels raped pregnant and breastfeeding mothers, and fathers were forced to watch their daughters being raped.

To date there has been no accountability for the thousands of crimes of sexual violence or other appalling human rights abuses committed during the war in Sierra Leone. The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement included a blanket amnesty under Sierra Leonean law for offenses committed by all sides, as the price for the RUF/AFRC agreeing to lay down arms. The United Nations (U.N.) stated that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty insofar as it purported to apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Two important transitional justice mechanisms, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have been established with U.N. assistance and are tasked with investigating the human rights abuses, including sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed by all parties during the war. Both bodies were operational by the third quarter of 2002. The SCSL, a hybrid national and international court, is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law" committed in the Sierra Leonean conflict since November 30, 1996. As the SCSL is likely to try only a very limited number of persons, due to funding constraints, a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy is essential, with a strong affirmation that gender-related crimes will be thoroughly and competently investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The TRC, provided for under the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement partially to offset the controversial amnesty it also included, has the mandate to establish an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law from the outset of the war in 1991, promote reconciliation, and make recommendations aimed at preventing a repetition of the violations committed. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight the crimes of sexual violence committed throughout the entire country during the armed conflict and make recommendations to strengthen the promotion and protection of women's human rights.

Sexual violence has remained Sierra Leone's silent war crime. Until recently, little attention has been paid either nationally or internationally to this less visible human rights abuse, although sexual violence was committed on a much larger scale than the highly visible amputations for which Sierra Leone became notorious. The underreporting is a reflection of the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone as well as the internal shame that survivors suffer and their fear of rejection by family and communities. Women and girls in Sierra Leone are subjected to structural discrimination by practice, custom and law. They face discrimination in terms of education and employment, in the political arena, and in other walks of life. Both customary law, which governs the majority of the population, and general law, which was inherited from the United Kingdom and is primarily applied in Freetown, discriminate against women and girls in terms of family law, as well as property and inheritance rights. In addition, the provisions pertaining to rape under general and customary law offer inadequate protection. The misinterpretation of the complicated provisions of general law by the police and courts means, for example, that those who are alleged to have sexually assaulted a minor are generally charged with "unlawful carnal knowledge of a child," for which the sentence is lighter, rather than rape. Under customary law, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. The victim may also be forced to marry the perpetrator.

The concept of sexual violence as a crime in itself is a very recent one in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society. Only rape of a virgin is seen as a serious crime. Rape of a married woman or a non-virgin is often not considered a crime at all: as in many countries, there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act, or she is seen as a seductress. The virtual destruction of Sierra Leone's already corrupt and inefficient court system and police force during the war, moreover, created a climate of impunity that persists, allowing perpetrators of sexual violence (as well as other crimes) to escape justice.

The lack of attention to conflict-related sexual violence means that few assistance programs have been established for women and girls who were subjected to sexual violence, including sexual slavery. Survivors not only live with the severe physical and mental health consequences of the abuses suffered, but also fear ongoing non-conflict-related sexual violence, largely perpetrated with impunity. International donors and nongovernmental organizations should work together with the government of Sierra Leone to establish programs (health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes) that will help to rehabilitate the survivors of sexual violence. To combat impunity and work toward changing societal attitudes toward sexual violence, the government of Sierra Leone should, with the technical and financial support of the international community, revise its discriminatory laws to ensure that they meet international standards. The constitution also needs to be reviewed and the provision exempting personal and customary law from the prohibition against discrimination removed. In addition, the government should take steps to improve the response of the legal system to ongoing sexual and domestic violence, including strategies for effective prosecution and protection. A nationwide public awareness campaign also needs to be undertaken to educate the general population on women's human rights.

Women have a crucial role to play at this critical phase in Sierra Leone's history, but they will only be able to contribute fully in a civic culture in which women and girls are respected as equal partners and gender-based abuses are not tolerated.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Sierra Leone

- Take all necessary measures to ensure that former rebels release all women and girls abducted during the armed conflict who continue to be held. Provide these women and girls with the necessary social and economic options to enable them to leave these often abusive relationships.
- Prioritize the nationwide establishment of reproductive health clinics for women and girls that can provide testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, along with other services.
- Revoke or revise existing laws (general, customary and Islamic) that discriminate on the basis of gender and ensure that they meet international human rights standards. Take the necessary steps to amend the constitution to remove the provision exempting personal law and customary law from the prohibition on gender-based discrimination. Provide training on these new laws for the judiciary, police, prosecutors, and staff of local courts.
- Establish an inter-ministerial task force with representatives from nongovernmental organizations to deal with the conflict-related sexual violence and related current problems facing women, with the aim of improving the social, medical and legal responses to women's and girls' needs.
- Take steps to improve the response of the legal system to ongoing sexual and domestic violence, including strategies for effective prosecution and protection, such as recruiting and training more female police officers, allowing nongovernment doctors to examine victims and providing legal aid to victims.
- Mainstream gender within the government and government policies. Launch a nationwide public awareness campaign on sexual and domestic violence against women to dispel the prevailing societal attitudes to sexual and domestic violence against women.
- Provide training on human rights and international humanitarian law, with a focus on women's human rights issues and gender-based crimes, to members of the security forces.
- Repeal the provision in the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement Act that grants amnesty to all warring parties, so that individuals who committed acts of sexual violence (and other crimes) during the war may be prosecuted in the domestic courts.
- Cooperate fully with the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- Establish an independent national human rights commission as provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement that will contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights beyond the lifespan of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

To Members of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

- Provide military personnel participating in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone (and elsewhere) with training in human rights and international humanitarian law, including a focus on women's human rights issues, and gender-based crimes. Ensure that peacekeepers understand the U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers, which provides that peacekeepers should not commit any act that could result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children. Prosecute any nationals that have been repatriated from Sierra Leone for crimes of sexual violence in line with the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL.

- Issue a statement, jointly, if possible, declaring your willingness to support the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to surrender any alleged war criminals to it. Commit to extraditing to Sierra Leone individuals indicted by the Special Court, take the legal steps that may be necessary to ensure that this can happen (for example, by amending extradition laws), and otherwise cooperate with the Special Court, for example, by locating witnesses or providing information.

To Members of the International Community

- Prioritize the funding of reproductive health clinics for women and girls that can provide testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, along with other services.
- Greatly increase funding for legal reform programs, including training, to ensure that both the laws and domestic courts meet international standards, as well as for programs that will establish better medical, legal and social support services for survivors of sexual violence.
- Monitor all aspects of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to ensure that cases involving sexual violence and sexual slavery are fully prosecuted and that survivors and witnesses of sexual violence receive necessary protection and support throughout the judicial process and post-trial period. Cooperate with the court and take the necessary steps for the extradition or surrender of persons indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
- Fund the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and monitor it to ensure that conflict-related sexual violence and sexual slavery are fully investigated and properly documented by the TRC in a gender sensitive manner.
- Prosecute military personnel, who have been repatriated from Sierra Leone in line with the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL.

To the Special Court for Sierra Leone

- Conduct thorough investigations into incidents of sexual violence against women and girls including sexual slavery during the war for possible prosecution under the court's mandate. Ensure that gender-integrated teams investigating these acts have competence in investigating rape and conducting interviews with rape victims, who should only be interviewed by experienced female investigators.
- Ensure the gender crimes investigators conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. Ensure the gender crimes investigators have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.
- Recruit a staff member with expertise in juvenile justice who can provide training on juvenile justice issues and interviewing skills for staff dealing most directly with young children.
- Establish a strong Victims and Witnesses Unit with protection and support for prosecution and defense witnesses. Protect and support the victims and witnesses not only during the investigation and trial phase but extend this to post-trial protection, where appropriate.
- Provide judges, prosecutors and defense counsel with strict guidance to prevent them from unnecessarily re-victimizing witnesses on the stand or releasing their identity publicly in violation of protective measures.

To the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

- Recruit an experienced gender advisor with expertise in sexual violence, and ensure staff of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is gender balanced at all levels.

- Recruit a staff member experienced in dealing with child victims and perpetrators who can provide training on how to interview young children.
- Investigate and document fully gender-based abuses committed throughout the country. Ensure survivors of sexual violence are heard in a manner that ensures their dignity and safety, and avoids any re-traumatization. Guarantee the confidentiality of these hearings when confidentiality is requested.
- Highlight gender-specific abuses in the final report on the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as well as recommendations on legal reform to ensure that the domestic laws and courts meet international standards; on human rights training for the judiciary and law enforcement officers; and on the assistance needs of survivors.
- Promote public awareness of gender-based crimes through the media umbrella organizations, NGOs and mobile community outreach teams as well as the creation of an information and resource center.

To the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

- Investigate fully any allegations of sexual violence by UNAMSIL personnel, which will serve to enforce the policy of zero tolerance for any such acts perpetrated by anyone employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL. Establish a mechanism with the Sierra Leone Police whereby cases of sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff member, including the provost marshal and gender specialist in the human rights section. Establish a mechanism to follow up on cases that have resulted in military personnel who commit such crimes being repatriated to their country of origin to ensure that states properly prosecute the offender. Civilian staff that have perpetuated sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file so that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.
- Provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff and ensure the human rights unit systematically monitors and reports on issues of gender-based violence. Ensure that peacekeepers understand the U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers, which provides that peacekeepers should not commit any act that could result in the physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to members of the local population, especially women and children.
- Collaborate with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to revise the U.N. Code of Conduct and the Military Observer Handbook, ensuring that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Compile similar guidelines for civilian staff.
- Provide capacity building with a focus on women's human rights issues to national women's groups and human rights organizations across the country under the guidance of the gender specialist in UNAMSIL human rights units.

III. METHODOLOGY

Over three hundred women and girls were interviewed by Human Rights Watch as part of ongoing research and for this report. For a variety of reasons, including the lack of an ideological aspect and the limited ethnic dimension to the civil war in Sierra Leone and the all-pervasiveness of abuse, victims of human rights abuses, including survivors of sexual violence, generally feel free to talk very openly about their experiences.⁶

Great care was taken with the victims to ensure that recounting their experience did not further traumatize them. While we sought as much information as possible from each interview, the well-being of the interviewee was always paramount and some interviews were cut short as a result. The interviews were conducted in private settings in the presence of a female interpreter. The interviews with survivors were mostly conducted in Krio, the *lingua franca* of Sierra Leone, or in one of the other languages spoken by the different ethnic groups and interpreted into English. In most interviews only females were present and in the few cases where a man was present, it was with the permission of the interviewee. In order to guarantee the confidentiality of all information, interviewees are not identified by name.

In addition to the survivors, government officials, law enforcement officers, lawyers, key figures from the rebel forces, health personnel, religious leaders, and representatives of local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the areas of human rights, women's rights, and health, as well as U.N. officials were interviewed.

IV. BACKGROUND

The Civil War

Sierra Leone is a coastal West African country that shares borders with Guinea and Liberia. It has a population of close to five and a half million (July 2001 estimate) composed of sixteen ethnic groups.⁷ These are the Fullah, Gola, Koranko, Kissi, Kono, Krim, Krio, Limba, Loko, Mandingo, Mende, Sherbro, Susu, Temne, Vai and Yalunka. The Mende, in the south, and the Temne, in the north, are the largest ethnic groups (around 30 percent each). The Krio, who are descendants of freed slaves, were settled in the area of Freetown (now the capital) in the late eighteenth century and make up 10 percent of the total population. The educated Krio minority generally still occupies a higher social and economic position and has traditionally been resented by the other groups. Sierra Leone was a British colony, and English is Sierra Leone's official language. Krio, largely based on English vocabulary but with its own grammar, is the first language of the Krios as well as Sierra Leone's *lingua franca*. Though there are no reliable figures, Sierra Leone is a predominantly Muslim country (around 60 percent) with the remainder of the population practicing indigenous religions (10 percent) and Christianity (30 percent).⁸

In 1961, Sierra Leone gained its independence from the United Kingdom. For most of the next three decades, Sierra Leone was governed by the All People's Congress (APC), dominated by the northern Temne and Limba ethnic groups, which came into power in 1967.⁹ The corruption, nepotism and fiscal mismanagement under the one-party rule of the APC led to the decay of all state institutions and the impoverishment of Sierra Leone's population, notwithstanding the country's large deposits of diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite. Frustration with government corruption and mismanagement led to the formation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1984. The RUF claimed to be a political movement with the aim of salvaging the country and overthrowing the APC. Its invasion of Sierra Leone from Liberia on March 23, 1991 triggered the civil war that was to last ten years.

⁶ Women and girls who have been raped can be presented and/or perceived either as victims or survivors and there is an ongoing debate as to which is the more appropriate term. In this report, both terms are used interchangeably without significant distinction.

⁷ See <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/si.html>.

⁸ See <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2001/5730.htm>.

⁹ See generally, J.A.D. Alie, *A New History of Sierra Leone* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

At its inception, the RUF consisted of a mixture of middle class students with a populist platform, unemployed and alienated youths, and Liberian fighters from Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who had helped Charles Taylor in his quest to become the president of Liberia. A lesser-known covert sponsor of the RUF was the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), with its ethnic base among the Mendes from the south, which also sought the overthrow of the APC.¹⁰ The RUF was led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal who had been imprisoned in 1971 for his alleged involvement in an attempted coup against the APC. Sankoh had also reportedly received training in Libya with Taylor.¹¹ The RUF initially consisted of two small groups of only 150 combatants in total. As the RUF captured border towns and villages in Kailahun and Pujehun districts, they used tactics similar to those used to terrorize civilians during the Liberian civil war: seizing and summarily executing chiefs, village elders, traders, government agents and suspected SLA collaborators.¹² The violence and looting or "jah-jah," especially by the Liberian mercenaries within the RUF, was sanctioned by Sankoh who justified them as reward for the mercenaries' support.¹³ The RUF's ideology of salvation quickly degenerated into a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's diamond and other mineral wealth. From the very beginning, the RUF's campaign of terror included sexual violence and sexual slavery, committed on a widespread and systematic basis.

In April 1992, APC President Joseph Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by twenty-six-year-old army captain Valentine Strasser, who formed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Strasser vowed to end corruption and create opportunities for all Sierra Leoneans. The new regime, however, was as corrupt as the old. The RUF continued to gain strength and was joined by numerous soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who were disgruntled with their poor conditions. These soldier-rebels or "sobels" discarded their uniforms at night to loot but wore government uniforms and continued to work for the government during the day. The "sobels," who included officers, also provided weapons, ammunition, and intelligence to RUF forces.

Starting in January 1991, Momoh and later Strasser embarked on a recruitment drive that swelled the army's ranks to approximately twelve thousand, aiming to dislodge the RUF including by offering its youthful constituency a lucrative alternative. Many of the new soldiers were unemployed drifters, petty criminals, and street children as young as twelve. Given the inability of the undisciplined and ill-trained SLA to drive out the RUF, in March 1995, Strasser invited Executive Outcomes (E.O.), a South African private security company, to fight the RUF and guard the mining areas, in return for concessions over their production. The RUF was by that time approaching Freetown and controlled most of the diamond mining areas. By December 1995, E.O. had retaken a number of key diamond areas and began to collaborate with the pro-government militia known as the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), of which the Kamajors are the largest and most powerful.

The CDF movement began with the establishment of the Eastern Region Defence Committee in 1993-4 and was greatly expanded in 1996 when regent chief Hinga Norman was appointed deputy minister of defense in Kabbah's government and head of the CDF, with the government providing the CDF with training, weapons and food.¹⁴ The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men who were used by the government to defend their native areas. The Kamajors operate mainly in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbettis in the north and the Donzos in the far east. Civilians who joined the CDF underwent initiation ceremonies, which were said to bestow magical powers, making them immortal and invincible.¹⁵ Units of fighters were initially deployed only in their own chiefdoms to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the

¹⁰ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (London: The International African Institute in association with James Currey and Heinemann, 1996), p. 7. When the RUF first invaded from Liberia, villagers in Kailahun were ordered to cut palm fronds—the symbol of the SLPP—"in support" of the rebels.

¹¹ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), pp. 173-178.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 185. By 1999, the CDF had grown into a movement of an estimated fifteen thousand fighters who had to be disarmed and demobilized.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* This is a throwback to the venerated esoteric Mende cult of invincible traditional hunters who were given power through initiation ceremonies. These powers enabled the hunters, *inter alia*, to turn into an animal in order to catch their prey.

best use of their superior bush knowledge. The CDF, in contrast to the SLA and the RUF, had the support of the local civilians and were very effective, overrunning main RUF camps in late 1996 with the support of E.O. and the army.

In January 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his deputy, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. Bio initiated peace negotiations with the RUF, which had begun to suffer a number of defeats, as well as a program to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule. In March 1996, elections were held, and Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP, who pledged to bring about an end to the war, became president of Sierra Leone.

In November 1996, the RUF and Kabbah's government signed the Abidjan Peace Accord, which provided for a ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, an amnesty to the RUF, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The ceasefire was broken in January 1997, however, when serious fighting broke out in southern Moyamba district. In January 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria on an arms charge and imprisoned by the Nigerian government.

In May 1997, fourteen months after assuming power, President Kabbah was overthrown in a coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who formed a new government called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Koroma had escaped from prison, where he had been held following an earlier attempted coup in September 1996. The AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and announced rule by military decree. Days of looting by soldiers followed the coup, which also ushered in a period of political repression characterized by arbitrary arrests and detention. An attempt by Nigerian and Guinean troops (who had been in Sierra Leone since 1995 as part of bilateral security accords to give support to the NPRC), supported by South African mercenaries, to oust Koroma failed.¹⁶

The AFRC consisted primarily of disgruntled ex-SLA soldiers who had become disillusioned by President Kabbah's decision to cut back support for the military. Koroma also cited the government's failure to implement the peace agreement as the reason for the coup. The SLA accused Kabbah of having put greater confidence for the country's defense in and giving more economic resources to the CDF than to the army. Formalizing an alliance between the army and the rebels based on joint opposition to President Kabbah and the SLPP, the AFRC invited the RUF to join its government in June 1997.

From exile in Guinea, President Kabbah mobilized international condemnation for and a response to the coup makers. In response to a plea from Kabbah, hundreds of Nigerian troops based in Liberia as part of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) moved to Freetown, reinforcing ECOMOG colleagues already based at the Freetown airport to defend it from attacks by the RUF. Nigerian vessels stationed off Freetown shelled the city, reportedly killing at least fifty people. Nigerian forces were, however, eventually forced to withdraw from around the capital. In August 1997, following the AFRC's announcement of a four-year program for elections and return to civilian rule, which represented a breakdown in negotiations initiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS established a strict economic embargo against Sierra Leone. In October 1997, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution also imposing mandatory sanctions on Sierra Leone, including an embargo on arms and oil imports, which ECOMOG forces were mandated to enforce.

After negotiations in Guinea under the auspices of ECOWAS, the Kabbah government-in-exile and the RUF/AFRC signed an agreement on October 23, 1997, providing for the return to power of President Kabbah by April 1998. The RUF/AFRC, however, undermined the implementation of the accord by stockpiling weapons and attacking the positions of ECOMOG forces. In February 1998, ECOMOG forces together with Kamajor militia launched an operation that drove the RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown. In March 1998, President Kabbah was

¹⁶ See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (A), June 1999, p. 8 for a discussion of the role of foreign mercenaries in the armed conflict. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition or Travesty? Nigeria's Endless Process of Return to Civilian Rule," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, vol. 9, no. 6, October 1997, for a discussion of the Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone.

reinstated. Over the succeeding months ECOMOG forces were able to establish control over roughly two-thirds of the country, including all regional capitals: as of mid-1998, the ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone was composed of approximately 12,500 troops, predominantly Nigerian with support battalions from Guinea, Gambia, Ghana and Niger.¹⁷ Sankoh was transferred to Sierra Leone from Nigeria and incarcerated in July 1998. In October 1998, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone tried and sentenced Sankoh to death for his role in the 1997 coup.

Once expelled from Freetown, the AFRC/RUF rebels tried to consolidate their own positions in other parts of the country. The Kabbah government, which had negligible forces of its own, had to rely on ECOMOG to stay in power. Through a series of offensives, the RUF/AFRC managed to gain control of the diamond-rich Kono district and several other strategic towns and areas. By late 1998, the rebels had gained the upper hand militarily and were in control of over half of the country, including all the mineral-rich areas. From this position, the RUF/AFRC launched a major offensive on Freetown in January 1999.

The battle for Freetown and ensuing three-week rebel occupation of the capital were characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of a wide range of abuses against the civilian population, and marked the most intensive and concentrated period of human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war. At least five thousand civilians were killed and one hundred civilians had limbs amputated, including twenty-six double arm amputations. Thousands of women and girls, including girls as young as eight, were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence. In addition, the rebels used civilians as human shields, both while advancing towards ECOMOG positions and as a defense against ECOMOG air power. They also burnt whole neighborhoods, often with the residents in their houses.

Government and the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces also committed serious human rights abuses, though on a lesser scale, including over 180 summary executions of rebels and their suspected collaborators. Prisoners taken by ECOMOG, some of who had surrendered and many of whom were wounded, were executed on the spot often with little or no effort to establish their guilt or innocence. Officers to the level of captain were present and participated in the executions. ECOWAS officials have yet to initiate a formal investigation into these killings.

As the RUF/AFRC were driven out of Freetown in February 1999, they abducted thousands of civilians, who were used to carry looted goods and ammunition, forcibly conscripted into fighting or used for forced labor. Thousands of girls and women were used as sex slaves by the rebels and forced to "marry" rebel husbands. As they moved eastward, the rebels continued to commit egregious human rights abuses, including killings and amputations, particularly in the villages around the towns of Masiaka, Lunsar, and Port Loko.¹⁸

In the months following the January invasion, and as a result of intense international pressure, Kabbah's government and RUF rebels signed a ceasefire agreement on May 18, 1999,¹⁹ followed by a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, on July 7, 1999.²⁰ Sankoh was released from prison by the Sierra Leonean government to participate in the peace negotiations. The accord, brokered by the U.N., the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and ECOWAS, committed the RUF/AFRC to lay down its arms in exchange for representation in a new government. Sankoh was given the chairmanship of the board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) and the status of vice-president.²¹ Johnny Paul Koroma was made the chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), provided for under Article 6 of the peace agreement.²²

¹⁷ See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Short Report*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (A), July 1998.

¹⁸ See Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," for a comprehensive report on the January 1999 invasion.

¹⁹ See the annex to U.N. Security Council report, S/1999/585, May 18, 1999.

²⁰ Lomé Peace Agreement at <http://sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>.

²¹ Article 5 (2) of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

²² The RUF delegation to the peace talks in Lomé included members of the AFRC who were also appointed as ministers as part of the agreement to share power.

The peace agreement also included a general amnesty for all crimes committed by all parties during the civil war until the signing of the peace agreement.²³ At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general's special representative attending the talks added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In addition, the peace agreement mandated the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a national human rights commission.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), initially established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security conditions, was transformed into a much larger peacekeeping mission.²⁴ In October 1999, months later than had been planned, UNOMSIL, which at its maximum deployment included 192 military observers as well as a small human rights unit of four persons, was transformed into the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was mandated to maintain the peace and monitor the ceasefire and had a maximum authorized strength of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers.²⁵ The human rights unit was authorized to expand to a total of fourteen human rights officers. Two further Security Council resolutions followed, increasing the authorized troop strength to 11,100²⁶ and then 13,000.²⁷

The peace process was marred by cease-fire violations, missed deadlines and infighting within rebel ranks. The RUF/AFRC failed to comply with several commitments, including the release of all civilian abductees. There was a relative decrease in human rights abuses following the peace agreement, although the RUF/AFRC continued to terrorize the civilian population in the north and east, which largely remained under its control. Sexual violence, in particular against the thousands of abducted women and girls, continued. In addition, a splinter group of the AFRC known as the West Side Boys established numerous bases in the Occra Hills near Freetown, from where they staged looting raids. The West Side Boys abducted hundreds of civilians, including girls and women, whom they raped and kept as sex slaves. In August 1999, they took hostage for one week forty-two members of a U.N.-led delegation composed of ECOMOG soldiers, religious leaders, aid workers, and journalists, who had gone to the Occra Hills to have abducted children released to them.

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program progressed slowly, with only 25,000 out of a total 45,000 combatants demobilized by May 2000.²⁸ There was also considerable delay in the deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces, with only 8,700 peacekeepers deployed by the same month. The peace process then broke down completely, when, in early May, the RUF captured over five hundred UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers deployed in the north and the east, holding them for several weeks.²⁹ The conflict erupted again throughout the country and many of the combatants, including child combatants, who had been disarmed and demobilized, were re-conscripted. The human rights situation deteriorated sharply with numerous reports of RUF abuses, including murder, widespread rape, abduction, forced labor, and looting. During a demonstration in Freetown to protest the collapse of the peace process and hostage taking of the peacekeepers, twenty-two civilians were killed outside the house of the RUF leader, Sankoh. On May 17, 2000, several days

²³ Lomé Peace Agreement. Under Article 9 (1) of this agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone was required to grant Sankoh absolute and free pardon. Article 9 (3) refers to the amnesty granted to all combatants of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF for any crimes they may have committed in pursuit of their objectives (*See below*, p. 61, for a discussion on the amnesty).

²⁴ U.N. Security Council resolution 1181, S/RES/1181 (1998), July 13, 1998.

²⁵ U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

²⁶ U.N. Security Council resolution 1289, S/RES/1289 (2000), February 7, 2000.

²⁷ U.N. Security Council resolution 1299, S/RES/1299 (2000), May 19, 2000.

²⁸ U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation report, May 29, 2001. *See* <http://www.relief.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B>.

²⁹ The hostages in the north were released on May 28, 2000. The hostages in the east, however, were not released until June 29, 2000. Two hundred and thirty-three peacekeepers and military observers who had been encircled by the RUF were finally freed by the U.N. military operation "Khukri" on July 15, 2000.

after the demonstration, Sankoh was arrested by the government and held in custody, together with over 125 members of the RUF, without charge, using powers under a state of emergency declared in 1998.

There was also a disturbing intensification of abuses by pro-government forces. The Sierra Leonean government caused numerous civilian casualties through helicopter gunship attacks during May and June 2000 against the RUF strongholds of Makeni, Magburaka, and Kambia. Abuses by both the government forces and the RUF caused the displacement of some 330,000 civilians from behind rebel lines. Civilians leaving RUF territory were often captured and accused of being rebel sympathizers by the CDF. Whereas previously sexual violence against women had been very uncommon among the CDF, numerous cases of sexual violence were reported, including gang rape by Kamajor militiamen and commanders.

When, in May 2000, it seemed as though the fighting would threaten Freetown again, several hundred British soldiers were rapidly deployed to Sierra Leone—in the first instance to evacuate foreign nationals who wished to leave, but also to secure the airport, allow reinforcement of the U.N. contingent, and assist in the reorganization of the pro-government forces as an effective fighting force. At their maximum, there were more than 1,200 British soldiers in Sierra Leone, though they began to withdraw within two months of the first deployment. UNAMSIL was rapidly brought up to strength: by June 5, 2000 there were 11,350 U.N. troops in the country.

At the behest of Johnny Paul Koroma, the West Side Boys in May 2000 briefly fought on the government side to prevent the RUF from entering Freetown. However, they continued to commit human rights abuses, and in August 2000 abducted eleven British soldiers of the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) and one SLA officer. In September 2000, the West Side Boys bases were destroyed during an operation by British paratroopers to free the captured soldiers. Numerous West Side Boys, including their leader, were arrested and incarcerated.

From September 2000 through April 2001, RUF rebels and Liberian government forces acting together attacked refugee camps and villages accommodating several hundred thousand Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees just across the border with Guinea. Following the attacks, Guinean security forces and the local population retaliated against the refugees, frequently looting, raping, and unlawfully detaining them. Guinean forces also responded to these RUF raids by killing and wounding dozens of Sierra Leoneans in indiscriminate helicopter and artillery attacks in the rebel-held areas in the north of Sierra Leone. Guinean troops conducted several ground attacks during which several civilians were gunned down and girls and women were raped.

In November 2000, the government and RUF signed a cease-fire, which committed both parties to restarting the disarmament process, the reestablishment of government authority in former rebel-held areas, and the release of all child combatants and abductees. On March 30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council authorized the further expansion of UNAMSIL to 17,500 military personnel, including 260 military observers. These forces, contributed by Bangladesh, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Zambia, were deployed into RUF strongholds, including the diamond-rich Kono district.³⁰ The DDR program recommenced in May 2001, and by the end of 2001 over three thousand child soldiers, abductees, and separated children had been released by the RUF and the CDF.

During this period, serious human rights abuses continued to be committed, though on a reduced scale. Fighting between the RUF and the CDF broke out in the east of the country in June through August 2001, leaving tens of civilians dead. RUF forces committed scores of serious abuses including rape, murder, and abduction. The victims of these abuses included Sierra Leoneans returning from refugee camps in Guinea; Guinean civilians who were attacked during the cross-border raids by the RUF from September 2000 through April 2001; and Liberians fleeing renewed fighting in Lofa county of Liberia from April 2001. While the RUF released or demobilized more than 1,500 male child combatants, they were reluctant to release Sierra Leonean and Guinean female abductees, most of whom are believed to have been sexually abused.

³⁰ U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

The human rights situation continued to improve in 2002, with the disarmament and demobilization phases declared completed. By January 2002, 47,710 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. On January 18, 2002, the armed conflict was officially declared to be over in a public ceremony attended by many dignitaries. In addition, the state of emergency was lifted for the first time in four years on February 28, 2002. Following the end of the state of emergency, the government charged Sankoh, and the other RUF and West Side Boys members held in custody since May 2000, with a number of crimes, including murder and related charges. The resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees from Guinea and Liberia was ongoing as of the writing of this report. By July 2002, approximately 250,000 refugees and IDPs had been resettled. The RUF transformed itself into a political party and nominated presidential and parliamentary candidates for elections held on May 14, 2002.

In the elections, President Kabbah's SLPP was re-elected for a second term and faced the challenge of rebuilding the country and its economy. After a decade of war, Sierra Leone ranks last out of 162 countries in terms of life expectancy at birth; adult literacy; combined enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and GDP per capita.³¹ Fifty-seven percent of Sierra Leone's population struggles to survive on only U.S. \$1 per day.³² Unemployment is rampant and the current economy is driven by the presence of UNAMSIL and other international organizations. Investors who could create desperately needed jobs remain cautious given the rampant corruption that permeates all levels of Sierra Leonean society and their concerns about regional security.

Women and Girls under Sierra Leonean Law

The Sierra Leonean Legal system

Three systems of law—general, customary, and Islamic—co-exist in Sierra Leone.

General Law

General law consists of the statutory law (codified) and common law (based on case law) mainly inherited from the United Kingdom, the former colonial power. General law is administered through the formal court system, which follows the usual Commonwealth structure, under which the High Court hears more important cases, and magistrates courts the less important ones, both civil and criminal. There is an appeal system, first to the Court of Appeal and then the Supreme Court, which is the ultimate court of appeal and also hears cases relevant to the interpretation of the constitution. The Court of Appeal and Supreme Court are located in Freetown. A High Court and magistrates courts are constituted in Freetown. The High Court was re-established in Kenema and Bo in 2002 and there are magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Port Loko.³³ The court system in the provinces, which had a limited infrastructure before the war broke out in 1991, was virtually destroyed during the war—the High Court has not held hearings outside Freetown for six years—and was only gradually being rehabilitated from 2002. Access to the judiciary for rural Sierra Leoneans is further limited by their lack of funds for lawyers, or even transport money.

Only a small number of women, primarily those who reside in the Western Area (where Freetown is located) and women with sufficient funds, have access to the formal court system. As many general law provisions have not been updated since colonial days, the protection that general law affords women is often only marginally better than that provided under customary or Islamic law.

Customary Law

Customary law is defined by the 1991 constitution as "the rules of law by which customs are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone."³⁴ Although there are sixteen ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, a general treatment of customary law is justified, as there are many fundamental similarities between the customary laws of

³¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 141-144.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³³ An itinerant judge covers the High Court in both Bo and Kenema.

³⁴ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter XII - The Laws of Sierra Leone, Section 170 (3). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-xii.html>.

these ethnic groups.³⁵ Customary law has not been written down or codified and is only applied by the local courts.³⁶ These courts operate in the provinces and not in the Western Area, which is historically where the Krio and the British colonizers settled. A chairman presides over the local courts with the assistance of chiefdom councilors who are knowledgeable in customary law. The chairmen in theory should be independent from the paramount chiefs who used to preside over the local courts before reforms were introduced both prior to and after independence.³⁷ Customary law officers who are trained lawyers are supposed to review decisions of local courts and provide training to the personnel of local courts. The government Law Officers' Department, however, remains chronically understaffed, and few of the customary law officers' posts are filled.

As the majority of Sierra Leoneans live in the provinces, customary law governs at least 65 percent of the population in relation to issues not reserved by statute to the magistrates courts or High Court. In practice, issues that should be dealt with in the magistrates courts and High Court are also dealt with under customary law. In addition to problems accessing the formal court system, rural Sierra Leoneans, in particular, have historically always preferred to administer justice amongst themselves to ensure that good community relations are maintained in villages where the other residents are invariably relatives by marriage or descent, rather than turning to outsiders.

Although customary law is not applied in the formal court system, it is recognized and there is some interaction between the two systems. There is the right of appeal from the local courts to the District Appeal Court, where a magistrate sits with two assessors who are chiefdom councilors from the given area of the local court and are knowledgeable about the customary law in their respective areas.³⁸ The assessors advise the magistrate on questions of customary law, with the decision remaining with the magistrate. Likewise, a decision of the District Appeal Court can be appealed to the High Court, with the High Court judge being advised by assessors with expertise in customary law.³⁹

Islamic Law

Islamic law has been recognized by statute in Sierra Leone in relation to marriage, divorce, and inheritance among Muslims.⁴⁰ Otherwise, Islamic law, if applicable at all, is considered part of customary law. In this report, Islamic law is therefore treated as part of customary law except when referring to the specific areas dealt with by the Mohammedan Marriage Act, and cases involving Islamic law are heard by the local courts. Criminal *sharia* law is not applicable in Sierra Leone.

Constitutional Status of Women

In theory, Sierra Leonean women are granted equal rights to men under the 1991 constitution, which provides as one of the "fundamental principles of state policy" that the state "... [s]hall discourage discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, sex, religion,...."⁴¹ The equal rights of women are again underscored in the human rights chapter of the constitution.⁴² Under Section 27 of the constitution, however,

³⁵ H. M. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law* (Freetown: Atlantic Printers Ltd., 1983), p. 6.

³⁶ See 1963 Local Courts Act.

³⁷ Richards, *Fighting for the Rainforest*, p. 46.

³⁸ Section 29 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

³⁹ Section 31 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act.

⁴⁰ The Mohammedan Marriage Act (Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960) deals with marriage, divorce, and intestate succession. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 20. Intestate successions occur when the deceased did not leave a will.

⁴¹ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter II - Fundamental Principles of State Policy, Section 6 (2). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-ii.html>. Under Section 8 (2) (a), "... [e]very citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations, and opportunities before the law...." and specific safeguards of equality before the law in terms of health care, employment and education are provided under Section 8 (3) (d); Section 8 (3) (a), (c), (e) and Section 9 (1) (a), (b) and (2) respectively.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Chapter III - The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, Section 15. See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-iii.html>. Section 15 provides that "every person in Sierra Leone is entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, has the right, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public Human Rights Watch

discrimination is permitted, *inter alia*, under laws dealing with “adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law,” which have direct bearing on the rights of women, as well as under customary law.⁴³ This important contradiction in the constitution—similar to that in many African constitutions—has contributed to the low status of women in Sierra Leone, as it legitimizes the application of discriminatory customary law. No protection from discriminatory customary law can be sought under the constitution on the basis of sex. Customary and Islamic laws also continue to be widely applied, notwithstanding the fact that legislation provides that general law should prevail over customary law when customary law is “repugnant to statute or natural justice, equity, and good conscience.”⁴⁴

Marriage

The rights of married women remain limited, particularly for those married under customary and Islamic laws, which govern most marriages. Women married under the general law have comparatively more rights.⁴⁵

A married woman’s position under customary law is comparable to that of a minor: a woman is generally represented by her husband who has the right to prosecute and defend actions on his spouse’s behalf.⁴⁶ Sierra Leonean women can gain status through marriage as well as through their role as mothers: a woman’s status within society and the polygynous household increases with the number of children she bears. Sierra Leone has one of the highest birth rates in the world, with the average number of children born to each woman estimated at 6.5.⁴⁷ Most households are polygynous, apart from the monogamous Christians (approximately 30 percent of the population); under customary law, a husband can marry as many wives as he wishes. Muslims (60 percent of the population) can marry up to four wives.

Under customary law, a girl is considered of marriageable age once her breasts have developed, her menses have started and she has been initiated, which could mean as young as twelve. Marriages are usually arranged, and the consent of the bride-to-be is not considered essential in most ethnic groups, but the consent of the girl’s/woman’s family is required.⁴⁸ The fact that a girl is considered “ready” for marriage at such a young age and her consent is not sought has contributed to the common practice of early forced marriages. Men wishing to marry do not need to seek consent from their own parents. The statutory age of marriage under general law is twenty-one years.

interest, to each and all of the following—(a) life, liberty, security of person, the enjoyment of property, and the protection of law; (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association; (c) respect for private and family life, and (d) protection from deprivation of property without compensation.”

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Section 27. Subsection 27 (1) provides that “Subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5), and (7), no law shall make provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.” Under Subsection 4, however, the protection provided under Subsection 1 does not apply “... (d) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interests of personal law, or (e) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe or customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons.” Discrimination is also permitted against persons who are not citizens of Sierra Leone or naturalized Sierra Leoneans. According to Dr. Tucker, former Chairperson of President’s Kabbah’s Advisory Committee, the original intent of Section 27 was “to preserve certain areas of segregation which are embedded in traditional practices and are generally acceptable to both sexes, such as the segregation between male and female secret societies. What was taken up in the constitution was more extensive than what was intended.” Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Tucker (Consultant on the Law Development Program funded by the U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID)), Freetown, April 25, 2002.

⁴⁴ Section 2 of the 1963 Local Courts Act and Section 76 of the 1965 Courts Act.

⁴⁵ Marriages under the general law are governed, *inter alia*, by the Christian Marriage Act, (Cap. 95), the Civil Marriage Act (Cap. 97), and the Matrimonial Causes Act (Cap. 102).

⁴⁶ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 98. Under customary law, a Sierra Leonean woman is always under the guardianship of a male relative.

⁴⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 157. This figure is based on births recorded for 1995-2000.

⁴⁸ Consent is a very relative term, as girls generally will find it very difficult to disobey their parents’ wishes, which can result in severe punishment, including ostracism from the immediate and extended family.

Under Islamic law, a male or female dependant can be given in marriage against his or her will, and the legal guardian of an adult woman has the right to object to her choice of husband if the prospective husband is not of equal birth.⁴⁹ Under customary law, a dowry is usually paid to the wife's family. Under Islamic law, the dowry is paid to the bride, although the contract is concluded with the legal guardian of the bride-to-be.⁵⁰

Under customary law, a wife can only refuse to have sexual intercourse with her husband if she is physically ill, menstruating or suckling a young child. She can also refuse intercourse during the daytime, in the bush or during Ramadan.

Under customary law, a wife's decision-making powers are limited since she is obliged to always obey her husband. This lack of decision-making power means that women in families where the breadwinner is the man find it very difficult to influence decisions on how the (generally) little income that the family makes is disbursed. Under customary law, a married woman must ask her husband for permission to work outside the house or visit her family. In families where the woman has been given permission to work outside the house and is the breadwinner, it seems that the added responsibility has not necessarily come with increased decision-making power.

A wife, especially in rural communities, is expected to cultivate food for herself and her children, whilst the husband's responsibility is limited to providing accommodation and clothing.⁵¹ A wife residing in an urban area is generally given a lump sum of money by her husband to start a small business, usually petty trading. If the business fails, the wife must refund the capital to her husband. Given the heavy work burden on women, however, there is little opportunity for women to seek remunerated work outside the house.

Divorce and Death of Husband

Under customary law, both parties can bring divorce proceedings either extrajudicially or judicially before a local court, but in practice women are generally not as free to do so as men.⁵² Only the husband has the right to divorce through unilateral repudiation.⁵³ A wife married under customary or Islamic law may, however, seek dissolution of marriage on grounds of impotence of the husband, for example.⁵⁴

Under customary law, the dowry is refundable upon divorce. Dowries paid to poor families are sometimes set purposely excessively high to ensure that the wife's family will not sanction a divorce given their inability to repay the dowry, again highlighting how little control women married under customary law have over their lives.⁵⁵ Under general law, a husband is expected to pay alimony for his wife and children on divorce, which both parties may initiate.⁵⁶

When a husband dies, the widow is expected under customary law to undergo a mourning period and rituals.⁵⁷ It is only after these rituals that widows are considered purified and can remarry. Some ethnic groups

⁴⁹ Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 161-2.

⁵⁰ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 161.

⁵¹ Full maintenance of his wife is only the responsibility of the husband during the rainy season (approximately between the months of May and November) or when his wife is sick or nursing a baby. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, pp. 106-7.

⁵² Judicial divorces are rare as they are more expensive. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-149.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 143-4.

⁵⁴ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 165.

⁵⁵ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 79. Strict tribal Muslims do not require that the dowry be repaid on divorce.

⁵⁶ Christian Marriage Act, Cap. 95 of the revised Law of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 7 (2), s. 15 (1) (b), and s. 5 respectively.

⁵⁷ A widow must mourn for forty days. Her head is shaved or, in some chiefdoms, disheveled and her body is washed with the same water used to wash her husband's corpse. In some chiefdoms her body is smeared with mud to indicate her mourning. After either one week or forty days for strict Muslims, widows are taken to a stream to be ceremonially washed.

still insist that if the widow remarries, she does so within her deceased husband's family, otherwise all marriage payments are refundable.⁵⁸

As Sierra Leone is a patrilineal society and the husband has custodial rights over children, children are handed over to the husband's family head upon his death.⁵⁹ Under Islamic law, the mother has the right to care for a boy child until the age of nine and a girl child until she comes of age.⁶⁰

Under customary matrimonial property law, a wife is generally only able to keep her own possessions and her self-acquired property in the event of divorce or death. A wife is generally not entitled to keep property acquired through the joint efforts of husband and wife and has no rights over the matrimonial home.⁶¹ Nor can a wife inherit under Islamic law: either the eldest son or brother or the official male administrator of the deceased inherits.⁶² Under general law, a wife is also only entitled to one third of her deceased husband's property, if he has not made a will.

This denial of inheritance rights of women is a major problem given the large number of war widows who are now able to return to their villages of origin, but have no access to land.

Domestic Violence

Societal attitudes to domestic violence are another indicator of the status of women and girls in society; physical violence against women and children is common in Sierra Leone. Indeed, under customary law, a husband has the right to "reasonably chastise his wife by physical force."⁶³ If the husband is persistently cruel and frequently beats his wife to the point of wounding her or causing her great pain, the wife can divorce her husband, but under customary law a single act of physical and brutal force is permitted. A population-based assessment of war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone carried out by Physicians for Human Rights among 991 female-headed households in camps for displaced people found that, although 80 percent of women surveyed expressed that there should be legal protections for the rights of women, more than 60 percent of the women believed that a husband had the right to beat his wife.⁶⁴

Rape as a Crime under General Law

The laws governing rape in Sierra Leone are very confusing even for persons working in the criminal justice system, such as members of the judiciary and police force. They are also archaic and date back to the British 1861 Offences Against the Person Act. Under this Act, rape is defined as "the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent by force, fear or fraud."⁶⁵ Penetration (however slight) is required to constitute the crime of rape.⁶⁶ In addition, although a child is defined as a person under the age of sixteen,⁶⁷ Sierra Leonean law makes the extremely unhelpful distinction between unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen and

⁵⁸ The Mende, Krim, Sherbro, Vai, Karonko and Yalunka adhere to this custom, whereas the Temne, Susu, Limba, Loko, Kissi and Kono allow a widow to select her own husband and do not require a refund of the marriage payments if she marries outside her deceased husband's family. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 138.

⁵⁹ If the couple was married under general law, the custody of the children is often determined by the courts, which generally grant the mother custody of the children.

⁶⁰ Schacht, *Introduction to Islamic Law*, p. 167. In practice, the mother and children will stay with whomever has the money to provide for them.

⁶¹ As customary marriages are generally polygynous, a divorce with one of the wives would result in the dissolution of the whole household if she were to ask for a refund for her contribution to building the house. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, pp. 113-120.

⁶² Mohammedan Marriage Act, Cap. 96 of the revised laws of Sierra Leone, 1960, s. 9.

⁶³ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, p. 152.

⁶⁴ Physicians for Human Rights, *War-related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A Population-based Assessment* (Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 2002), p. 55 (hereafter referred to as PHR report).

⁶⁵ Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c 100), s. 63. Unlawful carnal knowledge refers to sexual intercourse between unmarried persons. The law does not actually forbid or make sexual intercourse between unmarried persons a punishable crime, but it only recognizes the right to sexual intercourse for married couples.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (1926), Cap. 31 of the revised Laws of Sierra Leone 1960, s. 2.

unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between thirteen and fourteen years of age. The law is unclear about unlawful carnal knowledge committed against persons aged between fourteen and sixteen, although the few cases involving this age group that have gone to trial have reportedly been prosecuted as rape.⁶⁸

Nor is the age of consent explicitly stated, although it is presumably by necessary implication sixteen years old. Marital rape does not exist under Sierra Leonean statutory law, and most Sierra Leoneans firmly believe that it is the duty of a wife to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to.⁶⁹

Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of thirteen, whether with or without her consent, is a felony and carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment.⁷⁰ Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl between the ages of thirteen and fourteen, whether with or without her consent, is, however, only considered a misdemeanor and carries a maximum sentence of two years.⁷¹ The language "with or without her consent" refers only to cases of unlawful carnal knowledge that do not constitute rape; for example, an eighteen-year-old man who has sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl with her consent.

The police and judiciary seem to have misconstrued the meaning of the law. When an offence of rape against a girl under the age of fourteen is reported, the police and judiciary turn to either Section 6 or 7—depending on the age of the victim—of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act and determine that the girl did not consent. Based on her age, they then charge unlawful carnal knowledge and not rape. This misinterpretation therefore leads to a lesser charge for the rape of a child than for the rape of an adult.⁷²

Rape of a person over the age of sixteen is considered a felony and carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.⁷³ Indecent assault—sexual assault without penetration—on or attempts to have carnal knowledge of girls under the age of fourteen years carry the same maximum sentence as unlawful carnal knowledge of girls between the age of thirteen and fourteen i.e. only two years of imprisonment.⁷⁴ No person can be convicted of unlawful carnal knowledge, indecent assault or attempted unlawful carnal knowledge "upon the evidence of one witness, unless such witness be corroborated in some material particular by evidence implicating the accused."⁷⁵

The law pertaining to the abduction of girls for immoral purposes applies to any unmarried girls under the age of sixteen.⁷⁶ Abduction of girls for immoral purposes is a misdemeanor, carrying a maximum sentence of two years of imprisonment.

In addition to the legal confusion that exists in general law concerning rape, attempts by women to obtain the prosecution of rapists are frustrated by the collapsed state of the judiciary and the lack of effective law enforcement, which has contributed to the ongoing climate of impunity for offenders.

⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interviews with Abdul Tejan-Cole (human rights lawyer and acting coordinator for the national nongovernmental organization Campaign for Good Governance), Freetown, February–May, 2002.

⁶⁹ As the right to have intercourse between a husband and wife is recognized, a husband cannot be guilty of raping his wife unless he has been legally separated from his wife. *See also* PHR report, p. 55.

⁷⁰ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 6.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, s. 7. If a man were legally married to a girl under fourteen years of age, sexual intercourse with her would not be an offence.

⁷² Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

⁷³ Offences against the Person Act, s. 48.

⁷⁴ Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, s. 9. Section 9 stipulates that "whosoever commits an indecent assault or attempts to have carnal knowledge shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction before the Supreme Court be liable for imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any period not exceeding two years." Consent is no defense to a charge of indecent assault of a child under fourteen years.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 14.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 12. There are also problems with the term "unmarried" because abduction of persons should obviously be prohibited irrespective of their marital status.

Prosecution of Sexual Violence under Customary Law

The manner in which rape is dealt with under customary law is indicative of the societal values towards sexual violence and the low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone. Although all serious criminal cases should automatically be tried under general law, rape cases continue to be prosecuted under customary law in the local courts.⁷⁷

Under customary law, when a case is brought to the local court, the perpetrator is generally required to pay a substantial fine to the victim's family as well as to the chiefs. "Virgin money" is payable to the victim's family if the victim was a virgin. In some communities, in particular Muslim communities, the victim is forced to marry the offender, as a girl who is not a virgin is considered less eligible for marriage. Traditionally, in some ethnic groups, both the victim and the perpetrator will be made to undergo a purification ceremony. For the victim, the purification ceremony is supposed to restore her virginity and for the perpetrator to cleanse the guilt. Any man who invades the husband's exclusive sexual rights over a wife compensates the husband, and not the wife, for "woman damage."⁷⁸

In addition to applying discriminatory laws, the local court system is problematic as women of some ethnic groups do not have direct access to the local courts, but must be represented by a male guardian.⁷⁹ The situation is further exacerbated as the chairmen and chieftom councilors of the local courts are generally all male, which makes it difficult for women to bring cases of sexual violence as the women are often embarrassed and their cases are generally dealt with insensitively by the male court staff. The local courts are also prone to interference by the chiefs as well as the concerned parties, especially in cases dealing with sexual violence.

Many people in rural areas prefer to settle the case between the families and do not go to court. In cases settled between the two families, money or goods are given to compensate the victim's family. Paradoxically, the giving of gifts or money to a rape victim may even elevate her status within her family.

Some families turn to the local chiefs who can arbitrate between the two families but have no right to impose any fines. In practice, however, the local chiefs have been known to impose fines.

Discrimination against Women and Girls in Practice

In addition to being subjected to discriminatory laws, all women and girls face structural discrimination in Sierra Leone's patriarchal society, which accords automatic respect to its older male members. As a result of the low status accorded to them by law and by custom, women in Sierra Leone face substantial discrimination in practice.

Education

Systemic discrimination against women starts in childhood, when many parents prefer to spend their scarce resources on the education of their sons rather than their daughters. According to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Gender-Related Development Index, females account for only 21 percent of the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, compared with 32 percent males.⁸⁰ This gender disparity illustrates not only that fewer girls attend school but also that their education is discontinued at an earlier age than boys. This is reflected in the literacy rate of persons over fifteen years: only 20 percent of females are literate compared to 40 percent of males.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Under Section 13 (1) of the 1963 Local Courts Act, the local courts have no jurisdiction in seduction actions, which includes any act intended to lead the wife astray. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Family Customary Law*, footnote 34, p. 121.

⁷⁸ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme (Lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

⁸⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 213.

⁸¹ Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone: A Household Survey Report (MICS-2)* (Freetown: 2000), p. 30. The literate population includes those who are able to read "easily" or "with difficulty." Only 30 percent of the total population over fifteen years is literate.

The high illiteracy rate among women can in part be explained by the higher demand for female labor in the family. Girls are required to work in the house at an early age given that their mothers have to take care of the household and the children and do farm work. Another contributing factor to women's illiteracy is the harmful traditional practice of early forced marriage, which is very common in the provinces (see below).

The Workplace

Sierra Leone has ratified numerous international labor conventions.⁸² Some discriminatory practices, such as restricting the right to maternity leave to married women, which was the norm in the formal sector in the 1970s, have been prohibited by law. Extremely poor working conditions, however, persist in Sierra Leone for the majority of workers. In addition, women working for male bosses continue to be subjected to sexual harassment. According to the president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, the trade union federation, much work remains to be done to ensure the full and even application of the labor laws, especially in the provinces.⁸³

Sierra Leone's rural population is primarily engaged in subsistence farming, with women constituting 80 percent of the labor that produces 70 percent of the nation's food.⁸⁴ This agricultural labor is generally not remunerated by cash wages and women have unequal access to land or technology. In Sierra Leone, the different ethnic groups continue to operate under communal and family land holding systems. Women can use the land for subsistence farming but the control and management of the land and any property on it is vested in the male head of the family. With the post-war resettlement process underway, war widows returning to their villages of origin often lack the legal means or community support to reclaim their families' properties. As women have little or no property to offer as collateral, their access to credit is limited. Women therefore tend to rely on traditional sources of credit such as rotating savings, which only provide small loans.⁸⁵

Due to the limited number of educated women, which is partly the result of the high demand for girls to perform household tasks at a young age, the preference of sending boys to school, and early forced marriages, few women are represented in the better remunerated professional or managerial jobs. Sierra Leone's crushing poverty and high unemployment have also meant that positions that in the West are perceived as women's jobs are often held by men in Sierra Leone, leaving even fewer openings for women. In the formal employment sector, women therefore constitute only 40 percent of the clerical staff and a mere 8 percent of the administrative and managerial cadre.⁸⁶ In the informal sector outside agriculture, where the cash returns are low, women are mainly involved in petty trading, soap making and tie-dyeing. Given the lack of opportunities for remunerated work, women tend to be heavily dependent on their husbands.

The breakdown of community values as the result of the war, combined with cultural practices, also serves to make girls and women vulnerable to abuse and sexual exploitation, which has historically been rampant in Sierra

⁸² Multilateral Convention (no. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 28, 1947); Multilateral Convention (no. 105) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force January 17, 1959); Multilateral Convention (no. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (entered into force May 23, 1953); Multilateral Convention (no. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force June 15, 1960). Sierra Leone has not signed Convention 47 (40 hour week), Multilateral Convention (No. 95) concerning the Protection of Wages, July 1, 1949 (entered into force September 24, 1952), Multilateral Convention (No. 102) concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security, June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131 (entered into force April 27, 1955) or Multilateral Convention (No. 182) concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labor, although a social security system for both the public and private sector was recently established.

⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with Uriah O. H. Davies, president of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress, Freetown, April 14, 2002.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on the Advancement of Women* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone, 2000), p. 7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15. Rotating schemes are schemes whereby groups of women pool their resources and each member of the group has access to the funds on a rotating basis.

⁸⁶ Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, *National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming* (Freetown: Government of Sierra Leone), p. 3.

Leone.⁸⁷ Many women and girls have been driven to prostitution as a result of the increased poverty caused by the conflict and their lack of other opportunities and skills.

In the Political Arena

Discrimination against women is evident in the political arena. Women were not granted the right to vote or stand for election for any political office until after independence in 1961. Given their economic dependence on men, it is also much more difficult for women to raise the necessary campaign funds. In the Northern Province, women continue to be excluded from contesting and voting for the elections for traditional leadership positions (although there are reportedly several female chiefdom councilors).⁸⁸ Out of the 149 paramount chiefs in the country, only three are female, all based in the south.

Under the new block voting system which was introduced for the 2002 elections, 112 parliamentary seats are elected by popular vote. An additional twelve parliamentary seats are reserved for paramount chiefs who are elected in separate elections by chiefdom councilors. There are presently only eighteen female parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. This does represent an increase over the previous government, which had a total of eight women parliamentarians, including two female paramount chiefs. At government level, there are only three female ministers and three female deputy ministers, which is a marginal increase from President Kabbah's previous Cabinet.⁸⁹

Harmful Traditional Practices and Their Impact on Women's and Girls' Health

Early forced marriages

The health of many women and girls in Sierra Leone is compromised by early forced marriage.⁹⁰ Early forced marriages are very common in the provinces, where men often sponsor a girl from birth (paying for school fees, clothes, etc.) and marry her after she has been initiated (see below for an explanation of the initiation process).

Early forced marriage is one of the factors contributing to Sierra Leone's high maternal mortality rate, since young girls have several children before their bodies are fully mature. At 1,800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world. This mortality rate translates to approximately 4,000 maternal deaths per year based on a total population of five million.⁹¹

Girls who are forced to marry early not only miss out on education, but also on skills training opportunities and are therefore highly dependent on their husbands.

⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with a highly respected international observer who has worked in Sierra Leone for two decades, Freetown, February 27, 2002.

⁸⁸ Only persons paying tax can contest and participate in elections for paramount chiefs who are elected from ruling houses. The paramount chieftaincy system was introduced by the British Colonial Administration to administer the various chiefdoms in the Protectorate (i.e. the whole of Sierra Leone excluding the Western Area). Although there is reportedly no law against women paying taxes, women in the Northern Province have historically not done so probably due to lack of opportunities to find remunerated work. The tax is a negligible amount that women are willing to pay to ensure their eligibility for these elections. Human Rights Watch interview with Joseph Hall and Honerin Muyoyatta from the National Democratic Institute (NDI), Freetown, March 22 and 23, 2002.

⁸⁹ The three ministerial posts are Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Minister for Trade and Industry, and Minister of Health and Sanitation. The three female deputy ministers are in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Works, Housing and Technical Maintenance. The new government was sworn in on July 12, 2002.

⁹⁰ Early forced marriages are marriages whereby the consent of either party is not sought or more commonly whereby the consent of the girl is not sought and whereby one or both spouses is/are under the age of consent (which under international law should not be less than fifteen years of age). This harmful traditional practice contravenes article 16(3) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states that the betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, article 16(1) and (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 23(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which says that "[n]o marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending spouses."

⁹¹ Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 63.

Female Genital Cutting

Sierra Leonean girls as well as boys are traditionally initiated into secret societies at adolescence. The secret societies that perform the initiation rites take the adolescents into a sacred place in the bush where they are circumcised and taught about traditional practices. The male and female societies are segregated and males are not supposed to know what happens in female secret societies or vice versa.

Traditionally, initiation for girls entailed spending an extended period (up to two years) in the bush with girls of the same age, being taught various cultural skills (dancing, singing, drama, arts and craft, how to use local herbs, how to respect elders, etc.) and being a good wife (cooking, cleaning, child welfare, hygiene, fishing, etc.) by older women. Girls who undergo initiation through the secret societies are treated with deference after having completed the ritual and are feted by their communities.⁹² Today, the duration of the initiation ceremony has been greatly reduced, minimizing the skills transfer aspect, and thus focusing on the cutting itself. Because it was not always possible to hold the ceremonies during the war, initiation rites are now often practiced on adults, girl mothers, and pregnant girls—whereas traditionally it was seen as a rite of passage into adulthood for adolescent girls, who had to be virgins. In recent years, girls and/or adult women who do not wish to be initiated have been abducted and circumcised by force by female members of the community.

Ninety percent of Sierra Leonean women have undergone female genital cutting, which can have major health repercussions, including pain, injury to adjacent tissue of the urethra, hemorrhage, shock, acute urine retention, and infection.⁹³ Longer-term health effects include recurrent urinary tract infections, pelvic infections, infertility, keloid scar, and problems during childbirth.⁹⁴ The high prevalence of conflict-related sexual violence, which causes trauma to the genital area, can only have served to aggravate these health repercussions and both have in turn contributed to the increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS).

This harmful traditional practice, which is contrary to provisions of several international human rights instruments, continues to be practiced due to the significant societal pressure exerted by adults as well as peers.⁹⁵ Girls who have not been initiated are seen as less eligible for marriage and many future husbands sponsor the initiation of their bride-to-be.

Societal Attitudes to Sexual Violence against Women and Girls

The low status of women and girls is highlighted by the prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence. The notion of sexual violence as a crime is a very recent concept in Sierra Leone. It is still widely believed that only rape of a virgin is rape, which in Krio is called "to virginate." Rape of a non-virgin, on the other hand, is not considered rape, and there is often a belief that the woman must have consented to the act or is a seductress. Marital rape is not recognized under either customary or general law in Sierra Leone.

⁹² Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Mariane Ferme, (lecturer, Department of Social Anthropology, Cambridge University, U.K.), Freetown, April 19, 2002.

⁹³ Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, *The Circumcision of Women: A Strategy for Eradication* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1992), p. 19. The type of female genital cutting performed in Sierra Leone is clitoridectomy (removal of the prepuce of the clitoris) and excision (removal of the prepuce, the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora). The extreme form of infibulation is not practiced in Sierra Leone.

⁹⁴ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Report on the First Donors Meeting For FGM/FGC Elimination* (Washington D.C.: USAID, 2001), p. 12.

⁹⁵ Female genital cutting violates the right to be free from violence (Article 1 of the CEDAW) and the right to bodily integrity (Article 6 of the CRC). Under Article 5 (a) of the CEDAW, states are called upon "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." Article 24 (1) and (3) of the CRC also requires states to abolish traditional practices that are harmful to the health of children. General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committee also links traditional attitudes which subordinate women and violent practices, including female genital cutting, that "... justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or control of women."

Given the lack of statistics about rape cases before the war, it is impossible to establish the historical prevalence of sexual violence, but several doctors reported to Human Rights Watch that, before the war, they only treated a limited number of young girls who generally had been raped by older men.⁹⁶ According to the doctors interviewed, many cases of rape before the war occurred within the extended family and were considered family matters. They were rarely discussed or reported, in order to ensure that the victim's chances of marriage and obtaining a good dowry were not destroyed. Rape was also apparently unlikely to occur within a village community, where everyone knew each other and the shame attached to the offender would be too great. Rape outside the extended family was more likely to be committed in environments where there were mixed ethnic groups, such as in mining areas or larger towns. The cultural definition of rape and lack of reporting, however, may have led to the understanding that rape rarely occurred before the war. Sexual exploitation, however, has always been rampant in Sierra Leone, where economic options for women are limited and which has traditionally condoned a high level of promiscuity, despite the high value placed on virginity. With the increased poverty caused by the war, sex has become even more of a commodity.⁹⁷

The societal attitudes to rape and the low status of women have meant that no cases of conflict-related sexual violence and few cases of non-conflict-related sexual violence are prosecuted.⁹⁸ (See also below at p. 61 for a discussion on the amnesty included in the Lomé Peace Agreement.)

V. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE CIVIL WAR

Prevalence of Sexual Violence during the War

Throughout the ten-year civil war, thousands of Sierra Leonean women and girls were subjected to widespread and systematic sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. A survey of 991 female heads of households in communities of displaced persons carried out by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) in 2002 found that approximately one of every eight household members (13 percent) had been subjected to one or more incidents of conflict-related sexual violence; among the actual respondents to the survey, the prevalence rate of conflict-related sexual violence was 9 percent (94 out of 991).⁹⁹ Based on this prevalence rate, as many as 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced women may have been subjected to sexual violence as a result of the war.¹⁰⁰ Adding extrapolated data for other types of victim, PHR calculated that as many as 215,000 to 257,000 Sierra

⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002. The latter two doctors practiced in the provinces as well as in Freetown.

⁹⁷ Sex can be bought for as little as U.S. \$0.50. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children U.K., *Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone* (Geneva/London: UNHCR/SC-UK: 2002). Human Rights Watch has some concerns about this report as the report does not provide an adequate review of the context, including the status of women and girls within the given countries. Given the low status of women and girls in these countries, the sexual exploitation is much wider than reported: the power dynamic means that men of all walks of life, such as teachers, pastors, police, businessmen as well as aid workers or peacekeepers, exploit girls and women. It would also appear that the short-term solutions proposed do not adequately address the underlying structural issues, such as poverty, lack of education or alternative means of income generation for many women.

⁹⁸ It was not possible to obtain reliable statistics as reporting and recording of cases by the police and judiciary are not consistent.

⁹⁹ PHR report, p. 2. The PHR report captures some of the different types of sexual violence that women were subjected to. Of the ninety-four internally displaced women reporting their own experience of sexual violence to PHR, interviewees reported among other things: rape (89 percent); being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37 percent); gang rape (33 percent); abduction (33 percent); molestation (14 percent) and insertion of foreign objects into genital opening or anus (4 percent). It should be noted that the definition of rape used by the PHR report differs from that used throughout this report. The definition used in this report, as mentioned above, is that used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in the *Foca* case.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3. As PHR points out this figure might be an underestimate due to deliberate non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts made to ensure privacy.

Leonean women and girls may have been subjected to sexual violence in the conflict period.¹⁰¹ Although these figures are necessarily no more than estimates, they do give an indication of the widespread nature of sexual violence during the war.

Human Rights Watch has primarily documented sexual violence committed during the latter stages of the war when the organization had a full-time presence in the country, beginning April 1999. This does not mean that sexual violence was at its worse during this period. Since that time, Human Rights Watch extensively documented crimes of sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown as well as ongoing human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch has also received numerous reports of sexual violence dating from earlier in the war.

Perpetrators

Survivors of sexual violence mostly reported being raped by rebel forces, but were at times not able to identify which rebel faction the perpetrators belonged to or whether—especially given the frequent collaboration between soldiers and rebels—the perpetrators were indeed rebels or rather soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). In addition, survivors explained that they often deliberately did not want to look at their rapists out of fear and because they did not want to make eye contact. For example, D.T., a twenty-five-year-old woman raped by four rebels, including one child combatant, said that she would not be able to recognize any of the perpetrators, as she was too afraid to look at them (see below at p. 36).¹⁰² A. B., a thirty-year-old who was raped by two rebels, also said that:

When you are with these people [rebels], you do not ask questions. I did not even look into their faces. Many of them rubbed black chalk on their face and when you looked at them would say, "What are you staring at?"¹⁰³

Rebel Forces

The RUF committed crimes of sexual violence—often of extreme brutality—from the very beginning of the war when they invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991. RUF rebels committed crimes of sexual violence in the course of their military operations, during which thousands of women and girls were abducted and forced to "marry" rebel "husbands." These abducted women and girls were repeatedly raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence throughout the duration of their captivity, which in many cases lasted years. During captivity, these women and girls were also made to carry out forced labor, including carrying heavy loads, cooking, cleaning, etc. Many women and girls have given birth to children fathered by rebels. Especially during the early years of the war, the RUF were assisted by Liberian forces, who also committed rape and other sexual violence.

The AFRC committed crimes of sexual violence from May 1997, using the same tactics as the RUF. Sexual violence by the RUF and the AFRC continued to be committed after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999, and they were joined in this by the West Side Boys, a splinter group of the AFRC formed after the signing of the Agreement. An unknown number of abducted girls and women still remain under the control of their rebel "husbands" who did not want or feel able to relinquish the "families" they had founded in the bush; in many cases the abductees' own families would not have welcomed them back.

Sexual violence peaked during the rebels' military operations, which occurred countrywide as the rebels sought to capture more territory. After capturing a town or a village, the combatants rewarded themselves by looting and by raping women and girls, many of whom they later abducted. Crimes of sexual violence committed during and following military operations, such as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 3-4. PHR's calculation is not inclusive of all categories of victim: to the IDP women reporting conflict-related sexual violence, PHR added non-conflict-related sexual violence among non-displaced women, assuming a prevalence rate of 9 percent.

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

that took place in 1998, have been documented by Human Rights Watch.¹⁰⁴ Human Rights Watch has also extensively documented the January 1999 invasion of Freetown by the RUF/AFRC, during which sexual violence was systematically committed against women and girls on a massive scale. The sexual violence committed during January 1999 serves as an illustration of the widespread nature of sexual violence committed by the rebel forces. Among the perpetrators were child combatants, and many of the victims were also children. Members of the Small Boys Units (SBUs) within the rebel forces were known to be particularly cruel and committed egregious human rights abuses.

Although there are no exact figures for the number of women and girls subjected to sexual violence during the January 1999 invasion, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Sierra Leone chapter of the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE Sierra Leone), a nongovernmental organization that has been treating survivors of sexual violence since 1999, provided medical treatment and counseling to 1,862 female survivors of sexual violence who had been raped and/or abducted during the invasion. According to MSF, 55 percent of these survivors reported having been gang raped and 200 had become pregnant.¹⁰⁵

As the RUF/AFRC rebels controlled most of the countryside apart from pockets of government-controlled areas in the south and some key towns, including Bumbuna and Freetown, at different times throughout the war, women and girls living in these rebel-held areas were also subjected to sexual violence when the rebels went on patrol or simply sought to assert their domination over the population. Women and girls in government-controlled areas also lived in fear of rebel hit-and-run attacks, during which many women and girls were subjected to sexual violence and abducted. Women and girls residing in Freetown were "spared" until the January 1999 invasion by the RUF/AFRC.

Pro-Government Forces

Human Rights Watch has not documented any cases of sexual violence by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) prior to the time of the 1997 AFRC coup. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, of seventy-five women and girls who reported having been raped and identified the rapists' affiliation, only three said they were raped by SLA soldiers.¹⁰⁶ This may in part be due to the fact that survivors would have often found it difficult to distinguish between the rebel factions and the SLA. With the "sobel" phenomenon, the SLA soldiers would disguise themselves as rebels (the rebels were also known to disguise themselves as members of the SLA or the ECOMOG peacekeeping force).

Human Rights Watch has documented only a few cases of sexual violence committed by the pro-government Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The CDF movement consists of groups of traditional hunters and young men organized into militia. They were initially only deployed by the government in their own chiefdoms, in order to ensure their loyalty and discipline and make the best use of their superior bush knowledge.¹⁰⁷ The government provided training, weapons and food to the units. The relatively small number of identified cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the CDF may be related to the CDF's internal rules that stipulate that warriors cannot have sexual intercourse before going to battle, as they would lose some of their protective powers that are bestowed on them during their initiation ceremonies. These powers are meant to make the fighters invincible and immortal. During the initiation ceremonies, the fighters are also instructed not to harm civilians, and required to take an oath to that effect. Thus, it is likely that the pro-government forces did not actually commit sexual violence on a widespread and systematic basis; however, the low number of identified cases may also be partially due to Human Rights Watch's human resource constraints, faced with the overwhelming number of abuses committed by the rebel forces. Research on the CDF was mainly conducted in the south where the Kamajors, the

¹⁰⁴ See Human Rights Watch, "Sowing Terror: Atrocities against Civilians in Sierra Leone," *A Human Rights Watch Report*, July 1998.

¹⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with MSF, Freetown, March, 2000.

¹⁰⁶ PHR report, p. 48. and Table 5 on p. 52. See also Binta Mansaray, "The Invisible Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone: Conflict-related Rape, Sexual Slavery and Other Forms of Sexual Violence," June 2001. On file with UNAMSIL human rights section.

¹⁰⁷ The Kamajors operate predominately in the south and east, the Tamaboros in the far north, the Gbettis in the north and the Donzos in the far east. See also "Background" section.

largest and most powerful group of the CDF, are based. In recent years, as the Kamajors have been moved away from their villages of origin and the influence of their traditional chiefs, they have become increasingly undisciplined and cases of rape by Kamajors have become more common.

Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of sexual violence by UNAMSIL peacekeepers, including the rape of a twelve-year-old girl in Bo by a soldier of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent in March 2001 and the gang rape of a woman by two Ukrainian peacekeepers in April 2002 near Kenema (see below). There appears to be reluctance on the part of UNAMSIL to investigate and take disciplinary measures against the perpetrators. Reports of rape by ECOMOG peacekeepers, the majority of whom were Nigerian, were rare.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

Sexual Violence Committed by the Rebel Forces

“Virgination”—Targeting Young Girls

The rebel forces subjected women and girls of all ages, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic classes to individual and gang rape. Although the rebel forces raped indiscriminately irrespective of age, the rebels favored girls and young women whom they believed to be virgins. This was evident not only by their actions, but was also explicitly stated by them as they chose their victims. As in many countries, Sierra Leonean society places a high value on virginity. Girls who have been “virginated” and are therefore no longer virgins, are considered less eligible for marriage. M.B., a fifteen-year-old girl from Freetown, described how RUF/AFRC rebels deliberately sought out virgins for violation during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

We were hiding in the mosque when two rebels dressed in civilian [clothing] entered. It was dark but they shone their flashlights looking for girls and said, “We are coming for young girls ... for virgins, even if they tie their heads like old grandmothers, we will find them.” They also said that if the people did not hand over the young girls, they would open fire on all of us.¹⁰⁸

Some victims explained that female rebels physically checked girls to see whether they were virgins.¹⁰⁹ M.W., a thirty-eight-year old nurse who was captured by the RUF/AFRC during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown and forced to treat wounded rebels and civilians, said that the youngest rape victim she treated was “a little nine-year-old from Calaba Town [an area of Freetown]. Her perineum was bleeding and had been badly torn. Every day we gave her sit baths and she eventually recovered.”¹¹⁰ The consequences of sexual violence for virgins can be particularly severe as these testimonies highlight, although mature women also reported experiencing similar consequences.¹¹¹

R.T. was about sixteen when she was brutally raped vaginally and anally by ten RUF rebels in the forest near Koidu in Kono district in January 1997. R.T. developed vasico-vaginal fistula (VVF) and vasico-rectal fistula (VRF) from her brutal gang rape:

I was hiding in the bush with my parents and two older women when the RUF found our hiding place. I was the only young woman and the RUF accused me of having an SLA husband. I was still a virgin. I had only just started my periods and recently gone through secret society. There were ten rebels, including four child soldiers, armed with two RPGs [rocket propelled grenades] and AK-47s. The rebels did not use their real names and wore ski masks so only their eyes were

¹⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 1, 1999.

¹⁰⁹ It should be noted that virginity can not be medically proven.

¹¹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999. The victim probably suffered from vasico-rectal fistula (a tear or opening in the tissue between the rectum and the vagina, usually resembling an open blood vessel), which would have left her incontinent.

¹¹¹ International humanitarian law prohibits all rape and other acts of sexual violence, of course irrespective of whether the victim was a virgin or not.

visible. The rebels said that they wanted to take me away. My mother pleaded with them, saying that I was her only child and to leave me with her. The rebels said that "If we do not take your daughter, we will either rape or kill her." The rebels ordered my parents and the two other women to move away. Then they told me to undress. I was raped by the ten rebels, one after the other. They lined up, waiting for their turn and watched while I was being raped vaginally and in my anus. One of the child combatants was about twelve years. The three other child soldiers were about fifteen. The rebels threatened to kill me if I cried.

My parents, who could hear what was happening, cried but could do nothing to protect me. I was bleeding a lot from my vagina and anus and was in so much pain. My mother washed me in warm water and salt but I bled for three days. I can no longer control my bladder or bowels as I was torn below. We stayed in the bush until ECOMOG took over Koidu. When we came out of the bush, even adults would run away from me and refused to eat with me because I smelled so badly. I had an operation in 2000 but it did not work. Before I got a catheter in 2001, I had no friends, as I smelled too bad. I am still in pain and have a problem with vaginal discharge. I also have nightmares and feel discouraged.¹¹²

This extreme sexual violence is illustrated also by the following testimony by F.B., who describes the resultant deaths of eight young girls in one Liberian refugee camp alone (no doubt many others died from similar treatment during the war). F.B.'s testimony also illustrates the RUF's connection to Liberia and the role of Liberian mercenaries in the RUF movement. F.B. was a ten-year-old girl living in Mano village in Kailahun district near the Liberian border when the RUF accused civilians in her village of helping the SLA. Her family decided to flee to Liberia in November 1991, but was fired upon by the rebels as they fled. At least fifteen civilians were killed, including her father and several women with babies on their backs:

Only six of my family survived; my mother, one brother, two sisters, one uncle, and me. After hiding and fleeing through the bush for three days, Mohammed, my uncle, found someone with a boat to help us cross over to Liberia. We crossed into Vahun where there was a sort of refugee camp. We were there for two weeks and terrible things happened. We thought we had escaped from the rebels but we found many of them there. They controlled the camp. Even though food was being air dropped, the rebels took it all. They took everything we had, our money, salt, and all our food. The rebels were mixed Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.

About a week after arriving, the rebels came into our house in the evening and took my fifteen-year-old sister away. My mother stayed up the whole night. The next day my uncle went from hut to hut looking for her. He called her name and heard her groaning inside a hut. He picked her up and carried her home. When my mom saw her she burst out crying. I was only ten and didn't know anything about man business. My sister was crying all the time and couldn't walk. She cried, "Oh mother, I'm going to die." My mother just held her and told her it would be O.K. My uncle exchanged five gallons of palm oil so we could get some salt, which my mother later mixed with water and had my sister sit in. She was bleeding a lot. She told me they had tied her mouth and raped her many times, but I didn't know what rape was.

After that my uncle shaved my head, gave me trousers and made me look like a boy. When I was walking around a camp I saw a few girls aged under twelve years old, lying on the ground with their legs spread open and blood coming out between their legs. Some had their dresses pulled up and others had cloth stuffed in their mouths. During the two weeks I was in Vahun I saw eight girls like this. Sometimes their family would come and wrap them in white so I knew they had

¹¹² Human Rights Watch interview, IDP camp called "Lebanese Camp," March 2, 2002. Women and girls with obstetric fistulae suffer from a constant wetness that results in genital ulcerations, frequent infections and a terrible odor. These fistulae generally require surgery although occasionally they spontaneously heal.

died. Other times no one picked them up and they stayed there for days until someone buried them. There were so many girls who had lost their parents and were there alone, so no one would come for them.

I saw the rebels catching young and even older women. Once they caught an old woman. She said, "No, leave me. I'm too old for this business." But they made fun of her saying, "Oh look, we have caught a young *Bundu* [initiate into secret society] girl here." Other times I heard women screaming in the middle of the night. Everyday people were dying—from hunger, illness, and this rape. After that I had dreams about a dead person coming to hurt me.

The only reason we stayed that long was because people were still moving across the border and we figured things were even worse in Sierra Leone. Besides, the rebels stopped us from going back home, and we did not know anyone in Liberia so we would have died of hunger.¹¹³

M.M. was only eleven when she was abducted, together with her aunt and her aunt's four children, when Koidu was attacked during the dry season¹¹⁴ in 1994. M.M. had not yet experienced her first period or been initiated into secret society:

I was raped by seven child combatants, who were aged between fifteen and sixteen years old, on the way to Kailahun. I was raped in my vagina and anally. Other rebels and also civilians saw me being raped but the civilians were too afraid to protect me. My aunt put native herbs on my genital area but I bled for five days. The RUF had medicine but would not give it to us civilians. My aunt carried me on her back, as I could not walk because of the pain. It took us five days to reach Kailahun. A rebel commander wanted my aunt to be his wife but she refused so he killed her. In Kailahun, I was not raped again. Since my rape, I have only experienced irregular periods and my belly is always swollen like I am pregnant.¹¹⁵

M.F. was abducted from Koinadugu town in Koinadugu district in September 1998 when the RUF/AFRC attacked the town. She was only thirteen at the time and was brutally raped both vaginally and anally by five RUF rebels. During the same attack, the RUF killed over thirty older women:

I was only thirteen and a virgin. They forced me to go down on my hands and knees with my bottom in the air and raped me both vaginally and anally. Five rebels raped me on that first day. My clothes were bloodied and it hurt to urinate and defecate afterwards. The rebels who raped me promised to take me to Freetown and give me money and dresses. They gave me nothing after they used me. I was given to one of them, Mohammed, as his wife. We stayed in Koinadugu town for four days. I was with my parents but could not tell them about the rapes although my mother heard me being raped.

The RUF said they came to kill civilians who were ungrateful and talked bad about the RUF. The RUF cut my grandmother with a knife and beat her with a pestle. She died. The RUF told the older women to go to the mosque to attend a ceremony. More than thirty women, some of whom had children, went to the mosque. The RUF set fire to the mosque. Another old woman was rolled into a mat and the mat was set on fire.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000. *Bundu* is one of the secret societies that initiate girls and perform female genital cutting.

¹¹⁴ The dry season in Sierra Leone is approximately between November and May.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese Camp, March 2, 2002.

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.

Rape Victims Subjected to Multiple Human Rights Abuses

Rapes were often preceded by or followed by other human rights abuses against the victim, her family members and/or her community. Hardly any family was unscathed by abuse during the war. The PHR report highlighted that 94 percent of the 991 female-headed households surveyed had experienced at least one serious human rights abuse during the ten-year period.¹¹⁷ M.P., who was twenty-four years old when the RUF attacked Jaiweii village in Kailahun district in May 1991, testified:

I was captured together with my husband, my three young children and other civilians as we were fleeing from the RUF when they entered Jaiweii. Two rebels asked to have sex with me but when I refused, they beat me with the butt of their guns. My legs were bruised and I lost my three front teeth. Then the two rebels raped me in front of my children and other civilians. Many other women were raped in public places. I also heard of a woman from Kalu village near Jaiweii being raped only one week after having given birth. The RUF stayed in Jaiweii village for four months and I was raped by three other wicked rebels throughout this period.

The rebels, who spoke Liberian English, said they were fighting for the SLPP to be in power. When the RUF first entered Jaiweii, they accused my husband of giving information to the SLA, so they tied his hands behind his back and beat him mercilessly. They kept him tied up and continued to beat him. After six days, he died and they threatened to kill me if I cried. The RUF also shot three other men whom they accused of giving information to the SLA. My three children all died because they became sick and there was no medicine. The older one who was five years died one week before the two younger ones who died on the same day. They were only three and seventeen months old.¹¹⁸

M.P. added that the RUF had said that they could do whatever they want with women whom they "owned." A.J., a fourteen-year-old student, was abducted by the RUF from Pujehun and was held by them from February to May 1994. She was first tortured, caged, and then brutally raped:

On February 3, 1994 at around 8:00 p.m., the RUF attacked Pujehun. There was lots of firing because the SLA was deployed here. As we were fleeing, we ran straight into a group of over one hundred RUF. They were dressed in civilian clothes and nearly all had guns. Among those rebels was one named Maliki, who was actually from Pujehun. RUF Commander Bai Bureh started to select several people from our group. As he was doing the selecting, Maliki told him to choose me because if they let me go, I would go back to Pujehun and tell the SLA that he was there. They chose eight of us, four young men and four young women, including three of my cousins. They told the rest of the civilians to go back into the bush and said that if they found them the next day they would be killed. We were taken to their camp.

Two weeks later, the four young men managed to escape. When the rebels found out, they blamed us for what happened. They said the boys were really SLA soldiers that were there to get information on the RUF. I was then tortured by a Liberian RUF commander named C.O. Rackin. He said I was "bright and bold" and must have known how they escaped. He interrogated me, asking me if the boys were SLA's. During the interrogation he cut me in twenty-one places with a knife including a deep cut on my left breast. He drew a small, small circle in the dirt and told me to step inside and walk around in it. Any part of my body left outside he stabbed with a knife.

Then a commander called Momoh Rogers, who was the battalion commander, ordered that my cousin and I be put in a wooden cage smaller than one square meter. He said that if our brothers

¹¹⁷ PHR gave the following examples of serious human rights abuses: beating, bodily injury, amputation, torture, killing, forced labor, captured for less than one day, sexual assault without rape, rape, abduction, burned dwelling, looting. PHR report, pp. 45-47.

¹¹⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Lebanese IDP Camp, March 2, 2002.

who had gone to tell the SLA came to attack, it would be very easy for them to kill us. The cage was what the village people used to store their husk rice in and it had almost no ventilation. We were only let out to defecate. They told me I had to pee on myself in the box. They poured water into the cracks but it was never enough and was dirty. Sometimes they dropped cassava and boiled bananas into the cage, feeding us like we were animals. The stab wounds I had got infected and I got sores all over my body. They were painful and smelled very badly.

After about two weeks in the cage, one of Patrick's bodyguards took me to C.O. Patrick's house. When I saw him, I told him about the sores on my feet and breasts. I told him I was in pain and asked for treatment. C.O. Patrick told me to shut up and ordered me to go into the house. He turned to his bodyguard and said that if I refused, I was to be taken behind the house and executed. When we got inside, Patrick told me to lie down on the floor. Then he forced himself upon me. I was a virgin. He was violent and rough. Then he told me to turn over and give him my behind. But I told him I could not lie down because my breast was so swollen. So he brought a chair and told me to stand up and lean onto the chair. Then he stood behind me and tried to shove his penis into my vagina. The first time he did this I fell over onto my chest, which was so painful. I started bleeding from my chest wound. Then he told me to get up and said if I did not hold the chair firmly he was going to kill me. He took a long time doing that thing to me. I was crying from the pain of my breast and because it was painful, being the first time. He told me to shut up. As he was sexing me he accused my brothers of being spies and said he was going to kill me and that he was only waiting for the others to come from the frontline to do it.

C.O. Patrick asked if I had done sex before and I told him "No, I am a school-going girl." Then he said, "Well, tonight you are going to have sex, because you are going to be killed and you should do it before you die." I was terrified. I started crying. All I could think of was my death and all that guy could do was do that thing to me. After he was satisfied, I was taken back to the cage.¹¹⁹

A.M. was eighteen when she fled Freetown with her two children, two sisters, and brother after the 1997 AFRC coup. Not only was she first forced to watch the execution of three male civilians by Nigerian ECOMOG soldiers in Fadugu, Koinadugu district, but also the rebel execution of her brother and sister. The RUF tried to get her to eat her brother's liver and heart. Her sister's head was also placed on her legs:

After the rebels were driven out of Kabala by ECOMOG, the rebels spread to different towns, including Mongo, Badela, and Dankawali. One day I went with my brother to wash in the stream, as I was afraid to go by myself. We heard shots, which my brother thought must have come from ECOMOG soldiers. I was afraid. We met three rebels with guns who accused my brother of being a SLA soldier. "Superman" was the commander. They beat my brother with their gun butts and took off his clothes. "Superman" forced my brother to go down on his hands and knees and made me sit beside him. They cut his neck from the back and then took an axe and cut his back. They removed his heart and liver and put them on my hands. The heart had more shape and the liver was flat. They tried to force me to eat them but I refused to. Another rebel, Colonel Titus, a mercenary who spoke Liberian English, arrived and told the others not to force me to eat my brother's heart and liver. He said he would show me how they will deal with me. He said they should abduct me. They took me back into the village of Dankawali where we met my grandmother on her veranda. She was tied up and she said that another rebel commander, Hakim, had carried my two children and small sister away in the first group.

The rebels had abducted another group of twenty-five persons and held them by the cotton tree. My big sister was under the cotton tree. I told her that the rebels killed our brother. Colonel Titus slapped my sister and told her not to cry. They killed my sister and two other women and placed

¹¹⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Puiehun. February 12, 2002.

their cut off heads on my legs. The rebels also locked some villagers in the houses and set all houses on fire.¹²⁰

H.K., a sixteen-year-old student, was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion. She was taken to Makeni where she was "virginated" and forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," a twenty-two-year-old half-Liberian who threatened to kill her entire family if she escaped. H.K. was brutally tortured after Colonel "Jaja" accused her of stealing his money, which was in fact taken at gunpoint from her by "Superman," a notorious rebel commander and his bodyguard called "Yellowman." She described what happened afterwards:

Then the rebels took me into a stream and tied me to a tree in the water. They told people to beat me. I was in water up to my head. "Jaja" said the boys should cut down the tree and let me drown. I was there for several days, maybe up to a week or so. Once a water snake swam by and ate my foot in the water. When I was tied there, Jaja cut my neck and put cocaine into my body. He also gave me marijuana cigarettes to smoke. Finally he untied me and put me in an old container where I stayed for several days. While in the guardroom Jaja and Alhaji "Cold Boots" came several times to give me drugs.¹²¹

The rebels often used psychological torture against civilians by, for example, making them clap or sing in praise while watching family and friends being killed, raped or mutilated. They further exerted their domination over civilians by not allowing them to show any emotion, and threatening to kill anyone who did. In 1997, when K.M. was abducted by the RUF from Kabala in Koinadugu district, her brother was shot in front of her. The RUF accused him of planning to escape. She was not allowed to show any emotion and was forced to throw his body in the river. In 1999, K.M.'s husband was killed in front of her by RUF Captain Solvelar in Yomandu in Tonkolili district, when a child combatant accused her husband of not doing his job properly. As Captain Solvelar shot K.M.'s husband, he warned her not to cry otherwise she would be killed. Later in the same year, K.M.'s baby was killed in front of her in Kambia district by a rebel captain who wanted to rape her:

Captain "Danger" pulled my baby from my back and before I could do anything, he sliced my child in two. I was told not to cry as otherwise I would be killed as well.¹²²

Rape with Objects and Other Sexual Torture, including Sexual Mutilation

The rebels frequently used objects, including weapons, burning wood, and hot oil, to rape or otherwise torture (including sexually torture) women and girls, sometimes resulting in their death. In 1994, J.M., an elderly man from Giehun village in Kailahun district, witnessed the killing of nine civilians accused of plotting to set Foday Sankoh up for a government ambush. One of those civilians, a woman named Janneh, was alleged to have been one of Sankoh's "wives." J.M. described how rebels brought her into the village square, forced her to lie down and then poured boiling palm oil into her vagina and ears:

The RUF rounded up about seventy of us civilians, including Abi and Janneh, and accused us of making a plot to arrest Sankoh. The commander said we were to be killed but that first he would do an investigation. First he called upon Abi who accused Janneh of calling people in Freetown to arrange something against Sankoh. So Janneh was the first to be killed. The rebels grabbed her, stripped her and threw her down in front of the whole village. Several of them pulled her legs apart and held her tightly. They poured a pan of boiling palm oil into her vagina and then into her ears. This terrified us. She started shaking all over and was bleeding from the nostrils and mouth. While on the ground they struck her with a gun and danced around her saying, "When you were loving with the old man [Sankoh], you didn't show us any respect, but now your time for punishment has come." She died about an hour later. The rebels said they were sent by Sankoh who was living in Kailahun about seven miles. Nothing small or big happened without his

¹²⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

¹²¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.

¹²² Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

knowledge. After killing Janneh they poured hot oil in the mouths, eyes and noses of three other villagers, and then shot five others. I guess Janneh must have known all of Sankoh's secrets.¹²³

M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was raped by five rebels (see above, p. 30), witnessed how her stepmother's mother was beaten by the RUF with a long pestle in Momoria village in Koinadugu district in 1998. The rebels then shoved the pestle into her anus. M.F. said that her stepmother's mother was still alive when they left her with the pestle in her anus, which was bleeding.¹²⁴ One woman also reportedly had pepper put in her vagina as the RUF suspected her of being the wife of a SLA soldier. Rebels inserted burning firewood into the vagina of twenty-five-year-old F.T. and another woman during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown:

On 21 January 1999, I went to a neighbor's house to buy rice, as I had not eaten for over two days. The rebels had been in the area and as I bought two cups from my neighbor, we heard the rebels coming again. My neighbor told me to leave quickly so that he could lock up his house. When I left with another woman and a man, we met a group of ten rebels who surrounded us. They were dressed in full combat [uniform] and asked us where we were going in Krio.

The rebels asked us what we could give them, so the man took out all his money and gave it to them. He was then allowed to go. As the other woman and I did not have any money, they told us to take off our clothes at gunpoint. We begged them not to harm us. The rebels then told us to lie on the dirt ground and open our legs. They put their guns to our throats and stomachs to make sure that we followed their order. Once we were on the ground all the rebels surrounded us, and a tall rebel well over six feet went to the kitchen of Parliament House and took a piece of burning firewood from the fire. He then squatted down and with his two hands inserted it into my vagina. Then he returned to the fire and got another piece and then a third. I felt like I was being stabbed inside.

He did the same to the other woman. While they did this to us, I heard them say "This is the way we are going to fuck you. We are not able to do to you half of the things we do to people in the provinces. You bastard civilians, you hypocrites; as soon as you see ECOMOG, you start to point fingers at us."

They left shortly afterwards and I managed to drag myself to a nearby house with blood gushing from my vagina. I went to a clinic where the doctor removed bits of firewood from my vagina. I feel so unhappy and fear my husband will find another wife to satisfy his sexual desire. The treatment is very slow and I do not have money for treatment. There are sores inside me. I can not sleep at night or walk more than one hundred yards.¹²⁵

H.K., the sixteen-year-old Freetown student forced to be the wife of Colonel "Jaja," had an umbrella shoved up her vagina as part of the torture that followed her being accused by "Jaja" of stealing his money:

When Jaja came home, I told him what happened and instead of believing me, he blamed me and accused me of having stolen the money. He dragged me out of the house into the street and started beating me. He caused a great scene. He stripped me, tied me up and hit me again and again with a stick. He also beat with the butt of his gun. Then he took an umbrella and pushed it up inside me two times—he shoved it up into my privates—hard. Many people were standing around watching and even some of the other rebels told him to leave me. He went crazy. He started shooting up in the air. I lay there for a few days, naked and bleeding. I was three months pregnant but after this I aborted. I bled for over a month. Once a boy named Junior came by and put his hand inside my vagina. He brought out his hand, which was all bloody and said, "Look at

¹²³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 11, 1999.

¹²⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7, 2002.

¹²⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 21, 1999.

your blood, you're sick." All the civilians seeing this felt sorry for me, but of course they couldn't say anything.

Rebel forces were known for mutilating pregnant mothers to find out the sex of the unborn child. According to witnesses, they would bet large sums of money, and the rebel who had rightly guessed the sex of the unborn child after the women's belly had been cut open would keep the money. Some women were cut open alive, but sometimes the women were killed before the rebels cut their abdomens open. K.M. who was abducted during the 1997 attack on Kabala, witnessed the killing and sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman near Kono in Kono district (see above):

They captured a Koranko woman who was pregnant. Two RUF, Captain "Danger" and C.O. "Cut Hand" argued about the sex of the child. They bet 100,000 leones [approximately U.S.\$50] on the sex of the child. Then they shot the woman dead and opened her belly. The RUF held up the baby with the placenta, which they shook in the air. The baby cried and then died. I wanted to run away but my husband said that the civilians would think that I was a rebel and that they would kill me.¹²⁶

Fifteen-year-old F.K. was raped by the RUF in Lunsar in Port Loko district in May 2000 and witnessed the sexual mutilation of a pregnant woman as well as the killing of her three male relatives, and six amputations:

I was raped when the RUF attacked Lunsar in May 2000 by four rebels including one man called "Put Fire," who had made me his rebel wife from 1997 to 2000. One of the other rebels was called "Kill Man No Blood." While I was being raped, the rebels found my three male relatives who were hiding under their beds. They stabbed them with their bayonets and then shot them. They raped me in my bedroom and then brought me into the living room. Three men and three women were also brought into the room. They were put in line and then the rebels gave them the choice between their life or their money. The rebels strip searched each one and then killed them on the spot. The group was forced to watch as each was killed.

One of the women was six months pregnant and slightly disabled. She was last in the row. When it was her turn, she was stabbed in the neck and fell down. The rebels started to discuss whether she was carrying a boy or a girl. They bet on the sex of the baby so they decided to check it. Kill Man No Blood split open her belly. It was a boy. One of the other rebels took the baby out and showed everyone that it was a boy. The baby was still alive when he threw it on the ground next to the woman but died shortly after. As the rebels took me away, I saw six men who had just been amputated. Some had an arm cut off below the elbow, others above the elbow. They were screaming, "Please kill us, don't leave us this way."¹²⁷

Sexual Violence with the Added Element of Violating Cultural Norms

The rebel forces have used sexual violence as a weapon to terrorize, humiliate and punish, and to force the civilian population into submission. The rebels sought complete domination by doing whatever they wanted with women, including sexual acts that, by having the additional element of assailing cultural norms, violated not only the victim but also her family or the wider society. The rebels have forced civilians to commit incest, one of the biggest taboos in any society. One survivor witnessed the RUF trying to force a brother to rape his sister in Sambanya village in Koinadugu district. When the brother refused to do so, the rebels shot him.¹²⁸ Fathers were forced to rape their daughters. Fathers were forced to dance naked in front of their daughters and vice versa. In Sierra Leone, postmenopausal and breastfeeding women are presumed not to be sexually active, but rebels violated this cultural norm by raping old women and breastfeeding mothers. Child combatants also raped women who could have been their mothers or in some instances even their grandmothers. Many rapes were committed in

¹²⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, March 7 and 9, 2002.

¹²⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 25, 2000.

¹²⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 9, 2002.

full view of other rebels and civilians. Victims were also raped in mosques, churches, and sacred places of initiation.

During the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, A.C. was forced to watch the rape of his daughter by RUF/AFRC rebels:

The rebel in charge was a thirty-year-old ex-SLA known as "Amos." I knew him from before. He had plasters on his face. The others were called "Junior" and "Blood," who did most of the talking. They gathered five young girls together, including my fifteen-year-old daughter, and put them in the back room. They asked us for five million leones [approximately U.S. \$2,500] otherwise they threatened our girls would be killed. We managed to collect 350,000 leones [approximately U.S. \$175], which we gave to them.

Then they brought out the girls. They pushed my daughter and a seventeen-year-old on the bed in the parlor and started tearing off their clothes. I peeked through a crack in the door and could see them fighting with my daughter. They put clothes in her mouth so she would not scream. The rebels punched, slapped her and knocked her head with the butt of their rifle. Then one of them opened the door and asked who the fathers of the girls were. One of them took us and lined us up right in front of the bed and said, "Don't you want to see what we do to your daughters?" We begged them to leave them alone but they said, "If you continue to talk, we will burn this house and kill everyone of you." A rebel had his gun pointed at us the whole time and there were two more at the door. Amos raped my daughter and Blood raped another girl. Then the rebel with the gun and the one guarding took their turns. My daughter was crying but they covered her mouth and told her to shut up. Blood then told the girls to get dressed and they took them away.¹²⁹

S.G., a fifty-year-old widow, was raped by a teenage rebel called Commander "Don't Blame God" and subsequently had both arms amputated in Mattru village in Bo district prior to the 1996 elections:

I pleaded but Commander Don't Blame God said he was going to kill me if I didn't lie down. I told him it had been such a long, long time since I had sex. During the rape I was pleading with him saying, "Don't kill me, please don't kill me." He was so rough with me. Then he took me up a big dune above Mattru village. As we were walking, he said he was going to kill me. I pleaded with him and he then said, "I've changed my mind, I'm going to give you a letter." Once we got there I saw many more rebels, about twenty. I was stripped naked down to my underwear. It was humiliating. Then they asked me to sit down and wait. Commander Don't Blame God said: "I have a letter for you but wait for the cutlass man to come." Then the one with the machete came and told me to put out my left arm. It took them three chops with the cutlass to cut off my arm. After this I begged them not to cut my other arm but they struggled with me and a rebel held it down and cut it off. The cutlass man said, "We belong to Foday Sankoh's group." Then one of them took my left arm and put it under my vagina and kicked me twice in the vagina ... very, very hard.¹³⁰

D.T. was gang raped by a child combatant and three other RUF rebels in the rainy season in 2000 near Foriah village in Koinadugu district:

I was hiding in the bush from the rebels with about fifteen other villagers when the rebels found us. The rebels separated me from the others because my nine-month-old son was crying. A child combatant ordered me at gunpoint to put my son down. He then raped me. I do not know how young he was but he had not yet been circumcised. He was maybe as young as twelve. Then three other rebel men raped me. When I was being raped, I made no movement as they might think that

¹²⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999.

¹³⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

I was trying to resist. I was bleeding after being raped by four males. After being raped, the rebels forced me to carry a heavy load and walk to Kania town. I escaped the same day and returned to the farm. I explained to my husband that I had been raped but he was happy to accept me back.¹³¹

R.F., a thirty-three-year-old farmer, explained how she felt after she was gang raped by West Side Boys, including four child combatants, at Petifu village in Port Loko district in November 1999:

Four children between ten and twelve years used me. They were so small I could barely feel them inside me. The small ones tried to imitate the older ones and one of them kept saying, "I'm trying it, I'm trying it." It was the war that brought that humiliation. I kept comparing them to my own children; my first-born son is ten. I forgave them because they are children. It was not of their own making. They must have been drugged.¹³²

In December 1994, thirty-year-old A.B. was abducted with six other women from Yonibani in Tonkolili district by the RUF when they launched a surprise attack with the collusion of the SLA. The RUF made the women carry looted items to their camp, where A.B. stayed for a week before escaping. She herself was repeatedly raped by two rebels, including one Liberian, and witnessed the rape of an old woman with gray hair:

At least four of the women I had been abducted with were raped. Before they raped me, the rebels went for an old woman with white hair. When she realized what they wanted, she took off her headscarf to show her white hair and said, "I'm old, I have stopped having sex." At first the commander said the rebels should not touch her because she was old. But the other rebels got annoyed and started insulting the commander saying, "Fine, you can fuck any woman you want, anytime you want, but now that we have one we want, you say no." The commander finally said that they could go ahead so all five rebels, including a small boy of fifteen years raped her. One was on his knees with his trousers down while the others stood around watching.

When I saw that I felt sick. When I saw a young boy and that old woman, I realized they could do anything and that they were going to do the same thing to me. But I guess I was lucky as only two did it to me.¹³³

S.J., a wealthy forty-five-year-old woman, was raped by RUF rebels, including a child combatant, and then burnt in late January 1999 in Manjoro village in Bombali district:

Thirty rebels attacked our village. The rebels said that we, the civilians don't want peace. I saw them kill three people and were it not for God, I would have been the fourth. Then they burned thirteen houses and looted all our things. I ran with my four children to the house in the bush where we tend to the cows. We slept there with the cows for a few days but then seven rebels surprised us there. The commander of this group was called C.O. Caca Scatter. He was a Mende. Others were speaking Mandingo and Temne.

They started stealing what few possessions I had and then C.O. Caca Scatter said that I should be raped. When I heard that order I pleaded, "Please, don't do that one to me." But they said they would do whatever they wanted. Four raped me and the last one to rape me was a fifteen-year-old. I could have given birth to him, he was so young. He put a knife to my throat and said he was going to kill me but the C.O. said I shouldn't be killed.

Then they tied my hands behind me and C.O. Caca Scatter burnt me. He scooped up hot charcoal from the fire we had been cooking with and tried to burn my face with it. I struggled and turned

¹³¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Foriah, March 6, 2002. The rainy season starts in May and ends in October.

¹³² Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.

¹³³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, February 9, 2000.

my face so he burned my chest instead. He did this four times on my front and seven times on my back. Each time they picked up the charcoal and held it on my body until it burned deep into my skin. They left me with my skin burning but I could not roll on the ground for fear it would catch fire and burn me even more. When they started to burn me I pleaded for them to kill me. I started screaming and my children came around to try and save me. They took two of my children, gave them looted property to carry and took them away. That is the last I have heard of them.¹³⁴

T.B., a fifty-year-old woman was abducted from Freetown during the January 1999 invasion and made to walk to Magburaka in Bombali district. There, a RUF/AFRC rebel raped her until she developed an abscess in her vagina:

In Magburaka, I was first raped by three rebels. While doing it they called me a bastard child and that civilians wanted to burn them all alive. After that I was taken as a wife by a commander called "Bird Bod" who was in his thirties. He raped me every day. They were always on drugs. He said he didn't have a wife so I cooked and washed for him. He roughed and beat me and used to put his fingers violently up inside me. He would get an erection while he was doing this and would sometimes rape me afterwards. I think this is how I started to get boils—I had five or six of them. It started to create an ulcer. Over the two months I was with them it got worse and worse. It was terribly painful but Commander Bird still raped me and put his fingers up me even though I had this problem. I don't know why the RUF would treat an old woman like me in such a way.

The abscess got very swollen and started to hang down between my thighs. I could barely walk. It started to smell very bad and it was then that the commander finally drove me away. I walked for two to three weeks through the bush going from village to village until I got to Masiaka. In every village I went, the women felt for me and would give me food and make a bath of herbs and salt for me to soak in. Then when I felt strong enough, I would walk to the next village. When I reached Freetown, I received medical treatment. My husband has accepted me back and feels sorry for me.¹³⁵

Breastfeeding mothers were also not spared by the rebel factions even though in Sierra Leonean culture, women are not supposed to have sexual intercourse until their children have been weaned and can walk, which can take up to three years.¹³⁶ Sierra Leoneans believe that doing so will weaken the breast milk and the ability of the child to fend off infection. Women whose infants died from malnutrition after they—the mothers—had been raped frequently attributed the death of their child to the fact that they had been raped. It is also a specific crime for a man to commit adultery with another man's wife while she is breastfeeding. Traditionally, the guilty spouses are thought to be under a curse and will suffer misfortune.¹³⁷ A.B., who was raped by two rebels and witnessed the rape of an old woman, tried at first to dissuade the first rebel from raping her by telling him that she was a breastfeeding mother with full breasts, but the rebel said he did not care.¹³⁸ M.C. was breastfeeding her two-week-old baby when she was brutally gang raped by RUF/AFRC rebels in early January 1999 near Mabang in Tonkolili district; she breastfed her baby while being raped. She suffered a prolapsed uterus¹³⁹ as a consequence of the rape:

At the time of the January 1999 offensive, my husband who is a policeman was based in Mile 91. I became very worried about him and decided to travel to find him. I left Bo on January 8. I had just given birth to a baby girl two weeks before so was still feeling very weak but I desperately wanted to find my man.

¹³⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹³⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 8, 1999.

¹³⁶ Mariane C. Ferme, *The Underneath of Things: Violence, History, and the Everyday in Sierra Leone* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2001), p. 131.

¹³⁷ Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Law*, pp. 127-8 and 131.

¹³⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹³⁹ A prolapsed uterus is a condition in which the uterus drops from its normal position. In severe cases, such as those that may be associated with injury from sexual violence, the cervix and uterus may protrude beyond the vaginal opening.

I arrived late in the evening. Then all of a sudden we heard firing. There was confusion and armed rebels captured me. They took me to their bush camp in a place called Mabang. They started sexing me two days later. I tried to fight and told them to leave me, but several times they put a pistol into my vagina. I gave myself up to God and asked that he save me. The first day, about ten sexed me. After the first day there were fewer men, between three and six a day. Every day they came and stood in line waiting to rape me. All together there were over thirty different men. They were aged between seventeen and twenty-five years old. The younger ones were rough and most of them seemed to be on drugs. I think these were RUF people. Most of them seemed to be Mendes. I saw many young girls in their camp. I guess the lucky ones only had one rebel. But I'm from Bo and wouldn't allow myself to be together with one of them. I told them I wasn't a Kamajor and that my husband was a policeman and they said, "Oh policemen are our enemies ... we've killed them all. Forget about your husband."

Sometimes they tied my legs to my arms with my legs spread and raped me one after the other. They said since I was from Bo and I was a Kamajor's wife that they were going to rape me to death. [Sometimes] I held my baby Hawanatu in my arms while they were raping me. When she cried they said they wanted to shoot her so I gave her the breast.

They raped me for two or three weeks and then in early February, my vagina came out [i.e. she suffered a prolapsed uterus]. It was so, so painful. I can't tell you how much it hurt. When this happened, I thought I was going to die. In order to get it to go back in I had to lie down and push it back in. To urinate, I had to lie down. They provoked me and made fun of me. They said now my Kamajor husband will not be able to have sex with me. A wife of one of the commanders told a villager to help me escape which they did. He took me to a nice woman in another village away from the rebel area and after explaining my problem, she helped me so much. She gave me herbs and tried to cure me and my baby who by that time was vomiting and very sick. It's only God that helped keep my little Hawanatu alive. He decided that this little child is mine to keep. Later, when I was stronger, I made it to Freetown and had an operation for my prolapsed uterus. I feel much better now.¹⁴⁰

Rebels also raped pregnant women. In polygynous marriages, pregnant women generally stop having sexual intercourse with their husbands once their pregnancy has been confirmed, to protect the fetus. R.F, the thirty-three-year-old farmer gang raped by West Side Boys at Petifu, Port Loko, in November 1999 (see above, p. 39), was six months pregnant at the time. As the result of the gang rape she delivered prematurely, causing the baby's death:

I went with Isatu, her husband and my five-year-old son to harvest rice in Isatu's village, Petifu. We traveled by boat and at night to avoid the rebels. When we were resting having worked all the next day, we heard the rebels. They were all over the village and told us to give them our rice and palm oil. Several of them started hitting me on the head with their guns. Three were wearing uniform, the others wore civilian clothes. They spoke all different languages.

One of them tied a rope around my waist like a goat and pushed me out of the door screaming, "Show me where your people are." My little boy was left sleeping on the bed. Seven of the rebels then led me about a mile out of the village, screaming at me to tell them where we had hidden the rice and palm oil. I told them I was a stranger there but they did not believe me. They took me into a small farmhouse where they all used me. This went on for a few hours until the cloth I was lying on was soaked. I could barely walk. Then they ordered me to get up and dragged me like a sheep back to the village.

¹⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

Once back in the village, they put me in a house and more of them started raping me. I was used by at least twenty rebels. I think the whole unit raped me throughout the night. The only one who did not use me was the commander. He kept coming in and saying, "Have you had your turn?" He was the one they kept calling "Commander."

When one of the Temne speaking rebels was raping me I said, "Please brother, talk to these people and ask them to leave me." But he said he could not do anything. Another rebel pulled out a knife when he was on top of me and said if I said anything he would kill me. I told them I was pregnant and said, "Can't you see? I have a six month belly." But they said, "We do not care. We see your belly but so what." Two of them told me to stoop down, but I couldn't and they just pushed me down and used me. After many had used me one of them said, "Oh, there is no more sweetness there," so they turned me over and did it to me from behind. Three of them did it to me like that, and now when I go to the toilet it is so painful; I am still bleeding and it feels like my insides are coming out. One rebel had sex with me several times. He said he was punishing me for not having shown him where the rice and palm oil was hidden. I yelled for the commander and complained, saying, "He wants to kill me, tell him to leave me!" but he said, "We have killed others that are better than you." I did not complain after that. They kept saying they were about to stop fighting—that they really want peace and that after peace comes, they won't do these things any more.

In the early hours of the morning, they finally left. They wanted me to carry their looted items but I could not walk. They took other people whom they used to carry the looted goods. At one point I tried to get up but could not, I slipped and fell down to earth. By this time I had started bleeding. I felt my baby trembling in my belly. A few hours later the water broke and then I started to have contractions. I have five children and had never even had a miscarriage. I had about three hours of labor before giving birth. The little thing shook for a minute or so and then it died. It was so beautiful; it had fine hair and the face was so pretty. I wrapped it with a cloth. I could not bear to look whether it was a boy or a girl. I was gushing out blood and shortly after I delivered the placenta. I felt dizzy. I was barely able to walk.

Later when I had a little more strength I covered my baby and threw it in a pit latrine. I felt so bad for throwing it away like that but I did not have the strength to bury it properly. After thinking everything over, I am only angry at this war and thankful that I still have my life and that the life of my child [her five-year-old] was spared. It's only God that saved him. He was lying on the bed the whole time.¹⁴¹

Forced Pregnancies

Many women and girls became pregnant as the result of the rape(s) they were subjected to. Although some women were reportedly able to abort without the knowledge of the rebels using traditional herbal treatments, the majority had no choice but to carry the child to full term. M.W., the abducted nurse already quoted above (see p. 28), said that many girls who had been raped had miscarriages that might have been self-induced with herbs. I.S., a twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC during the January 1999 invasion, tried to abort, but was unsuccessful:

When I got pregnant I didn't tell my rebel husband for months. I asked a woman who knows about medicine to give me herbs to abort the baby, but it never worked and after my belly started to swell, he found out. He warned me that if I tried to flush the baby out, he'd kill me. He said he wanted the baby and that he hoped it would be a boy.¹⁴²

M.W., the abducted nurse, also mentioned that medical personnel were instructed by a rebel doctor, Dr.

¹⁴¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko, November 27, 1999.

¹⁴² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

Lahai, not to perform abortions, give birth control, or advise that traditional herbal treatments be taken, as the rebels felt that too many people had died and they needed to increase the population.¹⁴³ Many women did have miscarriages because of the brutal rapes and trauma they were subjected to by the rebels, as well as the difficult conditions in the bush.

Forced Abortion by West Side Boys

Human Rights Watch has documented one case of forced abortion by the West Side Boys, the splinter group of the AFRC that took power in the 1997 coup. Twenty-year-old M.K. was abducted from Magbele village in Port Loko district in July 2000, when she was four months pregnant. She was raped by four West Side Boys and was made the wife of a rebel who forced her to abort:

I was abducted with two other civilians, including my brother-in-law, by the West Side Boys. They were all wearing uniforms; some uniforms were new, and others wore old ones. We were taken to their base in Magbele Junction where there were many other abductees. At nighttime one of the rebels called Umaro Kamara came to me and said he wanted to have sex with me. He spoke nicely with me and said that he wanted to take me to Makeni and make me his wife. He raped me that day. The rebels saw that I was pregnant and said to Umaro, "We are not going to work along with any pregnant woman, we should kill her." Umaro said that he wanted to take me as his wife and that I should be given an injection instead. Umaro called me and tried to convince me to get rid of the baby. He said, "They will kill you if you do not agree so you better have the injection." I was taken to the doctor who gave me an injection and some pills. Two days later I started bleeding. I felt weak and had pain all over my body. Then I lost the baby.

When Umaro was on patrol, three other rebels raped me. When we moved out to go to another base, I saw the body of my brother-in-law. After one day I started bleeding again so Umaro took me to the doctor who gave me another injection. When we reached Lunsar, Umaro wanted to make me his wife. Even while I was bleeding, Umaro used me. He told me to wash myself before raping me.¹⁴⁴

Rape by Female Combatant

Human Rights Watch has documented a case of a female rebel manually raping female abductees. The virginity checks performed by female rebels on abductees prior to their "virgination" by male rebels, noted above, also constitute rape given that penetration occurred without the consent of the victim. More of such abuses may have been committed but not reported due to shame, as expressed in the testimony below. The rebels captured sixteen-year-old F.P. on January 7, 1999 when—as she was fleeing the fighting in central Freetown with two other girls—she ran into a patrol of five heavily armed rebels, including one female rebel. They knew the female rebel from before as Aminata; she had lived in their neighborhood before the 1997 AFRC coup. She had joined the rebels at that time and had not been seen since the AFRC was driven out of Freetown in February 1998. F.P. remembered having had an argument with her several years ago. The rebels called her "C.O. Sally." F.P. was taken with her sister and another girl whom she did not know to a rebel base. Her friend was raped by five men, which she was made to watch. F.P. was also "virginated" by male rebels and sexually molested by "C.O. Sally," along with another girl, also called Sally:

C.O. Sally came into the room where we were kept and said, "Why are you hollering? These are my boys, why are you refusing them?" Since we knew C.O. Sally, we asked her to help us get away, so finally on January 10 she took us at gunpoint to another house. She made us cook and wash for her. Once she told us to go into a room and take off our clothes. She had an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] on the ground as well as a gun. We took off our clothes and then she took two long sticks and tied our hands to them straight out from our shoulders. She stood us in front of her and asked if we remembered her to which I answered, "No." Then she said that she remembered

¹⁴³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 21, 1999.

¹⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Port Loko IDP camp, July 13, 2000.

me and that we had fought last time we had met each other. She made me put one leg up on a drum and then she fingered me with two fingers. I was so embarrassed and ashamed. I asked her why she was doing this but she screamed at me to shut up. She did not touch herself or say anything, but kept on fingering me. Then she called Sally and did the same thing to her. When she was finished, she left us standing there with our arms tied. A little later she fingered us again. It did not seem sexual to me and I do not know why she did it. An hour later a young rebel came and said he thought he was hearing gunshots from ECOMOG. C.O. Sally ordered the boy to untie us as "I have punished these people already."¹⁴⁵

Rape and Other Sexual Violence against Boys and Men by Male and Female Rebels

According to FAWE Sierra Leone, boys and men were also raped by male rebels. FAWE Sierra Leone treated fourteen boys aged between nine and fifteen years old who had been raped, but suspects that there are more cases. Due to the stigma attached to homosexuality in Sierra Leone, male victims of rape feared they would be perceived as homosexuals and therefore few boys were willing to report it. Human Rights Watch has not documented any of these crimes of sexual violence, which were apparently committed on a much smaller scale than sexual violence committed against women and girls. FAWE Sierra Leone did not want Human Rights Watch to interview the boys they had treated as they feared that interviewing them would re-traumatize them.¹⁴⁶

Human Rights Watch documented two cases in which female rebels forced men to have sexual intercourse at gunpoint. One case involved a female rebel forcing a male civilian to have sex during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, and the second involved a RUF female training commander and male conscripts in Kono. Cases of these crimes of sexual violence were also reported by FAWE Sierra Leone. It is impossible to determine the prevalence of this type of sexual violence, but—given the general level of violence within the rebel forces and the power that female combatants had over civilians—Human Rights Watch believes that such incidents did happen more often than has been reported, albeit again on a much reduced scale compared to male combatants raping female civilians.

Abduction, Sexual Slavery, Forced Labor, and Conscriptio

Abduction

The rebel forces used abduction as their primary method for recruitment. During an attack on a town or village, rebels typically rounded up civilians as they tried to flee or were found hiding. Men were abducted to carry the looted items as well as being forcibly conscripted. The abducted children were also given military training and forcibly conscripted.

In thousands of cases, women and girls were abducted after being subjected to sexual violence. The rebels often killed family members who tried to protect their women and girls. Abducted women and girls described being "given" to a combatant who then took them as their "wives" (see also "Sexual slavery" section, below).¹⁴⁷ Abduction of civilians continued for the duration of the armed conflict. In the early years of the conflict, the RUF went on hit-and-run raids, returning to their base camps with looted items and abducted civilians. As the RUF took over more territory, an increasing number of civilians were abducted. As their ranks increased with more men and boys being forcibly conscripted, so did their abduction of women and girls. The AFRC and West Side Boys used the same tactics. Some women had the extreme misfortune of escaping from one rebel faction, or unit, only to be abducted by another. One such victim, thirteen-year-old M.F. (see above, p. 34), who was first

¹⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 18, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding Chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

¹⁴⁷ The PHR report found that 9 percent of women reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence had been forced to "marry" their rebel "husband." PHR report, p. 2. These types of marriage are similar to marriages by capture, which were common at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. In tribal wars, the conquerors would kill the male inhabitants of the vanquished village and capture the women who subsequently became the wives of the conquerors. The "marriage" was validated by the captor's public declaration of his intention to cohabit with his captive. Such a wife was regarded as a slave and her children could not inherit from their father. Joko Smart, *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, p. 29.

abducted from Koinadugu by the RUF/AFRC and gang raped, was driven out of Makeni in October 1999 when it came under attack by the RUF. She was subsequently abducted by the West Side Boys and raped by two child combatants.¹⁴⁸

Sexual Slavery and Forced Labor

Women and girls were primarily abducted to be the sex slaves of the rebels and to perform slave labor. The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights found that 33 percent of the interviewees reporting war-related sexual violence had been abducted and 15 percent had been subjected to sexual slavery. Consistent with fairly common practice among the Sierra Leonean male population at large, many rebels had polygynous "marriages," including with abducted women whom they had forced to "marry" them. Rebels also changed "wives" frequently when they tired of them or when their "wives" were too ill to perform their tasks (a consequence of the brutality that they were often subjected to). Victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported attaching themselves to one rebel to avoid gang rape and be given a degree of protection. The more highly ranked the commander, the more protection a woman had. Women and girls, however, remained vulnerable to sexual violence by other rebels. M.F., the thirteen-year-old who was gang raped by the RUF/AFRC in Koinadugu was raped by two other commanders when her "husband" Mohammed was out on patrol.

Women who were "married" to high-ranking rebels benefited not only from "protection" but also were able to exert power over others. The women and girls often benefited from the looted items that their rebel "husbands" gave them, and took part themselves in looting raids to steal clothes, shoes, and jewelry. Not all were abductees: some women and girls voluntarily joined the rebel forces and sought to benefit from their relationship with the rebels, i.e. from the looted goods or escaping from their parents (some girls would use a relationship with a rebel boyfriend to gain freedom from parental control, by threatening to involve the boyfriend in their dispute over parental restrictions). Such women consenting to marry a rebel were probably still vulnerable to sexual violence from other rebels.

Numerous victims described being subjected to abuse or forced to work by commanders' wives. FAWE Sierra Leone also reported that female combatants "married" to rebels killed new abductees if their "husbands" showed a preference for them. A.J., the fourteen-year-old student who was abducted in Pujehun and tortured by the RUF from February to May 1994 (see above, p. 31) is an example of how some "wives" were treated by other female abductees or combatants:

I was put under the control of Commander Patrick, a Liberian. He was married to a woman called Neneh who was very jealous of me. Once, after the commanders had gone to the war front, Neneh told one of our guards to open up the cage where I was being held and take me out. She said, "My husband is interested in you. If you accept him to have sex with you, I'll kill you, so be forewarned." Neneh and Patrick have one child. She told me she'd joined the rebels voluntarily. She said, "You are just a captive. Do you think I was abducted? I was not abducted. I joined voluntarily. So you have no right to fall in love with my husband."¹⁴⁹

A few victims also described how some of these women, usually the wives of commanders, used their power to try and protect, and at times facilitate the escape, of other abductees. For example, M.C., who was brutally raped by rebels in early 1999 in Mabang and suffered a prolapsed uterus (see above, p. 38) was helped to escape by a commander's wife who felt sorry for her.¹⁵⁰

Abducted women were made to carry out forced labor during their captivity, including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes, and carrying heavy loads of ammunition and looted items. In many instances, women—intimidated by their captors and the situation they were in—felt powerless to escape their lives of sexual slavery, and were advised by other female captives to tolerate the abuses, "as it was war." The rebels often deliberately

¹⁴⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, 7 March 2002.

¹⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Pujehun, February 12, 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 5, 1999.

marked abducted civilians with the letters "RUF" or "AFRC" carved mainly onto their chests. This made escape more difficult because, were they to be caught by government forces, they would likely be suspected of being rebels and killed. Some women used traditional herbal remedies to remove their markings, and international organizations have also performed surgery on these victims to remove the scars.

Relationships between Rebels and Abductees

The relationships that developed between the abductees and rebels were very complex and varied. Most relationships were obviously very volatile, as described by I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted by the AFRC in the January 1999 invasion (see above, p. 40). She stayed with the AFRC/West Side Boys until August 1999 when she was able to escape:

We stayed there for months and they were always going on attacks in the Port Loko area. Occasionally C.O. Blood was nice to me and I had to kiss him and play love with him. But I could never tell him what was really in my heart; that I missed my family and wanted to escape. Other days he would beat me for nothing. He did the same thing to his other "wife." Neither of us could complain.¹⁵¹

H.K. was assigned as the wife of "Jaja" and was so badly treated by him that even the other rebels sometimes tried to prevail on him to be less violent:

Jaja was already "married" to another abductee, and when she saw what he had done to me, she escaped. He always beat both of us. He used to sex me twice every night. He made me take his penis in my mouth. I tried to refuse him but he always threatened to kill me. He was actually an SLA soldier but had joined the RUF. His C.O. was Colonel Stagger, who used to criticize him for how he treated us. Colonel Stagger used to say, "Look, when we take these kids, we should take care of them and now you beat her for nothing." Jaja used to say it was not Stagger's business. Stagger's own abductees were treated pretty well. He never beat them.¹⁵²

Some women fled at the first opportunity. Other women, especially those who had children with the rebels, found it difficult to leave these abusive relationships. Many women and girls experienced their first sexual relationship with their rebel "husband" and may have developed aspects of the "Stockholm Syndrome," whereby the hostage identifies with the hostage-taker. They adjusted to the level of violence with the rebels, which over time became "normal," in order to survive.¹⁵³ Others feared that their "husband" might seek revenge if they escaped and returned to their family. The rebels instilled fear in their "wives" by telling them that their families would not accept them back. The abductees also feared to some extent that they would be blamed for what happened to them. For some women who had lost their families, the rebels became a surrogate family. As many rebels had themselves lost their families or could not return to their villages of origin, given that they had in some cases committed human rights abuses in their communities, they did not want to relinquish their surrogate families or their slave labor.

As the women and girls were never registered in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program and there was insufficient documentation of this large category of victims throughout the armed conflict, it is unclear how many girls and women were abducted. It is now impossible to establish how many remain under the control of their rebel "husband" or have returned to their village of origin.

The ones who have remained involuntarily will only re-examine their situation when alternatives become available. Women who wish to sever links with ex-combatants have few alternative economic or social options. They are a very vulnerable group that has little or no means of support. They are often not able to return to their

¹⁵¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹⁵² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, October 12, 1999.

¹⁵³ A group of female ex-combatants and abducted women, for example, defined to Human Rights Watch domestic violence as "wounding or losing consciousness."

villages out of fear, lack of funds and social stigma, especially if they have given birth to children fathered by rebels. The women are therefore often forced to remain in situations in which they are vulnerable to continuing abuse. Numerous victims end up being commercial sex workers, selling their body for as little as U.S.50¢. Exploited girls and women can end up abandoned with several children to raise by themselves by the time they are in their early twenties.

Rebel Control over Abductees

Life with the rebels was very tough. Civilian abductees, in particular, were treated ruthlessly. The RUF established a military police system and courthouses to administer a form of justice to those who contravened RUF rules of behavior. Some of the RUF rules were written, but the rules, trial and punishment were to a large extent arbitrary, dependent on the particular commander. Interviewees reported that severe punishment was meted out for small incidents such as spilling water on a commander's shoes (one week in a cell with daily beatings) or not lodging complaints through the official channels (imprisonment in a dungeon). "Courthouses" were established to try both combatants and the civilians.¹⁵⁴ A rebel was expected to provide for his "wives" and children during their captivity even if he had taken on another "wife" or "wives." If a rebel reneged on his responsibility, then he could be put in a cell and beaten to death. Civilian women who were tried by the court were raped and beaten if they did not have a commander to stand up for them. According to K.M., who was abducted by the RUF from Kabala, Koinadugu, the three male rebels who presided over the courthouse in Burkina, a training camp in Kailahun, would arrange amongst themselves who could rape the women. She also said that one woman was raped to death by six rebels.¹⁵⁵

Forced Conscriptioin: Female Combatants

Women and girls were also forcibly conscripted into the rebel fighting forces. The RUF established military training camps for women. During active fighting, female combatants were sent into battle after the men and the Small Boys Units (SBU's). There were only very few high-ranking female commanders in the rebel forces and a much smaller number of female combatants than adult men or boys. Female combatants had more power than female civilians: combatants, including female combatants, who had received military training, had substantial power to do whatever they wanted to civilians. Within the rebel forces, however, women still held much lower status: female combatants were assigned "husbands."

Forcibly conscripted female combatants were in many ways as vulnerable as civilian abductees, and may have decided to stay with their rebel "husbands" for the same reasons as their civilian counterparts i.e. shame, lack of alternative options, and economic dependence on their "husbands."

RUF Officers' Responsibility for Sexual Violence

In addition to their individual criminal responsibility, rebel commanders can bear direct command responsibility for crimes of sexual violence and sexual slavery, for ordering the rape and abduction of women and girls (see below, p. 60, for a discussion of the principle of command responsibility in international law). C.O. Caca Scatter, for example, ordered the gang rape of S.J., the wealthy forty-five-year-old woman (see above, p. 37). A.J., the fourteen-year-old student, was tortured, caged and brutally raped by C.O. Patrick (see above, p. 43). S.G., the fifty-year-old widow was raped and had both arms amputated by Commander "Don't Blame God" (see above, p. 36).¹⁵⁶ Indeed, the organized way in which victims frequently describe being rounded up and taken, as well as the number of rebels involved in these abductions and the number of victims abducted, suggests an element of premeditation and planning on the part of the RUF, AFRC and West Side Boys command. Victims also frequently described being specifically selected to be given to a commander or being sexually abused in the presence of commanders, which again suggest that sexual violence was committed under the direction of and with the consent of members of the rebels' hierarchy. I.S., the twenty-seven-year-old student who was abducted and

¹⁵⁴ Abdullah and Muana, "The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone," p. 189.

¹⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Kabala, March 7 and 9, 2002.

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, May 3, 1999. Under Article 6 (1), persons are held individually responsible for the planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the statute.

gang raped by the West Side Boys from January to August 1999 explained how Commander "Blood" had initiated the "wife" selection process:

One of the commanders said he was going to amputate all of us too. But another commander, C.O. Blood, said, "Don't kill them, let's chose them as wives." Then we were divided up. The one who seemed to be in charge, C.O. Blood, chose me. When he looked at me I was frightened. His pupils were huge—he was high on drugs. He took me to a house and told me to lie down on the ground. He said if I did not allow him to have sex, he would kill me. He took out a knife and said he would not even waste his ammunition on me. He would just chop me to pieces. I knew he meant what he said. He forced my clothes off and used me twice. He was rough and after the second time I begged him to leave me, but he said he did not care. My insides hurt so much. Then he used me from behind. Other women were being raped in the same room. They [the West Side Boys] did not care.¹⁵⁷

According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirty-four of the ninety-four survivors directly reporting sexual violence believed that their attackers' commander was aware of the attack.¹⁵⁸ While it is difficult to generalize from this figure, it does tend to confirm the findings of Human Rights Watch that sexual violence and slavery, which were committed on a widespread and systematic nature, were part of the rebel forces' military strategy to dominate, humiliate and punish the civilian population.

The RUF has made occasional efforts to declare rape a crime within certain areas under their control and disciplined ordinary soldiers accused of raping. The disciplinary measures included summary trials followed by execution. These efforts failed to prevent sexual violence in practice. One commander, for example, prevented at least temporarily the rape of an eight-year-old girl who was abducted by a ten-year-old child combatant by ordering the child combatant to only use the young girl "for cleaning and cooking for now."¹⁵⁹ A.B. witnessed the gang rape of an old woman, which the commander had originally tried to stop but then allowed to happen (see above, p. 37).

Senior male and female figures in the RUF interviewed by Human Rights Watch mainly denied that sexual violence had happened, explaining that the women joined the RUF movement voluntarily and fell in love with their rebel "husbands."¹⁶⁰ A key figure in the AFRC admitted that he had heard of cases of sexual violence and blamed it on the breakdown of law and order.¹⁶¹ He also said that none of his men had expressed any remorse for the human rights abuses they committed. In the vast majority of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, those who committed rape were not disciplined or punished in any way

Sexual Violence Committed by the CDF

As already noted, there are relatively few reported cases of rape committed by the CDF. The CDF were reasonably disciplined during the war, although their discipline deteriorated when they were deployed in chiefdoms outside their own native areas. Sexual intercourse is believed to act against the protection bestowed on the fighters during their initiation ceremonies. However, Human Rights Watch has documented several crimes of sexual violence by the Kamajors, the CDF based in the Southern Province.

In March 1998, a forty-five-year-old Temne man, M.B., witnessed the rape of a young Temne woman called Jeneba by the Kamajors in Kenema town. The Kamajors also mutilated and killed Jeneba. M.B. explained that during the ECOMOG intervention to restore the democratically elected government in 1998, Kamajors accused members of the Temne and Limba ethnic groups of being RUF/AFRC supporters and persecuted them. According to M.B., the Kamajors identified Temnes and Limbas as such by their last names and publicly beheaded or

¹⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 17, 1999.

¹⁵⁸ PHR report, p. 54.

¹⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, June 16, 1999.

¹⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch interviews, Freetown and Makeni, April 1999 to May 2002.

¹⁶¹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 26, 2002.

stabbed to death numerous alleged rebels. The Kamajors also ate some of their victims, believing that this would bestow additional powers to them. The accused had no means to defend themselves, as ECOMOG initially backed the Kamajors and did not realize until later that the killings were carried out along tribal lines. After receiving death threats, M.B. sought refuge in the house of a chief who was Temne and the father of Jeneba. A group of about eight Kamajors came to the house, looking for Jeneba, and accused her of having a sexual relationship with an AFRC fighter:

I saw Jeneba being raped by one Kamajor, while the others were standing around watching. Then the Kamajors threatened to kill us if we did not stop looking at them, so we went into other houses to hide. From there we could not see what was going on but heard Jeneba screaming at the top of her voice, and when the Kamajors had gone we came outside and found Jeneba dead. She was naked and her hands and feet had been mutilated by a machete.¹⁶²

On February 17, 1999, J.K., a thirty-one-year-old woman was raped by two Kamajors in a small village in Bonthe district. A group of Kamajors entered J.K.'s house looking for her brother, who had not been home for the past three years:

One of the Kamajors called Kinie said that they had been told that my brother was in the village and was planning to attack them. I assured them no one knew where he was. During this argument, the other civilians in village became afraid and fled into the bush. As soon as the Kamajors forced their way into my bedroom, I followed them to check up on what they were doing. Kinie and another Kamajor whose name I did not know pushed me to the ground, tearing off my clothes. I screamed for help but no one came to my rescue. Even my father who was in the house was unable to help me. They both raped me while the others stood around laughing. When they left the village, they looted some goats and chickens. There was no one to report the incident to and I had no money to pay for a hospital visit. I decided to leave everything to the Almighty God.¹⁶³

In another incident, at least three female civilians were raped, including by a Kamajor commander. In July 2000, M.S. and twenty-five other passengers were taken off a bus at Bauya in Moyamba district, beaten, and accused of being RUF rebels. All their possessions were taken off the bus and inspected by the Kamajors but they did not find any incriminating goods. Their possessions were stolen by the CDF. In the evening, M.S. was locked in the guardroom at the CDF office with nine other women and her young child:

Twenty CDF came to the guardroom and told us, the women that we could choose between [being] raped or killed. I was raped by a young CDF on the ground of the guardroom. I told him that I was a suckling mother but he did not care. My baby was in the room when he raped me. He made me stoop like an animal. He said, "I am a government man so no one will ask me anything about this." My breast milk has gone bad now. I could hear another woman who initially refused to be raped being beaten with the torch. She was raped by two CDF called Mohammed and Ahmed.¹⁶⁴

In the same incident, an older high-ranking CDF commander raped a thirty-five-year-old trader, R.K.:

Mr. S. raped me all night. He raped me five times. I cried as I was not used to doing that even with my husband. He was rough and did it from behind like an animal in a bad way. He accused me of being a RUF commander's wife. I told him my husband is a Gbetti [part of the CDF].¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Human Rights Watch interview, Kenema, August 12, 2002.
¹⁶³ Human Rights Watch interview, Bonthe district, July 8, 2002.
¹⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.
¹⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed B.R., a Kamajor fighter who reported witnessing the rape of two civilians that took place in 1997 and 1998. He also witnessed the killing of a captured RUF female combatant, who died after being raped with a stick. B.R. explained that the rape that took place in 1997 happened when a patrol of six Kamajors, including B.R., met a group of female civilians in the bush:

Some of the women started talking bad things about the Kamajors and said that we were taking food off people. Then one Kamajors went for this woman. I saw him raping her. He had stripped her naked and she was screaming. I did not want to see it or be a witness but I had to rush there. At one point I thought he was killing her.¹⁶⁶

The incident was reported to the high priest, one of the main Kamajor initiators who decided that the offender had to be punished. B.R. explained that the punishment was called "walking the highway," which entailed the offender being made to walk slowly through fifty Kamajors lined up on two sides, with the Kamajors flogging him with canes. B.R. said that the victim would have reported the rape to the Kamajor high priest, but that he and the others on patrol decided to report it first, otherwise it would have made them equally guilty of the crime. The rape committed in 1998 involved a young Kamajor raping a twenty-year-old woman. B.R. explained that the offender was given a trial, during which he admitted to having committed the crime. He was subsequently locked up in prison (probably a local prison).

In another instance, B.R. explained how a twenty-five-year-old female RUF combatant captured in Tongo in Kono district was brutally killed by the insertion of a long stick in her vagina after the Kamajors had cut off her ears and nose and gouged her eyes out with a machete. The Kamajor commander allegedly wanted to teach the woman a lesson and said that: "This stick is your husband and is screwing you. Are you enjoying it? Just say your last prayers, as you are going to die bit by bit."¹⁶⁷

Sexual Violence Committed by International Peacekeeping Forces

Human Rights Watch has documented several cases of rape by the international peacekeeping forces. Human Rights Watch was informed of a rape committed by a Guinean peacekeeper, Sgt. Ballah, by two reliable sources, including the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), who had interviewed the twelve-year-old victim. The victim was raped on March 26, 2001 when she asked for Sgt. Ballah's assistance in securing a ride to Freetown at the checkpoint that he was manning. The rape was perpetrated in Bo, the area of deployment of the Guinean peacekeeping contingent. Sgt. Ballah was charged to court on the same day. Unfortunately, the SLP dropped the case and the offender was sent back to Guinea. Human Rights Watch was not able to locate the victim.

In February 2001, a Nigerian peacekeeper reportedly raped a sixteen-year-old girl in Freetown. When Human Rights Watch investigated the case, the SLP claimed they had not been able to trace the perpetrator for questioning. UNAMSIL claimed that the Nigerian contingent and UNAMSIL Civilian Police Section had investigated the matter and that the plaintiff had subsequently dropped the charge.

Human Rights Watch interviewed a witness to an alleged rape by two Ukrainian peacekeepers that took place on April 3, 2002 in the village of Joru in Kenema district. K.S., a fifty-five-year-old female farmer testified that she as well as others in her village had witnessed the gang rape:

Late at night I came out of my house to ease myself [urinate]. Maybe I had been woken up by a big white truck that had stopped about fifty meters away from my house. I hid and watched what was happening; there were people inside. I noticed two white men and one black lady inside the truck. Clearly there was a struggle going on. I could hear her yelling at them to "leave me alone" in what sounded like a Liberian accent, but I can not be sure. The door was open and one of them was on top of her. The lady was really struggling. I saw that one of them was holding her down while the other was raping her. I was able to see because in the process the men had opened the

¹⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, July 31, 2000.

¹⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch interview, July 31, 2000. The CDF generally killed any RUF that they had captured.

door to the car and the light had come on. I am sure they were raping her and she was fighting with them to stop it. I stayed and watched this go on for several minutes. I later learned a few more people were also watching what was going on. In fact we talked about it the next morning.

Then, perhaps afraid of being watched, the two whites moved their truck further down the road ... past my house, further down the road going out of town. Maybe they thought that because there were no houses around, we would not see what they were up to. They stayed another thirty or so minutes in this second location. I saw both of them have their turn on her, but I did not see any guns. After they were finished, I saw one of them drag her out of the cabin and put her in the back of the big truck. I can not remember if one of them got in the back with her but I think so. Then they drove off.

The next morning when I went out to go to the mosque, we found one of her black shoes that she must have kicked off while struggling with those men. The shoe was near the first place they had stopped. We took it to the police but they never came to ask us any questions. We are all a bit frightened of those UNAMSIL people now. We tell our girls never to get in a truck with them or the same thing might happen to them.¹⁶⁸

Neither the SLP in Joru or UNAMSIL in Kenema conducted a proper investigation into this alleged gang rape, both claiming that the absence of the victim prevented them from conducting their investigation. The UNAMSIL human rights section was not aware of this alleged gang rape until Human Rights Watch informed them, and to date has also not conducted a thorough investigation.

On June 22, 2002, a fourteen-year-old boy was allegedly raped by a Bangladeshi peacekeeper near the Jui transit camp for Sierra Leonean returnees located outside of Freetown in the Western Area. The rape occurred when the victim and his friends were fishing with several Bangladeshi peacekeepers near the camp. The offender was reported to have taken the boy away from the others in the group before raping him. The victim's friends reported that the boy looked disheveled after rejoining the group and immediately told them what had happened. The offender gave the victim the equivalent of U.S \$0.25 to silence him. The boy reported the rape to the SLP on June 24 and a medical exam carried out on the same day confirmed penetration had taken place.

The SLP were involved in the case for ten days, until the UNAMSIL provost marshal took it over. The provost marshal concluded that there was no conclusive evidence to link the crime to the perpetrator. After reviewing the case, the UNAMSIL force commander concluded that while the evidence was inconclusive, the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to conclude that the peacekeeper had violated military discipline, and as such issued an order of repatriation. It is not clear to Human Rights Watch whether this violation will be recorded on the offender's file. According to a reliable source, the investigation by the police and UNAMSIL was conducted in an insensitive manner and members of the Bangladeshi contingent spoke with the victim while the UNAMSIL investigation was ongoing, even though they should not have had access to him. Nor did UNAMSIL follow up with the victim or his family to apologize, provide compensation, and explain the outcome of the investigation.¹⁶⁹

UNAMSIL investigations into allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers indicate a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the problem of sexual violence. Human Rights Watch urges UNAMSIL to fully investigate any allegations of sexual violence committed by UNAMSIL military or civilian personnel. The human rights section should systematically monitor and report on sexual violence, including cases involving UNAMSIL personnel. UNAMSIL should establish a mechanism with the SLP whereby allegations of sexual violence by persons employed or affiliated with UNAMSIL reported to the police are immediately reported to the relevant UNAMSIL staff members, including the provost marshal and the gender specialist in the human rights section. UNAMSIL should reciprocate by reporting cases known to it to the SLP. UNAMSIL should ensure that states

¹⁶⁸ Human Rights Watch interview, Joru, May 28, 2002. Other villagers did not want to be interviewed.

¹⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, September 15, 2002

report within the prescribed six months on follow up to cases involving military personnel that have resulted in the alleged perpetrator being repatriated to his country of origin, in order to ensure that states prosecute the accused. This will serve to actually enforce a stated "zero tolerance" for sexual exploitation by UNAMSIL staff and persons affiliated with UNAMSIL, which to date has had no teeth and therefore no impact on changing behavior. Civilian staff who commit sexual violence should be fired and their misconduct properly recorded in their personnel file to ensure that they are not rehired in another U.N. mission.

The UNAMSIL human rights section should also provide in-depth gender sensitization training to military and civilian staff. The training should ensure that the peacekeepers understand the code of conduct and the consequences if they do not adhere to it. The U.N. Code of Conduct for peacekeepers and the Military Observer Handbook need to be revised to ensure that the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation by persons employed or affiliated with U.N. missions and the consequences of such acts are clearly stated in these guidelines. Similar guidelines for civilian staff need to be widely disseminated to all U.N. missions.

Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL peacekeepers have sexually exploited women and solicited child prostitutes.

VI. EFFECTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Health

Sexual violence often continues to impact the physical and mental well-being of survivors long after the abuses were committed. In addition to the reluctance of some survivors to seek medical treatment, the lack of health facilities, especially in the provinces, as well as the survivors' lack of money for transport, medical treatment and drugs has meant that the health status of survivors is poor.¹⁷⁰ Survivors also were often only able to seek medical treatment months after the abuse had happened, for example when they managed to escape rebel captors and make their way to a health center.

The probability of transmission of HIV and certain other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) is greatly increased in violent sex and any sex where a woman or girl is injured. Doctors and other health personnel interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported a high prevalence of STDs amongst victims, as the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, like other armed conflicts, served as a vector for sexually transmitted diseases.¹⁷¹

A World Health Organization (WHO) report found an alarmingly high prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS amongst Sierra Leone Army soldiers. According to the report, the SLA tested 176 soldiers and eighty-two civilians working for the army who had prolonged diarrhea, tuberculosis, weight loss or pneumonia, and found a HIV-positive rate of 41.9 percent (or 108 persons). Among the group tested were eighty female soldiers of whom thirty tested positive (37.5 percent). As many SLA soldiers defected to the rebel factions, it is likely that victims of sexual violence by them have been infected with the virus.¹⁷² A U.N. report on the impact of conflict on children states that rates of sexually transmitted diseases among soldiers are two to five times higher than those of civilian populations, and that during armed conflict the rate of infection can be up to fifty times higher.¹⁷³ Commercial sexual exploitation of women by soldiers, including peacekeepers, also contributes to the spread of

¹⁷⁰ PHR report, p. 45.

¹⁷¹ Human Rights Watch interviews with Dr. Olayinka Koso-Thomas, Freetown, February 25, 2002; Dr. Noah Conteh, Freetown, March 1, 2002 and Dr. Bernard Fraser, Freetown, March 3, 2002.

¹⁷² World Health Organization, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake—The Strategic and Organizational Context and Recommendations for Action* (Freetown, 2000), p. 3.

¹⁷³ See United Nations Security Council resolution 1308 on the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations, July 17, 2000; and Graça Machel, "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: A critical review of progress made and obstacles encountered in increasing protection for war-affected children," report prepared for and presented at the International Conference on War-Affected Children, September 2000, Winnipeg, Canada, p. 12, at <http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/machel-e.asp>.

STDs, including HIV/AIDS.¹⁷⁴ In 1997, tests showed that 70.6 percent of commercial sex workers in Freetown were HIV positive compared to 26.7 percent in 1995.¹⁷⁵

The 2002 report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) on the global AIDS epidemic estimated that by the end of 2001 there were 170,000 persons aged between fifteen and forty-nine living with HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. UNAIDS estimates that more than 50 percent of this figure (90,000) are women and girls.¹⁷⁶ More accurate figures on HIV/AIDS prevalence in Sierra Leone, as opposed to estimates, should be known when the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) publish their report based on a nationwide HIV/AIDS prevalence survey conducted in May 2002.¹⁷⁷ The government of Sierra Leone should ensure that future information campaigns on HIV/AIDS are designed both to impart basic information and to help reduce stigma, especially in light of the large number of survivors of sexual violence who may have been infected with HIV.

Other health problems are vasico-vaginal and vasico-rectal fistulas (VVF's and VRF's), as a result of the rape(s) especially of young girls but also of mature women; complications when giving birth; prolapsed uterus; trauma; and unwanted pregnancies. Health professionals have noted high rates of pregnancies amongst young girls with likely resultant illness, injury, and even death, due to pregnancy-related complications. These girls are likely to experience future complications including uterine problems and scarring, reducing their ability to have a normal sex life or to conceive or carry a child to full term in the future. The health of children born to abducted girls is also likely to suffer as the girls often have no one to teach them motherhood skills, contributing to high rates of infant mortality. The health risks are further exacerbated by various factors that impede safe sex, including lack of information about HIV/AIDS, as well as cultural practices and beliefs that undermine the use of reproductive health services and contraception.¹⁷⁸ The lack of attention paid until recently to conflict-related sexual violence has meant that the health needs of women and girls have not received as much attention or funding as required to adequately address the scale of the problem. In general the Sierra Leonean health services lack trained and motivated personnel, medical equipment and supplies, drugs, and blood for transfusion. The reproductive health infrastructure, which was poor before 1991, virtually collapsed during the war.¹⁷⁹ There are only six specialist obstetricians and gynecologists in Sierra Leone.¹⁸⁰ Treatment for sexually transmitted diseases is limited to the main towns and outreach by mobile clinics in some chiefdoms.

Mental health services for survivors of sexual violence are inadequate and as of 2002 there was only one qualified psychiatrist in the country. FAWE Sierra Leone, which has substantial expertise in treating survivors of

¹⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch interview, UNAMSIL medical personnel, Freetown, April 30, 2002.

¹⁷⁵ Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *National AIDS/STD Control Programme Annual Report for 1998* (Freetown, Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 1998), p. 3.

¹⁷⁶ UNAIDS, *Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002* at <http://www.unaids.org/>, p. 190. This figure is based on a total population of 4,587,000.

¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Dr. Joaquim Saweka (WHO Sierra Leone Representative), Freetown, May 3, 2002. The preliminary results of the CDC showed a prevalence rate of 4.9 percent.

¹⁷⁸ Only 297 of 4,923 women (or 6 percent) surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they used contraceptives. This low prevalence of contraception use is due to lack of access to family planning services within the communities, inadequate health facilities, especially in the provinces, lack of disposable income to pay for these services, and the low education of women. Only 3 percent of women with no education used contraception compared to 8 percent of women with primary education and 14 percent of women with secondary or higher education. Another worrying factor is the unwillingness of partners to use condoms, which does not bode well given the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other STDs. See Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, pp. 55-58.

¹⁷⁹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, p. 198.

¹⁸⁰ WHO and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, *Assessment of District Hospitals in Sierra Leone for the Delivery of Safe Motherhood and Reproductive Health Services* (Freetown: 2002), p. 10. The Assessment also found that physicians attended only 3 percent of births whereas traditional birth attendants assisted in 38 percent of births nationally. *Ibid.* pp. 56-57. Only 10 percent of 4,923 women surveyed by the government in 2000 reported that they received antenatal care from a physician. See Government of Sierra Leone, *The Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone*, p. 10.

sexual violence, believes that counseling on a massive scale is needed to ensure that the women and girls can face the future.¹⁸¹

Stigmatization and Shame of Survivors

The rebels frequently committed crimes of sexual violence in public places. A.M., a twenty-year-old male, reported that when he was held in captivity in State House in Freetown from January 8, 1999 for three days, he saw from his cell window RUF/AFRC combatants raping about twenty to twenty-five girls each night on the grounds.¹⁸² Given that rape has been committed on such a systematic and widespread scale and was witnessed by many people, it seems that rape survivors, particularly in urban centers, are generally not stigmatized by society. Survivors interviewed have expressed fear of rejection by their families and communities, but in practice it seems that their fears are unfounded. Most survivors are accepted back into their communities, with their families simply overjoyed to find that they are still alive.

Nevertheless, some women, like R.K. who was raped by the CDF (see above, p. 48), have been rejected by their husbands:

I told my husband what happened. He cried and rejected me. He said he will find another wife. My family has begged him to accept me as it was not my fault. He does not love me anymore. I am annoyed because I was the senior wife and now he does not treat me well.¹⁸³

Girls and women who voluntarily joined the rebel forces are less likely to be welcomed back.

The survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights gives an indication of survival strategies employed by women who had been raped: of the ninety-four interviewees reporting having themselves experienced sexual violence, sixty-one (or 65 percent) told someone about their case(s) of sexual violence. The majority of these survivors (fifty women and girls or 53 percent) reported their experience to a health care provider in a hospital, health care center or to a traditional healer, albeit on average five months after the incident(s) occurred. Among those not reporting these incidents and who stated a reason (twenty-eight out of thirty-three), the reasons given were feelings of shame or social stigma (eighteen women and girls or 64 percent), fear of being stigmatized or rejected (eight women and girls or 28 percent) and not having trust in anyone (six women and girls or 21 percent). Eighteen women and girls (19 percent) reported that discussions with family members helped them to try to forget about the incident(s). Other survivors reported that what helped most was to try and forget about the incident (46 percent), support of family (35 percent), a health care provider (33 percent) and traditional medicine (32 percent).¹⁸⁴

Human Rights Watch also found that many survivors feel intense personal shame that the rebels have defiled them, and therefore often do not report the crime or seek medical attention. S.G., the fifty-year-old widow who had both arms amputated after being raped (see above p. 36), described the shame and anger she felt after her ordeal:

I didn't even tell my people about the rape. It's such a shameful act. Not just because of the rebel's age, but also because never in my life have I had sex with someone besides my husband. I was a good woman. Can you imagine how I felt when this young boy raped me, kicked me and then told me to get out of his sight after doing this to me? And without my arms, how can I as a woman even clean myself, let alone take care of my affairs. We're farmers and how am I to farm now? Both the rape and amputation are awful ... but later when thinking about what happened, I was even angrier about the rape than the amputation because for him to have done that to me was

¹⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Christiana Thorpe (founding chairperson of FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter), Freetown, March 22, 2002.

¹⁸² Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, April 12, 1999.

¹⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, August 21, 2000.

¹⁸⁴ PHR report, p. 51 and Table 6 on p. 54. Women could select more than one of the choices given.

like killing me inside because of the shame. Sex is something you should enjoy together with your man. But to do it like that, to handle me like that, to torture me like that and then kick me and leave me like that ... it's too much. But I guess I was somehow lucky. There could have been ten people doing that to me.¹⁸⁵

P.S. twenty-five, who was abducted and gang raped by the West Side Boys in January 2000, explained why she had not reported her rapes:

I didn't want to tell anyone what happened. I was ashamed because it is bad enough being done like this, but having a rebel do it is even worse. I felt so bad because I wanted to save myself for someone special. I went to secret society and they instructed us not to be involved in sex until we were ready to marry. And now I'm afraid because of AIDS. When I think of them I feel so angry.¹⁸⁶

VII. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Introduction¹⁸⁷

Women and girls have, since time immemorial, been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence, including rape and sexual slavery, during armed conflict. Mass rape of women and girls was documented during the Second World War as well as in more recent conflicts in such diverse countries as the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁸⁸ Sexual violence has traditionally been considered as the inevitable by-product of armed conflict and has been mischaracterized by military and political leaders as a private crime or the unfortunate behavior of renegade soldiers. The use of rape as a weapon of war, however, means that rape is not a private or incidental crime. Rape as a weapon of war serves a strategic function and acts as an integral tool for achieving military objectives.

Conflict-related rape is an act of violence that targets sexuality, but it is also a military and political tool. It functions to subjugate and humiliate both the women and men within the targeted community. Furthermore, rape is generally not committed in isolation and victims are often subjected to multiple human rights abuses, which serve to further traumatize the survivor. In conflicts in which civilians are the principal targets, sexual violence has become an even more deliberate and insidious weapon of war. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, rape and other grave abuses committed by Serb forces were with the intent to drive the non-Serb population from their homes and communities. •

¹⁸⁵ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, February 8, 2000.

¹⁸⁷ Some of the information in this section was published previously in Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, *The Global Report on Women's Human Rights* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); and Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, "Rape in War: Challenging The Tradition of Impunity," *SALS Review* (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University Press, Winter-Spring 1994).

¹⁸⁸ See for example Human Rights Watch, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won't Help Banja Luka* Volume 6, Issue 8, June 1994, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/bosnia2/>; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, No. 13, October 1995, <http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.bosnia9510.html>; Human Rights Watch, *Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Closed, Dark Place: Past and Present Human Rights Abuses in Foca*, Vol. 10, No. 6 (D), July 1998, <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/foca/>; Human Rights Watch/Africa, Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme, Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, September 1996, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm>; Human Rights Watch, *The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo*, June 2002, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/>; Human Rights Watch, *Democratic Republic of Congo, War Crimes in Kisangani: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny*, Vol. 14, No 6 (A), August 2002, <http://hrw.org/reports/2002/drc2/>; United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45, E/CN.4/1995/42* (United Nations, 1994), p. 64.

The ten-year internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses against the civilian population, including the use of sexual violence to achieve military aims.¹⁸⁹ From the testimonies in this report, it is clear that the rebels waged a war through attacking civilians. Sexual violence was therefore used as part of the rebels' military and political strategy, with victims often being used to bring messages to their enemies, including President Kabbah, ECOMOG, the SLA or the CDF. RUF rebels told an older woman whom they first raped and then subjected to amputation that: "There should be peace before the elections. Now you can go and vote. You have got to take a letter to Bo and those hands are the letters."¹⁹⁰ The testimonies also reveal how the rebels sought complete domination over girls and women by doing whatever they wanted to, including breaking numerous cultural taboos, such as raping lactating mothers or elderly women.

Despite being commonplace during armed conflict, rape "remains the least condemned war crime," according to the U.N. special rapporteur on violence against women.¹⁹¹ It is only in recent years that it has been exposed and condemned alongside other human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations. Sexual violence remains insufficiently reported, condemned, and prosecuted as war crimes or crimes against humanity. This differential treatment of sexual violence highlights the international community's willingness to tolerate sexual violence against women notwithstanding its obligations under international law.

International law has prohibited rape and other forms of sexual violence against women during armed conflict for over a century.¹⁹² Perpetrators can be held accountable for rape and other forms of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and as acts of genocide.¹⁹³ International human rights law, which remains applicable in times of armed conflict, also prohibits sexual violence and sexual slavery.

International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war, sets out protections for civilians, prisoners of war and other non-combatants during international and internal armed conflicts.¹⁹⁴ The four Geneva Conventions¹⁹⁵ and their two Additional Protocols¹⁹⁶ implicitly and explicitly condemn rape and other forms of

¹⁸⁹ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone*, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2 (United Nations, 2002).

¹⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch interview, Bo, March 2, 2000.

¹⁹¹ United Nations, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against women*, E/CN.4/1995/42, p. 64.

¹⁹² Some examples of how the law prohibiting war-related rape developed include the Italian lawyer Lucas de Penna advocating in the thirteenth century for the punishment of wartime rape just as severely as rape committed in peacetime, and Hugo Grotius stating in the sixteenth century that sexual violence committed in wartime was a punishable crime. Articles 44 and 47 of the 1863 Lieber Code, which served as the basis for subsequent war codes, also lists rape by a belligerent as a war crime punishable by death. See the Lieber Code of 1863, Correspondence, Orders, Reports, and Returns of the Union Authorities, From January 1 to December 31, 1863.--#7, O.R.--Series III--Volume III [S# 124], General Orders No. 100., War Dept., *Adj. General's Office, Washington*, April 24, 1863. Article 4 of the Hague Convention (1907) provides a general prohibition of torture and abuses against combatants and non-combatants. Article 46 of the same convention prescribes that "[f]amily honour and rights...must be respected," which can be interpreted to cover rape. See *Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed Regulations (Hague Convention IV) of October 18, 1907*, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force January 26, 1910). Kelly D. Askin and Doreen M. Koenig (eds.), *Women and International Human Rights Law* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), Volume 1, p. 50. See also Kelly D. Askin, *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp. 18-36.

¹⁹³ Although genocide did not occur in Sierra Leone, rape and other forms of sexual violence can be defined as constituent elements of genocide. Genocide is defined under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as "acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." Genocide has attained *jus cogens* status (a norm that preempts other norms) and is prohibited both in its own right and as a crime against humanity.

¹⁹⁴ See the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions. Other sources of international humanitarian law are the 1907 Hague Convention and Regulations, decisions of international tribunals and customary law.

¹⁹⁵ Sierra Leone became a party to the four Geneva Conventions on June 10, 1965.

sexual violence as serious violations of humanitarian law in both international and internal conflicts. In international armed conflicts, such crimes are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and are considered war crimes. Violations involving direct attacks on civilians during internal armed conflicts are increasingly recognized as war crimes.

Under international humanitarian law, the civil war in Sierra Leone was an internal armed conflict.¹⁹⁷ Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions applies to all parties in an internal armed conflict, including armed opposition groups. Through its prohibition of “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” Common Article 3 implicitly condemns sexual violence.

The Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts provides a basis for defining the protections provided under Common Article 3. Article 27 on the treatment of protected persons states that “women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”¹⁹⁸ Article 147 specifies that “torture or inhuman treatment” and “willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” are grave breaches of the conventions.¹⁹⁹ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered to be grave breaches and even a single act of sexual violence can constitute a war crime.²⁰⁰

Article 4 of Protocol II, which governs internal armed conflicts and applied to the conflict in Sierra Leone, expressly forbids “violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment, such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape and enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault” as well as “slavery and the slave trade in all their forms.”²⁰¹ According to the ICRC Commentary, this provision “reaffirms and supplements Common Article 3 ... [because] it became clear that it was necessary to strengthen ... the protection of women ... who may also be the victims of rape, enforced prostitution or indecent assault.”²⁰²

As the above language highlights, crimes of sexual violence under international humanitarian law have been mischaracterized as attacks against the honor of women or an outrage on personal dignity—as opposed to attacks on physical integrity. This mischaracterization diminishes the serious nature of the crime and contributes to the widespread misperception of rape as an attack on honor that is an “incidental” or “lesser” crime relative to crimes such as torture or enslavement.²⁰³ Whilst it is true that rape is an assault on human dignity, rape should primarily be viewed as a violent assault on bodily integrity as well as one that dishonors the perpetrator and not the victim.

Sexual Violence as a Crime against Humanity

Acts of sexual violence committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians in Sierra Leone can be classified as crimes against humanity and prosecuted as such. There is no single international treaty that provides an authoritative definition of crimes against humanity, but such crimes are generally considered to

¹⁹⁶ Sierra Leone ratified the Additional Protocols on October 21, 1986.

¹⁹⁷ The fighting in 1997-98 between West African ECOWAS forces and the RUF/AFRC government may have met the criteria for an international armed conflict.

¹⁹⁸ Geneva Convention IV, Article 27 (2). Article 76 of Protocol I extends this protection of protected persons to all women. Protocol I, Article 76.

¹⁹⁹ Geneva Convention IV, Article 147.

²⁰⁰ Theodor Meron, “Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law,” *American Journal of International Law* (Washington D.C.: American Society of International Law, 1993), vol. 87, p. 426, citing the International Committee of the Red Cross, Aide Mémoire, December 3, 1992.

²⁰¹ Protocol II, Article 4 (2) (a), (e) and (f).

²⁰² Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Bruno Zimmerman (eds.), *ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols of June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949* (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 1375, para. 4539.

²⁰³ See Catherine N. Niarchos, “Women, War and Rape: Challenges facing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,” *Human Rights Quarterly* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1995), vol. 17, pp. 672, 674.

be serious and inhumane acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, during peacetime or war, and that result from the persecution of a specific group.²⁰⁴

The charter establishing the Nuremberg tribunal after the Second World War did not specify rape under crimes against humanity or list gender as one of the grounds of persecution; the inclusion of rape could however be derived from the charter's general prohibition against "other inhumane acts."²⁰⁵ Resolving this ambiguity, rape (as well as torture) was included in the specific list of crimes constituting crimes against humanity in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)²⁰⁶ and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).²⁰⁷

The statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) expands on this by including gender as one of the grounds of persecution, as well as adding rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.²⁰⁸ This definition of gender-based crimes against humanity, which appropriately makes no reference to the outdated notion of "crimes against honor," has been taken up in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see below for a discussion of the Special Court).

Under the evolving case law on crimes against humanity, formal proof of policy, plan or design is no longer an essential element for the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Both the ICTY and the ICTR have found that the existence of a plan or policy is sufficient: the policy need not be formalized and may be deduced from the way in which the acts occur.²⁰⁹ The failure to take action to address widespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population can also be considered sufficient to determine the requisite element of policy, plan or design. Both state and non-state actors can be held accountable for crimes against humanity.

An individual case of serious sexual violence can be prosecuted as a crime against humanity if the prosecution can make the link between the single violation and other violations of basic human rights or international humanitarian law that have been committed as a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.²¹⁰ Each enumerated type of act, such as murder, torture, or rape, does not need to be committed on a

²⁰⁴ See, e.g. "Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808," 32 I.L.M. at 1159 (1993), para. 48.

²⁰⁵ The Nuremberg Charter, as amended by the Berlin Protocol, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547 (1945), E.A.S. NO. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. Under article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, crimes against humanity included, but were not limited to the following atrocities: "[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds."

²⁰⁶ Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTY (adopted 25/5/93) at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-con.htm>.

²⁰⁷ Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8/11/94) at <http://www.icttr.org>.

²⁰⁸ Article 7 of the Statute of the ICC enumerates crimes against humanity as "any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, Article 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Rome Statute on October 17, 1998 and September 15, 2000 respectively.

²⁰⁹ *Kunarac* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 432.

²¹⁰ "It is sufficient to show that the act took place in the context of an accumulation of acts of violence which, individually, may vary greatly in nature and gravity." *Kunarac* Trial Chamber Judgement, para. 419.

widespread or systematic basis—it is the attack that must be widespread or systematic.²¹¹

Human Rights Law

Sierra Leone is party to international human rights instruments that provide safeguards for women and girls at all times, including during armed conflict. These include protection from rape as torture and other mistreatment; slavery and forced prostitution; and discrimination based on sex. Armed opposition groups, particularly those in control of territory, have increasingly been under an obligation to respect international human rights standards.²¹²

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)²¹³ prohibit torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by officials or persons acting in an official capacity. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides for the right to freedom from torture, sexual exploitation and abuse as well as liberty and security of person.²¹⁴ The 1991 constitution of Sierra Leone also prohibits “any form of torture or any punishment or other treatment which is inhuman or degrading.”²¹⁵

The United Nations special rapporteur on torture has recognized that rape can constitute torture: “[R]ape is a traumatic form of torture for the victim.”²¹⁶ The ICTY in the *Furundzija* case noted that “[i]n certain circumstances ... rape can amount to torture and has been found by international judicial bodies to constitute a violation of the norm prohibiting torture.”²¹⁷ The ICTR in the *Akayesu* case stated that “Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”²¹⁸

Sexual violence generally violates women’s rights to be free from discrimination based on sex as provided for under the ICCPR.²¹⁹ Under Article 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),²²⁰ the definition of discrimination is considered to include “gender-based violence precisely because gender-based violence has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the enjoyment by women of human rights” on a basis of equality with men.²²¹ The CEDAW Committee enumerated a wide range of obligations for states related to ending sexual violence, including ensuring appropriate treatment for victims in the justice system, counseling and support services, and medical and psychological assistance to victims.²²² In a 1993

²¹¹ *Prosecutor v. Kupreškic*, Judgement, IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000 (*Kupreškic* Trial Chamber Judgement), para. 550.

²¹² Nigel S. Rodley, “Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?” in P. Mahoney and K. Mahoney (eds.) *Human Rights in the 21st Century: A Global Challenge* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 297-318, and International Council on Human Rights Policy, “Hard Cases: Bringing Human Rights Violators to Justice Abroad—A Guide to Universal Jurisdiction,” (Geneva: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 1999), p. 6.

²¹³ Sierra Leone ratified the CAT on March 1, 2001.

²¹⁴ Sierra Leone ratified the CRC on June 18, 1990. Article 34 protects the child from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. Article 37 provides for the freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as well as liberty and security of person.

²¹⁵ Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, s. 20(1).

²¹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1992/32*, E/CN.4/1995/34, Paragraph 19, January 12, 1995.

²¹⁷ *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija*, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998, para. 171.

²¹⁸ *Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu*, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998 (the *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgement), para. 687.

²¹⁹ See ICCPR, Articles 2 (1) and 26.

²²⁰ Sierra Leone ratified this treaty on November 11, 1988.

²²¹ Women, Law and Development International, *Gender Violence: The Hidden War Crimes* (Washington D.C.: Women, Law and Development International, 1998), p. 37.

²²² Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, “Violence Against Women,” General Recommendation no. 19 (eleventh session, 1992), U.N. Document CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15.

resolution, the U.N. General Assembly declared that prohibiting gender discrimination includes eliminating gender-based violence and that states "should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women."²²³

The CRC also provides for freedom from discrimination on the basis of gender (Article 2), and the right to enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (Article 24). Under Article 39, states shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social integration of a child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture of any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. The CRC also calls upon states to provide special protection and assistance to a child "temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment."²²⁴ A child's right to "such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor" is also guaranteed by the ICCPR.²²⁵

Under both the ICCPR and CEDAW, slavery and forced prostitution in times of armed conflict constitute a basic violation of the right to liberty and security of person.²²⁶ Furthermore, slavery, which is a *jus cogens* norm from which no derogation is permitted, is prohibited under Article 8 of the ICCPR, which also prohibits forced labor, and by the 1926 Slavery Convention.²²⁷ The right to freedom from slavery is also provided under the constitution of Sierra Leone.²²⁸

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, to which Sierra Leone is a party, guarantees the "[e]limination of every discrimination against women ... and protection of the rights of the woman and the child"²²⁹ as well as the right to integrity of one's person, and the right to be free of "... [a]ll forms of exploitation and degradation ..., particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment."²³⁰

Gender Jurisprudence for Crimes of Sexual Violence

Despite the widespread practice of sexual violence during the Second World War, rape did not figure prominently in the prosecutions brought by the two major tribunals established after the war. Rape was not prosecuted at any of the Nuremberg trials notwithstanding the evidence of sexual violence presented. Rape charges were brought in a few cases before the International Military Tribunal in the Far East (the Tokyo Tribunal),²³¹ and several accused were convicted of crimes including sexual violence. The Tokyo tribunal was responsible for bringing international attention to atrocities, including sexual violence, committed during the

²²³ United Nations General Assembly, "Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women," A/RES/48/104, December 20, 1993 (issued on February 23, 1994). See Article 4, in particular.

²²⁴ Article 20 (1) of the CRC.

²²⁵ Although the masculine pronoun is used, the ICCPR is applicable without any discrimination to sex as stated in Article 24 (1).

²²⁶ Article 9 of the ICCPR provides for the freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, whilst Article 23 prohibits forced marriage. Under Article 6 of CEDAW, states are required to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.

²²⁷ Slavery Convention, United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 212, p. 17., July 7, 1955.

²²⁸ Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991), Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual, s. 19 (1).

²²⁹ Article 3 of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, Organization of African Unity Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 1982. Sierra Leone signed and ratified this treaty on August 27, 1981 and September 21, 1993 respectively.

²³⁰ Articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

²³¹ The Indictment for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) included rape within the crimes charged generally. IMTFE Indictment, p. 31, reproduced in the IMTFE Docs., vol., 20, Annex A-6; See also Appendix D, attached to the Indictment, which provides more detail on the charges. The Indictment stated that the accused were responsible for "mass murder, rape, pillage, brigandage, torture, and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population of the overrun countries." Appendix D alleged responsibility for "inhumane treatment" and "mistreatment" when "civilian internees were murdered, beaten, tortured, and otherwise ill-treated, and female prisoners were raped by members of the Japanese forces" and "female nurses were raped, murdered and ill-treated," and "large numbers of the inhabitants" were also murdered, tortured, raped, and otherwise mistreated.

“Rape of Nanking.” The Tokyo tribunal failed, however, to prosecute members of the Japanese government and military for the 200,000 “comfort women” forced into sexual slavery during the war.²³²

Widespread reports of sexual violence in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were instrumental in the U.N. Security Council decisions authorizing the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. As noted, the statutes of both the ICTY and ICTR make explicit mention of rape as a crime against humanity.²³³ The ICTY also has implicit jurisdiction to prosecute crimes of sexual violence as grave breaches of international humanitarian law, as violations of the laws and customs of war and genocide.²³⁴ The ICTR is explicitly empowered to prosecute rape as a serious violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and can prosecute crimes of sexual violence when they constitute torture or genocide.²³⁵

Both tribunals have played a critical role in setting precedents in the prosecution of conflict-related sexual violence, including articulating definitions and elements of many gender-related crimes.²³⁶ As noted at this report’s opening (see “Definition of Sexual Violence, Rape and Sexual Slavery,” p. 2), both the ICTR (in the 1998 *Akayesu* judgment) and the ICTY (in the 2002 *Foca* judgment) defined rape, of which there is no commonly accepted definition in international law, albeit the definition from the *Akayesu* judgment has been criticized as too broad. The *Akayesu* judgment also provided a legal definition of sexual violence: any act of a sexual nature, including rape, committed on a person under coercive circumstances, but which need not include a physical invasion of the body or even contact.²³⁷ The ICTY has found that sexual violence not only constitutes crimes against humanity, war crimes and grave breaches, but can also constitute torture, enslavement, serious bodily injury and other relevant acts as long as the elements constituting these crimes are present in the act of sexual violence.

In general, however, both tribunals have had an inconsistent record on investigating and prosecuting crimes of sexual violence. The ICTR continues to lack a comprehensive approach to the inclusion of sexual violence charges and has failed to include these charges or seek amendments in the original indictments where the Office of the Prosecutor has witness testimony or evidence of sexual violence.²³⁸

²³² See the Appendix entitled “An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for “Comfort Women Stations” Established During the Second World War” to the United Nations, *Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict*, pp. 38-55.

²³³ Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTY names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTY (adopted 25/5/93) at <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute-con.htm>. Article 3 of the Statute of the ICTR names rape as a crime against humanity. See Statute of the ICTR (adopted 8/11/94) at <http://www.icttr.org>.

²³⁴ Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Statute of the ICTY respectively.

²³⁵ Articles 4, Article 3 (f) and Article 2 respectively of the ICTR Statute.

²³⁶ *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgment; *Prosecutor v. Tadic*; *Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al.*, IT-96-21-A, November 16, 1998; *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija* Judgment, December 10, 1998; *Prosecutor v. Blaskic*, IT-95-14, Judgment, March 3, 2000; *Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al.*, Judgment, IT-98-30-T, November 2, 2001. *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic* (Foca case), Appeals Chamber Judgment, June 12, 2002, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1.

²³⁷ *Akayesu* Trial Chamber Judgment, para. 688. The ICTR stated: “The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. The incident described by Witness KK in which the Accused ordered the Interahamwe [Hutu militia] to undress a student and force her to do gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of the bureau communal, in front of a crowd, constitutes sexual violence. The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal.”

²³⁸ See Human Rights Watch press release “Bosnia: Landmark Verdicts for Rape, Torture, and Sexual Enslavement,” February 22, 2001, at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/02/serbia0222.htm>. These facts were reconfirmed from a reliable source from the ICTR, Human Rights Watch interview, Freetown, November 8, 2002.

Command Responsibility²³⁹

The culpability of superior officers for atrocities that their subordinates commit is commonly known as command responsibility. Although the concept originated in military law, it now also embraces the responsibility of civil authorities for the abuses committed by persons under their direct authority.²⁴⁰

Commanders of armed rebel groups, such as in Sierra Leone, are subject to command responsibility. While Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II on internal armed conflicts do not explicitly mention command responsibility, the application of Protocol II depends on there being organized armed groups "under responsible command."²⁴¹ Command responsibility is now part of customary international law, that is, a universally recognized precept of international criminal law. It is also an explicit feature of many treaties, including the statutes of the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see below, p. 63).

There are two forms of command responsibility. The first is direct responsibility for orders that are unlawful. When an official authorizes or orders rapes, massacres, or other grave abuses, that individual is criminally responsible for these acts, whether the superior who initiated or conveyed the order also carries out the atrocity or has subordinates perform it. The other form of command responsibility is an imputed responsibility for the crimes of subordinates where those crimes are not based on direct orders. In this case, responsibility is determined on the basis of whether the superior knew or should have known of the abuses committed by subordinates.

Knowledge of the abuses may be actual, either by the army officer or rebel commander witnessing the crimes or being informed of them shortly thereafter. It may also be constructive, where the abuses were so numerous or notorious that a reasonable person could come to no other conclusion than that the superior must have known of their commission or of the existence of an understood and acknowledged routine for their commission. Another basis of constructive notice is that the officer should have known of the offenses, but displayed such serious personal dereliction as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences, which is an extreme form of negligence. The failure of the commander to take appropriate measures to control the subordinates under his or her command and prevent atrocities, and the failure to punish offenders, are further elements in showing command responsibility.

An individual found to have command responsibility for the crime committed by a subordinate is deemed culpable to the same degree as the subordinate. A commander will therefore be found guilty of murder if he or she stood by while the subordinate committed murder.

With regard to the crime of rape, some courts have been reluctant to impute command responsibility for what is seen as random and a private crime.²⁴² However, the requirements of command responsibility do not vary according to the particular crime; the commander is no more permitted to stand by while rape is committed than to stand by while murder is. If a superior had reason to know that subordinates under his or her command committed rape (such as news reports, or widespread commission of this abuse), and failed to use all feasible means under his or her command to prevent and punish this abuse, he or she may also be found guilty of rape.

²³⁹ The legal analysis in this section was previously published in Human Rights Watch, *Milosevic and the Chain of Command in Kosovo*, July 7, 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/07/chain-of-command.htm>.

²⁴⁰ Geoffrey Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1999), p. 206-7.

²⁴¹ Article 1 (1), Protocol II.

²⁴² See generally Patricia Visser Sellers and Kaoru Okuizumi, "Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View: Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults," *Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems* Volume 7, Number 1 (Spring 1997), p. 45.

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VIII. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS FOR SIERRA LEONE

Two transitional justice mechanisms are currently underway to address the cycle of impunity in Sierra Leone: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Both bodies became operational in the third quarter of 2002.

The Lomé Amnesty

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, controversially provided for amnesty for combatants in the civil war. Under Article 9 (1), Sankoh was granted an absolute and free pardon (he had been convicted and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 1997 coup); and under Article 9 (3) the government was required to ensure that “no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to the time of signing of the present Agreement....”²⁴³ At the last minute, the U.N. secretary-general’s special representative attending the talks added a hand-written caveat that the U.N. held the understanding that the amnesty and pardon provided for in Article 9 did not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

Under international law, states have an *erga omnes* obligation—in other words a duty owed to the whole international community—to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide and torture even if this means that amnesty laws are in effect annulled. This means that Sierra Leone therefore has an obligation under international law to prosecute those who committed crimes against humanity and torture, irrespective of the Lomé Amnesty and the setting up of the SCSL. Other states also have an obligation to prosecute these crimes based on the principle of universal jurisdiction (see below at p. 66 for a discussion on this principle). Crimes committed in the post-Lomé period fall outside the amnesty and can be prosecuted under domestic law.

The granting of an amnesty may also be challenged under the Sierra Leonean constitution and international law, as being against the fundamental legal principle of the state’s duty to provide an effective remedy against official violation of guaranteed rights. The U.N. Human Rights Commission has ruled that “States may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such rehabilitation as may be possible.”²⁴⁴ A duty to revoke the amnesty retroactively may even arise under international law. Several Sierra Leonean lawyers have discussed the issue of the amnesty’s constitutionality and whether to challenge it in court.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was conceived by nongovernmental organizations attending the peace talks as a counterbalance to the amnesty granted to all parties. Under the peace agreement, the TRC was to be established to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation....”²⁴⁵

The commission should have been established within ninety days after the signing of the peace agreement, but the Sierra Leonean Parliament did not pass the Truth and Reconciliation Act establishing the TRC until February 2000. Its establishment was further delayed due to the renewed outbreak of fighting in May 2000, and lack of political will of both the government and the international community. As the selection process for the commissioners took longer than planned, the government also decided to delay the commencement of the TRC until after the May 2002 elections to ensure that the TRC would not be politicized by the elections. The activities of the TRC may well be further hampered by funding shortfalls. Only U.S. \$1.5 million had been pledged as of June 2002, partially because the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) did not

²⁴³ Article 9 of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

²⁴⁴ Robertson, *Crimes against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice*, p. 260.

²⁴⁵ Article 26 (1) of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement.

launch the funding appeal until January 25, 2002. Its total planned budget was reduced from almost U.S. \$10 million to U.S. \$6,276,440 in August 2002 and has remained unchanged since then.²⁴⁶

On May 13, 2002, President Kabbah announced the seven commissioners. The four Sierra Leoneans are: Rt. Rev. Dr. Joseph C. Humper; Justice Laura A. E. Marcus-Jones; Prof. John A. Kamara; and Mr. Sylvanus Torto. The three international commissioners are: Madam Ajaaratai Satang Jow (Gambia); Ms. Yasmin L. Sooka (South Africa); and Professor William Schabas (Canada). The commission had a three-month preparatory phase, which started in July 2002, and must wrap up its activities and submit a report within twelve months of the start of hearings, which as of this writing have not yet begun.²⁴⁷ An interim executive secretariat headed by the Sierra Leonean lawyer Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff and staffed with eight other members was established to support the work of the commissioners. The budget will be used to establish the secretariat of the commission in Freetown, which will support the seven commissioners and the office of the executive secretary. In addition, it is likely that six operational units will be established to provide support to the commissioners and the executive secretary.²⁴⁸ The establishment of regional offices is also provided for under the Act and should encourage Sierra Leonean participation and ownership of the process. These offices are expected to begin functioning in early 2003.²⁴⁹

The TRC's mandate is "to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the armed conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity; to respond to the needs of the victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered."²⁵⁰ The commission is called upon to give special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and may also implement "special procedures to address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who have suffered sexual abuse ..."²⁵¹ Any committees formed by the commission to assist it in the performance of its functions should also take into account gender representation.²⁵²

Both the UNAMSIL human rights unit and NGOs have conducted sensitization activities, mainly in the key urban centers, to ensure Sierra Leonean awareness of the process, but at the time of writing, there was still considerable confusion about the role of the TRC, especially in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).

Human Rights Watch believes that the work of the TRC would be greatly enhanced were the staff of the TRC to be gender-balanced with women represented at all levels and to include persons with expertise in sexual and gender-based violence. The gender adviser, expected to take up the post in January 2003, should provide gender sensitization training and ensure that the work of the TRC, including investigations and hearings, are carried out in a sensitive manner. Human Rights Watch recommends that the TRC explore the relationship between the widespread and systematic nature of conflict-related sexual violence and the low status of and discrimination against women. The final report on the findings of the TRC should highlight gender-specific abuses committed throughout the country during the armed conflict. The TRC should also make recommendations on improvements to the law and judicial system toward eliminating the discriminatory nature of customary and general law, and on legal reform and human rights training for government authorities, including members of the criminal justice system. The report should highlight the need for increased assistance (shelter, medical care, education, skills training, mental health programs, etc.) for women, as well as for strengthening existing women's groups through capacity building.

²⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.
²⁴⁷ The TRC can extend its operations for another six months provided that good cause is shown. TRC Act 2000, Section 5 (1). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>.
²⁴⁸ The six operational units will probably be: Administration and Programming; Public Information and Education; Legal; Investigation; Research; Reconciliation and Protection.
²⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with TRC staff, November 14, 2002.
²⁵⁰ TRC Act 2000, Section 6 (1). See <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcact2000.html>.
²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Section 6 (2) (b) and 7 (4) respectively.
²⁵² *Ibid.*, Section 10 (2).

Special Court for Sierra Leone

Following the hostage taking of over 500 U.N. peacekeepers and the renewed outbreak of fighting between the RUF and government forces in May 2000, the government of Sierra Leone requested that the U.N. assist in establishing a court "to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of U.N. peacekeepers as hostages."²⁵³ The government expressly mentioned that the RUF, in reneging on their obligations under the Lomé Peace Agreement, continued to subject many women and children to human rights abuses, including sexual slavery. On August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1315 requesting the secretary-general to negotiate with the Sierra Leonean government an agreement for the establishment of a special court.

Due to delays in funding contributions and agreement on key substantive matters, the agreement between the government and the U.N. to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone was not signed until January 16, 2002.²⁵⁴ The total budget for the SCSL is U.S. \$56.8 million. The first year of the court has been fully funded and pledges have been received for the second year.²⁵⁵ The secretary-general appointed the prosecutor and registrar on April 19, 2002, and it is hoped that the first trials will commence in the second quarter of 2003.²⁵⁶ Given budgetary constraints, it is likely that only a limited number of persons will be tried, perhaps as few as twenty.

The SCSL differs in notable ways from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Firstly, it is based on an agreement between the government and the U.N. and was not established by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This means that the Special Court does not have the power to require international cooperation.²⁵⁷ Secondly, the SCSL is a hybrid court relying on both international and domestic laws. The professional and support staff of the court will be a mix of Sierra Leonean and foreign nationals.

Article 1 of the SCSL provides that the court has the competence to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996."²⁵⁸

Other crimes that the court has the jurisdiction to prosecute are provided under Article 2 to Article 6. Under Article 2, which defines the crimes against humanity that the SCSL has the power to prosecute, the following crimes of sexual violence are specified: "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence."²⁵⁹ Rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault can also be prosecuted as violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II as stated under Article 3 of the statute. Under Article 4, specific serious violations of international humanitarian law are enumerated, including intentionally attacking civilians and the recruitment of children under fifteen years old into

²⁵³ Letter dated June 12, 2000 and addressed by the president of Sierra Leone to the U.N. secretary-general. Letter and annexed Suggested Framework for the Special Court.

²⁵⁴ Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf>.

²⁵⁵ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Robin Vincent (registrar of the SCSL), U.K., July 4, 2002.

²⁵⁶ S/2002/246, Letter dated March 6, 2002 from the secretary-general addressed to the president of the Security Council. David Crane, a prosecutor for the U.S. Department of Defence, was appointed as prosecutor and Robin Vincent of the U.K. was appointed as the registrar.

²⁵⁷ See also letter from Human Rights Watch to members of the Security Council and other interested states dated September 27, 2001. Under Chapter VII, which is entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," the Security Council can decide to take non-military and/or military action against states that threaten international peace and security. Decisions taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII—which should be read in conjunction with Article 24, which confers primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council, and Article 25, under which U.N. member states agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council—are binding on member states.

²⁵⁸ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents-specialcourt.html>.

²⁵⁹ The other crimes against humanity are: murder; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds; and other inhuman acts.

the armed forces. With the unanimous adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in May 2000,²⁶⁰ however, the minimum age for any conscription or forced recruitment has been raised to eighteen.²⁶¹ Under Article 5, gender-based crimes can also be prosecuted under domestic law provisions. However, as these provisions do not meet international standards in terms of definition of crimes and punishment, they should not be applied.²⁶²

In accordance with the U.N.'s statement that it did not recognize the Lomé amnesty as it purported to apply to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, Article 10 of the court's statute states:

An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.²⁶³

This means that those bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity (Article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (Article 3); and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4) can be prosecuted for their crimes.

The issue of command responsibility is of crucial import to the SCSL given that its mandate is to try "persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders, who in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."²⁶⁴ The court therefore will only prosecute the so-called "big fish" and not the "small fry" or those persons who in many instances actually committed the violations. Article 6 of the statute of the SCSL provides that:

- 3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
- 4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Special Court determines that justice so requires.²⁶⁵

The failure by rebel commanders and army officers to punish combatants involved in abuses, despite documentation of and international attention to crimes of sexual violence perpetrated by rebels and pro-government forces, indicates that such persons of authority knowingly tolerated and even condoned these abuses. Commanders may also bear individual criminal responsibility for crimes of sexual violence in addition to command responsibility, as the testimonies in this report highlight.

It is highly regrettable that the court's temporal jurisdiction does not extend to the beginning of the conflict (March 23, 1991). Instead November 30, 1996, the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord, was chosen as it was felt that including the whole war would impose too great a burden on the court. The U.N. also felt that this date corresponded to a new phase in the conflict without necessarily having any political connotations, and that this

²⁶⁰ General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, adopted May 25, 2000.

²⁶¹ Sierra Leone signed and ratified the Optional Protocol of the CRC on September 8, 2000 and on August 24, 2001 respectively. The Optional Protocol entered into force on February 12, 2002.

²⁶² Article 5 refers to the sections (6, 7 and 12) of the 1926 Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act that relate to abuses committed against girls under the age of fourteen. See above, "Rape as a crime under general law," et seq., for a discussion of these provisions.

²⁶³ Article 10 of the statute of the SCSL.

²⁶⁴ Article 1 of the statute of the SCSL.

²⁶⁵ Article 6 (3) and (4) of the statute of the SCSL.

temporal jurisdiction encompassed the most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups and in all geographical areas of the country.²⁶⁶ The temporal jurisdiction is, however, open-ended as the war was still ongoing at the time of the discussions on the court's establishment. The U.N. states that the lifespan of the court will be determined by "a subsequent agreement between the parties upon completion of its judicial activities, an indication of the capacity acquired by the local courts to assume the prosecution of remaining cases, or the unavailability of funds."²⁶⁷

In terms of prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, the statute specifies that "given the nature of the crimes committed and the particular sensitivities of girls, young women and children victims of rape, sexual assault, abduction and slavery of all kinds, due consideration should be given in the appointment of staff to the employment of prosecutors and investigators experienced in gender-related crimes and juvenile justice."²⁶⁸ Likewise, Article 16 (4) specifies that personnel of the Victims and Witnesses Unit should include experts in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence and violence against children.

As the TRC and Special Court will be functioning simultaneously, the interaction between the two bodies, whose subject matter as well as personal and temporal jurisdiction intersect, must urgently be clarified. This is crucial in terms of sharing of information, especially confidential information, but also for the sensitization efforts underway. Enabling legislation enacted in March 2002 contains a provision, criticized by many nongovernmental organizations, that establishes the primacy of the SCSL, apparently including over the TRC.²⁶⁹

Given that the SCSL will only try a limited number of alleged perpetrators, it needs to establish a clear and comprehensive prosecutorial strategy from the onset. Within the court's mandate, the prosecutor should ensure that gender-related crimes are thoroughly and sensitively investigated and rigorously prosecuted as crimes against humanity or war crimes. The two gender crimes investigators should conduct compulsory gender sensitization training for all staff, and provide more in-depth training for staff members dealing most directly with survivors of sexual violence. The gender crimes investigators should also have access to all cases under investigation, even the ones not previously identified as gender cases, to provide guidance and expertise.

Principle of Universal Jurisdiction

Given the limited number of persons that the Special Court can prosecute due to funding constraints, it is important to note that the principle of universal jurisdiction applies to war crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery,²⁷⁰ and torture.²⁷¹ A resolution passed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in April 1999, specifically reminded all factions and forces in Sierra Leone of this principle, stating that "in any armed conflict including an armed conflict of a non-international character, the taking of hostages, willful killing and torture or inhuman treatment of persons taking no active part in the hostilities constitute grave breaches of international humanitarian law, and that all countries are under the obligation to search for such persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their

²⁶⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, para. 25-28. Other dates considered were May 25, 1997, and January 6, 1999, but the U.N. considered that these would be perceived as offering only selective justice.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 28.

²⁶⁸ Article 15 (4) of the statute of the SCSL. A Woman's Task Force for the Special Court and TRC was established with the support of the International Human Rights Law Group to advocate that gender-based crimes be properly investigated by both bodies and—in terms of the Special Court—prosecuted. The Women's Task Force has also advocated for the appointment of staff who are experienced in and sensitive to cases of sexual violence, as well as for gender balance i.e. women should be well represented in positions of authority as well as in positions of support (statement takers, investigators, counselors and interpreters, etc.).

²⁶⁹ Special Court Agreement 2002 (ratification) Act 2002 (March 7, 2002). Article 21 (2) of the Act provides that: "Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court."

²⁷⁰ Slavery can be prosecuted as a war crime and a crime against humanity, but also on an independent basis against both state and non-state actors during wartime and peace given its status as a peremptory norm of customary law.

²⁷¹ Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Articles 8, 9, 17, 19 and 20, *Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-eighth Session*, U.N. Doc. A/51/10, para.50 (United Nations, 1996).

nationality, before their own courts."²⁷²

The special rapporteur for violence against women also stressed the principle of universal jurisdiction in her report on her mission to Sierra Leone:

Thus, crimes of gender based violence must be investigated and documented for possible criminal prosecution in the domestic courts of other States which may have jurisdiction ...²⁷³

IX. THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

National Response

Climate of Impunity

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any prosecutions in the Sierra Leonean courts of any cases of conflict-related sexual violence or other human rights abuses. The lack of both categories of prosecutions is due to a number of factors. Firstly, many survivors simply want to try to forget about the sexual violence and other human rights abuses they have been subjected to and just get on with their lives in post-conflict Sierra Leone, which for many is a daily struggle. Secondly, some women and girls fear reprisals. According to the survey conducted by Physicians for Human Rights, thirteen (or 25 percent) of the fifty-one respondents indicating that their perpetrator should not be punished, expressed this fear.²⁷⁴ Thirdly, women and girls are often ashamed of what happened to them and are therefore reluctant to present themselves in court. Fourthly, women and girls have little faith in the criminal justice system or the customary law system, which were never equipped to deal with crimes of such widespread and systematic nature. If a survivor of sexual violence does decide to prosecute, she is likely to be retraumatized by the whole experience given the very poor track record of the Sierra Leonean criminal justice system. Fifthly, many women and girls lack the financial means to access the court system. As women are generally economically dependent on men, many women who have initiated prosecution of non-conflict-related sexual violence, have dropped their cases once they realize that their husband may be sentenced to prison (dependency means that a previously abducted woman or girl who is still with her rebel "husband" is even more unlikely to bring any charges against him). Sixthly, victims are often not even aware of their rights, given high illiteracy rates, prevalent societal attitudes towards sexual violence, and women's low status in Sierra Leonean society. Many rural women and girls, in particular, see little value in the formal court system as there is often no financial or material benefit from bringing a case. Attitudes towards sexual violence, and the subordinate status of women and girls, mean that there is considerable societal pressure for women not to bring cases before the courts that could bring shame to the extended family, such as sexual violence cases.

The climate of impunity means that violence against women and girls remains a serious problem in post-conflict Sierra Leone. Rape continues to be committed by former rebels, members of the CDF and by civilians who are used to doing what they want with women by force and with impunity. A lawyer who practices in the Eastern Province reported to Human Rights Watch that of the rape victims he was currently representing at least 50 percent had been raped by civilians and the remainder by former combatants.²⁷⁵ Girls continue to suffer the greatest number of sexual assaults: a lawyer who practices in the Freetown area reported to Human Rights Watch that of the at least fifty rape victims she represented at the time of writing, 98 percent are under fourteen years old.²⁷⁶ Although there are no reliable statistics on the incidence of sexual or domestic violence, the police doctor in Connaught Hospital in Freetown, which is the largest government-run hospital in the country, sees about thirty victims of recent rape and sexual assault per month.²⁷⁷ For the reasons enumerated above, this figure is likely to

²⁷² UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/1, April 6, 1999.

²⁷³ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women* E/CN.4/2002/83/Add. 2, 2002, para. 78.

²⁷⁴ PHR report, pp. 53-55 and Table 7 at p. 56. Women could select more than one option.

²⁷⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

²⁷⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with Claire Fatu Hanciles (lawyer), Freetown, August 9, 2002.

²⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

be the tip of the iceberg. Physicians for Human Rights found that 39 percent of respondents expressed concern (“quite a bit” or “extremely worried”) about future sexual violence by family members, friends or civilian strangers. Ninety-one women (or 9 percent of all respondents) had experienced sexual abuse, occurring at an average age of fifteen, from family, friends or civilians during their lifetime.²⁷⁸

Despite all these problems, seventeen out of a total of ninety-four respondents (or 18 percent) reporting sexual violence to Physicians for Human Rights supported punishment for “all those involved,” thirty women (or 32 percent) supported punishment for the perpetrators, and seventeen women (or 18 percent) supported punishment for the commanders. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others.²⁷⁹

Corrupt and Ineffective Judiciary

Lack of faith in the system, as the few women who have decided to prosecute non-conflict-related rape have experienced, is fully justified. The judiciary—which, prior to the conflict, barely existed in the provinces, and in Freetown was only accessible to those who had sufficient funds—completely collapsed during the war. Many lawyers fled the conflict, and much of the infrastructure, including the law courts in Freetown, was destroyed. The low salaries of personnel working in the judiciary have meant that magistrates, lawyers, and judges are easy targets for bribery and/or intimidation. In addition to these problems, women who seek justice for crimes of sexual violence have to contend with more gender-specific problems. The judiciary is dominated by men and some of its older members, in particular, do not think rape is a serious crime and that the victims are generally to blame. The legal processes are very cumbersome and open to corruption, factors which favor the perpetrator. At the magistrates court level, it is up to the magistrate to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to submit a case to the High Court and whether to grant bail. As the court system is so overburdened this phase can take weeks or months, and it is not unusual for victims to have to appear over ten times before the case is handed on to the High Court. Magistrates have also been known to grant bail even if the offender and victim live in the same compound, which means that the victim is at risk at least of intimidation and even physical violence.²⁸⁰ Many cases die in the magistrates courts, as victims run out of money, patience, and/or time. Cases at this stage are also frequently dismissed, if, for example, the witnesses do not show in court (after three no shows, the case can be dismissed): witnesses often decide against appearing in court for reasons including intimidation, ignorance of the law, lack of transportation money, and the slow pace at which court cases proceed, or because they simply do not care. The requirement for corroborating evidence is often an obstacle to prosecution and violates international norms.

If the magistrate decides that there is sufficient evidence, the case is handed up to the High Court. Cases in the High Court can also take months especially as there are also continuous indefinite adjournments to contend with. There have been no High Court sittings in the provinces for the past six years, and cases in the provinces have therefore been on indefinite hold. One offender who sexually assaulted two young girls spent five years in pre-trial detention before being sentenced to two years for indecent assault—the five years already served in pre-trial detention were ignored by the court, thus putting the offender in detention for a total of seven years rather than two.²⁸¹

Need for Law Reform

Both general and customary law offer little protection for women and girls (see above, “Women and Girls Under Sierra Leonean Law”). The misinterpretation of the general law provisions pertaining to rape by members of the criminal justice system means that girls are offered even less protection than adults. There is an urgent need for the laws to be revised: the discriminatory provisions in both general and customary law should be removed and brought into line with international standards of human rights, including in relation to the protection of women and girls from violence. The law relating to rape, in particular, should be simplified as well as

²⁷⁸ PHR report, p. 49.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch interview with John Bosco Alieu (lawyer), Freetown, February 26, 2002.

²⁸¹ Human Rights Watch interview with Abdulai Bangurah (lawyer), Freetown, March 15, 2002.

strengthened. Specific legislation on domestic violence, which currently does not exist, should be introduced as women seeking legal redress for domestic violence generally face even more difficulty in convincing the police and members of the judiciary that their rights have been violated.²⁸² The constitution should also be amended to remove the exemption for customary law and personal law from the prohibition on discrimination. Ending discrimination under customary law in practice will require a major public education exercise, but, as a start, staff of local courts, especially those presiding over them, should be trained in relation to issues of discrimination and the rights of women under the (revised) constitution and international human rights law. The judiciary and the police force need to be trained on the new laws to ensure that they are properly applied.

The Sierra Leone Police

Prior to the civil war, the Sierra Leone Police had been used by politicians for their own purposes and had not received any substantive training for decades. The attitude of the police force to sexual and domestic violence remains insensitive. Police officers, for example, often do not take reports of rape seriously and chastise women who report domestic violence. There are many problems with police investigations of rape cases. Firstly, the police lack basic investigation skills. Secondly, victims must be examined by state-employed doctors, including police doctors, as only a state-employed doctor can present medical evidence in court. Both the police and other state-employed doctors often charge money for these examinations even though they should be free of charge. Thirdly, both the doctors and the police may be intimidated and/or bribed to drop the cases, or police may demand money from plaintiffs before interviewing witnesses and arranging their transport to court. A nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) is in the process of being established with the support of the British-funded Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence.²⁸³ To date, however, only a small number of police officers (approximately sixteen) have received some training and much work remains to be done before the FSUs can deal with victims of sexual and domestic violence in an appropriate manner.

The International Response

In addition to funding UNAMSIL, the international donor community pours approximately U.S. \$70 million a year into Sierra Leone for humanitarian assistance. Within the overall humanitarian assistance program to Sierra Leone, only a small percentage of funding is targeted to gender-related programs, notwithstanding the large number of girls and women who have been affected by gender-specific abuses. This funding has also come very late: there were no services specifically for survivors of sexual violence before 1999. After the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, the international community finally took note of the scale of sexual and gender-based abuses and started funding small-scale programs in accessible areas. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program consistently overlooked the assistance as well as protection needs of abducted women and girls (see below).

Donor funding has contributed to education, adult literacy, health care, trauma counseling, and skills training programs as well as credit and income-generating schemes for a limited number of survivors of sexual violence. These programs need to be expanded into all parts of Sierra Leone, so that more survivors can benefit from these programs. Long-term sexual and gender-based violence programs that aim to educate communities about sexual and domestic violence as well as provide women with health care and some legal aid on a limited scale have been established in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the east and south. These programs have been quite successful in changing the attitudes towards sexual and domestic violence of the IDP communities these programs serviced. They have also empowered rural women to stand up for their rights.

²⁸² Charges of physical assault can be made under the 1861 Offenses Against the Person Act under sections 18 (wounding with intent to maim; causing grievous bodily harm with intent; shooting with intent to maim), 20 (unlawful wounding) and 47 (assault, battery, actual bodily harm).
²⁸³ Human Rights Watch interview with Bill Roberts and Anne Hewlett (respectively crime adviser and criminal investigation trainer with the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project), Freetown, May 1, 2002.

To date, funding for the judiciary has focused on the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the judiciary, but as the peace in Sierra Leone takes hold, donors, including the British government and the World Bank, are considering funding desperately needed judicial reform programs.

The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program

The extent to which sexual violence, including sexual slavery, has been ignored throughout the war and in the post-conflict phase is most evident by the lack of attention paid to the thousands of abducted women and girls and their children. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process has completely overlooked the protection needs of these women and children. The lack of clear policy and procedural guidelines on these abductees has meant that the responsibility for these women and girls fell between governmental institutions and implementing agencies, resulting in an *ad hoc*, inappropriate and inadequate humanitarian response. Little to no funding was allocated to the protection needs of abducted women and children and only a small number of programs that provide education, skills training and counseling were established for them. This important human rights issue was raised on numerous occasions at different levels with the relevant government institutions, donor governments and the World Bank by UNAMSIL and nongovernmental organizations as well as by World Bank consultants in confidential reports, but did not succeed in bringing about any concrete policy decisions.

The needs of abducted girls and women should, however, be considered an inextricable part of the DDR process and a priority issue that should have been addressed during meetings between the U.N. and government officials or rebel leaders prior to the commencement of disarmament. The abducted girls and women should have been registered and interviewed at the same time that their "husbands" entered the DDR program, with the interviews conducted separately from the "husbands." Information on alternative options could have been disseminated at the DDR camps through social workers and orientation sessions. Alternatively, if it had been possible to gain access to the abducted women and children in rebel-held areas before or during the DDR process then contact should have been established to determine total numbers and inform them of the reintegration support and alternative options available to them. Female social workers in the DDR camps could also have counseled the abductees to help them understand the implications of their decisions, and that the decision is theirs. Basic reproductive health services, including testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, should also be provided at DDR camps.

Donors and the government of Sierra Leone must redress their neglect of survivors' protection needs by drastically increasing funding for women's programs and providing women with desperately needed assistance in terms of health, education, trauma counseling, adult literacy and skills training to promote their rehabilitation into society. In addition, donors should fund legal reform and training programs for the judiciary and police, which will contribute to increase the protection of women's human rights. Donors should also learn from their failure in Sierra Leone and ensure that DDR programs in other countries where large numbers of women and girls have been abducted by the fighting forces, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, do integrate the protection needs of these abducted women and girls.²⁸⁴

United Kingdom

The U.K. has played a key role in restoring peace to Sierra Leone. During the May 2000 crisis, British troops deployed to Sierra Leone, and a standby force was deployed offshore ready to provide additional support to UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army, if required. Since the May 2000 crisis, it has provided technical assistance to most government departments and military training to the new SLA, and has publicly committed itself to remain closely involved in Sierra Leone.

The U.K. is the biggest donor in Sierra Leone, and in 2002 contributed £100 million (approximately U.S. \$145 million) of which about £50 million (approximately U.S. \$73 million) was disbursed through its development agency, the Department for International Development (DFID). DFID-funded programs aim at

²⁸⁴ Human Rights Watch, *The War within the War: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

strengthening the protection and promotion of women's human rights. Since September 2001, the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP), which is funded by DFID and staffed only by British nationals, has been working to establish a nationwide system of Family Support Units (FSUs) to deal with cases of sexual and domestic violence. Under this system, only female police officers are supposed to interview female victims, while both male and female police officers are responsible for interviewing suspects and witnesses. More officers need to be trained in addition to the sixteen who have received training. As the force has few women, more females need to be recruited so only female police officers interview victims of sexual and domestic violence. The police officers in the FSUs lack strong leadership and require more training and close supervision to ensure that victims are dealt with in a professional and sensitive manner.

DFID also funds a program to promote the participation of women in politics, especially in Parliament, as well as university research into conflict-related sexual violence committed in January 1999.²⁸⁵ DFID has provided £2.5 million (about U.S. \$3.5 million) for a three year Law Development Program which aims at rehabilitating the physical infrastructure of the court system, as well as providing training to administrative staff to ensure proper record-keeping of cases. The Law Development Program is under review to determine its future strategy, in particular with relation to legal reform, including customary law. DFID is currently considering funding a three-year program that will establish sexual and physical assault referral centers across the country.

The U.K. has contributed a total of over U.S. \$500,000 to the operations of the TRC and its Interim Secretariat. The U.K. has also pledged U.S. \$9,110,000 over three years to the Special Court.

United States

In 1999, the U.S. put considerable pressure on the warring parties to seek a negotiated settlement. However, following the breakdown of the peace process in 2000, U.S. policy revolved around ending external support for the RUF, supporting British military actions and transitional justice mechanisms as well as providing humanitarian aid. From 2000 to 2002, the United States contributed a total of U.S. \$170 million to Sierra Leone, which was primarily disbursed on food-for-peace programs, the resettlement of displaced persons, and reintegration of former combatants. The U.S. has funded several women's programs, notably in the field of health, including the provision of obstetric surgery and HIV/AIDS education, a sexual and gender-based violence program, a program aimed at promoting women in politics, and micro-finance schemes for women. The Senate's Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) expand services to rape victims and fund a public education program on women's rights. The U.S., which is a strong supporter of the Special Court, has contributed U.S. \$5 million to this body, and pledged an additional \$10 million. The U.S. has contributed \$500,000 to the TRC.

After the May 2000 crisis, the U.S. initiated a program called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) to train and equip seven battalions of West African troops for peacekeeping with UNAMSIL. In July 2002, the U.S. pledged to help ECOWAS set up military bases for the rapid deployment of troops in conflict areas. The first steps in this assistance program include the installation of a U.S. \$5.3 million early-warning satellite communications system, which will link the ECOWAS secretariat with observation centers in four ECOWAS countries.

European Union

The E.U. did not play a key role in responding to the armed conflict and to date has not been a major donor. Since May 2000, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has disbursed approximately €30 million (roughly the same in U.S. dollars) in Sierra Leone. Few ECHO-funded programs have directly targeted women. ECHO has funded child protection programs, which have assisted child-mothers who became pregnant as the result of conflict-related sexual violence.

²⁸⁵ A survey of 226 victims, conducted by the University of Sierra Leone Gender Research and Documentation Centre in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUW), Médecins Sans Frontières, UNICEF and FAWE Sierra Leone.

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As the situation in Sierra Leone stabilizes, the E.U. will increase its funding to Sierra Leone through the European Development Fund (EDF), which from 2000 to 2002 disbursed €38 million on activities that supported the return to democracy, rehabilitation of infrastructure and resettlement. From 2002 to 2007, a total of €144 million will be made available for disbursement through the EDF on activities that focus on the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, good governance and institutional capacity building. An additional €76 million can be spent on activities outside of these two focal areas.

In 2002, the European Commission funded a two-year program that supports the reintegration of rape victims and other war-affected persons through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Human rights-related programs funded through the EIDHR, which has €6 million for disbursement over the next three years (2002-5), should include women's rights issues, which the EIDHR seeks to mainstream in all its programs.²⁸⁶

In addition to the U.K., other member states of the E.U. have bilaterally contributed to Sierra Leone. The Netherlands, in particular, has since 1999 funded sexual and gender-based violence programs. The Dutch government has also been a strong supporter of the Special Court and has contributed U.S. \$11.4 million, which is approximately 20 percent of the total budget. A donation for the TRC is being prepared at the time of writing, but has not yet been formalized. A small budget for human rights programs was made available for 2002.

United Nations

Security Council, Secretary-General, and UNAMSIL

Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the members of the Security Council have devoted much attention to the conflict in Sierra Leone. Kofi Annan visited the country in July 1999 and December 2000. The Security Council has frequently denounced the egregious human rights abuses committed during the conflict, in particular by the rebel factions, and has stressed the importance of protecting women in armed conflict.²⁸⁷

Following the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda, there was substantial pressure on the U.N. to ensure that the UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission would succeed when it was established in October 1999.²⁸⁸ After the slow initial deployment of peacekeepers, which led to the May 2000 crisis, the U.N. committed itself to deploy 17,500 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL is the world's largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission, costing the international community over U.S. \$700 million annually.²⁸⁹ As of March 31, 2002, there were 17,455 peacekeepers, 259 military observers, 87 civilian police officers as well as 322 international and 552 local civilian staff in Sierra Leone. The mission is now being hailed as a great success, although Human Rights Watch has criticized UNAMSIL on numerous occasions for failing to fulfill its mandate to protect the civilian population.²⁹⁰ In a June 19 report to the Security Council on UNAMSIL, the secretary-general stated that the government security apparatus was not yet capable of protecting Sierra Leone from both internal and external threats and warned that the international community must protect the major investments that had made possible the progress achieved so far.²⁹¹ On September 24, the Security Council extended UNAMSIL's mandate for a further six months, but envisaged a reduction of 4,500 troops in the peacekeeping mission within eight months. The resolution was based on the recommendation of a further report on UNAMSIL which laid out benchmarks to govern the withdrawal of the U.N. from Sierra Leone, including the ability of the police and army

²⁸⁶ Human Rights Watch interview with EIDHR representatives Andrew Kelly and Irene Corcillo and the Economic Adviser to the E.U., René Mally, Freetown, April 10, 2002.

²⁸⁷ In resolution 1370, the Security Council expressed "... its continued deep concern at the reports of human rights abuses and attacks by the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) ... against the civilian population, in particular the widespread violation of the human rights of women and children, including sexual violence, [and] demands that these acts cease immediately..." U.N. Security Council resolution 1370, S/RES/1370 (2001), September 18, 2001, para. 4.

²⁸⁸ U.N. Security Council resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (1999), October 22, 1999.

²⁸⁹ U.N. Security Council resolution 1346, S/RES/1346 (2001), March 30, 2001.

²⁹⁰ See Human Rights Watch letter addressed to Secretary-General Kofi Annan at <http://www.org/press/2001/11/annanltr.htm>.

²⁹¹ *Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/679, June 19, 2002.

to maintain security, the successful re-integration of ex-combatants, and the situation in the broader sub-region. The resolution also encouraged the government of Sierra Leone to "pay special attention to the needs of women and children affected by the war," and welcomed "the steps taken by UNAMSIL to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation of women and children," and encouraged the mission to continue to enforce a policy of "zero tolerance" for such acts. The Security Council also called on states to bring to justice their own nationals responsible for such crimes in Sierra Leone.²⁹²

UNAMSIL was initially authorized to field fourteen human rights officers, but for the first two years of UNAMSIL's existence, the human rights unit remained understaffed, which meant that human rights abuses were not effectively monitored. At various times during the lifespan of UNAMSIL, the gender specialist post was not filled. When UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded to 17,500, the human rights unit was authorized to recruit six additional human rights officers and most positions are currently filled. The Physicians for Human Rights report on conflict-related sexual violence was produced in collaboration with the UNAMSIL human rights section and has contributed to focusing the attention of the international community on the issue of sexual violence.

In October 2000, the Security Council held an Open Session on Women and Armed Conflict and adopted a resolution calling for documenting the impact of armed conflict on women and the role of women in peace-building.²⁹³ Since then the U.N. Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has undertaken a major study on the impact of armed conflict on women in more than ten countries around the world, including Sierra Leone. In January 2002, a three-woman UNIFEM team visited Sierra Leone in connection with this study.²⁹⁴ UNIFEM also recently appointed a gender and AIDS adviser in Sierra Leone, who is tasked with strengthening the gender division of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs and local women's groups as well as mainstreaming gender in the TRC and Special Court for Sierra Leone. She will also research the relationship between gender, conflict and HIV/AIDS with the aim to increase protection against HIV infection.²⁹⁵

In November 2001, a team from the Training and Evaluation Service of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) conducted a two-week training on gender in peacekeeping. The program involved over 1,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers and civilian personnel from both Freetown and the provinces. Local human rights activists and women's organizations were invited in order to contribute a domestic perspective on gender issues.

UNAMSIL has funded several women's programs for survivors of sexual violence through various trust funds. These trust funds are normally established for quick impact programs whilst the rehabilitation and reintegration of women who have been abducted and subjected to sexual violence and sexual slavery should be seen as long-term projects.

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The then U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson visited Sierra Leone in June 1999, while the Lomé peace negotiations were taking place. The purpose of the mission was "to support the peace process, to encourage future programmes for the promotion and protection of human rights in the country, and to draw attention to the plight of children, women and civilians bearing the brunt of the excesses in Sierra Leone."²⁹⁶ OHCHR has provided technical assistance for the establishment of the TRC, but was very slow to issue the funding appeal for the TRC. OHCHR has also assisted in the drafting of the statute for the national human rights commission provided under the Lomé Peace Agreement, but the establishment of this body has not progressed beyond that point.

²⁹² *Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2002/987, September 5, 2002; U.N. Security Council resolution 1436, S/RES/1436 (2002), September 24, 2002, paragraphs 14 and 15.

²⁹³ U.N. Security Council resolution 1325, S/RES/1325 (2000), October 31, 2000.

²⁹⁴ See the summary of the assessment's findings at http://www.unifem.org/gov_pax_assessment.pdf.html.

²⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch interview with Jebbeh Forster (Gender and AIDS advisor to UNIFEM Sierra Leone), Freetown, March 11 and April 15, 2002.

²⁹⁶ United Nations, *Sixth Report of the U.N. secretary-general on the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)*, S/1999/645, June 4, 1999, para. 39.

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The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has condemned the human rights situation in Sierra Leone on numerous occasions.²⁹⁷ In August 2001, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the commission's special rapporteur on violence against women, visited Sierra Leone to highlight the gender-specific abuses that thousands of women and girls have been subjected to. She highlighted that "systematic and widespread rape and other sexual violence has been a hallmark of the conflict in Sierra Leone" and noted that "the failure to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence has contributed to an environment of impunity that perpetuates violence against women in Sierra Leone, including rape and domestic violence."²⁹⁸ She therefore stressed the need for accountability for these abuses.

World Bank

The World Bank established a multi-donor trust fund for the DDR program, which is now focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants. As discussed above, the protection needs of abducted women and girls were ignored by the DDR program even though World Bank consultants had raised this issue in their confidential reports. In 2002, the World Bank agreed in principle to allocate U.S. \$140 million to support reconstruction and development efforts in Sierra Leone and U.S. \$15 million to go towards HIV/AIDS prevention projects there.

X. CONCLUSION

The decade-long war in Sierra Leone has been characterized by egregious human rights abuses committed primarily by the rebel forces against the civilian population. Throughout the conflict, thousands of women and girls were raped and subjected to other forms of sexual violence of unimaginable brutality, including sexual slavery. The low status of women and girls in Sierra Leone by law, custom and practice remains a contributing factor to their vulnerability and may have contributed to the widespread and systematic sexual violence. In addition to the combatants' motivation to achieve their strategic military objectives through terrorizing the civilian population, the fact that sexual violence during the Sierra Leone conflict predominantly involved *men* raping *women* reveals that conflict-related rape, like most rape, reflects this dynamic of gender inequality and subordination. This assertion by men of their power over women is deeply imbedded in societal attitudes in Sierra Leone. The international community and the government therefore need to think of creative ways to change these deeply embedded attitudes.

The lack of attention paid until recently, both nationally and internationally, to the widespread and systematic acts of sexual violence, sexual slavery and their consequences means that there are few assistance programs for survivors. The international community and the government of Sierra Leone should drastically increase funding to ensure that desperately needed health care, education, adult literacy, skills training, trauma counseling, and income-generating schemes are provided. Nor have there been any prosecutions. Rape therefore continues with impunity and it is little wonder that women and girls in post-conflict Sierra Leone remain vulnerable to non-conflict-related violence, and are reluctant to seek legal redress in the domestic courts or even report the incident given the country's inefficient and corrupt criminal justice system. Although, the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should help to address this climate of impunity, the domestic legal system must urgently be revised to ensure that crimes of sexual violence are prosecuted in a sensitive manner. The international community therefore needs to fund legal reform and training

²⁹⁷ The Commission on Human Rights deplored "... the ongoing atrocities committed by the rebels, including murders, rape, abductions ... calls for an end to all such acts." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/24, April 18, 2000, para. 4. The Commission also expressed its grave concern "...at the targeting and abuse of women and girls that have been committed in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front and others, including other armed groups, in particular murder, sexual violence, rape, including systematic rape, sexual slavery and forced marriages..." U.N. Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/20, April 20, 2001, para. 2(b).

²⁹⁸ United Nations, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/49*, Addendum, Mission to Sierra Leone, E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.2 (United Nations, 2002), p. 2.

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programs for the criminal justice system as a whole, which has a key role in promoting and protecting the rights of Sierra Leonean women and girls.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was written by Louise Taylor, a consultant to Human Rights Watch, on the basis of interviews conducted in Sierra Leone from February to June 2002. It is also based on testimonies collected by Corinne Dufka, Human Rights Watch Africa Division researcher based in Sierra Leone, from 1999 to June 2002, and by Ellen Vermeulen, consultant, from February 2000 to April 2001.

The report was edited by Bronwen Manby, deputy director of the Africa Division; James Ross, senior legal adviser; and Ian Gorvin, consultant to the program office. It was also reviewed by Corinne Dufka; Widney Brown, advocacy director in the Women's Rights Division; Zama Coursen-Neff, researcher in the Children's Rights Division; Joanne Csete, director of the program on HIV/AIDS and human rights; and Joanne Weschler, U.N. representative. The final edits were inputted by Max Marcus, consultant. Production and coordination assistance was provided by Jeff Scott, associate in the Africa Division; Patrick Minges, Publications director; and Fitzroy Hepkins, mail manager.

We would like to thank all the organizations and individuals interviewed for this report for their invaluable assistance and insights. We particularly thank the survivors who agreed to recount their experiences. The courage and dignity of these women and girls never ceases to amaze and inspire.

Human Rights Watch recognizes with appreciation funding for work on Sierra Leone from the Oak Foundation, Stichting Doen, and the Rockefeller Foundation.

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Number	Item	Content
201	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone 1998 – a year of atrocities against civilians".

Amnesty International

SIERRA LEONE

1998 - a year of atrocities against civilians

Introduction

During 1998 the scale of atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand unarmed civilians, including many women and children, have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed and mutilated by forces of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the armed opposition Revolutionary Front (RUF) since February 1998. These atrocities are continuing.

The AFRC, which seized power in a military coup in May 1997 and which was joined by the RUF, was deposed in February 1998 by West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone. The government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, which had been elected in 1996, returned to Freetown in March 1998. Although security has since returned to the capital, Freetown, and much of the south of the country, the scale of human rights abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces in the north and east of the country has escalated and taken on grotesque forms. From April 1998 reports emerged of civilians suffering mutilations such as crude amputations of their feet, hands, arms, lips or ears. Women and girls have been systematically raped. Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, have been abducted by rebel forces. The violence has resulted in hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans fleeing to neighbouring Guinea and Liberia or becoming internally displaced within Sierra Leone. AFRC and RUF forces must respect international humanitarian law and immediately end the gross human rights abuses which they are perpetrating against unarmed civilians.

The international community, including the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth and the European Union (EU), has devoted considerable attention and effort to resolving the political crisis in Sierra Leone and to restoring the government of President Kabbah. It has since repeatedly condemned the atrocities being committed by AFRC and RUF forces. The international community has committed itself to bringing peace and security to Sierra Leone and also to assisting in its reconstruction and rehabilitation. This commitment must include initiatives to help end the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by AFRC and RUF forces, to prevent further abuses and also to lay solid foundations for the respect and protection of human rights in the future.

The challenges facing Sierra Leone in confronting the widespread and gross human rights abuses which have continued and worsened since May 1997 are difficult and daunting. Sierra Leone's social and economic infrastructure needs to be rebuilt. Its institutions, such as the legal and judicial systems and the army and police, need to be restructured and reinforced in order to ensure protection of human rights. Civil society, including the human rights community, has a crucial role to play. The government of Sierra Leone has to respond to these challenges in a way that ensures that the fundamental human rights of all those in Sierra Leone are protected.

West African forces and a civilian militia who are fighting rebel forces must also respect international humanitarian and human rights law. Forces of the civilian militia have been responsible for extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, although on a far lesser scale than rebel forces. West African forces have in some cases illegally detained civilians and tortured and ill-treated captured combatants. Concerns have also been expressed about the protection of non-combatants during military operations.

Accountability for the gross human rights abuses which have occurred in Sierra Leone must be established. National reconciliation within Sierra Leone will not be possible if there is impunity for those who have perpetrated human rights abuses. All those charged in connection with the military coup in May 1997 and the period of AFRC rule must be granted trials which conform to international standards of fairness. Recourse to the death penalty will not contribute to the process of reconciliation.

The international community should continue to assist Sierra Leone to respond effectively to the challenges which it faces in ensuring the long-term protection and respect of human rights in Sierra Leone.

The political context

On 25 May 1997 the government of President Kabbah was overthrown in a military coup and the military formed the AFRC, headed by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. President Kabbah had come to power in March 1996 following parliamentary and presidential elections, ending four years of military rule. The AFRC claimed that they had overthrown the government because it had failed to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone following a peace agreement concluded in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in November 1996 between the government and the RUF to end the internal armed conflict which began in 1991. It also claimed that the government was undemocratic and that it had promoted tribalism by appointing people mainly from the Mende ethnic group from the south and the east to prominent government positions. A major grievance was the perceived lack of resources accorded by the government to the Sierra Leone armed forces and a favouring of a civilian militia composed of traditional hunters of the Mende ethnic group, known as *kamajors*, which supported the government in the conflict against the RUF. These accusations were strongly denied by President Kabbah, members of his government and their supporters. The AFRC also called for the release and return of the RUF's leader, Foday Sankoh, in detention in Nigeria.

Foday Sankoh remained held, effectively under house arrest, in Abuja, Nigeria. He had been detained by Nigerian authorities on arrival in Nigeria in March 1997, apparently for possession of arms and ammunition. From Nigeria, Foday Sankoh announced his support for the military coup. The AFRC was subsequently joined by RUF forces who arrived in large numbers in Freetown. Foday Sankoh was named as Vice-Chairman of the AFRC and prominent members of the RUF were appointed to the AFRC's ruling council.

The overthrow of President Kabbah was condemned by the international community which demanded the return of constitutional order to Sierra Leone. Negotiations by the

international community with the AFRC faltered, a global economic embargo was imposed and military intervention to restore the government of President Kabbah was seriously considered by countries in the region if dialogue and sanctions failed. Following the military coup the OAU gave a mandate to ECOWAS to take necessary action to restore legality and constitutionality to Sierra Leone and subsequently provided strong support for ECOWAS's initiatives to bring peace, security and stability to Sierra Leone. The UN Security Council also expressed its full support for the efforts of ECOWAS to resolve the political crisis in Sierra Leone.

On 23 October 1997 the AFRC signed an agreement in Conakry, in neighbouring Guinea, with representatives of five other West African governments to return power to President Kabbah by 22 April 1998. Implementation of this agreement, however, which included cessation of hostilities, disarmament and demobilization, encountered serious set-backs. Fighting between AFRC and RUF forces on the one hand and the *kamajors* on the other intensified.

In early February 1998, following attacks on its bases outside Freetown, West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) [1], launched an offensive on Freetown. Chaos and violence ensued the following week during which there were many civilian casualties. Civilians were killed by AFRC and RUF forces who also looted and destroyed their homes. Reports described soldiers and RUF forces, also joined by Liberian fighters, going from house to house of those they suspected of opposing them and deliberately and arbitrarily killing them. Others died as a result of shelling both by ECOMOG and also AFRC and RUF forces. While fighting continued in Freetown, civilians in Southern and Eastern Provinces were facing an equally desperate situation as they were caught in fighting between the *kamajors* and AFRC and RUF forces. Thousands of people, including women and children, fled into neighbouring Liberia to escape. The humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, already critical, deteriorated still further with the increase in hostilities.

Although after the ECOMOG intervention and the return of President Kabbah's government comparative calm and the rule of law returned to Freetown and Southern Province, armed confrontation has continued throughout the following months in Northern and Eastern Provinces as ECOMOG forces have fought to defeat remaining rebel forces. Appalling atrocities have been committed against civilians as conflict has continued. Major Johnny Paul Koroma and other prominent members of the AFRC and the RUF, including Sam Bockarie, known as Mosquito, remained with rebel forces in the north and east of the country.

The government of Sierra Leone has adopted a comprehensive program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants which contains clearly defined roles for ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which was established by the UN Security Council in July 1998. The program is aimed at some 33,000 former combatants of the disbanded national army, the RUF and the civilian militia, known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The government has expressed a particular commitment to demobilizing some 2,500 child soldiers who have fought in the

internal armed conflict. Funding was expected from international financial institutions, several UN agencies and important donor nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom. As violence has escalated and offensives by ECOMOG and CDF against rebel forces have continued, however, effective implementation of this program has been prevented.

On 25 July 1998 Foday Sankoh was released by the Nigerian government into the custody of the Sierra Leonean authorities. He appeared in a television interview calling on his fighters to end atrocities against civilians and to surrender to either ECOMOG or UNOMSIL. The government subsequently reiterated a deadline of 8 August 1998 for an amnesty for rebel forces but there was no significant response. Members of the RUF were subsequently reported as claiming that Foday Sankoh had made these statements under duress and continued to demand his release. The RUF threatened to continue their campaign of violence against civilians if he remained in detention. The government announced its intention to prosecute Foday Sankoh for crimes, including gross human rights abuses, committed during Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict. He was brought to trial on 24 September 1998 and convicted and sentenced to death the following month. This prompted further attacks by rebel forces against unarmed civilians in retaliation.

Also in September 1998 rebel forces called on the government to begin negotiations for peace through the UN, the OAU and the Commonwealth Secretariat, the moral guarantors of the peace agreement signed in Abidjan. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG)[2] on 9 October 1998 called on rebel forces to make an immediate statement accepting the following terms: the recognition of the legitimacy and authority of the government; an unconditional and indefinite cessation of all hostilities; and a willingness to enter into talks to bring about an immediate end to the conflict. At the same time CMAG expressed its grave concern about the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, in particular the continuing atrocities by rebel forces, which it condemned unreservedly. The government also responded to the call by rebel forces for negotiations by saying that they should lay down their arms and surrender to UNOMSIL military observers.

President Kabbah repeated calls for rebel forces to surrender on 19 October 1998 and renewed an offer of amnesty for those surrendering. It appeared that the amnesty implied that those surrendering who had not been responsible for crimes would be included in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process whereas those who were accused of criminal offences would be prosecuted with due process of the law. There was, however, no significant increase in the number of those surrendering.

The West Africa sub-region

Liberia was widely reported to be providing combatants, arms and ammunition to AFRC and RUF forces in Sierra Leone. Liberian fighters were present in Freetown at the time of the ECOMOG intervention and survivors of the gross human rights abuses which followed stated that the armed groups which had attacked them had included Liberians.

In the Vahun and Kolahun areas of Lofa Country in northwestern Liberia, where tens of thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees had fled escalating fighting in eastern Sierra Leone, cooperation between rebel forces and the Liberian military was reported to be witnessed regularly. The RUF second-in-command, Sam Bockarie, was reported to have been in direct contact with Liberian military forces and to have regularly crossed the border into Liberia.

On 12 May 1998 a statement by the United States Department of State referred to *"distressing rumours that RUF and AFRC forces were being assisted in their campaign of terror by other governments. Although we cannot confirm these rumours, it should be clear that any government or other party which is found to be helping the rebels to prolong the tragedy in Sierra Leone will face the strongest condemnation of the United States and the international community."*

On 20 May 1998 the President of the UN Security Council condemned as gross violations of international humanitarian law the atrocities carried out against the civilian population, particularly women and children, by the deposed AFRC and RUF, including widespread rape, mutilation and killings, and called for an immediate end to continuing violence against civilians. The Security Council also expressed grave concern about reports of military support being provided to the AFRC and RUF by other countries and called on all states to observe strictly the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, which had imposed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone, and to avoid any action which might further destabilize the situation in Sierra Leone. Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 lifted the arms embargo on the government of Sierra Leone. The same resolution prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related *matériel* to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. The Security Council subsequently praised the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to stop the flow of arms across the border from Liberia to rebels forces in Kailahun District, Eastern Province. All states were urged to comply strictly with the terms of the UN embargo on sales of arms to rebel forces still fighting in the interior of the country.

In his Fifth Report on the Situation in Sierra Leone to the UN Security Council of 9 June 1998, the UN Secretary-General stated that the deployment of ECOMOG troops at the border with Liberia could help dispel allegations of the influx of arms or the provision of armed assistance to the AFRC and RUF by foreign forces. While welcoming a commitment by the government of Liberia not to allow its territory to be used to destabilize any neighbouring country, the Secretary-General expressed the view that verification of this would improve the security climate throughout the sub-region and improve mutual confidence among countries in the sub-region.

On 22 and 23 June 1998 a Liberian delegation visited Freetown to deliver a message from President Charles Taylor to President Kabbah on ways to promote peace between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the three Mano River Union countries. The delegation denied allegations that the Liberian government was supporting AFRC and RUF forces. President Kabbah and President Taylor met in Abuja on 1 July 1998 at a meeting convened by the UN Secretary-General. Agreement was reached on a number of

confidence-building measures. A further meeting between President Kabbah and President Taylor took place in Monrovia, Liberia, on 20 July 1998. In a communiqué signed at the conclusion of the meeting both leaders condemned atrocities and human rights abuses committed by combatants in Sierra Leone against civilians, as well as continued rebel activities in Sierra Leone. They reaffirmed their commitment to non-aggression against the territorial integrity of each other's country and pledged to continue cooperation towards peace and security in the sub-region. Both leaders renewed a call to the UN and ECOWAS to deploy observer units on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone and agreed to coordinate border security activities.

At a UN special conference on Sierra Leone in New York in July 1998 the meetings between President Kabbah and President Taylor were welcomed and the two leaders were urged to continue to work towards improving relations between their two countries and regional security. The importance of stopping entry of illegal supplies of weapons into Sierra Leone and ending the direct or indirect support of neighbouring countries to rebel forces was stressed.

Relations between the two countries appeared to deteriorate, however, in October 1998 when the government of Sierra Leone was reported to have complained to the international community, including the UN Secretary-General, about the presence of Liberian combatants among rebel forces in Sierra Leone and about preparations for an incursion of Liberian fighters into Sierra Leone. These allegations were vigorously denied by President Taylor. UNOMSIL military observers at that time detected no evidence of an armed incursion from Liberia.

The UN Secretary-General in his Second Progress Report on UNOMSIL on 16 October 1998 expressed deep concern about developments in the situation between Sierra Leone and Liberia and urged both governments to exercise maximum restraint, pursue dialogue and implement the confidence-building measures agreed in July 1998. He also proposed that, should both countries agree, the deployment of ECOMOG forces at the border, subsequently accompanied by UNOMSIL military observers, could help stabilize the situation and restore mutual confidence.

During a visit by Reverend Jesse Jackson, special envoy of United States President Bill Clinton, to West Africa in November 1998 he held meetings in Conakry with President Kabbah, President Taylor and President Lansana Conté of Guinea. The three heads of state on 12 November 1998 stated their commitment to non-aggression and cooperation on security issues within the Mano River Union and also to promoting peace in Sierra Leone and maintaining stability within the sub-region.

In view of the appalling level of violence against civilians which has characterized the conflict in Sierra Leone, including the widespread and gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by AFRC and RUF and their stated intention to attack unarmed civilians, Amnesty International believes that military transfers, including arms, ammunition and combatants, to rebel forces will contribute to abuses of international human rights and humanitarian principles governing the conduct of war.

Recommendations

- all governments should take all possible measures to end immediately military transfers, including arms, ammunition and combatants, to AFRC and RUF forces;
- in addition, the governments of Liberia and Guinea, which border Sierra Leone, should take all possible measures to prevent military supplies, whether they originate in their country or not, destined for AFRC and RUF forces, from entering Sierra Leone across their borders;
- effective monitoring of the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia by ECOMOG forces and UNOMSIL military observers could assist in preventing military transfers to AFRC and RUF forces;
- governments in the sub-region should use whatever influence they may have on AFRC and RUF forces to bring about an end to the atrocities they continue to perpetrate against civilians.

International response to the human rights crisis

Following the military coup in May 1997 the international community made strenuous efforts to resolve the political crisis in Sierra Leone. Since the reinstatement of President Kabbah's government in March 1998, serious attention continues to be paid to consolidating the government's position, ending the conflict in the north and east of the country, which is still claiming hundreds of civilian victims, and to assisting rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. The continuing gross human rights abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces have been universally condemned, including by the UN, the OAU, the EU and the Commonwealth.

United Nations

On 17 April 1998 the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a UN liaison unit in Sierra Leone. Resolution 1162 (1998) provided for up to 10 UN military liaison and security advisory personnel in Freetown with a mandate for up to three months. The group was to coordinate closely with ECOMOG to report on the military situation in Sierra Leone and to assist in disarming former combatants. The resolution also welcomed efforts of President Kabbah and his government to restore peaceful and secure conditions, to re-establish an effective administration and democratic process and to embark on reconstruction. The resolution noted the need to promote national reconciliation and encouraged all parties to work towards that objective. All countries and international organizations were urged to provide urgent humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone and were encouraged to help with its reconstruction and economic and social recovery. A human rights officer was also appointed to assist the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Francis Okelo (who was subsequently appointed as Special

Representative).

In the UN Secretary-General's Fifth Report on Sierra Leone, the deteriorating human rights situation was emphasized, and it was recommended that the number of UN human rights officers in Freetown be increased.

The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

On 13 July 1998 the UN Security Council established a new peace-keeping operation, UNOMSIL, which expanded the office of the Secretary General's Special Envoy, to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone, as security conditions permitted, for an initial six-month period until 13 January 1999. UNOMSIL would consist of 70 military observers and would be accompanied by a small medical unit and civilian support staff. The civilian staff would advise the government and local police, report on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Sierra Leone, and assist the government in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs. UNOMSIL was to be led by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone. Initially, 40 military observers were to be deployed from July 1998 in Freetown, Hastings and Lungi. Depending on the security situation, a second phase of deployment would take place.

In approving Resolution 1181 (1998), which established UNOMSIL, the Security Council also condemned the continued resistance by remnants of the AFRC and RUF to the legitimate government and demanded that they lay down their arms immediately. It expressed its grave concern "*at the loss of life and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone, including refugees and displaced persons, as a result of continuing rebel attacks*".

Resolution 1181 (1998), in addition to establishing a military and civilian police peace-keeping mission, also mandated the monitoring of human rights and the provision of assistance to the government of Sierra Leone in addressing its human rights obligations [3]. The resolution also gave UNOMSIL military observers a mandate to monitor respect of international humanitarian law during the demobilization process.

By October 1998 the human rights component of UNOMSIL had been increased to seven staff: four international human rights officers, one national human rights officer and two support staff. Subsequent progress reports by the UN Secretary-General on UNOMSIL to the Security Council referred extensively and in detail to continuing human rights abuses in Sierra Leone. The prominence given to the human rights crisis in Sierra Leone in these reports is welcomed and should continue.

In his First Progress Report on 12 August 1998, the Secretary-General reported that "*there is strong evidence of the systematic and widespread perpetration of multiple forms of human rights abuse against the civilian population, including rape. In recent weeks, elements of the former junta have continued to shell population centres such as Koidu and Daru and have used civilians as human shields in their military operations. There*

have been numerous instances of arbitrary execution, including of women and children, followed in some cases by mutilation of the bodies."

In his Second Progress Report on 16 October 1998, the Secretary-General stated that *"the continuing conflict in Sierra Leone imposes immense suffering on the people of that country. I strongly condemn the summary executions, torture, mutilation, rapes, looting and other acts of barbarism carried out by former junta elements and call on them to lay down their arms and surrender. I am particularly outraged by the senseless acts of terror perpetrated against children, such as the amputation of limbs of boys and girls as young as six years of age, and support the efforts to bring to justice the authors of these especially abhorrent crimes."*

The UN Secretary-General concluded his Second Progress Report by stating that he would *"examine with great care any realistic proposal to end the armed conflict with minimal loss of life to combatants and to innocent civilians, and to promote lasting peace and national reconciliation in Sierra Leone"*.

Major initiatives have been undertaken by UNOMSIL human rights officers. Continued monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses have been reflected in the UN Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council. A preliminary human rights needs assessment has been developed. Human rights officers have also closely observed trials before the High Court and court martial in Freetown of those charged with treason in connection with the military coup in May 1997 and have intervened with the government in relation to these trials when appropriate. Guidance on human rights reporting to UNOMSIL military observers has been provided and human rights training programs for police officers, prison officials, the legal profession and the media have been developed and implemented. A human rights monitoring network including local non-governmental human rights organizations throughout the country and international non-governmental organizations has also been developed. Training for the network in human rights monitoring and reporting has been planned by UNOMSIL human rights officers, in cooperation with the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and a coalition of local groups, the National Forum for Human Rights. Increased cooperation between local human rights groups has been encouraged and it is anticipated that the human rights training program will involve relevant sectors of civil society from all parts of the country.

The role of UNOMSIL human rights officers in human rights monitoring and reporting should be continued for as long as necessary, including until it is clear that the government is implementing international human rights guarantees effectively. In September 1998 UNOMSIL human rights officers also began to provide human rights technical assistance to the government, including assistance in meeting its reporting requirements under international human rights treaties to which it is a party, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child [4].

The human rights component plays a dominant role within UNOMSIL and is an essential part of the military mandate of the peace-keeping operation. Sierra Leone continues to

face a human rights emergency and monitoring and reporting of human rights abuses therefore remain essential. Strategies to develop continued and enhanced support for the UNOMSIL human rights component should be developed by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The UN special conference on Sierra Leone

The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, convened a special conference in New York on 30 July 1998 to galvanize the international community's response to the political, humanitarian and human rights situation in Sierra Leone. The purpose of the meeting was to focus international attention on the situation in Sierra Leone and the government's initiatives aimed at resolving the conflict, restoring secure conditions and effective administration throughout the country. The conference brought together representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations, including the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS, the EU and the Commonwealth. The special conference on Sierra Leone specifically sought assistance from the international community for UNOMSIL and for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers.

At the time of the UN special conference Amnesty International recommended that the international community's commitment to bring peace and security to Sierra Leone and to assist in its reconstruction and rehabilitation include initiatives which would help to stop the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated by AFRC and RUF forces, prevent further abuses and also lay solid foundations for the respect and protection of human rights in the future[5].

The UN special conference strongly condemned the continued resistance of AFRC and RUF forces, and in particular their perpetration of appalling atrocities, and they were called on to lay down their arms and surrender. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone urged the international community to match their pledges of support to Sierra Leone with concrete action to consolidate its democratic gains. The conference agreed to establish an international contact group to mobilize and coordinate further support for Sierra Leone. The contact group was convened by the government of the United Kingdom in London on 5 November 1998[6]. Those participating included representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Sierra Leone and Lansana Kouyaté, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS. In his opening address to the meeting, Tony Lloyd, United Kingdom Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said that: *"Atrocities are still being carried out by remaining rebel forces. Sierra Leone needs peace, reconciliation and lasting restoration of democracy and human rights ... we hope to boost the efforts of the international community to meet these needs."*

Recommendations

- **the human rights component of UNOMSIL should continue to be supported and strengthened; adequate resources, including additional staff, should be**

provided to effectively monitor and report on human rights abuses throughout the country, implement technical assistance programs with the Sierra Leone government and provide support and training to Sierra Leonean human rights groups;

- the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should play a major role in reinforcing and providing support to the human rights component of UNOMSIL;
- the human rights component of UNOMSIL should include experts in the area of violence against women, including rape and sexual abuse;
- UNOMSIL human rights officers should continue to submit reports of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law to the UN Secretary-General and to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; comprehensive reports on the human right situation in Sierra Leone should be made public and submitted to the UN Security Council;
- the human rights component of UNOMSIL should have sufficient resources to effectively contribute towards long-term measures for human rights protection and its human rights monitoring and reporting roles should be continued for as long as necessary;
- visits to Sierra Leone by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on torture should take place in order to investigate and report on the gross human rights abuses which continue to be perpetrated;
- the international contact group on Sierra Leone should place human rights at the centre of its efforts to coordinate the international community's response to the situation in Sierra Leone and ensure that adequate resources are provided to initiatives aimed at the protection and respect of human rights.

OAU and ECOWAS

Immediately after the military coup in May 1997, the OAU Secretary General, Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, condemned it as "*unacceptable to the continent*". The Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution unequivocally condemned the military coup and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order [7]. It appealed to the leaders of ECOWAS states to pursue efforts aimed at assisting the people of Sierra Leone in the restoration of constitutional order and to the international community to support those efforts.

The 33rd OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe, in early June 1997 gave a mandate to ECOWAS to take necessary action to

restore legality and constitutionality to Sierra Leone. The specific measures to be taken were to be decided by ECOWAS. The OAU Secretary General reiterated the OAU's strong support for ECOWAS's initiatives to bring peace, security and stability to Sierra Leone at the ECOWAS summit in Abuja at the end of August 1997.

It was under this mandate from the OAU that ECOWAS forces were deployed in Sierra Leone to monitor a cease-fire, to enforce the sanctions and embargo imposed by the UN Security Council and to secure peace in Sierra Leone. Military intervention by ECOMOG remained an option if dialogue between the AFRC and representatives of other ECOWAS countries and sanctions failed.

ECOWAS and ECOMOG have played a dominant role in political developments in Sierra Leone since the military coup, culminating in the removal of the AFRC and the reinstatement of President Kabbah's government in February 1998. ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone have been widely praised by the international community. At the ECOWAS summit in Abuja in late October 1998 ECOWAS heads of state and government endorsed the extension of ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone and agreed that it should be strengthened, adding that efforts to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict should continue.

Between 10,000 and 12,000 ECOMOG forces were reported to have been deployed in Sierra Leone by October 1998. ECOMOG, which is composed largely of Nigerian forces, also comprises Guinean and Ghanaian troops and further contingents from Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Mali and Niger were envisaged. ECOMOG headquarters were to be transferred from Monrovia to Freetown. In April 1998 President Kabbah appointed the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone, Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, as head of internal security in Sierra Leone. He was subsequently appointed in July 1998 as Chief of Defence Staff of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF). The national Sierra Leone army had effectively ceased to exist but was to be re-established.

The ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone is generally considered by the international community and within Sierra Leone to be disciplined and its intervention in February 1998 was welcomed by the majority of Sierra Leoneans. During the following months, as atrocities in the north and east of the country escalated, ECOMOG forces evacuated to safety and medical facilities some of the hundreds of victims of amputations and other injuries, saving many lives.

In the following months, however, reports began to be received of human rights violations committed by ECOMOG forces, including illegal detention of civilians, and torture and ill-treatment of civilian detainees and captured combatants. Concerns have also been expressed that the safety of the civilian population might be endangered during ECOMOG operations, especially air strikes, against rebel forces, particularly in Kailahun District, a rebel stronghold. Measures to minimise the risk to civilians during combat must be undertaken during all military operations by ECOMOG forces. The OAU and ECOWAS have a responsibility to ensure that ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone conform to international humanitarian and human rights law at all times.

As atrocities against unarmed civilians by rebel forces have continued, the need for concerted action by the international community remains. The OAU Central Organ should continue to play a role both in attempts to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone and also to respond to post-conflict needs, in particular assistance for creating and reinforcing institutions aimed at long-term protection of human rights in Sierra Leone.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), meeting in Banjul, Gambia, on 22 October 1998 agreed to send its Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary executions, Dr Mohamed Hatem Ben-Salem, to Sierra Leone in November 1998.

Recommendations

- **in view of the continuing gross human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution should consider requesting that the UN Security Council increase the resources of the human rights component of UNOMSIL in order to investigate and document these abuses;**
- **in addition to its Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary executions, the African Commission should also consider a visit to Sierra Leone by its Special Rapporteur on women in order to investigate and report the gross human rights abuses which continue to be committed in Sierra Leone, including against girls and women;**
- **the OAU Central Organ should send a delegation to Sierra Leone to assess the country's post-conflict needs including the establishment of effective structures for the future protection and respect of human rights;**
- **ECOWAS should ensure full compliance of its forces in Sierra Leone to international humanitarian and human rights law; there should be a mechanism to monitor human rights violations and take measures to prevent further violations.**

Human rights violations during the period of AFRC rule

The period from 25 May 1997 until 12 February 1998 was marked by a total disregard for the rule of law and demands from the international community to respect international humanitarian and human rights law. The rule of law completely collapsed and violence engulfed the country.

Hundreds of people who were associated with the government of President Kabbah or his political party, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), or who were perceived to be opposed to the AFRC were detained without charge or trial, torture and ill-treatment were systematic, and many of those perceived to be political opponents of the AFRC were

extrajudicially executed.

On 20 October 1997 Amnesty International published a report which documented the human rights violations systematically committed by the AFRC and the RUF after the military coup [8]. The victims included those associated with the government of President Kabbah, journalists, students and human rights activists. Between October 1997 and February 1998 arrests, torture and killings continued relentlessly. The full toll of those detained, tortured, ill-treated and killed while the AFRC and RUF held power only emerged after they were forced from power.

During the period of AFRC rule, while it was possible to obtain limited information about human rights violations in Freetown, few details of what was happening in the Provinces were accessible. When an Amnesty International delegation travelled to Sierra Leone in May 1998, the extent of the suffering of civilians became evident. Killings, rape and looting were systematic in all parts of the country. Hundreds of people had been deliberately and arbitrarily killed, thousands lost their possessions, homes and livelihoods. Rape of girls and women was systematic throughout the country.

Amnesty International repeatedly called on the AFRC to end the systematic human rights violations which occurred after May 1997 and to adhere to its obligations under international human rights law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter)[9]. It called for urgent measures to end arbitrary arrest and detention of those perceived to be opposed to the AFRC and to end torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions.

It is important that there continue to be full and independent investigations into the human rights violations committed during the period of AFRC rule and that the truth of what occurred during those months is established and documented in order to bring those responsible to justice. There should be no impunity for the grave human rights violations committed throughout the period of AFRC rule. Investigation and accountability for these human rights violations will also contribute towards the process of national reconciliation within Sierra Leone.

Arbitrary arrest and detention

Hundreds of political detainees were held incommunicado without charge or trial. It was difficult to assess with any accuracy the number of those detained because of continuous arrests and releases, the failure of the authorities to provide information about detainees and lack of access to places of detention. Detainees were held at the Central Prison, Pademba Road, the police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) headquarters and Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown as well as other military camps, such as that known as the SS camp at the village of Regent in the hills above Freetown.

Throughout the period of AFRC rule journalists were particular targets of arrest, detention and torture. During October and November 1997 the crack-down on the press

intensified; at least 20 journalists were detained and many were tortured and ill-treated. They included Jon Z. Foray, editor of the *New Storm* newspaper, who was arrested by soldiers on 11 October 1997. He was taken first to Cockerill military headquarters where he was handed over to the military police and then held in a freight container. Also held in the container was Prince Akpu, a Nigerian journalist who had established a newspaper called *Alpha jet*, and who was arrested around the same time and accused of subversive activities. (Nigerian ECOMOG forces had used military aircraft called Alpha jets in their operations.) Two days later the two journalists were collected by a senior AFRC member, apparently to be taken to CID headquarters. They were, however, blindfolded and taken to the SS camp. Jon Z. Foray was beaten and stabbed with bayonets by soldiers and sustained a serious injury to his spine. He and Prince Akpu were released on 22 October 1997. With the help of friends, Jon Z. Foray managed to leave Sierra Leone for Ghana where he was admitted to hospital and received two months of medical treatment.

Arrests of journalists continued into November 1997: Dorothy Awoonor Gordon, acting editor of the *Concord Times*, Ibrahim Karim-Sei, editor of the *Standard Times*, and Pius Foray, editor of *The Democrat*, were among those detained and subsequently released without charge.

Sylvanus Kanyako, a journalist working for the *Herald Guardian*, and David Kamara, the newspaper's proprietor, were arrested on 10 January 1998, the day after an article suggested that a prominent member of the AFRC, Sergeant Abu "Zagalo" Sankoh, should be arrested in connection with the looting of the Iranian Embassy in Freetown on 31 December 1997. Sylvanus Kanyako was arrested by soldiers after being identified by an AFRC supporter. He and David Kamara were detained for three weeks. Both men were tortured. Sylvanus Kanyako was tied tightly with his arms behind his back, beaten all over his body and burned with a cigarette. At one point he lost consciousness. He sustained serious injuries to his arms and hands. He was then taken to CID cells where he remained, without any medical treatment, until he managed to escape on 30 January 1998.

On 30 January 1998 Michael Lawson, a university student at Fourah Bay College in Freetown, was arrested. He was apparently accused of passing information to a radio station broadcasting in support of the government of President Kabbah. The radio station, 98.1 FM, had been broadcasting clandestinely since July 1997. Many people suspected of providing information to the radio station, or knowing from where broadcasts were transmitted, had previously been arrested and detained. He was reported to be held at CID headquarters until his release in February 1998 after the intervention by ECOMOG.

Torture and extrajudicial executions

Ill-treatment, torture and extrajudicial executions were systematic throughout the period of AFRC rule. Soldiers and RUF members operated with impunity and created a climate of fear both in Freetown and throughout the country.

On 14 January 1998 a trader, Sama Turay, was shot dead by soldiers on Wilkinson Road

in Freetown after an argument. Local residents were forced to hand the body over to soldiers. Residents of the area staged a demonstration along Wilkinson Road the following day in protest against the killing. This demonstration coincided with a visit to Freetown of a delegation headed by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, at that time based in Conakry, for discussions with the AFRC on the implementation of the peace agreement signed in Conakry in October 1997.

The demonstration on 15 January 1998 was brutally suppressed; soldiers indiscriminately beat civilians and raided homes in the area around Wilkinson Road. They went from house to house accusing civilians of deliberately discrediting the AFRC during the visit of the delegation. One of the victims was a 25-year-old trader. When soldiers arrived at his stall he was hit in the face with butt of an AK 47 gun and was also badly beaten on his back. He recognized the soldiers who beat him and described them as relatives of Major Johnny Paul Koroma.

Another of the victims was an 18-year-old girl, also living in the Wilkinson Road area, who had joined the demonstration. Three days later six soldiers came to her home. She was raped by all six soldiers who then cut her hair and shaved her head with a broken bottle.

In Kenema, Eastern Province, terror reigned throughout the period of AFRC rule. The town was effectively under the control of the RUF and, in particular, Sam Bockarie. As in Freetown and other parts of the country, rape of girls and women was systematic and at least a hundred civilians were reported to have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed in Kenema. Every house in the town was looted. The homes of those perceived to have been supporters of the SLPP were destroyed.

On 13 and 14 January 1998 several prominent members of the community in Kenema were arrested by members of the RUF under the supervision of Sam Bockarie. They included B.S. Massaquoi, the chairman of the town council, Dr P.B. Momoh, a medical doctor, Paramount Chief Moinama Karmor, a traditional leader, and Ibrahim Kpaka, a businessman. They were arrested at a time of fierce fighting between the *kamajors* and AFRC and RUF forces around Kenema and were accused of supporting the *kamajors*. They were held at the AFRC Secretariat building in Kenema, which had been the local SLPP headquarters, and some were later moved to the police station and army brigade headquarters. They were stripped and repeatedly beaten with sticks, electric cable and strips of tyres and were threatened with death. Their arms were tied tightly behind them. One of those detained sustained a serious head wound and injury to his eye after being beaten on his head with a gun. At least one of these detained died as a result of beatings.

Some of those arrested were released on 26 January 1998 and escaped to safety. B.S. Massaquoi, however, was among those who remained held at army brigade headquarters. He was killed by members of the RUF on 8 February 1998 as news arrived of ECOMOG's offensive on Freetown and as *kamajors* entered Kenema. Dozens of other people were also reported to have been killed. The mutilated body of B.S. Massaquoi and 35 other people were reported to have been found in mass grave near Kenema on 23

March 1998.

The use of the death penalty by the AFRC

The AFRC resorted to the use of the death penalty in an apparent attempt to be seen to be taking action to impose law and order but in doing so violated international human rights standards. On 25 October 1997 10 soldiers were executed after being convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a military court. A further 17 people were reported to have been executed on 2 November 1997, apparently after conviction by a military court although some reports suggested that summary executions took place without any form of legal proceedings. Another eight people were publicly executed in Koidu on 2 December 1997. According to reports, they had been convicted of armed robbery by a military court, from which there was no right of appeal.

On 28 November 1997 a new decree was promulgated which was retroactive to the time of the military coup and which extended the scope of the death penalty by making death sentences statutory for the offences of looting and commandeering vehicles.

International standards prohibit the retroactive use of the death penalty. The ICCPR states that the death sentence may be imposed only "in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime" and also that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. The Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty state that: "Capital punishment may be imposed only for a crime for which the death penalty is prescribed by law at the time of its commission...".

In addition, the ICCPR states that: "In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes...". The Safeguards Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1994, also state that "... capital punishment may be imposed only for the most serious crimes ... with lethal or other extremely grave circumstances." The UN Human Rights Committee, a body of 18 experts established under the ICCPR, stated in 1996 that: "Extension of the scope of the application of the death penalty raises questions as to the compatibility with Article 6 of the Covenant", which guarantees the right to life. The UN Commission on Human Rights, in a resolution adopted in April 1997, called on all states which have not yet abolished the death penalty "progressively to restrict the number of offences for which the death penalty may be imposed".

Amnesty International urged the AFRC to repeal this legislation and to ensure that all death sentences were commuted and that no further executions took place.

Recommendations

- **investigations into the human rights violations committed during the period of AFRC rule should continue to be undertaken in order to bring those**

responsible to justice and to provide compensation to the victims of human rights violations;

- assistance for documenting the human rights violations which occurred during this period should be provided by the international community.

Human rights abuses by AFRC and RUF forces since February 1998

Since their removal from power the AFRC and RUF have wreaked a campaign of terror against unarmed civilians and human rights abuses have reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand civilians have been brutally killed or mutilated. Hundreds of others have been abducted from their villages and forced to join their attackers. Members of the AFRC and the RUF again inflicted on unarmed civilians the atrocities which they had endured throughout Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict but now on a much greater scale [10].

The abuses perpetrated by rebel forces of the AFRC and RUF constitute the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 which apply to international conflicts - wars between nations - also contain provisions which apply to internal armed conflicts. Article 3, common to all four Conventions, extends to "armed conflict not of an international character" fundamental rules for the protection of non-combatants which each party to the conflict is "bound to apply, as a minimum". Under the terms of common Article 3, people who take no active part or who have ceased to take an active part in hostilities must be treated humanely in all circumstances. Common Article 3 specifically prohibits: violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; the taking of hostages; and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment. This prohibition applies not only to government forces but to all parties to internal armed conflicts including armed political groups.

Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of victims of internal armed conflicts prohibits violence to life, health and physical well-being, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment, of all those not taking a direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities. [11]

In the days immediately after their removal from power by ECOMOG, AFRC and RUF forces indiscriminately killed unarmed civilians, looted and burned houses, both in Freetown and other towns. As the rebel forces were pursued eastwards by ECOMOG forces through towns such as Bo in Southern Province, Kenema and Koidu in Eastern Province and Makeni in Northern Province during February, March and April 1998, they were responsible for widespread killings, torture and ill-treatment, including rape and other forms of sexual assault, and abduction. Villages and towns were burnt to the ground, destroying thousands of homes. Koidu, a major town in the diamond-rich Kono District, was almost totally destroyed by AFRC and RUF forces and villages between Njaiama-Sewafe and Koidu were repeatedly attacked.

Several foreign nationals were captured by RUF forces in mid-February 1998. They included Spanish, Italian and Austrian religious brothers working at St Joseph's Hospital in Lunsar, Port Loko District, Northern Province, who were abducted on 14 February 1998. Eldred Collins, a prominent RUF member, was reported to have demanded the release of Foday Sankoh, at that time still detained in Nigeria, in exchange for the release of the hostages. They were, however, released on 27 February 1998. Two staff of the humanitarian organization *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF), a Canadian and a French national, were also abducted around 14 February 1998 at Rogberi while driving between Port Loko and Lunsar. They were also released after two weeks.

Those perceived to be opposed to the AFRC and the RUF were particularly targeted by rebel forces. They included Catholic priests. As almost all other sectors of Sierra Leonean society, the Catholic Church in Sierra Leone had condemned the military coup. Catholic priests were specifically sought by AFRC and RUF forces after February 1998 and some narrowly escaped death. Their homes were looted and destroyed. Traditional leaders, known as Paramount Chiefs, were also singled out; 44 Paramount Chiefs were reported to have been killed in the months following February 1998.

"Operation no living thing"

An even more grotesque pattern of killing, rape and mutilation became evident in April 1998 and the number of victims increased dramatically. Rebel forces called their campaign of terror against civilians

"Operation no living thing". As fighting continued between ECOMOG and rebel forces around Koidu attacks on civilians in villages in the area persisted and then spread west and north. Later in April and into May 1998 Alikalia, Yifin and other villages in Koinadugu District, Northern Province, were attacked. Unarmed civilians who were taking no active part in the conflict were killed, their homes burned and their villages destroyed.

Although the exact number of those killed is unknown, it is likely to be several thousand. Most survivors of attacks described hundreds of bodies lying in the bush where they had fled and of several members of their families and communities being killed. More than 200 people were killed during an attack on one village, Yifin, in Koinadugu District, in late April 1998. More than 650 bodies, many of them women and children, were reported to have been buried following fighting in the area around Koidu in mid-June 1998.

With these attacks came reports of mutilations. The arms, hands, legs, ears and lips of victims were deliberately cut off. By early May 1998 some 120 victims of severe mutilations had been admitted to Connaught Hospital in the centre of Freetown; about 60 were admitted on one day alone, 26 April 1998. Four had both arms cut off, another 23 had one arm cut off, and others had deep lacerations on their lower arms, severed tendons or broken bones in their arms after being attacked with machetes. Some had a complete hand, several fingers or ears missing. They were all civilians: farmers, housewives, traders, miners, school students. These numbers swelled in the weeks and months which

followed as more victims arrived at Connaught Hospital and other hospitals in the north of the country, including in Makeni and Magburaka. Some of these hospitals lacked the equipment needed to perform war surgery. Connaught Hospital in the centre of Freetown, which had the necessary facilities, struggled to cope with the influx of patients. Between 6 April 1998 and 27 July 1998 an MSF surgical team treated almost 300 patients with amputations, severe mutilations or gunshot wounds at the hospital. The majority of the cases treated were lacerations to the head or neck or amputations of arms, hands, fingers, ears or lips. About a fifth of these victims were children, one aged 18 months. This number represented, however, only a fraction of the number of such victims, many of whom never reached medical help. Between 25 May 1998 and 12 June 1998 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates evacuated 23 people from the north of the country with gunshot wounds, deep lacerations and amputated limbs requiring urgent reconstructive surgery. A helicopter was used to reach areas inaccessible by road because of insecurity and fear of attack by armed groups. Evacuation of wounded civilians continued throughout the following months. According to humanitarian agencies in Freetown, only about one in four victims of mutilations by rebel forces survived their injuries. In June 1998 the ICRC rehabilitated Netland Hospital in Freetown for the surgical treatment of victims of amputations. By the end of September 1998, some 400 victims of amputations were reported to have undergone surgery at Netland Hospital. By October 1998 estimates of the number of victims of mutilations since February 1998 were put as high as 4,000.

Among the thousands of refugees arriving from Eastern and Northern Provinces into Guinea to escape attacks were civilians with similar mutilations. Between April and June 1998 some one hundred refugees were reported to have arrived in Guinea with serious injuries; half of them had suffered deliberate mutilation. By September 1998 a regional representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that more than 400 refugees in a camp at Kissidougou in Guinea had hands, limbs or ears cut off or were suffering other injuries.

Many of the survivors provided accounts of the violence inflicted upon them. Groups of armed men arrived in their villages, claiming to be ECOMOG, that they had come to liberate the villagers and that they were safe. Forced out of their homes, they realised that they were not ECOMOG troops. Civilians were rounded up, in groups or in lines, and then taken individually to a pounding block in the village where their hands, arms or legs were cut with a machete. In some villages, after the civilians were rounded up, they were stripped naked. Men were then ordered to rape members of their own family. If they refused, their arms were cut off and the women were raped by rebel forces, often in front of their husbands. As well as rape, women and girls also suffered other forms of sexual assault such as having foreign objects inserted into their vaginas. Victims of these atrocities also reported women and children being rounded up, locked into houses which were then set alight.

The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sergio Vieira de Mello, following a visit to Sierra Leone, said on 15 June 1998 that the brutal treatment of civilians by AFRC and RUF forces was unlike anything he had seen in 29 years of

humanitarian work. Describing the pattern of amputations, lacerations and maiming of civilians, including of children, he said that "*hands are cut off and ears and noses are amputated ... there are no words to condemn this sort of practice ...*".

Villagers from Kondeya, Kono District, fled into the bush when they heard that rebel forces were approaching their village in early April 1998. On 9 April 1998 a group of about 50 rebel forces found them and captured about 120. One of the men was strangled. A baby who was crying was pulled from its mother's back and thrown into a river. They were forced to return to the village where all the houses were burned. Twenty-seven of the captured villagers were then attacked with machetes; some were decapitated, others had their throats cut or their eyes gouged out.

Survivors were often taunted by rebel forces to go to ECOMOG and tell them that the AFRC and RUF were there or to go to President Kabbah to ask for a new limb. One was given a letter and told to deliver it to President Kabbah. Victims who had one or both ears cut off were told that without their ears they could no longer listen to the government or ECOMOG.

In some cases it took victims days or weeks to reach medical assistance. One man who had both arms cut off in April 1998 walked for several weeks from village to village until he was able to find a vehicle to take him to Freetown. Many more, unable to reach a medical centre in time, died as a result of their injuries. Some spent weeks in the bush either attempting to walk to safety or waiting until it was safe to return to their homes. The fate of several thousand people who fled into the bush during attacks on villages remains unknown. Many of those wounded have died in the bush.

An Amnesty International delegation which visited Sierra Leone in May 1998 met some of the victims of these atrocities at Connaught Hospital. One, a farmer aged 40 from the village of Badala, in Koinadugu District, had both hands cut off when the village was attacked on 3 May 1998. Hearing reports of advancing attacks, including those on Yifin and Alikalia, he had previously sent his family to safety in Kabala. At the time of the attack he was preparing food in his compound. Up to 400 men, armed with machetes, AK 47 guns and rocket propelled grenades entered the village. They caught him and asked him where ECOMOG was. When he said that he did not know, he was hit on the head with an AK 47. He was then forced to lie down and both arms were cut off. He was also beaten on his legs. He begged to be killed. The men who attacked him wrote three letters and put them in the pockets of his trousers. He was then told to go to tell President Kabbah that they were coming to Freetown, adding "*No AFRC, no peace*". He lay injured for three days in Badala and arrived at Connaught Hospital four days later. He had no news of his wife and three children. Other villagers, of all ages, from Badala were also mutilated and killed; they included a woman who was raped and then cut with machetes.

Another of the victims, a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu who had arrived at Connaught Hospital on 10 May 1998, had suffered severe lacerations to his right ankle in an attempted amputation. He and his family - his parents and six brothers and sisters - had been hiding in the bush for more than two months after being driven from Koidu

after it was attacked by rebel forces. They had no food throughout that time other than bananas. On 1 May 1998 the family had heard reports that ECOMOG had arrived in Koidu and they went to enter the eastern part of the town. They and those with them were attacked by rebel forces who accused them of supporting President Kabbah. Almost 50 people were killed. The young boy stayed for four days in a house without food or treatment for his severely injured leg. He was taken first to Makeni by ECOMOG forces and then brought to Connaught Hospital. He did not know what had happened to his family.

Three young women survived an attack on the village of Boima in Bombali District, Northern Province, on 7 May 1998; one had a deep cut to her arm, the other two had been beaten all over their bodies. One of the women had witnessed the killing of several members of her family, including her children. Twelve people, including three of her children, died when their house was set alight. Another child, a girl aged three, was pulled from her back and cut with machetes.

There were many atrocities in villages around Karina, between Makeni and Fadugu, in Northern Province, which were attacked on 7 May 1998. All those who were unable to run away were killed; others had limbs amputated.

In an incident which occurred on 7 May 1998 in Northern Province, a woman survivor recounted that one of her sisters had been killed by having her throat cut and two others were covered in kerosene and burned. Other victims, including children, were wrapped in a foam mattress which was then set alight.

The village of Tumbodu, north of Koidu, was attacked repeatedly during April and May 1998. During one of these attacks, on 11 May 1998, a woman aged in her twenties who was hiding in the bush outside the town was caught and asked for rice, which she did not have. She was forced to carry a heavy load; when she faltered she was beaten. When she reached Tumbodu she was forced to place her legs on a stone which were then cut in an attempted amputation. She suffered deep laceration to both legs and also to her arms. She arrived in Connaught Hospital on 15 May 1998. Her 10-year-old son was abducted by the rebels.

Massenbendu, a village close to Tumbodu, was also attacked on 11 May 1998. One of the victims, a farmer, was in his house when the door was broken down by rebel forces who demanded money; he said that he had none. Rebel forces told him that they were going to kill him because he supported President Kabbah. He sustained deep lacerations to his neck, head and arms. He was taken first to an ECOMOG base at Masingbi and was then transferred to Freetown. Three members of his family - two men and a small boy - were abducted.

Human rights abuses by rebel forces since July 1998

Atrocities declined significantly during July and August 1998 as the rainy season advanced. Despite this decreased level of atrocities concerns remained that rebel forces

could mount future attacks against unarmed civilians. In his First Progress Report on UNOMSIL, the UN Secretary-General said that he remained "*deeply concerned about the plight of innocent civilians in the country, who may still be suffering the depredations of the rebel forces or at risk from future attacks.*"

Incidents of killing and mutilations continued to be reported. On 27 July 1998 rebel forces, after feigning surrender, attacked Kabala was held by ECOMOG. Rebel forces threatened to use civilians as human shields. No mutilations were reported but a large number of civilians, including children and young people, were reported to have been abducted. Rebel forces held Kabala for about four days before it was retaken by ECOMOG. Some 200 houses had been destroyed, property was looted and money extorted from civilians. All relief goods, medical supplies and logistics for humanitarian efforts had been looted or destroyed. At about the same time, rebel forces attacked a bus carrying civilians about 10 kilometres south of Kabala, killing seven people. Three young boys were also reported to have been abducted.

During attacks on villages in the area of Gbinti, Port Loko District, in early August 1998 victims of killings and mutilations included three women and a two-year-old child who were subsequently admitted to hospital with gunshot wounds, either to the backs of their bodies or their head. Three men were also admitted to hospital with deep lacerations apparently inflicted in attempted amputations.

In late August and during September 1998 an escalation of attacks was reported in Northern Province. Reports began to be received of victims having the initials "AFRC" carved into their foreheads and backs. Around 24 August 1998 there were attacks on villages, including Thawuya and Masunthu, in Kambia District. Several civilians were subsequently admitted to the Government Hospital in the town of Kambia with amputated limbs or severe lacerations. Three had both hands and ears amputated; others had deep wounds to their arms, shoulders and faces. One of the victims was a three-month-old baby with lacerations to the nape of its neck. On 6 September 1998 the town of Kamalu, near Kamakwie, in Bombali District, was attacked by rebel forces. At least 40 civilians, including children, were reported to have been killed in the attack; others were seriously injured with machete wounds. Some of those killed had been first been subjected to torture and sexual abuse; others had been burned alive. A Paramount Chief, Samura Bangura, was reported to have been abducted from Kamalu, together with some 50 others. On 11 September 1998 Fadugu, Koinadugu District, was attacked. According to reports, during that attack eight civilians, including a Paramount Chief, Alimamy Fanna Thoronka II, were burned alive.

Three villages in Kambia District, Yebaya, Kathatinah and Kakula, were reported to have been attacked by around one hundred rebel forces on 12 September 1998, resulting in the deaths of at least 16 civilians. According to witnesses of the attack on Yebaya, at least nine people were killed either by being shot or attacked with machetes. In late September 1998 and early October 1998 more than 50 people were reported to have been killed in attacks in Kambia District, near the border with Guinea, including on the village of Kukuna, and at least 25 civilians were reported to have been mutilated, including by

amputations, by rebel forces.

On 8 October 1998 the town of Mange in Port Loko District, some 150 kilometres from Freetown and on the main road to Guinea, was attacked by more than 200 rebel forces in an attempt to gain control of a strategic bridge. Some 25 civilians were reported to have been killed in the attack but the toll was expected to be higher since rebel forces were reported to have set fire to more than 40 homes, in some cases with civilians inside. Most of the town's 15,000 inhabitants fled and many of the wounded arrived at the hospital in the town of Port Loko for treatment. ECOMOG forces maintained control of the bridge after three days of fighting.

There were further attacks by rebel forces on villages in Bombali District during September 1998. Among the victims were two men, Pa Bai Munu and Morlai Munu, from the village of Mabunduka, between Pendembu and Mateboi, some 40 kilometres from Makeni. Pa Bai Munu, a farmer aged over 70, had fled his village for Makeni following an earlier attack during which two other members of his family, including Sorie Kabbie Munu, were abducted by rebel forces. The village was burned. Other members of the same family, Pa Amadu Munu and Pa Santigie Munu, had been killed by having their throats cut during an attack on Mateboi in May 1998. Pa Bai Munu later returned to a village, Four Road Loko, close to his home at Mabunduka. He, Morlai Munu and about 20 other people were killed when Four Road Loko was attacked on 16 September 1998. According to reports, Pa Bai Munu was tied by the neck and dragged for about 10 kilometres before he was hacked to death and his body mutilated. At least six members of the family had been killed or abducted.

Attacks on villages around Kabala, including Benikoro and Badala, resumed and intensified during September 1998. The town of Kabala itself, earlier attacked and held briefly by rebel forces in late July 1998, was again attacked on 18 September 1998. Some 20 civilians were reported to have been killed and houses burned. Among the victims who were evacuated to Freetown by the ICRC were three children, two of whom were suffering from extensive burns. One of them had hidden with his family in a hut which was set alight by rebel forces; he was the only survivor.

On 24 October 1998, apparently in retaliation at the death sentence imposed on Foday Sankoh the previous day, the village of Alikalia was attacked by some 300 rebel forces. Reports of the attack referred to civilians, including women and children, being shot, decapitated or having their arms amputated. Civilian survivors of the attack on Alikalia were admitted to Connaught Hospital with gunshot wounds and multiple lacerations.

Attacks by rebel forces also escalated in Kenema District from August 1998. Among the villages affected were Mendekelema, Neama and Sandaru, which was completely destroyed, less than 30 kilometres from the town of Kenema. One of the victims of the attack on Mendekelema in late August 1998 had both hands amputated. Survivors of attacks consistently described mutilation, rape, torture, killing and the burning of houses. Entire local communities were displaced from the area, many fleeing to the towns of Kenema, Segbwema and Daru.

Recommendations

- **the international community must continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms the grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed by forces of the AFRC and RUF;**
- **leaders of AFRC and RUF forces must take immediate measures to end human rights abuses committed by their combatants, including deliberate and arbitrary killing of non-combatants, torture, mutilation and rape, and must publicly state their commitment to respecting international humanitarian law;**
- **those in command of AFRC and RUF forces should exert effective control over those under their command in order to prevent torture and killing of non-combatants; those suspected of committing human rights abuses should be removed from any position of authority or duties which bring them into contact with prisoners or others at risk of abuse;**
- **AFRC and RUF forces must respect human rights and the basic principles of international humanitarian law and abide by minimum standards of humane behaviour at all times.**

Children at the centre of the violence

Children have not escaped the violence and brutality of the conflict in Sierra Leone; they have often been the principal victims of gross human rights abuses, including the atrocities in Eastern and Northern Provinces which occurred in the months following the removal of the AFRC and RUF from power in February 1998. They have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. Among the thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees in neighbouring countries or internally displaced within Sierra Leone after February 1998 were hundreds of unaccompanied children, separated from their families as a result of the violence.

Several thousand children, including babies and very young children, have been separated from their families as a result of seven years of internal armed conflict. Most of those abducted in the earlier years of the war were from Southern and Eastern Provinces. The most common reason for the separation of children from their families was abduction by rebel forces. Others became separated from their parents as a result of attacks on their towns and villages when their parents were killed, abducted or became missing.

Many families have rejected children who had been forcibly recruited into rebel forces and have refused to take them back into their homes. Even in cases where parents are willing to take back their children, the level of resentment and bitterness within their communities sometimes prevents them from doing so.

Significant and coordinated efforts are being undertaken by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) together with a coalition of non-governmental organizations to reunite these children with their families and to help their reintegration into their families and communities, often in the most difficult of circumstances.

The work of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations in providing help and protection to children traumatized by the conflict, including former child combatants, should be supported and reinforced by the international community.

Abduction of children

Large numbers of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, have been abducted by the RUF throughout the years of the internal armed conflict. They have been forcibly recruited to fight or forced to undertake other tasks such as carrying loads, including looted property and food, and cooking. Women and girls have been forced to become the sexual partners of rebel forces. While in the early years of the conflict representatives of the RUF claimed publicly that some of those abducted had joined rebel forces willingly, in most cases captured civilians have been held under duress, threatened with killing or ill-treatment, and have had little option but to cooperate.

Capture and abduction of civilians, including many children, has continued throughout the months since the AFRC and RUF were deposed and has occurred increasingly in Northern Province. In those areas of the country which remained under the control of rebel forces thousands of civilians, including women and children, effectively remained captive, many of them in Kailahun District, a stronghold of the RUF since the beginning of the internal armed conflict. Some estimates put this number as high as 10,000. They were used to carry goods, as human shields or for sexual slavery.

Testimonies of victims of the attacks by rebel forces which occurred in Northern Province from April 1998 invariably referred to the abduction of large numbers of people, including children. When the town of Kabala was attacked by a large group of rebel forces in July 1998, a large number of children were abducted. Njalia Nimikoro, a village some 10 kilometres southwest of Koidu, was reported to have been attacked around 18 August 1998. Nine civilians, including a 10-year-old child were admitted to hospital with gunshot wounds, and a woman and her five children were reported to have been abducted by rebel forces. A few days earlier, on 15 August 1998, rebels in the area around Koidu were reported to have released around 250 captured civilians. Dozens of civilians were reported to have been abducted, however, when three villages in Kambia District were attacked in September 1998.

The abuse of children by rebel forces

Many of those abducted have been trained and forced to fight. When RUF forces joined the AFRC in Freetown following the military coup in May 1997 many of its fighters, some as young as 11 or 12 years and many in their teens, who had previously been abducted arrived in Freetown. Many had spent several years in RUF camps in the bush

and had fought in the conflict. In some cases their names had been changed by the RUF. Fear played a significant role in forcing these children to remain with the RUF. Those who attempted to escape were beaten or killed. Former RUF child combatants have recounted summary killing, torture and ill-treatment. These children also relied on the RUF for their means of survival, including food and shelter. As well as being forced to fight, they were used as porters to carry goods and looted property. The use of drugs such as amphetamines was reported to be widespread. Sex was used in a systematic way by the RUF to enslave girls, often very young, and young women. While some later expressed a wish to remain with their partners, most remained under duress. Many had become pregnant and had children, making eventual reintegration into their own communities even more difficult.

The histories of many of the children abducted by the RUF since 1991 emerged when they arrived in Freetown. An 11-year-old boy caught and abducted during an ambush by the RUF near Bo several years earlier had been forced to take drugs and fight. Another boy had been captured in Kailahun District in 1992 when he was six years old and separated from his mother, sister and brother. Six years later he did not know where his family were or whether they were still alive. Another boy had been abducted during an attack in Kenema District in 1992, in which both his parents had been killed, when he was 10 or 11 years old. He had been with the RUF for six years and had been trained to use a gun and fight. A girl, aged 14 at the time of her abduction in 1995, was forced to become the sexual partner of a member of the RUF. She was forced to cook and taught how to use a gun.

Victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses

When the AFRC and RUF were forced by ECOMOG from Freetown in mid-February 1998 many of these children, some of whom had been responsible for killings and torture, were identified as members of the RUF and risked revenge attacks by civilians, placing their safety and lives in jeopardy. Almost 3,000 children associated with the RUF, fearing reprisals from civilians, were reported to have fled from Freetown in a matter of days. There were reports of such children being beaten by civilians before being handed over to ECOMOG troops and one child who had been living on the streets of Freetown was reported to have been burned alive in an apparent revenge attack. ECOMOG troops were also reported to have ill-treated some of these children when they were handed over into their custody.

Recruitment of children by Civil Defence Forces

Large numbers of children have also been recruited into the ranks of the CDF which support President Kabbah and are fighting with ECOMOG against rebel forces. Although the CDF has made a commitment to end initiation of children into the traditional hunters' societies which form the CDF, there were reports that new members, including children between the ages of 15 and 17, were recruited near Magburaka in Tonkolili District, Northern Province, in July 1998. Initiation of children into the CDF was also reported to be continuing in Southern and Eastern Provinces, for example at Daru and Segbwema,

during the following months and children, some as young as seven years, were still seen carrying arms and guarding CDF checkpoints. In early October 1998 Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence, during a visit to Sierra Leone by the Executive Director of UNICEF, Carol Bellamy, was reported as stating his commitment to disarming and demobilizing children recruited by the *kamajors*, adding, however, that the conflict in Sierra Leone was not yet over.

Efforts by the international community to meet the needs of children

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, visited Sierra Leone in both March and May 1998. During his visit in May 1998, when he travelled to the east of the country, it became clear that one of the most pressing challenges facing Sierra Leone was the "*crisis of the young*": the plight of children affected directly or indirectly by the conflict. He identified five areas requiring urgent action by the international community: demobilization and reintegration of child combatants; resettlement of internally displaced people; tracing the families of unaccompanied children; rehabilitation and support of victims without limbs; and provision and rehabilitation of medical and educational services.

At a meeting with the UN Special Representative during his visit in May 1998, the government agreed not to recruit children under the age of 18 years into a reconstituted national army. The CDF also agreed to stop initiation and recruitment of children under the age of 18 and to begin the process of demobilization of child combatants within their ranks [12]. Both ECOMOG and the CDF agreed to provide special protection to AFRC and RUF child combatants in their custody as a result of surrender, capture or escape. On 5 November 1998 Olara Otunnu again appealed to both the CDF and rebel forces to end the recruitment of child soldiers.

Olara Otunnu called on the international community to respond in a more vigorous and concerted way to the needs of children affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone and urged it to make the rehabilitation of children in Sierra Leone a pilot project for post-conflict reconstruction. Meeting the specific needs of children, young people and women affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone were particularly important in plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In a press conference following his address to the UN General Assembly in October 1998, Olara Otunnu made specific references to the plight of children in Sierra Leone and called for the international community to provide both political commitment and resources. He recommended to the key actors responsible for post-conflict reconstruction programs, such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), that the needs of women and children who had been victims of conflict should be at the centre of such programs.

On 29 June 1998 the UN Security Council strongly condemned the targeting of children in war, in particular their abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment as soldiers, and said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by armed conflicts.

In his address to the UN special conference, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged the terrible suffering of children in Sierra Leone: "*To an appalling degree, it was children who were, and still are, the victims of war, either as conscripted fighters or as casualties of indiscriminate attacks.*" The Secretary-General welcomed the government of Sierra Leone's decision to offer an amnesty for child soldiers from all combatant groups and efforts to develop a national program to meet the needs of children who had been particularly adversely affected by seven years of conflict.

At the UN special conference the Executive Director of UNICEF referred to the importance of demobilizing and reintegrating into society an estimated 4,000 children still attached to fighting forces which would require an intensive and long-term commitment of resources from the international community. Some 2,500 of these children were being forced to fight with rebel forces; the others had been recruited by the CDF. The safety of all children who had been captured needed to be ensured and ways found to release them and include them in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.

During her visit to Sierra Leone in early October 1998, the Executive Director of UNICEF again urged that all child combatants be disarmed and demobilized: "*the fact that the conflict is (still going) on should not justify recruitment of children*". During discussions with government officials, she sought assurances that the government would abide by its commitments to demobilize child combatants, not to recruit new child combatants and to provide an amnesty for those children who had been fighting with rebel forces. She urged that the process be speeded up. She also called for the release of all child prisoners of war, the number of which is unknown.

The demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into society - socially, psychologically, politically and economically - is critical to post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. Support for such programs, particularly those for children, is vital. UNICEF and UNOMSIL, with the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy and ECOMOG, are undertaking a program of registration and interviewing of former RUF child combatants in order to include them into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The children, once registered, are released from ECOMOG custody into the care of UNICEF. In October 1998 some 60 children, aged from eight to 18, were reported to have been registered in Makeni and another 120 in Bo; registration in Port Loko was due to commence in November 1998.

Recommendations

- **AFRC and RUF forces must end the gross human rights abuses being perpetrated against children, including killing, mutilation, rape and other forms of sexual abuse, abduction and forcible recruitment as combatants;**
- **AFRC and RUF forces should release all children currently held as captives or child soldiers;**

- **immediate measures to end the recruitment of children under the age of 18 by the CDF should be taken and the government should be assisted and supported in the registration of child combatants among the CDF in order to ascertain their exact number and location and to incorporate them into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program;**
- **the Sierra Leone government and the international community should fully support and assist relevant UN agencies and non-governmental organizations to identify and address the social, psychological and material needs of children, particularly former child combatants, affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone;**
- **the international community should fully support the proposal of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict for Sierra Leone to be made a pilot project for a more effective response in the context of post-conflict peace building; this pilot project should coordinate, reinforce, and provide adequate resources for initiatives aimed at the protection of children in Sierra Leone.**

Human rights violations by ECOMOG forces

At the time of its offensive on Freetown which began on 5 February 1998, shelling by ECOMOG forces was reported to have caused a high number of civilian casualties. Shelling continued in densely populated areas of Freetown throughout the week of the offensive, including in areas where medical facilities, such as Connaught Hospital, were situated. More than 600 people with war-related injuries were reported to have been admitted to hospital during that period. The high number of civilian casualties suggested that ECOMOG may have taken inadequate measures to protect civilians during the offensive on Freetown.

Shelling by AFRC and RUF forces was, however, also intensive during that period and some civilians claimed that residential areas in Freetown were being deliberately shelled by AFRC and RUF forces, particularly by those positioned at Fourah Bay College on a hill overlooking Freetown.

Thousands of civilians in rebel-controlled areas, in particular Kailahun District, remain at risk of being caught in hostilities between ECOMOG, fighting with the CDF, and rebel forces. There are fears that the safety of the civilian population might be endangered, especially during air strikes which are reported to be taking place. Measures to minimise the risk to civilians during combat, in conformity with international humanitarian law, must be undertaken during military operations, including aerial bombardments of rebel forces' bases located near or within areas where there are high concentrations of civilians.

In his Second Progress Report on UNOMSIL the UN Secretary-General referred to reports which suggested that "*certain ECOMOG personnel do not consistently ensure full respect for provisions of international humanitarian law, such as those regarding the*

protection of non-combatants in combat situations and the proper treatment of combatants during surrender or capture. UNOMSIL is encouraging the ECOMOG leadership to raise awareness among all troops to ensure full respect for all relevant aspects of international humanitarian law".

In the days after it took control of Freetown, several thousand soldiers surrendered to or were captured by ECOMOG forces. In subsequent weeks and months, ECOMOG supervised thousands of military detainees, in particular at Benguema, a military training camp some 25 kilometres from Freetown, but also at military bases at Lungi, Bo, Kenema and Makeni. According to the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, all military detainees held by ECOMOG remained under the authority of the Sierra Leone government; the role of ECOMOG was to screen those detained, assess whether they were a security risk and whether they could be deployed as part of the ECOMOG force or the eventual reconstituted national army.

It was claimed that AFRC and RUF combatants captured by the CDF were handed over to the police or ECOMOG forces after February 1998. It appeared, however, that CDF forces summarily killed some captured combatants and reports also suggested that ECOMOG forces handed over captured AFRC and RUF forces to the CDF who subsequently killed them.

A significant number of civilians are being detained by ECOMOG forces under the category of "safe custody" in prisons and other places of detention throughout the country. An unspecified number of people are held under ECOMOG "safe custody" at Pademba Road prison. At the Central Prison in Kenema more than 30 people, some apparently accused of collaboration with rebel forces, were reported to be held under ECOMOG "safe custody" in October 1998 without any referral of their cases to the civilian authorities. There is apparently no legal basis for their detention; it is unclear whether they are held under the provisions of the Public Emergency Regulations which came into effect in March 1998. In October 1998 there were reports that a suspected member of rebel forces had been taken into custody by ECOMOG in Makeni despite substantial evidence that he was innocent.

There have also been reports that those taken into custody by ECOMOG forces have been ill-treated by being beaten and tied tightly. Among the victims in Freetown were children who had been among RUF forces and who were detained shortly after the ECOMOG intervention. During September 1998 there were reports, although few in number, of torture and ill-treatment of both civilian detainees and captured combatants. A number of former RUF child combatants who were registered as part of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program claimed that they had been ill-treated while in the custody of ECOMOG.

There have also been reports of acts of violence and intimidation by ECOMOG forces against civilians in Freetown and other parts of the country. On 5 October 1998 at a checkpoint at Magbenteh, about three kilometres from Makeni, a driver was reported to have been beaten and stabbed with a bayonet by a member of ECOMOG during an

argument about a search of his vehicle and request for his documents. Sexual assault of women at ECOMOG checkpoints has also been reported in the area around Makeni.

There were several reports of harassment of humanitarian convoys by both ECOMOG and CDF forces in the area of Masingbi and Njaiama-Sewafe during October 1998. For example, the driver of vehicle belonging to a non-governmental organization was reported to have been physically assaulted by ECOMOG forces near Masingbi who also stole property from the vehicle. UNOMSIL military observers have frequently been requested to intervene with ECOMOG and the CDF on behalf of UN agencies and non-governmental organizations.

ECOMOG commanders have expressed a determination to address problems of ill-discipline and were reported to have established a complaints procedure to investigate any allegations of harassment of civilians by ECOMOG forces.

Recommendations

- **all military personnel participating in the ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone must adhere to international humanitarian and human rights law at all times;**
- **all troops participating in ECOMOG should be fully trained in these standards and understand their obligation to adhere to them;**
- **in accordance with international humanitarian law, civilians should not be targeted during military operations by ECOMOG forces; ECOMOG forces must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and take all necessary measures to protect civilians from the dangers arising from military operations;**
- **the cases of civilian detainees reported to be held "in safe custody" by ECOMOG forces should be reviewed by a civilian judicial authority in order to establish the legal basis for their detention and to determine whether they should be charged or released;**
- **specific mechanisms for monitoring, investigating and reporting any violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by ECOMOG forces should be established;**
- **UNOMSIL military observers should be provided with adequate resources to monitor the respect by ECOMOG forces of international humanitarian and human rights law during both military operations and during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs for former combatants;**
- **any allegations of human rights violations by ECOMOG forces, such as extrajudicial execution, torture and ill-treatment, should be promptly and**

independently investigated and those responsible brought to justice, in accordance with international standards.

Human rights violations by Civil Defence Forces

The CDF have also failed to respect international human rights and humanitarian law and have been responsible for torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions, although not on the scale of abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces.

The CDF are composed of traditional hunters and include *kamajors* from the south and east of the country, and *kapras*, *donsos*, *tamaboros* from the north. The National Coordinator of the CDF is the Deputy Minister of Defence. Although attempts have been made to register all members of the CDF throughout the country, this has been made difficult because of the lack of a formal structure and control over some of the CDF, continuing recruitment and fighting.

The CDF have killed, tortured and ill-treated both captured AFRC and RUF combatants and also civilians suspected of supporting or collaborating with the AFRC and RUF. In September 1997 four people, including a woman, who were suspected of being soldiers or AFRC supporters were reported to have been summarily executed by being decapitated when the vehicle in which they were travelling from Bo to Makeni was stopped by *kamajors*. In January 1998 *kamajors* were reported to have summarily killed civilians suspected of supporting the AFRC and RUF in two villages near the town of Rotifunk, Southern Province, some 90 kilometres from Freetown.

In February 1998, in the days following the removal of the AFRC and RUF, there were many cases of torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions by the *kamajors*, including in the towns of Bo, Kenema and Koidu. They were often mutilated and many were killed by being burned alive; some had tyres placed around their heads which were then set alight. At least 50 people accused of having supported the AFRC and RUF were extrajudicially executed in Kenema. Black marks on the dirt roads where people had been burned alive were still visible months later. When *kamajors* entered Koidu on 11 and 12 February 1998 they captured and killed AFRC soldiers. Some were decapitated, others were doused with petrol or had tyres placed around them and were burned alive. Such killings also took place in Freetown in the days immediately following the removal of the AFRC and RUF. At least six people were killed by civilians in revenge attacks. They included Mohamed Bangura, also known as Saccoma, who was burned alive, Sheik Mustapha, who was beaten to death, and Musa Kabia.

Several independent sources referred to isolated incidents of extrajudicial execution together with ritual cannibalism by members of the CDF. Ritual cannibalism is not, however, accepted behaviour or policy among the CDF and is rejected as abhorrent by most CDF. It appears to be carried out only by a small number of *kamajors*, in particular in the region around Kenema, who subscribe to animist beliefs. One such incident was reported to have occurred on 27 March 1998 when a boy aged 17 from Kenema was detained by *kamajors* and accused of collaborating with the AFRC and RUF. He was

taken to the market place and forced to buy vegetables and other ingredients. He was then reported to have been killed in a cannibalistic ritual. His partially burned body, with the heart removed, was later seen by witnesses. Other incidents of ritual cannibalism were reported to have taken place during April and May 1998 at Panguma, north of Kenema. These incidents must be investigated by the authorities and those responsible brought to justice. Longer-term measures, including increasing awareness and understanding of the cultural basis for this practice, are also needed in order to eradicate ritual cannibalism.

On 28 April 1998 President Kabbah announced that the CDF had been placed under the command of ECOMOG. The following day a *kamajor* leader in Bo was reported to have criticized the growing lawlessness of the *kamajors* and called for the registration of all CDF, who were apparently roaming the streets of Bo. Although nominally under the command and control of ECOMOG, the behaviour of the CDF continued to be undisciplined in the following months, particularly in areas other than their own villages, towns and districts. Reports of extrajudicial executions and torture of prisoners decreased significantly, however, from June 1998, apparently as a result of intervention by the government and ECOMOG, and the discipline of many CDF units improved significantly.

Some incidents of extrajudicial execution, torture and ill-treatment, however, continue to be reported. On 26 October 1998 four captured rebels were reported to have been extrajudicially executed in the village of Romeni, north of Port Loko. At least another 10 were reported to have been killed after being captured during the attack on Alikalia in October 1998.

In late August 1998 a young woman from the area around Kenema who had previously handled goods looted from the World Food Programme (WFP) by rebel forces was reported to have been interrogated by a group of about 20 CDF in the town of Kenema. When she made remarks considered offensive by the CDF, she was stripped and beaten. She was then taken to an unknown destination. Reports were also received in September 1998 of illegal arrest and detention of civilians by the CDF although it is unclear whether this practice is continuing.

Criminal acts, such as looting, confiscation of vehicles and civil disturbance, by the CDF have continued. Civilians have been harassed and money and goods extorted in exchange for permission to pass through checkpoints along major roads. The CDF have imposed their authority through fear and intimidation with the result that many people are afraid to make formal complaints to the authorities about their conduct. During September 1998 there were persistent reports of interference with the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

Little or no action is known to have been taken by the authorities against members of the CDF who have been responsible for illegal arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment and extrajudicial executions of those suspected of having collaborated with the AFRC which have occurred since February 1998. The CDF appear to act with impunity. There is an urgent need to investigate human rights violations committed by the CDF and bring those responsible to justice.

Recommendations

- **strict chain of command must be enforced over members of the CDF in order to prevent extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, illegal arrest and detention;**
- **all reports of extrajudicial executions, torture and ill-treatment, illegal arrest and detention by the CDF should be promptly and independently investigated in order to bring those responsible to justice.**

Refugees and internally displaced people - still at risk

In July 1998 at the UN special conference on Sierra Leone, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, stated that the refugee crisis in Sierra Leone had been the worst in Africa so far during 1998. On 10 November 1998 she again referred to the plight of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced people when she called on the UN Security Council to respond more effectively to refugee crises in Africa.

As fighting has intensified in the east and north of the country since the intervention by ECOMOG in February 1998, at least 550,000 Sierra Leoneans are estimated to have fled areas affected by conflict. They include hundreds of unaccompanied children. According to UNHCR, since the beginning of 1998, some 210,000 Sierra Leoneans have sought refuge in Guinea and another 57,000 in Liberia. It is also estimated that more than 300,000 have become internally displaced within Sierra Leone during 1998.

The continuing violence perpetrated by rebel forces has not only prevented the return of refugees and internally displaced people to their homes but has also caused a serious humanitarian situation which threatens lives. Both refugees and internally displaced people remain vulnerable to attacks by rebel forces and face acute hardship, disease and malnutrition. The violence and insecurity in areas affected by the conflict has often prevented adequate assistance reaching them.

Refugees in Guinea and Liberia

When fighting between ECOMOG and rebel forces intensified in Kailahun District in April 1998, some 1,000 civilians were reported to be fleeing to Liberia daily. Thousands of refugees also fled into Guinea; 6,000 new refugees arrived during the first week of June 1998. Many, including children, died as a result of malnutrition, diarrhoea and malaria.

The majority of Sierra Leonean refugees were in areas where access was extremely difficult. In both Guinea and Liberia, poor road conditions and the onset of the rainy season, combined with concerns about security by both the Liberian and Guinean authorities, aggravated still further problems of access by humanitarian agencies to refugees in camps near the border, threatening food deliveries and basic medical care,

including vaccinations.

Between 15 June 1998 and 10 July 1998 humanitarian agencies were denied access by the Guinean authorities to camps close to the border in the Guéckédou region where more than 150,00 refugees had recently arrived. The Guinean authorities cited insecurity and difficulties in guaranteeing the safety of humanitarian agencies in the area. UNHCR and its partners did not have access to these refugees for more than three weeks. Many of the refugees in this area were already in poor physical condition when they had arrived. In early September 1998 heavy rains disrupted the delivery of relief assistance to some 180,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in camps in the Guéckédou region of Guinea.

In Guinea most camps were near the border with Sierra Leone, leaving refugees close to areas of the fighting and vulnerable to attacks. On 3 July 1998 the refugee camp at Forokonia in Guinea was attacked during an incursion by rebel forces from Sierra Leone. Six refugees were killed and the camp was looted and almost entirely burned.

In early September 1998 UNHCR reported that rebel forces were continuing to brutalize Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea. Rebel forces had attacked a refugee camp at Tomandu inside Guinea on 1 September 1998, killing at least 10 people - seven women refugees and several Guineans - as they forced other refugees to carry stolen goods back across the border into Sierra Leone. UNHCR sent representatives to the village which had been attacked. They found Sierra Leonean refugees who had previously been abducted by rebel forces, including a girl who said that she had been repeatedly raped and a boy who had the letters RUF carved into his chest and forehead. Witnesses said that rebel forces had raided local food stores killing everyone nearby. Three women refugees were reported to have been shot and seriously wounded when they refused to continue across a bridge into Sierra Leone. UNHCR subsequently moved thousands of refugees from Tomandu to camps further inside Guinea.

Conclusion 22 of the UNHCR Executive Committee states that: "The location of asylum-seekers should be determined by their safety and well-being as well as by the security needs of the receiving State. Asylum-seekers should, as far as possible, be located at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin". In addition, Conclusion 48: "Condemns all violations of the rights and safety of refugees and asylum-seekers and in particular military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements".

On 8 September 1998 the WFP appealed for assistance for more than 200,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the Guéckédou region, most of whom had fled continuing rebel attacks in Kono and Kailahun Districts. According to the WFP, some 80 per cent of civilians from these areas were either dead or unaccounted for. Several thousand others were believed to be held captive by rebel forces. Refugees were arriving destitute, suffering from exhaustion, malnutrition and disease.

There was a further large influx of Sierra Leonean refugees into the Forécariah region of Guinea in late September 1998. According to UNHCR, more than 3,000 people crossed the border on 29 September 1998 after rebel forces had killed civilians and burned homes

in Kukuna. Concern was expressed that refugee camps in the Forécariah region, close to the border, were vulnerable to incursions by rebel forces from Sierra Leone. Another 2,000 were reported to have also fled their homes and become internally displaced.

Most Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, the majority unaccompanied women and children, were based at camps at Vahun and Kolahun in Lofa Country in northwestern Liberia. An unknown number of others were scattered along the border without access to humanitarian assistance. Bad roads and rains hampered access by humanitarian organizations to refugee camps.

The large concentrations of Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia, in particular at camps in Vahun and Kolahun, contained significant numbers of both active and former combatants. They included rebel forces who regularly crossed the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Others were former Sierra Leonean soldiers who feared returning to Sierra Leone because of possible reprisals by the CDF. Also among Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia were former combatants of the RUF who had voluntarily ceased combat. Conclusion 77 of the UNHCR Executive Committee "calls on States of refuge to take all necessary measures to ensure that the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements is maintained".

In addition to the severe physical hardship encountered by refugees and internally displaced people, there was also concern that refugees returning to Sierra Leone who might be considered to be associated with rebel forces could be at risk of revenge attacks on their return and might become victims of arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment or extrajudicial execution.

Internally displaced people

Some 20,000 internally displaced people sought safety from the increasing attacks in Northern and Eastern Provinces from April 1998 at Masingbi, between Koidu and Makeni, swelling the town's normal population of 7,000. During June and early July 1998 up to 300 people arrived daily at Masingbi, decreasing to between 50 and 100 a day during August 1998. The humanitarian situation of internally displaced people at Masingbi remained critical during the following months and there was a high mortality rate as a result of disease and malnutrition. Children under five years were the worst affected. Fears for the safety of displaced people at Masingbi heightened after ECOMOG forces repelled an attack by rebel forces on Masingbi in late October 1998.

With the onset of the rainy season from May, when endemic diseases such as cholera resurface, many civilians caught in areas under the control of rebel forces, forced from their homes and seeking refuge in the bush and with no access to medical assistance were reported to be suffering from vomiting and diarrhoea.

As attacks by rebel forces in both Northern and Eastern Provinces resumed during September and October 1998 entire local communities in Kambia, Koinadugu, Bombali and Kenema Districts were displaced. Attacks by rebel forces on villages in Kenema

District in late September 1998 were reported to have resulted in as many as 10,000 people fleeing their homes, half of whom sought refuge in the town of Kenema.

Recommendations

- **all violations of the rights and safety of refugees and, in particular, military or armed attacks on refugee camps and settlements should be condemned; all efforts should be made to protect the safety of refugees in camps and settlements, including location to secure areas and, whenever possible, at a reasonable distance from the border with Sierra Leone;**
- **effective measures should be taken to preserve the civilian and humanitarian nature of refugee camps and settlements;**
- **every effort should be made to ensure the safety of internally displaced people; internally displaced people's camps should be provided adequate protection from human rights abuses;**
- **all efforts should be made to ensure that there is adequate access to refugees and internally displaced people in order to monitor their safety and provide humanitarian assistance;**
- **refugee repatriation programs should include effective monitoring and protection for as long as necessary; international refugee law and protection standards must be adhered to at all times, including the principles of *non-refoulement*, the right to seek asylum and repatriation only on a voluntary basis with international supervision.**

Accountability for human rights abuses

The government of President Kabbah, since it was reinstated in March 1998, has taken measures to establish accountability for human rights abuses and to bring those responsible to justice. This is essential for achieving justice and moving towards national reconciliation. Such a process, however, must be undertaken in accordance with international standards and must not itself violate human rights. Trials of those accused of human rights abuses must conform to international standards for a fair trial and there should be no recourse to the death penalty.

Impunity contributes to continuing human rights abuses. It is only when those responsible for human rights abuses are brought to justice for their crimes that a clear message is sent that these abuses will not be tolerated or allowed to go unpunished.

The scale of the atrocities committed by the AFRC and the RUF, both before and after they held power, demand that those responsible be brought to justice. This is not incompatible with peace and reconciliation. Peace and security will not be achieved in Sierra Leone until there is an end to impunity. True reconciliation cannot be achieved if

the right of victims and their families to truth, justice and redress are ignored.

On 17 June 1998, shortly after a conference on the creation of an international criminal court opened in Rome, Italy, a joint statement by the heads of five UN agencies said that the atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone were a brutal reminder of the urgent need for an international criminal court to try those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The statement by UNICEF, UNHCR, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs urged those participating at the conference in Rome to study carefully the situation in Sierra Leone and to ensure that the statute they adopted would be able to combat impunity, provide justice and contribute to a lasting peace in the country.

The statement added that, despite the willingness of the Sierra Leone government, it was unlikely that the judicial system would have sufficient resources to bring those responsible for human rights abuses to justice, which would raise "*the prospect of yet another round of mindless violence going unpunished*".

The delegation of Sierra Leone to the conference in Rome repeatedly cited its country as evidence of the need for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court. Amnesty International believes that the international community must assist in establishing accountability for the atrocities in Sierra Leone. This assistance should include both political commitment and practical assistance towards the re-establishment of a functioning and effective justice system and the investigation and documentation of past human rights abuses.

At the UN special conference on Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General also stressed the need for national reconciliation and for Sierra Leoneans to put the past behind them and put the future first. The process of reconciliation did not, however, preclude accountability for human rights abuses: "*Those responsible for the atrocities and other gross violations of human rights will in time be brought to justice*". The need to pursue policies promoting national reconciliation had to be combined with ensuring that those responsible for crimes and atrocities against civilians were brought to justice. All those accused had to be given fair trials with full respect for due process of the law.

Recommendations

- **those responsible for the gross human rights abuses which have occurred in Sierra Leone since May 1997 must be held accountable for their crimes, in accordance with international standards;**
- **the international community should assist Sierra Leone in establishing accountability for the atrocities in Sierra Leone and bringing those responsible to justice, in accordance with international standards.**

Detentions and trials after February 1998

After ECOMOG forced the AFRC from power in February 1998, some 2,000 people were arrested and detained. A significant number were former combatants who were considered to be prisoners of war. Others were associated or perceived to be associated with the AFRC and RUF. Many of those detained were suspected of criminal offences which included gross human rights abuses such as torture and deliberate and arbitrary killing of civilians. Some of those detained had given themselves up to police and ECOMOG forces as a means of protection from civilians who attacked, and in some cases killed, those closely associated with the AFRC and RUF.

On 10 March 1998, President Kabbah proclaimed a state of emergency, under Section 29 of the Constitution of 1991, which includes provisions for indefinite detention without charge or trial. The Proclamation of Emergency was ratified by parliament on 26 March 1998. The Public Emergency Regulations, 1998, state that:

"2. The President may, if in his opinion it is necessary, for the purpose of maintaining and securing peace, order and good government in Sierra Leone, make an Order-

(a) directing that any person be detained or continues to be detained and so long as such an Order is in force in respect of any person, that person shall be liable to be detained in such place and under such circumstances as the President may from time to time determine and shall, while so detained, be deemed to be in legal custody".

Although Article 4 of the ICCPR allows the Sierra Leone government to derogate from its obligations under the treaty, it requires that derogation has to be to the "extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". Certain rights, including the right to life in Article 6 and the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 7, cannot be derogated from. The UN Human Rights Committee which monitors compliance with the ICCPR has stated that "measures taken under Article 4 are of an exceptional and temporary nature and may only last as long as the life of the nation concerned is threatened and that, in times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all the more important, particularly those rights from which no derogations can be made".

Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC and RUF have been held without charge under the Public Emergency Regulations. The scope of these regulations raises concern that people could be held indefinitely without charge or trial, in violation of international human rights standards, in particular the ICCPR.

Throughout the months following the return of the government of President Kabbah arrests of those suspected of collaborating with the AFRC have continued, although the scale of arrests has gradually decreased and some of the detainees have been released without charge. It has been difficult to determine at any one time exactly how many detainees are held without charge. At the end of September 1998, however, several hundred people, including some 130 children, were believed to be held without charge in

detention in Pademba Road prison and other places of detention in and around Freetown. In some cases detentions appeared to be entirely arbitrary, for example, in cases where people were denounced as collaborators for reasons of personal revenge or settling of scores. In September 1998, 18 women were reported to have been arrested in Freetown after being denounced for having fraternized with members of the AFRC.

Significant numbers of civilians are also being held illegally by ECOMOG forces in "safe custody" without any process of review of their detention by a civilian judicial authority.

Among those released without charge from Pademba Road prison after several months in detention were more than 20 senior police officers, who were reported to have been released on 20 August 1998. More than 270 Sierra Leonean soldiers who had been part of the ECOMOG contingent in Liberia at the time of the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, repatriated in March 1998 and detained in Pademba Road prison were also released from custody for retraining on 31 August 1998.

Fifty-nine civilians were charged with treason and other offences in April 1998 and were brought to trial before the High Court early the following month. Trials before a court martial of 37 soldiers began in July 1998. Foday Sankoh was brought before a magistrates' court on 4 September 1998 and charged with treason and other related offences; his trial before the High Court began later that month. It was also expected that further trials of both civilians and soldiers would begin in November 1998. The Court of Appeal ruled in 1975 that the death penalty for the offence of treason was discretionary.

The cases of some of the hundreds of other detainees who remained held without charge or trial were to be reviewed by an independent committee of investigation.

The committee of investigation

In late May 1998 the government established an independent committee of investigation to review the cases of the several hundred people arrested for alleged collaboration with the AFRC who remained detained without charge. The purpose of the committee is to review the cases of those detained in order to expedite release or prosecution. The terms of reference of the committee was to advise the government on action to be taken in the cases of: those alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC; civil servants who had resumed work under the AFRC at their own request or on the invitation of the AFRC; and managers and employees of public sector services who allowed the use of funds by the AFRC or others who facilitated payment of public funds.

The committee of investigation is headed by Nasiru Tejan-Cole, a former Director of Public Prosecution, and includes seven other prominent members of the community. It began its work on 17 July 1998 but its hearings were not held in public. Human rights officers from UNOMSIL were, however, allowed to attend. Detainees appeared before the committee in person and were not represented by lawyers. They were invited to comment on statements that they had made to the police after their arrest and were also able to call witnesses. The committee then made recommendations to the government on

whether to prosecute or release them.

Amnesty International welcomed the establishment of the committee of investigation by the government as a positive initiative. While its progress in reviewing cases has been slower than anticipated, the committee is reported to have conducted its work professionally and competently.

By late September 1998 the cases of some 120 detainees had been considered by the committee. More than 70 had been released unconditionally and another 17 were released either on bail or pending further investigations. In other cases the committee concluded that there was evidence of criminal offences. The committee of investigation is continuing its work and has repeated its calls for witnesses of suspected collaboration to provide evidence and cooperate with the committee.

Recommendations

- **the cases of those who remain detained without charge or trial should be reviewed by the committee of investigation with a minimum of delay with a view to either charging or releasing them.**

Trials before the High Court

Among the 59 civilians charged in April 1998 with treason and some also with other offences, including murder and arson, were those who had participated in the AFRC by accepting government posts. The defendants also included a number of former politicians including former President Joseph Saidu Momoh. One of the defendants, Abdul B. Sankoh, died as a result of ill-health on 21 June 1998. Trials in three groups began in early May 1998 before the High Court in Freetown.

The government stated its commitment to ensuring fair trials for those charged, whereas the public mood was one of anger and a desire for swift justice. The trials were open to the media and public and were monitored by UNOMSIL human rights officers, assisted from July until October 1998 by representatives of the International Bar Association. Independent observers concluded that there had been a genuine attempt by the government to conduct fair and transparent trials before the High Court and that the trials appeared to comply to international procedural standards.

On 25 August 1998, 16 defendants in one of the trials were convicted and sentenced to death; the two remaining defendants were acquitted. Among those sentenced to death were Victor Foh, a member of parliament of the All People's Congress (APC) party, Allieu Badara Kamara, AFRC Under-Secretary of State for Information, Christian Kargbo, former Governor of the Central Bank, Hilton Fyle, a journalist and broadcaster, who had formerly worked for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, Ibrahim Ben Kargbo, a journalist and editor of the *New Citizen* newspaper, Gipu Felix-George, Director General of the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), and two other SLBS broadcasters, Dennis Ayodele Smith and Olivia Mensah. Olivia Mensah,

who was pregnant at the time of her arrest and who gave birth in July 1998, was also convicted of murder.

A second trial concluded on 19 October 1998; 16 defendants were convicted and three acquitted. On 21 October 1998, 11 of those convicted were sentenced to death and the five others were sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. Those sentenced to death included Claude Victor Campbell, a former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Ahmed Charrid Dumbuya, former head of the National Power Authority, Brigadier (rtd.) Leslie Modibo Lymon, AFRC Secretary of State for the Interior, and Nancy Steele, a former APC politician.

The third trial concluded on 4 November 1998. Fifteen of the defendants were convicted of treason and were sentenced to death the following day. They included several people who had held ministerial positions during the period of AFRC rule, including Victor Brandon, Secretary of State for Development, Dr Bailah Leigh, Secretary of State for Health, Dr Matilda King, Under-Secretary of State for Health, and Ajibola Manley-Spaine, Attorney General and Minister of Justice. Former President Momoh was found not guilty of treason but was convicted of two counts of conspiracy and sentenced to two five-year terms of imprisonment to be served concurrently. Five other defendants were acquitted.

All those convicted by the High Court have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and, if unsuccessful, to the Supreme Court. If conviction and sentence are confirmed on appeal, those sentenced to death may seek the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, under Section 63 of the Constitution of 1991. The prerogative of mercy is exercised by a special committee chaired by the President. All those convicted and sentenced to death have appealed against their conviction and sentence; a date for hearings before the Court of Appeal had not been set by early November 1998.

Following interventions by the international community calling for commutation of the death sentences passed in August 1998, the government responded that the judicial process was continuing, that those sentenced had the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, that it remained committed to due process of the law and that the President would consider exercising clemency in any cases where a death sentence was confirmed at the completion of the judicial appeal procedure.

The trial of Foday Sankoh began on 24 September 1998 and he appeared before the High Court on several occasions during October 1998, pleading not guilty to charges of treason and other offences related to the military coup of May 1997. Sierra Leonean lawyers feared reprisals if they agreed to represent Foday Sankoh and genuine efforts by the government to provide legal representation for him proved unsuccessful. He therefore conducted his own defence.

Under Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, a defendant should be allowed to defend himself through a legal representative of his own choosing and that, if he does not have legal assistance, such assistance should be assigned to him. Article 7 of the African Charter, as

interpreted by the African Commission, also includes the right to be defended by a lawyer of the defendant's choice. Safeguard 5 of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, states that: "Capital punishment may only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives all possible safeguards to ensure fair trial, at least to those contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right of anyone suspected of or charged with a crime for which capital punishment may be imposed to adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings." The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions reiterated in December 1996, that: "All defendants facing the imposition of capital punishment must benefit from the services of a competent defence counsel at every stage of the proceedings."

On 23 October 1998 Foday Sankoh was convicted on seven of the nine counts against him and sentenced to death. He appealed against his conviction and sentence and requested representation by a defence lawyer for the appeal procedure. The government sought assistance in providing a lawyer for Foday Sankoh from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

Recommendations

- **all trials should continue to be open to international observers and to conform to international standards for a fair trial;**
- **all those tried for offences which carry a mandatory or discretionary death sentence should be ensured all appropriate safeguards as guaranteed by international standards, including adequate legal assistance at all stages of the proceedings and the right to appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction.**

Trials before court martial

The trial of 37 soldiers charged with mutiny, failure to suppress a mutiny, treason and conspiracy began on 23 July 1998. The defendants included senior members of the AFRC such as Colonel Abdul Karim Sesay, AFRC Secretary General, Sergeant Abu "Zagalo" Sankoh and Corporal Tamba Gborie who had announced the military coup on 25 May 1997 on state radio. The judicial panel comprised Sierra Leonean army officers and was presided by a Judge Advocate who was a Nigerian ECOMOG officer.

As with the trials before the High Court, the court martial was open to independent observers. In addition to monitors from UNOMSIL and the International Bar Association, an Amnesty International representative observed the early proceedings of the trial before the court martial in late July and early August 1998.

Trials before court martial in Sierra Leone allow no right of appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction. The right of appeal from a decision of a court martial was abolished by statute in 1971. This lack of judicial appeal violates international

standards for a fair trial. Amnesty International repeatedly urged the government to allow a judicial appeal from the court martial.

Article 14(5) of the ICCPR states that: "Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law." Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, ratified by Sierra Leone in 1996, where rights guaranteed by the ICCPR, including the right to fair trial, have been violated, recourse may be sought from the UN Human Rights Committee.

The Human Rights Committee has concluded that imposition of a death sentence after a trial which violates the provisions of the ICCPR, including Article 14, constitutes a violation of the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 6 of the treaty.

In addition, Safeguard 6 of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty states that: "Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to appeal to a court of higher jurisdiction, and steps should be taken to ensure that such appeals shall become mandatory." [13]

The African Charter also guarantees, under Article 7, the right to fair trial. The African Commission has made several decisions which interpret Article 7 of the African Charter to include a right of appeal to a higher jurisdiction. In April 1998 the African Commission, before the execution of 23 people in Rwanda, issued a statement saying that the executions of people who had been denied a fair trial violated Article 4 of the African Charter which prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.

As with those sentenced to death by a civilian court, the presidential committee for the prerogative of mercy may meet after judgment has been made to confirm or reduce sentences by the court martial.

In the final stages of the trial, the judicial panel of the court martial refused to accept legal arguments, which had previously been accepted by the prosecution in the case of civilians being tried for treason before the High Court, that the death penalty was discretionary, rather than mandatory, for the offence of treason. It therefore refused to accept evidence in mitigation.

On 12 October 1998 34 of the defendants before the court martial were convicted of treason, murder and collaborating with the enemy and sentenced to death. They included Colonel Abdul Karim Sesay, Sergeant Abu "Zagalo" Sankoh, Corporal Tamba Gborie, Brigadier Hassan Karim Conteh, a former Chief of Defence Staff, Colonel Samuel Francis Koroma, also former Chief of Defence Staff, Squadron Leader Victor L. King, and a woman, Major Kula Samba, who had been AFRC Secretary of State for Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs. The three other defendants were acquitted.

Complaints of violations of the ICCPR were submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee on behalf of 18 of those sentenced to death by the court martial. Despite these submissions and appeals for stays of execution and clemency by the international

community, including the UN Secretary-General and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 24 of those sentenced to death, including those named above, were executed on 19 October 1998. The other 10 had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment by the committee for the prerogative of mercy.

The executions were carried out by a firing squad using automatic weapons and took place in public on the outskirts of Freetown. The executions were reported to have been observed by a large number of people, although not specifically invited, who included the news media. Photographs of the executions were subsequently published. Amnesty International considers that the death penalty in all circumstances is a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. The manner in which these executions were carried out, however, was particularly cruel, inhuman and degrading. The graphic publicity subsequently appearing in the news media in Sierra Leone both emphasized and aggravated the brutalizing effect that the executions have on society within Sierra Leone.

These executions violated Sierra Leone's commitments under international human rights law and were condemned by the international community, including the UN and the EU, as well as Amnesty International and other human rights organizations. The UN Secretary-General said on 22 October 1998 that he regretted that the executions had taken place despite his appeal to the government to consider, at the very least, a stay of execution pending review of the proceedings before relevant international monitoring bodies. He added that he hoped that the government would ensure due process of the law in subsequent trials. The UN Human Rights Committee requested the government to explain why it had disregarded the Committee's request for a stay of execution and carried out the executions.

It was reported in late October 1998 that a further 16 soldiers would be tried on treason charges before the court martial; if convicted, they too faced death sentences without the right to appeal to a higher jurisdiction.

Recommendations

- **trials before court martial must conform to international standards for a fair trial, including the right of appeal against conviction and sentence to a higher jurisdiction;**
- **in addition, those tried before court martial for offences which carry a mandatory or discretionary death sentence should be ensured all appropriate safeguards.**

The death penalty - a violation of human rights

All those convicted of treason and other offences relating to the military coup of May 1997 face a possible death sentence. By early November 1998, 42 civilians and Foday Sankoh had been sentenced to death and 24 of 34 soldiers sentenced to death by court martial had been executed.

The anger and bitterness of the people of Sierra Leone against those tried for crimes committed during the period of AFRC rule and the desire for retribution and swift justice was demonstrated by the series of revenge killings which took place in Freetown and other parts of the country after the removal of the AFRC and RUF. Public opinion in Sierra Leone demands that strong action is taken by the government against those responsible for crimes committed during that period, which included gross human rights abuses such as killings and torture. The atmosphere surrounding the trials has been highly charged and support for the death penalty in Sierra Leone is inevitably widespread.

Amnesty International acknowledges the government's responsibility to bring to justice those responsible for such crimes, in accordance with international standards. Amnesty International is opposed to impunity and always encourages governments to investigate human rights abuses and to bring the perpetrators to justice. It is precisely because Amnesty International is concerned that those guilty of human rights abuses should not escape justice that it urges the government to ensure that all trials are conducted fairly.

Amnesty International is, however, unconditionally opposed to the death penalty on the grounds that it is a violation of the fundamental right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR. There is particular concern when those sentenced to death and executed do not receive fair trials.

The scale of human rights abuses committed in Sierra Leone has been horrendous. An argument used in favour of the death penalty is that it is justified retribution for particularly atrocious crimes. The use of the death penalty, however, perpetuates a cycle of violence, bitterness and revenge, instead of bringing reconciliation and respect for human rights. The death penalty is an official form of violence which has a brutalizing effect on society. Violent retribution is not justice but vengeance disguised as justice. A government and people committed to end human rights abuses must rise above vengeance and promote and protect human rights, in particular the right to life.

A difficult and daunting task faces Sierra Leone in achieving reconciliation within its society after the atrocities committed by the AFRC and RUF. Amnesty International, however, does not believe that the use of the death penalty will contribute in any way to the process of reconciliation. On the contrary, it considers that the public executions of 24 soldiers in October 1998 after an unfair trial are incompatible with initiatives aimed at reconciliation within Sierra Leone.

There has been significant progress towards ending the use of the death penalty both in Africa and throughout the world; 19 states in Africa and a majority of states worldwide have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice. The government of Sierra Leone should move in the direction of this trend, rather than against it.

Recommendations

- **the government of Sierra Leone should take steps towards the abolition of the death penalty in law**
- **pending abolition, all death sentences should be commuted and no executions should take place;**
- **the government and non-governmental organizations should initiate and promote open debate on the death penalty among the Sierra Leonean population in order to raise awareness of the human rights issues involved.**

Harsh prison conditions

Conditions in prisons, police stations and other places of detention in Freetown and throughout the country fall far short of international standards for the treatment of prisoners and in some cases amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The severity of conditions in Sierra Leone's prisons appears to be attributable to material shortages in a country which faces acute economic problems. Conditions have been further exacerbated by the destruction and damage of prison facilities at the time of the military coup in May 1997.

All places of detention hold numbers of detainees well beyond the capacity for which they were designed. Following the detention of some 2,000 people in the weeks following the removal of the AFRC and RUF from power, conditions in Pademba Road prison and police cells in Freetown became severely overcrowded. In October 1998 some 1,200 detainees were reported to be held at Pademba Road prison, more than three times the capacity for which it was constructed. Most of these detainees were held under the Public Emergency Regulations. Detainees were also held in military camps, including ECOMOG bases at Wilberforce and Lungi barracks.

In August 1998 a local human rights organization, Prison Watch Sierra Leone, reviewed conditions both at Pademba Road prison and the Kingtom Remand Home for children in Freetown. It concluded that generally the diet of prisoners was deficient. With the exception of separate facilities provided for women prisoners, sanitation was poor at Pademba Road prison. Prisoners depended on family and relatives for the provision of clothing. Prison Watch Sierra Leone drew particular attention to the neglect of 24 children held at that time at the Kingtom Remand Home, the youngest of whom was 11 years old. Few received visits from members of their families and most appeared to be children who had lost contact with their families as a result of the conflict.

Conditions are particularly harsh at CID headquarters and also at the Central Police Station in the centre of Freetown. Large number of detainees, accused of criminal offences or of crimes committed during the period of AFRC rule, are reported to have been held for lengthy periods at CID headquarters in small, dark cells with inadequate ventilation and sanitary facilities. Cells at the Central Police Station, which is situated next to the sea, are reported to be extremely damp and subject to flooding. Often detainees have no bedding and have to sleep on the floor. Food and medical care are

inadequate. Detainees held in police stations rely on food being provided by relatives and friends.

Conditions in prisons outside the capital are also extremely poor. Food and sanitary provisions are particularly deficient. There is no effective system for providing food to prisoners and those without support from relatives are at particular risk of deprivation. Often there is no space for exercise within the prison. In prisons outside Freetown, for example in Kenema, female prisoners are not segregated from males and minors are held with adult prisoners.

As a result of severe overcrowding, inadequate hygiene and medical care diseases, including malaria, diarrhoea and skin complaints, are rife in Pademba Road prison and other places of detention. Some prisoners and detainees were reported to have died as a result of ill-health. While Pademba Road prison has medical facilities within the prison and a prison doctor, most prisons outside Freetown have no such provision.

Following the detention of hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the AFRC and RUF visits were severely restricted and denied altogether on several occasions. The authorities justified these restrictions on security grounds.

Shortly after the removal of the AFRC and RUF a delegation of the ICRC, accompanied by a doctor and a nurse, were authorized to visit all places of detention in areas under the control of ECOMOG, including Pademba Road prison, and visits have since continued.

The government is reported to be reviewing the prison system in Sierra Leone in order to undertake major reforms. Financial assistance from the international community will, however, be necessary to implement improvements to conditions in prisons and other places of detention. Following visits to several places of detention in late October 1998 UNOMSIL human rights officers prepared an analysis of the problems faced by the prison system in order to provide a more coordinated response to the needs of prisons and other places of detention.

Recommendations

- **urgent and effective measures should be taken to ensure that all places of detention in Sierra Leone conform to international standards for the treatment of prisoners, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;**
- **the health of all detainees and prisoners should be ensured while in custody; adequate medical facilities and treatment, food, washing and sanitary facilities should be provided, and prisoners should have daily exercise in the fresh air;**
- **the international community should assist the Sierra Leone government in ensuring acceptable conditions of detention.**

Long-term measures for the protection and respect of human rights

Establishing accountability for human rights abuses is essential to prevent human rights violations in the future. Also needed are strong and effective institutions within Sierra Leone to ensure that fundamental human rights are respected and protected. This includes the legal and judicial systems, the army and the police, as well as an independent national human rights commission. Civil society, including human rights groups, are also integral to promoting human rights and creating an environment in which human rights are respected.

Despite the exceptionally difficult circumstances that all sectors of civil society, including the human rights community, in Sierra Leone have recently endured, human rights groups have emerged as a committed and active force. Their potential should be acknowledged and their activities supported. A National Forum for Human Rights, which is a coalition of 18 organizations working in diverse areas, has been established.

It is essential that basic institutional reforms are guided by strict adherence to international standards relating to the independence of the judiciary, human rights in the administration of justice and codes of conduct for law enforcement officials. All sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including the human rights community, should be involved in these reforms and should receive education and training on human rights standards and complaints procedures.

The international community, including the UN and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should work closely together to promote post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation in Sierra Leone which is based on good governance and respect for human rights. International financial institutions should use their influence - official and unofficial - to ensure that the restoration of good and effective governance includes the re-establishment of mechanisms and systems to promote the rule of law and the protection of human rights. This should include assistance towards the establishment of permanent, independent and effective national institutions for the long-term protection of human rights and the rule of law, including an independent judiciary and fair criminal justice system.

Reform of the legal and judicial system

The long-term protection of human rights in Sierra Leone depends fundamentally on an effective legal system which is enforced by an independent, impartial and accessible judiciary with adequate resources. The Sierra Leone government, following its return to power, admitted that the judicial system was entirely inadequate. Courts outside Freetown are not functioning, other than magistrates courts in Bo, Kenema and Makeni, and the traditional court system has collapsed.

There should be a thorough review of existing legal institutions in order to make them more effective in the protection of human rights. These initiatives should be accompanied by a determined government policy to hold those responsible for human rights violations

fully accountable.

UNOMSIL, UNDP, other UN agencies and international financial institutions should contribute towards the reconstruction of an effective judiciary and legal system in Sierra Leone. Some initiatives have already been undertaken. UNOMSIL has provided law books to the legal profession and has distributed legal technical documents to lawyers representing defendants in the treason trials. It has also conducted seminars for lawyers to discuss aspects of trial practice and procedure.

Restructuring the armed forces

The Sierra Leone national army, the RSLMF, was effectively disbanded following its participation in the military coup and the period of rule by the AFRC. Programs for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have commenced but at a slower pace than anticipated.

In May 1998 the government announced plans for the establishment of a new national army. Recruitment and training was entrusted to ECOMOG. During a meeting with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in May 1998, the government agreed not to recruit children under the age of 18 years. The government and ECOMOG have also agreed to receive assistance from UN agencies in providing training materials on humanitarian and human rights standards concerning the protection of civilians, particularly women and children.

In early September 1998 President Kabbah announced the government's strategy for the re-establishment of a professional and disciplined Sierra Leonean national army which would comprise 5,000 soldiers, including some of those who had remained loyal to President Kabbah's government after the military coup and who had surrendered to ECOMOG forces after February 1998. Some of these soldiers have already been deployed alongside ECOMOG and CDF forces in those parts of the country still affected by conflict. The international community, including the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, are providing assistance in training and equipping the new national army. Restructuring, training and equipping the national army should include provisions for the protection of human rights contained in international humanitarian and human rights law.

Human rights training for the police force

Restructuring and training of the police force should also include training in human rights. In August 1998 the government announced its intention to create a police force which would be able to assist Sierra Leone in returning to peace and prosperity and which would eventually remove the need for the deployment of military and paramilitary forces, including the CDF, in towns and villages.

UNOMSIL civilian police advisers should continue to monitor, supervise and train national police and security forces and verify their adherence to international human rights and criminal justice standards. A UN civilian police adviser was deployed in Sierra

Leone in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1162 (1998) in July 1998; Resolution 1181 (1988) provided for the deployment of a further four police advisers. Their role is to assist in restoring the confidence of the government and the people of Sierra Leone in the police force and to advise the government on training and re-equipment needs. UNOMSIL civilian police advisers are working closely with a team of police advisers from Commonwealth countries, the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force, deployed at the request of the government, as well as with UNOMSIL human rights officers.

In his Second Progress Report on UNOMSIL, the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that reform of the police force in Sierra Leone poses great challenges. Parts of the country are without a police presence, since many police officers have been killed or have abandoned their posts as a result of the conflict. Little or no training has been available for several years and the police suffer from inadequate logistical support, lack of equipment and poor conditions of service. Respect for human rights has been emphasized and police training initiatives have begun.

UNOMSIL human rights officers have conducted a series of human rights training workshops for police officers, including at the Sierra Leone police training college and in Bo and Kenema, as part of continuing efforts by UNOMSIL and the Commonwealth to restructure and train the Sierra Leonean police force.

The National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy

Long-term respect for human rights requires national human rights institutions to redress human rights violations. Rarely do they receive the necessary funding. If empowered with political support and resources national human rights institutions are the most sustainable mechanisms for the protection human rights. National institutions, which include government bodies as well as those of civil society such as human rights groups, the media, trade unions and professional organizations, are an important element of post-conflict reconstruction.

A National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy has been established in Sierra Leone and with the return President Kabbah's government has begun to resume its activities. The National Commission has a crucial role to play within Sierra Leone in building a culture based on the universality, interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights for all people. It should be supported and strengthened and its independence and impartiality guaranteed [14].

An effective national human rights commission, with the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate, can play a central role in protecting human rights. It is crucial, however, that the National Commission is supported by the government in bringing those responsible for human rights violations to justice.

An effective national human rights commission is an important mechanism for

strengthening human rights protection and bringing about institutional reform. It should not, however, replace or detract from the importance of safeguards provided by an effective legal system.

On 18 September 1998 the National Commission established four committees, composed of prominent civilians, to monitor and report on areas of concern for the protection and respect of human rights. These included the conduct of the police, prison conditions and the situation of women and children. On 10 October 1998 UNOMSIL human rights officers conducted a human rights training session for the committee monitoring women and children which was also attended by members of the National Commission.

The National Commission should continue to work closely with local human rights groups in order to develop a strong and effective human rights movement in Sierra Leone which includes all sectors of civil society.

Recommendations

- **the international community, including international financial institutions, should continue to contribute to institutional reform in Sierra Leone, including strengthening the independence of the judiciary and reforming the military and civilian police force;**
- **the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy should have the necessary powers, resources, professional competence and guarantees of independence and impartiality to carry out prompt and effective investigations into human rights violations; its findings should be made public and it should include recommendations for bringing those responsible for human rights violations to justice and for providing compensation to the victims;**
- **the National Commission for Human Rights and Democracy should also make recommendations for institutional reform and other preventive measures, such as human rights education aimed at all sectors of society, including military, police and judicial officials.**

(1) ECOMOG had been deployed under the authority of ECOWAS in neighbouring Liberia since 1990. Immediately after the military coup in May 1997, Nigerian forces already present in Sierra Leone under the provisions of a defence agreement between Sierra Leone and Nigeria were significantly reinforced by ECOMOG forces, who were predominantly Nigerian. ECOWAS is an intergovernmental organization of 16 states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo) with its headquarters in Nigeria. Established in 1975, the aim of ECOWAS is to promote cooperation and development and to improve relations among member states.

(2) CMAG is composed of Barbados, Botswana, Canada, Ghana, Malaysia, New

Zealand, the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

(3) For further information on implementing human rights in international peace-keeping operations, refer to *Peace-keeping and human rights* (AI Index: IOR 40/01/94), published by Amnesty International in January 1994.

(4) Sierra Leone ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990.

(5) For further information about Amnesty International's recommendations to the UN special conference on Sierra Leone, refer to *Sierra Leone: The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: the protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community* (AI Index: AFR 51/14/98), published by Amnesty International on 24 July 1998.

(6) The contact group included representatives from China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States and the EU.

(7) Countries which are part of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are also part of the Bureau of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. The Bureau consists of 16 ambassadors and is elected annually. It plays a crucial role in decision-making and planning at the OAU. For further information about the OAU and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, refer to *Organization of African Unity: Making Human Rights a Reality for Africans* (AI Index: IOR 63/01/98), published by Amnesty International in August 1998.

(8) For further information, refer to *Sierra Leone: A disastrous set-back for human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/97), published by Amnesty International on 20 October 1997.

(9) Sierra Leone ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1996 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1984.

(10) For further information about human rights abuses committed in the internal armed conflict in Sierra Leone, refer to *Sierra Leone: Human rights abuses in a war against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/95), published by Amnesty International on 13 September 1995, and also *Sierra Leone: Towards a future founded on human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/96), published by Amnesty International on 25 September 1996.

(11) Sierra Leone acceded to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II) in 1986.

(12) For further information on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, refer to *"Old enough to kill but too young to vote"* (AI Index: IOR 51/01/98), published by Amnesty International in January 1998.

(13) For further information on international standards relating to the use of the death penalty, refer to *International standards on the death penalty* (AI Index: ACT 50/06/97), published by Amnesty International in August 1997.

(14) For further guidelines on the mandate, composition and functioning of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights, refer to *Proposed Standards for National Human Rights Commissions* (AI Index: IOR 40/01/93), published by Amnesty International in January 1993, and the handbook on *National Human Rights Institutions*, published in 1995 by the UN Centre for Human Rights (now the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).

Number	Item	Content
202	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone – Childhood – a casualty of conflict," AFR 51/69/00, 31 August 2000.

5071

amnesty international

SIERRA LEONE Childhood - a casualty of conflict

31 August 2000

SUMMARY

AI INDEX: AFR 51/69/00

DISTR: SC/CC/CO

More than 5,000 children under the age of 18, both boys and girls and some as young as five, have fought as combatants in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict. Children have been specifically singled out for recruitment by both the armed opposition and forces fighting in support of the government. Most of the children fighting with rebel forces have been abducted from their homes and families and forced to fight. Victims themselves, they have also been perpetrators of human rights abuses, sometimes against members of their own families and communities. Many have been forced to kill and mutilate under the influence of drugs, alcohol or simply because of fear. Former child combatants often say that they do not know why Sierra Leoneans are killing Sierra Leoneans.

A further 5,000 children, again both boys and girls, have been associated with rebel forces although not directly deployed in combat; they have been used to carry goods, cook or collect firewood, and girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. Some girls are forced to "serve" many male combatants. These figures are estimates; the real figures may be much higher.

On 7 July 1999 in Lomé, Togo, the government of Sierra Leone and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement which was to end Sierra Leone's eight-year conflict. The difficult task of disarming and demobilizing very large numbers of child combatants and helping them to return to a normal life with their families and communities began.

While some progress was being made towards securing the release, disarmament and demobilization of child combatants following the signing of the peace agreement, further efforts have since been curtailed. The political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated in early May 2000 with the capture of some 500 United Nations (UN) peace-keeping troops by rebel forces and a resumption of hostilities. The recruitment and use of children as combatants

by both rebel forces and government-allied forces, among the most distressing features of the internal armed conflict, are continuing.

In this report Amnesty International describes the violation of the most fundamental rights of the children of Sierra Leone. Much of the information included comes from the children themselves who were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during visits to Sierra Leone in March, June and July 2000.

The scale of the problem of child combatants in Sierra Leone is well known and has been recognized, including by the UN, the government of Sierra Leone and non-governmental organizations, both national and international. There is a wealth of international and regional standards, resolutions and statements on the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. What is now urgent is to give substance to the repeated commitments to end the recruitment and use of children as combatants.

Amnesty International is making a series of recommendations to the government of Sierra Leone, the leaders of RUF forces and the international community aimed at finally ending the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. These include:

- the highest priority should be given to resuming the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants and prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited for military service, including by raising the minimum age for military recruitment to 18;
- all children held by RUF forces should be released immediately and RUF forces should immediately cease forcible or voluntary recruitment and use of children under the age of 18;
- in all efforts by the international community to resolve the political and security crisis in Sierra Leone, the needs of children affected by the internal armed conflict, including child combatants, should be given the highest priority and concrete steps should be taken to implement commitments made to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone;
- those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights law and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice.

KEYWORDS: CHILD SOLDIERS1 / RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS1 / JUVENILES / ARMED CONFLICT / MILITARY / NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES / WITNESS TESTIMONIES / REHABILITATION / MSP / HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS / INVESTIGATION OF ABUSES / PEACE-KEEPING / UNICEF / PHOTOGRAPHS

This report summarizes a 40-page document (15,129 words), *Sierra Leone: Childhood - a casualty of conflict* (AI Index: AFR 51/69/00), issued by Amnesty International on 31 August 2000. Anyone wishing further details or to take action on this issue should consult the full document. An extensive range of our materials on this and other subjects is available at <http://www.amnesty.org> and Amnesty International news releases can be received by email: <http://www.amnestv.org/news/emailnws.htm>

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
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SIERRA LEONE

Childhood - a casualty of conflict




Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi. ©Amnesty International

31 August 2000
AI Index: AFR 51/69/00
Distr: SC/CC/CO

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SIERRA LEONE

GUINEA

LIBERIA

ATLANTIC OCEAN

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY.

ROAD

RAILWAY

AIRFIELD

PORT

SWAMP

FREEPORT

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50 Kilometres

SIERRA LEONE

Childhood - a casualty of conflict

Introduction

More than 5,000 children under the age of 18, both boys and girls and some as young as five, have fought as combatants in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict. Children have been specifically singled out for recruitment by both the armed opposition and forces fighting in support of the government. Most of the children fighting with rebel forces have been abducted from their homes and families and forced to fight. Many were separated from their families at a very young age. Victims themselves, they have also been perpetrators of human rights abuses, sometimes against members of their own families and communities. Many have been forced to kill and mutilate under the influence of drugs, alcohol or simply because of fear. Former child combatants often say that they do not know why Sierra Leoneans are killing Sierra Leoneans.

A further 5,000 children, again both boys and girls, have been associated with rebel forces although not directly deployed in combat; they have been used to carry goods, cook or collect firewood, and girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. Some girls are forced to "serve" many male combatants.¹

These are the figures provided by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) but they are estimates; the real figures may be much higher. The Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, after a visit to Sierra Leone, said on 9 September 1999 that '*more than 10,000 children have been serving as child soldiers in various fighting groups*'.

On 7 July 1999 in Lomé, Togo, the government of Sierra Leone and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement which was to end Sierra Leone's eight-year conflict. The difficult task of disarming and demobilizing very large numbers of child combatants and helping them to return to a normal life with their families and communities began.

While some progress was being made towards securing the release, disarmament and demobilization of child combatants following the signing of the peace agreement, further efforts have since been curtailed. The political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated in early May 2000 with the capture of some 500 UN peace-keeping troops by rebel forces and a resumption of hostilities. The recruitment and use of children

¹For further information about the abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence committed against girls and women, see *Sierra Leone: Rape and other forms of sexual violence against girls and women* (AI Index: AFR 51/35/00), published by Amnesty International on 29 June 2000.

as combatants by both rebel forces and government-allied forces are continuing. This is among the most distressing features of a conflict which has also been characterized by systematic and widespread deliberate and arbitrary killing, amputation of limbs and mutilation, rape and other forms of sexual violence.²

In this report Amnesty International describes the violation of the most fundamental rights of the children of Sierra Leone. Much of the information included comes from the children themselves who were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during visits to Sierra Leone in March, June and July 2000.

The scale of the problem of child combatants in Sierra Leone is well known and has been recognized, including by the UN Secretary-General, his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the government of Sierra Leone and non-governmental organizations, both national and international. There is a wealth of international and regional standards, resolutions and statements on the protection of children in situations of armed conflict. What is now urgent is to give substance to the repeated commitments to end the recruitment and use of children as combatants, by whatever side.

Amnesty International is making a series of recommendations to the government of Sierra Leone, the leaders of RUF forces and the international community aimed at finally ending the use of child soldiers in Sierra Leone. These include:

- the highest priority should be given to resuming the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants, and prompt and effective measures should be taken to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited for military service, including by passing legislation raising the minimum age for military recruitment to 18;
- all children held by RUF forces, either used as combatants or in any way associated with fighting forces, should be released immediately and RUF forces should immediately cease forcible or voluntary recruitment and use of children under the age of 18;

² For further information about human rights committed during the conflict, see previous reports published by Amnesty International, in particular: *Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the international contact group on Sierra Leone, New York, 19 April 1999* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/99), 19 April 1999; *Sierra Leone: 1998 - a year of atrocities against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/22/98), November 1998; *Sierra Leone: A disastrous set-back for human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/97), 20 October 1997; *Sierra Leone: Towards a future founded on human rights* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/96), 25 September 1996; and *Sierra Leone: Human rights abuses in a war against civilians* (AI Index: AFR 51/05/95), 13 September 1995.

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- in all efforts by the international community to resolve the political and security crisis in Sierra Leone, the needs of children affected by the internal armed conflict, including child combatants, should be given the highest priority and concrete steps should be taken to implement commitments made to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone;
 - those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights law and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice.

The use of child combatants in the internal armed conflict

Children have fought with the various forces involved in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict which began in 1991. These forces include the RUF, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The AFRC came to power following the military coup on 25 May 1997 which overthrew the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected in 1996. The AFRC joined forces with the RUF after coming to power and remained its ally after the AFRC was forced from power in February 1998 by forces deployed in Sierra Leone by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), known as ECOMOG. With the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999, the AFRC allied itself to the government of President Kabbah but some of its forces continued to engage in hostilities against government-allied forces. Rebel forces who remain in control of parts of the north and east of the country continue to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers. Previously disarmed and demobilized members of the AFRC and those members of the Sierra Leone Army who had remained loyal to the government, including children under the age of 18, have again been recruited and rearmed to fight on behalf of the government since May 2000. Large numbers of children have also been recruited and used in combat by the CDF, the civilian militia based on societies of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, which support the government of President Kabbah.

The involvement of children in conflict has devastating effects on their physical and mental integrity. There have been higher casualty rates among children because of their inexperience, fearlessness and lack of training. Children are considered as particularly useful because their size and agility means that they may be sent on particularly hazardous assignments. Frequently ill-treated or even killed by the commanders, they have no protectors. Adult combatants who commit human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, involve children in those crimes. In addition to the obvious risks

of death or serious injury in combat, children suffer disproportionately from the general rigours of military life, especially in the bush, and are particularly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition. As for the severe psychological consequences of active participation in hostilities, with children witnessing and at times also committing atrocities, the full extent of the impact on child combatants as well as society as a whole may only become apparent over a long period.

Former child combatants tell their stories

Those children who have been released or have escaped and who have been disarmed and demobilized provide horrifying accounts of how the conflict has affected them. The names of the children whose testimonies are included have been changed in order to protect their identities. Most were interviewed by Amnesty International representatives during June and July 2000.


Child combatants live in constant fear of being beaten and killed. Many former child combatants describe being threatened, intimidated and severely beaten; others recount the killing of their friends and companions. Former child combatants describe the killings and mutilations of civilians which they carried out while fighting. If they refused, they risked being beaten or killed. Peter, a 12-year-old former child combatant, said: "*When I was killing, I felt like it wasn't me doing these things. I had to because the rebels threatened to kill me.*"

Former child combatants fighting with RUF

Ibrahim is now aged 16 and living at a centre for former child combatants at an internally displaced people's camp at Waterloo, 20 kilometres east of Freetown. He was captured by the RUF in 1992 in Kono District, Eastern Province, and from there was transferred to the rebel stronghold of Kailahun District, also in Eastern Province. He was taught how to use weapons, how to advance and attack the enemy and how to ambush. He described how before attacks, each combatant, including child combatants, was given cocaine and marijuana: "*After sniffing cocaine, I was not afraid of anything. I became bloody.*"

Ibrahim told Amnesty International on 19 June 2000 that when the RUF forces with whom he fought heard that RUF leader Foday Sankoh was going to be tried in 1998: "*We were ordered to kill any civilian that we came across. Any fighter or children suspected of being reluctant to do the killings were severely beaten. We were asked to advance and to do everything possible to terrorize the civilians. It was during this period that people's hands and limbs were cut off, in Kono, Masingbi, Matatoka, Magburaka and Makeni.*"

During that time, one of the children asked the commander the reasons for the killings. He said that the civilians were supporting President Kabbah's government. Sheriff Kabia, who was 17 and known as 'Crazy Jungle', was killed because he asked this question." Sheriff Kabia was reported to have been killed in November 1998. Ibrahim also described the death of Mamadu Kamara, aged 14, who was killed because he refused to cut off the hand of someone from his own village.



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi
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Abdul, now aged 17, was abducted by the RUF in 1997 during an ambush in Kenema District, Eastern Province. He told Amnesty International on 21 July 2000 that he was taken to an RUF training camp, known as Camp Lion, near Pendembu in Kailahun District where he was trained by both Sierra Leoneans and Liberians. He was taught to use a variety of weapons, including AK47 and AK58 rifles, which he said came from Liberia. *"After the Lomé peace accord, we thought that was the end of the whole war. We were waiting to disarm; there was no fighting. Instead we all went to Tongo Field to mine. Most rebels did that."* Abdul was then ordered to go to Lunsar, Port Loko District: *"We didn't even reach the front line when we met some wounded colleagues. I wanted to surrender but I was afraid."* When he gave himself up to Sierra Leone Army forces, his arms were tied tightly behind his back; rope marks on both arms were still visible. He was first taken to Masiaka, some 50 kilometres east of Freetown, where he was hit on the head with a pistol by a soldier and then transferred to Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. *"They threatened to kill me. For the first week I was treated badly but then I was given food and water and no one treated me badly. For the first two weeks I was not allowed out of the cell."* He remained there for more than three weeks before being transferred to an interim care centre in Freetown. *"I want to go back to school but here in Freetown, not in the provinces. I am scared that I'll get taken back to the front line."*

David, now aged 14, from Bumbuna, Tonkolili District, Northern Province, was abducted in 1996 by the RUF when they attacked Bumbuna. He is now at a centre established to care for former child combatants, known as an interim care centre, run by an international non-governmental organization, in Freetown. When interviewed by Amnesty International on 12 July 2000, he said that after his abduction he was taken first to Kabala, Koinadugu District, Northern Province, and then to Bunumbu in Kailahun District, an RUF stronghold. There he, together with another 40 children, was trained to fight at Camp Lion. *"I had to go through the training and learn to fight, otherwise the RUF people would beat me or kill me."* Among those killed by the RUF during the training was a boy, aged about 11, with whom David had become friends. He was beaten to death because he refused to continue training. He had complained of being tired - the training was difficult and he was exhausted. He was beaten in front of more than 30 other children and his body was thrown into the bush. Another child, aged 14, was also beaten and killed.

David described how, even under the influence of marijuana and alcohol, he was still afraid to fight, but he did not tell anyone for fear of being killed. David remained with rebel forces for three years until surrendering to forces of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) at Makeni, Bombali District, Northern Province, after the peace agreement was signed in July 1999. Now at the interim care centre, he said: *"I want to become a doctor now and go back to school to learn how to cure people."*

Many former child combatants with rebel forces have described how they were forced to drink alcohol and take drugs and the effect that it had on them. Among the drugs used were marijuana, amphetamines, commonly referred to as "blue boats", and cocaine. When child combatants refused to take drugs they were beaten and, in some cases, killed.

Komba, now aged 15, was captured by the RUF in 1997 in Binkolo, Bombali, District. Now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo, he told Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 that he was among rebel forces who attacked Freetown in January 1999: *"My legs were cut with blades and cocaine was rubbed in the wounds. Afterwards, I felt like a big person. I saw the other people like chickens and rats. I wanted to kill them."*

When interviewed by Amnesty International on 20 June 2000, Gibril, aged 11, said: *"Before battles, I was given white powder which was mixed with rice. It made me brave, it made me think that I could do anything."*

Fifteen child combatants, including at least two girls, were among some 2,500 Sierra Leonean refugees who fled into Gueckédou in Guinea during the first two weeks of August 2000 to escape intensified fighting and bombing by government forces of rebel-held areas in Eastern Province. All but one had been abducted by rebel forces and forced to fight for periods of up to seven years. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), all the children said that they had been heavily drugged with cocaine and they acknowledged that they had been extremely brutal. They were separated from other refugees because they feared that victims of the atrocities which they had committed would recognize them.

Former child combatants fighting with the AFRC

After being removed from power in February 1998 by ECOMOG forces acting in support of President Kabbah, the AFRC, together with the RUF, wreaked a campaign of terror against civilians, particularly in Northern Province. From April 1998 reports emerged of widespread killings, amputations and abductions in villages in Northern Province.

When interviewed on 19 June 2000 by Amnesty International, Sayo, now aged 14, said that he was abducted by AFRC forces in 1998 in Makali, Tonkolili District. He was trained in different places, including Koinadugu District. He described how his skin was cut in different places, including near his eyes, and cocaine put in the wounds. *"When I go to the battle fields, I smoke enough. That's why I become unafraid of everything. When you refuse to take drugs, it's called technical sabotage and you are killed."* After the peace agreement was signed in July 1999 Sayo was freed and taken to a centre for former child

combatants run by a non-governmental organization, CARITAS-Makeni, in Kabala. He is now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo.

Hassan, now aged 15, from Makeni, told Amnesty International on 21 July 2000 at a centre for former child combatants in Freetown that he was abducted with four of his cousins by the AFRC in 1998 when he was aged 13. He was trained in a camp near Kabala where he was given an AK 47 rifle. He claimed that there were several hundred other young boys in the camp. The training lasted three months. He had to learn how to dismantle a weapon, how to use a rocket propelled grenade (RPG), how to attack, how to undertake guard duty and how to parade. He also said that he had to parade for AFRC leaders, including Johnny Paul Koroma, now head of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, established under the July 1999 peace agreement, and Brigadier, now Colonel, Gabriel Mani, who was appointed in July 2000 as Director of Army Training.

Hassan spent over a year with the AFRC in Kono District, Eastern Province. Following the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999 he remained with the AFRC in the Occra Hills, some 40 kilometres east of Freetown, the stronghold of a faction of the AFRC known as the "West Side Boys" who had not disarmed after the peace agreement. In late June 2000 Hassan travelled to Freetown to purchase drinks for the "West Side Boys". He was not armed and he travelled in a public transport vehicle. At a checkpoint he was recognized as a West Side Boy by members of the Sierra Leone Army and the *kamajors* and ordered to get out of the vehicle. His shoes and trousers were removed but, initially, he was not otherwise ill-treated. He was taken to Benguema military training camp, 20 kilometres east of Freetown, and the following day to Cockerill military headquarters in Freetown. He was interrogated about a recent attack on the town of Masiaka. One soldier, however, beat him severely on his back; three weeks later, in July 2000, deep scars were still visible. The beating was stopped by a more senior officer.

Hassan said: *"At first, I loved being in the bush. I could get money and other things, including vehicles, for free. But then I got tired. Now I want to go home."*

When interviewed on 24 July 2000 John, now aged 15, from Mokañji, Moyamba District, Southern Province, did not remember when he had been abducted by the AFRC and did not know what had happened to his family. He was threatened that he would be killed if he did not go with the AFRC and was taken to Makeni where he was trained how to use weapons and how to fight the CDF and ECOMOG. John said that he was told not to kill civilians and that civilians were killed in the cross-fire. He was also instructed not to loot property but said that many AFRC members did engage in looting. *"I was not happy living in the bush but I had no way to escape. I asked to leave and was told 'go if you can' but I then saw children being killed - many of them - when they tried to escape to go home."*

I was afraid of fighting but I was given 'blue boats'. After that I felt like I could do anything. I never refused to take drugs."

John recalled that children were punished if they refused to obey orders: *"I was punished after I was asked to be part of an advance team to attack Koinadugu. I was not feeling well; I was feeling sick and had a stomach ache. I said that I could not go and fight. The commander ordered other small boys to beat me. After I was beaten a doctor who had been captured helped me."*

Isatu, a girl now aged 17, was abducted by AFRC forces from Fadugu, Koinadugu District, in 1998. She told Amnesty International on 24 July 2000 at a centre for former child combatants: *"I did not want to go; I was forced to go. They killed a lot of women who refused to go with them."* She was forced to become the sexual partner of the combatant who captured her and is now the mother of their three-month-old baby: *"When they capture young girls, you belong to the soldier who captured you. I was 'married' to him."*

Isatu was trained in a base near Kabala to use weapons, including a bayonet, gun and knife, and fought in the area around Fadugu and Makeni. She admitted that she had cut off the hands of children and adults, and set fire to houses with civilians locked inside. *"There is a law of the AFRC that forces you to kill; if you refuse to, you yourself are killed."*

Former child combatants fighting with the CDF

Child combatants recruited by the CDF have also recounted their experiences. The parents of 12-year-old Brima, now at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo, gave permission to the CDF to use him as a child combatant in 1998. He continued to live at his home but was active with the CDF in areas around Masiaka, Port Loko and Yele. He was trained to fight by CDF "initiators", those who admit members into the societies of traditional hunters. Brima told Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 that when children disobeyed orders they were beaten unless their parents paid a fine. Brima recalled: *"I was beaten because I became separated from a CDF patrol."*

Brima recounted that when a rebel is caught, his arms are tied up behind his back. The captive is then interrogated and stabbed to death. *"I saw four executions."*

Mohamed, also aged 12, from Port Loko, Port Loko District, Northern Province, was recruited by the CDF in 1998. His parents were not informed about the recruitment but they did nothing to prevent it because of the status attached to membership of the society of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, described by Mohamed as *"the supremacy of the society"*. In addition to carrying water and machetes for the CDF, he escorted captured

rebels to the Sierra Leone Army. He also described to Amnesty International on 20 June 2000 how the CDF executed rebels they had captured or those suspected of being rebels: "I saw three captured rebels being killed; their heads were cut off. The children had to bring the heads to the SLA [Sierra Leone Army] headquarters to show that the CDF were effective."

Rehabilitating child combatants

Until the resumption of hostilities in May 2000 UNAMSIL, including its human rights section, played an important role in negotiating the release of children held by rebel forces and providing logistical support and military escorts to ensure their safe transfer to interim care centres. It worked with a number of non-governmental organizations, both national and international, who have been active in trying to secure the release of children and to provide the assistance they need. In March 2000 UNICEF and non-governmental organizations were supporting more than 700 children in interim care centres; about 80 per cent of these were demobilized child combatants.

Following the July 1999 peace agreement and before the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, specific procedures had been adopted for child combatants. When children presented themselves to a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration reception centre - sometimes simply a table in the middle of the road - those who were not combatants were handed over to child protection agencies and taken to an interim care centre. If, after questioning, it was established that they were combatants, they were transferred to the children's sections of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps. For those who had fought with the RUF, the AFRC or the former Sierra Leone Army this program lasted for five weeks; for those with the CDF a shorter program was provided because normally the children had not been separated from their families and communities.

At interim care centres former child combatants are provided with medical treatment, food and clothing, psycho-social rehabilitation, education and recreation. Some of the older children, especially those who had spent months or years with rebel forces, have bullet wounds or other injuries. Malnutrition, respiratory and skin infections and other ailments are common, as are sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Some still suffer the effects of narcotic drugs.

When Amnesty International met former child combatants at the centre for former child combatants at Waterloo on 25 March 2000, a boy aged 14 who had been abducted by AFRC forces in 1998 said: "I want to go to school and learn so that I can forget the old

times." Another former child combatant interviewed at Waterloo on 19 June 2000 said: "We want to go back to school; we don't want to go back to the bush."




Former child soldiers in the interim care centre at Waterloo, east of Freetown, 25 March 2000
© Amnesty International

The psychological effects of the conflict on children have often been severe: many have killed, mutilated or raped or have witnessed such atrocities. During the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 - when at least 2,000 civilians were killed, more than 500 people had limbs severed, and rape of girls and women was systematic - it was estimated that some 10 per cent of rebel combatants were children. Often under the influence of drugs, many of them committed atrocities. During the first few weeks after they are disarmed and demobilized, former child combatants are reported to be often aggressive and violent, to show other behavioural problems, to suffer nightmares, alienation, outbursts of anger and an inability to interact socially.

In a report published in January 2000, the international humanitarian organization Médecins sans Frontières (MSF-Holland) said that: "The psychological impact of actually witnessing horrific events imposes a serious psychological stress. Deliberately or not, witnessing at least once events such as torture, execution, (attempted) amputations, people being burnt in their houses and public rape often results in traumatic stress or even post-traumatic stress disorder."³

³Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone, Médecins Sans Frontières (Holland), 11 January 2000.

At an interim care centre in Lungi, former child combatants have been encouraged to make drawings of their experiences as child combatants. Many have depicted horrific scenes of the mutilation, rape and killing in which they have been involved.



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi
© Amnesty International

After considering Sierra Leone's initial report under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in January 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern that the government had insufficient capacity to provide psycho-social

assistance to the many children who have suffered forms of psychological trauma. The Committee urged the government to make every effort to strengthen available psycho-social assistance and to recruit more mental health workers, recommending in addition that the government seek international assistance in this area.

After undergoing the demobilization and rehabilitation process, efforts are made to reunite former child combatants with their families. Child protection agencies have developed programs for family tracing and reunification, often with success. In some cases, however, former child combatants, especially the younger ones, do not know their real names and have lost all knowledge of what a family is. One boy now aged 16, who was abducted by the RUF in 1992, said: "*The commander told me when I was captured: 'Your father is gone. Now I am your father'.*" Another, aged 15, who was abducted in 1997 said: "*After you are captured you cannot think about your family; that is out. Sometimes, when I was by myself, I would think about them. But when you are captured you have to change or you are a dead man.*"

Many former child combatants have been transferred to the province from which they originally came, if this has been possible, in order to increase the possibility of tracing their families. In other cases, however, their parents have been killed or displaced. Where their families cannot be traced, the children are placed temporarily with foster families. Significant efforts have been made to sensitize communities to the plight of former child combatants and to promote reconciliation. In some cases, however, former child combatants have been rejected by their families and communities because of the atrocities committed by rebel forces during the conflict. One 16-year-old former child combatant said: "*I don't want to go back to my village because I burnt all the houses there. I don't know what the people would do, but they'd harm me. I don't think I'll ever be accepted in my village.*"

Girls who have been abducted and forcibly recruited often face specific problems. When an Amnesty International delegation visited Sierra Leone in March 2000, it identified that the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants appeared often not to provide any real opportunity to those girls and women who had been abducted by rebel forces and forced to become their sexual partners to free themselves from former combatants when they reported for disarmament and demobilization. The Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General on UNAMSIL of 19 May 2000 recognized "*the need to protect dependants of ex-combatants, the majority of whom are women and children*" and that "*the majority of 'wives' of the combatants are in fact abductees and, if not interviewed*

separately from their 'husbands', would most likely not feel free to express their wish to return to their original families".⁴

Effective provision needs to be made for those girls and women, many of whom are pregnant or have young children, to leave former combatants, if they wish. This would require: firstly, the opportunity to indicate privately to UN personnel their desire to leave the men who abducted and sexually abused them; secondly, support to enable them to receive all necessary medical and psycho-social care; and thirdly, support either to return to their families where this is possible or to re-establish their lives together with their children.

In Resolution 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict of 11 August 2000 the UN Security Council underlined "the importance of giving consideration to the special needs and particular vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed conflict, including, inter alia, those heading households, orphaned, sexually exploited and used as combatants" and urged "that their human rights, protection and welfare be incorporated in the development of policies and programmes, including those for prevention, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration".



Former child combatants attending a human rights education session led by a human rights officer for CARITAS-Makeni at the interim care centre at Lungi, July 2000
© Amnesty International

⁴Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455.

May 2000 - children again forced into conflict

"A whole generation of children has already been emotionally traumatized and physically scarred. They'd been told that peace had finally arrived. Now what are we supposed to tell them?" - Johanna van Gerpen, UNICEF representative in Sierra Leone, 10 May 2000.

After the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the RUF in July 1999, several hundred children were released by rebel forces; by the end of 1999 some 800 children, many of them combatants, had been handed over to UNICEF and other child protection agencies. During the first months of 2000 there was a significant increase in the release of children, most of them combatants, by AFRC forces from the Occra Hills to the east of Freetown and from Kabala, Northern Province. By the end of April 2000, some 1,700 child combatants, of an estimated total of 5,000, had been absorbed into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program. According to estimates by UNICEF, about 800 of them had been reunited with their families or placed in foster care, or had run away, leaving 900 in interim care centres. Several thousand children, however, remained in the hands of rebel forces, particularly in Northern Province.

When the political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated seriously at the beginning of May 2000, fears of an imminent attack on Freetown by rebel forces intensified and hostilities between RUF forces and forces of the Sierra Leone Army, the CDF and UNAMSIL troops were reported close to the capital and in Port Loko District.

Moves to secure the release of children still held by rebel forces halted. Former child combatants in interim care centres in areas where rebel forces were active again became vulnerable to being abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. UNICEF and the child protection agencies with which it works have tried to ensure adequate protection for these children.

In his Fourth Report on UNAMSIL to the UN Security Council on 19 May 2000, the UN Secretary-General cited preliminary reports which suggested that child combatants were being used extensively as hostilities resumed. UNAMSIL human rights officers who visited Masiaka on 15 May 2000 observed several child combatants, mostly boys, with the CDF, the AFRC and former Sierra Leone Army and the reconstituted Sierra Leone Army. Some 25 per cent of the combatants observed were under 18 and some freely admitted that they were between 7 and 14. Almost all of them were armed. Other reports indicated that RUF forces were using a similar proportion of child combatants at the front line. In his subsequent report to the UN Security Council on 31 July 2000, the Secretary-General reported that both the RUF and forces fighting for the government continued to use children


in combat.⁵ He expressed deep concern about continuing human rights abuses, including the forced recruitment of children, and urged “*all fighting forces to immediately release all child combatants among their forces and to cease the recruitment of children as combatants*”.

Continuing recruitment of children by the RUF

Since May 2000 RUF forces have continued to abduct and forcibly recruit children as combatants, some of whom had previously been demobilized. While some of the children recruited by both rebel and government-allied forces since May 2000 were forcibly recruited, usually after being abducted, others were reported to have volunteered to join the RUF. It appears, however, that in many cases these children had little option but to do so. Reports from Kambia District, Northern Province, during May 2000 described RUF forces going from village to village demanding a quota of men and boys, most of whom were forced to join under duress. Local traditional rulers, known as Paramount Chiefs, were ordered to provide a certain number of recruits and families were forced to hand over children, including those aged under 18. For example, in Madina Junction, Kambia District, 300 men and boys were demanded. Similar reports have been received from the towns of Kambia and Kamakwie. This practice explained the comparatively high number of young men and boys, without their families, who fled across the border into Forécariah region, Guinea, during May 2000. Reports of forcible recruitment were also received from Mange in Port Loko District.

In Makeni, when the RUF first confronted UNAMSIL troops in early May 2000, children were pressed by RUF forces by threats and intimidation into joining them. RUF commanders positioned vehicles at the entrance of an interim care centre, run by CARITAS-Makeni, and repeatedly coaxed the older boys to rejoin them, through enticement and implicit threat. Some of the children were told by RUF forces that their families had been traced and that the RUF would help them return to their homes. It was also reported that the RUF had threatened to kill all those in the interim care centre if the children did not rejoin the RUF. Staff at the centre believed that up to 30 boys aged from 14 to 17 rejoined the RUF; other estimates put the number of those who rejoined the RUF at 40 or as many as 50. It appeared that shortage of food at the centre, which had been looted by rebel forces, was also a factor influencing the children's return to rebel forces. The centre had been looted on 2 May 2000 by rebel forces; some of the older boys in the interim care centre had tried to prevent the looting and one of the adult carers, a woman, had been beaten. The rebels came the following day and again looted the centre.

⁵Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/751.



Lungi interim care centre for former child combatants run by CARITAS-Makeni, July 2000
 © Amnesty International

For fear of further attack, on 23 May 2000, 83 children from the centre - 73 boys and nine girls, most aged between 6 and 12 years - and 27 adult carers fled the centre for Freetown. On their arduous three-day trek their remaining possessions, including food and money, were stolen by RUF combatants. When they arrived in Petifu, Tonkolili District, some of the group, both children and adults, were beaten by members of the CDF. The children finally arrived safely in Freetown on 26 May 2000 and were taken to the interim care centre at Lungi.

One former child combatant, Francis, now aged 16 who had been abducted in 1998, described to Amnesty International on 15 July 2000 at the interim care centre in Lungi how RUF forces had tried to lure children back into their ranks from an interim care centre in Lunsar, Port Loko District: *“by then the rebels had moved from Makeni to Lunsar. They came to our camp and asked some children to join them again and we refused. We have rights to live and play. They encouraged us to join them. We told the manager of the centre to move us. At that time there were no vehicles; even the NGO’s vehicle was not around. We walked along the road to Rogberi Junction where we met the rebels. They told us to return to our camp. We knew that they were killing people around. After that they said, please, come and join us or we are going to kill you people. After that we fled in the bush.”*

On 31 May 2000 RUF forces were reported to have killed two boys and a young man at the village of Maforay, near Port Loko, after they refused to join them. On 15 June 2000, a farmer from a village near Magbile, Port Loko District, between Masiaka and Rogberi Junction, described to Amnesty International the killing of his sons by RUF forces on 11 June 2000: "*My four sons, aged 11, 21, 23 and 25, were building a new hut when the rebels asked them to join them. They refused and the rebels shot and killed them.*" His three eldest sons were all farmers, married with children; his youngest son worked on his father's farm.

Continuing recruitment of children by government-allied forces

Government-allied forces have also continued to recruit children and use them in combat. Some of the child combatants who had been disarmed and demobilized after the peace agreement were again recruited to fight against the RUF. Government-allied forces comprise a loose alliance of the Sierra Leone Army, the AFRC and the CDF. Although in theory these various forces are under the command of the Chief of Defence Staff, in practice it appears that chain-of-command control is diffuse and often unclear and that, in the confused and unstable situation which prevails, it is unlikely that senior military personnel of the Sierra Leone Army exert effective control over all forces fighting on behalf of the government.

When an Amnesty International delegation met the Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, who is also the National Coordinator of the CDF, in Freetown on 25 May 2000, he denied that the CDF recruited children or "initiated" them into the societies of traditional hunters. He said that the children with CDF forces had been rescued or captured from rebel forces and that they were handed over to child protection agencies. Chief Hinga Norman has publicly announced that child combatants will be demobilized from government and government-allied forces. In mid-July 2000 he held a meeting in Bo, Southern Province, with CDF leaders and "initiators". He instructed that no further children were to be "initiated" into the CDF. It is not clear, however, to what extent this instruction is being heeded. While it may reduce the number of children newly admitted into the CDF, it does not resolve the problem of those already with CDF forces.

A senior member of the CDF in Kenema, Eastern Province, told Amnesty International on 27 July 2000 that, although he personally opposed the use of children, he acknowledged that it was normal practice within the CDF. He was in the presence of two boys who appeared to be under 18 and who were both armed. He claimed that, before the peace agreement, there were some 600 children in the CDF forces around Kenema but that they were all subsequently demobilized and that there was no further recruitment of children.

On 12 June 2000 in Masiaka, an area where hostilities were continuing, much publicity was given to the apparent demobilization of 135 child combatants with government-allied forces, in particular the CDF. It subsequently transpired, however, that only 13 of these children were serving as combatants, nine with the CDF and four with the AFRC. It appeared that children and their families were attracted by the potential assistance and facilities provided to former child combatants, including food and education, as well as the opportunity to remove the children to safety from an area close to the front line. The children who were not former child combatants, and who had been separated from their families, were subsequently returned to their homes.

According to some reports, recruitment of children by the CDF is continuing in Bo and Moyamba Districts in Southern Province. It is often difficult, however, to distinguish between "initiation" into the societies of traditional hunters and recruitment to fight. Child protection agencies report that recruitment of children, including those who had previously been demobilized, is continuing. According to reports which remain unconfirmed, villages in Southern Province are expected to provide a certain number of children to the CDF. In some areas the CDF appear to be no longer using children so openly to guard checkpoints along major roads in Southern Province; children, some of them armed, have been seen close to checkpoints but hidden in the bush. In late May 2000 two children with the CDF aged about 14 or 15 were observed in Moyamba close to a checkpoint. In other areas, however, an increase in the number of children guarding checkpoints has been observed.

Arming the children

Military assistance to rebel forces

Rebel forces in Sierra Leone have received and continue to receive significant military assistance, including arms and ammunition, despite a UN embargo on the provision of such assistance. UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997 imposed an arms embargo on Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997 which brought the AFRC to power. After the government of President Kabbah was restored to power in March 1998, UN Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 lifted the arms embargo on the government of Sierra Leone but prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related *matériel* to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone.

In view of the appalling level of human rights abuses against civilians perpetrated by rebel forces, military assistance to rebel forces can be assumed to have contributed, and to continue to contribute, to continuing violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Among these violations are the recruitment and use of child combatants.

Arms and ammunition reaching rebel forces inevitably fall into the hands of the children abducted and forcibly recruited by rebel forces. Traffic in small arms and light weapons clearly facilitates and encourages the use of child combatants. Amnesty International is calling for the cessation of all military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone, including the provision of arms, ammunition, combatants and training.

The government of Liberia has been consistently cited as violating the embargo on military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone. Following a visit to Sierra Leone and Liberia in December 1998 the Chairman of the UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone said that arms and ammunition were crossing into Sierra Leone from neighbouring countries, including Liberia, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998).⁶ At the time of the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999, the governments of both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) unambiguously accused the government of Liberia of supporting rebel forces. Burkina Faso has also been reported to have acted as a transit route for military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone. Some of this assistance has originated from countries in the former Soviet bloc and has been facilitated by the activities of international arms brokers and shipping agents, some of them based in Europe.

In April 1999 the commander of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone accused Liberia and Burkina Faso of transferring arms to rebel forces. He asserted that a Ukrainian-registered cargo plane had delivered arms and ammunition to Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, for on-shipment to RUF forces through Liberia.⁷ A Gibraltar-based company was reported to have organized the arms shipment to Burkina Faso, using a UK-based air company.

These accusations against Liberia and Burkina Faso have continued and intensified, especially as the international community has focused increasing attention on the role of the illicit trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone in financing the provision of military assistance to rebel forces.⁸

⁶S/1998/1236, Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone, 31 December 1998.

⁷For further information, see *Neglected Arms Embargo on Sierra Leone Rebels*, published by Human Rights Watch on 15 May 2000.

⁸For further information on Amnesty International's position on military assistance to rebel forces and the trade in diamonds, see *Sierra Leone: Cutting the link between diamonds and human rights abuses "forever"* (AI Index: AFR 51/56/00) 14 July 2000, *Sierra Leone: Amnesty International calls for fast and effective action on diamonds* (AI Index: AFR 51/54/00), 30 June 2000, and *Sierra Leone: Cutting the link between diamonds and guns* (AI Index: AFR 51/27/00), 31 May 2000.

On 5 July 2000 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306 (2000) which imposed an embargo on all diamond exports from Sierra Leone for 18 months until the government of Sierra Leone can establish a proper certification system for diamonds and regain full access to those areas of the country - notably in Eastern Province and in particular Kono District and Tongo Field - where RUF forces remain in control. Liberia was specifically referred to as a transit route for diamonds from rebel-held areas; the Security Council expressed its concern "*at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia*". The resolution decided that "*all States shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory*".

The international diamond industry has meanwhile responded to growing international pressure. The International Diamond Manufacturers' Association and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, meeting in Antwerp, Belgium, from 17 to 19 July 2000, agreed that they will not trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone. The industry has sought further legal action from governments, such as import control and certification systems.

In line with the provisions of Resolution 1306 (2000), on 31 July and 1 August 2000 the UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone held a public meeting, which included representatives of the international diamond trade, governments and non-governmental organizations, to debate the role of the illicit trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas in procuring military assistance for rebel forces.

Further allegations were levelled against Liberia and Burkina Faso, notably by representatives of the UK and USA governments. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock of the UK said that: "*a variety of reliable sources show that President [Charles] Taylor [of Liberia] is orchestrating the activities of the RUF. He is giving direct military support, encouraging attacks against UNAMSIL and Sierra Leone government forces, providing strategic direction, influencing decisions on leadership and on command and control. Moreover, he is using the RUF to retain control of Sierra Leone's diamonds reserves.*" Ambassador Richard Holbrooke of the USA said that: "*there was reason to believe that RUF leaders and the President of Liberia have taken increasingly large commissions for each of themselves, and particularly for Liberian President Taylor for his services as a facilitator of diamond sales and related arms transfers*" and added that the government of Burkina Faso was also involved providing arms to the RUF.

The governments of both Liberia and Burkina Faso vigorously denied these allegations and called on the international community to conduct independent investigations in their countries in order to substantiate these claims.

The UN Security Council sanctions committee on Sierra Leone established a panel of five experts to continue to investigate the link between the diamond trade and the conflict in Sierra Leone, including the alleged implication of the governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso. The panel of experts is expected to report on its findings by the end of October 2000.

In Resolution 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict, the UN Security Council expressed its grave concern at: *"the linkages between the illicit trade in natural resources and armed conflict, as well as the linkages between illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and armed conflict, which can prolong armed conflict and intensify its impact on children, and, in this regard, expresses its intention to consider taking appropriate steps, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."*

Military assistance to government forces

Since May 2000 combatants below the age of 18 have continued to be recruited by the Sierra Leone Army and other government-allied forces, including the AFRC and the CDF.

While recognizing the responsibility of the Sierra Leone government to maintain security and protect its population and territory, Amnesty International opposes the provision of assistance to armed forces where it can be reasonably assumed to contribute to the recruitment of children under the age of 18 by the armed forces or other armed groups and their participation in hostilities. Effective mechanisms need to be put in place to monitor the distribution and use of arms and ammunition provided by other countries to the Sierra Leone Army and other forces fighting on behalf of the Sierra Leone government in order to ensure that they do not reach combatants under the age of 18. Continuing military assistance to government forces should be conditional on guarantees being provided that such assistance does not facilitate the recruitment and use of child combatants, or contribute to other human rights violations. If evidence is found that military assistance from other countries facilitates the recruitment and use of child combatants, the international community has a responsibility to ensure that such assistance is suspended.

The UK government has provided substantial assistance to the government of Sierra Leone for training and equipping the new Sierra Leone Army. As a condition for proceeding with training and equipping the Sierra Leone Army, the UK government sought and obtained assurances from President Kabbah in March 1999 that children under the age

of 18 would not be used by the Sierra Leone Army or the CDF and that equipment supplied would be used in accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law.

The UK leads what will become a 90-strong military training team composed of military personnel from several other countries. Some 200 UK military personnel are providing a two-month training for recruits for the new Sierra Leone Army; a first contingent of 1,000 recruits completed their training in July 2000 and a further contingent of 1,000 is now being trained. All have been over 18. In addition, the UK continues to provide arms and ammunition to the Sierra Leone Army.

On 23 May 2000 the UK Ministry of Defence announced that it would be transferring 10,000 self-loading rifles to the Sierra Leone Army to assist in military operations against the RUF. UK government officials stressed at the time that the program to train and equip the Sierra Leone Army would be carried out under strict supervision. It sought to allay fears that arms supplied by the UK government would fall into the hands of children. These fears were fuelled by a photograph published by a UK newspaper of a 14-year-old boy, alleged to be fighting with government-allied forces, with a weapon previously supplied by the UK government. A spokesperson for the UK government said on 24 May 2000 that: "*We have instructed the [(UK) High Commissioner in Sierra Leone to remind the President of his undertaking last year that UK-supplied weapons would be used only by regular soldiers and in accordance with international law.*" During a visit to Sierra Leone in early June 2000 UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, obtained clear and public commitments from the leaders of government-allied force that they would not use child soldiers and that any remaining in their ranks would be disarmed and demobilized.

Further assurances were provided by the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, following an announcement that further military assistance, including ammunition, was to be transferred to the Sierra Leone Army. He was reported to have said on 12 July 2000 that: "*the ammunition is being provided subject to further reassurances that it will be used only by regular soldiers, in accordance with humanitarian law and human rights standards, and not by child soldiers.*"

A violation of children's rights and a war crime

The recruitment and use of children under the age of 15 as combatants is prohibited by both international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Invariably, the use of children as combatants violates the rights enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, ratified by Sierra Leone on 18 June 1990, for example by depriving them of a family environment, education and basic health care.

On 13 January 2000 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child considered Sierra Leone's initial report on its implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and adopted its concluding observations on 28 January 2000.⁹ The Committee expressed "its deep consternation at the very high numbers of children who have been forcibly recruited into armed forces, including children at least as young as five years old, and who have been forced to commit atrocities against other people, including other children and members of their community". The Committee added that it was "deeply saddened by direct effects of the armed conflict on all child victims, including child combatants, and is concerned with the tragic loss of life and severe psychological trauma inflicted upon them".

Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that:

For the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.

Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that:

1. *States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.*
2. *States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 15 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.*
3. *States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of 18 years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.*
4. *In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict.*

⁹Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sierra Leone, CRC/C/15/Add.116.

Amnesty International believes that voluntary or compulsory recruitment and participation in hostilities, whether on the part of governments or armed opposition groups, ultimately jeopardize the mental and physical integrity of anyone below the age of 18. For this reason, Amnesty International actively opposes the voluntary or compulsory recruitment, as well as participation in hostilities, of children below 18 by governments or armed opposition groups.

In line with the general age of majority set in the Convention of the Rights of the Child, Amnesty International and five other international non-governmental organizations have been calling for the age of military recruitment - be it voluntary or compulsory - as well as deployment in hostilities to be raised to 18.¹⁰

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict states:	
Article 1	<i>States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.</i>
Article 2	<i>States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.</i>
Article 4(1)	<i>Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.</i>
(2)	<i>States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.</i>
(3)	<i>The application of the present article under this Protocol shall not affect the legal status of any party to an armed conflict.</i>

The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 May 2000 and is now open for signature and ratification. The Optional Protocol raises the age for participation in hostilities, for both the armed forces and armed groups, from 15 to

¹⁰Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation *Terre des Hommes*, the International Save the Children Alliance, the Jesuit Refugee Service and the Quaker UN Office (Geneva) launched the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in June 1998. For further information, see *Stop Using Child Soldiers!*, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, second edition published by Rädä Barnen on behalf of the International Save the Children Alliance in November 1998.

18. Eight countries have so far signed the Optional Protocol; only one, Canada, has ratified it. UN Security Council 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict urged member states to ratify the Optional Protocol.

The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which entered into force on 29 November 1999, is the only regional instrument which specifically prohibits the recruitment and use as combatants of children under 18 in both international and internal armed conflicts. Article 22 (2) requires States Parties to "*take all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular from recruiting any child*". Sierra Leone has signed but not yet ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

International humanitarian law - the laws of war - also prohibits the recruitment of children under 15 into the armed forces of governments and armed opposition groups as well as their participation in hostilities.¹¹

Article 4 (3)(c) of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions states that:


Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.

Francis, now aged 16 and at the interim care centre in Lungi, was abducted by rebel forces in 1998. He told Amnesty International on 15 July 2000: "*As far as the Geneva Conventions are concerned, we should not fight. They have violated our rights. Even the government troops, they some time ago made a mistake of killing the children because the rebels use children.*"

Many of the children who have been abducted and forcibly recruited have also been victims of deliberate and arbitrary killing, beatings and other forms of torture or ill-treatment. Girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery. These abuses constitute the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, extends to "*armed conflict not of an international character*" (internal armed conflict) fundamental rules for the protection of those taking no active part in hostilities which each party to the conflict is "*bound to apply, as a minimum*". Under the terms of common Article 3, people who take no active part or who have ceased to take an active part in hostilities must be treated humanely in all circumstances. Common Article

¹¹Sierra Leone acceded to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on 10 June 1965. On 21 October 1986 it acceded to both Additional Protocol I of 8 June 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, and Additional Protocol II of 8 June 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.

3 specifically prohibits: "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." This prohibition is binding not only on government forces but on all parties to internal armed conflicts, including armed political groups.



Former child combatants playing volleyball at the interim care centre at Lungi, July 2000
© Amnesty International

Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of internal armed conflicts, which develops and supplements common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, requires all parties to the conflict to treat humanely every person affected by the conflict. Article 4 of Additional Protocol II prohibits: "violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment" of all those not taking a direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.

In Resolution 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict the UN Security Council urged: "all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict, in particular the Geneva Conventions

of 1949 and the obligations applicable to them under the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court."

Bringing to justice those who recruit and deploy children as combatants

Although the recruitment of children is unlawful in many countries, prosecution is rare. The majority of the world's nations finalized in July 1998 the Statute of a permanent International Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction to prosecute those charged with war crimes, genocide, aggression and crimes against humanity. Included in the list of war crimes is "*conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities*" and, in the case of an internal armed conflict, "*conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities*". The International Criminal Court will be formally established once 60 states have ratified the Statute, thereby giving the court jurisdiction over these provisions. Sierra Leone signed the Statute on 17 October 1998 and intends to ratify it shortly.

On 12 February 1999, Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, stated at a UN Security Council Open Briefing on the Protection of Civilians that: "*over 300,000 children, girls as well as boys, have participated as combatants in the 30 most recent conflicts. Many are recruited - others are abducted. Some join simply to survive. And many of these children, some less than 10 years old, have witnessed or taken part in acts of unspeakable violence, often against their own families or communities... Children's recruitment as members of the armed forces, their rape and slaughter, and the targeting of their schools and hospitals are recognized by the International Criminal Court statute for what they are: heinous atrocities.*"

The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999 on children and armed conflict, called on all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under international law, in particular the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and stressed "*the responsibility of all States to bring an end to impunity and their obligation to prosecute those responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*".

This was reiterated by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1314 (2000) in which it emphasized the responsibility of all States: "*to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and, in this regard, stresses the need to exclude these, where feasible, from amnesty provisions and relevant legislation.*" In a statement issued on 11 August 2000 when the resolution was

adopted, UNICEF said that it: "*underlines the urgent need for an end to impunity for those who commit crimes against children.*"

Although the use of child combatants under 15 violates both international human rights and humanitarian law, no one in Sierra Leone has yet been brought to justice for these crimes. The peace agreement signed in July 1999 provided an amnesty for all activities undertaken in pursuit of the conflict, including human rights abuses, even when amounting to crimes against humanity or war crimes. The UN at the time added a disclaimer to the agreement that the amnesty would not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Although the amnesty did not apply to crimes committed after 7 July 1999, human rights abuses against civilians, including deliberate and arbitrary killings, mutilation, rape, abduction and forcible recruitment continued to be committed with impunity.

By June 2000, with the lack of implementation of key provisions of the peace agreement, the resumption of hostilities and the arrest of the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, and other leading members of the RUF, initiatives by the authorities began to address the issue of impunity. On 12 June 2000 the government wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General requesting assistance from the UN in establishing a special court to try Foday Sankoh and other senior members of the RUF for "*crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of UN peace-keepers as hostages*".

On 14 August 2000 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1315 (2000) on the creation of an independent special court. Amnesty International has urged that the special court try all those alleged to be responsible for crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as certain grave crimes under national law, throughout the period since the conflict began in 1991. This would include the forcible recruitment and deployment of children under 15. Although forces of the RUF have been responsible for systematic and widespread abuses throughout the conflict, those of the AFRC, the Sierra Leone Army and the CDF have also been responsible for gross human rights abuses, including violations of international humanitarian law. Those allegedly responsible for these crimes, whether they be members of the RUF, the AFRC, the Sierra Leone Army and regardless of their current political position or allegiance, must be brought to justice.¹²

¹²For further information on Amnesty International's recommendations for ending impunity in Sierra Leone, see *Sierra Leone: The United Nations Security Council should strengthen the independent special court to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuses* (AI Index: AFR 51/66/00), 4 August 2000, and *Sierra Leone: Ending impunity - an opportunity not to be missed* (AI Index: AFR 51/60/00), 26 July

Child combatants themselves will not be brought to trial before the International Criminal Court, as the Statute bars it from exercising jurisdiction over any person who was under 18 at the time that the crime was committed. Child combatants in Sierra Leone have been responsible for gross human rights abuses; many of the worst atrocities have been carried out by children who were abducted and subjected to horrifying acts of violence. In a situation where crimes have been committed by children terrorized and brutalized into submission, complex questions about their criminal responsibility are raised.

While recognizing the need for justice and accountability, former child combatants must be treated in accordance with the principles of juvenile justice, which place the best interest of the child as a priority, recognize the special factors and needs of childhood, and place an emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration rather than punishment. In conformity with the provisions of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child must be in accordance with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. Any child who is detained should be held separately from adults.

The Sierra Leone government's responsibility to end the use of child soldiers

The government of Sierra Leone has made repeated commitments to demobilize all combatants under the age of 18, to raise the legal age of military recruitment to 18 and to fulfil its obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Considering Sierra Leone's initial report in January 2000, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its deep concern about the massive participation of children associated with fighting forces in Sierra Leone, either as combatants or in other roles. The Committee also noted that there is no minimum age defined by national legislation for voluntary recruitment, when the consent of a specified adult party is given. The Committee welcomed the government's intention to pass legislation raising the minimum age of recruitment to 18 and urged the government to move quickly towards passing this legislation and to ensure that the new legislation was enforced.

On 24 May 2000, following reports that children were either fighting with government-allied forces or were being allowed to remain in front-line positions, the government issued a statement reiterating its position on the recruitment of child soldiers (see appendix A).


2000.

The government stated that this practice was “totally against government policy which stipulates that 18 years is the minimum age for bearing arms in Sierra Leone”. The statement continued: “The Acting Chief of Defence Staff has been instructed to ensure that all those below the age of 18 currently involved in fighting on the side of the government should be immediately withdrawn, demobilized and handed over to competent institutions for rehabilitation. Henceforth, any commander who allows a child below 18 years to carry arms within his area of operations or allows children to remain in areas of active conflict will face severe disciplinary action.” It is not clear, however, what measures have been taken to implement these commitments.

On the same day Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC, issued statements on behalf of the AFRC and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace which he heads. In these statements Johnny Paul Koroma “warned all warring factions to desist from recruiting child soldiers” and stated his strong opposition to the recruitment of child soldiers by both government-allied forces and rebel forces.

On 22 March 2000 CARITAS-Makeni launched a campaign to end the use of child combatants. Secondary school children marched through the centre of Freetown and speakers representing the government, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations called publicly for an end to the use of child combatants.

A Declaration of Commitment to the Release of Child Combatants and Child Abductees by the Various Factions was drafted as part of the campaign and signed by Chief Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence and National Coordinator of the CDF, Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC and Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, and Colonel Tom Carew, acting Chief of Defence Staff. RUF leader Foday Sankoh declined to sign the



Poster for CARITAS-Makeni's campaign against the use of child soldiers © Amnesty International

declaration (see appendix B). The declaration made the following commitments:

- Article 1* *The parties hereto shall forthwith facilitate the disarmament of all child combatants, that is to say, children under the age of 18 years and bearing arms and shall take immediate steps to prevent the use of child combatants in any manner whatsoever.*
- Article 2* *The parties hereto shall in tandem with the actions contemplated in Article 1 above, release, free and cause to be released, all children and other persons abducted both during the conflict and after the signing of the Lomé peace accord.*
- Article 3* *The parties shall in utmost good faith facilitate the return and/or handing over of child combatants and abductees to UNAMSIL, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration camps and other humanitarian agencies by 15 May 2000 (the International Day of the Family), to enable them to receive care and attention and ultimately to be reunited with their families and relatives.*
- Article 4* *The parties in this regard undertake to cooperate with UNAMSIL, all agencies concerned with the welfare of children and the war affected and shall assiduously work towards the attainment of goals enumerated in the Declaration.*



Demonstration by schoolchildren to launch CARITAS-Makeni's campaign against the use of child soldiers in Freetown, 22 March 2000 © Amnesty International

Following the signing of the peace agreement in July 1999 Foday Sankoh became the Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and assumed the protocol rank of Vice-President. Other RUF members also became part of the government by being appointed to ministerial and deputy ministerial positions. The RUF therefore became obliged not only to implement the provisions of the peace agreement which it had signed, but also to implement the government's commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Article XXI of the peace agreement stated specifically that all prisoners of war and non-combatants should be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties. This would include the thousands of civilians, including children, who had been abducted by rebel forces. Article XXX of the peace agreement stated that the government of Sierra Leone should give particular attention to the issue of child combatants and should mobilize resources, both within Sierra Leone and from the international community, to address the special needs of former child combatants in the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

Foday Sankoh frequently denied that the RUF had abducted children. In a meeting with Amnesty International representatives on 25 March 2000 he said that the RUF had not abducted any children but had "rescued" them and was not holding any children captive. He was arrested on 17 May 2000, after more than 20 civilians were shot and killed by his forces during a demonstration outside his house in Freetown on 12 May 2000, and remains in detention. Other prominent members of the RUF are also detained. They are expected to be charged with a number of offences, including crimes amounting to violations of international humanitarian law.

In late April 2000, just before the resumption of hostilities, the government of Sierra Leone agreed to establish a National Commission for War-Affected Children in order to ensure that children's concerns are addressed at the highest political levels. This agreement was reached during a visit to Freetown on 29 and 30 April 2000 of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, and the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy.

Moves by the international community to end the use of child soldiers

The plight of children in Sierra Leone has been highlighted repeatedly by the international community and commitments have been made to assist the children whose lives have been blighted by nine years of conflict. In the Eighth Report of the UN Secretary-General on the

UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (then known as UNOMSIL) of 23 September 1999, the Secretary-General stated that "*the plight of children is among the most pressing challenges currently facing Sierra Leone*".¹³

On 25 August 1999 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1261 (1999) on children and armed conflict. The Security Council urged States and all relevant parts of the UN: "*to intensify their efforts to ensure an end to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law through political and other efforts, including promotion of the availability of alternatives for children to their participation in armed conflict*"; and also "*to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of children used as soldiers in violation of international law*."

At a debate on children and armed conflict at the UN Security Council on 26 July 2000, Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF, said that many of the values, principles and concrete commitments enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child remained unfulfilled, as did those of Resolution 1261 (1999). The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, said that the use of child combatants must be curbed by mobilizing political pressure, addressing the economic, social and political factors leading to the use of child combatants and increasing capacity on the ground for receiving and rehabilitating child combatants.¹⁴ Commenting on UN Security Council 1314 (2000) on children and armed conflict which was passed on 11 August 2000, UNICEF said that: "*The council has reminded the world that it is both immoral and illegal to make children the victims and protagonists of war... It has helped to maintain awareness of the unacceptability of turning children into soldiers, of forcing millions of children and women to flee their homes, and of subjecting children to forced labour, sexual abuse and the pressure to commit atrocities.*"

Olara Otunnu has visited Sierra Leone on several occasions, most recently in April 2000, and has made recommendations for a special program for assisting children affected by the conflict. Following a visit in late August and early September 1999, he formulated a 15-point agenda for action for children affected by the conflict, which included recommendations in respect of: ending the recruitment and use of child combatants; access to and release of abducted children; demobilization of child combatants; and the establishment of a National Commission for Children in Sierra Leone.

¹³Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/1003.

¹⁴SC/6985, Security Council holds debate on children and armed conflict, 26 July 2000.

UNAMSIL, whose current full strength is 13,000, but which is expected to be increased to 16,500 peace-keeping troops, was deployed to assist with the implementation of the peace agreement, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. UN Security Council Resolution 1313 (2000) of 4 August 2000 extended UNAMSIL's mandate until 8 September 2000 and requested the UN Secretary-General to make recommendations for the restructuring and strengthening of UNAMSIL.

The process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration was first hampered by the failure of large numbers of combatants to disarm and demobilize and then halted by the resumption of hostilities in May 2000. The human rights section of UNAMSIL is providing training in human rights, including children's rights, and international humanitarian law for peace-keeping troops. Since the peace-keeping force comprises troops from several countries with different training and experience, it is essential to ensure that adequate time and resources are devoted to comprehensive human rights training, including in children's rights. A child protection adviser was appointed to UNAMSIL in February 2000 and the UNAMSIL human rights section includes human rights officers with specific responsibilities for children's rights.


Resolution 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999 on children and armed conflict specifically requested the UN Secretary-General to ensure that: "*personnel involved in United Nations peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities have appropriate training on the protection, rights and welfare of children.*" It urged States and relevant international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training was included in their program for personnel involved in similar activities.

At the end of the African Conference on the use of Children as Soldiers, held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 19-22 April 1999, participants adopted a declaration against the use of children as combatants. The Declaration calls on all African states to end the recruitment of all children under 18 into the armed forces. The Declaration also condemned the use of children by armed opposition groups and called upon these groups to end the recruitment of children and to demobilize or release into safety children already being used as combatants.

On 27 and 28 April 2000 a West African ministerial conference on war-affected children was held in Accra, Ghana, sponsored and co-hosted by the governments of Ghana and Canada. It brought together ECOWAS foreign ministers, as well as civil society organizations, donor governments, UN representatives, including Olara Otunnu, and children affected by conflict in the region. The primary objective of the event was to mobilize concrete action for child protection in a region whose children have been acutely affected by armed conflict. The conference focused on practical ways to implement and

support international instruments of child protection, such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

At the end of the conference the delegates adopted and signed a West African Declaration on War-Affected Children which is expected to lead to commitments to: implementation of existing international, regional and local norms; ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; incorporation of child rights and civilian protection into military training; and implementation or early warning/response systems to prevent armed conflict. At the conclusion of the conference, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs said: "*The protection of children affected by war and the promotion of their well-being is a moral, political, social and economic imperative.*" The outcome of the conference will be discussed and developed at an International Conference on War-Affected Children to take place in Winnipeg, Canada, in September 2000.



Drawing by a former child combatant at the interim care centre at Lungi © Amnesty International

While some countries have made commitments towards providing assistance to children affected by the conflict and others have made significant contributions towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the attention of the international community should continue to focus on the needs of former child combatants, both on securing their disarmament and demobilization and also providing the assistance they need to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into their families and communities. All these initiatives will require sustained commitment and resources from the international community.

Amnesty International's recommendations

Amnesty International is urging that the Sierra Leone government, the leaders of the RUF and the international community implement swiftly and effectively the following recommendations in order to end the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone and to meet the particular needs of former child combatants.

Recommendations to the Sierra Leone government, including the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister of Defence and the leader of the AFRC:

- the highest priority should be given to the immediate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child combatants;
- prompt and effective measures should be taken by the government to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited for military service, including by passing legislation raising the minimum age for military recruitment to 18;
- the Chief of Defence Staff should ensure that there is effective chain of command over all forces fighting on behalf of the government to ensure the immediate demobilization and disarmament of child combatants currently serving in these forces and to ensure that no child under the age of 18 is recruited or used in the future;
- the leader of the AFRC should give immediate effect to his condemnation of the recruitment and use as combatants of children under the age of 18 by instructing AFRC forces to release all children, both those used as child combatants or in any way associated with AFRC forces;
- the Deputy Minister of Defence and National Coordinator of the CDF should immediately and unequivocally denounce the recruitment and use of children under the age of 18 by the CDF and instruct all CDF leaders to immediately demobilize and disarm all child combatants serving with the CDF and to cease any further recruitment;
- the government of Sierra Leone should take steps to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, including by identifying priorities relating to child combatants and defining strategies to implement those priorities;

- the government should ratify without delay the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the Statute of the International Criminal Court;
- the government should take effective measures to end impunity and prosecute those responsible for crimes under international law including violations of international humanitarian law, such as the abduction and forcible recruitment of children under the age of 15.

Recommendations to the leaders of the RUF:

- leaders of the RUF should immediately and publicly condemn and prohibit the recruitment and use of child combatants and RUF forces should immediately cease forcible or voluntary recruitment and use of children under the age of 18;
- RUF forces should be instructed to release immediately all children either used as combatants or in any way associated with fighting forces;
- leaders of the RUF should make a public commitment to observing international humanitarian law, in particular Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
- RUF forces should be instructed to end deliberate and arbitrary killings, rape, sexual abuse and other forms of torture or ill-treatment of all captured civilians, including children;
- RUF forces should also allow immediate, full and unhindered access by child protection agencies and UNAMSIL personnel supervising the disarmament and demobilization program to children who continue to be held;
- RUF forces should allow immediate, full and unhindered access by humanitarian agencies, both national and international, to all civilians, including children, who continue to be held, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Recommendations to the international community:

- the international community should repeat its condemnation of the continuing recruitment and use of children as combatants in Sierra Leone which constitute a crime under international law and a violation of both international human rights and international humanitarian law;
- the highest priority should be given to implementing commitments made to end the use and recruitment of child combatants, including by taking concrete measures to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000;
- in all efforts to resolve the political and security crisis in Sierra Leone, including any reconsideration or renegotiation of the peace agreement signed in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999, the needs of children affected by the internal armed conflict, including child combatants, should be given the highest priority;
- all governments should take all possible measures to end military transfers, including arms, ammunition, combatants and training, to rebel forces in Sierra Leone and enact legislation to prevent the trade in diamonds from rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone from facilitating the provision of military assistance to rebel forces;
- those governments which are providing military assistance, including training, arms and ammunition, to the Sierra Leone Army and other forces fighting on behalf of the government should first ensure that stringent safeguards are in place to ensure that this assistance does not facilitate or encourage violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the recruitment and use of child combatants; these safeguards should also include effective mechanisms to ensure that arms do not reach combatants under the age of 18; if evidence is found that such assistance facilitates the recruitment and use of child combatants, such assistance should be suspended;
- the international community should provide full and sustained support and assistance to relevant UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, both national and international, in order to strengthen initiatives for child protection, prevent further recruitment and use as combatants of children under the age of 18 and assist the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former child combatants, including by addressing their social, psychological and material needs;


- the child protection adviser and human rights section of UNAMSIL must be given full political support and adequate resources in order to undertake their work in relation to child protection;
- the UN should ensure that all troops participating in the UNAMSIL peace-keeping force are fully trained in international human rights and humanitarian law, including children's rights, and that they have training in addressing the specific needs of child combatants;
- the international community should ensure that those responsible for grave breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice; this should include provision of the necessary expertise and practical assistance for the independent special court to be established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000.

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SIERRA LEONE

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (afrc) continued to detain prisoners of conscience without charge or trial and was responsible for torture and extrajudicial executions. After their removal from power in February, the afrc and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (ruf) killed and mutilated thousands of unarmed civilians. A civilian militia supporting the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Civil Defence Forces (cdf), was also responsible for extrajudicial executions and torture, although on a significantly smaller scale. Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the afrc and ruf were detained without charge by the reinstated government. Thirty-four soldiers were sentenced to death by a court martial which did not meet international standards for fair trial; 24 were executed. Forty-two civilians and the leader of the ruf were also sentenced to death.

The elected government of President Kabbah was reinstated after the afrc was forced from power in February by West African forces deployed in Sierra Leone – the Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ecomog). The afrc had seized power in a military coup in May 1997 and was joined by the ruf (see *Amnesty International Report 1998*).

During the ecomog offensive on Freetown, the capital, in February, afrc and ruf forces deliberately and arbitrarily killed many civilians. Several hundred others were injured or killed as a result of shelling by both sides, which in some cases appeared to be indiscriminate.

Following their removal from power and throughout the rest of the year, afrc and ruf forces embarked on a systematic campaign of killing, rape, mutilation, abduction and destruction in the east and north of the country. By December rebel forces had advanced towards Freetown and an attack on Freetown appeared imminent. The government of Liberia was widely reported to be providing combatants, arms and ammunition to rebel forces.

In late April President Kabbah announced that the cdf, composed of traditional hunters such as the *kamajors*, had been placed under

the command of ecomog.

On 10 March President Kabbah proclaimed a state of emergency, subsequently ratified by parliament, which included provisions for indefinite detention without charge or trial. Some 2,000 soldiers and civilians suspected of collaboration with the afrc and ruf were detained following the ecomog intervention. Many were suspected of human rights abuses.

In May the government established an independent committee of investigation to review the cases of several hundred detainees and recommend whether they should be charged or released.

Implementation of a comprehensive plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including an estimated 5,000 child soldiers, from the ruf, cdf and national army, was limited because of continuing conflict.

The un and other intergovernmental organizations repeatedly condemned as gross breaches of international humanitarian law the atrocities committed against civilians by rebel forces. The Special Representative of the un Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, following a visit to Sierra Leone in May, called for a more vigorous and concerted response by the international community to the needs of children affected by the conflict.

In July the un Security Council established a peace-keeping operation, the un Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (unomsil). unomsil human rights officers consistently investigated and reported human rights abuses, monitored treason trials and undertook several other important initiatives which contributed to the protection of human rights.

On 30 July the un Secretary-General convened a special conference in New York, usa, attended by representatives of the government of Sierra Leone, intergovernmental organizations including the un, the Organization of African Unity, ecowas, the European Union and the Commonwealth, and humanitarian organizations. The conference agreed to establish an international contact group to coordinate support for efforts to restore peace, stability, democracy and human rights in Sierra Leone. It first met in November.

While in power, the afrc and ruf committed widespread human rights violations, including detention without charge or trial, torture and extrajudicial executions. Among prisoners of conscience detained by the afrc were Sylvanus Kanyako, a journalist on the *Herald Guardian*, and David Kamara, its proprietor, who were arrested in January, held without charge for three weeks, and tortured.

In mid-January in Kenema, Eastern Province, the ruf detained several community leaders accused of supporting the *kamajors*. They were repeatedly beaten and one died as a result. Some were released, but several others remained held, including B.S. Massaquoi, Chairman of the town council. He was killed by ruf forces in February, and his mutilated body was reported to have been found with 35 others in a mass grave near Kenema the following month.

After they were removed from power, afrc and ruf forces killed thousands of unarmed civilians, including many women and

children, in the east and north of the country. The exact number of those killed remained unknown. The town of Koidu, in Koidu District, Eastern Province, was virtually destroyed by rebel forces in April, and more than 650 bodies were reported to have been found there. More than 200 unarmed civilians were killed during an attack on Yifin, a village in Koinadugu District, Northern Province, in late April.

As many as 4,000 men, women and children suffered mutilation, crude amputations of their hands, arms, legs, lips or ears; others suffered lacerations and gunshot wounds. Survivors of attacks recounted that many others from their villages had been killed or had fled into the bush where many died of their injuries. They reported that villagers had been rounded up and locked in houses which were then set alight. Women and girls were systematically raped or subjected to other forms of sexual assault. Men who refused to rape members of their own families had their limbs amputated as punishment. Children were ripped from their mothers' backs and killed with machetes. Among the victims who were evacuated to Freetown was a 15-year-old schoolboy from Koidu who had severe lacerations to his right ankle after an attempted amputation; about 50 people with him were killed when they were attacked on 1 May.

Reports of atrocities declined significantly during July, but from August onwards, atrocities by rebel forces in Northern and Eastern Provinces escalated. In early September, for example, at least 40 civilians, including children, were reported to have been killed in Kamalu, Bombali District, Northern Province. Some of those killed had first been tortured and sexually assaulted and others were burned alive. Some 50 civilians were reported to have been abducted in Kamalu.

Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, were abducted during attacks by rebel forces. They were forced to fight and used as forced labour; women and girls were forced into sexual slavery. All those abducted were at risk of ill-treatment and deliberate and arbitrary killing. As many as 10,000 civilians in rebel-controlled areas, in particular in Kailahun District, Eastern Province, were effectively held captive.

An estimated 570,000 civilians fled to neighbouring countries to escape the violence or became internally displaced. Many remained at risk of killing, mutilation and abduction. In September rebel forces attacked a refugee camp at Tomandu in Guinea, killing at least seven women refugees and three Guineans and forcing others to carry looted goods across the border. In November, 20 refugees in Tomandu who crossed the border in search of food had their hands cut off by rebel forces. The un High Commissioner for Refugees subsequently moved thousands of refugees from Tomandu to camps further inside Guinea.

In mid-February several foreign humanitarian aid workers were captured and held hostage for two weeks by ruf forces who demanded the release of their leader, Foday Sankoh, who had been detained in Nigeria since March 1997. An Italian priest abducted in Kamalu by rebel forces in November remained held hostage at the end of the year.

The cdf were responsible for extrajudicial executions and torture and ill-treatment of captured combatants and real or suspected supporters of the afrc and ruf. afrc soldiers were summarily executed by kamajors in Koidu in February; some were

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decapitated, others were doused with petrol or had tyres placed around them and were burned alive. At least 50 people were extrajudicially executed in Kenema in February. Human rights violations by the cdf decreased significantly after June, apparently following intervention by the government and ecomog.

There were some reports that ecomog forces were responsible for illegal detention of civilians and torture and ill-treatment of combatants during surrender or capture. Reports also suggested that ecomog forces handed over some captured rebels to the cdf who then summarily executed them. unomsil also expressed concern that ecomog forces did not consistently respect international humanitarian law in relation to the protection of non-combatants in areas affected by conflict.

Hundreds of people alleged to have collaborated with the afrc and ruf were held without charge under legislation allowing indefinite detention without charge or trial. By December about 100 detainees had been released unconditionally and others were released either on bail or pending further investigation after their cases were reviewed by the independent committee of investigation; in other cases the committee concluded that there was evidence of criminal offences.

In April, 59 civilian prisoners, one of whom later died in detention, were charged with treason and some also with murder and arson. Three separate trials began the following month before the High Court in Freetown. Sixteen defendants were convicted and sentenced to death in August, 11 in October and 15 in November. Seven were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and the others were acquitted. Appeals against conviction and sentence had not been heard by the end of the year. Another 22 civilians were charged with treason in December.

ruf leader Foday Sankoh was returned to Sierra Leone from Nigeria in July and in September brought to trial for treason and other offences. Efforts by the government to obtain legal representation for Foday Sankoh were unsuccessful because lawyers feared reprisals. In October he was convicted and sentenced to death. His appeal against conviction and sentence, during which he was to be represented by lawyers from abroad, had not commenced by the end of the year.

A court martial of 37 soldiers, including prominent afrc members, charged with treason and other offences began in late July. In October, 34 were convicted and sentenced to death; the others were acquitted. Despite a 1975 Appeal Court ruling that the death penalty for treason was discretionary, the court martial refused to accept arguments that the death penalty was not mandatory for these offences. The court martial allowed no right of appeal to a higher jurisdiction, contrary to international standards for fair trial. The convicted soldiers appealed to a special committee for the prerogative of mercy, chaired by the President. Despite calls for clemency by the international community and submissions on behalf of 18 of those convicted to the un Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 24 were publicly executed a week later. The others had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment.

In December, two journalists, Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay and Sylvester Rogers, both *British Broadcasting Corporation* correspondents, were arrested. Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay was charged with publication of false news for allegedly publishing false

information about hostilities and failing to check his stories with ecomog, and released on bail. A third journalist was also sought.

Prisoners and detainees were held in conditions which in some cases amounted to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Following large-scale detentions after February, the Central Prison, Pademba Road, in Freetown was severely overcrowded. Conditions were particularly harsh in prisons outside the capital and at the headquarters of the police Criminal Investigation Department and the Central Police Station in Freetown.

Before the afrc and ruf were removed from power, Amnesty International repeatedly appealed for the release of prisoners of conscience and an end to detention without charge or trial, torture and ill-treatment, and extrajudicial executions.

In late February Amnesty International requested that those detained for alleged collaboration with the afrc and ruf be charged and brought to trial in accordance with international standards with a minimum of delay and that those not to be charged be released. The Minister of Justice and Attorney General responded that detainees included prisoners of war and those who had surrendered for their own safety and that criminal investigations were proceeding.

In early May Amnesty International publicized escalating atrocities by rebel forces. It called for an end to human rights abuses against civilians and for the urgent establishment of an independent human rights presence in the country.

An Amnesty International delegation visited Sierra Leone in May and met government officials and members of the military, the legal profession and non-governmental organizations, as well as victims of human rights abuses.

Amnesty International addressed a report to the un special conference in July _ *The United Nations special conference on Sierra Leone: The protection of human rights must be a priority for the international community*. The report called for an end to impunity as a prerequisite for lasting peace and recommended: that unomsil be given the necessary resources to monitor violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; that particular attention be given to the needs of children affected by the conflict; and that assistance be provided to create effective institutions for the protection and respect of human rights.

An Amnesty International representative observed the early stages of the court martial of afrc members in late July. Amnesty International repeatedly urged the government to allow a judicial appeal procedure from the court martial.

Amnesty International appealed to President Kabbah to commute all death sentences and in October condemned the execution of the 24 soldiers.

In November Amnesty International published *Sierra Leone: 1998 _ a year of atrocities against civilians*, which documented in particular the gross human rights abuses committed by rebel forces and made specific recommendations to the government, rebel forces and the international community for ending human rights abuses and ensuring the protection of human rights in the future.

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U.S. Department of State

Sierra Leone Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998

Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999.

SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature; however, this democratically elected Government did not control the whole country effectively at any time during the year. In March the Government, led by President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who had been elected in 1996, was returned to power after 9 months in exile. The President's party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, has had a majority in the Parliament since 1996. The Government's return followed the February ouster of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which had overthrown the Kabbah Government in 1997 and assumed power. The RUF had conducted an insurgency against successive governments; the AFRC originated in a 1997 coup by elements of the Government's armed forces. The AFRC and RUF junta forces were defeated and driven out of Freetown by forces of the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), led by the armed forces of Nigeria. In February and March there was fierce fighting throughout the country as ECOMOG and members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) continued to fight remnants of the AFRC and RUF, particularly in the larger cities outside the capital. However, government and ECOMOG forces failed to gain control of the whole country, and the civil conflict continued throughout the year. In December AFRC AND RUF rebels infiltrated Freetown and, at year's end, controlled areas close to the capital. The officially independent judiciary functioned only in part of the country and only during part of the year, but demonstrated substantial independence in practice when it did function.

Among the Government's security forces, the police officially had primary responsibility for internal order. However, due to the continuing insurgency, the newly constituted army, the CDF and ECOMOG

shared de facto responsibility with the police in security matters. Government forces, particularly poorly trained CDF units that included child soldiers, committed numerous serious human rights abuses, and ECOMOG forces also committed some abuses.

Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, with a market-based economy and a per capita income of less than \$100 per year. It is estimated that only one-fifth of adults are literate. Although it is rich in natural resources and minerals (particularly diamonds, gold, rutile, and bauxite), and has large areas of fertile land suitable for farming, the junta period and the continuing insurgency have brought normal extraction and agricultural production almost to a standstill. There is little manufacturing, and there are few exports; approximately 70 per cent of the Government's budget comes from external assistance. Years of corruption and mismanagement have resulted in a crumbling infrastructure; many schools, hospitals, government buildings, roads, and bridges have been damaged or destroyed in the fighting and through neglect.

The Government's human rights record was characterized by serious problems. Some members of the security forces, including the Civil Defense Forces, committed extrajudicial killings, and tortured and beat suspected rebels and rebel collaborators. Prison and jail conditions remained harsh and sometimes life-threatening. Government forces sometimes interfered with humanitarian relief efforts. The Government arrested and detained persons under emergency decrees approved by Parliament that authorized indefinite detention without trial. Pretrial detention often was prolonged. The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press, and harassed, arrested and detained journalists for their coverage of security-related issues. Government forces limited movement within the country due to the civil conflict. Violence and discrimination against women, and prostitution remained problems. CDF units inducted child soldiers and female genital mutilation continued to be a widespread practice. Discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted. There was some forced labor in rural areas. Child labor persists. ECOMOG forces operating in support of the Government occasionally beat and detained noncombatants. In the period directly following the removal of the junta from power, there was a significant number of vigilante-style extrajudicial killings by citizens; upon being restored to power, the Government, with ECOMOG support, acted forcefully to end these killings.

Throughout the year, AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous egregious abuses, including brutal killings, severe mutilations, and deliberate dismemberments, in a widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population known as "Operation No Living Thing." While still in power in January and February, junta forces continued their previous pattern of abuse, which included assaults and other acts of intimidation against political opponents, nongovernmental and other civic and humanitarian organizations, and citizens. During the fighting for Freetown in February, their retreat to the interior in March, and their advance on the capital in December, junta forces were responsible for killings, kidnappings, mutilation, rape, and destruction of property. One particularly vicious practice was cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants who were unwilling to cooperate with or provide for the insurgents. The victims ranged from small children to elderly women; in some cases, one limb was cut off, in others two limbs, typically two hands or arms. Rebel forces also detained, decapitated, burned alive, and inflicted bullet and machete wounds on civilians; many died from their wounds before they could obtain any form of treatment. The rebel forces abducted missionaries and aid workers, ambushed humanitarian relief convoys and raided refugee sites. The junta forces continued the long-standing practice of abducting villagers and using them as forced laborers, as sex slaves, and as human shields during skirmishes with Government and ECOMOG forces. Boys were forced to become child soldiers. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic against women. Rebel atrocities prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. As many as half a million persons fled to neighboring countries to escape the civil conflict, and remain outside the country on their own or in refugee camps, primarily in Guinea and Liberia.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were persistent reports that some elements of the CDF refused to take prisoners and, after torture or other acts of physical abuse and interrogation, often killed captured insurgents and AFRC and RUF sympathizers. In November a senior CDF spokesman confirmed that the CDF had executed seven individuals who had been searching illegally for diamonds in the Tongo fields in the eastern part of the country, an area long contested by both the CDF's Kamajoh militia and the RUF.

In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the rebel junta in February, there were dozens of reports of torture and vigilante-style executions in Freetown, Bo, Kenema, and other cities. Some of these abuses were committed by citizens in reprisal against junta members and their alleged supporters. Victims were stabbed, beaten, and in some cases burned to death; there is no evidence that any of those responsible for the deaths were ever formally charged or prosecuted. AFRC and RUF forces also committed such abuses as they were driven out of their strongholds.

Many of the hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians killed by AFRC AND RUF insurgent forces in the conflict were executed deliberately for political motives. In March RUF leader Sam Bockarie summarily executed 10 prominent residents of Kenema, including former cabinet minister Bockari S. Massaquoi and paramount chief Momoh Tarawlie, for opposing the rebels. Also in March, RUF forces executed 32 youths in Koidu for supporting Kamajoh CDF forces that previously had taken the town. In September rebel forces shot 50 individuals execution-style in Kamalu, and on October 4, RUF forces shot and killed contract employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who were traveling in clearly-marked trucks, in an ambush near Joru. On December 15, rebel forces killed a number of noncombatants in the village of Masiaka on the approach to Freetown.

Government security forces retaking areas discovered mass graves of those killed by rebel forces in Bo (over 100 bodies) and on Bonthe island (more than 550 bodies); the latter had been considered a Kamajoh CDF stronghold, and the killings apparently were reprisals against islanders for supporting the Kamajohs.

There were also several reports of indiscriminate, mass killings as villagers tried to escape from contested towns; for example, 50 persons reportedly were killed while fleeing fighting in Kabala in March, 22 in Malima, and 80 in Ngolahun. In May U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict Olara Otunno described the continuing conflict as the "deliberate targeting of civilians," and described that strategy as "part of the objective of conflict fare, not just indiscipline on the part of fighters."

b. Disappearance

AFRC and RUF forces continued the RUF's long-standing practice of kidnapping youngsters and women and compelling them to work for the troops and, at times, act as "shields" in battles with government and ECOMOG forces. Women were also forced to act as sexual slaves. A conference sponsored by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) noted that the RUF had captured children as young as 4 and 5 years of age. Seven girls between the ages of 7 and 15 were abducted in March from the Ben Hirsh childcare center in Kenema. During the rebels' retreat, the insurgents kidnapped five medical missionaries and two French medical aid workers in the Lunsar area and held them captive for 2

weeks. In November RUF forces kidnapped an Italian priest, father Mario Guerra, from his mission in Kamalu in the Northern District; he still was held at year's end.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Constitution prohibits torture; however, some of the security forces, in particular the CDF, routinely tortured suspected insurgents upon capture to gather information.

AFRC and RUF forces continued to use rape as a terror tactic against women. In February during their retreat from Freetown, rebel forces raped female patients at the Lunsar Eye Hospital. In March rebel forces gang-raped several teenage girls in Koidu after retaking the town from Kamajoh control. In May several women who had fled to Guinea reported that they were sexually assaulted by junta forces before they were able to escape. ECOMOG forces operating in support of the government occasionally beat and detained noncombatants. Rebel forces also were responsible for many cases of deliberate mutilation, including the chopping off of hands, arms, ears and legs; attempted decapitations; and severe cuts with machetes. The victims have ranged from babies

10 months old to elderly men and women. Humanitarian organizations estimated that at least 2,000 individuals had one or both limbs amputated, and that for every one of these wounded who eventually succeeded in securing medical aid, at least three or four died en route from their wounds, shock, and the hazards of the journey. Some victims who secured treatment in Freetown indicated that at times the junta members forced civilians to take part in macabre lotteries, in which the victim picked a piece of paper which indicated the sentence--from the loss of one limb to scalping or death. In other cases, rebel forces cut off the arms of men who refused to rape relatives.

The rebel campaign, known as "Operation No Living Thing," drove thousands of persons from their homes into the countryside, where many have died from untreated wounds, disease, and starvation. Over 250,000 citizens crossed the borders of Guinea and Liberia to escape the conflict; many thousands of others were displaced internally, and fled their homes to hide in wooded areas, or to towns where there are security forces and some degree of protection from rebel forces. In November Amnesty International published a report that detailed rebel abuses and atrocities during the first 10 months of the year.

Prison conditions and those in police lockup facilities generally are harsh; at best they are Spartan, and at worst life threatening. The Pademba Road maximum security prison, which was designed for 325 prisoners, housed almost three times that number at year's end. Diet and medical care were inadequate; only a handful of toilets was available for use by the prison population. Although male and female quarters were separate, adults and juveniles were incarcerated together. Convicted felons, those in the middle of the judicial process, and those who had not yet been charged formally also were incarcerated together. Other prison facilities were equally rudimentary; the holding cells in police offices are even further from compliance with international standards.

The Government allowed the ICRC, U.N. human rights officials, and other observers to visit the prisons, assess conditions, and see inmates.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile

The Public Emergency Regulations enacted by the Parliament in March at President Kabbah's request provide for indefinite detention without trial. In the immediate aftermath of its restoration, the Government arrested and detained without specific charges persons suspected of collaborations in crimes committed by the desposed junta. Although the Constitution and law provide for a speedy trial,

in practice the lack of judicial officers and facilities often produced long delays in the judicial process. Due to the civil conflict, the judicial system did not function in some parts of the country at any time during the year, and functioned in other parts of the country only during part of the year. Many prisoners were held for months on suspicion of criminal activity before their cases were examined or formal charges were instituted.

ECOMOG forces at times detained noncombatants (see Section 1.c.) In January and February, while still in control of the capital, the rebel junta continued its practice of detaining individuals suspected of supporting the Government in exile and criticizing junta policies. The junta arrested three journalists from The Herald Guardian and detained them for several weeks in apparent retaliation for publishing a statement urging children to remain home rather than go to school because of the security situation. Several other persons were released after shorter detentions.

The Government does not use forced exile.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in practice.

Although there are often lengthy delays between arrest, detention, the imposition of charges, and judicial proceedings, trials are usually free and fair. Traditional justice systems continued to supplement the central government judiciary extensively in cases involving family law, inheritance, and land tenure, especially in rural areas.

After the overthrow of the rebel junta, the Government detained several hundred individuals on suspicion of treason and other charges stemming from their involvement with the junta. Some eventually were released; some remained in detention at year's end; and at least 103 persons were tried in four civilian trials and one court-martial proceeding. The trials and court-martial were open to the public, and were extensively monitored by U.N. personnel, foreign diplomats, and human rights observers from both within and without the country. Observers generally agreed that these high profile proceedings were conducted in an open and fair manner, and that the defendants had adequate opportunities both for counsel and to make their cases. The verdicts ranged from acquittals on all charges to guilty; the sentences given ranged from 5-years imprisonment to execution. However, some observers from international human rights organizations questioned the appropriateness of the treason prosecutions or death sentences in the cases of five journalists and one 75-year-old woman. Twenty-four former army officers convicted on treason charges subsequently were executed.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Constitution and law prohibit such practices, and government authorities generally respected these prohibitions.

Throughout the year, there were numerous instances in which rebel forces invaded, looted, and destroyed private property and terrorized civilians. Homes and businesses associated with former government members and supporters of the elected Government were particular targets, but many homes of ordinary citizens were also looted, burned, or destroyed.

g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts

During the year, there were reports that government security forces or ECOMOG forces hindered the safe passage of relief supplies on two occasions by commandeering vehicles that belonged to relief organizations. The CDF continued to accept, train, and induct children into its ranks.

AFRC and RUF rebel forces routinely committed numerous serious abuses, and sought to coerce, intimidate, and terrorize those who either refused to cooperate with them or supported the Government. They massacred groups of persons fleeing fighting; maimed and cut off the limbs and ears of noncombatants; kidnapped children and women to work for them, and men to carry equipment; raped women as a means of punishment and to inspire fear and cooperation; forced individuals to commit atrocities under penalty of their own mutilation or death; commandeered relief supplies; and vandalized religious institutions, hospitals, and schools.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government restricted these rights during the year. The Government has attempted to regulate the press through registration, and attempts to control the publication of information on security-related topics.

There are over 50 newspapers published in Freetown alone, covering a wide spectrum of interests. Their number fluctuated weekly; many contained sensational, undocumented stories and repeated items carried by other newspapers. Newspapers openly and commonly criticized the Government and its officials, as well as the rebel forces.

Due to low levels of literacy and the relatively high cost of newspapers and television, radio remained the most important medium of public information. There were several government and private radio and television stations; both featured domestic news coverage and political commentary. The government-controlled Sierratelecom communications company provided Internet access in Freetown, although the condition of its land lines often made Internet reception problematic.

The Junta arrested three journalists and detained them for several weeks (see Section 1.d.).

The Government generally respected academic freedom. All institutions of higher learning were wholly or partly closed during the year; most had been looted, burned, or used as quarters by rebels.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected this right in practice. The Government was not known to deny requests to use public areas for meetings or demonstrations, many of which took place throughout the year. The Constitution provides for freedom of association and the government respected this right in practice. There were numerous civic, philanthropic and social organizations, and the registration system was routine and apparently nonpolitical. There were more than a dozen opposition parties, and there were no known restrictions on their formation or organization.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government respected this right in practice.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for these rights, and the Government generally respected them in practice. However, numerous ECOMOG and government roadblocks throughout the country due to the security situation hindered free movement. Citizens were required to get a police clearance within the 72 hours before international travel, but such clearances were issued nonrestrictively; the Government did not attempt to limit citizens' departure or return for political or discriminatory reasons. There were reports of attempts by troops manning roadblocks to extort food or money from travelers.

At year's end, more than one million citizens, more than one-quarter of the population, either were displaced internally or had fled the country to escape the continuing insurgency. More than 500,000 persons were in refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia; others had fled to The Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire, and other destinations in Africa, and still others were in countries outside Africa. Although thousands returned from abroad after the restoration of the Kabbah Government, most remained outside the country because of continuing security concerns.

There is no formal process for granting political asylum. The Government cooperated with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations on repatriation matters, and continued to provide first asylum to over 5,000 Liberians who had fled to Sierra Leone because of conflict in their home country in earlier years of the decade. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries where they feared persecution.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their government, and the 1996 elections won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone People's Party were the first free and fair multiparty elections held in the country in 30 years. In March the democratically elected Kabbah Government, which had assumed power in 1996 and which was deposed by the combined AFRC and RUF forces in May 1997, was restored to power. Several political parties were represented in the unicameral legislature. Local government was controlled by locally elected councils and a traditional chieftancy system. Preparations for local elections were in progress at year's end.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to their views. Representatives of various local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), foreign diplomats, the ICRC, and U.N. human rights officers were able to monitor freely and fully the major treason trials, and visit prisons and custodial facilities.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status

The Constitution prohibits discrimination against women and provides for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity, except for the long-time prohibition against citizenship for persons with a non-African father. This provision effectively blocks citizenship for much of the sizable Lebanese community, and for other persons with non-African fathers.

Women

Violence against women, especially wife beating, is common. Police are unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases involving severe injury or death. Domestic violence is not recognized as a societal problem. However, rape is recognized as a societal problem punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment. There is a significant amount of prostitution: Many women, especially those displaced from their homes and with few resources, resort to it to secure income for themselves and their children. Rebel forces used rape as a terror tactic (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.).

The Constitution provides for equal rights for women, but in practice women face both legal and societal discrimination. In particular, their rights and status under traditional law vary significantly depending on the ethnic group to which they belong. The Temne and Limba tribes of the north afford greater rights to women to inherit property than does the Mende tribe, which gives preference to male heirs and unmarried daughters. However, in the Temne tribe, women cannot become paramount chiefs. In the south, the Mende tribe has a number of female paramount chiefs. Women are nevertheless very active in civic organizations and NGO's, and were instrumental in pressuring the previous government to allow free and fair multiparty elections in 1996.

Women do not have equal access to education, economic opportunities, health facilities, or social freedoms. In rural areas, women perform much of the subsistence farming, and have little opportunity for formal education. The average educational level for women is markedly below that of men; only 6 percent are literate. At the university level, men predominate.

Children

Although the Government is committed to improving children's education and welfare, it lacks the means to provide basic education and health services for them. Schools, clinics, and hospitals throughout the country have been looted and destroyed during the 8-year RUF insurgency, and most have not been replaced. Although in November, the Government began a program to pay the fees for 3 years of schooling for all children, lack of schools and teachers still place even this much education out of the hands of many. Schools are financed largely by formal and informal fees that many families cannot afford.

The recruitment for military service by the CDF and the kidnaping and forced conscription of children into rebel forces were a serious problem; an estimated 5,000 youthful soldiers served alongside adults during the civil conflict. While the CDF forces accept children as volunteers, most children who join the insurgent ranks do so under duress: For years rebels have kidnapped young boys and girls to serve them and augment their forces. In some cases they have forced these children to commit atrocities involving family members. There are now several programs to deal with former child combatants, including those who have escaped from rebel forces. However, even children who escape and wish to leave the ranks sometimes are rejected by their families and communities for their perceived involvement in rebel activities.

Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is condemned by international health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health, is widely practiced among all levels of society, although with varying frequency. The form practiced is excision. Some estimates of the percentage of women and girls who undergo the practice range as high as 80 to 90 percent. While UNICEF estimates the percentage of females who have undergone this procedure to be as high as 90 percent, local groups believe this figure is overstated. There is no law prohibiting FGM. There are a number of NGO's that are working to inform the public about the harmful health effects of FGM and to eradicate it; however, an active mass campaign by secret societies countered the

well-publicized international efforts against FGM.

Occasional instances of ritual murders of boys and girls, as well as adults, associated with illegal secret societies, have been reported in the past. There were no reported cases this year.

People with Disabilities

Questions of public facility access and discrimination against the disabled have not become public policy issues. No laws mandate accessibility to buildings or provide for other assistance for the disabled. Although a few private agencies and organizations attempted to train the disabled in useful work, there was no government policy or program directed particularly at the disabled. There does not appear to be outright discrimination against the disabled in housing or education. Given the high rate of general unemployment, however, work opportunities for the disabled appear to be few.

Some of the many individuals who were maimed in the fighting, or had their limbs amputated by rebel forces, are receiving some special assistance from various local and international humanitarian organizations. Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, prostheses, and vocational training to help them acquire new work skills.

National/Ethnic/Racial Minorities

The country's population is ethnically diverse, and consists of members of at least 13 ethnic groups. These groups generally all speak distinct primary languages and are concentrated regionally outside urban areas. However, all ethnic groups use Krio as a second language, there was little ethnic segregation in urban areas, and interethnic marriage is common. The two largest ethnic groups are the Temne in the northern part of the country and the Mende in the southern part; each of these groups is estimated to make up about 30 percent of the population.

Ethnic loyalty remained an important factor in government, the military, and business. Complaints of corruption within ethnic groups and ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, and promotions were common. There did not appear to be a strong correspondence between ethnic or regional and political cleavages. Ethnic differences also did not appear to contribute appreciably to the RUF rebellion, the 1997 coup, or the civil conflict during the year. There was no identifiable ethnic or regional base of voluntary popular support for the rebels, who controlled territory by terror and coercion rather than by popular consent.

Residents of non-African descent face institutionalized political restrictions. The Constitution restricts citizenship to persons of patrilineal Negro-African descent. This constitutional restriction effectively denies citizenship to many long-term residents, notably the Lebanese community.

Section 6, Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

The Constitution provides for the right of association and, in practice, under the restored Government, workers had the right to join independent trade unions of their choice. About 60 percent of the workers in urban areas, including government workers, are unionized, but there has been little success in organizing agricultural and mine workers. All labor unions by custom join the Sierra Leone Labor Congress (SLLC), but such membership is voluntary.

The Trade Union Act provides that any five persons may form a trade union by applying to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who has statutory powers under the act to approve the creation of trade unions. The Registrar may reject applications for several reasons, including an insufficient number of members, proposed representation in an industry already serviced by an existing union, or incomplete documentation. If the Registrar rejects an application, his decision may be appealed in the ordinary courts, but applicants seldom take such action.

There is a right to strike, although the Government can require 21 days' notice. Union members may be fired for participating in even a lawful strike. There were no reported strikes during the year.

Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate internationally. The SLLC is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The Regulation of Wages and Industrial Relations Act provides the legal framework for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining must take place in trade group negotiating councils, each of which has an equal number of employer and worker representatives. Most enterprises are covered by collective bargaining agreements on wages and working conditions. The SLLC provides assistance to unions in preparations for negotiations; in case of a deadlock the Government may intervene.

No law prohibits retribution against strikers. An employee fired for union activities may file a complaint with a labor tribunal and seek reinstatement. Complaints of discrimination against trade unions are made to a tribunal. Individual trade unions investigate alleged violations of work conditions to try to ensure that employers take the necessary steps to correct abuses.

There are no export processing zones.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children. However, under the Chiefdom's Council Act, compulsory labor may be imposed by individual chiefs, who may require members of their villages to contribute to the improvement of common areas. This practice exists only in rural areas. There is no penalty for noncompliance. The last Saturday in each month is declared a National Cleanup Day; in Freetown traffic is proscribed before 10:00 a.m. so that everyone may clean their immediate area. There have been reports of security forces publicly humiliating citizens to ensure compliance; however, social and community values and pressures largely unrelated to the State were chiefly responsible for widespread compliance. There were no legal or formal governmental consequences of noncompliance.

The AFRC, and particularly RUF rebels forcibly impressed young boys and girls into their ranks and forced them into involuntary servitude, and to perform as sexual slaves. Many later become fighters with the rebel forces

(see Section 5).

d. Status of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is officially 18 years, but in practice there is no enforcement of this law because there is no government entity charged with the task. Children routinely assist in family

businesses and work as petty vendors. In rural areas, children work seasonally on family subsistence farms.

Because the adult unemployment rate remains high, few children are involved in the industrial sector. Children have been hired by foreign employers to work as domestics overseas at extremely low wages and in poor conditions. The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is responsible for reviewing overseas work applications to see that no one under the age of 14 is employed for this purpose.

School attendance through primary school is required by law. However, there is a shortage of schools and teachers, due both to inadequate government funding of public education, and to widespread destruction of educational facilities by rebel forces. Consequently, a large number of children receive little or no formal education. Many consequently enter the workforce with few skills and with limited, if any, literacy. The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded labor, including that by children; however, there was some compulsory labor possibly including labor by children in rural areas (see Section 6.c.).

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no minimum wage. Purchasing power continues to decline through inflation. Most workers support an extended family, often including relatives who have been displaced by the insurgency in the countryside, and it is common both to pool incomes and to supplement wages with subsistence farming.

The Government's suggested work standard is 38 hours per week, but most workweeks for those who are employed exceed that figure. Although the Government sets health and safety standards, it lacks the funding to enforce them properly.

Trade unions provide the only protection for workers who file complaints about working conditions. Initially, a union makes a formal complaint about a hazardous working condition. If this complaint is rejected, the union may issue a 21-day strike notice. If workers remove themselves from dangerous work situations without making a formal complaint, they risk being fired.

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205	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International "Annual Report 2000, Sierra Leone".

SIERRA LEONE

REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE

Head of state and government: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
Capital: Freetown
Population: 4.4 million
Official language: English
Death penalty: retentionist

The political and human rights crisis deepened as rebel forces attacked Freetown in January 1999. Thousands of unarmed civilians were deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated, raped or abducted. Although conclusion of a peace agreement in July provided opportunities to end human rights abuses, the political and security situation remained precarious and human rights abuses against civilians continued. The peace agreement included a general amnesty which provided impunity for human rights abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed during the conflict.

Background

Rebel forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) attacked Freetown on 6 January and committed large-scale atrocities against civilians. Extensive destruction of property made as many as 200,000 people homeless. Although rebel forces were forced to retreat by forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), fighting continued in other parts of the country and some towns, including Makeni in Northern Province, remained under rebel control. Liberia was widely accused of providing military support to rebel forces, in violation of a UN Security Council resolution.

A cease-fire was agreed in May, and a peace agreement — signed in Lome, Togo, in July — provided for an immediate cessation of hostilities and disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. RUF and AFRC members were appointed to ministerial positions in a government of national unity in October and the RUF became a political party. RUF leader Foday Sankoh, with the status of vice-president, chaired a commission to manage mineral resources and post-conflict reconstruction, and Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of the AFRC, a commission to oversee implementation of the peace process.

Implementation of key provisions of the peace agreement, including disarmament and demobilization, release of captured civilians and unhindered humanitarian access, was, however, limited. Full deployment of a UN peace-keeping force to monitor the cease-fire and assist with disarmament and demobilization was delayed. By the end of 1999 only some 3,500 of an estimated 45,000 combatants had been disarmed and demobilized. Despite the

appointment of their leaders to official positions, political rivalry between AFRC and RUF forces resulted in heavy fighting, in particular in Makeni and Lunsar in October. Rifts also emerged between Foday Sankoh and other rebel leaders who had yet to disarm, and doubts remained about the commitment of the RUF to the peace process. Parts of the north and east of the country, including strategic diamond-mining areas, remained inaccessible.

Abuses by rebel forces

RUF and AFRC forces committed gross human rights abuses on a large scale. AI repeatedly called for an end to abuses and to transfers of arms, ammunition and combatants to rebel forces.

Despite improvement after the signing of the peace agreement, there was a marked increase in attacks on civilians from October in areas west of the Occra Hills and in Northern Province, in particular around Makeni, Lunsar, Port Loko, Kambia and Kabala, and a pattern of deliberate intimidation and terrorizing of civilians re-emerged. From November such attacks, often during raids for food, money and other goods, occurred almost daily in Northern Province.

Deliberate and arbitrary killings

Although it was impossible to ascertain the exact number of deaths during the rebel incursion into Freetown, an estimated 5,000 people, at least 2,000 of them civilians, were killed. Medical authorities subsequently put the figure at over 6,000. Although most killings were arbitrary, some individuals and groups — including government officials, journalists, lawyers, human rights activists, prison officials and police officers — were deliberately targeted. For example, more than 200 police officers and eight journalists were reported to have been killed.

After being forced from Freetown, rebel forces continued to commit atrocities. In Masiaka, east of Freetown, civilians accused of sympathizing with government forces were killed or mutilated. In one incident in a village between Masiaka and Mile 38, several babies and young children were reported to have been killed. Deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians continued after the peace agreement, particularly in Northern Province.

Torture, including mutilation and rape

As rebel forces retreated from Freetown, they mutilated civilians by cutting off limbs, most frequently hands and arms. In February reports indicated that some 500 victims of mutilation who required surgery were being treated in Freetown hospitals. Among the youngest recorded victims was a six-year-old girl whose left arm had been severed. It was probable that many other victims failed to reach medical help and died from their injuries.

Amputations and others forms of torture continued to be reported after rebel forces retreated from Freetown, although on a lesser scale. In May boys and young men in the area around Masiaka were seen with the letters RUF carved across their chests. In an attack

on a village near Port Loko in October there were cases of attempted amputation of limbs, and burns inflicted by molten plastic.

Rape and other forms of sexual abuse of women and girls were systematic and widespread. During the rebel incursion into Freetown, women and girls were rounded up and gang-raped, often in public. More than 90 per cent of women and girls abducted and held captive were believed to have been raped; many were forced to submit to rape or be killed. Many girls subsequently released were pregnant, had given birth or had contracted sexually transmitted diseases. Rape of women and girls caught up in the fighting between AFRC and RUF forces in Makeni and Lunsar in October was common.

Abduction of civilians

Rebel forces abducted several thousand civilians, including children, from Freetown in January. Some of those abducted were subsequently killed. Some were selected for training as fighters, others used as porters to carry looted goods. Abducted women and girls were forced into sexual slavery and retained to cook and undertake other tasks. Up to 4,000 children were reported missing from Freetown, most of them abducted.

A small number of prominent Sierra Leoneans, including the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Freetown, and foreign nationals, including priests and nuns, were also abducted. At least eight were killed and two others seriously injured. Others, including the archbishop, either escaped or were released.

Although the peace agreement provided for the release of captured civilians, only some 1,000 adults and children, a comparatively small number, had been freed by December. Many of those released suffered from malnutrition and disease. The release of girls and young women was particularly difficult to secure. Some 2,400 children, most of them girls, abducted from Freetown remained missing.

As attacks against civilians increased from October, the number of civilians being abducted exceeded those released.

Hostage-taking

AFRC forces captured more than 30 UN military and civilian personnel who had gone to the Occra Hills in August with an ECOMOG escort to supervise the release of abducted civilians. Their captors claimed that Johnny Paul Koroma was held under duress by RUF forces and that the peace agreement disadvantaged AFRC forces. All were released after six days.

In December RUF forces captured two foreign nationals working for an international humanitarian organization, Medecins sans frontieres (MSF-France), in Kailahun District, Eastern Province, and held them hostage for 10 days in protest against disarmament and demobilization being supervised by UN peace-keeping forces and ECOMOG troops.

ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces

ECOMOG forces were commended by the international community for their role in Sierra Leone. They and the

civilian militia supporting President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), however, also committed human rights violations.

During the rebel incursion into Freetown, large numbers of captured or suspected rebels were extrajudicially executed by ECOMOG and the CDF, often without any real attempt to establish guilt or innocence. Children, including an eight-year-old boy caught in possession of a gun, were among the victims. Ill-treatment, including beatings, whippings and public humiliation, was common at ECOMOG and CDF checkpoints.

At least 10 Sierra Leonean staff of humanitarian organizations and the International Committee of the Red Cross were detained by ECOMOG forces in January; most were beaten. Although accused of cooperating with rebel forces, these allegations were unfounded.

Indiscriminate aerial bombardments on densely populated areas of Freetown during the rebel incursion resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties.

AI called for strict compliance by ECOMOG forces with international human rights and humanitarian law. In April the ECOWAS Executive Secretary called for an investigation into extrajudicial executions by ECOMOG forces but none took place. A committee subsequently established to monitor relations between ECOMOG forces and the civilian population failed to function effectively.

Reports of harassment and ill-treatment by ECOMOG forces continued in the months which followed.

Detainees held by ECOMOG forces and the CDF were ill-treated, including by being beaten and having arms and hands tied extremely tightly. Civilians and humanitarian convoys travelling along major roads were frequently harassed.

Child combatants

Several thousand children under the age of 18 fought with rebel and CDF forces. An estimated 10 per cent of rebel forces who attacked Freetown were children, many of them previously abducted and frequently under the influence of drugs. Some were responsible for killings and mutilations.

Before the peace agreement, widespread recruitment of children by the CDF in Southern and Eastern Provinces continued. The peace agreement specified that particular attention be given to the issue of child combatants and the government made repeated commitments to end recruitment of children. Although the CDF subsequently demobilized some child combatants, it admitted in November that some 300 children aged between 15 and 18 were in its forces in the Kabaia region and that there had been no effort to demobilize them.

In September the UN estimated that 5,400 child combatants were awaiting disarmament and demobilization; the real number, however, was likely to be much higher. Child combatants, including those who had been abducted, were still engaged in combat; in October a number of boys were among those injured in

fighting between rebel forces.

AI called for priority to be given to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers and for adequate resources for agencies, including UNICEF, specifically helping them.

Refugees and internally displaced people

More than a million people were internally displaced and half a million were refugees, most of them in Guinea. Often still at risk of human rights abuses, they also suffered acute hardship including shortage of food and basic health care. In some areas up to 30 per cent of internally displaced people were reported to be children, many unaccompanied.

Delays in disarmament and demobilization, continuing insecurity and lack of access to parts of the country limited the return of internally displaced people and refugees.

Intergovernmental organizations

Human rights abuses and violations of the peace agreement by rebel forces were repeatedly condemned by the international community which took major initiatives to establish peace and security. An international contact group bringing together intergovernmental organizations and key governments met in April and July. AI called on the international community, including the UN and the World Bank, for protection and respect of human rights to be at the centre of efforts to resolve the political crisis and during post-conflict reconstruction.

A Human Rights Manifesto for Sierra Leone was adopted during a visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in June. It included commitments to promote children's rights and to raising the age of military recruitment to 18 years. It also pledged UN support for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a National Human Rights Commission, both subsequently included in the peace agreement.

In September, after visiting Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict proposed specific measures to meet the needs of children affected by the conflict.

In October the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an international peace-keeping force of 6,000 troops as part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The force, to include a substantial number of troops from ECOWAS countries, was to be deployed for an initial period of six months to help implement the peace agreement, in particular monitoring the cease-fire and the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. The full complement of troops, however, had not been deployed by the end of 1999. A reduced ECOMOG force was to remain to maintain security and help implement the peace agreement with UNAMSIL. Subsequent plans to withdraw ECOMOG troops, however, prompted a recommendation by the UN Secretary-General in late December for a substantial

increase in UNAMSIL troops. The UN peace-keeping force was mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment.

Following the peace agreement, the UN Security Council agreed to expand the human rights section of UNAMSIL, including by appointing advisers on child protection. The human rights section monitored and reported abuses and promoted respect and protection of human rights. It was actively involved in securing the release of prisoners and captured civilians and in assisting in the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the National Human Rights Commission. It also provided human rights training for police and UN military observers and support for Sierra Leonean human rights groups. AI called for the human rights section to receive full political support and adequate resources.

In November the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights decided to send a delegation to Sierra Leone in early 2000.

Impunity

The peace agreement provided for a general amnesty for all acts undertaken in pursuit of the conflict. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sierra Leone, signing the peace agreement as a moral guarantor, added a disclaimer that the UN did not recognize the amnesty as applying to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. It remained unclear, however, how impunity for such abuses would be addressed. While the Truth and Reconciliation Commission provided by the peace agreement could examine human rights abuses committed during the conflict, it could not alone establish full accountability because of the amnesty.

Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called for an international investigation into human rights abuses during the conflict and the UN Secretary-General acknowledged that the amnesty was difficult to reconcile with the goal of ending impunity. He suggested to the UN Security Council that it consider measures to ensure accountability for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including the establishment of an international commission of inquiry. While noting the views of the Secretary-General, the Security Council neither explicitly supported nor endorsed such a commission, judging that insistence on accountability for human rights abuses at that stage would undermine the peace process.

In a letter to the Security Council in July, AI urged that it recommend an effective international mechanism for investigating human rights abuses and for bringing those responsible to justice. Although the High Commissioner's Office established a study on the possible relationship between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and an international

Amnesty International Report 2000 - This report covers the period January to December 1999

commission of inquiry, no recommendations were known to have been made by the end of the year.

AI country reports

- Sierra Leone: Escalating human rights crisis requires urgent action (AI Index: AFR 51/001/99)
- Sierra Leone: UN human rights presence reduced as abuses worsen (AI Index: AFR 51/003/99)
- Sierra Leone: Recommendations to the international contact group on Sierra Leone, New York, 19 April 1999 (AI Index: AFR 51/005/99)
- Sierra Leone: Mary Robinson's visit to Freetown - placing human rights centre stage (AI Index: AFR 51/006/99)
- Sierra Leone: A peace agreement but no justice (AI Index: AFR 51/007/99)
- Sierra Leone: The Security Council should clarify the United Nations' position on impunity (AI Index: AFR 51/010/99)
- Sierra Leone: Amnesty International's recommendations to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Durban, South Africa, 12-15 November 1999 (AI Index: AFR 51/011/99)
- Sierra Leone: Escalating human rights abuses against civilians (AI Index: AFR 51/013/99)

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206	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Amnesty International Press Release, "Sierra Leone: Action Needed to End use of Child Combatants", 31 August 2000.

AI INDEX: AFR 51/075/2000 31 August 2000 **AMNESTY**
INTERNATIONAL PRESS RELEASE

AI Index AFR 51/075/2000 - News Service Nr. 164
Embargoed for : 31/08/2000 00:01 GMT

Sierra Leone: Action needed to end use of child combatants

"The abduction and forcible recruitment of children in Sierra Leone must be stopped and those responsible brought to justice", says Amnesty International in a report released today.

More than 5,000 children under the age of 18 have fought in Sierra Leone's internal armed conflict that began in 1991. They have been recruited by both the armed opposition and forces allied to the government. Most of the children fighting with rebel forces were abducted and forced to fight. Many have become perpetrators of human rights abuses themselves, killing and mutilating under the influence of drugs, alcohol or simply out of fear. A similar number of children, both boys and girls, have also been used by rebel forces to carry goods and cook. Girls have been raped and forced into sexual slavery.

"Childhood has been a casualty of this long and brutal conflict", said the human rights organization. "Former child combatants may not be able to regain their youth but they can reclaim their lives if concerted action is taken immediately."

Since 7 July 1999 when the government of Sierra Leone and the armed opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, efforts have been made by the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations to disarm and demobilize child combatants. However, the political and security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated in May 2000 and these programs have been suspended. The recruitment of children as combatants by both rebel forces and government-allied forces has continued.

Rebel RUF forces, which control parts of the north and east of the country, are reported to have forcibly recruited child combatants again in Kambia District and other areas in Northern Province. Previously disarmed and demobilized child combatants with the government-allied Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) have been re-enlisted. And there are reports that children continue to be recruited by the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the government-allied civilian militia based on societies of traditional hunters, such as the *kamajors*, particularly in Bo and Moyamba Districts in Southern Province.

In March, June and July 2000 Amnesty International delegates in Sierra Leona obtained graphic testimonies from former child combatants with the RUF, AFRC and CDF. Many described how they were forced to drink alcohol and take drugs before combat. Some children have acknowledged that, often heavily drugged with cocaine, they were extremely brutal, as reports from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have also noted. For example Sayo (not his real name), now aged 14, who was abducted by AFRC forces in 1998 in Makali, Tonkili District, told Amnesty International, "*When I go into the battle fields, I smoke enough. That's why I become unafraid of everything. When you*

refuse to take drugs, it's called technical sabotage and you are killed."

The recruitment of children under the age of 15 as combatants is prohibited by both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It violates the rights enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 which was ratified by Sierra Leone in 1990.

Traffic in small arms and light weapons also facilitates and encourages the use of child combatants. Arms and ammunition reaching rebel forces inevitably fall into the hands of the children they have abducted and forcibly recruited. Amnesty International is calling for the cessation of all military assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone, including the provision of arms, ammunition, combatants and training. There must also be effective mechanisms to monitor the distribution of arms and ammunition to the government of Sierra Leone to ensure that these do not reach combatants under the age of 18. In particular, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah must be held to his assurances that arms and ammunition supplied by the UK government will not be used by child soldiers, and he should ensure that the government forces cease recruiting and using child soldiers.

Amnesty International's report makes specific recommendations to all groups involved in the recruitment and use of child combatants in Sierra Leone and to the international community. These include a call for the immediate release of all children held by the RUF and a cessation of the recruitment and abuse of children by opposition forces. Child protection agencies and personnel supervising the process of disarmament, demobilization must be given unhindered access to children who continue to be held. Urgent action should be taken by the government of Sierra Leone to follow up on its repeated commitments to demobilize all combatants under the age of 18 and to raise the minimum age of recruitment to 18. The international community should also provide full and sustained support to help meet the social, psychological and material needs of demobilized child combatants.

Finally, all those responsible for these grave breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the abduction and forcible recruitment of children, should be brought to justice. The international community must provide the necessary expertise and practical assistance for the independent special court for Sierra Leone to be established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000, provided that it meets strict international standards for fair trial and excludes the possibility of the death penalty.

"Regardless of their current political position or allegiance, those who have forcibly abducted children and forced them to commit many of the worst atrocities in this horrendous conflict must be held to account," says Amnesty International.

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Sierra Leone

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Human Rights Developments

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Human Rights Developments

In early February, troops of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ousted the government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Freetown. This ended their nine-month rule, characterized by widespread human rights abuses and a complete breakdown of the rule of law. For the past seven years a vicious civil war has engulfed Sierra Leone, characterized by atrocities against civilians, often committed by the RUF, a rebel group formed in 1991 with support from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Upon taking power on May 25, 1997, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned political parties and public meetings, and announced rule by military decree. The ARFC, created by a group of senior military officers, soon joined forces with the RUF. During their joint rule, many judges, lawyers, and police fled the country, causing a total collapse of the judicial system. The AFRC/RUF government arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics, including students, journalists and human rights advocates, causing thousands to seek asylum.

On March 10, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG reinstated President Tejan Kabbah, first elected in March of 1996, who subsequently declared a state of emergency. After losing political power, the AFRC/RUF alliance engaged in a war of terror against civilians, committing widespread and egregious atrocities in an attempt to regain power. Between February and June 1998 alone, its members raped, deliberately mutilated, or killed outright thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians. The AFRC/RUF abducted men, women and children, probably numbering in the thousands, for use as combatants, forced laborers, or sexual slaves. Women were actively targeted through sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery. In addition to various forms of physical abuse, innumerable civilians suffered psychological trauma from the rebels' choice of tactics and extreme cruelty—like the severing of limbs—to compound the horror of their attacks.

Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who supported the Kabbah government, also committed numerous abuses, including indiscriminate killings and torture, but on a significantly smaller scale than those carried out by the AFRC/RUF. The CDFs were created in order to provide local security and targeted for abuse those they claimed

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CAMPAIGNS

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- [Human Rights Causes of the Famine in Sudan](#)

were AFRC/RUF combatants or their supporters. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, were responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the Kabbah government. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors also obstructed humanitarian assistance and extorted money or other payment at roadblocks.

Children were victims of gross violations of human rights committed by both sides to the conflict. The AFRC/RUF abducted an unknown number of children—probably in the thousands—for use as laborers, fighters, and in the case of girls, sexual prisoners. Many girls were forced to work for the AFRC/RUF combatants until they reached sexual maturity, when they would be assigned to a fighter as a “wife.” There were also many child soldiers among the Kamajors, and despite promises by the government to demobilize all combatants under the age of eighteen, the CDFs continued to recruit children at least until July.

The United Nations estimated that over 416,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the fighting as refugees to neighboring Guinea and Liberia or to internally displaced camps. Conditions for both internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees were often severe due to a lack of access to camps and poor security conditions. In particular, the close proximity of the camps in Guinea and Liberia to the Sierra Leonean border and the presence of former combatants among the refugee population in Liberia jeopardized humanitarian assistance and protection. Many refugees and IDPs suffered from a host of problems including high levels of malnutrition and disease, as well as occasional attacks from the RUF/AFRC.

The government made repeated gestures in support of human rights, such as its pledge to provide amnesty for child soldiers and intermittent appeals to combatants to lay down their arms in exchange for amnesty. In a climate of public hatred for individuals associated with the AFRC/RUF, the Kabbah government initiated legal proceedings against fifty-eight civilians in regular courts and thirty-eight former soldiers before a military court on a range of charges including treason and murder. In hearings in August and October, the High Court of Sierra Leone sentenced to death twenty-seven civilians convicted of treason, including five journalists and a seventy-five-year-old woman. International observers questioned the appropriateness of the treason charges for the journalists, and criticized the lack of a right to appeal sentencing by the military court. On October 19, the government of Sierra Leone executed by firing squad twenty-four of the soldiers who had been sentenced to death one week earlier. The trials constituted the first major test under the Kabbah government of a justice system which lacked basic infrastructure and support. Many of the over 2,000 prisoners in Sierra Leone were held under the 1998 Public Emergency Regulations, introduced by President Kabbah on March 16 and ratified by parliament, which provided for indefinite detention without trial. Prisons were often overcrowded, unsanitary, and lacking in health care and the regular provision of food.

Section 13 of the Public Emergency Regulations declared that “disturbing reports” by the media were punishable offences. On June 24, Minister of Information and Cultural Affairs Dr. Julius Spencer stated that any information regarding the security situation must be approved by ECOMOG before publication. Journalists complained further that taxes had been unjustly imposed upon newspapers in an attempt to limit their ability to publish.

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Sierra Leone: Most Serious Attacks in Months *Human Rights Watch Interviews: Victims and Witnesses*

(July 24, 2001)

'Abu,' was shot in his abdomen and through both legs, during the June 17, 2001 attack on Yiraia by CDF militiamen. He described how he and his ten-year-old son, shot through the knee, hid under the bed while the attackers looted their house. Abu, also lost also lost his mother, father, five-year-old son and twenty-eight-year old sister in the attack:

When we heard the gunshots my children yelled, 'father, they're going to kill us.' I had all my family stand behind me and cracked open the door to make sure it was safe for us to run. But as I did, I saw three Kamajors standing in front of our door and just seconds later they opened fire. I fell down and together with my young son, slithered on my back into the bedroom and under the bed. As I did I saw my mother and sister lying there struggling to die. I heard my father, who is blind, yelling, 'they're killing me.' We hid there for almost an hour listening to the gunfire and sounds of them singing and clapping. They one yelled, 'ceasefire,' and shortly after I heard footsteps coming into the house. My son, who'd been shot through the knee, was crying from the pain but I told him if he didn't be silent they'd kill us. Thank God they didn't find us. Some time later my brother came into the house and pulled us out but a few meters from the house I found my fathers body. I guess he'd tried to find his way out of the house and was caught. My brother and I cried as we passed by his body; he was lying on his back and it looked like his stomach had been cut open.

They put my son and I down next to some other wounded. A few yards away they were laying down the bodies of the dead. Over the next hour they kept bringing more and more bodies from all over the village. I counted twenty-four dead including two RUF combatants. I knew every one of them.

'Sara,' age twelve, was left for dead during the Yiraia attack, after they cut at least five gashes around her neck with a machete. Her mother was shot and killed just meters away. She described:

As my mother and I tried to run out of the house we saw about eight Kamajors. Most had guns and a few had machetes. My mother dashed down the verandah but they caught her and then shot her. She fell about five meters from the house. By this time several of them had surrounded me. They ordered me to sit down and one held me tight by the head while the other cut my neck with his machete. I tried to protect my neck with my left hand but they slashed it. They said in the Kono language, 'you'll be dead - all of you are RUF wives.' After cutting me, I lie still, pretending to be dead. I was bleeding so much. After a while I heard them say, 'she done die.' Then I crawled into the bush and hid until my family came to help me.

'Aminata,' who had just given birth three days before a June 17, 2001 attack on the town of Worodu, described seeing her younger sister shot as the CDF militias attacked

Related Material

[Sierra Leone: Most Serious Attacks in Months](#)
Press Release, July 24, 2001

[No "Safe Passage" Through Rebel-Held Sierra Leone](#)
Human Rights Watch Press release, Freetown, Sierra Leone, April 3, 2001

[Guinean Forces Kill, Wound Civilians in Sierra Leone](#)
Human Rights Watch Press Release, February 28, 2001

the town:

I was lying in bed with my newborn baby. I'd sent my younger sister Fina to go tend to the rice field earlier in the morning. Suddenly, Fina came running into the house and said the RUF had told all civilians to leave the town because the CDF were about to attack. As I struggled to get up we started hearing gunfire. I started gathering my things but Fina said, 'leave everything, let's go.' As we neared the end of the village I was in terrible pain and insisted that we hide in a nearby house. Fina wanted to keep going and as we were arguing, a bullet caught her. I yelled, 'Fina, Fina, get up,' but she died quickly. I rushed over to get Fina's three year old girl who'd been strapped to her back and only then did I see that the same bullet had also gone through both of the child's legs.' I saw the CDF clapping and singing as they approached the town and ran quickly into the house to hide. The wounded girl cried but I told her to shhh. Later we slipped out the back and into the bush.'

'**Mani**,' a twenty-four-year old coffee farmer from Sukudu village in Kono District, had recently returned to his village after spending three years as a refugee in Guinea. He described how he was shot through both legs by CDF-militiamen during an attack on his village on July 11, 2001, and was accused by the CDF of being an RUF combatant:

At around 7:00 am I was getting ready to go spend the day in the fields when I heard a few gunshots. At first I thought it was the RUF who hang around our village letting off a few rounds. There were usually four RUF rebels who're based in our village and besides making us give them rice, they pretty much leave us alone. Then, as I was leaving my house I started hearing more firing and suddenly saw a Kamajor standing about ten meters in front of me. As I tried to run I saw him aim his gun directly at me and fire. The bullet went through both of my legs. Then as the firing was going on, the Kamajor ran into the town and I pulled myself into the bush to hide. They looted our village; my brother was abducted by them to carry away the loot. After walking to their base in a village called Yaradu-Sandor, he was let go. Now we have nothing and I can't walk. We came back from Guinea because we heard there was a ceasefire and that everything would be ok. I came as a refugee with practically nothing and now I have even less.

In the first week of July, RUF rebels attacked the village of Porpon, killing at least three children and wounding several more civilians. AN elderly man, also interviewed by Human Rights Watch, had his left ear cut off. At least sixteen civilians were abducted to carry away looted property. One of the abducted described the brutal killing of the children and explained why he believed the RUF's attack was retaliation for the June 17 attack on the village of Yiraia.

It's farming season and on the day of the attack I was in the fields with six of my friends and family members, including three children. At around 10:30 a.m. I suddenly saw nine armed men; some in uniform and some in civilian dress. Five had guns and the rest were with machetes. We know the RUF and I recognized at least three of them. We've been living with them for years and since the ceasefire hadn't had too many problems except their system of forced taxation for money and rice. We tried to run but they caught five of us, including the children aged ten, five and about two. They tied us together at the waist and told us to start walking. One of the RUF was carrying the two year old. They said, 'today some of you will die; you people are Kamajors.' As we walked the children were crying and slowing us down. The commander was complaining and about half an hour later, he ordered us to halt and then took his machete and started hitting us. First he hit me twice on the head and on my left arm, and then he started hitting the children one after the other. It was pathetic. The children were crying and begging but he killed them anyway. We had to leave them right there by the side of the path. Then we walked into Porpon where I saw other RUF's had captured seven more of us from the village. After giving us all loot to carry, they walked us to Yiraia where we saw RUF big man Demba Marrah who started accusing us of being Kamajors. He was angry because some weeks earlier the Kamajros had attacked his village and killed many of his people including his mother. But we have nothing to do with it. The Kamajors have never even come to our village. He told us to strip off our clothes and then put us in a house and there we found even more people from our village. The RUF would always come around and tell us we were going to be

killed. Two days some shots were fired, and in the panic I was able to run away.



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Recent Abuses Documented by Human Rights Watch

(New York, November 30, 2000) Since the resumption of hostilities in May 2000, Human Rights Watch has taken scores of testimonies from victims and witnesses of abuses taking place within Port Loko, Kambia, Makeni, Lunsar, Kono, Kenema and Kabala districts. While our research suggests that the RUF continue to commit the overwhelming majority of atrocities -- including rape, murder, abduction, forced conscription, and amputation -- we note with concern the rising number of serious abuses by the Civil Defense Forces (CDF, primarily the Kamajors and Gbithis) including rape, systematic extortion, looting of villages, commandeering of vehicles, recruitment of children, and torture and summary execution of suspected rebels. We have also documented RUF attacks on Guinean villages and civilians.

The following is a chronology of some of these violations and atrocities documented by Human Rights Watch in both Sierra Leone and Guinea since May 2000.

Abuses by Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone:

August 9-10: RUF rebels conducted a recruitment operation in villages around the northern town of Kabala in which some forty civilians, mostly young men, were rounded up and "tattooed" with the letters R-U-F by a rebel commander. The tattooing was done by cutting 1-2 inch letters into the upper chest with a razor blade or knife. Human Rights Watch interviewed twelve of those, including three adolescent girls, who managed to escape after being "tattooed." Victims described the rape of at least eleven girls by the RUF during the operation.

July 28: A family from a small village in diamond-rich Kono district were "tried" and brutally "punished" for having defied the rebels' authority over mining and other issues. In the attack, one woman and two adolescents were executed, the hand of another woman was amputated, and yet another was gang-raped by the RUF rebels perpetrating the attack.

July 12-15: Civilians fleeing Makeni in July described two waves of forced recruitment by the RUF. In the first stage, which began around July 12 and lasted for three days, hundreds of men and adolescent boys were seized in marketplaces, taken off trucks, or abducted from their homes. In the second wave starting July 21, the elders and chiefs from around Makeni were summoned for a meeting and told they had two weeks to provide thirty males from each of their chiefdoms. Forced conscription has also been reported around Kabala, Kono and Kambia Districts. Several witnesses said the RUF told the new recruits they were later to be sent to wage war against Guinea.

July 3-5: Elders from villages around the town of Magbele, in Port Loko District described seeing the bodies of seven men who had either been hung or had their necks broken through torture, during a series of rebel attacks. Several other witnesses described the abduction of six women and one young man during the same attack. Three of these women, including one who was eight pregnant, were raped.

July 3: A 25-year-old women was one of nine women raped by rebels, including boy soldiers, during an attack on the town of Madigba, Port Loko District. She had been pregnant and lost the baby after being raped by five men.

Late June: A 33-year-old mother of six described how her husband was executed and decapitated by RUF rebels after he tried to stop them from abducting their 15-year-old daughter. Eleven other youths were abducted in the attack which took place as the civilians tried to flee the rebel-held town of Makeni.

Related Material

[New Evidence of Atrocities in Sierra Leone](#)
Human Rights Watch Press Release, November 30, 2000

[Letter to Kofi Annan](#)
Human Rights Watch letter, November 30, 2000

[Sierra Leone: A Call for Justice](#)
Human Rights Watch Photoessay 2000

Mid-June: A 45-year-old mother of eight saw her 21-year-old daughter and her newborn gunned down in front of her during an RUF attack on the town of Funkun, in the Northern Kambia District. They were, according to several witnesses, among seven civilians killed and over thirteen abducted in the same mid-June raid. Nine of those who were abducted were adolescents.

Mid-May: A 12-year-old girl from Mange-Burre in Northern Kambia District had her left hand amputated by RUF rebels after being captured along with some ten other village girls and adolescents while washing clothes in a stream.

Abuses by RUF in Guinea:

September 15: A 15-year-old boy recuperating in a Freetown hospital described how he was wounded and five young men were killed by RUF combatants when they attacked the Guinean town of Kolakuri. The victim said the RUF fired directly into a house in which he and nine of his friends were hiding.

September 6: Several residents of the Guinean border town of Pamelap verified the involvement of RUF combatants, including high-level commanders, in an attack on the town. One man interviewed by Human Rights Watch witnessed an RUF combatant gun down two Guinean traders and one Guinean policeman. Other witnesses saw the bodies of at least fifteen other victims and verified the abduction of up to fifteen Guinean women who were later taken into Sierra Leone by the retreating RUF. One Sierra Leonean refugee living in the town witnessed the abduction by the RUF of two Italian Catholic priests who are still in their custody at this writing.

Abuses by Civil Defense Forces

October 10: A local journalist was abducted from his office and taken away in a car with tinted windows to a Kamajor base in Freetown. Inside this base, he was beaten by Kamajor officers who accused him of having written unfavorable articles about the Kamajors, and in particular about their leader, Deputy Minister of Defense, Chief Sam Hinga Norman. The journalist was held for two days before being freed.

August 16: An official convoy carrying Chief Norman and the Sierra Leonean Vice President, Joe Demby, was briefly delayed crossing a damaged bridge near the southern town of Mabang by a public bus which had gotten stuck by a broken plank. Human Rights Watch researchers spoke with five witnesses who described how Chief Norman personally ordered his security detail to open fire on the bus after becoming irritated at having to wait for it to be removed from the bridge. While the bus was empty at the time, the ricocheting bullets wounded two civilians. Chief Norman later refused to take the wounded to Freetown for treatment.

August 14: A 45-year-old truck driver was severely beaten and lost several teeth, and another was beaten and held "prisoner" for several hours in a closed storage container by Kamajors controlling an extortion racket on a key bridge leading to the Southern and Eastern Provinces. The Kamajors manning the Mabang bridge routinely extort large sums of money from anyone wanting to take a vehicle across and subject drivers to excessive brutality if they are unable to pay their "tax." Human Rights Watch researchers visiting the area spoke with several drivers who had waited up to three days to cross the bridge because they could not produce the amount required by the Kamajors.

Mid-July: Three women described being raped by Kamajor fighters in the Southern town of Moyamba after the mini-bus in which they were traveling was detained and all the occupants "accused" of transporting goods to rebel held areas. One of the women interviewed was raped by one of the Kamajor commanding officers and others were raped within the CDF headquarters in Moyamba Town. Another was severely beaten on the head with a flashlight while resisting the sexual assault.

July 19: A 29-year-old RUF "Discipline Officer" interviewed by Human Rights Watch inside a jail in Kenema, described being tortured by Kamajor militiamen after his capture. He said the Kamajors dropped burning pieces of plastic on his left arm, and cut him on the legs and shoulders with a knife. Human Rights Watch verified the injuries described.

July 17: A civilian from the northern town of Batkanu described seeing the head of a young RUF combatant on a stick at the entrance to the town. The RUF fighter had earlier that day been executed by Gbethi CDF militias who accused him of spying. The young RUF fighter had allegedly tried to surrender.

July 15: Villagers fleeing RUF repression and forced conscription in the town of Gbendembu described being later captured, tortured, and robbed by CDF Gbethi fighters who accused them of being rebel sympathizers. Many residents of Makeni who in June and July fled forced RUF recruitment and attacks by the government helicopter gunship, described similar incidents. In one such incident on July 18, a young man who sold cigarettes in Makeni market was executed.

July 15: An elder from Kangahun village, 12 miles from Moyamba, described how Kamajor fighters raided the village of Kangahun (Moyamba District.) In the attack the Kamajors beat up several residents, rounded up and stole all the livestock, and extorted money from the villagers.

July 12: A Sierra Leonean Army vehicle carrying an army paymaster with 9 million leones (\$3,830 USD) in salaries was robbed by Kamajor fighters near Moyamba Junction. The money was shared among nine Kamajors and the local commander. The Kamajor authorities received considerable pressure to return the money to the army and some of it eventually was.

Early June: A Kamajor fighter described how militiamen from his unit raped two village girls they had come across in the bush while patrolling near Rogberi Junction. He said the fighters accused the girls of being rebel sympathizers.

Child Combatants:

Human Rights Watch and other credible witnesses and organizations have verified the continued use of child and adolescent combatants by Kamajor and Gbethi militias. Numerous children and adolescents, as young as 11, have been spotted manning checkpoints along the Freetown - Mile 91 highway, and around the towns of Moyamba, Yele and Bo.

Sierra Leone Army (SLA) Abuses:

A 24-year-old farmer from the Northern village of Alikalia described being tortured by an SLA lieutenant who accused her of being an RUF rebel. The woman had earlier this year been abducted and briefly held by the RUF. After being detained at a checkpoint outside of Kabala, she was severely beaten in the body and face, whipped and bound by wire at the elbows.

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Sierra Leone Government Bombing Causes Civilian Deaths

"It is unacceptable for the Sierra Leone government to start dropping bombs on a crowded market place in the hope of hitting a small number of rebels. The pro-government forces in Sierra Leone need to do more to minimize the impact of their military actions on the civilian population."

Peter Takirambudde
Executive Director for Africa at Human Rights Watch

(New York, July 12, 2000)—Human Rights Watch today expressed concern that the Sierra Leone government has caused civilian casualties and massive civilian displacement in helicopter gunship attacks against suspected rebel positions. The attacks took place during the months of May and June in the towns of Makeni, Magburaka and Kambia and have resulted at least 27 civilian deaths and some 50 wounded civilians, as well as the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians. Human Rights Watch called on the Sierra Leone government and its British military advisors to ensure that government forces respect international humanitarian law and take the necessary precautions to protect civilians.

"It is unacceptable for the Sierra Leone government to start dropping bombs on a crowded market place in the hope of hitting a small number of rebels," said Peter Takirambudde, Executive Director of the Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. "The pro-government forces in Sierra Leone need to do more to minimize the impact of their military

actions on the civilian population."

Displaced civilians from Makeni, located some 120 miles north-east of Freetown, and Magburaka, located fifteen miles southeast of Makeni, have described several air attacks on public places, including crowded markets. The actions of the helicopter caused a massive civilian exodus which emptied entire towns and villages. Aid workers and credible sources said the number of Sierra Leoneans seeking refuge in nearby Guinea doubled from 100 to 200 per day in mid-June following attacks around the Northern town of Kambia. Witnesses maintain the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sustained few casualties in the raids.

In Makeni, the Government MI-24 gunship on May 31 dropped leaflets warning the RUF of a future air attack but attacked the center of town just minutes later. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that between seven and nine people were killed when a government helicopter attacked the central lorry park with bombs and gunfire. The victims included a pregnant woman; a

[Peter Bouckaert of HRW on BBC Online - Real Audio - 28 K](#)



Lungi, Sierra Leone - A fifteen-year-old woman and her nine-month-old daughter in Caritas' camp for demobilized child soldiers. The mother lived with the rebels for two and a half years, giving birth in the bush with the help of a midwife. ©Molly Bingham May 2000

Related Material

[Decisive U.N. Action on Sierra Leone Urged](#)
Press Release, June 20, 2000

[Letter to U.N. Security Council](#)
June 20, 2000

[Memorandum on Sierra Leone: Priorities for the International Community](#)
June 20, 2000

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twenty-nine-year-old pharmacist called Umar Bongo; Alhadji Jallo, aged thirty-three; and Ibrahim Conte. Some had rushed to collect the leaflets which had just been dropped.

It is possible that there may have been a legitimate military target near the market place shortly before the attack. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they saw senior RUF commanders as well as RUF vehicles, including one with a mounted anti-aircraft gun, in the vicinity of the market place just before the bombing.

Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions prohibits attacks targeting civilians and requires that armed forces take precautions to limit the dangers of attacks to civilian populations. 'Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilians population' are prohibited. Military actions should be guided by the principle of proportionality; the attacker should refrain from launching an attack if the expected civilian casualties would outweigh the importance of the military target.

Forty-year-old Zainab from Makeni described seeing the bodies of four men and three women after the helicopter gunship attacked the crowded lorry park in the center of town on May 31. "The bodies were torn apart, I could see that one of the women was pregnant. These bombs never hit [RUF] soldiers because they know by now how to hide from it. It only kills civilians. The rebels run to surrounding villages and hide, they mix with civilians."

Khalil, a thirty-one-year old vendor, described the May 31 attack in Makeni and related how rebels later forced him to bury the civilian dead, "Close to where I was staying a house was hit. I went out and just near the house were the bodies of two young boys between the ages of twelve to sixteen. I then went out to the lorry park and saw the dead body of a man who used to sell tires at the Makeni market. Then about fifteen rebels approached me and a few others and ordered us to bury the dead. When we arrived at the graveyard after carrying two bodies, I saw four others bodies of civilians lying there waiting to be buried."

Seventeen-year-old Sahr was selling mangos when the gunship attacked Magburaka on June 7: "The bombs and the leaflets came at just about the same time. I fled into a neighboring house to seek shelter. The bombardment seemed to last for about thirty minutes and when it was finished I went back to the market to take a look. I saw nine dead bodies; men and women and one child, a baby. I saw about eight injured people as well."

As the military effort in Sierra Leone is being advised, trained, and in some cases directed by British military forces on the ground, Human Rights Watch urged Britain to take a proactive role in ensuring that international humanitarian law is respected by the pro-government forces. In particular, parties of the conflict must distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants and take the necessary precautions to protect civilians from attack.

Human Rights Watch also strongly condemned the continuing practice of both pro-government and rebel forces to extort "taxes" from fleeing civilian populations. All witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they had been forced to pay a "tax" to pro-government Civil Defense Forces (CDF) before entering the town of Mile 91, and civilians who fled through RUF-held territory described how they were forced to hand over personal belongings and money at RUF-controlled territory.

"It is unconscionable that pro-government and rebel forces are stealing the last possessions from frightened, fleeing people," said Takirambudde. "The government of Sierra Leone needs to act immediately to stop theft and extortion by forces loyal to the government, particularly the Civil Defense Forces."

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SIERRA LEONE
TIME FOR A NEW MILITARY
AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

11 April 2001

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SIERRA LEONE

TIME FOR A NEW MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sierra Leone is a human tragedy of massive proportions that is rapidly becoming a security nightmare for all West Africa. Two-thirds of Sierra Leone's population are thought to have been displaced during the ten-year civil war. Another 600,000 have become refugees in neighbouring countries. The war is spilling over into Guinea, where heavy fighting since September 2000 threatens the collapse of the government and has already produced a massive, new refugee problem. In effect, Sierra Leone is now at the heart of a series of conflicts that risk forming an arc of violence from southern Senegal to the Ivory Coast.

ICG believes the international community needs to take a radically different approach to that in which it has engaged so far. There should be no further negotiations with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) other than for its complete disarmament and demobilisation. The RUF has blatantly used negotiations for the purpose of rearming. It has consistently shown bad faith in the string of agreements it has signed in Abidjan, Conakry, Lomé and Abuja. The RUF has no meaningful political constituency. Its main backer is Charles Taylor, the president of Liberia, who uses it as a proxy army to pursue his drive for regional hegemony: not for nothing is Taylor known widely as the Milosevic of West Africa. And, of course, the RUF has committed heinous atrocities qualifying as war crimes.

This report reaches the conclusion, stark, but we believe unavoidable -- that the international community must help Sierra Leone take decisive military action against the RUF. There are two vital conditions.

First, it is urgent to harmonise the divergent approaches of the UK government, which is arming, retraining and re-equipping the Sierra Leone army (SLA) for a serious campaign, and the UN military mission (UNAMSIL), which is still trying to implement the compromise provisions of the Lomé agreement. The international community cannot run two or more strategies in Sierra Leone simultaneously. Working against each other with conflicting mandates will only fuel the conflict and invite warring factions to exploit differences. Achieving a common approach will require much diplomacy, especially with West African nations that are hesitant about a muscular policy in which a former colonial power takes a prominent role.

Those in the RUF who refuse to demobilise should be defeated militarily. The military option could be spearheaded by UK trained and led Sierra Leone armed forces, with UNAMSIL securing the areas regained. The UK should provide military and intelligence backup to guarantee the safety of UN forces. The Civil Defence Force (CDF) could provide additional security for local villages and settlements.

Secondly, military action must be co-ordinated with a coherent political strategy accepted by all the key international actors and the Sierra Leone government. This will involve some form of UN-endorsed commitment to an international effort that may need to last five years or more, in order to help Sierra Leone re-establish good governance and reconstruct its shattered society. Without such a political effort, even military victory over the RUF would be pointless since the resulting power-vacuum would soon be filled by more violence from government and pro-government forces, new rebels and predatory neighbours.

The specific recommendations that follow will be difficult to implement. If the international community does not make a substantial commitment to help Sierra Leone resolve both its military and political problems now, however, it is all too easy to foresee the contagion of violence spreading out of control in West Africa much as has happened in Central Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the UN Security Council

1. Abandon the Lomé Agreement and make no further deals with the RUF.
2. Call for immediate surrender of the RUF and, against those who refuse, support the threat and eventual use of military force by the Sierra Leone army, supported by the UK.
3. Give UNAMSIL a tougher mandate to occupy and protect areas liberated by the SLA and harmonise its objectives with the UK and with West African heads of state.
4. Impose targeted sanctions on Charles Taylor's regime in Liberia -- involving visa restrictions, freezing of bank accounts and the like -- in order to persuade it to end its support for the RUF.
5. Provide adequate financing so that the Special Court established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 2000 can begin to investigate and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and a Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission can start operations.
6. Support Demobilisation and Reintegration Programs for RUF and government militia (CDF) combatants.
7. Commit to a continuing international role in Sierra Leone, which may need to last five or more years, to assist the Sierra Leone government constitute a more reliable army, re-establish good governance, and restore its shattered society.

Freetown/Brussels/London, 11 April 2001



SIERRA LEONE

TIME FOR A NEW MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRATEGY

I. INTRODUCTION

Sierra Leone has become a tragedy of massive proportions. Moreover, the civil war in that country has now spilled into neighbouring Guinea, where heavy fighting since September 2000 threatens to produce the collapse of another West African government. In effect, Sierra Leone is at the heart of a series of conflicts that risk spreading an arc of conflict from southern Senegal to the Ivory Coast.

Radical action is urgently needed if the further spread of war is to be avoided. The experience since the first international intervention in neighbouring Liberia in 1990 has demonstrated that neither the United Nations nor regional groupings can achieve this unaided, not least because conflicts in this part of Africa make a unanimous approach by the local countries impossible. The presence of an 800-strong British military force in Sierra Leone is an important new factor. However, if lasting peace is to be established in Sierra Leone and destabilisation of the region halted, it is essential that the British role and other forms of international intervention be harmonised. The International Crisis Group believes that further efforts to achieve a workable negotiated agreement between the parties to the Sierra Leone war would be fruitless. Rather, what is needed is broad international consensus on the military measures required to save the country from further agony and prevent violence from extending further throughout the region, and support for a complementary political strategy to rebuild the devastated country's institutions.

The modern republic of Sierra Leone grew out of an eighteenth-century settlement on the West African coast for black people from Britain, some of them former slaves. Starting with the colony of Freetown, British rule eventually extended into the hinterland. The country remained under British rule until independence in 1961. From the beginning, Sierra Leone's political parties vied for dominance at any cost. In 1967, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), that had led the country since independence, was narrowly defeated by the All People's Congress (APC) led by former trade union leader Siaka Stevens. The latter was prevented from taking power immediately by a military coup, but in 1968 Stevens became head of state. His APC party quickly consolidated power, and in 1978 it formally established a one-party state. Its notoriously corrupt government made extensive use of patronage and eventually undermined all the principal institutions including parliament, police, and civil service, resulting in chaos.

The past twenty years have seen a succession of bad governments, both military and civilian, all in one way or other dependent upon or involved in the trade in diamonds, which are Sierra Leone's most valuable resource. In the last decade the diamond trade has helped destroy Sierra Leone. Financial, military and diplomatic crime have characterised the country, as Lebanese, Israeli, Russian and other traders have competed for gems, and various military forces have fought for control of the diamond fields.¹

Diamonds have also fuelled the terrible civil war in which a nihilistic movement known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by a former corporal, Foday Sankoh, has battled against every government that seized or otherwise obtained power in Freetown since 1991. Sankoh, widely thought to be a psychopath, has repeatedly committed atrocities against civilians. He has been supported in his ambitions by the equally brutal and unscrupulous Charles Taylor, now president of Liberia. Taylor won power in Liberia through war and now seeks to dominate the Mano River basin, which includes Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

Throughout the 1990s, Sierra Leone has had only one period of relative peace, in 1995-1996. South African mercenaries from an organisation known as Executive Outcomes were hired by the NPRC in April 1995. With a force of less than 200, they drove the RUF away from Freetown, secured the diamond fields and many other areas, and enabled a peaceful democratic election to be held in 1996. This was won by Tejan Ahmed Kabbah, a former UN official. Unwisely, Kabbah thought that Foday Sankoh could be persuaded to reasonable compromise. In one of several peace agreements ultimately broken by the RUF, Kabbah agreed that Executive Outcomes should leave. As a result, he was overthrown by a military coup and exiled in May 1997.

Nigerian forces, deployed under the banner of the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), eventually restored Kabbah but they were unable to defeat the RUF, which invaded Freetown again in January 1999, killing, mutilating and abducting thousands of people. It was this awful event – coinciding with the Kosovo crisis – that finally compelled the broader international community to act. At that stage, the refugees in and from Sierra Leone were double those of Kosovo. Around 600,000 persons have fled the country - mainly to Guinea - and two-thirds of Sierra Leone's population of almost five million are thought to have been internally displaced.

The question was what to do. Nigeria, now under the democratic rule of Olusegun Obasanjo, wished to withdraw, and no other country wanted to take its place. Consequently, President Kabbah was pressured by the U.S., the UK and his neighbours to make another peace agreement with Sankoh, in Lomé in July 1999. Under this, Sankoh was, astonishingly, given the status of vice president and put in charge of the strategic minerals, including diamonds. The RUF were amnestied for their crimes. A UN mission (UNAMSIL) was dispatched to implement the accord.

¹ See Appendix 1: Detailed Background to the Political Crisis.

The Lomé agreement collapsed in May 2000. The RUF was chiefly to blame, sabotaging the peace process by capturing 500 UN peacekeepers and their equipment. The peacekeepers were eventually released through the intervention of Liberia's Taylor, and Sankoh was arrested. He faces the prospect of trial by the special tribunal established under UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 2000 for war crimes committed after the signature of the Lomé agreement, if international funding for that tribunal and political will can be found. Nevertheless, the RUF still controls 50 per cent of the country, including the diamond areas. From those areas it continues to make incursions across the border into Guinea, which is growing ever more unstable.

The collapse of the peace process has left the United Nations and its member states floundering for a response. Neither the amnesty offered to all combatants by the Lomé accord nor the deployment of what is already the UN's largest current peacekeeping force has been sufficient to keep the peace process on track. A decade after the end of the Cold War, Sierra Leone provides a sobering reminder of how little progress has been made on forging appropriate international responses to conflict. A further international failure in Sierra Leone will have catastrophic consequences for West Africa and grave implications for future international peacekeeping.

Throughout the last decade, international initiatives in Sierra Leone have been marred by divergent and competing agendas. Too often, mediators have staked their credibility on negotiated settlements in which rival warring groups are treated as potential political players, even allies in a coalition government. The notion of bringing rebel groups into government, which has been successful in some countries and some situations, however, has proved utterly misguided in Sierra Leone. The Lomé accord, the most recent agreement to disintegrate, was a vain exercise motivated largely by international expediency. It attempted to elevate those responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians into statesmen even though they lacked a coherent political agenda and almost any political base.

The collapse of Lomé means that the international community and the Sierra Leone government must rethink their approaches. There are key questions that need to be resolved before it will be possible to embark on a new strategy based on more than short-term expediency: what issues underlie the war? who are the key players, including in the international community? what assumptions are behind the failed peace initiatives? what new approaches are viable? The situation is so desperate and so unusual that new approaches are certainly necessary.

The answers do not lie in futile pursuit of yet another negotiated settlement with forces that have shown no interest in adhering to accords. The RUF plays a long game and uses peace agreements as stepping stones towards its ultimate goal of power. Its strategy is at the expense of democracy and the country's citizens. For the commanders of the RUF and its chief puppeteer, President Taylor, peace offers little reward; war presents greater opportunities to extend their influence.

ICG believes that there is no other real option than to take military action against the RUF. We do so, however, with the vital proviso that this must be associated with a coherent political strategy agreed among the key international actors and with the Sierra Leone government. The type of political strategy sketched here is

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an unusual one. It will require significant international commitment to Sierra Leone for five years or more. In the particular case of Sierra Leone, the decision already made to establish an international tribunal to try Foday Sankoh and others accused of war crimes is a significant marker of the willingness of national and international forces to work together.

The necessity for a coercive military response has been recognised by the UK, which has been supporting the Sierra Leone government's need to reform and strengthen its armed forces to defeat the RUF on the battlefield since last summer. The UK and the U.S. have also supported a complete embargo against diamonds from Liberia in order to cut the RUF's revenue. The prospect of such a military policy, which conflicts with the UN's propensity towards impartiality, being applied without broader international agreement causes deep consternation in West Africa for understandable reasons. It must acquire the commitment of key regional and other international players if it is to succeed. Most importantly, a military policy will not succeed in isolation but must be coupled with a political strategy that addresses the conflict's underlying causes and has broad support inside Sierra Leone and within the region. Without international consensus around these linked objectives, real peace is unlikely, and the people of Sierra Leone, who have been victims for so long, will continue to suffer.

In short, Sierra Leone needs radical solutions involving the serious use of force complemented by extended international political commitment. The use of military force should always be a last resort, but ICG believes the crisis is so grave that this option must now be seriously pursued.

II. ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

Amidst the turbulence of Sierra Leone's conflict, the underlying causes are frequently overlooked. These include corrupt and unaccountable government, ethnicity that has been manipulated for political ends, and alienated youth. Peace cannot be sustained without addressing all these factors.

A. Bad Government

Sierra Leone's problems are rooted in its history. Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has never experienced truly democratic, accountable government.² Independence was preceded by lengthy colonial rule which, although including a strain of authentic democratic tradition, was characterised by patronage and authoritarian government, especially in rural areas.

The habits of trust and accountability between people and rulers are often absent. There is little general awareness of the duties and responsibilities of government as these are accepted internationally. Politicians have for decades squandered the country's resources, which include good land and rich mineral deposits. Diamonds provide easily transportable and lucrative returns for people who enjoy good connections with or within the government. A medley of politicians, businessmen, soldiers and civil servants have formed networks of patronage or commerce,

² See Appendix 1: Detailed Background to the Political Crisis.

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spread as far as the Middle East, the U.S. and Europe, that have undermined state institutions. Unsurprisingly, within a few years of the RUF's appearance, the rebel group's primary focus had become the occupation and control of diamond areas as a source of funds for weapons. The link between diamonds and corruption, conflict and weapons is a central feature of Sierra Leone's war.³

Sierra Leone desperately needs to establish a government that is both legitimate and accountable. The events of the last five years have shown that free elections alone are no guarantee. President Kabbah's SLPP government was democratically elected but is now widely regarded as corrupt. It is highly dependent on armed support from forces over which it has no control. President Kabbah has spent much of his life outside the country, is often perceived as detached from the population, and does not demonstrate the requisite level of influence over all members of his government. He has also shown poor judgement. Following his return to office in February 1998, for example, he unwisely oversaw a policy that led to the execution of people associated with the military junta and convicted of treason. This and other policies heightened animosity towards his administration and undoubtedly contributed to the intensity of the horrific revenge killings and abuses during the January 1999 RUF attack on Freetown.

Elections in 2001? There is widespread support among Sierra Leone citizens for new elections this year. Although they would be insufficient in themselves, they could be a vital element in creating a new legitimate government and underpinning reforms. New elections were due in March 2001 but were postponed by the government due to insecurity in parts of the country. They are unlikely to be held soon as around 50 per cent of Sierra Leone's territory is controlled by the RUF and two-thirds of its population is displaced.

The constitution provides conditions under which elections can be postponed: if Sierra Leone is fighting a war affecting the national territory; if the president concludes that under such circumstances it is not practicable to hold an election and proposes postponement to the parliament; and if the parliament so decides. If these conditions are met, the president's tenure may be extended for a maximum of six months at any one time. The number of extensions is unlimited.

There are other practical problems. The 1996 elections cost around U.S.\$10 million. Unless similar funding is forthcoming from donors, there is little possibility of organising new elections. Voter registers will need to be revised, constituency boundaries delineated, and hundreds of thousands of refugees repatriated. This will not be cheap.

B. ' Unaccountable Military

President Kabbah's most immediate problem is control of the armed forces. Under President Siaka Stevens, the armed forces remained small, around 3,000, sufficient to quell minor uprisings but not to pose a threat to the government. President Stevens did, however, establish an Internal Security Unit, from which the Special

³ For a full account, see *Report Of The Panel Of Experts Appointed Pursuant To UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19 in Relation To Sierra Leone (December 2000)*.

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Security Division (SSD) was created in 1972. This notorious, 500-strong unit was effectively a private army for his APC party.

In 1991-92, to counteract emergence of the RUF, the security forces were expanded to around 13,000. (The exact figure has never been determined because of the large number of 'ghost' soldiers, who drew salary and rations.) Recruitment attracted street boys and unemployed youth. Coupled with poor leadership, training and equipment, the rapid expansion led to disillusionment among front-line soldiers and the emergence of what became known in Sierra Leone as 'sobels' – 'soldiers by day, rebels by night'.⁴ During 1994 and 1995, violence against civilians was often blamed on combatants believed to be part of the security forces. Difficulty in identifying the attackers fostered a belief that both sides – army and rebels – were equally to blame.

The 'sobel' phenomenon and collapse into gang-like tactics had several causes. Soldiers were unprepared to risk their lives to serve corrupt masters in Freetown, particularly as their salaries and rations were frequently missing. That led to collusion with the RUF to avoid battle. There was evidence of large-scale transfers of arms and ammunition from the army to the RUF. Also, soldiers discovered the lucrative returns that could be made by mining diamonds or simply looting civilian property.

Substantial commonality of interest gave the army and the RUF further incentive to cooperate. During 1995, terror tactics – which included amputation and carving messages into the chests and backs of victims – were often designed to deter the population from the democratisation process that was gathering momentum. Both the RUF and the armed forces recognised that elections were against their interests. The armed forces – which held power throughout the NPRC military administration headed by Valentine Strasser – stood to lose their ruling position. For the RUF, elections threatened further exclusion at home and internationally since a democratic government would gain international recognition and credibility. It has been alleged that the practice of cutting off the hands of civilians at random dates from this period and was originally an attempt to deter voting: the official election slogan was 'The future is in your hands'. Such terror tactics, however, failed to deter. The parliamentary and presidential elections held in February 1996 had widespread support. People saw the elections as a chance to express dissatisfaction with both the military government and the RUF and bring about permanent change.

While the initial success of the elections was astonishing, the Kabbah government failed to inspire extensive loyalty. It favoured a Mende militia in the form of the *Kamajors* (later the central element in the Civil Defence Force, CDF). Latent discontent within the army intensified, resulting in the coup of May 1997. The immediate spark was a government proposal to slash spending on the military and use the savings for the CDF, turning it into a private army for the ruling SLPP or factions within it. Johnny Paul Koroma, the head of the AFRC, justified his coup by noting that:

⁴ ICG Interviews with residents of Bo and Kenema, November 1995.

'the SLPP tribal hunter militia, the Kamajors, received logistics and supplies far beyond their immediate needs. This was enough indication of the preference for the private army over our Armed Forces, foreshadowing the ultimate replacement of the Constitutional Defence Force by Mr Kabbah's hunters.⁵

The AFRC junta, which took power in May 1997, may have had some desire to end the war by inviting the RUF to join it in power, but it also sought to protect army privileges. At a more basic level, the administration reflected the battlefield collusion between the two sides. However, the army underestimated the strength of the RUF and quickly found itself a hostage of the rebel movement.

When a Nigerian military assault in February 1998 pushed AFRC and RUF forces out of Freetown, their common front ended. What was left of the alliance wreaked terror against civilians, particularly in the Northern Province.⁶ Some former military filtered back into Freetown while others joined the RUF and yet others continued nominally as the AFRC or joined splinter groups such as the West Side Boys who set up base in the Okra Hills outside Freetown. In August 2000, this faction kidnapped eleven British soldiers, ultimately leading to its elimination during a rescue by British special forces.

With its entry into Freetown in February 1998, the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG contingent effectively became Sierra Leone's military. President Kabbah was reinstated, and Nigerian Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe, who had led the assault on Freetown, was seconded to be the country's defence chief. General Khobe was in theory answerable simultaneously to the Nigerian and Sierra Leone governments.

The New Sierra Leone Army. Sierra Leone has a long history of private armies formed by particular parties or factions, degenerating into banditry, and official security forces being abused for private interest. The British decision to revive the Sierra Leone army as the core of a new military thus carries significant risks.

In September 1999, the SLA consisted of around 6,300 troops of which 2,000 were new recruits, the others the rump of the AFRC with little loyalty to the elected government and with a lamentable human rights record.⁷ The military is highly politicised. Maintaining an ethnic balance will be essential if it is to be impartial. The military is also riddled with corruption. Sierra Leone has a long history of coups, and for nearly a decade the army has taken power on a whim. Inculcating values of professionalism, discipline and service to the state and eliminating corruption will require long-term training.

Finally, the success of security sector reform requires not only the remodelling and retraining of soldiers into an accountable force, but also a guarantee that they will be adequately paid and equipped. Sierra Leone's resources are limited and the government has no revenue base adequate to finance an efficient army in the

⁵ In letter from Johnny Paul Koroma to ECOWAS, August 1997. Available at www.sierra-leone.org/koroma0897.html.

⁶ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Childhood – a Casualty of Conflict* (Amnesty International, AFR 51/69/00, London, 31 August 2000), p.7.

⁷ Comfort Ero, *Sierra Leone's Security Complex* (Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, 2000), p.41.

short or medium term. Donors have traditionally been reticent to fund the security sector, although since last May the UK has increased bilateral defence assistance to Sierra Leone.

The Civil Defence Force. Apart from the considerable difficulty in organising the SLA into a responsible force, there remain other security forces of dubious nature within the government camp. Most notable is the Civil Defence Force. The CDF began as an initiative to protect civilians from the ravages of both RUF and SLA but its current strength and composition may exacerbate rather than improve the internal security situation.

Currently, the CDF consists of some six different groupings, representing the main ethnic groups in Sierra Leone. The most powerful, however, are the *Kamajors*. These were originally a guild of hunters among the Mende people in the southeast of the country. They defended their villages and hunted game with home made shotguns. As RUF and army looting intensified, traditional chiefs, many supporting the SLPP, which is regarded as a Mende-dominated party, recruited young men to be initiated into the *Kamajor* movement to defend their communities. The success of the *Kamajors*, supposedly equipped with extraordinary spiritual powers, stimulated similar defence forces, also purportedly traditional in nature, in other parts of Sierra Leone. These were loosely organised under the CDF umbrella.

On balance the CDF has been highly successful at protecting some communities, particularly when supported by good logistics and elite troops such as the South African military company Executive Outcomes. The CDF alone, however, is generally unable to resist a concerted RUF attack. Over time, the CDF has evolved into a force which itself contains the seed of destabilisation. The mistrust and hostility that has existed between CDF and army for six years has not evaporated with creation of the 'new' SLA. Towns like Lunsar have been lost to the RUF reportedly because of fighting between the coalition of forces that support the government. Some CDF commanders admit they now exist to guard against the SLA as much as against the RUF. CDF fighters are bitter that they receive fewer rations and weapons than the SLA. They argue the CDF stayed loyal to the democratic government and fought the RUF in the bush while the SLA colluded with the rebels. That loyalty, they argue, should be rewarded.

To a large degree, the CDF's future depends on the ambitions of Chief Hinga Norman, the Deputy Defence Minister, who is the nominal leader of all CDF and exercises real control over some *Kamajor* forces. Norman, formerly a professional army officer, was imprisoned in the late 1960s for planning a military coup on behalf of the SLPP, the party which is today in power. There is sometimes speculation that he may attempt a coup again, although this appears unlikely. However, Chief Norman may be a candidate in the next presidential election, in which case his influence among the CDF will be of real political value, especially if the CDF were to be seen as instrumental in the war against the RUF. There are also splits emerging in the CDF. Chief Norman is said to be losing control of the *Kamajors* in the regions of Kenema and Pujehun and Moyamba district to another leader, Eddie Massally.

There is a risk of wider ethnic instability if the SLPP, whose core support is among the Mende, were to lose forthcoming elections. The Mende component of the CDF – the *Kamajors* – are seen by many as guarantors of Mende power. Controlling the CDF – and giving it an effective role, such as local territorial force as is being mooted – is a major challenge facing the Sierra Leone government and its British military advisers.

C. Ethnic Politics and Exclusion

Ethnic balance, most particularly in the reorganised armed forces, will play a large part in rekindling people's confidence in institutions of government. Ethnic relations have been a persistent undercurrent in Sierra Leone's modern history, although there is not a history of enmity comparable to that in the Balkans or Rwanda, nor has widespread violence been conducted on a plainly ethnic basis.

The first seven years of Sierra Leone's independence were dominated by the SLPP, which attracted support predominantly from the Mende people in the south. Under the All People's Congress (APC) led by Siaka Stevens, power shifted to northern groups, principally the Limba and Temne. Stevens' dictatorship ensured that this dominance, reinforced by ethnic favouritism in the security forces, continued until the transfer of power to Joseph Momoh in 1985.

When the SLPP in 1996 won office for the first time in nearly 30 years, it was widely perceived as the return to power of a Mende constituency. But Kabbah tried to heal ethnic divisions by bringing representatives of other parties into his government. The dominance of northerners in the army remained a legacy from Stevens' time. Hence, the military coup of May 1997 also reflected some shift in the ethnic complexion of power.

Yet ethnicity is not necessarily all-pervasive. Ethnic factors appear to have played little role in the formation of the RUF or in its later manoeuvres. RUF combatants come from all parts of the country, many of them recruited by force. In its first months, the RUF attempted to rally support not on grounds of ethnic favouritism but in protest against social and political exclusion, a result of corrupt central power of whatever form.

D. Militarisation of Youth

'Central to an understanding of the war in Sierra Leone is the role of alienated youth ... for whom combat appears a viable survival alternative in a country with high levels of urban unemployment'.⁸

Sierra Leone's future will depend on ensuring that youth do not join military factions. That in turn largely depends on having an economy able to absorb an expanding young work force. This is a challenge that is not unique to Sierra Leone. Throughout Africa, poorly educated, unemployed youth are the excluded and disenfranchised outcasts created by corrupt governments. In Sierra Leone,

⁸ Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, 'The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone', in Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas* (James Currey, Fountain Publishers and Indiana University Press, Oxford, Kampala & Bloomington, 1998), p.172.

frustrated urban and rural youth formed a veritable reserve army. The RUF's simplistic messages offered the possibility of reversing the social hierarchy through violence. Quick wealth was also an attractive incentive.

Although many joined the RUF for these reasons, young people with an identical profile in 1992 joined the army to fight the RUF. It is perhaps unsurprising that ill-equipped, poorly-trained, ill-paid army recruits colluded with the rebels. The more structured CDF, by contrast, recruited a greater concentration of rural youth through the patronage networks of chiefs. More recently, recruitment into the CDF has been less discriminate.

For the young, therefore, ethnic differences have been less important than finding a remedy to feelings of dispossession and alienation or, more positively, achieving a sense of purpose. Policies that do not address these fundamental issues are unlikely to provide long-term remedies for Sierra Leone's problems.

III. THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PEACE

While the underlying causes of Sierra Leone's war can be traced to different roots, the resolution of the conflict has been hampered by a number of issues. First, the RUF has shown little sign of wanting peace. The international community has confused the signing of agreements with achieving peace. Lomé and earlier negotiations need to be understood as interludes within a wider strategy of war through which the RUF bought time to seize power. A new peace agreement that relies on the RUF being a cohesive force willing to adhere to a document is pointless. Finally, the response of the international community has been uncoordinated and has shown lack of resolve. Its competing interests have hampered the search for a consistent strategy.

A. The Futility of Negotiations and the Failed Peace Accords

Early Attempts at Negotiation (1992 -1996). Few chances for negotiation were taken during the early years of the war. When the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) military junta came to power in 1992, the RUF sought a negotiated settlement but the NPRC spurned the offer as it was confident of military victory. Its counteroffer to the RUF was tantamount to a demand for unconditional surrender and was rejected by Sankoh.⁹ Instead, the RUF consolidated its weak position and realigned its rhetoric.¹⁰ As the military situation began to turn during 1994 and early 1995, the RUF's desire to negotiate lessened further.

The NPRC and RUF re-established communication toward the end of 1995 when the NPRC offered a coalition government of 'national unity'. But Sankoh, still confident he could win militarily if foreign forces left (specifically the Executive Outcomes mercenaries), refused to compromise. According to senior diplomatic

⁹ Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (James Currey and Heinemann, London and Portsmouth NH, 1996), pp.10-11.

¹⁰ For further information on the NPRC, see appendix 1. •

sources, he demanded the presidency, but the NPRC was willing to concede only the vice-presidency.¹¹

Faced with Sankoh's unwillingness to compromise, the NPRC stepped up its military attacks through Executive Outcomes. EO deployed a helicopter gunship and tactics that included concentrated mortar fire and ground attacks by approximately 120 soldiers. It rolled the RUF back in a number of battles, taking the Kono diamond fields in late 1995 and enabling a number of diamond companies, including Branch Energy, a firm with close links to EO, to resume mining. During the later battles, it conducted combined operations with the *Kamajors* and occasionally with the Sierra Leone armed forces, though these were often hampered by intelligence leaks.

In January 1996, following a campaign that destroyed a key RUF base in the Kangan Hills, the RUF dropped its demands, agreed to a ceasefire, and began unconditional negotiations for the first time. It was this that created the period of relative stability that enabled the elections in February 1996 to proceed.

The Abidjan Accord (1996). The election of a civilian government undermined any legitimacy the RUF might have claimed and relegated it to an insurgent threat. But the army was also threatened by civilian government as it lost political and economic privileges. When Sankoh, after weeks of talks in the Ivory Coast, reneged on his promise to sign a peace accord, President Kabbah authorised EO and the *Kamajors*, supported by the SLA, to assault RUF positions. A few days after they destroyed the RUF headquarters southeast of Kenema in November 1996, Sankoh agreed to sign the Abidjan peace accord. A senior diplomat in Freetown noted that, 'always military pressure was needed to be put on before negotiations could succeed'¹².

Unsurprisingly, Sankoh insisted that the Abidjan agreement include EO's departure. Unwisely, Kabbah agreed. In its place a UN peacekeeping force was to be established but never arrived. Donors were not willing to meet the U.S.\$ 47 million bill for 700 soldiers, and Sankoh continued to dispute the agreement, maintaining that the UN presence should be less than 100. Nevertheless, EO was finally asked to leave by President Kabbah, who believed the RUF was sincere about peace. Three months later, without any external force to defend his government, he was deposed in another military coup led by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

The Conakry Accord (1997). The AFRC was not recognised by any foreign government or by the Sierra Leone people. After extensive bloodshed and destruction, the Conakry Accord was signed in October 1997 by a delegation sent by the AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma. It was intended to restore the Kabbah government. But it clearly became a ploy to buy time in the face of international pressure and a domestic boycott by government employees, who refused to work under the AFRC regime and shut down key government functions. Under cover of the accord, the AFRC stockpiled weapons and attacked remaining ECOMOG positions at the country's international airport at Lungi.

¹¹ Confidential interview, 24 April 1997.

¹² ICG Confidential interview, 24 April 1997.

The Lomé Accord (1999). A Nigerian/ECOMOG offensive retook Freetown in February 1998, forced the AFRC out of the city and reinstalled President Kabbah. In January 1999, however, the RUF rampaged through Freetown, killing and maiming until Nigerian troops drove them out. Seven months later, the Lomé Accord was brokered by the UN under the auspices of Francis Okello, special representative of the UN Secretary General, as well as by the UK, the U.S. and regional states. Lomé was an act of expedience. ECOWAS states – particularly Nigeria – wanted to withdraw. Nigeria claimed it was spending U.S.\$ 1 million a day and had been actively fighting for over two years. Other than from the UK, there was little Western assistance for the Nigerian operations, and there was scant prospect of any replacement force or backing from Western states. Lomé was the child of stalemate. For the UN, striving for continued relevance as a peace-brokering body after being sidelined in Kosovo by NATO, the stakes were high. In October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of UNAMSIL.

The international desperation to reach an agreement and 'create' peace enabled the RUF to negotiate very favourable terms. Donor countries, for their part, invested more heavily in the Lomé process than in past agreements and made important concessions to push the accord through. The U.S. hoped that the agreement would usher Sierra Leone off the international agenda at minimum cost. President Clinton's special envoy to Africa, Jesse Jackson, helped persuade Sankoh. At a critical point, Sankoh received a call from Clinton. Sankoh was reportedly jubilant. 'What rebel leader gets called by the president of the United States?' he asked. 'I only got that call because I fought in the bush for so many years'.¹³

Under Lomé the RUF was brought into the government, gaining four cabinet positions, heading a number of public sector directorships, and filling some ambassadorial posts. Most controversially, there was a blanket amnesty for all crimes committed during the war, however terrible. At the last moment however, the UN dissociated itself from the amnesty for crimes against humanity. In November 1999, a UN spokesperson stated that the amnesty would not cover 'the most flagrant' human rights abuses, and there would be a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In February 2000, the Sierra Leone parliament approved legislation to create such a commission. However, it has not begun to function.

Lomé also achieved one of the RUF's central goals – exit of the Nigerians. Foday Sankoh was rewarded with the status of vice president and chairmanship of the Strategic Mineral Resources Commission, effectively giving him access to the country's diamond resources. Diamonds have been the main source of revenue for the RUF in its nine years' bush war. When Sankoh was imprisoned in May 2000, documents were discovered in his house that allegedly prove he continued to export diamonds illegally while in government.

Given the extent of concessions to the RUF, President Kabbah, was reluctant to sign. He buckled under international (particularly U.S.) pressure.

¹³ Steve Col, 'The Other War', *Washington Post Magazine*, 9 January 2000, p.25.

The Abuja Agreement (2000). Within days of the last ECOMOG troops' departure in May 2000, the RUF took 500 members of UNAMSIL hostage and seized their vehicles and weaponry. Charles Taylor, increasingly recognised as the real power behind the RUF, came under strong international pressure to secure the eventual release of these hostages. He claimed this result proved his desire to broker a peace; it also showed his power over the RUF. Subsequently, Sankoh was arrested in Freetown, and a powerful UK force was dispatched to Lungi airport to provide security for the capital after the UN debacle. This intervention was crucial in again changing the military balance inside Sierra Leone.

In August, the Security Council approved the creation of a Special Court for war crimes. In November a cease-fire was agreed in Abuja between the RUF and the government, which was followed by a break in fighting. However, the RUF continues to commit atrocities against the civilian population and to block UN deployment. Furthermore, the fighting has spread to Guinea, where the RUF is backing rebels.

B. The RUF - No Credibility or Legitimacy

For the most part the RUF has agreed to negotiations when it faces military disadvantage and has then broken the resulting agreements after rearming. Negotiated peace settlements with the RUF, unless they provide for its complete demobilisation and disarmament, are, therefore, extremely suspect.

Moreover, the RUF lacks any independent political legitimacy. It is effectively controlled by Liberia's President Taylor, who uses it to advance his regional ambitions. The RUF has become an army of Taylor's convenience, so negotiations with the RUF's leadership ignore the real power behind its operations. These factors, discussed in more detail below, point to the need for a coercive military strategy that also provides opportunities for RUF combatants to demobilise voluntarily.

A Proxy for Charles Taylor's Political Ambitions. Taylor was elected Liberia's president in 1997 after a campaign of terror. He runs Liberia as his own personal fiefdom. He has a personal stake in every major business and personally directs all financial and security services. For Taylor, there is limited advantage at best in ending the Sierra Leone war. Disorder enables the RUF to control the diamond fields and gives Taylor access through northern Sierra Leone to attack Guinea. Both the RUF and his own elite forces have been trained by Fred Rindel, formerly with the South African special forces. Associated with Rindel are several South Africans, formerly of Executive Outcomes, who have effectively changed sides. Rindel is believed to have markedly improved the RUF's military capabilities. A state of war also provides a pretext for Taylor to quell domestic opposition.

President Taylor is not just interested in money and diamonds. Resources are simply a means to his political goals. As one senior Liberian commentator put it, 'he's in Sierra Leone not for the money but for his political agenda.'¹⁴ Although the

¹⁴ ICG interview, 3 November 2000.

Sierra Leone diamond revenues are a key source of funds, the Liberian president has never been short of money. While head of the NPFL, in control of 90 per cent of the country, he was estimated by the former U.S. ambassador to Liberia, William Twaddell, to be earning U.S.\$ 75 million a year from taxes on the passage of diamonds, timber, rubber and iron ore through his territory.¹⁵

Taylor is determined to attain power throughout the region. Since the mid-1980s he has relied heavily on personal links with Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso and Libya. He attended the Libyan training camps that 'became the 'Harvard and Yale of a generation of African revolutionaries'¹⁶ where he first met Foday Sankoh. Now unchallenged in his control of Liberia, he has a grander design to control the Mano River countries. However, his desire to destabilise Sierra Leone and Guinea also reflects personal grudges. He was angered that West African ECOMOG forces occupied Monrovia in 1990 and foiled his initial attempt to seize power.

An uncompromising report by the UN in December 2000 identified President Taylor as the principal culprit behind the Sierra Leone war and linked him with diamond smuggling and arms trading. It noted that he 'is actively involved in fuelling the violence in Sierra Leone, and many businessmen close to his inner circle operate on an international scale, sourcing their weaponry mainly in eastern Europe'. It added:

'In short, Liberia is breaking [UN] Security Council embargoes regarding weapons imports into its own territory and into Sierra Leone. It is being actively assisted by Burkina Faso. It is tacitly assisted by all the countries allowing weapons to pass through or over their territory without question, and by those countries that provide a base for the aircraft used in such operations.'¹⁷

An Unpopular Movement. The RUF has no discernible popular following. The 1996 elections were essentially a protest vote against the RUF and the Sierra Leone government of the day. While there was some initial sympathy for the RUF's aims – opposition to corruption in government – that has long since evaporated.

From its beginning the RUF relied on terror and brutality, summarily executing leaders believed to support the government, including chiefs, government officials and village elders. It has carried out widespread and indiscriminate campaigns of terror, mutilating thousands of people, often at random. It has received little support from the more settled rural communities, the population of which has often preferred to flee the 'freedom fighters'. Consequently, there has been 'little scope for the transformation of political dissent in these areas into revolutionary fervour'.¹⁸

An Ideological Vacuum. The simplistic ideology the RUF once enunciated is no longer a real influence on its actions. It has been replaced by a triangle of profit,

¹⁵ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: the Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, (C. Hurst and New York University Press, London and New York, 1999), p.90.

¹⁶ Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy*, *ibid*, p.72.

¹⁷ Report of the UN panel on illicit diamond and arms dealings in Sierra Leone, December 2000.

¹⁸ Abdullah and Muana, 'The Revolutionary United Front', p.179.

power and brutality. The overwhelming view in Sierra Leone is that the RUF is criminal.

The main RUF propaganda tract, 'Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone', quotes copiously from foreign revolutionary documents and essentially calls for a return to multi-party democracy, a fair sharing of resources, reform of education and an end to Lebanese domination¹⁹. This bears no relation to RUF practice. The RUF has not focused on building a political base in the countryside among the peasantry that might have been its natural following but has sought only to terrorise. Sankoh is a militaristic despot and, like Charles Taylor, is intent on taking power by whatever means. He executed his two main internal rivals, Rashid Mansaray and Abu Kanu in 1992, apparently for objecting to his tactics, and thereby eliminated any threat to his command.

The RUF concentrates upon making money, obtaining power, punishing those who are perceived as opponents, and perpetuating the privileges of gangland authority. Since Sankoh's imprisonment, it has continued to mine diamonds but the proceeds have gone to other senior leaders and Taylor. Miners work most commonly on a 'split pile' arrangement whereby they keep diamonds from one pile, and the other is taken by the RUF. Most reports indicate that any larger stones are taken by the RUF with the largest going to Liberia²⁰.

Forcible Recruitment of Young Fighters. Many, perhaps most, RUF fighters were forcibly recruited. Many are child soldiers who were kidnapped from their homes and fed on a diet of drugs. Former child combatants report using marijuana or *djamba* (often spiced with gunpowder to make it stronger), homemade alcohol, and various tablets. Cocaine and heroin are also taken, but less frequently.²¹ Children say they took drugs because it made them 'fearless'. They 'no longer saw people as people but as animals, and they could do anything they had to do, the implication being that drug taking made it possible to commit atrocities such as killing family members and cutting off peoples' limbs'.²²

There are many accounts of children forced to commit atrocities against their home villages. This transforms them into pariahs in their own communities and makes it impossible for them to return. Others are tattooed with RUF symbols so they cannot go home even if they had the chance to escape. Former combatants also relate that they would be beaten if they returned from raiding expeditions against civilians with nothing, and several tell of seeing friends shot by commanders if they did not follow orders.²³

War Crimes and Terror as a Means of Control. The RUF has committed heinous atrocities that qualify as war crimes. Indeed, the main tactic used to control territory is intimidation through violence. A RUF hallmark is amputation. Since the mid-1990s hundreds of people have had hands hacked off. The most

¹⁹ The economic influence of the Lebanese communities in West Africa is often seen as imperialistic by local populations.

²⁰ *Report Of The Panel Of Experts Appointed Pursuant To UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000)*.

²¹ Sue Loughlin, 'A preliminary assessment of past and current drug use among former child ex-combatants in Sierra Leone', Report for UNICEF, August 2000, p.4.

²² *Ibid.*, p.6.

²³ *Ibid.*

dramatic orgy of violence occurred in January 1999 when the RUF, supported by disgruntled members of the former army, infiltrated Freetown, attacked Nigerian troops from ECOMOG, killed several thousand civilians and amputated limbs of over 800 people.²⁴ More than anything, it was these well-documented atrocities that forced Western governments to take notice of Sierra Leone.

Internal Divisions within the RUF. There appear to be splits within the RUF. These are not new. In April 1997 one group of senior RUF members denounced Sankoh's leadership because he did not support the Abidjan Accord. They were taken prisoner and tortured. Some never reappeared. It is unclear whether the RUF now operates cohesively as a single unit. Junior members were sent to sign the November 2000 cease-fire, for example. It is uncertain exactly who has authority to represent the movement and ensure that it adheres to a peace agreement.

With Sankoh's imprisonment, the RUF appears to have come more directly under President Taylor's control. Issa Sesay has been announced as 'interim leader', although it is not clear on whose authority. The 'interim' nature of the appointment is presumably meant to indicate that Sankoh remains in theory the overall leader despite his imprisonment. Sesay's appointment appears not to have total support but is most likely backed by President Taylor. Some leaders, such as Dennis 'Superman' Mingo, have opposed Sesay's more moderate line, while there are reports that Sam 'Mosquito' Bockarie may be trying to exert more influence after disagreeing with Sankoh and taking refuge in Liberia. But Bockarie's position is uncertain since it was reported in January 2001 that Taylor had expelled him from Liberia, probably to distance himself from visible connections with the RUF.

Further confusion has fuelled uncertainty about who speaks for the RUF. On 22 November 2000 media reports quoted RUF spokesperson Gibril Massaquoi as alleging that the RUF was divided over the cease-fire signed earlier in the month, and the majority of combatants no longer took orders from Sesay. This was later denied. The RUF appears broadly divided into two commands. The eastern command has two main brigades, one centred around Kono and Tongo diamond areas to secure those resources and the communication routes to Liberia. The northern command, with four brigades, is located in the Magburaka, Makeni area. The division poses difficulties for obtaining full RUF acquiescence to any peace agreement.

C. Conflicting Agendas and Military Deadlock

Intransigence and a lack of legitimacy and integrity have been the hallmarks of the RUF but the RUF has also capitalised on the absence of international resolve and the multiplicity of international agendas. The result has been a series of weak accommodations engineered by the international community that have perpetuated rather than resolved the war.

The UK intervention to retrain the SLA with a view to conducting a more coercive strategy is a break with the past. It contains risks given SLA unreliability but it

²⁴ 'Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone', *Africa Rights Watch*, Vol. 11, No. 3(A), June 1999.

recognises that there is little chance of permanent peace through negotiations. The UK stance has been met with scepticism and a degree of resentment in Africa. The UN has tended to favour another series of negotiations, in large part because UNAMSIL is incapable of robust action.

1. The African Response

Nigeria. A small Nigerian unit has been in Sierra Leone since the mid-1990s. Nigerian troops have served under both ECOMOG and the UN. The initial Nigerian role was to assist Sierra Leone during the Liberian war when it was clear Charles Taylor was helping the RUF. A large ECOMOG force held parts of Liberia and was frequently in conflict with Taylor's NPFL faction. Conversely, one militia recruited from Liberian refugees (ULIMO) was helping the Sierra Leone army against the RUF.

In Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG force was usually small and restricted to guarding key installations. When confronted with the AFRC/RUF forces during the coup in May 1997, the Nigerians were forced into an embarrassing retreat to the international airport. Their failure was exacerbated by the fact that Nigeria had also signed a defence agreement with the Kabbah government in March 1997 which promised to provide presidential protection, training for the Sierra Leone military and strategic support for the regime.

That blow to Nigerian pride, added to impatience at the intransigence of the AFRC/RUF junta, was a key reason for the Nigerian assault that took Freetown and restored Kabbah to power in February 1998. Intervention also suited General Sani Abacha's military government. Nigeria needed – and still needs – to be seen as a powerful player and a positive force for regional stability. For Abacha the intervention was an opportunity to divert the increasing international pressure on Nigeria to improve its human rights situation and hold elections. The West was obliged to recognise Nigeria's involvement in Sierra Leone because no other state was willing to fulfil this role.

More than any other nation, Nigeria has committed itself militarily to the resolution of Sierra Leone's war. Without its involvement it is likely the RUF would have consolidated its power. But it also locked Nigeria into a long-term fight against the RUF, which retreated into the hinterland. On assuming office in early 1999, the newly elected Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, stated that one of his main foreign policy priorities was to reduce the cost of Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone. Prior to the Lomé agreement, there was a clear feeling among Nigerian politicians that it was time the UN pulled its weight in Africa by sending more peacekeepers or at least paying for ECOMOG.

Today Nigeria's continued presence risks degenerating into collaboration with its supposed enemies. Something similar happened earlier in Sierra Leone and in Liberia where international peacekeepers often collaborated with various armed factions. During the Liberian war, timber and minerals were transported across the frontlines between rival forces, earning ECOMOG the synonym of 'Every Car Or Moving Object Gone'. In September 2000, some

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Nigerian soldiers were accused by the Indian UN Force Commander, General Jetley, of collaborating with the RUF to mine and trade diamonds. This is an accusation with which most independent observers in Sierra Leone concur. The economic ambitions of senior Nigerian officers are worrying, especially since, as part of UNAMSIL, Nigerian troops are likely to reoccupy the diamond mining areas

Positioning Nigerian forces in the diamond areas could prolong an intractable conflict. Added to the U.S.\$ 1,000 per month that Nigeria receives for each soldier it contributes to UNAMSIL (under ECOMOG all costs were borne by West African states and so overwhelmingly by Nigeria), the fear is that some commanders have little incentive to seek an end to the conflict.

When a UN Security Council mission visited Liberia in October 2000, President Taylor stated he would prefer Nigerian forces to be based in the diamond fields and to guard the Liberian border. This contrasts to statements during the Lomé negotiation when he insisted that ECOMOG withdraw. His change is clearly linked to what he judges would give him best advantage. Within days of ECOMOG's departure in April 2000, the RUF took UN peacekeepers hostage. Now with the threat of the UK-trained force on the horizon, Taylor is courting Nigeria and attempting to drive a wedge between Nigeria and the UK so as to maintain his stronghold. On 21 November 2000, for example, he called for withdrawal of UK forces if they were not brought into UNAMSIL. Clearly, Taylor believes he can do business with the Nigerians.

Liberia and Guinea. West African conflicts are too frequently compartmentalised into state specific insurgencies, ignoring regional implications. Sierra Leone's war was perceived as a local conflict until its regional ramifications recently became only too obvious. Clearly, the RUF has support from Liberia and, indirectly, Burkina Faso. There has been significant fighting along the Sierra Leone-Guinea border between RUF and Guinean troops and also between Liberian and Guinean security forces along the Guinea-Liberia border around the Guinean town of Guéckédou where there are approximately 200,000, mainly Sierra Leone, refugees.

Liberia and Guinea have accused each other of territorial violations and harbouring dissidents. Liberia has charged that more than four attacks on its territory in two years were carried out with the acquiescence of Guinea, which it alleges trained and armed Liberian insurgents.

Guinea claims the Liberian government supports incursions into its territory from Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinea has carried out several bombing raids of Sierra Leone territory, claiming they were in pursuit of dissidents who were attacking Guinean towns and villages. Fighting in Guinea's forest region has created a humanitarian crisis involving over 300,000 Sierra Leone and Liberian refugees, who have fled the wars in their countries. The conflict has seriously affected the ability of aid agencies to reach desperate refugees. The UNHCR describes the crisis as its biggest humanitarian emergency.

Charles Taylor is widely regarded as supporting RUF attacks against Guinea. There are fears that these attacks could provoke more widespread conflict and instability within Guinea, a country of over seven million considered close to collapse from internal strife and the misgovernment of President Lansana Conté's regime.

In addition to Taylor, another name consistently linked with the incursions into Guinea is that of Mohammed Touré, son of Guinea's first post-colonial leader, Ahmed Sékou Touré. Mohammed Touré is believed to be close to Taylor and working alongside the RUF to exploit its control of territory adjacent to Guinea's long border with Sierra Leone. Ethnicity also plays a leading role in this instability since there are mixed populations along the border.

Many of the same factors in Sierra Leone and Liberia's wars are present in Guinea. Poverty and corruption have resulted in high levels of youth unemployment. Unsurprisingly, students and disgruntled young people are at the vanguard of protests and most likely to take up arms. Unfortunately, Guinea's mineral wealth, including one third of the world's bauxite reserves²⁵, significant iron ore and gold and an estimated 300 million carats in diamond reserves, could prove to be a source of instability.

2. The United Nations

Military Role. ICG believes that there is a need for military coercion against the RUF but UN forces can not do this. Increasing their numbers in the expectation that more will prove better could lead to further UN humiliation.

The UN's mandate permits peacekeepers only to protect themselves when threatened and to protect civilians in 'imminent threat of physical violence' in areas of UNAMSIL deployment. Thus, in practice, the issue of where and when to use force to protect civilians is open to inconsistent interpretation and is ultimately at the discretion of the field commander. UNAMSIL's evacuation of Kenyan peacekeepers from Kabala when the town came under RUF attack in early June 2000 demonstrated the lack of clarity and vulnerability inherent in the current 'Chapter Six and a Half' mandate. Many argue that UNAMSIL needs more extensive powers so as to be better prepared if attacked or deployed in dangerous areas. Under a stronger Chapter VII mandate, it would be more easily held accountable for any failures.²⁶

However, even a more robust mandate will not change the reality that the UN force is ill-suited to wage war in Sierra Leone. It cannot be expected to launch offensives. To protect civilians effectively, UNAMSIL requires not only a robust mandate, and the political will to hold UN field commanders and their units accountable, but also serious military capability.

²⁵ Guinea's production represents 11 percent of the world's production.

²⁶ See U.S. Committee for Refugees http://www.refugees.org/news/fact_sheets/faq_sierraleone.htm

Regrettably, much of the current UNAMSIL force is inadequate, and its soldiers are not willing to put their lives at risk in a conflict in which they have no direct interest. The standard of many of the African forces that form the bulk of UNAMSIL is woeful. Poorly briefed, ill-equipped and unable to operate cohesively, they are unprepared to cope with the tactics of the armed groups. Peacekeepers in May 2000 put up little resistance to RUF attempts to disarm them in Makeni. Rather than disarming combatants, they contributed a significant array of weaponry and equipment to the arsenal of the RUF. An informal poll of the rules of engagement by various contingents revealed that they would return fire if under attack but that they considered themselves under no obligation to go to the rescue of another country's soldiers in UNAMSIL.

The U.S. supports a more forceful UNAMSIL approach and advocates that the force be strengthened. It favours a redrafting of the UN mandate to allow UNAMSIL to impose peace and has threatened to withhold funding if that does not happen. The U.S. has started training five Nigerian, one Ghanaian and one Senegalese battalion to join UNAMSIL and enforce a more aggressive mandate.²⁷ But there is little guarantee that this diverse force could retake much territory. Experience suggests that the successful use of force requires a single cohesive military unit.

Furthermore, adopting a more robust Chapter VII approach would deter potential troop-contributing countries. They question why their soldiers should fight a war to which Western governments are unprepared to commit troops. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was unusually frank during the hostage crisis of May 2000: 'We would have liked to see some of the governments with capacity, with good armies and well-trained soldiers, participate but they are not running forward to contribute to this force'.²⁸

For developing countries, the opportunity to earn hard currency has become a compelling reason for contributing peacekeepers. UN peacekeeping forces in Africa – especially in unresolved internal conflicts – are rapidly turning into a third world army paid by the West. Whereas five years ago, Western governments formed the backbone of UN deployments, today they shun such involvement. Lakhdar Brahimi, the Algerian diplomat who led a UN panel on the reform of peacekeeping, recently lamented 'you can't have a situation where some people contribute the blood and some contribute the money'.²⁹

India's withdrawal of its 3,000 soldiers and Jordan of its 1,800 at the end of 2000 is linked in part to their reluctance to provide peacekeeping forces to areas where Western troops refuse to go. But there was also considerable hostility between Nigeria and India over Gen. Jetley's remarks concerning Nigerian diamond interests. The two most senior Nigerian officials implicated in the report – Mr Annan's special representative in Freetown, Ambassador

²⁷ The U.S. partnership with Western African armies to support UN operations in Sierra Leone is called "Operation Focus relief".

²⁸ UN press release SC/6857, 11 May 2000.

²⁹ Colum Lynch, 'U.S. and Europe Shift UN Peacekeeping Burden to Poor Nations' Troops', *Guardian Weekly*, 14 December 2000, p.29.

Oluyemi Adeniji, and Gen Jetley's immediate subordinate, Brigadier-General Mohammed Garba - both denounced Gen. Jetley's memorandum.

After that incident, future co-operation between these two major contributors, each with three battalions, was untenable. General Victor Malu, the Nigerian chief of staff, demanded Gen. Jetley's immediate removal. 'We are not going to serve under that man in whatever circumstances. If he is not removed, he will not get our co-operation, and we are the largest contingent in the force,' he said.³⁰

Although two Bangladeshi battalions and further troops from Zambia and Ghana will partly fill the gap, the departure of the Indians is a major blow to UNAMSIL's viability; the Indian forces were its best troops.

International Tribunal. 'The Lomé peace agreement entrenched the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights abuses throughout Sierra Leone's eight-year conflict. By including an amnesty for all activities undertaken in pursuit of the conflict, the peace agreement granted impunity for some of the worst human rights abuses, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.'³¹

The Security Council has resolved (Resolution 1315 of 14 August 2000) to create an international tribunal to prosecute those who have committed crimes against humanity. The tribunal or special court will try 'persons who bear greatest responsibility' for 'crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law, committed within the territory of Sierra Leone'. Unlike the Tribunals of Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia, the court is to be a mixed effort between the international and Sierra Leone justice systems.³² Although the Lomé accord of July 1999 included a comprehensive amnesty, it would be possible to prosecute people who have committed crimes since that date, including Foday Sankoh. Moreover, it is sometimes argued that RUF failure to respect Lomé terms has rendered the amnesty null and void, thus enabling prosecution also of earlier crimes.

The tribunal is needed. Those who have committed abuses must be brought to trial. That will go some way to ending impunity for perpetrators on all sides of human rights abuses. But there has been little material support for its establishment. In January 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan cautioned the Security Council against moving ahead without proper funding. He noted that the court might encounter financial problems unless provided three years of operational funds before its inception.

³⁰ Chris McGreal and Ewen MacAskill, 'UN to Bolster Peacekeeping Force by 7,000. Decision to Send Extra Troops Could Solve Dilemma about Leadership', special report: Sierra Leone, *The Guardian* (London), 13 September 2000.

³¹ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity - an Opportunity Not to be Missed* (Amnesty International, AFR 51/60/00, 6 July 2000), p. 2.

³² See letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 12 January 2001, S/2001/40.

There is also need for legal improvements within Sierra Leone. Administration of justice, both civil and criminal, is barely functional. Judicial institutions lack the necessary personnel with the appropriate training in international criminal law, financial support, equipment and the necessary legal tools to conduct trials of those accused of crimes under both national and international law³³. Furthermore, Sierra Leone law does not currently extend to crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The Lomé Accord also mandated a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and a national human rights commission but little progress has been made toward establishing either. The TRC was to be established 90 days after the signing and to submit its report twelve months later. However, the government stated that it did not want the TRC to begin until disarmament and demobilisation of combatants were complete. Recently, UNAMSIL has assisted the government to draft legislation to establish a human rights commission, but funding is lacking. A workshop by the UNAMSIL human rights office in November 2000 also laid out some issues for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

3. The UK Role

The UK has maintained an interest in Sierra Leone since independence. It contributed the bulk of the funding to the February 1996 election. The so-called Sandline Affair (known also as the 'Arms to Africa Affair') and the publicity surrounding atrocities in Sierra Leone intensified British interest. In March 1998 it was reported that the British private security company Sandline (an associate of Executive Outcomes) had violated an arms embargo on Sierra Leone. Sandline had purchased weapons and provided a small number of personnel and a helicopter in support of the February 1998 Nigerian assault on Freetown to reinstate President Kabbah. Sandline, dubbed 'mercenaries' in the British press, claimed that the UK government had known of its intention to assist Kabbah. While the Labour government condemned the affair as an affront to ethical foreign policy, it appeared to many that the company was supporting the restoration of democracy against a barbarous AFRC/RUF junta and could, therefore, be seen as being on the 'right' side in Sierra Leone's war.

Sandline's intervention raised a more fundamental issue. In the absence of other international assistance, President Kabbah had little choice other than to arrange a commercial deal to obtain the funds to pay Sandline for its support and to request the help of Nigeria, which then was under the dictatorial rule of Sani Abacha. The international media coverage of atrocities when the RUF entered Freetown in January 1999 fuelled further pressure on the UK to assist in resolution of the Sierra Leone conflict. These events resulted in a marked increase of UK funds to restructure the Sierra Leone armed forces in 1999.

³³ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Ending Impunity*, p.3.

As noted earlier, the UK's policy to train and equip SLA troops to inflict a military defeat on the RUF is high-risk. A military offensive against the RUF may be essential given the failure of Sierra Leone's elected government to stabilise the country and end the war but if pursued in the absence of an appropriate political strategy it could prove disastrous. Even if a reorganised SLA, supported by British troops, could decisively defeat the RUF, the consequence might be further regional destabilisation since RUF forces could regroup in Liberia and renew their offensive in Guinea. Moreover, SLA forces, unless regularly paid and effectively commanded, might well begin to live off the land as so many troops in Sierra Leone have done in the past. Finally, a British withdrawal after a comprehensive military victory over the RUF would tip the balance of military power and risk restarting the war, as happened after the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes in 1997. All the problems which helped create the war in the first place remain present, aggravated by the events of the past ten years.

It is obvious, despite Whitehall denials, that British involvement in logistics and training will need to continue for a long time. Habits of ill discipline and corruption are endemic in the Sierra Leone armed forces, and many of the same soldiers are being recycled. Familiar problems – especially 'lost' wages and rations – are re-emerging as soldiers are placed under Sierra Leone command following their UK training. To reorient the SLA, it needs to know it is being effectively led. For that to happen, British officers must be placed in the chain of command, probably as deep as the rank of major. That step, while believed essential by British officers on the ground, is politically risky for a Blair government already accused of 'mission creep' by its political opponents. It would also create unprecedented dependence by an African country on a former colonial power.

The necessity for outside commitment to Sierra Leone goes further than the military sphere. In effect, a military option alone is doomed to failure in the sense that it cannot by itself stabilise Sierra Leone and could cause serious military repercussions throughout West Africa, further destabilising a troubled region. A military option, while necessary, can only achieve stability if it is part of a medium-term political strategy.

4. Harmonising Objectives

There is mounting unease in West Africa at the British approach to arm, retrain and re-equip the Sierra Leone army with the objective of defeating the RUF. The show of British strength in November 2000, including deployment of warships, attack helicopters and marines, may have been comforting for Sierra Leone citizens, but it was condemned by the acting UN commander, a Nigerian, who considered it overly aggressive and declared it might undermine any peace agreement.

The Nigerian position - which has great resonance in UNAMSIL - is that international and Sierra Leone government forces should push into the interior, persuading, not compelling, the RUF to stand aside. Multinational forces, given their composition and mandate, actually have few other options. UNAMSIL continues to hold one-on-one conversations with the RUF,

entreating its leaders to keep the Lomé accord, which in reality has already failed.

The UK mission is distinct from that of the UN, and there are risks of serious disagreement. The new appointments of Force Commander Major-General Daniel Opande (Kenya), Deputy Force Commander Major-General Martin Agwai (Nigeria) and a British Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Alastair Duncan, may help bridge some of the gaps. But the question remains how mediation aimed at forging a consensus favoured by UNAMSIL can mesh with the more aggressive stance taken by the Sierra Leone government and its UK backers.

Nevertheless, the two international forces need each other. UNAMSIL relies on the guarantee of forceful UK intervention. Without it, UNAMSIL risks once again being humiliated by the RUF as in May 2000. At the same time, the UK plan presumably requires UNAMSIL to occupy areas that the SLA takes, especially given the nature of Sierra Leone troops. That strategy, however – appearing to take sides against the RUF – does not coincide with the UN approach.

The UN also worries that, should the SLA be defeated by the RUF, its soldiers will retreat into UNAMSIL bases, effectively placing them on the front line and compromising their 'impartiality'.

The international community cannot run two or more strategies in Sierra Leone simultaneously. Working against each other with conflicting mandates will only fuel the conflict and invite warring factions to exploit differences. The former Yugoslavia and Somalia provide clear examples that strategic coherence is fundamental to success.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

There are no simple solutions to the Sierra Leone war. The task is to make the best policy from the possibilities and players available. The international community must not repeat its mistakes by believing that a quick-fix negotiation will resolve the conflict. This time around, Sierra Leone deserves reassurance that the international community will fulfil its commitment to restore and uphold peace for as long as needed. That first aspect -- to restore peace -- involves a militarily robust response.

- The Lomé peace agreement is dead and should be abandoned. It was broken by the RUF in the first months after its signature. The most recent blatant demonstration of bad faith came in December 2000 with the long awaited hand-over of weapons and equipment taken from UNAMSIL in May 2000. A total of eleven armoured vehicles were returned on 11 December 2000 but they had been stripped of all mounted weapons and equipment. No other weapons or ammunition were turned in, despite commitments to do so. Furthermore, the RUF banned UNAMSIL from entering areas it controlled until certain 'non-negotiable' conditions were met, including the release of Foday Sankoh.

Since bringing the RUF into negotiations has not aided peace, the UN should call for the RUF's immediate 'surrender'. The RUF is not a cohesive movement. It lacks ideology or popular support. It is an armed gang, ultimately controlled by President Charles Taylor.

RUF combatants wanting to demobilise should be helped to do so quickly and in safety, with well planned and designed re-integration programs to entice them out of the bush. Delays in providing re-integration programs will result in many youths being recycled as further recruits for President Taylor and his security forces.

Those in the RUF who refuse to demobilise should be defeated militarily. The military option could be spearheaded by UK trained and led Sierra Leone armed forces with UNAMSIL securing the areas regained. The UK should provide military and intelligence backup to guarantee the safety of UN forces. The CDF could provide additional security for local villages and settlements.

Such a military strategy, while essential, clearly requires a shift in international perceptions and agreements.

A forward military strategy requires rapid harmonising of international positions. It is unlikely to succeed while the UN-West Africa alliance pulls in a different strategic direction from the UK-Sierra Leone government alliance. The international community must quickly find a united way forward or it will witness another intervention disaster in Africa.

It is essential that the UN Security Council upgrade the UNAMSIL mandate. This will require a concerted effort by permanent Security Council members including the U.S., UK and France. The UK is already committed to such a course. The U.S. also supports redrafting the UN mandate. Its role as a funder of the operation and its training function with various West African armies give the U.S. considerable influence. France is understood to be considering a British request to take a more positive approach to military interventions in West Africa. An incentive for France to do this could come from its relations with Ivory Coast, the government of which is threatened by a further spread of violence in the region and has closed its territory to arms transfers from Burkina Faso to Liberia.

It is also vital that other West African governments identify themselves with such an approach. This is perhaps the hardest diplomatic task. It would effectively legitimise a position already taken by the UK that has never been the subject of any international mandate. It would require resolution of deep differences between West African governments.

The most important actor in this respect is Nigeria. A guarantee of further international funding for African troops in UNAMSIL would have to be part of a comprehensive diplomatic agreement that would also include an enhanced mandate for UNAMSIL and agreement by ECOWAS on an aggressive stance towards the RUF. Importantly, Ivory Coast might now be expected to support such a position given its vulnerability. France might also be prevailed upon to intercede with its regional allies and is already considering British requests for support for joint border operations between Sierra Leone and Guinea. This would be welcome if agreed by key regional actors, especially Nigeria and Ivory Coast. Other African

governments should be asked for support. Little can be hoped for from the Organisation of African Unity, which is too large and disparate, but some gesture of support for robust international action might be obtained from South Africa, which has good relations with both Britain and the U.S. Although South Africa is not militarily involved in West Africa, its influence and its rhetorical commitment to the notion of an African renaissance make its position important.

If Charles Taylor is not stopped from fuelling the Sierra Leone conflict, he is likely to encourage formation of a new rebel group should the RUF be defeated. This tactic was often seen during the earlier war in Liberia. The conflict must be examined in its regional context and Sierra Leone's neighbours need to be made accountable for their role in it. The use of targeted sanctions – visa restrictions, freezing bank accounts and the like -- against key members of President Taylor's power structures and their families would be extremely effective. To keep Taylor's threat at bay these sanctions could be extended to Taylor's business partners in the region and in the United States. A key element would include logging activities, which enrich Taylor's immediate circle and are frequently associated with arms shipments. ECOWAS is already considering such sanctions against Liberia.

Funding is needed to start the Special Court, which has already been formally established. While the pitfalls of the Rwandan tribunal need to be heeded, the instigators of violence such as Foday Sankoh and key members of the RUF hierarchy should stand trial. This is essential to stop the cycle of impunity.

Parallel support is needed to re-establish basic judicial functions within Sierra Leone and to bring into play a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in a form appropriate to the Sierra Leone situation. The latter would seek to produce a degree of healing between those who have committed crimes at a lower level, and their victims.

The underlying causes of Sierra Leone's war are frequently forgotten in the face of the immediate conflict. These include corrupt and unaccountable government, manipulated ethnicity and alienated youth. Peace cannot be sustained without addressing these factors.

Demobilisation and reintegration campaigns that collapsed in May 2000 should be rejuvenated to provide an incentive for soldiers to give up their weapons. Even before May 2000, only a minority of those who demobilised were RUF.

The CDF needs to be brought under more accountable control, possibly as part of local territorial units. Currently, it is an extra-state force, answerable to Chief Hinga Norman, who runs it as his own military. The CDF's future needs to be resolved quickly and decisively. While it has been effective in keeping the RUF at bay, it is a wild card in the peace process and risks deteriorating into a new RUF. The UK and Sierra Leone governments have developed an apparently sound concept to formalise the CDF's existence and bring it under state control. It envisages the CDF serving as a smaller territorial force that could be mobilised in response to local security threats. Its weaponry could conceivably be stored in one central arsenal.

Improving governance in Sierra Leone is the most difficult problem of all but it is essential if there is to be a lasting peace. The civil war is rooted in four decades of bad government and a longer colonial history of indirect rule. Elections in 1996 produced a government which was democratically chosen but soon demonstrated itself incapable of governing well or installing peace. It failed to address many of the fundamental problems that have underpinned the war. New elections are needed. They should be run by the UN, as in Cambodia and elsewhere.

However, there is no reason to believe that a government elected in the immediate future would do any better unless rooted in a clear partnership with the international community. This means the Security Council making a clear commitment to a continuing role for the international community in Sierra Leone for a long enough period, probably five years or more, to complete essential contributions not only to rebuilding Sierra Leone's army but also to re-establishing the judicial system and other elements of good governance, including a national system of education.

The whole strategy proposed, with both its military and civilian support dimensions, would need to be the subject of negotiation with key political actors in the country, and discussed and, as far as possible, endorsed by key regional actors, especially Nigeria. It would surely be supported by the overwhelming majority of the Sierra Leone population.

Regarding the international half of this partnership, the single most eligible actor to play a leading role is the UK government, which is the only potential peacemaker that has shown the will and ability to intervene decisively. Its authority, however, would need to be confirmed in some form and complemented by the UN, with respect to both military and political strategy. It needs to be emphasised again that a purely military strategy, without a real political commitment by the international community, would likely only further destabilise the region, as many West Africans fear, regardless of the fate of the RUF.

These are unusual and radical recommendations. They will be difficult to implement. However, if the international community were to leave Sierra Leone quickly, even in the event of the military defeat of the RUF, violence would likely resume at once as the consequent power-vacuum attracted intervention from Liberia and Burkina Faso. The results would almost certainly include a collapse of government in Guinea and spread of the zone of conflict throughout much of West Africa in a manner comparable to what has happened in Central Africa. In other words, without an unusually intense and protracted international commitment in Sierra Leone, the prospects are terrible.

Freetown/London/Brussels, 11 April 2001

Appendix A: Political Background to the Crisis

The modern republic of Sierra Leone grew out of an eighteenth-century settlement on the West African coast for African and Carribean Slaves and free citizens from Britain, some of them former slaves. Starting with the colony of Freetown, British rule eventually extended into the hinterland. The country area remained under British rule until it gained independence in 1961. From the beginning Sierra Leone's political parties vied for dominance at any cost. In 1967, the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), that had led the country since independence, was narrowly defeated by the All People's Congress (APC) led by former trade union leader, Siaka Stevens. The latter was prevented from taking power immediately by a military coup but in 1968 Stevens became head of state. His APC party quickly consolidated power and in 1978 formally established a one-party state. This notoriously corrupt government made extensive use of patronage.

In 1985, the 80-year old Stevens handed over power to his hand-picked successor, General Joseph Momoh. Momoh cracked down on prominent Lebanese businessmen who controlled the Sierra Leone diamond trade and had become politically powerful under APC rule. These businessmen used their wealth to finance the civil war then raging in Lebanon itself and their influence with the government to encourage diplomacy helpful to one or another Lebanese faction. However, President Momoh became increasingly dependent in his own turn on Israeli traders and diplomatic and security networks and on Russian criminals with interests in the diamond trade. Such webs of international influence, in which criminal, financial, military and diplomatic interests are inextricably linked, have characterised Sierra Leone ever since.

Sierra Leone's war began in March 1991 when a small armed contingent known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), accompanied by Liberian fighters and Burkinabe soldiers, entered south-eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia. Foday Sankoh and other leading figures in the RUF had been involved with Charles Taylor and other insurgents from various West African countries in training camps in Libya and Burkina Faso in the 1980s. They said they intended to overthrow the APC government of President Momoh and claimed their larger goal was a radical, pan-African revolution.

The RUF was heavily dependent on Taylor, then the leader of a military faction in the civil war that had begun in neighbouring Liberia in 1989. Taylor and Sankoh sometimes claimed that their alliance was based on pan-African revolutionary solidarity. Taylor was also motivated by a desire to punish the Sierra Leone government for its participation in the West African intervention force in Liberia, known as the Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and led by Nigeria. That intervention in 1990 had prevented Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) faction from taking control of Liberia. As time went by, Sierra Leone and Liberian forces became increasingly embroiled in one another's affairs, and Taylor supported the RUF to prevent Sierra Leone from being used by his Liberian opponents as well as to acquire diamonds and other plunder.

On 29 April 1992, President Momoh was overthrown in a military coup by young officers disillusioned with his government. Many of these officers had battlefield experience of the burgeoning two-country war. The coup was overwhelmingly popular among Sierra Leone citizens, many of whom regarded the old administration as incorrigibly corrupt. But the new National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) administration, consisting of eighteen military officers and four civilians, headed by Captain Valentine Strasser, soon adopted a style reminiscent of its predecessors. It also suffered a series of defeats

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against the RUF. Despite military government and the expansion of the Sierra Leone army from 3,000 to over 13,000, the RUF advanced within a few kilometres of Freetown. Moreover, it became increasingly apparent that the government army often avoided fighting the RUF. Army and rebel commanders even reached informal understandings not to confront one another. Both sides lived off the countryside, plundering and abusing unarmed civilians. In desperation the government hired a private military company, Executive Outcomes, mainly comprised of former South African soldiers. This more disciplined and experienced force, which was supported by local armed militias, reversed the tide of war and pushed the RUF from most strategic areas.

The subsequent lull in fighting afforded sufficient stability – coupled with international and local pressure for democracy – for elections to be held in February 1996. These were conducted reasonably well and were won by the SLPP party led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a former international civil servant with the United Nations.

The new government continued the policy of encouraging some local communities to recruit their own armed militias, officially called the Civil Defence Force but often known as *Kamajors*. It signed a peace settlement with RUF leader Foday Sankoh in Abidjan in November 1996, as part of which Kabbah was obliged to terminate Executive Outcomes' contract at the beginning of 1997. This proved a mistake that crucially changed the balance of military force and upset whatever basis had existed for political accord.

Three months later, President Kabbah was overthrown in a coup led by his own army, which had grown dissatisfied with the new government's curtailment of its privileges and its increasing use of the Civil Defence Force as, in effect, a private army. Kabbah and his government were forced into exile in Conakry. The new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) invited the RUF to join a coalition government.

A bizarre alliance of former foes, the AFRC/RUF administration was characterised by the total absence of the rule of law. There was widespread violence, rape and looting. The military regime was shunned by the international community. Many Sierra Leone civil servants boycotted their government jobs. Under international and domestic pressure, the AFRC/RUF agreed in Conakry in October 1997 to return power to the democratically elected Kabbah government. But almost immediately the AFRC/RUF administration showed increasing reluctance to adhere to its pledges.

Nigerian forces, present under an older defence agreement, continued to hold the international airport at Lungi even after the May 1997 overthrow of Kabbah. In February 1998 these troops, now technically part of ECOMOG, attacked Freetown, ousting the AFRC government. Most RUF fighters returned to the interior and resumed guerrilla war. Many Sierra Leone soldiers who had served the AFRC junta also fled to the interior and lived off the land, making common cause with the RUF. Pitted against them were 10-12,000 mainly Nigerian troops, under the banner of ECOMOG. These worked closely with the armed civilian militias, especially the *Kamajors*.

Horrific atrocities against civilians in rural areas were reported throughout 1998. In many cases these seem to have been perpetrated by the RUF and former soldiers seeking to impose their will in the countryside, but there were also reports of atrocities by the *Kamajors*. In effect, Sierra Leone was prey to a variety of armed groups, some having little coherence and no formal status. Its government, although internationally regarded as legitimate by virtue of its electoral mandate, was actually dependent on Nigerian troops and local militias. Several local forces recruited Liberians who had come to Sierra Leone either as refugees or as military adventurers. Some of these retained

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links to Liberian military factions. There were many reports of collusion between groups officially opposed to one another, especially in diamond-marketing.

In July 1998, the UN established UNOMSIL, a 40-strong observer force.³⁴ But in January 1999, AFRC and the RUF infiltrated and nearly seized control of Freetown. Appalling atrocities were inflicted on civilians including rape, the random amputation of limbs from men, women and children, and kidnapping. Three thousand people are believed to have been murdered or abducted and many hundreds mutilated before ECOMOG again consolidated and pushed the RUF out of the capital.

ECOMOG, overwhelmingly Nigerian, was incapable of inflicting a lasting military defeat on the RUF, which continued to be supplied from Liberia by President Taylor. Nigeria wanted to withdraw, especially once Olusegun Obasanjo was elected as head of a civilian government in 1999. With few other states showing interest in sending troops and under international pressure to take even cosmetic action, another peace agreement was signed between the government and the RUF in Lomé just six months after the January 1999 atrocities.

Under Lomé the RUF gained positions in the government, and Foday Sankoh was given the status of vice president and made responsible for diamond marketing. To replace departing ECOMOG forces the UN Security Council also agreed to establish a 6,000-strong peacekeeping force, recently raised to 17,500. The new UN force, known as UNAMSIL, was empowered under Chapter VI of the UN Charter 'to ensure the security of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under immediate threat of violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Sierra Leone government and ECOMOG'. Half of the 6,000 troops were expected to be provided by ECOWAS countries.³⁵

But within days of the last ECOMOG troops' departure in May 2000, the RUF took hostage 500 members of UNAMSIL and seized their vehicles and weaponry. Charles Taylor, increasingly recognised as the real power behind the RUF, came under strong international pressure to secure the eventual release of these hostages. He claimed this result proved his desire to broker a peace; it also showed his power over the RUF. Subsequently, Sankoh was arrested in Freetown, and a powerful UK force was dispatched to Lungi airport to provide security for the capital after the UN debacle. This intervention was crucial in again changing the military balance inside Sierra Leone.

By December 2000, a vague west-east front line divided the warring factions. Since then there has been little fighting inside Sierra Leone itself. To the north of this front line, the RUF remains dominant except for isolated army deployments around Kabala and Bumbuna. In the south, especially around Freetown, some 13,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers, predominantly African and dominated by three Nigerian battalions, are stationed in camps. Between them, and operating completely independently, is the Civil Defence Force (CDF), an exceedingly loose militia group of up to 40,000 fighters nominally under the control of the Deputy Minister of Defence, Hinga Norman. The training and strength of the militia is highly variable though many have modern automatic weapons.

³⁴This was renamed UNAMSIL in October 1999, initially with some 6,000 troops.

³⁵John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner publishers, Boulder and London, 2001), p.127.

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The new Sierra Leone army, which will ultimately number 8,500, is becoming a more powerful force. Under the direction of several hundred UK soldiers, 3,000 have now completed basic training. A British rapid reaction force has been stationed offshore, presumably ready to intervene should the RUF become a major threat once again. A key concern to many observers, however, is that among the troops deployed in support of the government are many who could carry out future abuses. The new, retrained Sierra Leone army appears to contain individuals who were themselves responsible for human rights abuses in previous years. If they are not well led, there may be more abuses. The CDF has also been responsible for many abuses; some of its fighters are reported to have served previously with other militias in Sierra Leone or in Liberia.

Appendix B: Acronyms

- AFRC: Armed Forces Ruling Council. A military junta established after a coup in 1997, which was driven from power by Nigerian forces operating under the umbrella of ECOMOG in February 1998. Troops loyal to the AFRC retreated to the countryside and continued to operate as armed opponents of the restored democratic government.
- APC: All People's Congress. A political party formed by the late Siaka Stevens, which held power until a military coup in 1992.
- CDF: Civil Defence Force. Officially a government-aligned militia force of about 40,000, the name is given to a number of local militias, most notably the *Kamajors*, which are in fact largely independent of government control.
- ECOMOG: ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group. Originally organised in 1990 to intervene in Liberia, it has evolved into an umbrella for various regional interventions in which Nigeria has played a leading role.
- ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. A regional economic grouping which has become a key diplomatic forum for organising regional military interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and elsewhere.
- EO: Executive Outcomes. A South African security company run by former members of the South African Special Forces. Employed by the Sierra Leone government in 1995-6, it decisively altered the military balance. Its contract was terminated under the terms of the Abidjan peace agreement in early 1997. EO has subsequently been dissolved, but some of its associates have recently worked for President Taylor of Liberia and have aided the RUF.
- NPRC: National Provisional Ruling Council. A military junta established after a coup in 1992 chaired by Valentine Strasser. It ceded power to an elected government in 1996.
- RUF/SL: Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone. A revolutionary group formed by Sierra Leone citizens in Libya in the late 1980s and led by Foday Sankoh. It began its armed campaign in March 1991. It is particularly known for its use of terror tactics such as amputation and mutilation.
- SLA: Sierra Leone Army. The armed force of the Sierra Leone government.
- SLPP: Sierra Leone People's Party. A political party which held power immediately after independence and again since 1996. Regarded as having a power-base particularly among the Mende people, one of the country's largest ethnic groups.
- ULIMO: United Liberation Movement for Democracy. A militia established in 1991 by Liberians opposed to Charles Taylor, at that time Liberia's main rebel leader. ULIMO was employed as an auxiliary force inside Sierra Leone, fighting against the RUF, before pushing its way into Liberia. It subsequently split into rival factions, some supported both by the Nigerian faction in ECOMOG and the government of Guinea. ULIMO has used Guinean territory to launch attacks on President Taylor's Liberia and appears to have played a role in recent fighting inside Guinea.
- UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1270 of October 1999.

Appendix C: Chronology³⁶

- 1961 Sierra Leone is declared independent on 27 April. Its first prime minister is the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party.
- 1967 All People's Congress party leader Siaka Stevens wins elections. He is prevented by a coup from taking office.
- 1968 Non-commissioned officers stage Sierra Leone's third coup in thirteen months. Siaka Stevens assumes power.
- 1978 The APC adopts a one-party constitution.
- 1985 Military force commander Major-General Joseph Momoh succeeds Stevens as president.
- 1990 Momoh supports return to multiparty constitution. Elections scheduled for 1992.
- 1991 March 23. Around 100 fighters, including Sierra Leone citizens, Liberians loyal to Charles Taylor, and some Burkinabe mercenaries, attack Sierra Leone in the name of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal once detained for his part in a coup attempt.
- 1992 April 29. Junior officers carry out a coup and establish the National Provisional Ruling Council with Captain Valentine Strasser as chairman.
- 1994 September. Sierra Leone and Nigeria sign a mutual defence agreement.
- 1995 February. An RUF advance on Freetown is stopped by pro-government forces including some 2,000 Nigerian soldiers.
- 1995 March. Strasser signs a contract with the South African security company Executive Outcomes.
- 1996 January 16. Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio replaces Strasser as NPRC Chairman in an internal coup.
- 1996 February 26-27. Presidential and legislative elections are held with the participation of thirteen political parties. No presidential candidate receives the required 55 per cent vote.
- 1996 March 15. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP wins a runoff.
- 1996 March 29. Kabbah is sworn in as president.
- 1996 November 30. Kabbah and Sankoh sign the Abidjan Peace Agreement.

³⁶Adapted from Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, pp.113-34.

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- 1997 January 31. Executive Outcomes officially leaves Sierra Leone under the terms of Abidjan.
- 1997 May 25. A military coup installs the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, chaired by Major Johnny Paul Koroma. President Kabbah flees to Guinea.
- 1997 June 1. Major Koroma invites the RUF to join the ruling junta.
- 1997 October 8. UN Security Council Resolution 1132 establishes an embargo on selected items. ECOWAS is empowered to enforce the embargo.
- 1997 October 23. In negotiations in Conakry between the junta and ECOWAS, the AFRC/RUF agree to restore President Kabbah within six months.
- 1998 January 15. Nigerian troops operating with ECOMOG attack Freetown.
- 1998 February 15. The AFRC/RUF leave Freetown, which is taken by Nigerian troops.
- 1998 March 10. President Kabbah returns to Freetown and is reinstated as president.
- 1998 July 13. UN Security Council 1181 establishes the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone.
- 1999 January 6. AFRC/RUF forces re-enter Freetown by force. They inflict major destruction and widespread atrocities.
- 1999 May 25. Negotiations begin on a new peace agreement.
- 1999 July 7. The Lomé peace agreement is signed by President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh. The UN Security Council welcomes the agreement.
- 1999 October 22. UN Security Council Resolution 1270 establishes the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, now known as UNAMSIL.
- 2000 February 7. The Security Council adopts Resolution 1289 which expands UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,100 military personnel and revises its mandate to include additional tasks, like providing security at key locations and ensuring the free flow of people and goods on specified routes.
- 2000 May 6. After several incidents indicating its non-compliance with the peace process, the RUF takes 500 UN peacekeepers hostage.
- 2000 May 8. RUF fighters in Freetown fire on a demonstration, killing seventeen people.
- 2000 May 9. ECOWAS appoints Charles Taylor to ensure that the RUF complies with the terms of the Lomé peace agreement and frees the estimated 500 UN peacekeepers hostages.
- 2000 May 17. Foday Sankoh is captured by a crowd in Freetown, turned over to government authorities, and imprisoned.

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- 2000 May 19. UN Security Council resolution expands UNAMSIL to 13,000.
- 2000 May 29. An ECOWAS summit approves a proposal to send 3,000 West African troops to Sierra Leone.
- 2000 June 10. A team of British military trainers arrives in Freetown.
- 2000 July 5. The UN Security Council imposes an eighteen-month trade ban on uncertified diamonds from Sierra Leone in a bid to stop their sale from funding the RUF rebellion (Resolution 1306).
- 2000 August 1. The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee announces the composition of a panel to look into possible violations of sanctions and the link between trade in diamonds and arms.
- 2000 August 4. The UN Security Council extends UNAMSIL's mandate and agrees to a reinforcement of its military component (Resolution 1313).
- 2000 August 14. The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1315 that recommends the setting up of a Special Court, which would have jurisdiction over suspected perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations and would operate under both Sierra Leonean and international law.
- 2000 August 28. Kofi Annan recommends that UNAMSIL be increased to 20,500 troops, which would cost \$305 million more, bringing the UNAMSIL annual budget to \$780 million.
- 2000 September 20. India announces its intention to withdraw troops from UNAMSIL, soon followed by Jordan.
- 2000 November 10. Sierra Leone's government and the RUF agree to a cease-fire and to resume the peace process. They also agree that the UN Mission will be allowed to deploy freely in rebel held areas in order to supervise the cease-fire.
- 2000 December 20. The UN panel investigating illicit arms and diamond dealings with anti-government forces in Sierra Leone recommends a complete embargo on all diamonds from Liberia.
- 2001 January 1. The British announce that their troops will remain in Sierra Leone "until the RUF has been defeated by war or diplomacy".
- 2001 January 17. Kofi Annan cautions the Security Council that the Special Court has not yet received adequate funding from UN member states.
- 2001 January 30. Presidential and parliamentary elections are postponed because of the continuing insecurity in parts of the country.
- 2001 March 30. UN Security Council Resolution 1346 authorises the extension of UNAMSIL by six months and increases its military strength to 17,500.

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212	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	International Crisis Group Sierra Leone Project, "Sierra Leone Situation Analysis," 9 February 1998.

Source: International Crisis Group
Date: 9 Feb 1998

Sierra Leone Situation Analysis

ICG Sierra Leone Project, February 1998
 (covering the period 1 to 31 January 1998)

Provinces unstable as fighting continues...

In January, tensions grew between Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) junta soldiers and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Freetown as hostilities between the "kamajor" traditional hunters and the military erupted into a virtual war in the south and the east of the country.

On 4 January heavy fighting started between the kamajors and the army around Bo (240 km south of Freetown) after the kamajors had intensified attacks and raids on highways in the area. Hundreds of civilians fled the town of Bo as the AFRC fought with heavy guns and rocket propelled grenades and the kamajors used AK-47 rifles in addition to their more traditional spears and machetes. Fighting spread throughout the south and east and well-armed kamajors fought government soldiers in Zimmi, Kenema, Pujehun and around the diamond mining area of Tongo Fields. On 18 January, the kamajors took Tongo town, with heavy losses reported on both sides. Three days later, the junta claimed to have retaken the town.

Thousands of civilians fled the fighting in the south and east of the country, while humanitarian agencies scrambled to provide aid. Estimates put the number of internally displaced at 8,000-10,000. The major highways into Freetown were impassable.

The kamajors displayed hostility toward civilians and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and generated some heavy propaganda that until now had been more common among the military and the rebels. Still, the kamajors maintained that, despite offensive attacks that are in clear violation of the Conakry Accord, they remain deeply committed to the return of the democratically elected government. In fact, they cited their repeated attacks as evidence of their commitment and a logical consequence of the junta's refusal to disarm by the deadline outlined in the accord.

UN makes assessment visit...

The twice delayed UN technical survey mission led by UN Special Envoy Francis Okelo visited Freetown for three days starting 14 January. The mission is expected to make a recommendation to the UN Security Council regarding the deployment of a military observation force in Sierra Leone. Okelo, who appears to have gained the trust of the junta, publicly maintained his commitment to the deadlines set by the Conakry Accord, but privately questioned the realism of the aggressive timetable that is already well behind schedule. He said that he would encourage a meeting between the C-5, (foreign ministers from Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria who are empowered by ECOWAS to negotiate with the junta), to try to move the deadlocked issues forward.

Conakry Accord: Same old issues outstanding...

The following issues-whose resolution hold the key to progress in the implementation of the

Conakry Accord-remain unresolved at this time:

- the release of rebel leader Foday Sankoh;
- the demobilisation of the Sierra Leone army; and
- the dominance of Nigerian soldiers in ECOMOG.

There is no agreement on how to address these issues and a promised follow-up meeting has yet to happen. Described by Francis Okelo as "legitimate concerns", these issues must be resolved and quickly or the full implementation of the accord, and indeed the peace process, will be stalled.

The registration of child soldiers is the only element of the accord that began on schedule, but the process has since been held back in all areas of the country, (with the exception of Freetown), due to security concerns. Social workers endeavouring to register boy soldiers said consistently that they were faced with the challenge of soldiers refusing to disarm without the release of Foday Sankoh, stating simply "No Foday, No Peace". The BBC reported that of an estimated 5,000 child soldiers, less than 1,300 have so far been registered.

The junta reaffirmed its commitment to restoring power to President Kabbah by 22 April, providing the three deadlocked issues listed above are addressed. Admitting they had problems with the accord when they signed it on 22 October, the junta explained that to not sign it "would have sent the wrong message" to the international community. They used this logic as an explanation for Johnny Paul Koroma's statement in December that he would not hand-over in April.

ECOWAS claimed that the deadlines were still realistic and said that C-5 was working out modalities for the full implementation of the accord. New ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi (see below) stated his commitment to the full implementation of the Conakry Accord. It was not clear what the implications of ECOMOG's massive pullout of neighbouring Liberia would be, as 10,000 troops now have no posting.

Population is tense and pessimistic...

Almost daily price increases and a three-way propaganda war (between the kamajors, the AFRC and Kabbah) are tiring the already weary population. There has been an increase in incidents of civilian intolerance toward the military and Freetown papers reported cases of men in military uniform being harassed by civilians, who are fed up with requests for food, petrol and other scarcities. Armed robbery and looting continue.

Junta struggles for illusion of legitimacy...

The traditional celebratory "happy fire" that usually marks the start of the New Year in Sierra Leone (and that inevitably results in civilian deaths) did not happen this year. The Department of Defence pleaded with soldiers to not fire their weapons and said that anyone who did would be "prosecuted". The junta feared that any sounds of gunfire would provide ECOMOG with an excuse to "retaliate" with not-so-happy fire. Additionally, the Department of Defence described the "indiscriminate and irresponsible firing" that traditionally marks the start of the New Year as causing "a drain on warlike resources and unnecessary loss of life".

In apparent accordance with their Anti-looting decree No. 6, which stipulates that all looters will be shot, the junta disciplined seven of its members for their alleged involvement in looting and

vandalising the Iranian embassy on New Year's Eve. The high profile crime caused deep embarrassment within the junta and outrage from Iran, which has positioned itself as a friend (and donor) to Sierra Leone. (President Kabbah visited Iran last year and continues to describe Sierra Leone, when convenient, as an Islamic state.) Five people's revolutionary leaders involved in the looting were sacked and two others demoted and stripped of their salaries. Mr Tamba Gborie, who had the dubious honour of being the first to announce the coup on state radio last May, was one participant demoted (to lance-corporal) and fired. He was said to have been outraged by his dismissal and led a shoot-out at Johnny Paul Koroma's residence several days afterwards. No casualties were reported and Lance Corporal Gboire is now being held in Pademba Road Prison.

Junta Foreign Secretary Paulo Bangura claimed to have conducted "behind-the-scenes" diplomacy in Cote d'Ivoire, although it is unclear if his efforts resulted in anything other than showing the travel ban on the junta to be ineffective.

New ECOMOG Commander...

Nigerian Defence Headquarters named Major-General Timothy Shelpidi as the eighth commander of ECOMOG, replacing Major-General Victor Malu. The unexpected replacement took place on January 8, just three days after the announcement was made. The shift was believed to be the result of Charles Taylor's growing intolerance of General Malu. General Shelpidi is a career soldier described as a "brilliant tactician" and is not expected to change the profile of ECOMOG drastically. However, there will be implications for Sierra Leone as ECOMOG will have time and soldiers on its hands when the 10,000 troops currently stationed in Liberia leave.

Kabbah and democracy...

While President Kabbah remains in Guinea, in a state of 'outrage', a BBC report on 26 January indicated that a group of 40 parliamentarians from the ousted government would return to the Lungi region before April. It was unclear how they planned to "govern" from Lungi. The constitution, suspended by the junta in May, stipulates that the parliamentarians are permitted to govern anywhere on Sierra Leonean soil.

Other developments...

UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook appointed John Flynn, the former British ambassador to Angola, as his special representative to Sierra Leone. Immediately following his appointment, Mr Flynn travelled to New York to meet with relevant UN officials. He has indicated he would consider opening an office at Lungi.

President Charles Taylor of Liberia called for the release of Foday Sankoh, fanning popular belief that he is sympathetic to the junta. It is widely believed that Liberia is arming the rebels to some extent, and that ECOMOG is arming the kamajors to some extent.

Regional observers are questioning the agenda of kamajor chief Sam Hinga Norman. His increasing unpredictability, the aggressive actions of his "traditional hunter" force (including forcing 30 passengers on a commercial bus travelling from Bo to walk in the forest for three hours) and his ethnic assertions (he has called for a "Mende-land" to be established in the south of the country) are creating the perception of the kamajors as the "new" rebels. Rumours of mercenaries...

There were repeated rumours throughout the month that President Kabbah had signed another

contract with Executive Outcomes. This seems unlikely as the mercenary group is still owed a significant amount of money for the "help" it provided President Kabbah in containing rebel attacks more than two years ago. The likely method of payment-a stake in the country's rich diamond mines-is not practicable now as control of and access to the diamond rich areas fluctuate between various armed elements of the military, the kamajors, and non-native diamond merchants.

Economic situation

The economy does not function. Inflation is measured on a week-to-week basis. Prices of potatoes and onions have almost doubled since Christmas and are at 70,000-90,000 leones per 50 kg bag. Pre-coup prices were 17,000-20,000. Rice is at 70,000 leones per 50 kg bag in some areas of the country, up from a pre-coup price of 17,000 leones. Petrol and diesel are so scarce that any stocks-no matter how small-are obvious targets for looting. The streets are virtually empty of commercial traffic.

Embargo

Although the ECOWAS sanctioned embargo does not apply to humanitarian aid, much-needed food and medicine stocks have been held at the Guinea border as obscure procedures are finalised. Several food relief NGOs are reporting dangerously low stocks of food, particularly for children's feeding centres.

On 24 January, a rice ship attempting to evade the blockade was repelled by ECOMOG in the main harbour at Freetown, and did not succeed in reaching land.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

ICG is calling for the following actions to be undertaken immediately to help head off a complete collapse of the peace process and avoid a serious deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation.


1. The timetable for implementation of the Conakry Accord must be amended, with realistic but solid targets set for each stage of the process. The population of Sierra Leone has been promised that democracy will be theirs in eleven weeks. Unless something significant happens on 22 April, disillusionment and mistrust will overwhelm any prospects for further progress.

2. The emphasis should be on putting back in place a credible democratisation process. As ICG has argued in the past, all available options, including the installation of an interim government empowered to oversee demobilisation and prepare for fresh elections, should be considered. The Effort to return the country to democracy will at worst fail and at best provide very short-lived results as long as it is pinned exclusively to the return of the previous government, intact. Demobilisation and, critically, reintegration, of all armed elements is a prerequisite to both sustainable security and sustainable democracy and ensuring Sierra Leone has a government that tackles these issues should, for now, be the strategic goal of international policy.

3. Finally, ICG repeats its call for the international community to support the proposal to post UN military observers in Sierra Leone. The presence of UN military observers would provide an important counter-balance to Nigeria's dominant role in ECOMOG.

Freetown, Sierra Leone

Number	Item	Content
213	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	Physicians for Human Rights "War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone," published 2002 ISBN: 1-879707-37-3.



**War-Related
Sexual Violence
in Sierra Leone**

War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone

A Report by Physicians for Human Rights

With the Support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone's decade-long conflict has been one of the deadliest in recent history and has been marked by an extraordinary level of brutal human rights abuses, including abductions, beatings, killings, sexual assault of women and men, being "captured" for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries and amputations. An alarming 94% of 991 households of internally displaced persons randomly surveyed by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) reported among its members at least one of these serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict. The majority of abuses occurred between 1997 and 1999 and, when known, were attributed primarily to the forces of the rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

The PHR/UNAMSIL study is one of the first to scientifically document the extent of sexual violence as a result of war. Approximately one of every eight household members (13%) reported one or more war-related sexual assaults among its members, and these assaults were perpetrated primarily by members of the RUF. In addition, 23% of women interviewed reported being pregnant at the time of the attack. A striking 53% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. One third of the women who reported sexual assault reported being gang raped.

In fact, the prevalence of war-related sexual assaults (8-9%) in only a ten year period was equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual assault (also 9%) among the study participants. PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean internally displaced women may have suffered war-related sexual assaults.

Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual assault are considered war crimes and can be prosecuted as such. A Special Court has been proposed to prosecute those "most responsible" for violations of human rights in Sierra Leone's conflict. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is being set up to foster accountability and reconciliation. All who have expressed an interest in testifying or providing information to the Special Court or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should have an opportunity to do so.

... They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush... When I escaped, I couldn't walk... I was bleeding from my vagina... Since I got back I have been so sick... I never used to get sick like this... I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...

Isata, a 15-year-old girl

PHYSICIANS
for
HUMAN
RIGHTS

War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone

A Population-Based Assessment

A Report by Physicians for Human Rights

With the Support of the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Sierra Leone

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Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 1-879707-37-3

Cover and report Design: Glenn Ruga/Visual Communications

Cover Photo: Kristina Hare Lyons

Physicians for Human Rights

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) promotes health by protecting human rights. We believe that human rights are essential preconditions for the health and well-being of all people. Using medical and scientific methods, we investigate and expose violations of human rights worldwide and we work to stop them. We support institutions that hold perpetrators of human rights abuses, including health professionals, accountable for their actions. We educate health professionals and medical, public health and nursing students and organize them to become active in supporting a movement for human rights and creating a culture of human rights in the medical and scientific professions.

Since 1986, PHR members have worked to stop torture, disappearances, and political killings by governments and opposition groups; to improve health and sanitary conditions in prisons and detention centers; to investigate the physical and psychological consequences of violations of humanitarian law in internal and international conflicts; to defend medical neutrality and the right of civilians and combatants to receive medical care during times of war; to protect health professionals who are victims of violations of human rights; and to prevent medical complicity in torture and other abuses.

As one of the original steering committee members of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, PHR shared the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. PHR currently serves as coordinator of the US Campaign to Ban Landmines.

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Physicians for Human Rights
100 Boylston St., Suite 702
Boston, MA 02116
Tel. (617) 695-0041
Fax. (617) 695-0307
Email: phrusa@phrusa.org
Web: www.phrusa.org

Physicians for Human Rights
1156 15th St. NW, Suite 1001
Washington, DC 20005
Tel. (202) 728-5335
Fax. (202) 728-3053
Email: phrusa@phrusa.org
www.

UNAMSIL

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1270 on October 22, 1999 with the broad based mandate of cooperating with the Government of Sierra Leone and other parties in implementing the Lome Peace Agreement and assisting in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the parties in conflict. On February 7, 2000, May 19, 2000 and March 30, 2001 the mandate and size of UNAMSIL were expanded. Its current troop strength exceeds 17,000, making it the United Nations' largest peacekeeping mission.

In pursuit of its mandate, UNAMSIL combines military and civilian personnel. The Human Rights Section is part of the civilian component of the mission and has a threefold approach to its activities. The first is to monitor the compliance by government and all parties to the conflict of human rights and international humanitarian law. Secondly, the Human Rights Section provides technical assistance in building the capacity of national institutions that can promote respect for the rule of law through a sustainable culture of human rights. Thirdly, the Section undertakes and supports human rights and peace awareness programs conducted in national languages as a means of building popular confidence in, and understanding of, the human rights principles and their role in peace-building efforts.

The UNAMSIL Human Rights Section conducts specialist work with national institutions, the internally displaced and children. It also focuses on the rule of law and gender issues. The Human Rights Section currently has 16 international staff members and 4 national staff members deployed in its three offices in Freetown, Kenema and Makeni.

UNAMSIL
Mammy Yoko, Aberdeen
P.O. Box 5
Freetown, Sierra Leone

Foreword

The subject of violence against women in Sierra Leone has until recently been overlooked. I welcome this report by Physicians for Human Rights, with the support of UNAMSIL, which helps to redefine the role that sexual violence played in the conflict. The findings and data are a clear indication of the kinds of depravity that war can bring. I visited Sierra Leone on official mission in August 2001 to study the issue of violence against women committed during the conflict and to identify key measures and initiatives needed to ensure the rights of women in the aftermath of the conflict. In my work as Special Rapporteur on violence against women I have seen that it is often the need to understand clearly the specific nature of gender-based crimes, through research and collection of data, that is required to mobilize civil society, governments and the international community against such abuses. This report comprehensively documents the widespread nature of sexual violence in Sierra Leone during the conflict and is a valuable tool for those who have been fighting for women's human rights to be put on the agenda as a matter of priority.

Furthermore by documenting the wartime experiences of women in Sierra Leone this report will provide a valuable contribution in making the post-conflict needs of women and girls more apparent. Its findings should be taken into consideration in the formulation of repatriation and resettlement plans, as well as demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

I often see many situations involving gender-based violence—similar to the cases so carefully documented in this report—for which perpetrators go unpunished. Internationally there has been progress, at least in the area of legal sanction. Perpetrators of violence against women during wartime are being brought before the courts of justice. Their trial and punishment is a vindication of many years of effort by many groups and individuals who have been trying throughout the years to end the impunity of those who commit the most horrendous acts of brutality. In this regard, I welcome the Foca judgment by The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which sets out in detail, the international law and standards with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against women and girls. The Tribunal found that these actions constituted rape as a crime against humanity, torture as a war crime and enslavement as a crime against humanity. Their strong judgment is welcome and lays to rest all arguments that rape and sexual slavery during wartime does not constitute international customary law that is in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. The Foca judgement sets a context by which the wealth of information contained in this report should be analyzed.

The International Criminal Court, which was finalized in 1998, is also a major victory for those who have fought to make international justice an important part of modern international law. The Rome Statute makes explicit that rape and gender violence are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community by specifically defining them as constituent acts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. According to the Statute, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence also constitutes a Grave Breach of the Geneva Convention. Similarly, the Statute defines crimes against humanity to include torture, as well as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. The Statute also provides that persecution on the basis of gender may constitute a crime against humanity.

As a result of this Statute and the decisions of the international tribunals in the Hague and in Arusha, the world is slightly more just for women who have been the victims of sexual violence during wartime. It is my hope that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone will follow this example and ensure that cases involving violence against women are prosecuted and the perpetrators brought to justice.

Rarely do human rights organizations undertake and publish such substantial and detailed studies of sexual violence in conflict. It is in this light that this report will help the international community to understand the grave situation in Sierra Leone and the needs of all the conflicts' survivors. I encourage its wide dissemination, as this important and timely report will be of interest to all those who seek to understand or intervene in the rebuilding of Sierra Leone.

Radhika Coomaraswamy

United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its cause and consequences

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This report was written by Chen Reis, J.D., M.P.H., a consultant to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR); Lynn L. Amowitz, M.D., M.S.P.H., M.Sc., Fireman Health and Human Rights Fellow, Physicians for Human Rights, and Instructor in Medicine, Division of General Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital and Harvard Medical School; Kristina Hare Lyons, M.A.L.D., Program Associate for Physicians for Human Rights; and Vincent Iacopino, M.D., Ph.D., Senior Medical Consultant to Physicians for Human Rights. Holly Burkhalter, Advocacy Director for PHR contributed to the Executive Summary and Background sections of the report. Michele Heisler, M.D., Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholar, University of Michigan Health System, contributed to the chapter on qualitative comments and testimonies of women and girls. Kelly Askin, J.D., Fellow, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, contributed to the chapter on Application of Relevant International Law.

Ahunna Eziakonwas, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, contributed to the recommendations. We are grateful to John Gay for his assistance with the presentation of statistical analysis.

The report is based on two research investigations. The first research trip was undertaken by PHR in March 2000 by Adyinka M. Akinsulure-Smith, Ph.D. and Deborah Dyson-Stockhoff P.A., M.P.S., from the Bellevue-NYU Program for Survivors of Torture, and Ms. Lyons. The second phase of research was undertaken by PHR together with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) between January and February 2001. Ms. Lyons, Ms. Reis, Binta Mansaray, M.A., a consultant to UNAMSIL; Beth Vann, M.S.W., a consultant to PHR; Dr. Akinsulure-Smith; and Louise Taylor, M.B.A., LL.M., UNAMSIL Human Rights Officer, composed the PHR/UNAMSIL team.

PHR especially thanks Maarit Kohonen, former Gender Specialist, UNAMSIL Human Rights Section; Mara Bustelo, Gender Coordinator, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; Rodolfo Mattarollo, Chief of Human Rights Section, UNAMSIL; Patrice Vahard, Human Rights Section, UNAMSIL; Chris Mburu, former Acting Chief of UNAMSIL Human Rights Section, and Michael O'Flaherty, former UNAMSIL Human rights Section staff member, who helped initiate this project. We also are grateful to Memunatu Pratt for her assistance.

The report was reviewed by Ms. Kohonen; Christina Saunders, Assistant to the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on Violence Against Women; Corinne Dufka, Researcher in Sierra Leone for Human Rights Watch; Ronald Waldman, M.D., M.P.H., Director, Program on Forced Migration and Health, Center for Population and Family Health, the Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia

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University, New York, NY; Leonard Rubenstein, J.D., PHR's Executive Director; Susannah Sirkin, PHR's Deputy Director; Barbara Ayotte, PHR's Director of Communications; and Ms. Burkhalter. The authors are indebted to these people for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. Ms. Ayotte and Michelle Sachs, PHR's Internet and Publications Coordinator, edited and prepared this document for production. Christina Deck, an intern at PHR, also assisted with report production.

The authors are grateful to UNAMSIL and the UN agencies in Sierra Leone that provided information and support. The authors are also grateful to the organizations that provided referral services without which this study could not have been done including GOAL, the International Rescue Committee, Médecins sans Frontières-Holland, Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Concern, Merlin, International Medical Corps (IMC) and Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and to those which otherwise facilitated access to, and collection of information used in this study.

We thank those individuals and organizations working in Sierra Leone who shared their time and insights with our research team including: former United States Ambassador Joseph Melrose, Rabih Torbay of IMC, William Aldis of the World Health Organization (WHO), Glens Taylor of UNICEF, the Campaign for Good Governance, Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), and The Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL). PHR is especially grateful to the women of Sierra Leone who participated in this study after years of suffering.

PHR and UNAMSIL thank the team of dedicated researchers: Agnes Conteh, Isatu Fofana, Margaret Ganda, Fatmata Kabba, Joyce Kamara, Adama Koroma, Abigail Lebbie, Doris Lebbie, Erica Luke, Bondu Mani, Salley Mansaray, Laurel Mendenkia, Mary Quashie, Fatmata Salisu, Sia Sandy, Fatmata Sesay, Mariatu Songo-Kanu, Aminata Thorlie, Safiatu Turay, Mary Vandi, and Rose Vincent whose commitment to the project and perseverance under very difficult circumstances made this report possible. The authors also thank Muctar Jalloh.

This report is dedicated to Abigail Lebbie, who passed away in May, 2001. Abigail was a dedicated member of a team of Sierra Leonean field researchers. We wish to express our heartfelt condolence to her family and friends. May her soul rest in peace.

Glossary

- ADRA: Adventist Development and Relief Agency
- AFRC: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (rebel force)
- CDF: Civil Defense Forces (pro-government force)
- CRS: Catholic Relief Services
- DDR: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
- ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group, a military intervention force with troops donated by ECOWAS members
- ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
- FAWE: Forum for African Women Educationalists
- ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
- IDP: Internally Displaced Person
- IMC: International Medical Corps
- IRC: International Rescue Committee
- Krio: lingua franca of Sierra Leone
- MSF: Médecins sans Frontières
- NCRRR: National Commission for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation
- NGO: Non-governmental organization
- OTI: Office of Transitional Initiatives
- PHR: Physicians for Human Rights
- PHU: Peripheral Health Units
- RUF: Revolutionary United Front (rebel force)
- SLA: Sierra Leonean Army
- TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- UN: United Nations
- UNAMSIL: United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
- UNDP: United Nations Development Program
- UNDPKO: United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations
- UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNOCHA: United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WFP: World Food Program

WHO: World Health Organization



I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose of Study

Sierra Leone's decade-long conflict has been marked by an extraordinary level of brutal human rights abuses, including summary killings, sexual violence against women and girls, abductions, amputations, and the use of child soldiers. The combined effects of prolonged conflict, pervasive human rights abuses, and massive forced migration¹ in one of the poorest countries in the world have devastated the health and well-being of the Sierra Leonean people. The daunting process of rebuilding and reconciliation in the aftermath of such destruction requires the establishment of an accurate account of the nature and extent of abuses that have been committed. For this reason Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), with the support and participation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), conducted a population-based assessment of the prevalence and impact of sexual violence and other human rights abuses among internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone.

Findings

The findings of this study, the most comprehensive population-based assessment to date of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, indicate that combatants have committed widespread human rights abuses and international crimes against IDPs in Sierra Leone including: abductions, beatings, killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence, capturing for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. Such quantitative findings contribute considerable insight into the nature and extent of human rights abuses among IDPs in Sierra Leone, i.e., the frequency of specific human rights abuses, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the impact of these experiences and the most urgent needs identified by the victims. Furthermore, a rigorous approach to sampling enables the findings to be generalized to the larger IDP population. In order to gain insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well.

¹ Approximately 400,000 people have fled Sierra Leone into neighboring Guinea and Liberia as refugees. At the time of this study, there were 334,061 registered and approximately 500,000 to 1 million unregistered internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sierra Leone.

A striking 94% of 991 households randomly surveyed reported among its members at least one of these serious abuses during the past ten years of conflict. The majority of abuses reported by participants in the PHR study occurred between 1997 and 1999 and, when known, were attributed primarily to forces from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The study's primary focus on abuses of women and girls stems from the historical neglect of these sexual crimes committed against women from previous reports of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone.

The PHR study indicates that war-related sexual violence experiences perpetrated by armed combatants (primarily RUF) are, indeed, widespread among IDPs in Sierra Leone. Approximately one of every eight household members (13%) reported one or more incidents of war-related sexual violence. Nine percent (94/991) of respondents reported war-related sexual violence.^{2,3} A striking 53% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence, compared to less than 6% for any other combatant group.⁴ One third of the women who reported sexual violence reported being gang raped.

Participants reporting sexual violence related the following: rape (89%), being forced to undress/stripped of clothing (37%), gang rape (33%), abduction (33%), molestation (14%), sexual slavery (15%), forced marriage (9%), and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus (4%). In addition, 22 (23%) of the women who experienced sexual violence reported being pregnant at the time of the attack with an average gestation of three months. The majority of the incidents of sexual violence reported by participants (68%) occurred between 1997 and 1999.


This prevalence rate of war-related sexual violence (8%-9%) during only a ten-year period is equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-

² It is likely that the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in the study was underestimated because of willful non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts to ensure privacy. According to Koss (Koss M.P, "Detecting the scope of rape: a review of prevalence research methods," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*. 1993(8);198-222) reasons for willful non-disclosure often include fear of retribution by an assailant, being stigmatized and rejected, being blamed for the attack, and/or the psychological consequences of disclosure.

³ In addition, the average age of participants reporting war-related sexual violence was more than twice the average age of non war-related sexual violence reported in the study. Although interviewers were careful to explain that there would be no material or other gain by participating in the survey, the number of abuses reported in the study may have been overestimated or underestimated if IDPs judged that it was in their material, political or psychological interest to exaggerate or conceal claims of abuse.

⁴ Other perpetrators reported included Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), West Side Boys, unspecified "rebels", and Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and ex-SLA. The UN peacekeepers and Civil Defense Forces (CDF) militia forces were not identified as perpetrators among respondents reporting sexual violence.

FIGURE 1:
Extrapolation of Human Rights Abuses Among All IDPs in Sierra Leone



* Extrapolations are based on frequencies reported by 9,166 household members (Table 2); sexual assault is among female respondents only. For 95% confidence intervals, please see page 45, footnote 165.

related sexual violence (9%) among the study participants.

By extrapolating the number of war-related sexual violence incidents reported by participants in the PHR sample to the total female IDP population in Sierra Leone, PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean IDP women may have suffered such human rights abuses. If non-war-related sexual violence among non-IDP females is added to the IDP totals (assuming a 9% prevalence rate), as many as

215,000-257,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone currently may have been affected by sexual violence.⁵

Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual violence are considered war crimes⁶ and can be prosecuted as such.⁷ They also constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic⁸ attack against the civilian population.⁹ This population-based assessment demonstrates that war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses were indeed perpetrated as a widespread attack against the civilian population, and therefore constitute both war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹⁰ A Special Court has been proposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1315 to prosecute those "bearing the greatest responsibility" for violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone's conflict.¹¹ A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is being created to provide an impartial historical record of the war and to foster reconciliation.¹²

Methods of Investigation

Quantitative

PHR sampled 1,048 households in three IDP camps (near Freetown, Port Loko, and Kenema) and one community with a large number of IDPs,

⁵ To generate population estimates of sexual violence among the IDP and non-IDP females in Sierra Leone, PHR assumed a total IDP population of 1.0-1.3 million (55% female) and a non-IDP population of 2.7-3.0 million (50% female). UNOCHA database. Sierra Leone: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Updated February, 2001; Norwegian Refugee Council, Sierra Leone Section, "Population profile and figures". Available at: www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/fdc6d215bab90118c12569dd002b1aec?OpenDocument; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at: [unhcr.ch/un & ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf](http://unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf)

⁶ Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 "FOCA" Available at: www.un.org/ICTY/judgement.htm

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See Chapter V for a discussion.

⁹ Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 5, Crimes against Humanity. Available at www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/stat2000.htm#5.

¹⁰ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), adopted 7/17/98. Available at: untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm; Askin K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*, M. Nijhoff Publishers, 1997. Askin K. "Women and International Humanitarian Law," in Askin K.D, Koenig D.M., Editors, *Women and International Human Rights Law*, Transnational, 1999. Vol. I. Also see: United Nations, Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915. Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf

¹¹ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 (Adopted August 14, 2000). Available at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf

¹² For more information see www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html

Mile 91 Township. The camps/locales included in this study represented 91% of the registered IDP population in Sierra Leone. All study participants were selected using systematic random sampling or a combination of systematic random sampling and cluster sampling.¹³ A total of 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). The 991 household representatives reported on the experiences of 9,166 household members, which included themselves and those who lived with them prior to their displacement. The PHR survey contained 49 questions pertaining to demographics, physical and mental health perception, experiences of human rights abuses among household members and experiences of sexual violence. It also inquired about assistance needs, opinions regarding punishment and justice for perpetrators, and attitudes on women's human rights and roles in society.

Qualitative

In order to gain additional insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well. Two primary approaches were used to elicit qualitative information. Seven open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire itself, and longer semi-structured interviews were conducted with survivors of human rights abuses, some who were not survey participants.

Individual case testimonies provided considerable insight into the brutality of the human rights abuses reported, including sexual violence, in the PHR survey. Katmara B, a 13-year-old girl, reported being abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's "wife." She was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and now has a baby girl. The story of what happened to her and her family during the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 captures the anarchy of those days which left the people of Sierra Leone's capital city terrified:

...So, on our way to be killed, we were taken to a house with about 200 people held in it. My older cousin was sent to go and select 25 men and 25 women to have their hands chopped off. Then she was told to cut off the first man's hand. She refused to do it saying that she was afraid, I was then told to do it. I said I'd never done such a thing before and that I was also afraid. We were told to sit on the side and watch. So we sat. They chopped off two men's hands. My cousin couldn't watch and bowed her head down to avoid the sight. Because she did that, they shot her in the foot. They bandaged her foot and then forced her to walk. We left the two men whose hands had been cut off behind. We were then taken to a mosque in Kissy. They killed everyone in there...They were

¹³ See Patton M.Q., *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, Sage Publications, 1990; 169-283.

snatching babies and infants from their mother's arms and tossing them in the air. The babies would free fall to their deaths. At other times they would also chop them from the back of their heads to kill them, you know, like you do when you slaughter chickens... One girl with us tried to escape. They made her take off her slippers and give them to me and then killed her... one time we came across two pregnant women. They tied the women down with their legs eagle-spread and took a sharpened stick and jabbed them inside their wombs until the babies came out on the stick.

Several women who had not suffered sexual violence spoke of the range of abuses they and their families had experienced and the multiple losses they faced. A young woman, Marie K., described her and her family's experience:

... They killed many of us, many people... about 100, we were in an unfinished house when they came and kicked at the doors and demanded to know who was in there. They yelled that if we didn't come out they would kill us or burn the house down. Someone near the door opened it. The rest of us were hiding in a room, huddled together. They came in and began to hit us with their weapons yelling "get out, if you don't come out we will kill you." Those who refused to come out, they lit the house up and burned it with them inside the house...

Some of the women who reported experiencing sexual violence provided the PHR/UNAMSIL team with information that suggests that the incidents of sexual violence were politically motivated. One woman told PHR that her attackers told her "to come and report or tell [president] Tejan Kabbah that they will continue to do such things." Another told PHR that her attacker asked her "whom are you going to vote for?"

Sexual Violence

Given the prevalence of sexual violence reported in the PHR study, it is not surprising that the vast majority (91%) of respondents reported being "quite a bit" or "extremely" worried about sexual violence to themselves or family members by combatants. They were much less worried about sexual violence by family members, friends, or civilian strangers despite 9% of respondents reporting sexual abuse by family members, friends, or civilian strangers in their lifetime.

In February 2001, PHR interviewed a fifteen-year-old girl, Bola N. Rebels had abducted her four times since 1999. At the time of the interview she was two months pregnant and living at an IDP camp in Port Loko. She described her first abduction to the interviewer:

When they first attacked the village, we fled to the bushes. When they removed us from our village we were frightened... They held us, they cut

some hands. They killed some. They forced us to be tied. We were taken to the bush where the sexual act was forced on us...Nine men raped me...My mother was taken away, my things, belongings, taken. I slept three days in the bush after they had raped me. I was unconscious, not myself...After they had raped me to their satisfaction; they left me in the bush. I was beaten, bruises on my body, part of my body. Some around were amputated. I was not well.

Isata, a 15-year-old girl, was abducted and gang raped by rebels. She described her experiences and their continuing effects on her health:

...I don't have any children. I was a virgin before. They ruined me. The story is long, much too long. I was at home when they came and kidnaped me...They demanded money. My family has no money. They demanded Le 200,000.00 (\$83.00)...they said to my parents, come and see how we use your children. They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush...When I escaped, I couldn't walk – the pain. I was bleeding from my vagina. That night, God gave me strength to walk...I can't remember how long I was held...I don't like to talk because of the memories. When I made it back, my mother couldn't believe it. Since I got back I have been so sick...I never used to get sick like this...I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...

Characteristics of Assistance Needs among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Sixty-five percent of respondents said that they had reported the incident(s) of sexual violence to another person. The most common reasons for not reporting these incidents were feelings of shame or social stigma, fear of being stigmatized/rejected, and not having trust in anyone. Only 53% of women reported seeking help after the attack, although 80% of these women reported that they informed a health care provider of the specifics of the attack. Women reported that what helped most after the attack was trying to forget about the incident, support of family, a medical provider, and country medicine/traditional healer.

A number of testimonies collected by PHR in March 2000 were from survivors of rape who reported becoming pregnant by their attackers. Many of these young women are particularly vulnerable as they must not only recover from the trauma of their ordeals while often facing stigma from their communities, but at the same time learn to care for and support a baby with few resources.

The majority of women who responded to the two questions about their biggest worries about the future in general and about their health referred to the financial and personal insecurity they faced as a result of the war. Women expressed fear that the war would not end and that they would experience future attacks and abuse. They spoke of their lack of livelihoods, homes, and husbands to provide for them. A number of women expressed fear about how they would provide for themselves or for their children, including offspring from their rapes:

Presently my husband is no more. Who will take care of me in the future? They have looted my properties and I do not have anything for now.

I am homeless, bankrupt, and where can I get help to take care of my unborn child?

In their responses about overall worries about the future, some respondents linked their fears about their vulnerability as “violated” women without a male partner or family with concern about their health:

There will be no better future for me because I am broken. No man will marry me or take me seriously. I don't want to become sick, to get what they call AIDS. People will begin to say a lot about me if they know what happened to me.

The concern about having contracted a sexually transmitted disease or AIDS was a prominent concern expressed by several participants in response to the question about specific health worries. Women described experiencing diffuse abdominal and pelvic pains and expressed worry that these represented sexually transmitted diseases. Yet, they were afraid of the stigma associated with seeking help for rape-related health problems:

I don't want to have AIDS. I am afraid to go to the hospital. I don't want people to know if it is true that I have AIDS. I don't know whether I have AIDS or not.

Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Of the respondents who indicated whether their perpetrator should be punished, 42% thought their perpetrators should be punished. The most common reasons cited for not punishing a perpetrator were, “in the spirit of reconciliation”, fear of reprisal, no confidence in the system for such punishments, or they wanted to forget about the incident.

Thirty-six percent of all respondents reporting sexual violence believed their attacker's commander was aware of the attack. Only 35% of women

believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others. Twenty-two of the 94 women reporting sexual violence to PHR (23%) were willing to give their names to the proposed Special Court and/or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Given the prevalence of war related sexual violence as reported to the PHR/UNAM-SIL team, the team believes that there may be thousands of female IDPs in Sierra Leone who have experienced sexual violence and who may be willing to provide testimony to the Special Court or the TRC.

Mary J., 16 years old at the time of the interview, explained her reasoning for why she would not seek punishment for her persecutors:

If they catch them and try to do to them what they did to me, it won't even come near the hell I've been through. So they should just leave them. If they try to punish them, the punishment that I have gotten is more than theirs. I wanted to die during that time. If the emergency operation had not been performed, I would have died... If I ask for punishment for them, it will never amount to what I went through, so the best thing is just to leave them so that we can have peace in Sierra Leone.

Madina K., a young woman, described her reactions to her experience and expressed a desire for the punishment of only one of those involved in her attack:

They'd wanted to burn the house down with me in it... I was beaten, raped, forced to go with them. They told me to do bad things, they threatened me with death and beat me. Two men raped me. The first one would go and call other men to come and join in. Others intervened and saved me... I don't want revenge. I don't even remember who they were. The only one I want punished is the one who kidnapped me. I want him to be punished for his wickedness...

Attitudes on Women's Human Rights and Women's Roles in Society

Despite 80% of women expressing that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, more than half of women reported that their husbands had the right to beat them and that it was a wife's duty to have sex with her husband even if she did not want to. The apparent disparity between such beliefs and international principles of human rights suggests a need for public discourse and education on local, regional and international levels.

Recommendations

To the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)¹⁴

- The RUF should immediately release all remaining abductees and child soldiers under its control.
- The RUF command must explicitly prohibit violence against civilians including women and must hold RUF members who commit abuses accountable in a manner that is in keeping with international standards. The RUF should cooperate fully and not interfere with investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the conflict.
- The RUF must cooperate fully with demobilization of soldiers, accelerate efforts to collect and relinquish weapons, and allow UN forces full access to the country.

To the Government of Sierra Leone

- The Government of Sierra Leone, with the assistance of the international community, should ensure:
 - that military commanders are held accountable for violations committed by their subordinates,
 - that violations by members of the armed forces and militias will be promptly and fully investigated and those responsible brought to justice,
 - that all members of its armed forces and civilian militias be trained in humanitarian law,
 - that instruction in the rights of civilians – and in particular women's rights – be an integral part of this training.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should strengthen the capacity of its police force and judicial system adequately to address cases of sexual violence including rape. Efforts should include the recruitment of female police officers, training in appropriate means of obtaining evidence, development of procedures that protect the rights and privacy of victims, protection for victims and witnesses, development of forensic capacity, and social services. Police training must include training in women's rights.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work with professional organizations and international experts to establish gender-based violence

¹⁴ These recommendations are specifically addressed to the RUF as the main armed opposition group and the primary perpetrator of human rights abuses documented in this report. These recommendations, however, should be implemented by all parties to the conflict.

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reporting procedures that are effective, sensitive, and that protect victims. Strict and consistent policies of confidentiality should be developed for all groups working with survivors of sexual violence so that the privacy of those who report or testify is fully protected.

- The National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration must emphasize the protection of women's rights as an integral part of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) effort for ex-combatants, including child soldiers.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should engage in large scale public education, in collaboration with women's groups to educate women, men and youth on issues relating to sexual violence and to women's rights. This includes the promulgation of information through radio.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should ensure that human rights education including women's rights, be made an integral part of training of health, legal, education, and law enforcement professionals.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work to increase the number of female clinicians/ health care workers and to increase the number of health care workers trained in women's health. The Government of Sierra Leone should support medical and educational institutions to increase the number of women professionals, including the establishment of dedicated scholarship programs to encourage women to enter these professions.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work to address the needs of survivors of gender-based violence, including provision of health services, referral and transport assistance; counseling; and education or job/skills training. These services must be extended throughout the country. The physical, emotional and economic well-being of children born as a result of rapes should also be protected – and efforts made to encourage community acceptance of both rape survivors and their children as they reintegrate into society.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should ensure that efforts are made to coordinate the various actors providing treatment to those who have suffered sexual violence, and efforts to protect women and girls in the future in order to improve services and use scarce resources more effectively.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should work with civil society to educate Sierra Leoneans about HIV/AIDS. They should integrate HIV/AIDS prevention messages into formal education curricula and public education and social marketing campaigns. Approaches must be developed for the majority of the population that is illiterate. They should integrate education about HIV/AIDS prevention into the DDR process.

- The Government of Sierra Leone must formulate and begin to execute a national strategy to address HIV/AIDS to facilitate treatment and prevention, and to encourage donor funding to support those efforts.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should assure confidentiality of HIV test results and seek international assistance to conduct a national HIV prevalence survey. Epidemiological data should be disaggregated by gender and other factors for more targeted interventions.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should develop and implement sex education, including sexual violence education, curricula in schools and public campaigns for those not in school.
- The Government of Sierra Leone should institute legal reform to eliminate discriminatory practices in inheritance that contribute to the lack of security and severely limit the choices of women.

To the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Health

- The Ministry of Health should ensure that medical services are sufficiently organized to collect and safeguard evidence that could be useful in holding alleged rapists accountable and establish systems of record keeping throughout the country for epidemiological, human rights and other purposes, in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice.
- The Ministry of Health should train health care workers in the diagnosis and management of sexually transmitted diseases, and ensure that appropriate medications, such as broad-spectrum antibiotics are available to combat resistant strains.

To the United States Government and other Bilateral Donors

General Funding

- The US Government and other donors should accelerate provision of funds to meet the needs of victims of sexual violence, including rape, in Sierra Leone. In particular, the needs of the displaced and those newly returning to their communities in under-served areas should be prioritized. Assistance should be given to locally run programs such as FAWE that address the needs of survivors of sexual violence such as shelter, mental and physical health, and job skills training so that they can serve a larger number of people.
- The US Government should fully meet its obligation to fund UNAMSIL.
- The US and other Governments should fully fund the 2002 Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sierra Leone, with particular attention to those programs focusing on the needs of women and girls.

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- The US Government and other donors should fund the World Bank trust fund for the DDR effort so that the reintegration portion of the plan can be carried out and former combatants who are not imprisoned can be reintegrated in such a way that they will be less likely to commit human rights abuses in the future, including sexual violence, or to re-arm.

Humanitarian/Medical Assistance

- The US Government and other donors should fund HIV/AIDS education, prevention and treatment programs - specifically those that target high-risk populations and provide HIV test kits and anti-retroviral drugs at a low cost.
- The US Government and other donors should support improved medical facilities, equipment, medical supplies, and training, including health center and health post training and human rights and universal precautions training. Programs for community-based social service providers should be supported.
- The US Government and other donors should provide appropriate diagnostic, therapeutic and prevention measures to combat sexually transmitted diseases - and support more widespread and comprehensive reproductive health services including the provision of adequate supplies of male and female condoms.
- The US Government and other donors should provide extensive reconstruction assistance now that IDPs and returnees are returning to their home communities. Particular attention must be paid to the shelter needs of single women and widows.

Justice and Law Enforcement

- The US Government and other donors must adequately fund both the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
- The US Government and other donors should support the establishment and strengthening of national institutions and mechanisms in Sierra Leone in order to improve the capacity of the judiciary, police, armed forces and other relevant government institutions to respond adequately to the problem of sexual violence in the country.

Humanitarian Assistance Programs for Women

- The international community should establish a coordinating body for treatment protection and data collection related to sexual violence.

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- The US Government and other donors should fund Sierra Leonean civil society organizations promoting women's rights, health and education.
 - The US Government and other donors should support effective and culturally appropriate psychosocial programs for those who suffered sexual violence and other human rights abuses.

Women's Human Rights

- The US Government should ensure that women are included in all aspects of planning for peace, demobilization, reintegration and rebuilding and support local organizations working to promote women's full participation and rights

To the United Nations

- The UN should continue to deploy peacekeepers in all areas of Sierra Leone and actively protect civilians, including women and girls, from sexual violence
- The UN should work with the Government of Sierra Leone to incorporate education about sexual violence into all aspects of demobilization and re-training of professionals including those in the military and police, health and legal professions and educators.
- The UN should ensure that rape and other forms of gender-based violence are prioritized as crimes by the Special Court and that perpetrators from all sides are held accountable.
- The UN should ensure that safeguards are in place to protect those who come forward to testify – especially women. The UN should educate and inform people throughout Sierra Leone about the Special Court and TRC, and ensure that all those who want to provide information or testify have an opportunity to do so.
- The UN should work with the Government of Sierra Leone to train all Special Court and TRC staff who will be working with victims. Learning from experiences with other international tribunals, the UN should establish sensitive procedures that protect victims and do not further traumatize survivors of gender-based violence and other abuses. This should include the provision of counseling before and after testifying in the first language of the victim and the protection of the victim or witness upon return to her/his community.
- The UN, with the Government of Sierra Leone, should ensure that women are represented at every level of the Court and TRC.

II. BACKGROUND

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Population and Geography

Sierra Leone, named by the Portuguese for the resemblance of its peninsula mountains to a crouching lion,¹⁵ borders Liberia to the southeast, the Republic of Guinea to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the West. It is about 71,700 sq. km in size¹⁶ and has a population of approximately 5 million.¹⁷ The year consists of two main seasons; the wet season lasts from May to October and the climate during the rest of the year is dry.¹⁸

The largest of the indigenous ethnic groups in Sierra Leone are the Mende, Temne (each about 30%), and Limba (under 10 %).¹⁹ Most of the population is Muslim, though there is a significant Christian population and followers of indigenous religions. English is the country's official language, however, the population primarily uses Krio, Mende and Temne.²⁰

Historical Overview

Sierra Leone gained independence from England in 1961. From that time it was ruled by a series of governments most of which were plagued by corruption. Its first Prime Minister, Milton Margai, ruled until his death in 1964. At that time his brother Albert Margai became the Prime Minister. Albert Margai's rule was marked by authoritarian efforts to consolidate power and remove opposition.²¹

Albert Margai and his Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) were challenged during the 1967 elections by Siaka Stevens and his All People's Congress (APC) Party. On March 21, the Governor General of Sierra Leone declared Stevens winner of the contested elections.²² Before Stevens could

¹⁵ Alie, J.A.D., *A New History of Sierra Leone*, St. Martin's Press, 1990; p 4.

¹⁶ Central Statistics Office, "Sierra Leone in Figures" (1997) Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/cso.html#Natural Resources

¹⁷ UNICEF, "Statistical Data: Sierra Leone," available at: www.unicef.org/statis/Country_1Page154.html

¹⁸ Conteh-Morgan, E & Dixon-Fyle, M., *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century: History, Politics, and Society*, Peter Lang, 1999; p.11.

¹⁹ Africaville.com, "Sierra Leone Profile," available at www.africville.com/seraleon1.html

²⁰ Kaplan, I, Dobert, M, McLaughlin, J.L., Marvin, B. J., & Whitaker, D P. *Area Handbook for Sierra Leone*, 1976; p. vii.

²¹ Conteh-Morgan p. 77

take office, however, a series of military coups and counter coups established a military government named the National Reformation Council (NRC) headed by Brigadier Andrew Juxon-Smith.²³ Another coup in 1968 brought Stevens back from exile and restored a civilian government.

For the next 17 years, Stevens ruled Sierra Leone. In 1968, Stevens established a one-party state.²⁴ Under his rule, the economy declined due to alleged mismanagement and corruption. By the start of the 1980s, Sierra Leone was increasingly dependent on international assistance – specifically International Monetary Fund loans.²⁵ Virtual insolvency, high inflation, shortages of power and food, mounting deficits, declining exports, corruption, and high unemployment particularly among youth became increasingly severe problems.²⁶ In 1985, Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, then head of the military, took over leadership of the APC and the presidency of the country in a peaceful hand-over. Although Momoh promised economic reform and an end to corruption,²⁷ his seven years in power were marked by increased deprivation and economic collapse. In 1987 a coup attempt against Momoh took place – believed to have been sparked in part by Momoh’s anti-corruption efforts.²⁸ Although it failed, the coup marked a return to the status quo and the start of Momoh’s downfall.²⁹

In 1990, Momoh instituted reforms including the drafting of a new constitution. Before multiparty elections could be held, however, an April 1992 military coup headed by young officers overthrew Momoh’s government. The young coup leaders, many in their twenties, formed a new ruling body, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) headed by Captain Valentine Strasser.

During this time, the ongoing conflict in neighboring Liberia played a part in the development of a new threat to stability in Sierra Leone.³⁰ In March 1991, a group calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) began a rebellion against the Freetown Government. The small band of insurgents consisted primarily of disaffected youth from the criminal cultures spawned in the urban ghettos of Freetown and the mining regions,

²² Ibid p. 80

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid p. 81

²⁵ Conteh-Morgan p.87

²⁶ Pratt, D. “Sierra Leone: Danger and Opportunity in a Regional Conflict: Report to Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honorable John Manley, P.C., M.P.” July 27, 2001;p.37 available at: www.davidpratt.ca/sleone_e.htm

²⁷ Conteh-Morgan p.122

²⁸ Ibid p. 125

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid p. 127

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though a number of university students who had been radicalized by conditions in Sierra Leone and inspired by the revolutionary teachings expressed in Muammar al-Qaddafi's Green Book³¹ also participated. They were led by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal and photographer who had received military training in Libyan camps.³² From their base in a part of Liberia controlled by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the RUF attacked the southeastern region of the country. The NPFL's support for the RUF may have been in response to Sierra Leone's participation in ECOMOG, the West African Regional Peacekeeping Force, which was using Freetown as a staging ground for operations against Taylor in Liberia.³³ Marked by their brutality against civilians and the abduction and forced conscription of children, the RUF raids caused rapid flight by much of the population in the region. In a matter of weeks after the first incursions, the RUF controlled much of Kailahun District in the East³⁴. This period was marked by confusion and brutality as rebels committed attacks while dressed in army uniforms and as disaffected members of the armed forces carried out attacks against civilians, which they blamed on rebels. These soldiers by day, rebels by night became known as "Sobels."³⁵ By late 1992, local militias known as the Civil Defense Force (CDF) or Kamajor (Mende for hunter) sprang up to defend areas against the RUF and the "sobels." Within a year and a half of the first attacks in Sierra Leone, international agencies estimated that at least 400,000 people were displaced within Sierra Leone. Sierra Leonean refugees in neighboring Guinea and Liberia numbered in the hundreds of thousands by the summer of 1992.³⁶

In 1995, with the RUF not far from Freetown, Strasser turned to the South African mercenary (security) firm Executive Outcomes for assistance in pushing the RUF back from their positions.³⁷ Executive Outcomes succeeded in forcing the retreat of the RUF from the Freetown area but were not able to uproot the RUF from their headquarters in Kailahun.³⁸

By 1996, civil society and the donor community placed great public pressure upon the government to hold democratic elections and return the country to civilian rule. Women's groups were especially instrumental in

³¹ Pratt, *Sierra Leone: Danger and Opportunity*, p.38. The Green Book is Qaddafi's two volume treatise on Islamic socialism published between 1976-1980. See www.encyclopedia.com/articles/10672.html

³² Ibid p.38

³³ Ibid p.38

³⁴ Ibid p.38.

³⁵ Conteh-Morgan p.135

³⁶ Conteh-Morgan pp.128-9

³⁷ Hirsch, J. L., *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series), Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; p.38

³⁸ Ibid p.39

this campaign.³⁹ In spite of a coup in January in which Strasser was overthrown by his deputy Julius Bio,⁴⁰ popular pressure intensified and democratic elections were held as scheduled in February and March, 1996.⁴¹

In the weeks leading up to the elections, RUF attacks on civilians in areas under RUF control became more violent. The RUF hacked off the limbs and other body parts of men, women and children. The RUF particularly employed the amputation of hands or arms as a method of attempting to discourage others from voting in the elections.⁴² Despite this, the voter turnout was large and the winner of these elections was Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a former United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) official.⁴³

At the time of the elections, peace talks began between the RUF and the short-lived Bio Government. The Abidjan talks continued after Kabbah took power as did attacks by the RUF and counter attacks by Kamajors and Executive Outcomes.⁴⁴ The Abidjan peace agreement was signed by the RUF and the Government in November of 1996. Shortly thereafter Executive Outcomes was dismissed from the country as required by the agreement.⁴⁵

In May 1997, the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) overthrew Kabbah and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) regime under Major Johnny Paul Koroma.⁴⁶ The AFRC invited the RUF to join in ruling the country. This period was marked by lawlessness, rampant destruction and looting of property, and specific targeting of Kabbah allies.⁴⁷ An estimated 200,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the country in the weeks following the coup. Many of these ended up in refugee camps on the Guinea-Sierra Leone border.⁴⁸ In October 1997, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1132 which imposed sanctions on the AFRC junta and prohibited the importation of military equipment and petroleum into Sierra Leone. The resolution also placed travel restrictions on AFRC officials and their families.⁴⁹

³⁹ Ibid p.40

⁴⁰ Ibid p.42

⁴¹ See www.Sierra-Leone.org/govt8.html

⁴² Hirsch, John L., *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* p.45

⁴³ Ibid p.57

⁴⁴ Pratt p.40

⁴⁵ Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Article 12; Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html

⁴⁶ Pratt, p.40

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Hirsch, J. L., *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series), Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001; pp.59-60

In February 1998, following months of increased CDF and ECOMOG activity against the AFRC/RUF, ECOMOG forces removed the AFRC/ RUF from Freetown in fierce fighting. Many civilians were injured and killed in battles throughout the city. Kabbah was restored to power and returned to Freetown in March from exile in Guinea. The RUF continued to brutally attack civilians and, together with elements of the SLA, to fight the Freetown government, a policy dubbed by the RUF, "Operation No Living Thing."⁵⁰ By the end of December the rebels were again near Freetown and foreigners began to leave the capital.⁵¹ On January 6, 1999, the RUF and AFRC forces entered the Eastern part of Freetown and unleashed an unprecedented wave of terror upon the population – killing, amputating and raping civilians and setting fire to buildings and vehicles. They were eventually pushed back by ECOMOG. During the invasion and their subsequent withdrawal following the ECOMOG intervention, the rebels committed egregious human rights abuses against the civilian population, killing at least 5,000 civilians, including members of the government and journalists who were singled out, and abducting an estimated 3,000 children.⁵²

The Role of Diamonds in the Conflict

Sierra Leone's rich diamond resources have largely been fueling the brutal war. Diamonds, primarily alluvial deposits, discovered in 1930, are found in about a third of the country's territory – mostly in the east and south-east.⁵³ For more than half a century, diamonds have been the leading source of foreign exchange, accounting for between 80% and 90% of export earnings in recent years.⁵⁴ Official exports, however, for 1999 as reported by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) totaled only \$1.5 million, though diamond exports for the first half of 2000 were valued at \$3.45 million.⁵⁵

The Lome Peace Agreement

The attack on Freetown accelerated local and international desire for peace. A cease-fire was brokered by May of 1999 which set the stage for peace negotiations held in Lome, Togo which led to the signing of the

⁴⁹ www.un.org/Docs/scres/1997/9726713E.htm

⁵⁰ Pratt, p.41

⁵¹ Hirsch, p.71

⁵² Pratt, p.41

⁵³ Pratt, p.36

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Cook, N., *Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals and Background*, Congressional Research Service, November, 2000; p.22.

Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999. The resulting controversial power-sharing agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF granted amnesty to all combatants and was widely condemned by human rights organizations.⁵⁶ The UN ultimately added a hand-written caveat to the agreement that stipulated that the amnesty did not apply to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.⁵⁷ The UN subsequently established a UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone with 6,000 troops in October 1999. At the time of this writing, UNAMSIL has grown to be the world's largest peacekeeping force with 16,000 troops.⁵⁸

Despite the signing of the accord and the deployment of UN troops, the AFRC/RUF continued its campaign of terror – abducting, raping, killing, mutilating and destroying the property of civilians in areas under and some outside AFRC/RUF control.⁵⁹ In April and May 2000, more than 500 UN personnel were attacked and held hostage by the RUF. Though several peacekeepers were killed by the RUF, the rest were released in June, following the intervention of Charles Taylor, the announcement of a British government plan for military assistance to the Sierra Leone Government, and the arrest of Foday Sankoh after some protesters were killed by his security guards outside his home in Freetown. Sankoh remains in government custody and is awaiting trial.⁶⁰

In August 2000, upon the request of President Kabbah, the UN Security Council voted to establish a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of humanitarian law committed after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement on November 30, 1996.⁶¹ Other members of the warring parties will be expected to participate in the planned Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).⁶²

From September 2000 to March 2001 the RUF engaged in cross-border attacks into Guinea, causing widespread panic and considerable civilian casualties. The Guinean government retaliated, often indiscriminately attacking villages in Sierra Leone. The fighting caused panic among the

⁵⁶ Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 7 July 1999; Available at www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.

⁵⁷ Pratt p. 42. Conversation with Corinne Dufka, Sierra Leone Researcher, Human Rights Watch.

⁵⁸ Pratt, p.10

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone*, July 1999, Vol. II. No. 31 (A). Available at: www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/; Human Rights Watch, *Fresh Reports of RUF Terror Tactics*, May 26, 2000; Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone. Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls*, June 29, 2000; p. 2.

⁶⁰ Pratt p.42.

⁶¹ Pratt, p. 28.

⁶² See Chapter V.

400,000 refugees largely living in camps near the border, prompting tens of thousands to flee back into Sierra Leone. While fighting continued in Guinea in 2001, the RUF had largely been observing a cease-fire since November 2000 and in May 2001 an agreement to cease hostilities was signed between the RUF and CDF. Though isolated acts of violence against civilians by both sides have been documented as recently as July 2001, at the time of this writing, UN troops were deployed in much of the country and the disarmament of RUF and CDF fighters had resumed. On September 17, 2001, UNAMSIL peacekeepers deployed to the diamond rich region of Tongo, opening the area to humanitarian assistance.⁶³ The following day, the UN Security Council extended UNAMSIL's mandate until March 31, 2002.⁶⁴

In 2000, the UN Security Council enacted sanctions against the conflict diamond trade, barring the import of Sierra Leonean diamonds into UN member states for 18 months, except those certified by a newly established Government of Sierra Leone system.⁶⁵ The US, UK, Belgium and Israel assisted the Government of Sierra Leone in developing a new and more effective diamond trade policy with the aim that diamonds can once again promote prosperity rather than violence in the country.

Of even greater importance in terms of immediate impact on the ground is that on May 7, 2001, the UN Security Council voted to enact sanctions against Liberia, which included both a ban on travel by government officials and on the importation of diamonds from Liberia. Until these sanctions were enacted Liberia had been exporting many more times its annual mining capacity in what is believed to have been stones of Sierra Leonean, Angolan and Congolese origin. Both Liberia and Burkina Faso were implicated in transferring arms and ammunition through their territories and trading diamonds from rebel-held areas, according to a report by a UN Panel of Experts published in December 2000.⁶⁶ As part of the continuing diplomatic pressure particularly on Liberia for its role in the Sierra Leone conflict, approximately \$50 million in aid from the European Union was suspended.

Through the work of several non-profit organizations, namely Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness, the role of diamonds in supporting conflict and the complicity of national leaders such as Liberia's Charles Taylor have been revealed to the world, forcing a multi-sectoral response.

⁶³ USAID, BHR, OFDA, *Humanitarian Situation Report #1* (FY 2002), October 3, 2001.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ A diamond certification system was established in Sierra Leone in October, 2000 and the UN Security Council removed sanctions on government certified diamonds. (AI 9/7/01)

⁶⁶ Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 9, in relation to Sierra Leone. Available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/1195.pdf

Industry leaders, importing and exporting countries, NGOs and UN agencies are now working together to create a global system of controls⁶⁷ which would require the registration, identification and monitoring of international shipments in order to shut illicit diamonds out of the market place and cut off revenues to insurgents.⁶⁸ In late 2001, The Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds,⁶⁹ an umbrella organization of groups concerned about the issue, co-chaired by PHR, worked closely with the US Congress to pass legislation in the House of Representatives that imposes trade sanctions against diamond-exporting countries that have not put in place comprehensive controls to eliminate the trade in conflict diamonds. The legislation, called the Clean Diamonds Trade Act, is supported by the World Diamond Council.⁷⁰ The United States represents approximately 65% of the retail market for gem quality diamonds.

While recent developments in Sierra Leone offer hope that combatants may finally lay down their arms, lasting peace will not be achieved until UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone have taken full control of the highly contested diamond areas of Tongo Field and Kono from the RUF and the CDF.⁷¹

Presidential elections are scheduled for May 14, 2002, and are expected to take place if the cease-fire continues to hold and rebels and the CDF are fully disarmed.

Demobilization Effort

One critical aspect of the transition from war to peace is demobilization of combatants. A Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program was begun with the assistance of the international community in 1998. Prior to the virtual halt of the DDR effort following the RUF attack

⁶⁷ This effort to develop an international certification system, known as the Kimberley Process, was initiated because of the recognition by the international community of the link between diamonds and human rights abuses, particularly the case of Sierra Leone and the RUF. (Amnesty International, "Sierra Leone Diamonds: International Certification System Essential to Help End Killings, Abductions and Torture of Civilians." 9/17/2001)

⁶⁸ As noted by Nicholas Cook in the November 2000 CRS Report to Congress, *Diamonds and Conflict: Policy Proposals and Background*, (see note 67) "diamonds are a highly fungible, concentrated form of wealth, and the legitimate global diamond industry is historically insular and self-regulating."

⁶⁹ www.endconflictdiamonds.org

⁷⁰ The Clean Diamonds Trade Act prohibits the import of diamonds into the United States unless the exporting country is implementing a system of controls on the export or import of rough diamonds that meets specified requirements, consistent with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/56 adopted on December 1, 2000, or a future forth both civil and criminal penalties for violations of the requirements of this Act.

⁷¹ Progress in this regard includes the deployment of UNAMSIL forces in the diamond areas as well as an agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone, the UN and the RUF to ban mining in Eastern Kono district. (AI 9/7/01)

on peacekeepers and defacto withdrawal from the Lome agreement in May, 2000, nearly 25,000 ex-combatants of an estimated 45,000 had disarmed and entered the demobilization process.⁷² While it is likely that many previously demobilized combatants rearmed after the May 2000 incident, more than 30,000 fighters have handed over their weapons and 3,000 more children have been turned over to the UN since the most recent cessation of hostilities in May 2001.⁷³ The current climate suggests peace may be within reach, however, the sustainability of peace largely depends on the effectiveness of the demobilization effort.

DDR, managed by the government of Sierra Leone and supported by a World Bank trust fund, was designed not only to remove weapons from the hands of former combatants, but to provide a bridge to civilian life, a process which was intended to include medical, psycho-social, educational and financial support to jump-start a new society after years of armed conflict.⁷⁴ With a surge in disarmaments since the May 2001 cease-fire and concern about the security implications of keeping large numbers of former fighters in close quarters with little to occupy them, the revised approach seeks to encamp fighters for only two weeks.⁷⁵

Physicians for Human Rights is concerned about releasing former fighters before they have received human rights training, including education about sexual violence, as well as other reintegration support. Thousands of ex-combatants are now returning to the very communities where they may have committed violent acts. Furthermore, the World Bank Trust Fund, which has been supporting DDR does not have sufficient funds for the reintegration portion of the process.⁷⁶ The successful reintegration of former combatants is vital to the long-term security of the country as well as the immediate security of the communities and families to which they will be returning.

Status of Women in Sierra Leone

The basic human rights enshrined in many international and regional instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights are found in the 1991 Sierra Leone

⁷² UNOCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, May 29, 2001. available at: www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B

⁷³ Pratt, p.21; Also conversation with Corinne Durka, Human Rights Watch

⁷⁴ PHR interview with Florian Fichtl of the World Bank, Freetown, March 2001.

⁷⁵ PHR telephone interview with Richard Bennett of UNAMSIL, August, 2001.

⁷⁶ UNOCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, May 29, 2001. Available at: www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/s/4A58557840970841C1256A5C0050441B

⁷⁷ The Constitution of Sierra Leone (1991) Chapter III — The Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual. Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/constitution-iii.html

Constitution, Chapter 3, Sections 15-30, which provides for the equal rights of women.⁷⁷ Sierra Leone also ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1988.⁷⁸ Though the constitution states that no law should discriminate against any person because of his/her gender, in practice women face structural discrimination under all three types of law which coexist in Sierra Leone – English, Islamic, and Customary Law.⁷⁹ The effects of discriminatory inheritance practices are particularly devastating to women and children, especially during armed conflict which has produced many war widows. It should be noted that Sierra Leone's criminal justice system remains largely dysfunctional due to a lack of financial and human resources.

While high levels of war-related sexual violence have been documented by the PHR study and by other organizations documenting human rights abuses, evidence also suggests that domestic violence against women and children is common, though it is not generally recognized as a societal problem.⁸⁰ Nearly 67% of urban women interviewed for a survey on AIDS knowledge, practices and behaviors revealed that they had been beaten by an intimate male partner, and over 50% reported being forced to have sexual intercourse.⁸¹ In almost 90% of these cases, a boyfriend or husband was identified as the perpetrator.⁸² The police are generally unlikely to intervene in domestic disputes except in cases resulting in severe injury or death.⁸³ And though rape is a crime under Sierra Leonean law,⁸⁴ historically, the response of the Sierra Leone Police and judiciary to reports of

⁷⁸ Ratified: November 11, 1988. Sierra Leone's initial and second and third periodic reports were due December 11, 1989, 1993 and 1997 respectively.

⁷⁹ According to Abdul Tejan-Cole of the Sierra Leone Bar Association, under English Law, the husband inherits all his wife's property if she dies, whereas the wife only inherits one-third of her husband's property if he dies, the remainder going to the children. Under Islamic Law, the wife inherits the estate of her deceased husband, but is not permitted to administer it – that responsibility falling to the husband's eldest brother. Under Customary Law, the wife is part of the property inherited by the eldest brother. By law women receive little or no child support after divorce or for children born out of wedlock. In Freetown, however, women can inherit property; upcountry they can not.

⁸⁰ PHR interview with Zainab Bangura and Christiana Solomon of the Campaign for Good Governance, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

⁸¹ Coker, A.L. & Richeter, D.L., "Violence Against Women in Sierra Leone: Frequency and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sexual Intercourse," *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 1998; 2(1).

⁸² Ibid p.61.

⁸³ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001; p. 8.

⁸⁴ Thompson, B., *The Criminal Law of Sierra Leone*, University Press of America, 1999; pp.68-72.

⁸⁵ PHR Interview with Zainab Bangura, Campaign for Good Governance, Freetown, March 2000.

rape has been minimal.⁸⁵ In fact, the first successful prosecution of a rape case in Sierra Leone did not occur until 1999.⁸⁶ Rape cases are not made a priority and are generally not handled professionally due to improper/insufficient training, lack of means, and structural discrimination against women resulting in a lack of understanding that rape is a serious crime. In response to this problem, the Commonwealth Police have recently established a number of centers called Family Support Units to educate police on sexual and domestic violence, receive rape victims, ensure proper forensic testing has been done assist in processing their cases and to reach out to the community.

Human Rights Abuses During the War

All armed groups involved in the war have committed a range of serious human rights abuses against the civilian population, other groups, and members of their own groups including: extra judicial killing or summary execution, sexual violence including rape, abduction, amputation, destruction of property, disappearance, torture, violations of humanitarian law and forced labor. The crimes committed by rebel forces have been of a particularly heinous nature. In addition to the practice of amputation of limbs and other body parts of men, women and even infants, there are reports of pregnant women disemboweled, and women and children raped and made to witness torture and murder of relatives and neighbors. More recently, since the November 2000 cease-fire between the government and the RUF, rebel abuses have apparently been on the decline.⁸⁷

Despite this, several serious incidents involving multiple civilian deaths including women and children were reported by Human Rights Watch as recently as July 2001.⁸⁸ Based on interviews with victims and witnesses, Human Rights Watch reported that attacks by the CDF militias in June and July against then RUF-controlled towns resulted in the killing of least twenty-four civilians, and the wounding of another nineteen.

Rebel Abuses

In recent years RUF rebels, the ex-SLA/AFRC and an ex-SLA splinter group called the West Side Boys have reportedly committed widespread abuses, including killings, abductions, deliberate mutilations, and rape. Rebel forces also abducted civilians, missionaries, aid workers from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and UN personnel; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided refugee sites; and extorted and stole

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2001; pp. 2-11.

⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch, *Sierra Leone: Most Serious Attacks in Months; UN Peacekeepers Needed to Protect Civilians*, July 24, 2001.

food. The RUF forces continued their long-standing practice of abducting civilians (including women and children) and using them as forced laborers, child soldiers, and sexual slaves.

Since the Lome agreement was signed, there are reports that the RUF have committed numerous abuses including rape, the execution of civilians and peace keepers, and execution of their own, allegedly for committing rapes.⁸⁹ Mostly rebel atrocities but also government allied jet and helicopter gun ships prompted the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of civilians over the past several years.⁹⁰

The extent of the rebel's signature mutilations reportedly declined in 2000 and 2001. Thousands of individuals, including children as young as 2 months, had their limbs severed during the conflict, and many more died as result of their wounds. It has been estimated that for every one amputee that survived, three perished from shock, infection and loss of blood because they were not able to obtain medical care.⁹¹

Abduction has been one of the methods of recruitment used by the RUF.⁹² The UN estimates the number of men, women and children abducted by rebel forces from 1991-1999 to be approximately 20,000.⁹³ The RUF has also abducted aid workers, and has taken UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage on several occasions.

Throughout the war rebel forces have invaded, looted and burned private and public property. These destructive actions have played an instrumental role in the terror campaign against civilians – often resulting in the evacuation of whole towns and villages on the first signs that rebels were approaching. The rebels have also looted belongings, crops, animals, medicines and cash for their own use.

Child Soldiers

It has been estimated that at any time during the conflict at least 5,000 children fought alongside adults, the majority with the RUF, which created “Small Boy Units” and “Small Girl Units” and sent them into combat.⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Interview with Corinne Dufka of Human Rights Watch in Freetown, January 2001. Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence Within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, Human Rights Watch, February 26, 2001

⁹⁰ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, pp. 1-2.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4

⁹² Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers *Sierra Leone: Child Soldiers Global Report 2001*, 2001. Available at:

www.child-soldiers.org/report2001/countries/sierra_leone.html

⁹³ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*; p 3.

⁹⁴ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 2001; p. 9.

Children were frequently plied with a range of narcotics and forced to commit atrocities, even against their families and communities. Many children who were abducted had "RUF" permanently engraved on their skin with a knife or bayonet, often in places where it is difficult to cover up the markings.⁹⁵

Sierra Leone ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, which prohibits the recruitment of children under fifteen as combatants, and more recently has made repeated commitments to demobilize those under eighteen.⁹⁶ Sierra Leone has also ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflicts.⁹⁷ In May 2000, however, approximately 25% of combatants fighting with government forces near Masiaka were observed to be under eighteen, and some as young as seven.⁹⁸

Abuses by Government Forces and Their Allies

Evidence suggests and the PHR survey confirms that rebel forces committed the vast majority of abuses against civilians. However, government forces committed serious violations as well. There were reports that government and ECOMOG forces operating in support of the government committed extra judicial killings and summarily executed suspected rebels and their collaborators, particularly in the wake of the rebel occupation of Freetown.⁹⁹ There appear to have been fewer reports of human rights violations involving the SLA since the latter half of 2000, most likely due to training and reorganization.¹⁰⁰

Abuses by the Civil Defense Forces (CDF)

The Government affiliated Civil Defense Forces also committed human rights abuses according to reports. While the number of abuses perpe-

⁹⁵ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000*, p. 4; Even once healed, the markings are a daily reminder of their trauma and may lead to stigmatization and/or retribution. The Council of Churches of Sierra Leone, a local human rights organization told PHR about one boy interviewed by the organization who was captured by ECOMOG with five of his child-soldier colleagues in February/March 1999. The boy escaped, but not before witnessing the immediate execution of his friends by ECOMOG reportedly because they had "RUF" engraved on their skin.

⁹⁶ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Action Needed to End Use of Child Combatants*, 2001

⁹⁷ Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts. Available at: www.unhcr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm

⁹⁸ Amnesty International, *Report 2001, Sierra Leone*, p. 5. ; www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/index.html

⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone*, 1999. US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000*; p 2.

¹⁰⁰ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000*, p. 4.

trated by other groups appeared to have decreased in the later part of 2000 and early in 2001, violations by CDF seemed to have risen during the same period,¹⁰¹ including reports of rape by CDF, which in past years had not been reported to have engaged in rape.¹⁰² In June and July 2001 pro-government militias reportedly attacked RUF-controlled towns killing at least 24 civilians, most of whom were women and children.¹⁰³ There are reports that the CDF also continued to recruit child soldiers in spite of promises to halt the practice. Like the other groups, the CDF have manned unofficial roadblocks and routinely extorted money from travelers. The CDF have also arrested and detained suspects illegally.¹⁰⁴

The Humanitarian Situation

The complex humanitarian emergency, a product of the war, exacerbated the already grim quality of life experienced by most of the population in Sierra Leone. In 2001 Sierra Leone was the least developed country in the world according to the United Nations Human Development Index.¹⁰⁵ A Sierra Leonean's average life expectancy of 38.3 years is the lowest in the world, and the under-five mortality rate is the highest in the world; nearly one third of children in Sierra Leone die before their fifth birthday.¹⁰⁶ Sixty-eight percent of adults are illiterate, 36% do not have access to health care, 34% do not have access to clean water, and the average per capita annual income is \$448.¹⁰⁷ Twelve percent of children aged 0-14 have one or both parents dead.¹⁰⁸ For the majority of people in the country, life is consumed by the challenge of survival, which is threatened not only by violence but by disease, malnutrition,¹⁰⁹ and the limited availability of basic services. Sierra Leoneans live not only with the consequences of extreme poverty, but with the profound insecurity that exists in a society

¹⁰¹ Human Rights Watch, *Recent Abuses Documented by Human Rights Watch*, November 30, 2000.

¹⁰² US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000*; p 4.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, February 26, 2001.

¹⁰⁴ US Department of State, *Sierra Leone, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000*; p 4.

¹⁰⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001* available at www.undp.org/hdr2001/back.pdf

¹⁰⁶ UNICEF, *State of the World's Children*, UNICEF 2000.

¹⁰⁷ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*. Figures are for 1999.

¹⁰⁸ The Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade*, November, 2000; p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Twenty-seven percent of children under five are underweight or too thin for their age, according to the Government of Sierra Leone *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade*, November, 2000.

where the infrastructure and rule of law have virtually collapsed and there seems to be little hope for the future in terms of work and education opportunities. The humanitarian assistance community has an enormous task providing aid to the displaced and other war-affected peoples and beginning to rebuild the country, particularly in the areas of housing, health care, and education.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

Mass displacement has been a defining characteristic of the crisis in Sierra Leone. At the height of the hostilities, more than 3,000 communities¹¹⁰ were destroyed resulting in the flight from their homes of nearly half the country's population. Many have experienced displacement more than once. At the time of writing it is estimated that more than one million, approximately a quarter of the population, are either displaced internally or have fled to neighboring countries to escape the conflict.¹¹¹ An estimated 75,000 refugees had been repatriated by UNHCR to Sierra Leone and had returned independently by ship and foot since the beginning of 2001 as a result of the declining security situation in Liberia and Guinea. As many as 500,000, however, remained in camps in Guinea, as well as in the Gambia, Ghana and the Côte D'Ivoire.¹¹² As the numbers of returnees grow, particularly in Freetown where IDP camps are already over capacity, the government of Sierra Leone and relief agencies are making efforts to relocate them to host communities in areas deemed secure.

The official caseload of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is over 400,000 at the time of this writing.¹¹³ An estimated 170,000 people reside in eighteen official IDP camps, and thousands more are living with host communities primarily in the Port Loko and Tonkolili districts. The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) estimates that an additional one million Sierra Leoneans are internally displaced and absorbed into host communities where they are not receiving any humanitarian relief.¹¹⁴ At least 55% of the refugee and displaced populations are estimated to be women and girls.¹¹⁵

Most of the camps in Sierra Leone were constructed as temporary measures to address the immediate shelter needs of the displaced population.

¹¹⁰ United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone, 2000, p. 117.

¹¹¹ Global IDP Database, Sierra Leone Profile Summary. Available at: www.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/Sierra+LeoneProfile+Summary

¹¹² USAID, BHR, OFDA, *Humanitarian Situation Report #1* (FY 2002), October 3, 2001.

¹¹³ Pratt. p.23

¹¹⁴ Global IDP Database www.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/Sierra+LeoneProfile+Summary

¹¹⁵ UNOCHA Database - Sierra Leone: UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs. Updated February, 2001

They have, however, since been used as long-term housing and issues of space, sanitation, durability and management exist. The breakdown of the peace process in May 2000 not only prevented the resettlement of most IDPs, but led to additional internal displacements of people fleeing fighting, which overwhelmed already inadequate facilities. 5259

The camps are generally crowded and unsanitary and most IDPs interviewed by PHR desperately want to return home. The return of the displaced to their home communities, many of which have been occupied by rebels for years, may, however, pose an even greater challenge to the government of Sierra Leone and humanitarian relief agencies. Sierra Leone's fragile and limited infrastructure may be unable to absorb an influx of refugees from unstable areas in Liberia and Guinea. This difficulty may be exacerbated by the voluntary resettlement of IDPs as the peace process moves forward and areas of the country are secured. The National Committee for Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) which is providing those who return home with seeds, tools and other essential household items, had reached only 77 of 149 chiefdoms before the end of the planting season in May, 2001.¹¹⁶ So whether the displaced return home or remain in camps, the need for food aid will remain high. Massive reconstruction of shelter and education and health facilities must also be a top priority.¹¹⁷

Extension of state authority into the provinces – crucial in order to undertake and sustain programs in key sectors – has been hampered by the military, political and economic situation. Government capacity to deliver basic services continues to be limited and civil administration in areas under RUF control was virtually obliterated. Health and development indicators point to particularly dire conditions in the North.¹¹⁸ The current needs for displaced populations, the host communities and resettlement far exceed the existing capacity at all levels.¹¹⁹

Health Care Delivery

The health sector, which was already weak prior to the war, has been further compromised during ten years of conflict. It is ill equipped to serve a large number of returning IDPs and refugees. Hospitals and health clinics were systematically looted and destroyed over the past 10 years. Though some district hospitals are now open including Kenema, Port Loko, Lungi and Kabala, they are not operating at full capacity and the percentage of

¹¹⁶ Pratt p.23

¹¹⁷ Mid-Year review of the 2001 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone

¹¹⁸ The Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade*, November, 2000; p.51.

¹¹⁹ Mid-Year review of the 2001 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone.

functioning peripheral health units (PHU) that provide primary care is very low.¹²⁰ Other factors contributing to reduced health standards are a decrease in number of health-care providers due to death and displacement, limited access to drugs and equipment, and referral services which are inaccessible and/or unaffordable to local populations.¹²¹ Efforts to address public health issues are also hampered by a dearth of reliable statistics.

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Maternal and Child Care

The continuing political and military turmoil has had a particularly devastating impact on those most vulnerable to poverty and disease – women and children. Sierra Leone's maternal mortality rate is the highest in the world. It has been estimated that one in seven women will die from complications related to childbirth.¹²² The inability of women to access health services is largely due to their unavailability, but also a problem of access and affordability. Much of the population today is so poor that they cannot pay even small fees that are now required.¹²³ In spite of the obstacles, it has been reported that 85% of women in Sierra Leone receive some form of prenatal care, and antenatal care from a health care provider with specialized skills.¹²⁴ A recent government survey found that 42% of births were attended by a doctor, nurse or midwife, though only 22% of births in the North received specialized assistance.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ For example, Connaught Hospital in Freetown, the country's largest hospital had no laundry and food service and was in desperate need of medical equipment, qualified staff, plumbing and telephones when PHR visited in March, 2000. Princess Christian Medical Hospital (PCMH), a maternity hospital in the eastern part of Freetown suffers from years of neglect in the form of puddles, peeling paint and a lack of general daily medical consumables. A survey conducted in 2000 revealed that only 237 PHUs, out of a total of 730 pre-war facilities were operating. Each functioning facility is technically servicing 25,000 people, far higher than the recommended standards for effective primary health care delivery. UNICEF is supporting the PHUs, while WHO is working to improve the district hospitals which act as referral centers – and they are working together to meet the emergency

¹²¹ For example, the ICRC clinic at the Clay Factory IDP camp sees patient and may prescribe drugs, however many cannot afford to have their prescriptions filled or they are referred to Connaught Hospital for surgery, but they cannot afford it, so the problem goes untreated. Many people have no idea where to go for treatment.

¹²² Rada Petrovic, "Most Natural Thing in the World," in *Birth Matters*, Marie Stopes International p. 8.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ The Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade* (Central Statistics office, Ministry of Development and Economic Planning), November 2000; p. 13.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

Mental Health Care

The Kissy mental hospital in Freetown, the only hospital providing mental health care in the country, is managed by the only Sierra Leonean psychiatrist in the country. Due to limited resources and other constraints the hospital has been more a refuge for the mentally ill who have nowhere else to go for mental health services. Though they should be more widely available and better coordinated and regulated, anecdotal evidence suggests existing psychosocial services provided almost exclusively by NGOs are proving to be very valuable in some IDP camps in larger towns such as Freetown and Kenema. Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) has begun to assist the government of Sierra Leone in coordinating their mental health response to the crisis.

HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS will likely be one of the greatest challenges facing the country in the post-war period. As suggested by a recent Sierra Leone government report,¹²⁶ there is a lack of information and knowledge about HIV/AIDS among women in Sierra Leone. For example, overall, only 54% of women aged 15-49 had heard of AIDS. Of these, 21% correctly stated three main ways of avoiding HIV infection; 9% knew where to get an HIV test and 2% had been tested. Given the dearth of testing facilities and health services in the areas we surveyed, the PHR/UNAMSIL team felt it would be unethical to raise concern about HIV/AIDS in our population-based survey activities. However, women reporting sexual violence were asked several open-ended questions including one¹²⁷ geared towards health concerns. Several women used this opportunity to raise concerns about AIDS (see Chapter IV).

The exact prevalence rate of HIV infection in Sierra Leone is not known. Although UNAIDS lists the adult prevalence rate as 2.99%, the estimates of those actually living with AIDS vary greatly.¹²⁸ UNAIDS's 2000 report¹²⁹ states that "scant information on HIV prevalence is available for Sierra Leone."¹³⁰ A recent analysis conducted on behalf of the WHO attributed the lack of information to "the fact that no statistically

¹²⁶ Government of Sierra Leone, *Survey report on the Status of Women and Children* November 2000

¹²⁷ See Appendix A.

¹²⁸ www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/report/Final_Table_Eng_Xcel.xls

¹²⁹ www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/june00/fact_sheets/pdfs/sierraleo.pdf

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.3

¹³¹ World Health Organization, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake*, December 2000

¹³² www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/june00/fact_sheets/pdfs/sierraleo.pdf p.3

valid national epidemiological survey has been undertaken in Sierra Leone due to the prolonged civil conflict.”¹³¹

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Smaller studies conducted at antenatal clinics and among high risk groups such as the armed forces cited by UNAIDS¹³² and in the recent WHO analysis¹³³ suggest that the prevalence rate is probably higher than the official UNAIDS figure. This likelihood is supported by several aspects of the situation in Sierra Leone, including those documented by PHR.

One key factor that suggests that HIV prevalence is higher than reported by UNAIDS is the long-term conflict and the corresponding population displacement and human rights abuses. Data from Rwanda indicate that “wars and armed conflicts generate fertile conditions for the spread of HIV.”¹³⁴ These conditions include conflict related rape which was reported as a factor in increasing the HIV prevalence in Rwanda,¹³⁵ and which PHR documents to have affected 9% of internally displaced women in Sierra Leone. The nature of the rapes documented in this report also suggests that these are likely to contribute to the spread of HIV; about a third of those reporting sexual violence reported experiencing gang rape and the mean number of attackers reported for those experiencing sexual violence was 3.2. Abduction, reported by a third of women reporting sexual violence, is also likely to contribute to the spread of HIV when associated with repeated rapes over a period of time of a month or longer. Thirty-nine percent of respondents reported that the sexual violence lasted for more than one week. HIV prevalence among combatants is an important factor in determining HIV rates. This is especially true for rates of infection among the RUF, since 53% of participants in the PHR survey who reported face-to-face contact with RUF also reported sexual violence.

Other factors that are likely to contribute to the prevalence of HIV in Sierra Leone relate to devastated health and education infrastructures of the country and include: the lack of materials necessary for prevention and treatment, the lack of availability of testing and counseling, and the absence of a coordinated comprehensive government policy to address HIV/AIDS including the absence of a policy on confidentiality of test results. According to a recent analysis of government response to HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone, the country’s “National AIDS Control Programme remains weak and largely ineffective...there is no national policy or strategic plan to deal with the epidemic in any comprehensive way.”¹³⁶

¹³³ World Health Organization HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone

¹³⁴ UNAIDS, *AIDS epidemic Update: December 1998* p.12 www.unaids.org/publications/documents/epidemiology/surveillance/wad1998/wadrp98e.doc

¹³⁵ Ibid p.12

¹³⁶ WHO, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone*

¹³⁷ Ibid p.17

The issue appears to be one of lack of capacity and management as well as 5263
of financial resources.¹³⁷

Whatever the reason for the lack of effective government response, the pattern of HIV infection in other countries demonstrates that once the adult rate of infection passes 5%, the infection spreads exponentially – sometimes as swiftly as 50% per year.¹³⁸ If, as limited data suggest, the prevalence rates in Sierra Leone are significantly above that level, the country could potentially reach South Africa's prevalence rate of over 20% within 10 years if an effective HIV/AIDS control program is not established.¹³⁹

Education

Although the Government of Sierra Leone is committed to improving children's education and welfare generally, and girls and boys are legally required to attend primary school, the government lacks the financial and practical capacity to provide basic education and other services for children, particularly in areas that have been under rebel control.¹⁴⁰ An estimated 70% of schools were destroyed during the fighting and rampant looting has left most facilities still standing without teaching materials and furniture.¹⁴¹ Additionally, school fees and/or the cost of uniforms and books are prohibitive for many.¹⁴² As a result, a large percentage of children are currently receiving no formal education, or have missed many years of school.¹⁴³ Furthermore, reentry into the educational system is proving to be a challenge for those whose schooling was disrupted by displacement or who suffered psychological trauma. Many children feel they are too old to return to the level where they left off and feel pressure to

¹³⁸ Ibid p. 11 citing a World Bank document.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ According to a Government of Sierra Leone Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the End of the Decade, released in November 2000, 42% of primary school age children are attending school, though attendance levels in the North and East are markedly lower at 28% and 35% respectively.

¹⁴¹ Global IDP Database, "Sierra Leone: Widespread Destruction of Schools in 1997 and 1999," www.db.idpproject.org

¹⁴² Global IDP Database, "Sierra Leone: Combination of Factors Discourage Displaced Children from Attending School (2000)," www.db.idpproject.org

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Global IDP Database, "Sierra Leone: Combination of Factors Discourage Displaced Children from Attending School (2000)," www.db.idpproject.org; Interview with Glenis Taylor of UNICEF; UNICEF recognizes the vital role of education in normalizing the lives of psychologically traumatized children and is particularly focused on ensuring that girls return to school. UNICEF has proposed working to improve access to formal primary education, but also to advocate for the development of specialized programs for displaced populations and for over-age children to complete primary education in accelerated learning programs, which would also include psychological counseling and peace building.

earn income to help rebuild the lives of their families. Others now must take on the responsibility of breadwinner due to the death of parents or pregnancy resulting from rape.¹⁴⁴

The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs has primary responsibility for children's issues within the government and has been working actively with UNICEF and civil society to provide services and normalize conditions for children as a way to address the trauma so many of them have suffered.

Impact of War on Women

The impact of war on civilians has increased substantially in the past century. In World War I, approximately 5% of casualties were civilians, whereas in the 1990s it is estimated that 80% of war casualties were civilians, many of whom are women and children. Women and children also constitute the majority of the world's displaced and refugee populations.¹⁴⁵ This dramatic increase in the impact of conflict on civilians is likely due to the changing nature of conflict itself. Most conflicts today occur within a state's borders and are often characterized by deliberate and systematic violence against civilians and civilian institutions. Of 101 armed conflicts around the world between 1989 and 1996, 95 were internal disputes characterized by the use of light weapons and small decentralized fighting groups. These conflicts have devastating consequences for civilians.

Although rape is thought to be a common aspect of military conflict throughout history and in all regions of the world, rape, until recently, remained the "least condemned war crime,"¹⁴⁶ not because of inadequate legal provisions, but because of the international community's willingness in the past to tolerate sexual abuse of women and girls.¹⁴⁷ There had been little or no research on the scale of sexual violence, the factors that provoke it, or how to mitigate the problem.¹⁴⁸ Perhaps even less is known about how women recover after the trauma of rape in war and about the impact of rape on their communities.¹⁴⁹ Documenting sexual violence, already difficult during peacetime, is even more challenging during conflict when lack of ordinary support systems, general instability and collat-

¹⁴⁵ Worldwide Refugee Information, US Committee for Refugees, www.refugees.org/articles/women_refugees.htm

¹⁴⁶ Commission on Human Rights, *Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences*. United Nations, 1994; p.64.

¹⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, 1996.

¹⁴⁸ Swiss S., Giller J.E., "Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective," *JAMA*. 1993; 270:612-615

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p.2

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

eral trauma further discourage disclosure. Despite this, persistent efforts to do so are increasingly forcing the issue into the light.¹⁵⁰

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Rape, forced prostitution, sexual slavery and forced impregnation are all criminal means and methods of warfare that have attracted more attention in the recent years because of the widespread reporting of such acts in recent conflicts."¹⁵¹ The wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia focused attention on the use of rape as a deliberate strategy to undermine community bonds and weaken resistance to aggression.¹⁵² In fact, the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and the devastating effects it typically has on communities reflects a profound and disturbing perspective on the dignity and worth of women and girls—that a woman's dignity and worth can be reduced to her sexual purity and serve as a measure of family and community honor.¹⁵³ The recent convictions handed down by the ad-hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia on rape as a war crime and crime against humanity¹⁵⁴ send a strong message that impunity around sexual violence can no longer be taken for granted. While rape is receiving increased attention, an emphasis on this particular abuse should not lead to a disregarding of other violations. Instead, sexual violence should be understood in the context of a range of abuses and hardships faced by women during conflict situations.

Health care professionals have a unique role to play in the investigation and documentation of sexual violence in war and in the treatment of survivors. Collecting and presenting sound evidence will help hold perpetrators accountable, restore the rule of law, and limit future violations. Furthermore, increasing medical and social knowledge about sexual violence in war will facilitate the development of strategies that allow the recovery of survivors of sexual violence and their communities. A better understanding of the determining factors and characteristics of sexual violence in war may contribute to the development of measures to better protect potential victims and deter perpetrators in the future.¹⁵⁵ Documentation is also important for the development of international jurisprudence and strengthening the interpretation and implementation of existing international legal standards.

¹⁵¹ ICRC, "Fact Sheet: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Women," March 6, 2001.

¹⁵² Swiss and Giller.

¹⁵³ Frank, M., Bauer, H.M., Fincanci, Korur S., Arican, N., & Iacopino, V., "Virginity Examinations in Turkey: The Role of Forensic Physicians in Controlling Female Sexuality," *JAMA*, 282(5), 1999; pp.485-490.

¹⁵⁴ See especially Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Zejnir Delalic et al., Judgement, IT-96-21-T, November 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgement, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, February 22, 2001.

¹⁵⁵ Swiss & Giller.

III. THE PREVALENCE OF WAR-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AMONG IDPs¹⁵⁶

Methods

Subjects

Subjects of the PHR survey consisted of female heads of household who could most accurately provide information about the experiences of the entire household over the past 10 years. An assertive attempt was made to ensure that each respondent was interviewed privately due to the sensitive nature of questions asked. Of the 1,048 households sampled, 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). Seven women were not eligible; 41 were not available at the time of sampling, and 8 women were either opposed to the survey, refused to participate, or requested the interview be stopped.

Sampling

At the time of the study, registered IDPs were living in a total of 21 camps or locales in seven districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone. To obtain a representative sample of IDPs, the PHR/UNAMSIL team selected camps and/or locales on the basis of IDP arrival time and the place of residence before displacement. Since the proportion of "recent arrivals" (after the May 2000 crisis) was known for each camp/locale, the PHR/UNAMSIL team was able to select camps/locales that reflected the known proportion of two-thirds recent arrivals in all IDP camps/locales. A total of four sample locations from three different districts and the Western Area of Sierra Leone were included in the study. The camps/locales included those that best represented the IDPs' home district and/or region of the country. The four districts from which camps/locales were sampled

¹⁵⁶ This chapter is excerpted from Amowitz, L et al. "Letter from Sierra Leone: Prevalence of War-Related Sexual Violence and other Human Rights Abuses Among Internally Displaced Persons in Sierra Leone," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (Forthcoming January 23, 2002 issue).

represented 91% of the registered IDP population in Sierra Leone. Camps/locales located in four other districts were excluded on the basis of inaccessibility due to safety concerns or an inadequate number of IDPs for sampling (less than 5,000).

Assuming a prevalence rate of sexual violence (based on a previous estimate by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) of 14% of Freetown residents witnessing rape in 1999)¹⁵⁷ to be between 10% and 20%, the PHR/UNAMSIL team determined the following sample sizes would be needed. For a 20% prevalence (18-22% margins), sample size would range from 653 at 80% confidence to 1,071 at 90% confidence. For a prevalence of 10% (9-11% margins), sample size would range from 1,457 at 80% confidence to 2,377 at 90% confidence. The PHR/UNAMSIL team therefore planned to include approximately 1,000 households in the study due to safety and logistical constraints during the time period of the survey. Households were selected in each camp/locale in proportion to the distribution of IDPs in that location. A total of 1,048 households were selected from the three camps and one town, Mile 91 Township.

All study participants were selected using systematic random sampling or a combination of systematic random sampling and cluster sampling.¹⁵⁸ In sampling IDPs, the PHR/UNAMSIL team first mapped all domiciles within the camp, cluster, or town, then conducted a systematic random sample of the entire camp, cluster, or town. A sampling interval (n) was calculated by dividing the number of households in the camp, cluster, or town by the number of interviews to be conducted in the camp, cluster, or town. A starting household was determined by random number generation and each nth household was interviewed until the entire camp, cluster, or town had been surveyed. One camp required cluster sampling due to size and difficulty in mapping. The camp was organized into eight administrative units. Two clusters (administrative units) were selected at random from seven of the units. One unit was excluded from sampling because it consisted of only very recent arrivals, unlike the other seven units.

Survey Questionnaire¹⁵⁹

The PHR survey contained 49 questions pertaining to demographics, physical and mental health perception, experiences of war-related human rights abuses among household members, experiences of war-related sex-

¹⁵⁷ de Jong, K., Mulham, M., van der Kam, S., *Assessing trauma in Sierra Leone: Psychological Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes*, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières, January 11, 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml.

¹⁵⁸ Patton MQ. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications; 1990:169-283

¹⁵⁹ See Appendix A.

ual violence, including assistance needs, opinions regarding punishment and justice for perpetrators, and attitudes on women's human rights and roles in society. The survey also assessed the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual violence.

Physical and mental health perception, fears of sexual violence in communities either by combatants or non-combatants, and family relationship changes after the incident of sexual violence were assessed using Likert-type scales (e.g., excellent, good, fair, poor). Human rights opinions and views on women's roles in society were asked of all female heads of the households. Opinions were assessed by a response of "agree" or "disagree" with statements concerning human rights and women's roles in society.

Regarding experiences of human rights abuses, respondents were asked whether they or their household members had been beaten, shot, killed, tortured, seriously injured, sexually violated, raped, abducted, suffered amputations or been subjected to forced labor by combatants during the past 10 years (e.g., since the war started). Respondents also were asked whether their homes were burned and/or property was looted. For each abuse, participants were asked the gender of the abused, type of abuse, who they thought committed the violation, and consequence of the abuse. Finally, all participants were asked about non war-related sexual violence experiences in their lifetime committed by non-combatants such as family members, friends, or civilian strangers, including age at time of attack, type of sexual violence and identity of the perpetrators.

Regarding war-related sexual violence experiences during the past 10 years of war, respondents were asked when the incident occurred, where it took place, the sexual abuse type, the identity of the perpetrator, the number of attackers, the duration of the attack, and the consequences of the sexual violence. In addition, these women were asked their opinions regarding the punishment of perpetrators, and whether they were interested in giving their names to the proposed Special Court or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The questionnaire was written in English, the official language of Sierra Leone, translated into Krio, the lingua franca of Sierra Leone, and back-translated into English. The questions on sexual violence and sexuality were written by Sierra Leonean women who conduct research in this area and who provide treatment services to survivors of sexual violence in Sierra Leone. Researchers learned to administer the survey in Krio in which they all were fluent and collaborated on a translation from Krio into the two other main languages in Sierra Leone (Mende and Temne). These translations were checked for accuracy by members of the PHR/UNAMSIL team. Seven regional human rights and sexual violence experts reviewed the questionnaire for content validity. The survey was pilot tested among twelve IDP women in Freetown and suggestions were incorporated for clarity and cultural appropriateness of questions.

Interviewer Training

The survey interviews were conducted by 21 Sierra Leonean women trained and supervised by the PHR/UNAMSIL field team. The five-member team had extensive experience in research, psychological counseling with survivors of sexual violence and torture, sexual violence aid programs for Sierra Leonean refugees and IDPs, and human rights issues. Researcher training consisted of eight to nine days of classroom teaching and role-play followed by several days of field observation and continuous supervision. (See Appendix B for details of training process.)

Interviews

All interviews were conducted over a four-week period in the calendar year 2001. Interviews with participants lasted approximately 25-60 minutes and were conducted in the most private setting possible. All questionnaires were reviewed for completeness and for correctness of recording after the interview by the researchers themselves, and then reviewed by the field supervisors at the end of each day.

Human Subjects Protections

This research was reviewed and approved by an independent group of individuals with expertise in clinical medicine, public health, bioethics, and international human rights research. In addition, permission for the study was granted by UN officials, camp administrators and local community leaders in each area surveyed and there were no limitations on movement or to surveying. The research was conducted in accord with the Declaration of Helsinki, as revised in 2000.¹⁶⁰ Every effort was made to ensure the protection and confidentiality of and to reduce any potential adverse consequence to the human subject participants. All data were kept anonymous. Verbal informed consent was obtained from all participants and parental consent was obtained for all participants under the age of eighteen. Participants did not receive any material compensation. To reduce the risk of possible retraumatization among respondents, researcher training included extensive sensitization to this issue by a psychologist and social worker who specialize in sexual violence and those who reported sexual violence were referred to any existing services.

Statistical Analysis

The data were analyzed using STATA statistical software.¹⁶¹ For 2x2 cross tabulations containing cells with expected frequencies of less than five,

¹⁶⁰ World Medical Association, *Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects* [5th rev], Edinburgh, Scotland: World Medical Association; 2000.

¹⁶¹ STATA 5.0 (Intercooled) for Windows, STATA Corporation, College Station TX.

statistical significance was determined using Fisher's exact test; Yates' corrected chi square was used for all others. For cross tabulations with greater than two rows, statistical significance was determined using Pearson chi square. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for statistical comparison of means and the Kruskal-Wallis test was used for comparison of medians. For all statistical determinations, significance levels were established at $p < 0.05$.

Definitions

A perpetrator was defined as any person who directly inflicts violence or abuse.¹⁶² Torture was defined according to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.¹⁶³ Sexual violence included rape¹⁶⁴ and other forms of sexual violence such as molestation, sexual slavery, being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing, forced marriage, and insertion of foreign objects into the genital opening or anus. Gang rape was defined as rape by two or more individuals. Depression was self-reported as "depression." Symptoms of "depression" included "very sad," "excessive worry," sleeping difficulties, "unhappy," "change in appetite," and "feels bad."

Mental Health Counseling was defined as "having someone to talk to about your problems who will listen and give emotional support." A household was defined as "those people sleeping and eating under the same roof before first displacement." Female head of household was considered "the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household." War-related prevalence of sexual violence included experiences of sexual violence committed by combatants during the past 10 years of war. Life-time prevalence of non war-related sexual violence included experiences of sexual violence committed by family members, friends, or civilians at any time in a woman's lifetime. These two prevalence rates did not overlap since the perpetrator categories were mutually exclusive.

Findings

The findings of the PHR study represent the most comprehensive population-based assessment to date of war-related sexual violence and other human rights abuses in Sierra Leone. Such quantitative findings contribute

¹⁶² Saltzman, L.E., Fanslow, J.L., McJahon, P.M., Shelley, G.A., *Intimate Partner Violence Surveillance: Uniform Definitions and Recommended Data Elements*, Center for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Injury Prevention and Control: Atlanta, 1999:11. Available at: www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/intimate.htm

¹⁶³ Article 3, Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1948, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force October 21, 1950).

¹⁶⁴ International Planned Parenthood Association Western Regional Hemisphere, *Definitions: What is Gender-Based Violence?* Available at: www.ipprwhr.org/whatwedo/definitions.pdf.

TABLE 1:
Demographic Characteristics and Health Perceptions among Respondents

Respondent Characteristics	Respondents* n=991
Age (years), mean \pm SE (range)	34 \pm 0.48 (14-80)
Marital Status	
Married; living with husband	622 (63)
Widowed due to war	134 (13)
Widowed/divorced/separated	113 (11)
Separated due to war	101 (10)
Never married	21 (2)
Wife Status, n=965	
First wife	430 (45)
> First wife	535 (55)
Tribe, n=989	
Temne	703 (71)
Mende	150 (15)
Kono	39 (4)
Limba	28 (3)
Krio	4 (0.4)
Other	65 (7)
Religion, n=989	
Muslim	814 (82)
Christian	172 (17)
Other	3 (0.3)
Years Since Displacement, n=766	
1-3 years	216 (28)
4-6 years	225 (29)
7-10 years	311 (41)
> 10 years	14 (2)
Number of Times Fled Fighting, mean \pm SE (range)	4 \pm 0.07 (1-15)
Months in Camp/Town, mean \pm SE (range)	18 \pm 0.53 (.25-120)
Years of Formal Education, mean \pm SE (range)	1.9 \pm 0.11 (0-16)
Most Commonly Reported Occupations †	
Farmer	500 (50)
Trader	383 (39)
Business	76 (8)
Student	17 (2)
Professional	25 (2)
Homemaker	11 (1)

Perception of General Health in the Last Two Years	
Very good	19 (2)
Good	83 (8)
Fair	629 (63)
Poor	260 (26)
"State of Mind" † Since Displacement, n=988	
Very good	8 (0.8)
Good	48 (5)
Fair	638 (64)
Poor	294 (30)
Suicidal Ideation Since the War	
	280 (28)
Suicide Attempts Since the War	
	34 (3)
Assistance That Would Help "State of Mind" ‡	
Humanitarian assistance	960 (97)
Medical assistance	956 (96)
Income generation projects	937 (94)
Religious counseling/support	879 (89)
Skills training	832 (84)
Mental health counseling	714 (72)
Traditional ceremonies	452 (48)
Education	393 (41)
Country medicine/traditional healer	321 (34)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise
 † May list more than one
 ‡ "State of mind" defined as current thoughts and feelings

considerable insight into the nature and extent of human rights abuses among IDPs in Sierra Leone, i.e. the frequency of specific human rights abuses, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the impact of these experiences and the most urgent needs identified by the victims. Furthermore, a rigorous approach to sampling enables the findings to be generalized to the larger IDP population.

Characteristics of Respondents

Of the 1,048 households sampled, 991 female heads of household participated in the study (response rate = 95%). Seven women were not eligible; 41 were not available at the time of sampling, and eight either were opposed to the survey, refused to participate, or requested the interview be stopped.

Demographics of the respondents are presented in Table 1. The mean age was 34± 0.48 years (range 14-80 years). The majority of the women sampled were poorly educated, Muslim, married, women of either the

TABLE 2:
Reported Human Rights Abuses among Household Members

Characteristics	Household Members Reporting Abuse n= 3759*
Household Members, #, mean ± SE (range)	
Total	9166, 9.37 ± 0.11 (2-30)
Women	5001, 5.18 ± 0.07 (1-17)
Men	3983, 4.17 ± 0.07 (0-17)
Current Age, mean ± SE (range) †	
	24.8 ± 0.33 (1-95)
Human Rights Abuses Among All Household Members, n=9166 †	
Abduction	841 (9)
Beating	618 (7)
Killing	414 (4)
Reported sexual assaults among household members	402 (4)
Sexual assault among respondents, n=991	94 (9)
Sexual assault among household females, n=5001	396 (8)
Sexual assault among household males, n=3983	6 (0.1)
Torture	151 (2)
Forced labor	114 (1)
Gunshot wound	128 (1)
Bodily injury (stabbed, burned, cut)	85 (0.9)
Amputation of limb or digits	21 (0.2)
Destruction of Property	
	1836 (20)
Alleged Perpetrator †	
<i>Rebel forces</i>	
RUF, Revolutionary United Front	1490 (40)
"Rebels", unspecified	590 (16)
AFRC, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	74 (2)
West Side Boys	82 (2)
Ex-SLA	17 (.4)
<i>Government forces</i>	
SLA, Sierra Leonean Army	39 (1)
CDF, Civil Defense Forces	14 (.4)
<i>Peacekeeping troops</i>	
ECOMOG, Economic Community of West African States	5 (.1)
UN, United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone	1 (.02)
<i>Other</i>	
Don't know	1290 (34)
"Mixed group"	162 (4)

Consequences of Abuse †	
Self reported "depression" or symptoms of depression ‡	837(22)
No consequence	455 (12)
Killed/died after attack	420 (11)
Bodily injury	321 (8)
Stigmatized and rejected	27 (1)
Consequence of Sexual Assault, n=396	
Self-reported "sexually transmitted disease"	79 (20)
Self-reported pregnancy following rape	36 (9)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise

† May list more than one

‡ Symptoms of depression included "sleeping difficulties," "excessive worry," "unhappy," "change in appetite," "crying all the time," "cannot stop crying," "feeling bad," and "feeling sad."

Temne or Mende tribes who most commonly reported their occupation as farmers, petty traders and business women. Nearly one quarter of women were either separated or widowed due to war, had been displaced more than four times since 1990 and had, on average, lived in the IDP camps or Mile 91 Township for eighteen months. Fifty-seven percent of women reported that they had been displaced between one and six years ago, and 41% of women had been displaced between six and ten years ago.

The majority of women perceived their general health (89%) and mental health (94%) as "fair" or "poor" (Table 1). Approximately one third of women (280, 28%) reported suicidal ideation (thoughts or feelings), and 3% (34) had attempted suicide. Women reported types of aid that would help their states of mind the most, including humanitarian assistance (960, 97%), medical assistance (956, 96%), income generation projects (937, 94%), religious counseling and support (879, 89%), skills training (832, 84%), and mental health counseling (714, 72%).

Human Rights Abuses Reported among Household Members ¹⁶³

The 991 household representatives reported on the experiences of 9,166 household members, which included themselves and those who lived with

¹⁶³ The following 95% confidence intervals (CI) are calculated among household members (N=9166) for all human rights abuses (12.6 ± 0.635), abduction (9.0 ± 0.564), beatings (6.7 ± 0.494), killings (4.5 ± 0.415), sexual assaults among household members (4.4 ± 0.399), captured for less than 24 hours (3.4 ± .307), torture (1.6 ± 0.255), forced labor (1.2 ± 0.221), gunshot wounds (1.4 ± 0.239), bodily injuries (0.9 ± 0.192) and amputations of limbs or digits (0.2 ± 0.097); sexual assault among respondents where N=991 (9.0 ± 1.74), sexual assault among household females where N=5001 (7.9 ± 0.717), sexual assault among household males where N=3983 (0.15 ± 0.120). The 95% confidence intervals reported here can be used to calculate the confidence interval for the estimates of abuses of the total IDP population (see Figure 1) using (95% CI X N value).

TABLE 3:
Reported Abuses of Household Members (n=1157), by Offender

Reported Abuse*	RUF	"Rebels"	AFRC	West Side Boys	Ex-SLA	SLA	CDF	ECOMOG	UN
All Abuses, n=2266	1312 (58)	645 (28)	125 (5)	69 (3)	58 (2)	42 (2)	11 (.5)	3 (.1)	1 (.04)
Abduction, n=666	398 (60)	161 (24)	46 (7)	26 (4)	19 (3)	12 (2)	3 (.04)	1 (.1)	-
Beating, n=511	260 (51)	188 (37)	21 (4)	15 (3)	14 (3)	11 (2)	2 (.04)	0	-
Killing, n=335	218 (65)	90 (27)	10 (3)	1 (3)	7 (2)	5 (2)	2 (.06)	1 (.3)	1 (.3)
Sexual Assault									
Females, n=353	186 (53)	103 (29)	23 (6)	17 (5)	11 (3)	12 (3)	0	1 (.3)	-
Males, n=3	2 (67)	1 (33)	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Torture, n=135	81 (60)	37 (27)	9 (7)	0	3 (2)	2 (1)	3 (2)	0	-
Forced Labor, n=86	48 (56)	22 (26)	9 (10)	6 (7)	1 (1)	0	0	0	-
Gunshot Wound, n=108	75 (69)	29 (27)	2 (2)	1 (1)	0	0	1 (1)	0	-
Bodily Injury, n=49	35 (71)	12 (25)	0	1 (2)	1 (2)	0	0	0	-
Amputations, n=20	9 (50)	2 (11)	5 (28)	2 (11)	2 (11)	0	0	0	-

*The 2266 abuses represent abuses (1 or more) listed by the 1157 household members who could identify the perpetrator. This data excludes those who could not list the perpetrator.

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them prior to their displacement (mean household size 9.4 ± 0.11) (Table 2). Of the 9,166 household members, 5,001 (55%) were females and 3,983 (44%) were males.¹⁶⁶ Overall, there was a total of 1157 household members with specific forms of war-related human rights abuses reported among the 9,166 household members. These included abductions (841, 9.3%), beatings (618, 6.7%), killings (414, 4%), and sexual violence against women (396, 8%) and men (6, 0.1%). Three hundred and sixteen (3%) were “captured” for less than 24 hours, 151 (2%) were tortured, 114 (1%) were forced into labor, 128 (1%) reported gunshot wounds, 85 (0.9%) had serious injuries, and 21 (0.2%) reported amputations. Burning of homes and/or looting of property also was commonly reported among household members (1,836, 20%).

Regarding sexual violence, 9% (94) of the 991 respondents reported one or more war-related sexual violence experiences. Study participants also reported war-related sexual violence among 396 (8%) female and 6 (.1%) male household members. The prevalence of war-related sexual violence among female household members may be as high as 11% (554/5001) if 158 women are included who did not report sexual violence per se, but did report abduction with the likely consequences of sexual violence, and who became pregnant, or experienced vaginal bleeding, pain, swelling, uterine pain, vaginal discharge, or sexually transmitted diseases.


For all abuses reported, the RUF was identified most often (1,490, 40%) as the perpetrator (Table 2). Table 3 and Figure 3 represent the 1,157 household members who reported abuses and could name the perpetrator. These household members had 2,266 incidents of abuse since each victim could have one or more abuses listed; however, this does not take into account those who did not know their perpetrators. In this analysis, the RUF was reported as the perpetrator 58% of the time. The most commonly reported consequences of all abuses reported among household members included “depression” or having symptoms of depression 837 (22%), 420 being killed (12%), 455 reported “no consequence” (11%), and 320 had bodily injury (8%). Respondents reported that 36 (9%) female household members became pregnant as a consequence of the attack. Respondents reported that the majority of the abuses among household members occurred in the last three years with most of these occurring between 1997 and 1999 (Figure 2).

Characteristics among Respondents Reporting War-related Sexual Violence

Table 4 presents the characteristics of respondents reporting war-related sexual violence. Nine percent (94 of 991) of the respondents reported a

¹⁶⁶ There were a total of 9,166 household members but the gender was not indicated for 182 persons. Since some of these individuals may have experienced sexual assault but were not included in the analysis, it is likely to have led to an underestimate of sexual violence.

FIGURE 2:
Occurance of Sexual Assaults Among Respondents and Other Human Rights
Abuses Among Household Members



personal account of sexual violence (Table 4). The mean number of attackers was 3.2. Sixty-eight percent of the incidents reportedly occurred in the last three years, with more than half (54%) in their home villages, and 22% while fleeing. More than half (60%) of the abuses lasted for one week or less. The majority of the incidents of sexual violence (63, 67%) occurred between 1997 and 1999. In addition, 22 (23%) of women reported being pregnant at the time of the attack with an average gestation of three months. Fifty-three percent of respondents and 47% of female household members who were sexually assaulted reported “face to face” contact specifically with RUF forces, compared with less than 6% for any other combatant group.


Overall, 79 (84%) of 94 respondents reported the identity of one or more of their perpetrators (Table 5). Of these, the RUF was the perpetrator 60% of the time (Figure 5). Other perpetrators reported included AFRC, West Side Boys unspecified “rebels”, and both SLA and ex-SLA. The UN peacekeepers and CDF militia forces were not identified as perpetrators among respondents reporting sexual violence.

Rape was reported by 84 of the 94 women reporting sexual violence and 31 reported being gang raped. Also, approximately one third of the 94 women reported abduction, being stripped of clothing and being forced to undress. Nine women reported forced marriage to combatants, and six women reported pregnancy as a consequence of the attack. Forty-four percent of women felt the incident of sexual violence had “quite a bit” or an “extreme” effect on relationships with family and friends. The

most commonly reported consequences of the attack included bodily injury/physical disability, sexually transmitted disease, and “reproductive complications” including miscarriages.¹⁶⁷ 5278

The majority (91%) of respondents reported being “quite a bit” (161, 16%) or “extremely” (740, 75%) worried about sexual violence to themselves or family members by combatants (Figure 4). Concern about sexual violence by family members, friends, or civilian strangers was lower (39% “quite a bit” or “extremely” worried). In addition, 91 (9%) of respondents reported sexual abuse (occurring at age 15 ± 1.2 years) by family members, friends, or civilian strangers during their lifetime.

FIGURE 3:
Proportion of Reported Human Rights Abuses by Offender



¹⁶⁷ Female Genital Cutting is reportedly widely practiced in Sierra Leone. Women who are raped and who have undergone female genital cutting are likely to be at increased risk for genital trauma and related complications.


TABLE 4:
Characteristics Among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Characteristics	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assaults* n=94
Reporting Sexual Assault, n=991	94 (9)
# of Attackers, mean ± SE (range)	3.2 ± 0.39 (1-25)
Timing of Abuse, n=92	
Within last 3 years	63 (68)
> 3 years ago	23 (25)
Unsure	6 (6)
Where Abuse Occurred, n=91	
Home village/town	49 (54)
While fleeing	20 (22)
While abducted	18 (20)
Non home village	2 (2)
IDP camp/town	1 (1)
Other	1 (1)
How Long Abuse Lasted, n=91	
Less than one week	55 (60)
One week to 1 month	16 (18)
1-6 months	10 (11)
More than 6 months	10 (11)
# Women Pregnant at Time of Assault	22 (23)
Months Pregnant During Assault, mean ± SE (range)	3.1 ± 0.47 (1-7)
Abuse †	
Rape	84 (89)
Being forced to undress/stripped of clothing	35 (37)
Abduction	31 (33)
Gang rape	31 (33)
Molestation	13 (14)
Sexual slavery	14 (15)
Forced marriage	9 (9)
Insertion of foreign object	4 (4)
Consequences of the Abuse †	
Bodily injury/physical disability	48 (51)
Self reported "sexually transmitted disease"	32 (34)
Self reported "reproductive complications/miscarriage"	19 (20)
Stigmatized/rejected by family and/or community	14 (15)
Fear of STD/AIDS	9 (9)
Self reported "pregnancy" after the assault	6 (6)
Other	19 (20)

Effect on relationships with family and friends, n=89	
Not at all	29 (32)
A little	18 (20)
Quite a bit	15 (17)
Extremely	27 (30)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise
 † May list more than one

FIGURE 4:
Proportion of Participants Reporting Fear of Sexual Assault



Characteristics of Assistance Needs among Respondents Reporting War-related Sexual Violence

Of the 94 respondents reporting war-related sexual violence, 61 reported the incident(s) to another person (Table 6). Of those who did not report the attack, the most common reasons were “feelings of shame or social stigma” (18, 64%), fear of being stigmatized/rejected (8,28%) and not having trust in anyone (6, 21%). Fifty women reported seeking help after the attack and 40 of these women reported that they informed a health care provider of the specifics of the attack. On average, these women sought help five months after the attack(s) occurred. Hospitals (25, 50%), traditional healers (20, 40%) and health centers (19, 38%) were the most common places where women sought help after the attacks.

TABLE 5:
Reported Sexual Violence of Respondents (n=79) by Offender

Reported Assaults	RUF	"Rebels"	AFRC	West Side Boys	Ex-SLA	SLA	CDF	ECOMOG	UN
All Assaults, 213	129 (61)	21 (10)	18 (8)	19 (9)	12 (6)	10 (5)	0	4 (2)	-
Rape, n=75	48 (64)	10 (13)	5 (7)	4 (5)	4 (5)	3 (4)	0	1 (1)	-
Abduction, n=34	21 (62)	2 (6)	4 (12)	3 (9)	1 (3)	3 (9)	0	0	-
Stripped of clothing, n=39	22 (56)	3 (8)	4 (10)	4 (10)	3 (8)	2 (5)	0	1 (3)	-
Gang Rape, n=30	16 (53)	3 (10)	3 (10)	4 (13)	3 (10)	0	0	1 (3)	-
Molestation, n=14	8 (57)	3 (21)	0	1 (7)	1 (7)	0	0	1 (7)	-
Sexual Slavery, n=12	7 (58)	0	1 (8)	3 (25)	0	1 (8)	0	0	-
Forced marriage, n=9	7 (78)	0	1 (11)	0	0	1 (11)	0	0	-

Women reported what helped most after the attack was trying to forget about the incident (43, 46%), support of family (33, 35%), a health care provider (31, 33%), and country medicine/traditional healer (30, 32%). Figure 6 shows what respondents felt were the most needed assistance that would help their state of mind and ability to cope with the sexual assault experience.

Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Violence

Of 88 respondents, 37 (42%) thought those who had committed sexual violence against them should be punished (Table 7). Of the 51 respondents who indicated that their perpetrator should not be punished, the most common reason given was "in the spirit of reconciliation" (35, 68%), followed by fear of reprisal (13, 25%), no confidence in the system for such punishments

FIGURE 5:
Proportion of Sexual Assault Abuses by Offender




TABLE 6:
Characteristics of Assistance Needs Among Respondents
Reporting Sexual Violence


Characteristic	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault* n=94
Told Anyone About the Incident	61 (65)
Reasons for Not Telling Anyone About Incident, n=28 †	
Feelings of shame or social stigma	18 (64)
Fear of being stigmatized/rejected	8 (28)
Do not trust anyone	6 (21)
Fear of rejection by my husband/family	5 (18)
No one asked	2 (7)
Fear of physical retaliation by perpetrator	1 (3)
Other	6 (21)
Sought Help After Sexual Assault	50 (53)
Sought Help After Sexual Assault # days, mean ± SE (range)	161 ± 50 (1-1460),
Where Help Was Sought After the Sexual Assault, n=50 †	
Hospital	25 (50)
Country medicine/traditional healer	20 (40)
Health center	19 (38)
NGO	3 (6)
Informed Health Care Provider of Specifics of Sexual Assault, n=50	40 (80)
What Has Helped the Most After Assault †	
Trying to forget about it	43 (46)
Support of family	33 (35)
A health care provider	31 (33)
Country medicine/traditional healer	30 (32)
Discussions with family members	18 (19)

* Values are number (percent) unless stated otherwise

† May list more than one

(8, 16%), or they wanted to forget about the incident (4, 8%). Of the 94 respondents reporting sexual violence, punishment was supported by 17 (18%) for "all those involved," 30 (32%) for the perpetrators of the attack(s), and 17 (18%) for the commanders. Thirty-four of the respondents reporting sexual violence believed their attacker's commander was aware of the attack. Thirty-three women believed that punishment of perpetrators would prevent sexual violence from happening to others. Twenty-two of the 94 women reporting sexual violence to PHR were willing to give their names to the proposed Special Court and/or the Truth and Reconciliation

FIGURE 6:
Assistance That Would Help State of Mind and Ability to Cope
with Your Experience



Commission. Given the prevalence of war related sexual violence as reported to PHR, PHR believes that there may be thousands of female IDPs in Sierra Leone who have experienced sexual violence and who may be willing to provide testimony to the Special Court or the TRC.

Attitudes of Women's Human Rights and Roles in Society

More than 90% of women agreed that women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys (Table 8). More than 80% of women agreed that women should be able to express themselves freely, that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, and that women and girls need more education about their reproductive health. However, more than 80% of women also indicated that a good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees. More than 70% of women felt that family problems should only be discussed within the family, that women have the right to control the number and spacing of their children, and that more should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they do not want to. More than 60% of women expressed the view that a man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys, and that it is a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to. The same proportion of women (more than 60%) indicated women and girls need more education about their right to refuse sex.

TABLE 7:
Beliefs about Justice among Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault

Belief	Respondents Reporting Sexual Assault* n=94
Who Should Be Punished for Sexual Assaults †	
Perpetrators	30 (32)
Commanders	17 (18)
All involved in attacks	17 (18)
Believe Perpetrator Should Be Punished, n=88	
Yes	37 (42)
No	51 (58)
Reasons Why Perpetrators Should Not Be Punished, n=51 †	
In the spirit of reconciliation	35 (69)
Fear of reprisal/revenge	13 (25)
No confidence in a system for such punishments	8 (16)
Respondent just wants to forget about incident	4 (8)
Other	13 (25)
Believe Perpetrators Commander Was Aware of Assault	34 (36)
Believe Punishment of Perpetrators Will Prevent This From Happening to Others	33 (35)
Willing to Give Name to Truth and Reconciliation Commission or the Special Court	22 (23)

* Values are number (percent) † May list more than one

Comments on Survey Findings

The findings of this study indicate that combatants (primarily, members of rebel forces) have committed widespread human rights abuses against civilians in Sierra Leone, including: abductions, beatings, killings, sexual violence against women and men, being "captured" for less than 24 hours, torture, forced labor, gunshot wounds, serious injuries, and amputations. These abuses were experienced on an individual level by a substantial number of participants and their household members. The respondents in this study reported at least one of these abuses had occurred during the past ten years of conflict among 94% of households surveyed (Figure 7). Recent PHR surveys in Chechnya¹⁶⁸ and Kosovo¹⁶⁹ found abuse rates of 19% and 31% respectively among participant households. The burning of homes and/or looting of property was also

¹⁶⁸ Physicians for Human Rights, *Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya*, PHR, 2001.

¹⁶⁹ Physicians for Human Rights, *War Crimes in Kosovo: A Population Based Assessment of Human Rights Violations Against Kosovar Albanians*, PHR, 1999.

TABLE 8:

Majority Opinions Among Primary Respondents on Women's Rights and Gender Roles in Society

Shared by more than 90% of women

- Women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys
-

Shared by more than 80% of women

- Women should be able to express themselves freely
 - There should be legal protections for the rights of women
 - Women and girls need more education about their reproductive health
 - A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees
-

Shared by more than 70% of women

- Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family
 - Women and girls need more education about their rights to refuse sex
 - More should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they don't want to
-

Shared by more than 60% of women

- A man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys
 - It is a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she does not want to
 - Women have the right to control the number and spacing of their children
-


commonly reported among household members. The majority of these abuses experienced by interviewees occurred between 1997 and 1999. Forty percent of these abuses were attributed to RUF forces; however, of those who could identify a perpetrator, 58% of abuses were reported to be due to the RUF. Fifty-three percent of respondents and 47% of all female household members reporting "face to face" contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. Sexual violence was reported by less than 6% of respondents reporting "face to face" contact with any other combatant group.

Sexual violence in war has increasingly been recognized as a means of demoralizing individuals, families and communities¹⁷⁰ and is used as a weapon to disable an enemy by dissolving bonds between family and society.¹⁷¹ Today, in the context of war, rape and other forms of sexual violence have been recognized as instruments of genocide, crimes against humanity,

¹⁷⁰ Swiss, S., Giller, J.E., "Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective," *JAMA*, 1993;270:612-615; Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch: 1996; Herman, J.L., *Trauma and Recovery*, New York, NY: Harper Collins: 1992.

¹⁷¹ Goldfeld, A.E., Mollica, R.F., Pesavento, B.H. & Farone, S.V., "The Physical and Psychological Sequelae of Torture," *JAMA*. 1988;259:2725-2729.

FIGURE 7:
Proportion of Households Reporting Human Rights Abuse



means of torture, and crimes of war¹⁷² and can be prosecuted as such.¹⁷³ They also constitute crimes against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”¹⁷⁴

To generate population estimates of sexual violence among the IDP and non-IDP females in Sierra Leone, the PHR/UNAMSIL team assumed a total IDP population of 1.0-1.3 million (55% female)¹⁷⁵ and a non-IDP population of 2.7-3.0 million (50% female).¹⁷⁶ By extrapolating the number of incidents of war-related sexual violence reported by participants in

¹⁷² Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1 “FOCA.” Available at: www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/judgement/index.htm; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 7/17/98). Available at: untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*, The Hague, M. Nijhoff Publishers, Distributed by Kluwer Law International, 1997; Askin, K., “Women and International Humanitarian Law,” in Askin, K.D. & Koenig, D.M. editors, *Women and International Human Rights Law*, Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 1999. Vol. I.

¹⁷³ Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*; Askin K. “Women and International Humanitarian Law”

the sample to the total female IDP population, PHR estimates that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 Sierra Leonean IDP women may have suffered such human rights abuses. The prevalence of sexual violence among IDP women and girls, including war-related or non-war-related, in this study was 17%, or an estimated 94,000-122,000 individuals. If non-war-related sexual violence among non-IDP females is added to the IDP totals (assuming a 9% prevalence rate), as many as 215,000-257,000 women and girls in Sierra Leone currently may have been affected by sexual violence.

This study indicates that war-related rape and other forms of sexual violence were committed on a widespread basis among IDPs in Sierra Leone. In fact, the prevalence of war-related sexual violence (8%-9%) was equivalent to the lifetime prevalence of non war-related sexual violence (9%) among the study participants, increasing Sierra Leone's total prevalence rates to 17%.¹⁷⁷ The lifetime prevalence of rape in the United States is 9%, though the average life span of an American is more than twice that of a Sierra Leonean.¹⁷⁸

Rates of sexual violence vary based on research methodology and populations surveyed. Studies of sexual violence in Sierra Leone that include non-probability samples¹⁷⁹ or select populations such as clinic patients¹⁸⁰ generally report higher prevalence rates of sexual violence but cannot be generalized to broader populations. The prevalence of war-related sexual violence in this study was less than that reported in Liberia (15%),¹⁸¹ but

¹⁷⁴ Rome Statute; Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals*; Askin, K., "Women and International Humanitarian Law"; United Nations, Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S/2000/915.

¹⁷⁵ United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UNOCHA Database: IDP Census (data collected February 2001), UNOCHA, February, 2001.

¹⁷⁶ Norwegian Refugee Council, Sierra Leone Section: Population profile and figures, Available at: www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/1c963eb504904cde41256782007493b8/fdc6d215bab90118c12569dd002b1aec?OpenDocument; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, available at: [unhcr.ch/un & ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf](http://unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/numb2000.pdf).

¹⁷⁷ One percent of participants had experienced both war-related and non-war-related sexual violence.

¹⁷⁸ Crime Victim Research and Treatment Center, *Rape in America*, Charleston, SC: Medical University of South Carolina: 1992.

¹⁷⁹ Coker, A.L., & Richter, D.L., "Violence against Women in Sierra Leone: Frequency and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sexual Intercourse," *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 1998; 2(1):61-72.; Giller, J.E., Bracken, P.J., Kabaganda, S., "Uganda: War, Women, and Rape," *Lancet*, 1991;337:604.

¹⁸⁰ Shanks, L., Ford, N., Schull, M. & de Jong, K., "Responding to Rape," *Lancet*, 2001;357:9252; Human Rights Watch. "Women's Rights Project" in: *Human Rights Watch World Report 1998*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch: 1998.

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exceeded that found in other population-based assessments of refugees and displaced persons (0-0.1%),¹⁸² including a prior study conducted in Freetown, Sierra Leone (2%).¹⁸³

Physical injuries and self-reported "depression" were among the most common consequences reported following sexual violence. The adverse physical and psychological consequences of sexual violence are described in other studies.¹⁸⁴ The prevalence of sexual violence, including war-related or non-war-related, suggests a serious health burden for individual and community members that cannot be addressed adequately by services that currently exist in Sierra Leone. The assistance needs most commonly identified by women reporting sexual violence included humanitarian assistance, including food and shelter, medical care, income generating projects, and women's support groups. These needs were not significantly different ($p < 0.05$) from Sierra Leonean women who did not experience sexual violence but did experience other human rights abuses.

The majority of participants reporting sexual violence indicated the belief that their perpetrators should not be punished and, among these women, the most common reasons cited were "in the spirit of reconciliation" and "fear of reprisal/revenge." This highlights the need to protect survivors of war-related sexual violence including those that come forward to testify. Twenty-three percent of these women indicated an interest in giving their names for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court that are expected to be established in 2002. This may be explained by feelings of shame, and/or fear of being stigmatized or rejected also reported in the study, as well as a desire to put the incident(s) behind them. Such concerns are not unfounded in societies where women are financially dependent on their husbands or extended family and are subjected to structural social inequality on many levels.¹⁸⁵ Being cast out of a community or family can have dire consequences not only for the woman but her children as well.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸¹ Swiss, S., Jennings, P., Aryee, G., et. al. "Violence against Women during the Liberian Civil Conflict," *JAMA*, 1998; 279:625-629.

¹⁸² PHR, "A Population-based Assessment of Human Rights Abuses against Ethnic Albanian Refugees from Kosovo," *American Journal of Public Health*, 2001;91(12); Physicians for Human Rights, *Endless Brutality: War Crimes in Chechnya*, Physicians for Human Rights, May 2001:1-143; Physicians for Human Rights, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan: A Population-Based Study*, Physicians for Human Rights, May, 2001.

¹⁸³ de Jong, K., Mulham, M. & van der Kam, S., *Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone: Psychological Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes*, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières, January 11, 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml

¹⁸⁴ Resnick, H.S., Acierno, R., Kilpatrick, D.G., "Health Impact of Interpersonal Violence, 2: Medical and Mental Health Outcomes," *Behavioral Medicine*, 1997;23:65-78; Schafran, L.H., "Topics for Our Times: Rape is a Major Public Health Issue," *American Journal of Public Health*, 1996;86(1):15-17.

Despite 80% of women expressing that there should be legal protection for the rights of women, more than half of women reported that their husbands had the right to beat them and that it was a wife's duty to have sex with her husband even if she did not want to. The apparent disparity between such beliefs and international principles of human rights suggests a need for public discourse and education on local, regional and international levels.

Limitations

It is likely that the prevalence of war-related sexual violence in the study was underestimated because of willful non-disclosure of sexual violence and the lack of privacy in some of the interviews, despite efforts to ensure privacy. Reasons for willful non-disclosure often include fear of retribution by an assailant, of being stigmatized and rejected, blamed for the attack, and/or the psychological consequences of disclosure.¹⁸⁷ In addition, the average age of participants (female heads of households) reporting war-related sexual violence (34 ± 0.48 years) was more than twice the average age of females experiencing non war-related sexual violence reported in the study (15±1.2 years). Although interviewers were careful to explain there would be no material or other gain by participating in the survey, the number of abuses reported in the study may have been over or underestimated if IDPs judged that it was in their material, political or psychological interest to exaggerate or conceal claims of abuse.

¹⁸⁵ Ulin, P., "African Women and AIDS: Negotiating Behavioral Change," *Soc Sci Med.* 1992;34(1):63-74; Bruyn, M., "Women and AIDS in Developing Countries," *Soc Sci Med.* 1992;34(3):249-262.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Koss, M.P., "Detecting the Scope of Rape: A Review of Prevalence Research Methods," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 1993;8:198-222.

IV. QUALITATIVE COMMENTS AND TESTIMONIES OF SIERRA LEONEAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

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In order to gain insight into individual experiences of human rights abuses of Sierra Leonean women and their families, the PHR study included qualitative assessments of abuses as well.¹⁸⁸

Two primary approaches were used to elicit qualitative information. Seven open-ended questions were included in the questionnaire itself, and longer semi-structured interviews were conducted with survivors of human rights abuses that were not survey participants. Throughout this chapter, wherever possible, the exact words of the women and girls interviewed have been used in order to give expression to their individual experiences. All participants were informed of the purpose of the interview and of how the data would be collected and used. In the interest of confidentiality, their names have been changed and identifying information removed.

Case Examples from In-Depth Interviews

Case testimony of survivors of war-related human rights abuses was collected during two separate investigations to Sierra Leone. A PHR delegation visited Sierra Leone in March, 2000 to assess the medical consequences of human rights abuses committed during the war, including sexual violence. During that trip, members of the team with specialized training in sexual violence interviewed more than two dozen survivors of abuses. To mitigate the risk of re-traumatization, most of the testimony gathered during the 2000 investigation was taken from individuals who were already participating in programs for rape survivors. The interviews were semi-structured and covered a range of topics including basic biographical information, the circumstances of violations, details about perpetrators, medical and psychological consequences of the abuses, what types of services had been available and helpful to them, and what their concerns were for the future. The interviews took place at NGO offices,

¹⁸⁸ Quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiries each may have value independent of the other when the research questions address meaningful human rights issues and the studies are designed and interpreted within relevant historical and political context. Using both quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiry also may be complementary serve as one line of inquiry may serve to corroborate, or challenge, another.

UNICEF's headquarters in Freetown, health clinics, IDP camps, and programs for women who had become pregnant as a result of rape.

Testimony was also collected at the time the survey was conducted in February, 2001. Researchers administering the questionnaire were asked to identify women who had experienced human rights abuses who were willing to describe their experiences in more detail. These women then recorded their stories on audio and videotape in a private room in the health clinic on the outskirts of the camp. Most interviews were conducted in the first language of the victim and translated simultaneously by the researcher who first interviewed the woman or a translator, or they were translated at a later date from a tape recording.

A number of testimonies taken by PHR in March 2000 were from survivors of rape who had become pregnant by their attackers. These young women are particularly vulnerable as they must not only recover from the trauma of their ordeals while often facing stigma from their communities, but at the same time must learn to care for and support a baby with few resources. As part of a larger effort to assist rape victims in Freetown after the January 1999 incursion by rebel forces, a local NGO, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), established a program providing medical, psychological and educational support to these women and their children. A number of the young women participating in the program acknowledged to PHR the importance of the program in helping them to cope with what had happened to them.

Cases of Sexual Violence

Bola N.

In February 2001, Physicians for Human Rights interviewed a fifteen year-old girl, Bola N. Rebels had abducted her four times since 1999. At the time of the interview she told PHR she was two months pregnant and living at an IDP camp in Port Loko. She described her first abduction to the interviewer:

*When they first attacked the village, we fled to the bushes. When they removed us from our village we were frightened ... they held us, they cut some hands, they killed some, they forced us to be tied, we were taken to the bush where the sexual act was forced on us. ... Nine men raped me. ... My mother was taken away, my things, belongings, taken. I slept three days in the bush after they had raped me. I was unconscious, not myself. ... After they had raped me to their satisfaction, they left me in the bush. I was beaten, bruises on my body, part of my body. Some around were amputated. I was not well.*¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

As she described her multiple abductions, she wrapped her arms around herself and lowered her tone to almost a whisper:

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My first captivity was when the nine men raped me. Then I was left in the bush. Second time I was held a little over a month, taken to base. There are many, many combatants there. There are also many other young women held there, too. I was not assigned to just one man, as long as you are good looking, you have intercourse with all of them. In the third captivity they remembered me. They knew me. They use abusive language. I escape during the night. The fourth time was last year: they did an ambush [on an outing of women from the IDP camp]. They came for us, raped us, they asked us to go back to the village to prepare food for them, so we had to escape. We were afraid to go to the village. So we escaped.¹⁹⁰

Over the course of her multiple abductions and gang rapes, she had two miscarriages. She had been engaged to one man at the time of the first gang rape, but he left her when he heard of the event:

I was just engaged to someone. So when I went to the bush, I was pregnant. Because of the nine men who raped me, I had to abort. So my husband had to resign from continuing the engagement. The husband I have now is a new person.¹⁹¹

She said that this new husband did not know what had happened to her in the bush. She told PHR that she had not gone to a doctor for prenatal care because she did not want anyone to know she was pregnant, although she stated that she would go to the doctor once the pregnancy was visible. She had not gone to the hospital for the miscarriages because they asked for 1,000 Leones (approximately 30 cents) simply to register. The cost for medical care had further prevented her from seeking help for the multiple health problems she had experienced since the abductions.

She stated that she was not able to sleep through the night. Every night she wakes up and cries. Her family had been killed. Her first fiancé had left her. She was afraid to tell anyone about the violence she had experienced. When asked if she had told anyone of these events before PHR interviewed her, she acknowledged that she had told her friend who had taken her to the hospital after the first attack, but no one else. No one in her family knew what had happened to her.

Sampa K.

Another woman, Sampa K., had 11 children under her care when the rebels attacked. She told PHR that they abducted her for two years, sepa-

¹⁹⁰ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

¹⁹¹ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

rating her from all but one of the children. Some were killed, others were scattered. Sampa described the initial attack:

*I woke up in the morning about two o' clock and cleaned my house. ... As soon as I lifted a load I was trying to carry, my daughters said, "Mama! The rebels are coming!" I dropped everything. I am ready to flee to the bush with the baby on the back. Then there are so many, I cannot escape. They hit me, they took the baby from my back and threw the baby, the baby is too tired. Then he started to do the act on me - there are many of them.*¹⁹²

During her subsequent servitude to the rebels, she tried in vain to save her infant child:

*I was now crying with my baby, the baby was crying, I tried to let the baby suck the breast milk. And it was not completely five days, [when] I lost the baby. The baby was having trouble. Everyday I had to sleep with the boys. Every day I sleep with the boys and I cannot refuse - guns all over, they threaten me with guns. Guns all over. And then one says give the breast to the child. And every time I gave the breast to the child, he refused me. And so for three days I did not feed the child.*¹⁹³

She traveled for two years, living as the "wife" of one particular rebel. He kept her compliant by feeding her drugs:

*Every day this man would give me some tablets to take, some are green, some are blue, some are red. I was using the tablets so that I wouldn't get any problem with the man. The man used to tell me to take this tablet it is good for you.*¹⁹⁴

Throughout the interview, Sampa kept a blank look on her face, giving the facts of her abduction and sexual enslavement in a straightforward manner. It was not until she was asked what might help her that her demeanor shifted. In response to this question, she described a nightmare she had recently had, in which she was again chased by the rebels. They brandished knives that filled her with fear. They chased her, intending to kill her once they caught her, up to a bridge. The dream ended with her standing on the edge of the bridge, prepared to jump to her death rather than be caught again.

Aminata K.

Twenty-year-old Aminata K. wanted to tell her story, but did not want to be recorded. She was eight months pregnant at the time of the interview. Aminata was captured by the a breakaway faction of the AFRC, the West

¹⁹² PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

¹⁹³ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

¹⁹⁴ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

Side Boys, in Mafore village in the Port Loko area in 1999 and held for almost two years. According to Aminata K., they killed one young man, left some old women and took Aminata, along with one young boy and two other women, to their base. She said she was forced to leave behind her eight-month-old baby. She told PHR that she was held at the base for a year and a month and forced to marry a young member of the West Side Boys called James. Initially she was closely watched and then was forced to go with others to villages to loot, a practice the rebels refer to as "jaja". She saw them burn many houses. The leader was referred to as 'Pape' or 'Sammy'. She said that she escaped by telling the rebels that she was going to wash her clothes and then ran away to her home village where she found her family seeking food. Aminata told PHR that she is pregnant as a result of being raped and now reports feeling depressed and hopeless. Before she was abducted, she was married and had three children. One of her children died, but two are living. Her parents took care of the baby. Since returning from her captivity, her husband left her and they have divorced. She said that after she returned he kept saying, "this is not my child – you are pregnant with child – this is not my child," and after a few months he left her. She wanted to abort using herbs, but her family asked her not to as it might kill her and offered to help raise the new child. She said she is worried, however, because she has no husband or means and is completely dependent. They are currently living in the IDP camp, but they go back to their village from time to time to see if they can rebuild their house – but she does not see much hope for the future.¹⁹⁵

Kadiatu S.

Kadiatu S. was 16 years old at the time of the PHR interview. She was abducted when she was fourteen years old. She had no formal education, but worked for her mother, a businesswoman in Kono. "The rebels attacked the town and we ran. I was separated from my parents and for nine days I walked in the bush with five other girls to the next town. We were grabbed by rebels. They used me and threatened to kill me with a gun." A commander stopped them from killing her and took her back to the base. ECOMOG attacked the base. An ECOMOG soldier took her for his wife. She traveled with ECOMOG and stayed in Kailahun for approximately one year. She hitched a ride from a car full of rebels. "If you are a willing rebel wife you can get a ride in the rebel cars into town to shop." She told them she was going to visit family in Makeni. They assumed she was a rebel and would return. Kadiatu managed to find her way to Freetown, where she contacted her aunt. She was taken to her uncle, a doctor, and diagnosed six months pregnant. She was devastated. Kadiatu states that she does not cry, though she is

¹⁹⁵ PHR Interview, February, 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

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very sad and angry about the pregnancy. Her mother came to Freetown to collect her.¹⁹⁶

Hawa

Seventeen year-old Hawa told PHR that she delivered a stillborn baby girl in the bush after carrying her unwanted child for eight months.

The rebels burned my father's house and my mother jumped out the window. The rebels shot her in the chest and killed her. My father is too depressed to work. He lives in the house and is making the repairs. The rebels took me to the bush and kept me for six months. I was made a real wife.¹⁹⁷

She showed the interviewer the scars on her right thigh – “RUF.” She said they had traveled a route from Freetown to Collage, then to Occra Hills and to Makeni. She reported that the rebels starved her for 2-3 days, drugged her with cocaine and infected her with a sexually transmitted disease. She told PHR that ECOMOG came into the bush and rescued her and delivered her to Waterloo camp.

Katmara B.

Katmara B., a 13-year-old girl told PHR she was abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's “wife.” She said she was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and now has a baby girl. The story of what happened to her and her family during the rebel incursion into Freetown in January 1999 captures the anarchy of those days which left the capital city and its people profoundly fearful:

...that night, houses were being burned down in our neighborhood, so we ran to the local mosque for sanctuary. There were so many people hiding in there. We tried to run away. They began to shoot and killed some people in the mosque. They forced us to sit down on the side and went into the mosque and killed about 15 people in there. I saw them do it. Then they called us to come and look at the bodies. My cousin's father and my aunt were shot. An uncle's hand was hacked off. My mother was inside the mosque, when she saw me, she called out to me, one of them heard her and said “If you call her, we'll kill you.” So she didn't call me again. Then they took us outside and told us to change our clothes and gave us combat clothes to wear. We were told that we had to do anything they told us to do. We were told that when they addressed us, we were to respond with “Yes sir”. At that point we were given guns and cutlasses, and told that we were to go and cut hands off. On our way to wherever they were taking us, we met up another group

¹⁹⁶ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

¹⁹⁷ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

called "Born Naked". The people in this group roamed the streets naked, the way they were born, and when they met people, they killed them. When the members of "Born Naked" saw us, they told the others that they should kill us since they had been warned not to take any more hostages.

So, on our way to be killed, we were taken to a house with about 200 people held in it. My older cousin was sent to go and select 25 men and 25 women to have their hands chopped off. Then she was told to cut off the first man's hand. She refused to do it saying that she was afraid, I was then told to do it. I said I'd never done such a thing before and that I was also afraid. We were told to sit on the side and watch. So we sat. They chopped off two men's hands. My cousin couldn't watch and bowed her head down to avoid the sight. Because she did that, they shot her in the foot. They bandaged her foot and then forced her to walk. We left the two men whose hands had been cut off behind. We were then taken to a mosque in Kissy. They killed everyone in there...They were snatching babies and infants from their mother's arms and tossing them in the air. The babies would free fall to their deaths. At other times they would also chop them from the back of their heads to kill them, you know, like you do when you slaughter chickens...One girl with us tried to escape. They made her take off her slippers and give them to me and then killed her...one time we came across two pregnant women. They tied the women down with their legs eagle-spread and took a sharpened stick and jabbed them inside their wombs until the babies came out on the sticks...¹⁹⁸

Isata

Isata, a 15-year-old Mandingo girl, was abducted and gang raped by rebels. She described her experiences and their continuing effects on her health:

...I don't have any children. I was a virgin before. They ruined me. The story is long, much too long. I was at home when they came and kidnapped me...They demanded money. My family has no money. They demanded Le 200,000.00 (\$83.00)...they said to my parents, come and see how we use your children. They undressed five of us, laid us down, used us in front of my family and took us away with them. They wouldn't release us, they kept us with them in the bush.....When I escaped, I couldn't walk - the pain. I was bleeding from my vagina. That night, God gave me strength to walk...I can't remember how long I was held...I don't like to talk because of the memories. When I made it back,

¹⁹⁸ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

*my mother couldn't believe it. Since I got back I have been so sick...I never used to get sick like this...I would like to go back to school, but I can't concentrate anymore, I can't do anything...*¹⁹⁹

Binta K.

Binta K., an 18-year-old girl, told PHR she was abducted, beaten, raped and forced to become a rebel's "wife." She was released during the latter stages of her pregnancy and at the time of the interview had a two-month old baby girl. She recounted to PHR:

*...As the rebels were pulling out of Freetown, they came to our house and captured us. They even killed some of the other girls in our house. I was hiding with some girls when they found us. We were told that if we didn't come with them, they'd kill us. While I was begging them not to take me, a little boy, about ten years old who was with them piped up "If she doesn't want to come, pass her over to me and I'll chop her hands." I agreed to go. I was raped and held there in the bush. I wanted to run away, to escape, but there was no way. If you were caught trying to escape, you were killed or put in a box...*²⁰⁰

Later in that same interview, she expressed her sorrow that many of her family members blame her for not having tried harder to escape. She and her baby were living with a girlfriend at the time of the interview.

Zainab K.


Zainab K. told PHR she was abducted when she was seventeen during the January 1999 incursion into Freetown. She recounted her story in English in measured, unemotional language. She had attended school through second form (12-14 years).

Zainab was taken from her home in Wellington by RUF and ex-SLA combatants and then taken to Calaba Town with two neighbors the same age. She said that she was raped by two older men who were very brutal. She was a virgin. They beat her and carved "RUF" on her chest with a knife. She said that she remained in Calaba Town for three days and then walked 20 miles to Waterloo carrying cartons of water. She had to forage for food and ate Cassava plants by the roadside. She stayed in Waterloo for one week and then walked for three days to Masiaka. There, she recounted, the CDF attacked. About 100 girls escaped, leaving 50 with the rebels. From then on, she said, soldiers guarded them and told them they would shoot them if they tried to escape.

They then walked for two weeks to Makeni. She told PHR that she knew she was pregnant because she had morning sickness. She stayed with

¹⁹⁹ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

²⁰⁰ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone



Chen Reis

The PHR/UNAMSIL team randomly sampled 1,048 households in three internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps (near Freetown, Port Loko, and Kenema) and one community with a large number of IDPs—Mile 91 Township. The camps/locales represented 91% of the registered IDP population.




Beth Varin

A total of 991 female heads of households participated in the PHR study (response rate = 95%). Nine percent of respondents reported war-related sexual violence. A striking 53% of respondents reporting “face to face” contact specifically with RUF forces reported experiencing sexual violence. One third of the women who reported sexual assault reported being gang raped.




Beth Vann

The majority of the women interviewed by PHR/UNAMSIL perceived their general health (89%) and mental health (94%) as "fair" or "poor".



PHR program associate Kristina Hare Lyons (left) interviews a Sierra Leonean woman in March 2000.

5 02



Cheri Reis


PHR consultants Beth Vann (left) and Yinka Akinsulure-Smith led training sessions for local Sierra Leonean researchers who later conducted the survey.

PHOTO COURTESY OF THE PHR CONSULTANTS




Chen Rets

PHR/UNAMSIL survey researchers prepare to conduct interviews at an IDP camp.



Kristina Hare Lyons

The Forum for African Women's Educationalists (FAWE) is a pan-African NGO that has been successful in promoting education for girls. FAWE expanded their mandate to respond to the needs of rape victims after the January 1999 incursion by rebels into Freetown and became the primary organization providing medical and counseling services to rape survivors.




Kristina Hare Lyons

The US government and other donors should ensure that women are included in all aspects of planning for peace, demobilization, reintegration and rebuilding and support local organizations working to promote women's full participation and rights.




Kristina Hare Lyons

Sierra Leone's rich diamond resources have largely been fueling the brutal war. Diamonds, discovered in Sierra Leone in 1930, are found in about a third of the country's territory—mostly in the east and southeast. Governments, activists and representatives of the diamonds industry are working to regulate the import and export of the gems.



Chen Reis

In 2001, Sierra Leone was the least developed country in the world, according to the United Nations Human Development Index. Sierra Leoneans average life expectancy of 38.3 years is the lowest in the world and the under five mortality rate is the highest in the world. Nearly one third of children in Sierra Leone die before their fifth birthday. Twelve percent of children under 14 years of age, such as the orphans pictured here, have one or both parents dead.



Kristina Hare Lyons

Destroyed buildings in Freetown, such as the one pictured, are still occupied. Sierra Leone's infrastructure has been devastated by the war. Thirty-six percent of Sierra Leoneans do not have access to health care. Thirty-four percent do not have access to clean water. The average per capita income is \$448. More than 3,000 communities were destroyed resulting in flight from homes of nearly half the country's population.

one man, Mohammed, who was ex-SLA. She said that she begged him to release her but he said she should stay until she had the baby, so she could leave the child with the rebels. She told PHR that if she refused to have sex he would beat her – though he stopped beating her when she was four months pregnant. No other men touched her after that. Mohammed's boss took care of her and gave her food. From Makeni she was brought to a base in Occra Hills.

One day when she was about six months pregnant she said that she was sent to do laundry by the stream. She left the clothes and took a bush path with another girl. They came to an area where soldiers had surrendered and found transportation back to Freetown. She said that she found her mother who was pleased to see her, but her aunt said her mother should not take her in. She said that her mother, however, insisted and her father has also been supportive. She was scared to go home, but since she went to FAWE and got counseling she feels much better. She came to FAWE two weeks after arriving back in Freetown. A neighbor in Wellington had told her and her mother about the program and brought her to the office. At first she could not sleep and would always wake up at night, but now after the FAWE counseling sessions she is able to relax.

Her baby, Fatmata, was four months old at the time of the interview. Zainab had no problems with the delivery and likes being a mother. She knew she wanted to keep the baby when she was pregnant. She said she is scared Mohammed will come for the baby. Though she does not think he should be punished, she never wants to see him again and wants to try to forget about him. She also has anxieties about what will happen when the program ends. At the time of the interview she was not interested in getting married in the future, but in gaining skills so she can support her child.²⁰¹

Other Human Rights Abuses

The PHR study revealed the severity of human rights abuses in addition to sexual violence experienced by IDPs at the hands of combatants. Ninety-four percent of households interviewed by the PHR/UNAMSIL team were affected by one or more serious physical abuses. The trauma experiences by those who suffered sexual violence must, therefore, be understood in the context of trauma suffered from a range of abuses committed against the individual, her family and community. In addition to the reported levels of trauma and physical abuse experienced, many of those PHR interviewed spoke of loss. This loss went beyond the loss of basic human needs such as housing, food and medical care. It concerned safety, trust, control, self-esteem, and intimacy. Participants interviewed expressed shock, anger, horror, sadness, and a sense of countless additional losses – loss of property, society, family, loved ones, health and a sense of well being. In a society

²⁰¹ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

where the extended family plays an integral function, this primary means of support was irrevocably damaged. Several women who had not suffered sexual violence spoke of the range of abuses they and their families had experienced and the multiple losses they faced. A young woman, Marie K., described to PHR her and her family's experience:

...They killed many of us, many people...about 100, we were in an unfinished house when they came and kicked at the doors and demanded to know who was in there. They yelled that if we didn't come out they would kill us or burn the house down. Someone near the door opened it. The rest of us were hiding in a room, huddled together. They came in and began to hit us with their weapons yelling "get out, if you don't come out we will kill you." Those who refused to come out, they lit the house up and burned it with them inside the house...²⁰²

Aminata B.

Aminata B., a 21 year-old Limba woman who was 12 years old when the war started, told of the destruction of her family's farm by rebels

...I grew up with my parents in the Kenema area – Bahamaconta. When the war came, we had to run away, everything we had was burned down or taken away. My father was killed and we couldn't even bury him, we had to just leave him behind...we don't know whether he was ever buried. My mother, sisters and I fled to Makeni. When we lived in Bahamaconta I used to go to school, but when we fled to Makeni, my mother could no longer afford to send my sisters and me to school. We tried to sell water (put in small plastic bags for drinking purposes) to make money to survive...²⁰³

Musu

Musu was abducted when she was 12 years old and at the time she was interviewed by PHR in March 2000 she had twin nine-month-old boys. She told PHR her story:

I had gotten up and bathed and was getting ready to go to school when the rebels came. I heard shooting and hid under my bed. They searched my house. They shouted, they'd launch an attack on the house and set it on fire if we didn't go with them. I was so frightened I felt I had to use the toilet – the rebels told me I could relieve myself right there in front of them. They took me out of my house and threatened to kill me if I resisted. I saw a neighbor and warned her to run. She was seated and had already surrendered. I surrendered also. We were forced to walk in

²⁰² PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

²⁰³ PHR Interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

the bush for one week and three days. My feet swelled with pain until my toenails came off. We traveled from Kambia to Malal Hill in Makeni. We stayed one week then we trained as commandos for one month and three days, after which we were attacked by government troops. They (rebels) moved out in the middle of the night and traveled on foot to Rotifunk where we all stayed for one year and six months. In 1997, I was with the rebels when they attacked Freetown, but I returned with the rebels because I saw no family there. I never killed anyone. I [lied to them and] told them I had surgery on my eyes and could not see to shoot. They believed me because my eyes were always swollen and red [from crying] because of the things I saw. When the rebels returned to Freetown in 1999 I was pregnant. I convinced a lady to allow me to stay with her. I told her no harm would come to her. I stayed in her house until one day I ran into my aunt on the street. I told her my story and she invited me to come stay with her.²⁰⁴

Women's Attitudes about Punishment of Perpetrators

A striking finding from both the in-depth interviews and survey was how many women did not want their perpetrator to be punished. The survey revealed that only 42% of those who responded to this question thought their perpetrators should be punished. Because of the destruction of the war, many Sierra Leoneans do not have experience with a functioning judiciary – this may have been a factor in some women's responses. Some of the women indicated to PHR that what they had experienced was so horrific that they did not believe justice to be possible, others feared retaliation by their perpetrators. Most did not seek justice or revenge, but rather peace and reconciliation, a theme that was echoed in the long form testimonies.

Mary J., 16 years old at the time of the interview, explained her reasoning for not wanting to seek punishment for her persecutors:

...My parents died during the war – they were killed by rebels. I was there and saw it. They captured me and took me with them to the bush. I was a virgin. Two men used me, they ruined me. I escaped when we came near Freetown...so many problems since. I became ill, stomach aches...Finally I was taken to the hospital. I wanted to die. In the hospital, they told me they had to do emergency surgery, my people did not have any money...If they catch them and try to do to them what they did to me, it won't even come near the hell I've been through. So they should just leave them. If they try to punish them, the punishment that I have gotten is more than theirs. I wanted to die during that time. If the emergency operation had not been performed, I would have died...If I

²⁰⁴ PHR Interview March 2001, Port Loko, Sierra Leone.

*ask for punishment for them, it will never amount to what I went through, so the best thing is just to leave them so that we can have peace in Sierra Leone.*²⁰⁵

A desire for a return to peace was also expressed by Fatmata, a 21 year-old woman with two children:

*I was dragged out of the house, but when they saw me, they said that they wanted a virgin, even then I was told to undress...a gun was put to my head, I was kidnapped and constantly threatened with rape...I just want peace in the country, I want things to go back to the way they were in the old days...*²⁰⁶

Madina K., a young woman, was one of the women who expressed a desire to bring one of those involved in her attack to justice:

*...They'd wanted to burn the house down with me in it...I was beaten, raped, forced to go with them. They told me to do bad things, they threatened me with death and beat me. Two men raped me. The first one would go and call other men to come and join in. Others intervened and saved me...I don't want revenge. I don't even remember who they were. The only one I want punished is the one who kidnapped me. I want him to be punished for his wickedness...*²⁰⁷

Some victims revealed that their attackers made explicit threats. A 30 year-old woman from the north was raped and beaten by two RUF members in 1997. Her husband was also beaten and their home burned and looted. She told PHR, "They [the attackers] were saying to me after they raped me if I will say it to anyone, they will come and kill me."

In spite of the risks, women did offer to give their names to the Special Court or the TRC. One victim who agreed to testify said enthusiastically: "I am ready to go anywhere in the world to explain myself."

The PHR survey administered in 2001 concluded with a series of six open-ended questions for those respondents who reported war-related sexual violence to provide more details about their experiences and additional information about their health, their future, and other concerns. All participants were also encouraged to provide additional comments at the end of the interview. The experiences and concerns women described in their answers to these questions are briefly described here.

Identity and Affiliation of Attackers

Participants were asked to provide identifying information about their attackers and their affiliation:

²⁰⁵ PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

²⁰⁶ PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

²⁰⁷ PHR interview, March 2000, Freetown, Sierra Leone

Do you know anything that could identify your attackers? Did they call each other by name? How do you know which military group your attackers were with?

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Many respondents were able to provide first names of their attackers – both real names and *noms de guerre* such as Blood, Pepper, Nasty, Bullet, Cut Hand, Poison, God Father, Rebel Baby, Dry Gin, Rambo and Commando Around the World. While one woman was gang-raped by eight members of the RUF, she only named one perpetrator: “His name is Body Naked and if I see him now I will identify him.” Several women offered the full names of their attackers as well as descriptions of them.

The affiliation of perpetrators was understood primarily through verbal communication, “They call their leader’s name, Foday Sankoh and their commander Superman;” “They call themselves West Side Boys and they took me to their base and I was with them until I escaped.” A twenty-five year-old woman from Port Loko who was captured by the AFRC in 1998 and whose husband was tortured said that the perpetrators referred to themselves as “our junta the AFRC.” Two women specifically identified members of the Sierra Leone Army, though it is possible that they were part of the military that turned on the government: “They said they were the Sierra Leone Military Group.”

Dress also played a role in linking individuals to a group in the minds of those who were attacked. One woman told PHR, “They were running after us and they were calling Superman, Colonel Issa, and everybody knows that these people were RUF, because they were always at the bush and wore T-shirts with “RUF” printed on them. I was given one to wear by Gold Teeth.” A 16-year-old from Port Loko who was gang raped by five attackers and held for months was able to identify her attackers “because they were wearing Tupac [Shakur] T-shirts, so I know they were rebels.” The RUF were identified numerous times as wearing red scarves tied around their heads. “They identify each other by names. One called himself Abdullah, another Mohammed and the last Sorie. They all had red cloths on the forehead. The Ex-SLA wore their uniforms and identified themselves as Ex-SLA,” recounted a woman who had been abducted and gang raped. Another woman who had a similar experience in which she was jointly attacked by RUF and Ex-SLA claimed: “They had red cloth on their forehead and call their leaders name, which is Poppeh,²⁰⁸ meaning Foday Sankoh.” Another woman told PHR, “They had red headbands and green uniforms on and said they were fighting for Foday Sankoh (and) that they were going to fight until Tejan Kabbah goes away.”

Of the 93 survivors of sexual violence interviewed in the PHR survey

²⁰⁸ The name of Poppeh, apparently a nickname for Foday Sankoh, was mentioned by many women in the questionnaire. While it was spelled differently by the various researchers, it is reasonable to assume that they are all referring to the same name.

who were able to identify the affiliation of their perpetrator(s) in the PHR survey, the RUF was named 63 times, four of which were in complicity with ex-SLA soldiers. The West Side Boys were named 14 times, the AFRC eight times, Liberians two times, and the Sierra Leone military twice, though it is unclear whether their loyalty was with the government at the time of the attacks. Most attackers identified themselves verbally as well as by their dress, but also, in the incidents perpetrated by RUF fighters, by declaring their loyalty to their leader. Several victims concluded the affiliation of their perpetrators because they were "based near by."

While no direct evidence of command responsibility was provided to PHR, several women pointed a finger at rebel leadership. A 30 year-old woman from the North who was abducted, raped and beaten by RUF stated, "I just know that the leader of the fighters is the fault because if he stopped them, they would never do it - because he supported it - that's why."

Many participants were clear about the affiliation of their attackers. It must, however, be understood that many of the rebel factions collaborating and loyalties shifted at various times of the war. As such, in some cases, it may be difficult to determine perpetrator affiliation with certainty.

Relationship between Victim and Perpetrator

The complexity of the relationship between victim and perpetrator that has on occasion developed in the bush must be noted. It has been reported that some women and girls who were abducted chose to remain with their captors. There are a number of possible explanations. The PHR survey revealed that some who became pregnant as a result of rape consider themselves married to their captors and believe they have no choice but to remain with their "husbands." Other possible factors contributing to the reported phenomena of abductees voluntarily remaining with their captors include: identification with the abductor, drug addiction, the more desirable food options reportedly available in the bush, fear that they will be rejected by their families and communities if they go home, and the fact that many abductees, particularly those who were abducted as young girls are now accustomed to their new way of life and surrogate families.²⁰⁹

For example, one 16 year-old girl from the Port Loko area with no schooling was raped and abducted by a member of the RUF. She thinks commanders were aware of the attacks and she "can identify her attacker because she knows his name and he forced her to marry him." While she expressed fear of contracting a disease and of future sexual violence by combatants, she does not think her perpetrator should be punished now because he is her legal husband and they have a child together.

²⁰⁹ PHR conversations Corinne Dufka of Human Rights Watch, January, 2001 and with NGO representatives who were providing services to returned abductees, March 2000.

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A 16-year-old from the Eastern area was abducted by the RUF in 1999 with her sister and forced to marry her captor. She also claims the commander was aware of the attack. She does not think her attacker should be punished because of fear of reprisals and in the spirit of reconciliation:

In the bush he was called Lt. Papay, ... He said they were Mosquito's group. That he was pure rebel and would marry me and carry me into the bush and live with me there because they are bad people and want to destroy me and even the country.

What Perpetrators Said During the Attacks

More than half of the women who reported sexual violence answered the question, "What did [your attackers] say to you, or to each other?" About a fourth of these reported that their attackers explicitly claimed to be targeting supporters of Pa (Tejan) Kabba. Of these, many women were directly told to go tell Pa Kabba about what had happened to them: One woman told PHR "They told me to go complain to Tejan Kabbah after they have burnt my clothes and house, then raped me." Another reported that "they told me if I refuse to lie down they will kill me and after they finished they told me to go and report to Pa Kabba." This was almost identical to what was reported to PHR by another woman: "They told me they are going to kill me if I refuse to follow them and they told me to lie down. They also used all sort of obscene language at me and they told me to go and tell Tejan Kabba." These remarks suggest that the attacks were politically motivated.

Other women reported comments made by their attackers that suggest political motivation. According to one participant, "they asked me, 'whom are you going to vote for?'" Another told PHR "they said they are coming with their boss Foday Sankoh to take over from Pa Kabbah, and that we should support them." A 22 year-old woman who was abducted by the RUF with her husband's other wife quoted her attackers; "We will never release you until we marry you... Because Foday Sankoh is not president, that's why we are doing this to women." Another told PHR "they said they were fighting because the government was corrupt." A 19 year-old woman was raped along with all seven other female members of her household. "They were saying we are not ready for disarmament until they release Foday Sankoh from prison to come to us."

Many also reported to PHR that they were threatened with violence or death by their attackers if they did not cooperate, as evidenced by some of the statements above. A woman from Port Loko whose husband was beaten, whose sons were abducted and are still missing, and who was raped along with her daughter and her husband's other wife reported the

rebels saying to her “that if I don’t allow them to rape me they were going to kill me, so I allowed them.”

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Why Did Respondents Think Combatants Attacked Women?

In response to the question posed by the PHR/UNAMSIL team, “Why do you think combatants did these things – sexually abusing women and girls – during this war?” the majority of women did not reply or stated that they did not know. Many of those who answered gave the question over to God, saying only God knew why the assailants did those things. Among those who ventured an opinion, most maintained that the combatants targeted women because women are weak, they cannot fight back, or run away. Some women stated simply that the men wanted sex. A smaller, but significant, group of respondents indicated that the men committed acts of sexual violence because they did not respect women or their mothers. Other women cited the sense of omnipotence felt by their attackers. As one woman explained, “They are rebels. They could do anything.” Another said, “because they wanted young women and they have money and guns.”

Several responses suggested the actions of the perpetrators were strategic: “They use women as human shields in their campaign against the government and whenever they have planned attacks women lead in order to be spies.” “They know what they did it for – they hold the gun and their motive was to see women and rape them.”

Women’s Concerns about the Future and about Their Health

The majority of women who responded to the two questions about their biggest worries about the future in general and about their health referred to the financial and personal insecurity they faced as a result of the war. Women expressed fear that the war would not end and that they would experience future attacks and abuse. They spoke of their lack of livelihoods, homes, and husbands to provide for them. As one woman told PHR “Presently my husband is no more. Who will take care of me in the future? They have looted my properties and I do not have anything for now.” A number of women expressed fear about how they would provide for themselves or for their children, including offspring from the rapes they experienced. One woman told PHR, “I am homeless, bankrupt, and where can I get help to take care of my unborn child?”

In their responses about overall worries about the future, some respondents linked their fears about their vulnerability as “violated” women without a male partner or family with concern about their health:

There will be no better future for me because I am broken. No man will marry me or take me seriously. I don't want to become sick, to get what they call AIDS. People will begin to say a lot about me if they know what happened to me.

The concern about having contracted a sexually transmitted disease or AIDS was a prominent concern expressed by several participants in response to the question about specific health worries. Women described experiencing diffuse abdominal and pelvic pains and expressed worry that these represented sexually transmitted diseases. Yet, they were afraid of the stigma associated with seeking help for rape-related health problems:

I don't want to have AIDS. I am afraid to go to the hospital. I don't want people to know if it is true that I have AIDS. I don't know whether I have AIDS or not.

Other women expressed a desire for medical treatment, but spoke of their lack of access to medical assistance at the IDP camps. Many of the respondents, both those who had directly suffered sexual trauma and those who had not, spoke in general terms of being physically and mentally sick, but with little hope of receiving necessary medical care.

In addition to the series of open-ended questions asked by PHR of those who survived sexual violence, all participants were given the opportunity to provide additional comments at the end of the interview.

Many respondents expressed a strong desire for an end to the war so they can return home and resume their previous routine including work, food and housing: "I want the government to help with all possible means to put an end to this war. I am fed up being displaced. I want to go back. I want perfect peace so that our children can go back to school and we would no longer have fear."

Many, however, did not know the state of their homes, which they feared or knew had been burned or looted: "When the rebels attacked us at night, I left naked and ran into the bush. They burned and looted everything in our house." In the camps many women have little to do but gather firewood to occupy their time, which some sell to earn money. Some complained of food shortages and lack of access to medicines: "I worry about my daughter because she never discloses anything about her experience when she was abducted. I want the government to help me with money so that I will be able to take her to the hospital for medical check up since she refuses to talk to me. I need clothes for my children and also for myself." Another expressed her desperation:

Since four years back they abducted my son – until now I don't know if he's dead or alive. I want to see him. The condition we are living in is deplorable. We are praying and asking for rapid deployment – we want to return. There is nothing to live on unless the mere bulgur. My sides are paining me from laying on the ground – we have no place to sleep.

A number of women who had lost their husbands in the war stressed the need for education and skills training for women and assistance in sup-

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porting their children: “Now that they have killed my two children and also my husband is dead, how am I going to maintain the other children as we need assistance?”

Now I have lost my husband so I do not have a husband. I have no money. I am also an old woman. All that I had was left to the mercy of the rebels because I had to run when they were behind us. As you can see, my feet are swollen, I cannot walk – I cannot do anything. The first thing is that I do not have money – If I had money I would start doing something. All I can say now is that I wish the war would end.

Women requested loans for business purposes, as well as a need for assistance with school fees so they could send their children back to school: “We are praying that this war ends. We will also like to see rehabilitation take place in our community. We want our homes rebuilt, but most of all education for our children. We know that once they are educated, they in return will help build our nation.” Several women not only recognized the importance of education for the long-term success of the country, but specifically noted education for girls:

We want education in our land. The saying goes that when you educate a woman, you educate a nation. We want our girl children to go to school, learn skills – and even we parents, if need be. We want loan schemes because some of us were traders, but today the rebels have suffered us.

Many of the additional comments could be categorized to reveal the most common concerns among IDP women who did not report sexual violence. The prevailing response was a desire for the war to end (168/424): “My heart’s desire now is to see that the war ends so that we can go back home. Those who took the guns on us, we want God to take the guns from them so that we can go to our homes in peace.” A quarter (108/424) said that they wanted to return home: “Only begin the perpetrators to come out of the bush and lay down their weapons for us to go home – we’re homesick.” Education for children was also mentioned (30/424) – and education/skills for the participant by (10/424). A thirty-four year-old woman with five young children who had been displaced since January 1999 and is separated from her husband said that she “needs help from any NGO to set up women’s groups for the promotion of women’s activities to become self-reliant.”

Fifty-eight women expressed a need for clothing, food or other household items including pots for cooking, utensils and bedding. Twenty requested financial assistance and 15 medical assistance. Fifteen requested assistance with building and repair.

Of those who reported sexual violence, 79 provided additional comments. The comments they provided were related to the preceding ques-

tions which focused on details about their perpetrator and their concerns about their health and their future. The most common comments among this group also had to do with a desire for an end to the war and for going home. Other concerns cited in descending order of frequency were: health/medical, schooling/training, clothing, shelter, cooking tools, financial support/loans, child care, food, family tracing, justice, and fear of future attacks. "Help me with school fees as I want to be a lawyer in the future. My mother is poor and do not have money. Protect women also."

Many of these women also asked for assistance to simply begin rebuilding their lives, in some cases their pleas reflect an acute helplessness and desperation more evident among those who reported sexual violence. Many have lost their husbands, their homes, their children, their possessions and in some cases their ability to work due to disability and disease. "I am going to let the human rights people help me for medication. I am slowly dying – please help." "Let the government and other NGOs decide on any help for us." "We have suffered greatly during this war – even something to eat and wear we do not have, so please help us." "Provide enough medicines because only panadol (paracetamol²¹⁰) is available. Rebuild our homes, send doctors who are very well with their jobs." "Please UNAMSIL, help us. We are tired of this war. We want to return back. Please UN come help us with this war – help us return to our homes."

Even those who felt less defeated pleaded for help: "I am thanking all those who ask you people to come and interview us about our experiences in the war in Jesus name. I greet them all. I pray God will touch the heart of the human rights people to think of our plight and bring immediate help for us."

²¹⁰ Also known as acetaminophen or Tylenol.

V. APPLICATION OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW

The acts of sexual violence, killings, and torture documented in this report that were perpetrated against civilians in Sierra Leone are crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined by international legal standards.²¹¹

Traditionally, rape and other forms of sexual violence were regarded as legitimate spoils of war, and sexual access to the vanquished women viewed as an incentive to capture a town. During the Middle Ages, wartime rape was increasingly prohibited, though rarely punished. Sexual violence was generally viewed as an unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of war. Although evidence of rape, enforced prostitution, sexual slavery, forced abortion, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, sexual mutilation, and sexual humiliation was entered into the official transcripts of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials held after World War II, attempts to prosecute the crimes were very limited.²¹²

As recent events in such conflicts as those in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have demonstrated, sexual violence is increasingly used as a powerful weapon of war, a means to cause serious bodily and mental harm to not only women, but to all members of the opposing group. Rape and other forms of sexual violence, including reproductive crimes, are now regarded as means of inflicting terror and destruction upon the civilian population and the armed forces protecting them.²¹³ Partly as a result of reports of women being detained and systematically raped in the Balkan conflict and during the Rwanda genocide, the international community has recognized these acts as serious crimes which merit prosecution and punishment. This acknowledgement has led to the inclusion of gender-based crimes in not only the Statute of the International Criminal Court, but also the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia²¹⁴ and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.²¹⁵ Several judgments rendered by these tribunals have recognized various forms of

²¹¹ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 7/17/98). See www.untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm

²¹² See Askin, K.D., *War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (1997).

²¹³ See discussion in Askin, K.D., "Women and International Humanitarian Law," in Askin, K. & Koenig, D., eds. *Women and International Human Rights Law*, vol. I, 1999.

²¹⁴ Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (adopted 5/25/93) www.un.org/icty

sexual violence as instruments of genocide, means of torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, regardless of the nature of the conflict as international or internal.²¹⁶ Sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, is specifically included in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Humanitarian law

The legal instruments that constitute what is referred to as international humanitarian law, or laws of war, set out protections that apply in times of conflict. These overlap and supplement the protections offered by human rights law.

In the case of an internal conflict, such as the one in Sierra Leone, the protections that exist are less complete. Nonetheless, rape, extrajudicial killing, and torture are clearly prohibited under any circumstance. The origin of these standards is codified in Article 3 common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which afford protections to civilians, prisoners of war, and others rendered *hors de combat* in internal armed conflicts.²¹⁷ The 1977 Additional Protocol I which regulates international armed conflicts and Additional Protocol II, which regulates non-international armed conflict, expand on these protections.²¹⁸ Sierra Leone is a party to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions²¹⁹ and both Additional Protocols.²²⁰

Common Article 3 which applies to all parties in internal conflicts such as Sierra Leone's, prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." Additional Protocol I that regulates international armed conflict specifies that "Women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent

²¹⁵ Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 11/8/94). See www.ictz.org

²¹⁶ See especially Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, ICTR-96-4-T, September 2, 1998; Prosecutor v. Anto Furund'ija, Judgement, IT-95-17/1-T, December 10, 1998; Prosecutor v. Zejnir Delalic et al., Judgement, IT-96-21-T, November 16, 1998; Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgement, IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, February 22, 2001.

²¹⁷ See e.g., Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS (1950) 287-417.

²¹⁸ 1977 Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS (1979) 609-99 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].

²¹⁹ Succession: June 10, 1965

²²⁰ Ratified: October 21, 1986

assault.”²²¹ Additional Protocol II which applies in certain internal armed conflicts expands upon and explicitly forbids “violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation”²²² and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”²²³ The jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR has reinforced the principle that serious violations of these provisions constitute war crimes. As such, the acts of rape, killing and torture documented in this report, which were committed with a nexus to the armed conflict, are war crimes and international crimes prosecutable regardless of the presence of an armed conflict if committed in the context of crimes against humanity or genocide.

Human Rights Law

Sierra Leone has signed or ratified several international human rights treaties that prohibit the abuses committed against civilians documented in this report. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),²²⁴ the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),²²⁵ and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).²²⁶ These treaties protect the right to life, and the right to be free from torture and arbitrary detention. Sierra Leone is also a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).²²⁷

International human rights law distinguishes certain rights as non-derogable. These must be respected in all circumstances including times of conflict. The right to life is one such right and is set out in the ICCPR²²⁸ and, in the case of children, the CRC.²²⁹ Another non-derogable right identified in the ICCPR is the right to be free from torture.²³⁰ This right is set out in more detail in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Sexual violence including rape is

²²¹ Additional Protocol I, Article 76 (1)

²²² Additional Protocol II, Article 4(2)(a).

²²³ Ibid, article 4(2)(e).

²²⁴ Acceded: August 23, 1996.

²²⁵ Signed: March 18, 1985; ratified by parliament March 1, 2001

²²⁶ Signed: February 13, 1990; ratified: June 18, 1990

²²⁷ Signed: September 22, 1988; Ratified: November 11, 1988. Sierra Leone's initial and second and third periodic reports were due December 11, 1989, 1993 and 1997 respectively

²²⁸ ICCPR, Article 6(1)

²²⁹ CRC, Article 6(1)

²³⁰ ICCPR, Article 7

also recognized as a form of torture in reports by the Special Rapporteur on Torture, and in cases before the European Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The Slavery Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”²³¹ As recognized in the Kunarac Case, indicia of slavery may include “sex; prostitution; and human trafficking” as well as “control of sexuality.”²³² The case stood for the proposition that enslaving women and girls and subjecting them to rape constituted sexual slavery. Also, article 8 of the ICCPR states that “No one shall be held in servitude”²³³ and prohibits forced labor.²³⁴

Non-State Actors

Regarding international humanitarian law, the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions apply to all parties to a conflict, this includes armed opposition forces such as the RUF and the AFRC. As such, these non-state actors may be held accountable for their violations of international humanitarian law.²³⁵

The Kunarac Case in the ICTY recently emphasized that under international humanitarian law, the “presence of a state official or of any other authority-wielding person in the torture process is not necessary for the offense to be regarded as torture.”²³⁶ Thus, whereas human rights law might require state action or sanction of torture, international humanitarian law and international criminal law does not. This is consistent with the Statute for the International Criminal Court, which also deleted the state-actor requirement.²³⁷ All persons, regardless of whether acting in an official capacity or not, can and should be held individually criminally liable for international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The perpetrators of the crimes documented in the PHR survey can and should be prosecuted for their crimes.

The PHR study documented that 6% of abuses were committed by government forces. However, most abuses for which the affiliation of perpetrators was identified were committed by the RUF or unspecified rebels

²³¹ Slavery Convention Article 1(1) www.hri.ca/uninfo/treaties/28.shtml

²³² Kunarac et al, paras. 542-43.

²³³ ICCPR, Article 8(2)

²³⁴ ICCPR Article 8(3)

²³⁵ E/CN.4/2001/73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences Violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the State during times of armed conflict (1997-2000)

²³⁶ Kunarac et al., para. 496.

²³⁷ Rome Statute untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/rome-en.htm

(86%). As an armed opposition group, the RUF is not a party to the human rights instruments above, however the characteristics of the RUF and the nature, pattern, and seriousness of the abuses are such that the RUF may be held to the standards contained therein.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone

Background

At the request of the Government of Sierra Leone, the United Nations proposed establishing an international court for prosecution of those responsible for the commission of atrocities during the war. UN Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on August 14, 2000, requested negotiations for creation of a court to prosecute “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law,”²³⁸ and to try those “persons who bear the greatest responsibility”²³⁹ for these crimes.

Following negotiations, it was determined that the court for Sierra Leone would differ from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in several ways.

The Sierra Leonean Court would be based on a treaty or agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone. As such, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, it cannot assert primacy over national courts of other states nor can it order accused individuals located in another state to surrender.

Staff for the Special Court, including the judges and prosecutors, will be composed of both Sierra Leoneans and people from other countries.²⁴⁰ The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction will include acts in violation of international humanitarian law as well as certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.²⁴¹

The Special Court will try cases of events occurring since November 30, 1996.²⁴² Although the conflict started in 1991, it was believed that extending the temporal jurisdiction to that time would impose too much of a burden on the court.

Security Council Resolution 1315 refers to voluntary contributions of funds, services and equipment,²⁴³ implying that the Security Council intended this to be the primary method of meeting the Special Court’s

²³⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on August 14, 2000 Available at www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/res1315e.pdf.

²³⁹ Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Article 1 Available at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

²⁴⁰ Ibid Arts 2 & 3

²⁴¹ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Article 1 Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf.

²⁴² This is the date of the signing of the Abidjan accords, the first peace agreement between the RUF and the Sierra Leonean Government.

²⁴³ UN Security Council Resolution 1315 8(c)

costs.²⁴⁴ The UN Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs has estimated that the Special Court's budget for the first three years will be about \$57 million of which some \$16.8 million will be required for the first year of operation.²⁴⁵ As of the end of November 2001, the UN had received contributions for \$14.8 million for the Court's first year. It had only received pledges for some \$20.4 million for the next two years. Initial steps toward the establishment of the court have taken place despite lack of funding.²⁴⁶

Gender-Based Crimes in the Special Court

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone explicitly includes gender-based violence in its definition of several categories of crimes that the Court has the power to prosecute.

The Statute, in its listing of Crimes against Humanity, includes "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence"²⁴⁷ as prosecutable crimes when "committed...as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population."²⁴⁸

The Court also expressly includes "rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault"²⁴⁹ as violations of humanitarian law as enshrined in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II.²⁵⁰ As mentioned above, the court has the power to try certain offenses under Sierra Leonean law. Some of these may be used to prosecute gender-based violence against girls under the age of fourteen.²⁵¹

The term "systematic" requires a qualitative judgment by adjudicators as to active and passive complicity and the extent to which these crimes were committed. It is important to consider the high rate of sexual violence documented by the PHR survey. The frequency of sexual violence and other human rights abuses, especially those committed by the RUF, suggests that commanders are likely to have been aware of the crimes perpetrated by the forces under their command.

²⁴⁴ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Renewed Commitment Needed to End Impunity*, 24/09/2001 Available at [www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/\\$File/AFR5100701.pdf](http://www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/$File/AFR5100701.pdf) p.7

²⁴⁵ Ibid, p.9

²⁴⁶ UN Daily Briefing, "Annan Authorizes Planning Mission for Sierra Leone Court", January 3, 2002, <http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites.htm>.

²⁴⁷ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Art 2 (g) Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/915e.pdf

²⁴⁸ Ibid, Article 2 chapeau

²⁴⁹ Ibid, Article 3 (e)

²⁵⁰ Ibid, Article 3 chapeau

²⁵¹ Ibid, Article 5

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Lome Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999, provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to “address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story [and] get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation”²⁵² by addressing human rights violations committed from the start of the conflict.

Enacted in 2000, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act²⁵³ provides more detail about the TRC, which will look at cases occurring prior to the signing of the Lome Agreement. As part of its mandate to “work to restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation,”²⁵⁴ the TRC will pay “special attention to the subject of sexual abuses.”²⁵⁵ Some education efforts about the TRC have begun²⁵⁶ and preliminary steps towards selection of Commissioners and preparation of a budget have been taken.²⁵⁷ The TRC, however, is not expected to begin operations until after the elections in 2002. Most importantly, the nature of the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court has not yet been resolved.²⁵⁸

It will be particularly important for both the Court and the Commission to consult with and hire persons with expertise in and sensitivity to gender-related crimes, including sexual violence and to ensure the protection of women that come forward to testify.

²⁵² Peace Agreement Between The Government Of Sierra Leone And The Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone Art. XXVI <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>

²⁵³ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000. Available at www.sierra-leone.org/trcacat2000.html

²⁵⁴ TRC Act Part III 6 (2)(b)

²⁵⁵ TRC Act Part III 6 (2)(b)

²⁵⁶ <http://www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html>

²⁵⁷ Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone p.7 www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/857e.pdf

²⁵⁸ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Renewed Commitment Needed to End Impunity*, 24/09/2001; pp. 13-14 [www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/\\$File/AFR5100701.pdf](http://www.web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AFR510072001ENGLISH/$File/AFR5100701.pdf)

VI. RESPONSES TO THE SIERRA LEONE COMPLEX HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY 5328

Humanitarian Assistance

Numerous non-governmental and international organizations are working in Sierra Leone to address the complex humanitarian emergency that has emerged from the ongoing conflict. These groups are doing their best to provide a range of basic services under extremely difficult conditions. There are, however, significant gaps in services due to funding, coordination and security problems. The task is made all the more challenging by the frequent movement of populations including the periodic surges of returnees from neighboring countries. United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) is the lead coordinating body for humanitarian relief in Sierra Leone with Sierra Leone's National Committee for Relief Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (NCRRR).

After the peace process deteriorated in May 2000 most relief agencies were forced to evacuate the country and humanitarian assistance temporarily ceased. Relief activities resumed, however, in the second half of 2000 as agencies regained access to affected areas. The cease-fire agreements between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone as well as the recent opening of roads has allowed much improved access to areas of the country previously beyond the reach of aid agencies.²⁵⁹

Numerous agencies are working to build shelter; feed and provide healthcare for the displaced; reintegrate adult and child soldiers; reunite families; care for orphans; mitigate the ill effects of the civil war, particularly for children, women and the injured; provide food security; educate the population and rebuild the infrastructure of the country.²⁶⁰ Meeting the food needs of the displaced, one of the greatest challenges to the relief community, has been managed by four implementing agencies: Care, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), World Vision and the UN World Food Program (WFP). The provisions of shelter, education and healthcare have also been priorities.

Basic health services are offered in clinics set up temporarily in some IDP and demobilization camps by organizations such as International

²⁵⁹ Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY2001), April 20, 2001 p 1.

²⁶⁰ For a more detailed list of organizations working in Sierra Leone specifically on the issue of sexual violence, see Appendix C.

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Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), the International Medical Corps (IMC), and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), though like the PHUs they suffer from a shortage of trained staff, equipment and medications.²⁶¹ Some of those who were maimed in the fighting or who had their limbs amputated by rebel forces have received more comprehensive assistance from various NGOs including Handicap International (HI), MSF, and Christian Children's Fund (CCF). Such programs involve reconstructive surgery, prostheses, physical therapy, counseling and vocational training.

Despite several rebel incursions, the capital, Freetown, has been one of the most secure areas in the country and provided a base for the various aid organizations working in Sierra Leone. This concentration of services has led to problems of coordination in the Western area, as well as inadequate services in the provinces, although both issues are beginning to be addressed as the security situation continues to stabilize.²⁶² UNOCHA and UNHCR are making significant progress in developing maps on who is doing what and where in the humanitarian arena. The maps of individual international non-governmental organizations are now available, in electronic form, at the Humanitarian Information Center in Freetown.

NCRRR is providing emergency recovery funding and technical support in over one-third of the country, which is accessible in the following sectors: agriculture, capacity building, community infrastructure, education and health facilities rehabilitation water and sanitation, and roads.

Relief agencies, with the support of international donors, are also responding to the needs of half a million refugees in Guinea by setting up camps and providing food, medical care and education.²⁶³

International Community Response to the Crisis in Sierra Leone

Though a number of international and non-governmental organizations have had operations on the ground providing humanitarian and development assistance for decades, the international community has been particularly active in promoting peace in Sierra Leone since the signing of the Lome Accord in 1999. Efforts to end the crisis have included strengthening the UN peacekeeping mission, taking concerted action to curb the trade in diamonds used to procure arms, supporting the demobilization effort, and resolving to establish a Special Court for Sierra Leone in an effort to end impunity.

The United Kingdom (UK) has played a particularly prominent role in the marked improvements in the security situation over the past year. The

²⁶¹ During a March 2000 investigation, PHR observed that many clinics had no gloves, antibiotics or antibiotic cream.

²⁶² USAID, BHR, OFDA, Humanitarian Situation Report #1, October 3, 2001.

²⁶³ USAID, BHR, OFDA, Situation Report #1, October 3, 2001.

UK sent a team of Special Forces in response to the May 2000 crisis. Since then, the British have maintained a high-profile military presence and are actively screening new recruits and training the new Sierra Leonean army. While the United States has declined to send American soldiers to Sierra Leone, in an effort to build regional peacekeeping capacity the US has trained battalions of peacekeepers in Nigeria, Senegal²⁶⁴ and Ghana who could serve under the West African Regional Peace Keeping Force (ECOMOG) and/or or the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) in the future, and has provided logistical and technical support to UNAMSIL and ECOMOG.

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The US and the UK have also assumed a leadership role within the UN structure to address conflict diamonds as well as the involvement of Charles Taylor and Liberia in the conflict.

While many developed countries have been active diplomatically and through humanitarian efforts, only developing countries including: Nigeria, India, Kenya, Jordan, Zambia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ghana, Guinea, and Nepal have contributed troops to the peacekeeping force.

Multilateral and Bilateral Support

While the international community is actively engaged in ending the conflict and is funding UNAMSIL in the amount of millions of dollars per day, Sierra Leone has historically received inadequate humanitarian and development assistance.²⁶⁵ Of over \$64 million requested by UN agencies for humanitarian assistance for Sierra Leone in 2000, only 65% was funded through contributions – and a portion through carry-over funds for the previous year. The increased appeal (CAP) of \$74 million in 2001 was also underfunded by 35%, or approximately \$26 million.²⁶⁶ Most donors channeled assistance to Sierra Leone through either the United Nations agencies or international NGOs, rather than through bilateral assistance given the weak state of the government. The primary donors involved in Sierra Leone are the European Union, The African Development Bank, The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank. The World Bank's activities have focused on agriculture, education, infrastructure and health. In addition to advising the government on economic reform, the Bank has provided funds of over \$650 million to various initiatives since 1995²⁶⁷ and manages the

²⁶⁴ Fisher-Thompson, J, US Aid West African Force in Sierra Leone on Track www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/440FC9976409CA70C1256A1D003CB447

²⁶⁵ Pratt p. 24

²⁶⁶ 2001 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals for Humanitarian Assistance Summary of Revised Requirements and Contributions by Affected Country/Region. November 6, 2001.

²⁶⁷ World Bank web site www.worldbank.org, Countries: Sierra Leone

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trust fund for the DDR process.²⁶⁸ Among the largest government donors of assistance to Sierra Leone are the US, UK, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Canada, Japan, France, Denmark and the Netherlands. The European Commission has earmarked 15.5 million Euros in 2001 to meet the needs of refugees, IDPs and host communities in Sierra Leone and Guinea. In both countries funds are channeled through partner organizations including Premiere Urgence, Action Contre La Faim, Enfants Refugies du Monde, Oxfam, International Medical Corps (IMC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross which are providing food, water and health care to the targeted population, assistance for IDPs, assistance for humanitarian agencies working on the ground, and special support for children, amputees and war-affected women.²⁶⁹

While the international community has provided increased humanitarian aid, particularly in 2001 in response to the refugee crisis in Guinea, many urgent humanitarian and development needs remain unmet due to the sheer scale and complexity of the crisis. Furthermore, Sierra Leone has historically received less development assistance in real terms and per capita than other nations in the region. In fact, official development assistance figures reveal that aid to Sierra Leone declined from \$133.4 million (\$30.6 per capita) in 1992 to \$106.3 (\$21.9 per capita) million in 1998.²⁷⁰ Though countries including the US may have hesitated to invest in a country wracked by political instability and corruption, now that the security situation is improving, it is vital that Sierra Leone receive strategic capital infusions in order to consolidate the delicate peace.

The current level of international involvement coupled with the relatively conciliatory position of the RUF offers the most optimistic outlook for peace in years. With active support for development and good governance by the international community, Sierra Leone with all its potential could become a model for the positive involvement of the international community. In the absence of adequate funding, it is likely that conflict in the country could reoccur as well as a broadening of the conflict in the region with serious humanitarian and security implications.

In addition to short-term engagement to enforce peace and longer-term development and nation building efforts to foster a climate less conducive to conflict, there is a particular need for greater assistance for women and girls who, even before the war, were disadvantaged due to discriminatory laws and cultural practices. Women and girls who have lost their fathers, sons and husbands due to the war are now heading households with severely limited resources while trying to recover from displacement and

²⁶⁸ World Bank, "Fact Sheet: Sierra Leone Disarmament Program and Donor Conference" Washington DC June 5 2001 Available at www.worldbank.org/afr/sl_pr_factsheet.pdf.

²⁶⁹ IRIN-WA, "ECHO Director Visits Guinea, Sierra Leone," May 16, 2001.

²⁷⁰ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2000*.

human rights abuses. Funding is urgently required for medical treatment, housing and skills training for survivors of sexual violence and for improved education, law enforcement, and judicial processes in order to better protect the population from sexual violence in the future.

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United States Assistance

The US Government has provided more than \$300 million in humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone since the war began ten years ago from a number of departments within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the US Department of State. These include: the Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP), the Africa Bureau (USAID/AFR), and the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (State/PRM). The total USAID humanitarian assistance in FY 2000 was nearly \$40 million.²⁷¹ The total US Government humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone for FY 2001 was over \$75 million. That figure includes approximately \$20 million in support for humanitarian assistance programs²⁷² in agriculture, health, IDP resettlement, nutrition, shelter, water/sanitation, and education and training for ex-combatants, as well as electoral/political processes support and support for the reconciliation process, including human rights; \$37.3 million in food assistance,²⁷³ and nearly \$10 million for programs to assist returning refugees.²⁷⁴

The US also provided substantial support for Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea. In addition to \$60 million provided in response to UNHCR's Global Appeal for Africa for 2001, which was not earmarked, as well as \$33 million earmarked for West Africa, over \$22 million was allocated in 2001 (more than twice last year's figure) to address the refugee crisis in Guinea largely through international non-governmental organizations.²⁷⁵ Programs in Guinea and Sierra Leone addressing war-affected women that received funding from PRM in 2001 include the Center for Victims of Torture (approximately \$1.5 million) for psycho-social assistance to traumatized refugees in Guinea and Sierra Leone, the IRC (approximately \$250,000 for programs addressing sexual and gender-based violence, and IMC (\$725,000) for gynecological surgeries.²⁷⁶

²⁷¹ USAID Pledges \$2 million to Sierra Leone to Aid War-Affected, USAID Press Release June 27, 2000.

²⁷² Organizations receiving US funds include: Action Contre La Faim, Africare, CARE, CRS, Merlin, International Medical Corps, UNICEF, World Vision, and WFP.

²⁷³ Food assistance is distributed between WFP, CRS, CARE, and World Vision

²⁷⁴ Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY2002), October 3, 2001. P.12

²⁷⁵ From a phone conversation with Mary Lange of PRM/State, October 26, 2001. Organizations receiving PRM funds in Guinea and Sierra Leone include: UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, OCHA, FAO, ICRC, Center for Victims of Torture, WHO, The Red Cross, Action Contre La Faim, American Refugee Committee, IMC, Save the Children, IRC

²⁷⁶ From a phone conversation with Mary Lange of PRM/State, October 26, 2001

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USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), is focusing its activities on supporting reconciliation and reintegration activities. OTI began working in Sierra Leone in January, 1997 and will exit in March, 2002 after handing off activities to other donors. In FY 1999, OTI supported the Sierra Leonean peace process with 232 small grants to civil society groups working in the areas of human rights, peacebuilding and youth activism for community development. This assistance for civil society's peace-building initiatives is particularly related to reconciliation and reintegration of war-torn communities in the provinces, and civic education to prepare for upcoming elections has been ongoing since FY 2000 and 2001. Also in 1999, OTI sent representatives to the Lome Peace talks. In 2000, at the request of the Sierra Leonean government, OTI provided specific technical assistance to establish the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP).²⁷⁷

OTI has also been supporting a nationwide, non-formal education initiative intended to reach 40,000 ex-combatant and civilian young adults. This two-year program, which began in January, 2000 combines reintegration orientation and counseling, life-skills training, vocational counseling, agriculture skills and development, civic education, and functional literacy training. The Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) program focuses simultaneously on reintegration of ex-combatants and war-torn communities, and remedial education for youth who were unable to attend school due to the war. As of August 2001, 36,180 male and female war-affected youth and ex-combatants are participating in the program in over 1750 sites throughout the country. Approximately 18% of those enrolled were officially discharged combatants.²⁷⁸ The initiative addressed sexual violence only in one question as part of a 20-minute segment on responsible sexuality, which includes a discussion question related to sexual violence.²⁷⁹ This year the program has been expanded to include a second track of adult non-formal education, aimed at private and public sector leaders nationwide. So far, 180 civil servants, traditional and religious leaders, civil society leaders and leaders of professional groups, youth groups and women's groups are participating in the program.²⁸⁰ OTI has also funded efforts by the Sierra Leone Ministry

²⁷⁷ Documents provided to PHR by OTI summarizing their activities in Sierra Leone

²⁷⁸ Ibid

²⁷⁹ Email correspondence with Patrick Wingate, OTI/USAID to PHR, October 29, 2001.

²⁸⁰ OTI's international implementing partners in Sierra Leone are World Vision, Management Systems International (MSI), Common Ground Productions, and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES).

of Gender and Children's Affairs to create public awareness and build consensus on the role of women as peacemakers and agents of reform.

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The OTI FY 2001 budget for Sierra Leone of \$3,804,081²⁸¹ is divided between five principal efforts:²⁸²

- Assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone for development of a new diamond policy and operations to address the conflict diamond problem;
- A continuation of the Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program;
- A continuation of funding for a small grant program for civil society's peace building initiative with an added focus on the reintegration of war-affected women and girls and the development of community leadership;²⁸³
- Communication support through NCDDR for demobilization, reconciliation, and reintegration, and to media and distance learning support for OTI's non-formal education program; and
- Co-funding with the UK (DFID and other USAID offices) to provide election assistance for national parliamentary, local and paramount chief elections scheduled to be held in 2001.

The US also pays 27% of the cost of the peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. Though it is an assessed contribution, and therefore mandatory, several holds have been placed on the transfer of funds in the past year. Most of the funds were ultimately released, however, the problem of arrears adversely impacted the force and may have hampered the ability of the UN to get firm commitments of troops from member nations.²⁸⁴

The United Nations

The UN is deeply invested in Sierra Leone with the largest peacekeeping force in the world and most agencies operational on the ground including: UNHCR, OCHA, WFP, WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNDP. UNAMSIL is working to ensure that a human rights perspective is mainstreamed throughout the system and boasts the first permanent child rights protec-

²⁸¹ Sierra Leone-Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY 2001) April 20, 2001, p.2.

²⁸² In FY 2000, OTI provided \$3,284,000, and in FY 2001 is expected to contribute \$3,770,000.

²⁸³ OTI provided funding for programming for girls and women war victims to FAWE through World Vision, according to PHR correspondence 6/12/01 with Stephen Grant, USAID Sierra Leone Desk Officer.

²⁸⁴ According to the UN contributions office, as of August, 2001, the US had paid \$44 million for all peacekeeping operations in 2001 and owed \$1.8 billion, of which \$800 million was arrears.

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tion officer connected to a UN peacekeeping operation. The UN's recognition of the particular circumstances faced by women in the Sierra Leonean war is reflected in more recent programs that have been carefully designed to ensure that the needs of women are addressed. At least 15 projects presented for funding in the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for 2001 focus on the special needs of women.²⁸⁵ In addition, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, visited Sierra Leone in August 2001.

²⁸⁵ UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Sierra Leone 2001

VII. THE FUTURE FOR WOMEN IN SIERRA LEONE

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Women, already disadvantaged and vulnerable prior to the outbreak of fighting in Sierra Leone,²⁸⁶ have suffered in egregious ways, as documented in the PHR survey. Many women have lost the protection of husbands, fathers and sons – the PHR survey revealed that 23% of IDP women were widowed or separated due to the war. Not only are women targets of violence simply because of their gender, but the low social status of women interferes with their ability to obtain treatment and ensure protection from future attacks, particularly in the climate of social breakdown that has existed in the country for much of the past 10 years.

Thousands of former combatants who have spent years murdering and raping are returning to their communities without punishment or accountability for their crimes to live among women and children who are likely traumatized. The greatest concern consistently expressed by survivors of sexual violence in interviews with PHR was an extreme fear that the fighters would return to abuse them again. Education for spouses, family members and communities is also important to mitigate social rejection.

The RUF and other factions have been reluctant to release abducted women and children in spite of their obligation to do so under the Lome Peace Accord.²⁸⁷ Girls and young women who escaped from the rebels or who were released, suffer a variety of consequences such as: sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS; trauma with symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (the symptoms of PTSD are: recurrent and intrusive memories of a distressing event (intrusive memories in the form of visual or auditory flashbacks), persistent avoidance of things that remind one of that event and hyperarousal, i.e., hypervigilance, inability to sleep or stay asleep, inability to concentrate, and anxiety; stigmatization and alienation by their communities and families; unwanted pregnancies and unsafe and illegal abortions; scarring and serious gynecological problems, such as prolapsed uterus and bladder perforations.²⁸⁸ Some are pregnant or are now single mothers of so-called “bush babies.”²⁸⁹ Some women who were raped, now suffer from vesico-vaginal

²⁸⁶ Conciliation Resources, “Gender and Conflict in Sierra Leone,” 1997 Available at www.c-r.org/occ_papers/briefing5.htm

²⁸⁷ Peace Agreement Between The Government Of Sierra Leone And The Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone, Article XXI Available at: www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html

fistulas (VVF). This condition can leave them incontinent and often renders them social outcasts.²⁹⁰ UNICEF reported that one 16-year-old who was gang raped and suffered VVF would not leave the hot, dark hut of her refugee camp for fear of being teased and humiliated.²⁹¹

Many of those who became pregnant as a result of rapes are now faced with the task of raising their babies as single mothers. Many have few parenting skills, and are limited in their ability to support themselves and their children. In some cases, families reject either their daughters or their babies, leaving these young women and their children in extremely vulnerable positions.²⁹² Some live in fear that the fathers, members of rebel groups, will come back from the bush to claim their babies.²⁹³

The consequences of human rights abuses including sexual violence are not merely physical. Previous studies by PHR and others²⁹⁴ suggest that a high level of psychological trauma is associated with displacement and exposure to human rights abuses. A Sierra Leonean psychologist who participated in both investigations reported that most of those she interviewed exhibited acute signs of distress in all four of the following spheres: physical, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral. Survivors of abuses spoke to her of numerous physical symptoms – aches, pains, trembling, startle responses to sudden sounds or movement, anxiety attacks, upset stomachs, elevated blood pressure and excessive fatigue. Additionally, there were cognitive symptoms related to difficulties in decision mak-

²⁸⁸ Summary report from March 2000 investigation into the medical consequences of human rights abuses committed during the war in Sierra Leone (available at www.phrusa.org/campaigns/sierra_leone/sierra_tripreport.html) and also World Health Organization, *Reproductive Health during Conflict and Displacement: a guide for programme managers*. Department of Reproductive Health and Research World Health Organization, 2000.

²⁸⁹ PHR Summary report from March 2000 investigation.

²⁹⁰ PHR interview with Rabih Torbay of International Medical Corps, Freetown, March 2000 and January 2001.

²⁹¹ PHR interview with Glennis Taylor of UNICEF, Freetown, January, 2001; These women and girls, who are unable to begin to recover from their trauma, could be helped with specialized surgery; there is, however, currently no one in the country with the necessary expertise. A number of organizations including, Marie Stopes, MSF, and IMC have been trying to secure funding to bring a gynecological surgeon to the country. IMC has recently applied for a \$300,000 grant from USAID for a range of services for survivors of sexual violence including vaginal fistula repair

²⁹² Observations of counselors at FAWE and COOPI who had been working with girls who had become pregnant as a result of rape as told to PHR, March, 2000.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ PHR, *The Taliban's War on Women: a Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan*, 1998; PHR, *Women's Health and Human Rights in Afghanistan A Population-Based Assessment (2001)*; MSF-Holland, "Assessing Trauma in Sierra Leone :Psychosocial Questionnaire: Freetown Survey Outcomes," 2000. Available at: www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/reports/2000/sierraleone_01-2000.shtml

ing, poor concentration, memory loss, flashbacks, and confusion. On an emotional level, many reported symptoms related to depression, anger, anxiety, fear and resentment. Finally, all reported behavioral changes – withdrawal from friends and family, changes in normal behavior patterns, inability to function the way they did before the war. These symptoms of distress were particularly remarkable in those women and girls who reported experiencing sexual violence.²⁹⁵ These clinical observations are consistent with the PHR survey findings.

Responses to Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone

Support services for rape survivors in Sierra Leone were, until fairly recently, virtually non-existent.²⁹⁶ In response to conflict related sexual violence, a number of local and international non-governmental organizations have developed services to aid survivors including: medical care, psychological counseling, housing and skills training for young mothers, family mediation to encourage parents to accept returned abductees, and public education efforts. These organizations are, however, only able to assist a fraction of victims. They lack the capacity to address the needs of the many who have not yet been released able to escape from the rebels and arrive in Freetown where until recently virtually all²⁹⁷ of the programs were based. Even if access to populations in the rebel-held east and north continues to improve, there is limited infrastructure in place to respond to the needs of a population which may have experienced particularly high levels of sexual trauma.

UNICEF has been a leader in coordinating services for girls who have suffered sexual violence. UNICEF reports that two specialized programs that provided for girls who were raped and have subsequently borne children, have been enormously helpful.²⁹⁸ Despite the successes of UNICEF, FAWE, COOPI, MSF, IMC and others, there are no government or UN-led multi-sectoral efforts in place to prevent or respond to sexual violence in Sierra Leone.

²⁹⁵ Observations made by psychologist Dr. Yinka Akinsulure-Smith, who interviewed survivors of abuses on behalf of PHR in March, 2000.

²⁹⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, February 26, 2001.

²⁹⁷ The IRC has a program servicing Kenema and Bo.

²⁹⁸ PHR interviews with Glennis Taylor of UNICEF, Freetown, March, 2000 and January, 2001.

VIII. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:

Sexual Violence Survey Instrument

Sierra Leonean Women's Health Survey
(PRIMARY PARTICIPANTS ONLY)

6 Feb 01

1A. CASE ID _____ (1-2,000) ID

1B. Household member interviewed: A HMC

2. Date of interview _____ - _____ - 2001 DATE
(month) (date)

3. Researcher code _____ ICD

4. Language code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) TCD

5. Location code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) LCD

6A. Participation Outcome: [Circle ONE] OUTC: 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 5d
 Eligible/Survey Complete = 1
 Not Eligible = 2
 Not Available = 3
 Refusal= 4a=No Time; 4b=Fear Reprisal; 4c=Oppose Study; 4d=No explanation; 4e=Other
 Unable to Complete= 5a=Interrupted; 5b=Emotional; 5c=Safety; 5d= Lack of privacy; 5e=Request to stop; 5F=Other
 Unable to conduct interview due to language =6

6B. Was participant referred to another organization(s)? [Circle ONE] Yes.....1 (GO TO Q6C) REFR
 No.....0

6C. If yes, which organizations? (list) _____ WORG

Read **ONLY** text that is in *italics*
For a response of 'don't know' code DK. If no response to a question, code NR

1) Hello, my name is _____ I am working with the UN and Physicians for Human Rights, an American NGO. I would like to speak to the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household. [once you have identified the woman continue with introduction]

2) Our purpose: *We are gathering information from displaced women, which we hope will help to better promote and protect the health and human rights of women.*

3) *We are only here to ask questions. We are not here to provide humanitarian assistance.*

4) Confidentiality *We will not report the information in a way that will reveal your identity.*

5) *We would like to speak to you and perhaps other women in the household. We want to ask you questions about your experiences during the war.*

6) *We are conducting this survey in many households in Sierra Leone and have chosen your home randomly from this camp.*

7) *It is important that we have some privacy for our conversation because some of the questions may be sensitive*

8) *If you do not understand a question, please ask me to explain it to you. You are free to stop at any time during the interview. If a question makes you uncomfortable, we will skip the question and go to the next question. Do you have any questions before we begin?*

7. What is your tribe? [circle ONE] ETH
 Krio1
 Temne 2
 Mende3
 Limba4
 Kono5
 Other [SPECIFY] _____ 6

9. I want you to tell me-- are you married?.....
 [READ ALL CHOICES; Circle ONE] MAR
 Married and living with husband now....1
 Never Married2 (GO TO Q 12)
 Separated due to the war.....4
 Divorced/separated not because of war.....3
 Did your husband die because of the war?...5
 Did your husband die NOT because of the war?.....6

11. [IF SHE IS OR WAS EVER MARRIED] Are you/were you the only wife?
 Only wife.....1
 Which wife are/were you?
 First.....2 WIFN
 Second.....3
 Third.....4
 Fourth.....5
 Other.....6 [specify] _____

12. What is your religion? [Circle ONE] RELG
 Muslim.....1
 Christian.....2
 Other [SPECIFY].....3

13. What level did you complete in school? _____ level [number years of school] _____
 EDU

14. What was your job before you fled your home? _____ WRK

15. Where were you born [be sure to use correct spelling]
 A. Province _____ LVPR
 B. District _____ LVDS
 C. Chiefdom _____ LVCH
 D. Town or Village _____ LIVL
 E. If not born in Sierra Leone, which country? _____ LVCT

16. When were you first displaced? _____ year; _____ month MLV

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17. Where did you live at the time before you were first displaced?

- A. Province _____ BDPR
- B. District _____ BDDS
- C. Chiefdom _____ BDCH
- D. Town or village _____ BDCT

18. How many times have you fled the fighting? (number of times) _____ FLED

19. How long have you lived in this camp? number _____ weeks/months/years [circle one] NHME

20. I will give you four choices to answer this next question about your health. The question is: In the last 2 years, how has your general health been? And the four choices are: [CIRCLE ONE] GH

- In the last two years, my health has been Very good1.....E good-o. I noh get wan problem.
- OR -In the last two years, my health has been Good2.....E fine.
- OR -In the last two years, my health has been Fair3.....I dey manage.
- OR -In the last two years, my health has been Poor4.....E bad off. E noh good at all.

Which one of those things I just read is most correct for you? [read choices again if needed]

22. For this question, again I will read you some choices so you can answer the choice that is most correct for you: How would you describe your state of mind since your displacement? [Circle ONE] PSY

- Is your state of mind since displacement Very good1.....E good-o. I noh get wan problem.
- Is your state of mind since displacement Good2.....E fine.
- Is your state of mind since displacement Fair3.....I dey manage.
- Is your state of mind since displacement Poor4.....E bad off. E noh good at all.

24. Since the war, have you ever had thoughts that you were better off dead? DED
YES.....1
NO.....0

25. Since the war, have you ever tried to hurt yourself or end your life? SUI
YES.....1
NO.....0

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26. I am going to read you a list of things – For each one, I want you to tell me if that thing would help your state of mind?

[READ ALL CHOICES; circle all that apply]

	YES	NO	
26A Women's support groups	1	0	GWSG
26B Country medicine/ traditional healer	1	0	GTRD
26C Traditional ceremonies	1	0	GTGR
26D Religious counseling/support	1	0	GRCS
26E Mental health counseling	1	0	GMHC
26F Medical assistance	1	0	GMAS
26G Income generating projects	1	0	GIGP
26H Skills training	1	0	GSKT
26I Education	1	0	GEDU
26J Humanitarian assistance/ food & shelter	1	0	GHUM
26K Anything else? (Other) [SPECIFY] _____			GOTR

Person	Sex	Current age	Did she/he have face-to-face contact with combatants?	Suffer any abuses or violence by combatants? [DO NOT READ CHOICES, list all codes that apply]	When did abuse(s) occur	Group membership of Perpetrator	Name of Perpetrator	After Effects [DO NOT READ CHOICES, list all codes that apply]	[ONLY If person NOT here now:] Unable to flee?	Reason unable to flee
PEERS Husband Mother Father Son a, b, ... Daughter a, b, ... Sister a, b, ... Brother a, b, ... Other wife a, b, ... Child of other wife Other Relative Non relative	GEN D F or M	CAGE D=Dead	FTT YES or NO	1=Beating AIRU 2=Gunshot Wound 3=Amputation 4= Torture 5=Killing 6=Captured for less than 1 day 7=Sexual assault, No Rape 8=Rape 9=Abduction 10= Burned dwelling 11= Looting 12= Other [SPECIFY] 13=No Response 14= Don't Know 99=No Abuse	WHEN	WHOM 1=RUF 2=AFRC 3=EX-SLA 4=SLA 5=ECOMOG 6=UN 7=CDF 8= West Side Boys 9= Other [SPECIFY]	FNOM	CONC 1=Killed 2=Injured 3=Got pregnant 4=Gave birth 5=STIs 6=Stigmatized 7= Rejected 8=Nothing / no problems/ no after effects 9=No Response 10=Don't know 11= Other [SPECIFY]	PUFF YES= Unable to flee NO=Able to flee from the incident, but NOT in household now, at this camp YES=1 NO=0	RUFF 1=Abuse caused injury/disability that prevented travel 2=Killed due to the abuse 3=Rejected because of abuse 4=Abducted 5=Death/Disability unrelated to abuse 6=Don't Know 7=Other [SPECIFY]

1.A. CASE ID _____ (1-2,000) ID

1.B. Household member interviewed: A HMC

2. Date of interview _____ - _____ - 2001 DATE
(month) (date)

3. Researcher code _____ ICD

4. Language code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) TCD

5. Location code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) LCD

6.A. Participation Outcome: [Circle ONE] OUTC 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 5d
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 Refusal= 4a=No Time; 4b=Fear Reprisal; 4c=Oppose Study; 4d=No explanation; 4e=Other
 Unable to Complete= 5a=Interrupted; 5b=Emotional; 5c=Safety; 5d= Lack of privacy; 5e=Request to stop; 5E=Other
 Unable to conduct interview due to language =6

6B. Was participant referred to another organization(s)? [Circle ONE] Yes.....1 (GO TO Q6C) REFR
 No.....0

6C. If yes, which organizations? (list) WORC

Read **ONLY** text that is in *italics*
 For a response of 'don't know' code DK. If no response to a question, code NR

- 1) Hello, my name is _____ I am working with the UN and Physicians for Human Rights, an American NGO. I would like to speak to the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household. [once you have identified the woman continue with introduction]
- 2) Our purpose: *We are gathering information from displaced women, which we hope will help to better promote and protect the health and human rights of women.*
- 3) *We are only here to ask questions. We are not here to provide humanitarian assistance.*
- 4) Confidentiality *We will not report the information in a way that will reveal your identity.*
- 5) *We would like to speak to you and perhaps other women in the household. We want to ask you questions about your experiences during the war.*
- 6) *We are conducting this survey in many households in Sierra Leone and have chosen your home randomly from this camp.*
- 7) *It is important that we have some privacy for our conversation because some of the questions may be sensitive*
- 8) *If you do not understand a question, please ask me to explain it to you. You are free to stop at any time during the interview. If a question makes you uncomfortable, we will skip the question and go to the next question. Do you have any questions before we begin?*

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44. As a result of the incident, did you seek help for your health? [Circle ONE] SHLP
YES.....1 (GO TO Q45)
NO.....0 (GO TO Q50, NEXT PAGE)

45. Where did you seek help for your health?
[READ CHOICES; circle all that apply]

- 45A Hospital SHHO
- 45B Health center SHHC
- 45C Country medicine / Traditional healer SHCM
- 45D NGOs SHNG
- 45E Other [SPECIFY] _____ SHOT

46. How long after the incident(s) did you seek this help? TTSHA
days _____ months _____ years _____

47. Did you tell the health care provider what happened to you? [Circle ONE] THCP
YES.....1
NO.....0

50. What has helped you through all this you have suffered?
[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply]

- 50A Discussion with other survivors of sexual violence HLDS
- 50B Discussions with friends HLDF
- 50C Religion HLRL
- 50D Discussions with family members HLFA
- 50E Assistance from NGO workers HLNG
- 50F A medical care provider HLMC
- 50G Not telling anyone about the incident HLNT
- 50H Support of family HLSF
- 50I Country medicine/ traditional healer HLCPM
- 50J Traditional ceremonies HLTR
- 50K Work/job/employment HLWK
- 50L Taking care of household HLHW
- 50M Trying to forget about it HLFR
- 50N Other [SPECIFY] _____ HLOT

51. I am going to read a list - please tell me which things on this list you think would help you with your state of mind and help you cope better with your experience?

[READ ALL CHOICES; circle all that apply] COPE

	YES	NO	
51A Women's support groups	1	0	SWSG
51B Country medicine/ traditional healer	1	0	STRD
51C Traditional ceremonies	1	0	STCR
51D Religious counseling/support	1	0	SRCS
51E Mental health counseling	1	0	SMHL
51F Medical assistance	1	0	SMAS
51G Income generating projects	1	0	SIGP
51H Skills training	1	0	SSKT
51I Education	1	0	SEDU
51J Humanitarian assistance/ food & shelter	1	0	SHUM
51K Other [SPECIFY] _____			SOTR

53. Do you think your attacker's commander was aware of his attack on you? [Circle ONE] CMDR

YES.....1

NO.....0

54. Should your attacker(s) be punished for what they did to you? [Circle ONE] PUN

YES.....1 (GO TO Q56)

NO.....0 (GO TO Q55)

55. Why do you say you don't want your attacker to be punished?

[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply]

55A Fear of reprisal/revenge NPIR

55B Fear of rejection/ stigmatization NPSJ

55C Respondent doesn't want to be reminded of the incident; wants to forget NPNR

55D In the spirit of reconciliation NPRC

55E No confidence in a system for such punishments NPNC

55F Other [SPECIFY] _____ NPOT

GO TO Q58

56. Do you think punishment of perpetrators might prevent this from happening to others? [Circle ONE]

PREV

YES.....1

NO.....0

57. Of all those people who did these things to you, which ones should be punished?

[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply]

57A Perpetrators PUPR

57B Commanders PUCM

57C All involved in the attacks PUAL

57D No One PUNO

57 E Other [SPECIFY] _____ PNOT

Now I want to know if there is anything more you can tell me about what happened.

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*58A. Do you know of anything that could identify your attacker, such as:
Did they call each other by name?*

58B. How did you know which military group your attackers were with?

58C. What did he/they say to you, or to each other?

59. Why do you think combatants did these things -- sexually abusing women and girls -- during this war?

60. What are your biggest worries about your future after what you have suffered?

61. What are your biggest worries about your health?

30. Do you believe that perpetrators of human rights abuses should be punished? BELP

YES.....1

NO.....0

33. Now, please tell me – at any time in your lifetime, have you ever had any of these things happen to you:

sexual violence such as molestation, being forced to undress or stripped of clothing, forced intercourse or other sexual acts committed by FAMILY MEMBERS, FRIENDS, OR CIVILIAN STRANGERS?

Age at assault	Types of sexual assault	Perpetrator
DAGE	SXAS 1=Molestation 2=Being forced to undress/Stripped of clothing 3=Attempted rape/attempted intercourse 4=Rape/ intercourse 5=Other sexual acts [SPECIFY] 99 = NO ABUSE	PERP 1=Boyfriend 2=Husband 3=Father 4=Son (4a, 4b..) 5= Brother (5a, 5b..) 6= Uncle(6a, 6b..) 7 = Other Relative (7a, 7b) [SPECIFY] 8= Other Non-relative known to individual (8a, 8b..) [SPECIFY] 9= Stranger

34A. About this sexual violence committed by COMBATANTS - How much you are afraid that it could happen to you or your family? Like before, I will give you four choices for your answer.

351

[READ ALL CHOICES; Circle ONE] COMF

- Are you worried about this Not at all.....1.....E noh day worry me at all.
- Are you worried about this A little.....2.....E day worry me small, lili bit, no moh.
- Are you worried about this Quite a bit.....3.....E day worry me plenty..
- Are you worried about this Extremely.....4.....E day worry me pass mark. Bad bad wan.

34B. And now this sexual violence committed by FAMILY MEMBERS, FRIENDS, OR CIVILIAN STRANGERS - How much are you afraid of this for yourself and your family?

[READ ALL CHOICES; Circle ONE] DOMF

- Are you worried about this Not at all.....1.....E noh day worry me at all.
- Are you worried about this A little.....2.....E day worry me small, lili bit, no moh.
- Are you worried about this Quite a bit.....3.....E day worry me plenty..
- Are you worried about this Extremely.....4.....E day worry me pass mark. Bad bad wan.

35 I am going to read some statements, one at a time. For each one, please say if you agree or disagree

	Agree	Disagree
35A Women and girls should have the same access to education as men and boys. ...EDAC....1	1	0
35B Women should be able to express themselves freely.EXPR....1	1	0
35C Family problems should only be discussed with people in the family.PROB....1	1	0
35D A good wife obeys her husband even if she disagrees.....OBHEY....1	1	0
35E It's a wife's duty/obligation to have sex with her husband even if she doesn't want to osav.1	1	0
35F A man has the right to beat his wife if she disobeys him.....BEAT....1	1	0
35G Women and girls need more education about their rights to refuse sex.....EDRS....1	1	0
35H More should be done to protect women and girls from having sex when they don't want to.....PRRS....1	1	0
35I Women and girls need more education about their reproductive health.....RHLT....1	1	0
35J Women should have the right to control the number and spacing of their children...BSPC...1	1	0
35K There should be legal protections for the rights of women.LPRW....1	1	0

REVIEW Page 5, Question 28:

Did she report human rights abuses for any other female member of the house over age 13?

IF YES, go to Question 62 (page 14).

IF NO, go to Page 15.

62. You told me that other female household members suffered some kind of war-related abuse. When you and I finish, can you introduce me to them so I can ask if they will let me interview them?

YES1 [GO TO NEXT PAGE] PRMI
NO0

63. Tell me why you cannot introduce me to them?

Family member reported in Q28 FNI	Why unable to be introduced FNIW
(use same codes from Q28, page 5)	[DO NOT READ CHOICES; Circle all that apply] 1=Not available 2=She doesn't want to talk, 3=Not permitted by others to talk, 4=Too young (< 13 years old) 5=Dead 6=Missing 7=Other [specify]

TAKE A MOMENT TO REVIEW THIS FORM: Be sure all questions are answered and any refusal/inability to answer a question is noted on this survey

For Participants who report NO human rights violations: GO TO PAGE 16.

For Participants who report Human Rights violations by combatants that they themselves have suffered:

Everything that you have told me so far will be kept confidential which means that your identity will not be revealed.

There are now plans for a Special Court to punish people like your attacker(s) for their crimes and to get justice for the victims and for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. I am going to tell you more about these plans:

There are plans to create a Special Court with the support of the UN. This Special Court will bring to justice those people most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as mass killing, widespread mutilation, sexual violence against girls and women, sexual slavery, abduction of children and adults, and forced conscription.

The Lomé Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission "to break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story and to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation". The Truth and Reconciliation Commission will only be established once there is sustainable peace. Since the outbreak of fighting in May 2000 its establishment has been on hold though some preparations towards its establishment are taking place.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Special Court will be looking for persons who have suffered human rights abuses during the war. If you are willing to be contacted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or Special Court staff, I will take your name.

1A Do you want us to give your name to the special court? We understand if you prefer to remain anonymous.

Yes.....1 [check SP on PAGE 17] SP
No.....0

1B Do you want us to give your name to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

Yes.....1 [check TR on PAGE 17] TRC
No.....0

If respondent answered YES to 1A and / or 1B, GO TO PAGE 17 – Question 2.

Sierra Leonean Women's Health Survey
(PRIMARY PARTICIPANTS ONLY)

5354

16 Feb 01

- 1A. CASE ID _____ (1-2,000) ID
- 1B. Household member interviewed: A HMC
2. Date of interview _____ - _____ - 2001 DATE
(month) (date)
3. Researcher code _____ ICD
4. Language code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) TCD
5. Location code _____ (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20) LCD
- 6A. Participation Outcome: [Circle ONE] OUTC: 1 2 3 4a 4b 4c 4d 5a 5b 5c 5d
 Eligible/Survey Complete = 1
 Not Eligible = 2
 Not Available = 3
 Refusal= 4a=No Time; 4b=Fear Reprisal; 4c=Oppose Study; 4d=No explanation; 4e=Other
 Unable to Complete= 5a=Interrupted; 5b=Emotional; 5c=Safety; 5d= Lack of privacy; 5e=Request to stop; 5E=Other
 Unable to conduct interview due to language =6
- 6B. Was participant referred to another organization(s)? [Circle ONE] Yes.....1 (GO TO Q6C) REFR
 No.....0
- 6C. If yes, which organizations? (list) WORG

Read **ONLY** text that is in *italics*
 For a response of 'don't know' code DK. If no response to a question, code NR

- 1) *Hello, my name is _____ I am working with the UN and Physicians for Human Rights, an American NGO. I would like to speak to the woman who knows the most about the persons in the household. [once you have identified the woman continue with introduction]*
- 2) *Our purpose: We are gathering information from displaced women, which we hope will help to better promote and protect the health and human rights of women.*
- 3) *We are only here to ask questions. We are not here to provide humanitarian assistance.*
- 4) *Confidentiality We will not report the information in a way that will reveal your identity.*
- 5) *We would like to speak to you and perhaps other women in the household. We want to ask you questions about your experiences during the war.*
- 6) *We are conducting this survey in many households in Sierra Leone and have chosen your home randomly from this camp.*
- 7) *It is important that we have some privacy for our conversation because some of the questions may be sensitive*
- 8) *If you do not understand a question, please ask me to explain it to you. You are free to stop at any time during the interview. If a question makes you uncomfortable, we will skip the question and go to the next question. Do you have any questions before we begin?*

SP _____

TR _____

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2. Surname _____

First name _____

Middle Name _____

Current address _____

3. I know that you will not be living in this camp forever. Where do you plan to go when you leave the camp:

A. Province _____

B. District _____

C. Chiefdom _____

C. Town or Village _____

4. Is there someone else whose name and residence information you can give us who will know how to contact you after you leave this place?

Name _____

Address _____

Relationship to participant _____

Summary of PHR/UNAMSIL Researcher Training and Supervision

Overview

The field surveys were conducted by a staff of 21 Sierra Leonean women primarily from the Temne, Mende, and Kono ethnic groups. These researchers were selected based on education, experience or knowledge about sexual violence, and language skills. All researchers were fluent in English, Krio, and at least one other language. All had completed high school level education, several had attended university classes, and a few had university level degrees. All of the researchers were affected by the war, most of them were displaced at least once, and approximately half had lived as refugees in Guinea for a period of time. None of the researchers had prior experience with quantitative surveys such as this one.

There were five Field supervisors for the project who provided extensive training and supervision of the researchers, among other duties. Each supervisor brought a specialized set of skills and experience to the team. In combination, this knowledge and experience made a complementary and highly skilled team of supervisors for the project:

Binta Mansaray, Sierra Leonean, specialized training and experience in qualitative research on sexual violence through in depth individual interviews with Sierra Leonean women

Adeyinka Akinsulure-Smith, PhD Psychology, Sierra Leonean, specialized training and experience in psychological counseling with survivors of sexual violence and other forms of torture

Chen Reis, JD, MPH, specialized training and experience in quantitative research and human rights issues

Beth Vann, MSW, specialized training and experience in West Africa humanitarian aid field work, national staff training, and sexual violence aid programs with Sierra Leonean refugees/IDPs

Louise Taylor, MBA, LLM, UNAMSIL liason, human rights officer

Researcher training consisted of eight to nine days classroom teaching and experiential role play followed by at least one day of field observation. At the end of the 7th day, trainees were tested on skill and ability. After testing, trainees were divided into two groups. Group I proceeded to

the field to begin supervisory observation and conducting the survey. Group II stayed in the classroom for an additional day of intensive training and observation before joining Group I.

Training was conducted at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown.

Training commenced with 24 trainees. Three of the trainees were unsuccessful when tested, and supervisors determined through observation that they were unable to accurately conduct the survey. By the end of the 10th training day, there were 21 researchers trained, observed by supervisors, and sufficiently prepared to conduct the survey in the field.

There was at least one supervisor, and usually two, at each field site. Supervisors managed the sampling by making assignments for areas or zones, and also provided supervision, guidance, and support for the researchers.

Throughout each day, the supervisor remained in a designated central location to provide any support or assistance needed. In the morning, researchers were given assignments, survey forms, and supplies. Around mid-day, each researcher checked in to review her completed surveys, hand them in, and gather a fresh supply of forms and another assigned area if needed. This was repeated at the end of the day. Researchers were encouraged to return to the supervisor at any time for questions, problems, and to discuss particularly severe situations they encountered. For each field site, supervisors had information about services available for referrals, such as health care, counseling, etc. When the affected research participant agreed, supervisors made referrals for follow up by local or international organizations best able to provide assistance.

Training

Training was interactive; researchers provided input on the questionnaire and interview procedures and observed and participated in role play. A training schedule was developed in advance and revised frequently to meet the needs of the trainees. The survey was printed in English, but researchers learned to administer it in Krio.

During Days 3 – 6, revisions were made to the survey instrument for easier translation from English to Krio. Sentences and questions were reformed to better follow the pattern of Krio speech. These changes enhanced researchers' ability to both understand the intended meaning of the questions and to translate them into any language they would be using.

Day 1 Training

Introductions

- Intro to Physicians for Human Rights, UNAMSIL Human Rights Section
 - Purposes and Overview of the project
 - Confidentiality and Conduct Agreement (discussion, signatures)
 - Training plan, field work plan and logistics
-

This was the researchers' first exposure to quantitative research. At first, it was difficult for them to understand their role as data collectors and not "counselors". The Confidentiality Agreement proved to be an extremely useful tool for conveying the nature and purposes of the project. The Agreement included detailed descriptions of expectations for researcher conduct, professional integrity and dignity, confidentiality, information sharing, impartiality, and accuracy in transmission of information from the research participant. Item by item discussion of the standards and expectations, in Krio, clarified many questions from the researchers. After this discussion, they were much better able to discuss the project and asked questions more relevant to the work at hand.

Day 2 Training

Sexual Violence:

- Definitions and types of sexual violence, myths and facts
- Causes and contributing factors
- After-effects and consequences – health, emotional, legal psychological after-effects – cognitive, behavioral, and emotional
- Exploration of our own personal values, biases, attitudes – how to keep these out of the interview process
- Emotional responses of research assistants to secondary trauma

Human Rights and Lome Peace Agreement

- Overview of international human rights documents
 - Special Court for Sierra Leone War Crimes
 - Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
-

The purpose on this day was to ensure that all researchers would be working with the same definitions and concepts for the topics on the

agenda. For many, this was the first candid description of the various forms of sexual violence, and there were many questions.

Detailed descriptions of the variety of cognitive and behavioral after-effects was necessary for researchers to understand the types of behaviors they might see that could help them identify problems needing referral, and choose strategies for interviewing.

Discussion of the special court and TRC was part of the survey, and it was important that all researchers thoroughly understand so that they could explain it to research participants as needed.

Day 3 Training

Interview skills

- Developing trust
- Body language
- Techniques for eliciting narrative accounts of individual experiences
- Privacy
- Confidentiality

Survey instrument

- Reading, explanation item by item
-

Included a practical and detailed discussion of various strategies and words (in Krio) to encourage participants to disclose private and potentially embarrassing information.

Day 4 Training

Survey instrument

- Translation to Krio, item by item
 - Discussion, question and answer
 - Practice role plays in groups of 3
-

After going through the survey in Krio, supervisors determined it was time to suspend the full classroom didactic methods and begin experiential learning. Researchers were divided into groups of three. They were given three role play scenarios for practice interviews. One person played the researcher, one the participant, and one an observer. After each interview, they were to listen to feedback and switch roles until each person had practiced at least once as researcher.

Supervisors circulated among groups observing, giving feedback, and gathering information about common areas of confusion or misunderstanding. From time to time, supervisors called the group together to discuss and clarify issues.

Day 5-7 Training

Continue Practice

- Role plays in groups of 3, feedback, switch roles
- Discussion with entire group for common issues and problems
- Instrument revisions and instruction

End of Day 7

- Test
-

During these three days, supervisors became familiar with each researcher's strengths and weaknesses. At the end of Day 7, a test was administered to all researchers: the two Krio speaking supervisors conducted a mock interview while the researchers observed as a group, each completing her own survey instrument form.

In the evening, supervisors reviewed and made corrections and notes on the forms using the "Interviewer's" completed form as the guide. Based on these reviews and supervisory observations made during the practice role plays, the trainees were divided into two groups for the next day's session. Group I excelled in their tests and were observed to be well skilled in interviewing. Group II made errors on their tests and were observed to have some problems in conducting interviews.

Day 8 Training

Review tests with individual researchers

Group I:

- Observe individually in role plays, review documentation
- Translation to Temne and Mende; practice

Group II: Focus training on weaknesses

- Techniques for systematic random sampling and the use of sample site maps
 - Identification, assistance, referral for serious problems and severe cases
-

Supervisors distributed tests to researchers and discussed individually each error and area of concern. Researchers were given the responsibility to focus on their own weaknesses during the day's role-plays and discussions. Only three of the trainees performed poorly on the test and had also been observed making interview errors that demonstrated they did not understand the purposes of the survey. These three individuals were excluded from the project, leaving 21 researchers. 536)

Supervisors observed each researcher in Group I conducting a role play interview to verify that her skills were adequate. Group I was then divided into Temne and Mende sub-groups to go through the questionnaire and develop consensus on translation into those languages.

At the end of the day, mapping and methods to be used for systematic random sampling were explained. The role of the supervisor in the field was also discussed, emphasizing the need for researchers to identify and bring forward for supervisory assistance information about any situations they encountered that were problematic.

Day 9 Training

Group I to field site to begin survey and individual observation by supervisors

Group II in classroom for continued practice and individualized training and observation

At the field site, each researcher was observed at least once conducting a complete interview from introduction through closing statements. Supervisors gave immediate feedback, and observed additional interviews if there were problem areas.

In the classroom, Group II (12 people) received individualized assistance. By the end of the day, it was determined they were ready for field observation.

Day 10 Training

Groups I and II at field site conducting surveys

Continue individual observation with supervisors

Group I teaching Temne / Mende translation to Group II

Individual supervisory observation continued until all researchers had been observed and deemed adequately knowledgeable and skilled.

Supervision

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By the end of Day 10, supervisors were thoroughly aware of each researcher's strengths and weaknesses in conducting the survey and documentation on the instrument. For the duration of the fieldwork, supervisors continued to provide guidance, review, and advice as needed for each individual researcher. A supervisor reviewed each completed survey, giving immediate feedback for any errors or items left blank. Survey skills most closely monitored were:

- ✓ Appropriate and accurate introduction and explanation of purpose of survey
- ✓ Complete and accurate questioning and corresponding documentation
- ✓ Ability to elicit information about private, shameful, and traumatic events in a warm and respectful manner
- ✓ Correct and simple explanation of the Special Court and TRC
- ✓ Appropriate requests to interview other household members
- ✓ Complete and accurate closing statement
- ✓ Ability to accomplish all of this in a rapid fashion while maintaining warmth and respect. Primary interviews were expected to take no more than one hour, with secondary interviews maximum 40 minutes.
- ✓ Accurate counting and selection of households in accordance with sampling method in each field site
- ✓ Ability to find and maintain privacy for interviews in very crowded settings

Summary of Existing Treatment and Protection Services for War-Affected Women in Sierra Leone²⁹⁹

Prior to the rebel incursion into Freetown in January, 1999, there were no services in the country specifically addressing the problem of sexual violence.³⁰⁰ The alarming number of women and girls who were sexually abused during the invasion precipitated a response from several organizations including UNICEF, the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), and MSF-Holland. A task force was established which created a network of medical practitioners and counseling centers to treat the thousands of reported cases, MSF-H set up a training program for counselors, and COOPI and FAWE opened comprehensive programs to assist women and girls who had become pregnant as a result of rebel rapes.

In response to a growing recognition of the widespread and particularly brutal nature of the crimes committed against women and girls, many new programs are now servicing survivors and beginning to address some of these problems. It is challenging, however, to provide services in Sierra Leone given the continuing insecurity, ever-changing population shifts, lack of awareness and recognition of the scope of the problem, and chronic funding shortfalls. With scarce resources and constant emergency situations, both the government of Sierra Leone and the UN agencies face a number of difficulties in providing coordination, continuity and leadership for the myriad of humanitarian and development needs in the country. Therefore, services addressing the various aspects of sexual/gender violence are fragmented and coordination is a continuing problem. In spite of these challenges, there are a plethora of international NGOs and UN agencies operating in Freetown, many of which are working in highly successful cooperative arrangements. With the improving security situation, some groups are beginning to expand their services to the provinces and are seeking funding to do so.

There was general agreement among all organizations interviewed by PHR that there is a need for development of both prevention and response services to include all relevant sectors, and also for improved coordination among providers and sectors. There was general acknowledgement that some

²⁹⁹ The information about individual organizations was compiled primarily from PHR interviews conducted with representatives of the organizations in March, 2000 and January, 2001, as well as from written information published by the organizations themselves. Additional information was provided by Glenis Taylor of UNICEF, the UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Sierra Leone, 2001 and other sources which are cited in the footnotes.

³⁰⁰ Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict, *Human Rights Watch*, February 26, 2001.

of these problems could be alleviated if one agency took the lead, perhaps expanding the UNICEF model to include all survivors of sexual violence.

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International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations Providing Treatment and Protection Services:

Most organizations working on sexual violence are providing treatment, though several have been documenting abuses and some are beginning to work more strategically to improve protection and the status of women through education and institutional capacity building. UNICEF, Campaign for Good Governance and a handful of others are addressing the problem from a number of angles.

Treatment Services

UNICEF chairs a sexual violence committee in Freetown comprised of international, local and government agencies working on the needs of girls. The committee meets regularly and its members include: COOPI, MSF-Holland, Marie Stopes, CARITAS, GOAL, FAWE, Planned Parenthood Association of Sierra Leone (PPASL), The Ministry of Social Welfare, and the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone with their Child Rights Monitoring Network. The Committee currently acts as a referral system for girls who were abducted and raped. Girls are brought by their parents, families, UNAMSIL representatives, and some simply show up at UNICEF headquarters in Freetown. Though those actively seeking assistance have dwindled in the West, there are many who require services outside of Freetown where programs are not as coordinated. Those groups working in cooperation with the Committee on Sexual Violence in the provinces include: Christian Brothers, War-Affected Girls Association (WAGA), PPSL, CARITAS-Makeni, the IRC in Kenema and FAWE, now with a new branch in the South. Committees on sexual violence were recently formed in the Southern and Eastern provinces.

While UNICEF's efforts are focused on those under 18, the needs of women are also being addressed through their education efforts, which are aimed at the population as a whole. UNICEF is providing training on sexual violence for lawyers and police, as well as in schools, which includes information on rape, its effects, and what to do if raped. They have found that more women and girls are coming forward, but that the judicial process is slow and frustrating. These efforts will continue next year with the aim of reaching all schools in the country and an emphasis on prevention, if funding is available.³⁰¹

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is providing comprehensive maternal-child health services, sexual violence services and operating an interim care center for former child soldiers in Kenema District. IRC was

³⁰¹ Email correspondence with Glenis Taylor of UNICEF, November 18 and 19, 2001.

the first international NGO to focus on sexual violence beginning in November 1999 in Kenema. Kenema was chosen because it was identified as the best place to filter displaced people from rebel areas of Kono and Kailahun. IRC has been providing sexual violence services under the umbrella of a safe motherhood program, which addresses basic reproductive health. The IRC team trains core groups of local women who then reach out to others in their chiefdoms. They are focusing particularly on Lebanese and Blama camps near Kenema, and are expanding their outreach to other camps in the area. For example, in Blama camp there are 21 chiefdoms represented from districts in the South and in the East, and one woman has been selected to represent each group. They use reproductive health and maternal/child health as an entry point, deliver reproductive health kits (which include condoms, family planning, STD/HIV prevention information), and introduce the subject of sexual violence. Basic training on sexual terms and definitions of sexual violence is provided. Sexual violence is not the initial focus because women are generally unaccustomed to talking about sexual violence and women's rights.

The IRC staff has generally found physical needs to be more urgent than psycho-social needs. IRC staff reported to PHR that they are attempting to introduce the program in each community/village and have found that women are responding very positively to their sensitization efforts around the notion of women's rights as human rights. According to IRC staff, the women they are working with generally express excitement when they learn that their husbands do not have the right to beat them.³⁰² In 2000, IRC conducted a survey in several of the camps in Kenema to learn more about sexual violence in the community. Results were not available at the time of writing.

The Forum for African Women's Educationalists (FAWE) is a pan-African NGO which has been successful in promoting education for girls. FAWE expanded their mandate to respond to the needs of rape victims after the January 1999 incursion by rebels into Freetown and, because there was a vacuum, became the primary organization providing medical and counseling services to rape survivors. Their ultimate goal, in service of their mandate, is to get these girls back to school and as of March 2000 they had been 100% effective in negotiating with parents of girls who had babies as a result of rapes, to keep them in school.

FAWE began their rape victims program in March 1999 with a sensitization effort over radio and TV and by going to secondary schools and communities to let people know that FAWE was offering medical and counseling services. They did this outreach both to make the community aware of the new services being offered, but also as part of an effort to remove some of the stigma around talking about rape. Within one year

³⁰² PHR interview with IRC field staff, Kenema 2000.

FAWE served over 2,000 women and girls in the Western Area alone. All participants saw a doctor at least once. All participants in the program began with individual counseling two times per week and then transitioned into group counseling. Once girls returned to school, they were monitored by the guidance counselors at their schools who have been briefed by FAWE on their circumstances. FAWE planned to end the program in Freetown because they had largely addressed the need and because they had run out of funds. Once the full-time program concludes in Freetown, FAWE arranged for those participants who still need counseling to see MSF counselors and organized some doctors to take referrals.

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FAWE has also been working to sensitize the community at large to accept girls who have become pregnant as a result of rape. Many of these girls have been gang raped and do not know who the father is. There is often a stage of rejection of these babies both by the mother and their communities. FAWE created two training centers in the eastern area of Freetown, which provide comprehensive services to young women/girls and their babies including: skills training, education, parenting skills and medical care for their children. They do not provide human rights training specifically, but do sensitize the adolescents about what is inappropriate treatment. The program was designed very much in response to the needs identified during counseling session with their patients. Those young women participating in the program who were interviewed by the PHR team reported feeling much better since being enrolled in the program (though they were anxious about what they would do when the program concluded) and expressed a keen interest in learning marketable skills so they could care for their children. In 2000, FAWE expanded its programs to Kenema in the eastern area, where sexual violence has been particularly widespread, and immediately enrolled 700 victims.

FAWE has also produced a series of radio programs to educate the public against rape. The discussion/phone-in programs were aired every 2 weeks in 1999, with the hope that they would be aired bi-weekly once funding is available.

COOPI (Cooperazione Internazionale), an Italian NGO specializing in international relief and development projects, has been working in Sierra Leone since 1967. In 1998, COOPI expanded its development mandate to help children released by the rebels and operates several interim care centers, that provide family tracing services, medical care, counseling and skills training. One of its centers, the Conforti Welcome Home is similar to FAWE's program for girls who became pregnant as a result of rape, except that it also provides housing. Conforti Welcome Home was set up as a temporary facility for pregnant girls and child mothers who could not go home for reasons ranging from their area of origin being inaccessible for fear of rejection by their families. Those enrolled in the program

expressed a desire for skills training before returning to their families so they have something to offer and are not dependent. COOPI is providing them with such training, as well as general education and literacy, and is working actively to sensitize communities and families to be more accepting and supportive of these young mothers and their babies. COOPI operates the Holy Mary Clinic in the eastern part of Freetown where the women and girls at Conforti Welcome Home receive a full range of reproductive health services including deliveries.³⁰³

COOPI also has established psycho-social teams, which make 'house calls' in IDP camps and host communities in and around Freetown. They have also created self-help groups in a number of IDP camps in the Western area. COOPI takes referrals from both camp clinics and the community.³⁰⁴ They are committed to a community-oriented approach to psycho-social care, to developing local capacity and building on indigenous coping mechanisms. Most of the counselors are from the Sierra Leonean community and were teachers or nurses. The organization provides basic training on trauma and then encourages the counselors to adapt the information to their own culture. They have found that their patients are most responsive when they are engaged in a task, and so the self-help groups are organized around activities like needle work. According to one aid worker interviewed by PHR, approximately 40% of the women they see have been sexually abused. COOPI is committed to offering options so survivors of trauma can find the treatment and support that works for them.³⁰⁵

Marie Stopes Society (MSSSL), an international NGO headquartered in the UK, is a reproductive health agency. Many sexual violence survivors are seen among the 7,000 women treated each month in the three MSSSL outpatient clinics in west-, central- and east Freetown. MSSSL offers a range of reproductive health services including a maternity center, ante- and post-natal care, and treatment and diagnosis for STDs. While they were forced to close their clinics in Port Loko and Segbwema in the east, they are expecting to open new centers in the provinces, perhaps in Bo and Makeni. The organization accepts referrals for abandoned children and rape survivors in need of delivery services through the Child Protection

³⁰³ PHR visited the Welcome Home in March, 2000 and spoke extensively to COOPI staff there.

³⁰⁴ Information on COOPI's psycho-social programs is based on a PHR interviews with Patrick Campbell of COOPI and local COOPI counselors in Freetown in March, 2000.

³⁰⁵ While Coopii started off doing individual counseling, they have often found working in groups to be more culturally appropriate, and therefore effective. COOPI counselors report that children respond best in a group of three or four – though, even under ideal circumstances, it can take 4-5 sessions for them to realize there are no negative consequences in telling the truth and to open up. COOPI mental health providers told PHR that integrating rebel wives has been even more challenging than integrating child soldiers.

Committee on Sexual Violence, which MSSSL fully subsidizes. The director, Pamela Greene, and Dr. Yvonne Harding are actively seeking comprehensive health care services and improved inter-agency referral systems and coordination. According to Dr. Harding, there is a lack of surgical care for the small number of sexual violence survivors who need it, but the psychological scars are more common and sometimes require long-term intervention. Like other members of the Sexual Violence Committee, Marie Stopes does not test patients for HIV partly because of concerns over the lack of an official national policy on confidentiality of test results. Though MSSSL's concerns are valid, hundreds of pregnant women are passing the disease on to their babies or to their partners when transmission could be prevented with medication. MSSSL's funding from DFID is coming to an end in 2001, and at the time of their interview with PHR, the organization was pursuing new grants.

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins sans Frontières-Holland (MSF-H), an international medical relief organization, has been providing a range of health care and psycho-social services in Sierra Leone since 1994. While the French and Belgian branches also have programs in Sierra Leone, MSF-Holland has been more focused on war-affected women and mental health. In January, MSF-H released a report documenting high levels of trauma among the population and has since advocated for governments and donor agencies to provide greater resources for treatment of post-traumatic stress among the general population. MSF-H also identified the need for specialized surgery for VVF and VRF cases. These surgeries were provided for a brief period after the 1999 Freetown invasion, but the specialist was in-country only for a short time. CCSL referred girls who suffered physical consequences from sexual violence to MSF for surgery at Connaught Hospital. MSF has also been providing referral services for FAWE and other members of the sexual violence committee, and has supplied all medications required for participants in the program. At National Workshop IDP camp in the Western Area, MSF-H provided counseling to the displaced population. In addition to Freetown, MSF also had programs in Makeni and Kambia.

International Medical Corps (IMC) is focusing on providing health care to ex-combatants, dependents of fighters, displaced and the community at large. Reproductive health services are offered at IMC clinics, including treatment of STDs. All patients receive information about safe sex and condoms. In April 1999, IMC launched a pilot program with Rural Aid, a local NGO, focused on basic health education including HIV prevention counseling.

Since only medical screenings (no treatments) are available at DDR camps, all referrals of former combatants and their dependents are sent to IMC clinics. IMC health workers have also identified a need for special-

ized VVF and VRF surgeries among their patients. While the organization has secured surgical space at Lungi Hospital, there is a need for an expert surgeon, some additional equipment, and referral/ transport assistance for patients from Freetown.³⁰⁶ IMC received a grant from the US government to hire surgeons to treat victims of VVF and to train Sierra Leonean surgeons in the procedure.

Planned Parenthood Association of Sierra Leone (PPASL), is a member of International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), and has been promoting maternal and family welfare in Sierra Leone for over 40 years. At its clinics in the major urban areas of the country, PPASL has been offering a range of reproductive health services at reduced rates, including treatment of STDs, laboratory tests, and maternal and child care. PPASL takes referrals from the Council of Churches of Sierra Leone for patients who require medical care due to sexual violence.

Because of its links to IPPF, PPASL is able to tap into the resources of the larger organization to address the AIDS epidemic including educational materials about HIV, general best-practices on reproductive health and a supplies of low-cost condoms. PPASL relies particularly on community members and leaders to act as peer counselors and to educate the population at large. The organization has reached out to the most vulnerable groups with education programs including IDPs, the military, and youths through the school system. PPASL reported to the researchers of the recent WHO/Associates for Global Change study on HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone that they had virtually no contact with the National AIDS Control Program.

Due to the war, Planned Parenthood has experienced shortages in both staff and supplies, including medications. Health care providers at PPSAL in Kenema reported to PHR a dramatic jump in syphilis and gonorrhea among their clients, which was not a significant problem before the conflict. They also noted that most of their patients do not reveal that they have been victims of sexual violence. It is possible that the hesitancy of survivors to report is exacerbated by the predominance of male clinicians observed by the PHR team during a March 2000 investigation.

Leonet, an NGO funded by Americans concerned about Sierra Leone, works with street/unwanted children, many of whom are sexual violence/abduction survivors. Leonet has been assisting a number of young girl abductees who have been rejected by their families due to resulting pregnancies. UN agencies, government ministries, and NGOs refer the "most hopeless" cases to Leonet. The organization is also operating a day care and skills training centers in Kissy, the eastern part of Freetown, which was hardest hit by the January incursion of 1999, and was operat-

³⁰⁶ At time of writing, IMC was in the process of obtaining a list of VVF patients awaiting surgery from a physician at Princess Christian Medical Hospital (PCMH) in Freetown.

ing in Port Loko. The building was given to them by the community and is open to other single mothers, but the program is at a standstill because of lack of funding. Leonet uses Marie Stopes for referrals.

Cause Canada, an international relief and development organization, has been active in Sierra Leone since 1989. Their activities include refugee assistance, primary health care, vocational and post war reconciliation, and reintegration of women and girls affected by war. The program for war-affected women and girls consists of counseling, medical treatment, vocational training and community reintegration.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provides a range of services, focusing its activities in the last year on emergency aid and protection of war-affected civilians. ICRC's surgical team has performed hundreds of surgeries on destitute patients with war-related injuries, established and upgraded medical and surgical facilities, assisted thousands in reconnecting families that had been separated due to the war, and raised the coping abilities of vulnerable and displaced women by teaching them skills to increase their self-sufficiency. ICRC is also providing training to the new Sierra Leonean army and UNAMSIL troops on humanitarian law.³⁰⁷ They are also supporting a community theater program to educate the population about HIV transmission.

Other Groups Working Directly and Indirectly with War-Affected Women and Girls

- CARITAS: a UNICEF Child Protection partner and operates interim care centers in Lunsar and Makeni
- The Ministry of Social Welfare and ICRC collaboration to link children with relatives through the National Family Tracing Network
- A joint effort by UNDP/UNIFEM to create a holistic program for women and girl refugees to support reintegration
- A UNDP project providing medical, social and legal support, as well as micro-credit
- UNAMSIL's Civil Affairs Division has been helping the Government of Sierra Leone restore its authority in rebel-held areas and identifying

³⁰⁷ ICRC, Update on ICRC activities in West Africa: Sierra Leone-Guinea-Liberia. December 15, 2000. <http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5cacdf48ca698b641256242003b3295/62e58fc7be68051cc12569b6004a9e5c?OpenDocument>

³⁰⁸ In July, 2001, UNAMSIL distributed \$45,000 from their trust fund to support the activities of three community-based organizations working with survivors of sexual violence.

urgent humanitarian needs in these regions. The division also raises funds to support locally-based programs to assist sexually abused women and girls and ex-combatants.³⁰⁸

Documentation, Education and Protection Services

Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) is a Sierra Leonean NGO based in Freetown that works "to facilitate the full participation of all Sierra Leoneans in the political, social and economic processes of development in Sierra Leone." CGG has been at the forefront of fighting for gender equality and is interested both in improving women's lives by enhancing their status as a group and as individuals, and in improving national government and civil society by involving women at all levels. CGG played a critical role in the success of the 1996 democratic election when the group mobilized market women who took to the streets to insist the election take place. As part of their efforts in both gender equality and human rights, CGG has been addressing sexual violence and human rights on a number of fronts including:

- Establishing a group in 1999 called SOS-Women in Freetown focused on violence against women and children. The group seeks to provide support for victims, promote accountability, and to educate women about their rights. Among their goals is to break the silence around sex and encourage victims and others to speak out;
- Investigating reports of mistreatment of women;
- Playing an active role in the first successfully tried rape case in Sierra Leonean history.³⁰⁹ CGG has also been active in efforts to change trial procedures, which required victims, including child victims, to testify in front of their rapists;
- Conducting public education presentations about sexual violence on the radio, including the use of short-wave radio to broadcast outside of Freetown since February 2000;³¹⁰
- Establishing a database of women in decision-making positions in government with the intention to advocate for more women in positions of power;
- Monitoring the full range of human rights abuses committed by combatants for the TRC and Special Court;

³⁰⁹ A 65-year-old man was sentenced with 10 years imprisonment for raping a 13 year-old girl. (CGG, 3/2000)

³¹⁰ The content of their broadcasts comes mostly from materials sent to them by the US Embassy in Freetown. (CGG, 3/2000)

- Providing legal advice and representation to human rights victims;
- Providing human rights education to schools, groups and communities in an effort to elevate the expectations the public has of their government.

Council of Churches of Sierra Leone (CCSL), a local NGO based in Freetown, created the Child Violations Monitoring Network (CRIVMON) in 1998 with technical and financial support from UNICEF. It works through a country-wide network of child and human rights organizations, as well as individual lawyers to document abuses committed against children. CCSL found sexual violence to be one of the most prevalent violations, with a sharp increase in the number of abuses occurring after the January 1999 rebel incursion into Freetown.³¹¹ It was Helen Bash-Taqi, then CRIVMON Co-ordinator, who informed the Child Protection Committee of the high number of rape cases in the communities. In response, UNICEF invited interested partners to meet and discuss how to facilitate physical and psychological rehabilitation for girls who had been abused by combatants. This led to the formation of the Sexual Violence committee. CCSL has submitted statistical documentation and narrative reports to UNICEF, which they hope will be used for accountability purposes in the TRC and Special Court processes and to bring the attention of the government to the problem, which thus far, has done little to either protect women and girls or prosecute their perpetrators. CCSL has a referral arrangement with Planned Parenthood of Sierra Leone but also makes medical referrals to other partners.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) closely monitors and documents a range of human rights abuses in Sierra Leone, including sexual violence. HRW produces frequent reports and press releases as part of an effort to advocate for accountability, stronger protection for civilians at risk and improved human rights training of former combatants. In February, 2001 HRW released a short report specifically on sexual violence during the conflict.³¹²

Amnesty International has also been producing regular reports and releases documenting rights abuses, including rape³¹³, and advocating

³¹¹ PHR interview with Helen Bash-Taqi of CCSL in Freetown, March, 2000. Generally, their research has revealed that most younger children were used as domestic servants, though cases of girls as young as 10 being used for sex have been documented. They also have cases of two boys (15 and 16) who were forced to have sex with their female commander and young boys who were forced to commit rapes.

³¹² Human Rights Watch, *Sexual Violence within the Sierra Leone Conflict*, February 26, 2001.

³¹³ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone: Rape and other Forms of Sexual Abuse Must be Stopped*, May 30, 2000.

³¹⁴ Amnesty International, *Sierra Leone. Rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls*, June 29, 2000.

within the Sierra Leonean government and the international community for protection, justice, and concerted action against the diamond and arms trades which are fueling the war. Amnesty also produced a report specifically documenting war-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone.³¹⁴

Women's Forum is a Freetown-based nation-wide network of women's groups established in February 1994 in response to the need among women for sharing ideas, building effective alliances and taking collective action on issues of common concern and interest to the overall advancement of the status of women and the promotion of children's rights. The Women's Forum played a crucial role in ensuring that the first democratic elections since independence from British rule took place in 1996. They are in a position to promote the need for legal reform and put pressure on political parties to address women's rights in the upcoming general elections.³¹⁵ The Women's Forum was identified at a forum chaired by UNHCR in 2001 as a potential partner to house a data-base on sexual violence and disseminate information on the issue.³¹⁶ With adequate financial support, the Women's Forum could also address the ongoing problems of coordination on the issue.

Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) is a Sierra Leonean NGO, active in Freetown, Kenema, Bo and the Kono district, with a strong foundation and solid experience in civil society, public advocacy, and rural development. NMJD is well suited to provide public advocacy to change the laws governing treatment of women/children, and to promote community development to establish community-based prevention and response systems in both rural and urban areas.³¹⁷

GOAL is an Irish NGO working with street children and commercial sex-workers in Freetown. In a survey conducted in 2000, they found that nearly half of the girls interviewed were between the ages of 13-17, many were formerly with the rebels, and 98% were addicted to drugs. The sex trade is an ongoing problem that has been aggravated by the war and sexual violence continues to be a daily problem in the lives of these girls – perpetrated by customers, boyfriends and military personnel. GOAL has established a drop-in center for these girls where they offer counseling, non-formal education and medical care. GOAL also advocates for the

³¹⁵ Witness, *Witness action in Women and Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*, December 2001 www.witness.org

³¹⁶ One of the problems raised at a workshop organized by UNHCR in Geneva in March, 2001, was the non-availability of adequate information and data about the extent of sexual violence in Sierra Leone which makes it difficult to provide targeted support for survivors. It is hoped that the findings of the PHR/UNAMSIL survey will help address this problem.

³¹⁷ NMJD received technical and training assistance from a representative of John Snow International in September, 2000 and has also received a small grant to expand their programs from the Washington D.C. based, Reproductive Health of Refugees Consortium.

rights of these girls with the police. Although family reunification has been particularly challenging because there is such a stigma attached to prostitution, GOAL is attempting to mediate with families to allow the girls to go home.

HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care

Society for Women and AIDS in Africa is a regional organization which focuses on the gender dimension of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and works to improve women's access to information, to challenge the cultural and legal constraints of patriarchal societies, and to encourage women's financial independence and self-esteem. The Sierra Leone branch, SWAASL, was set up ten years ago and has played a central role in organizing stakeholders to address the epidemic strategically and cooperatively. Major present and future activities which arose from a conference on best practices convened by SWAASL in 1998 include: establishing an AIDS/STD Resource Center, conducting research on the prevalence and impact of the disease, and orchestrating awareness campaigns targeted at war-affected women, commercial sex workers and other vulnerable groups.

Shepherd's Hospice – Sierra Leone's only hospice has no in-patient capacity, but at the time of this writing had 25 volunteer counselors throughout the greater Freetown area. The hospice has received modest funding from Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and WHO, and is expected to receive additional funds to rehabilitate their building and expand their services. Because of the stigma surrounding HIV and the frequent reports of those discovered to have the disease being thrown out of their homes and shunned by their families, it is essential to establish in-patient services.³¹⁸ There is currently nowhere else in the country to refer those who are ill for care and counseling.

National AIDS Control Office, a body within the Sierra Leonean government, is trying to revive AIDS-related activities nationwide. This office is intended to facilitate coordination and planning between government, NGOs, and international organizations working on the issue, but lacks the necessary capacity.³¹⁹ Among their activities, NACC has conducted prevalence testing among pregnant women as recently as 1997 and organized efforts to inform parliament of the need for a more active government role in preventing and treating HIV/AIDS.

³¹⁸ World Health Organization and Associates for Global Change, *HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone: The Future at Stake, The Strategic and Organizational Context and Recommendations for Action*, December 20, 2000.

³¹⁹ According to a presentation made by a representative of the National AIDS Control Office attended by PHR in March 2000, testing of pregnant women at clinics revealed the following growth in HIV prevalence rates: 2% in 1992, 2.7% in 1993, 3.4% in 1994, 4.5% in 1995, 5.5% in 1996, and 7% in 1997.

APPENDIX D

Referrals

The PHR/UNAMSIL team took every precaution to minimize the risk of re-traumatization for interview subjects, including careful design of the survey instrument, sensitivity training of the research team, and by the central involvement of two consultants, one a psychologist and one a social worker, who had extensive experience counseling survivors of sexual violence. In spite of the team's best efforts, it was recognized that the women and girls interviewed were taking some emotional and practical risk in sharing their stories, as well as giving up some of their time. While PHR decided against giving the participants any material compensation or token, and made it clear at the outset that the team was not offering any humanitarian services, it felt the least it could do was educate them about and connect them to existing services in the area. First, PHR established contact with those organizations providing medical and psychosocial support in the camps where the team intended to survey and explained the nature of the study. All the groups we contacted including: IMC, IRC, MSF-H, ADRA, GOAL, Concern, and Merlin, were happy to provide referral services to the women and girls we interviewed. In most cases, the researchers simply told the participant about the services offered in her camp, however special arrangements were made for "high risk cases." Researchers were trained to identify particularly severe cases requiring intervention and to request permission from the individual to pass her name along to the appropriate health care provider. Great care was taken to ensure that any names taken were separated from the completed questionnaires to ensure strict confidentiality. The PHR/UNAMSIL team is grateful to those organizations and individuals who so generously cooperated with this effort.

The researchers also provided a brief explanation of both the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in an effort to begin to educate the population and to ensure that the participants had an adequate understanding to determine whether they wanted PHR to give their names to these bodies. Any names that were given to pass on to the TRC or Special Court were separated from the questionnaires, so that no information about the participant's history would accompany her name. These names and contact information are in the possession of the UNAMSIL Human Rights Section until they can be passed on to the appropriate bodies.

Number	Item	Content
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From Combat to Community:
Women and Girls of Sierra Leone

By Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson

With Contributions by
Sanam Naraghi Anderlini

Series Editor
Sanam Naraghi Anderlini

January 2004

WOMEN WAGING PEACE is a program of Hunt Alternatives Fund that advocates for the full participation of women in formal and informal peace processes around the world.

THE POLICY COMMISSION is conducting a series of case studies to document women's contributions to peace processes across conflict areas worldwide.

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KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Key Findings

1. Throughout the conflict, women led civil society peace efforts. In 2002, as the country faced the breakdown of the 1999 Lomé accords, women were pivotal in galvanizing mass demonstrations that led to the end of the war.
2. Contrary to official reports, women played a military role in the pro-government Civil Defense Forces and in the rebel movement.
3. Female ex-combatants from all forces were significantly underrepresented in official disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs.
4. Women are playing a significant but unacknowledged role in the reintegration of former fighters, filling many gaps in official programs.

Recommendations

1. When **planning DDR**, international actors, including the UN, multilateral organizations, donor governments, and national governments, must:
 - ensure the participation of women during all stages of negotiation;
 - assume that women are part of the fighting forces and be aware that, where children are present, 10 to 33 percent may be girls;
 - recognize the initial estimated number of fighters provided by military forces may be low, and thus be prepared to increase resources to ensure effective programs; and
 - extend the definition of *combatant* to include those who were part of a “regular armed force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks and messengers...and girls recruited for sexual purposes...”—in accordance with existing norms followed by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and outlined in the UN Secretary-General’s study, *Women, Peace and Security* (2002).
2. During **disarmament and demobilization**, implementing organizations should:
 - accept females even when unaccompanied by men; and
 - develop parallel systems for the demobilization of women and girls by:
 - offering women the choice to enter care centers with their children or to remain with their male colleagues and counterparts; and
 - ensuring there are facilities to separately house girls and boys without parents.
3. In **reintegration**, donors should ensure that:
 - local organizations and communities working with former combatants are direct beneficiaries of resources from official reintegration and rehabilitation programs;
 - income-generation and job-creation programs are created to provide employment for ex-combatants and members of communities into which they are returning; and
 - DDR programs support mothers, particularly single mothers, emerging from the fighting forces—including providing basic care for them and their children (through foster care programs or centers) to facilitate their participation in education and skills training that can help them avoid petty crime or the sex trade.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sierra Leone ended its national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program in December 2003. Since the program began in 1998, 72,500 former combatants have been demobilized, including 4,751 women (6.5 percent) and 6,787 children (9.4 percent), of whom 506 are girls.¹ From the outset, there was some recognition that women and child soldiers made up a significant portion of the forces.² In theory, the DDR process was designed to include them. But while the program was effective in reaching out to male combatants, ultimately women and children were underserved. Despite this shortcoming, the plan has been hailed as a success and a model upon which other DDR processes could be based.

These DDR programs have also failed to support civilian populations faced with the reality of reintegrating former fighters. Instead, in communities across Sierra Leone, women as individuals and in groups have taken on the responsibility of assisting former combatants as they return to civilian life. But they receive little or no support from the national and international programs established to ensure successful reintegration.

Women and the War

In March 1991, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), led by former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) corporal Foday Sankoh, invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia. Violence against women and children, and general terror in rural and urban centers quickly became cornerstones of the RUF movement and were encouraged by its leadership. But as the war escalated, women and girls reported atrocities committed by forces on both sides. Preyed upon by the RUF and SLA, local civilians in many areas transformed traditional hunting societies, such as the Kamajors, into pro-government militias known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF). These militias gained prominence with the armed activities of the Kamajors in the eastern and southern provinces and the rise of the Gbethis in the north, among others. Throughout the war years, the government endorsed the CDF, providing them with resources, including weapons.

Soldiers and "Wives," Cooks and Spies

Women and girls were present in large numbers in pro-government and rebel forces and were involved in a variety of activities. In the survey of 50 female ex-

combatants (ranging in age from 10 to 35) conducted for this study, almost all stated "abduction" as their means of entry; one third stated that they had fighting experience; nearly half indicated that they received weapons training; one fifth described themselves as spies; and more than half indicated that in addition to performing other duties, they were forced to be captive "wives." On average, they were 12 years old when they entered the forces.

Despite denials by government officials, girls and young women played an integral role in the CDF. They were spies, commanders, and frontline fighters; some were herbalists, meant to supply fighters with magic potions for invulnerability. Others were cooks, medics, and spiritual leaders. They witnessed brutal rituals and suffered significant sexual abuse.

Women and girls also made up a large part of rebel RUF forces. Many served as captive "wives" of commanders and were responsible for distributing weapons, food, and loot confiscated from village raids. They commanded fighting forces known as small boys units and small girls units; many were also involved in the mutilation and murder of civilians. In camps, commanders' "wives" sometimes used their control over food and loot to prevent young boys and men from abusing girls.

In sum, the experience of women and girls in the fighting forces was complex. They were captives and dependents, but they were also involved in the planning and execution of the war.

Disarmament and Demobilization 1998-2000

The Sierra Leone government and international partners, including the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group and the United Nations, conducted disarmament and demobilization in three phases between 1998 and 2000. Reintegration programs continued through 2003. At the start of the program, the estimated number of combatants was 45,000, of which 12 percent was presumed to be women.³ At its completion, over 72,000 had been demobilized, indicating that the preliminary estimates of force size were inaccurate. As 84 percent of the demobilized were adult men, the program was effective in reaching out to this segment of the population. Since just 6.5 percent of the demobilized were women, however, it seems likely that thousands

With no hope of receiving assistance from the children's fathers, their own families, or the state, some are turning to violence. In 2002, social workers observed that young women, particularly those with children, were instigating riots in urban centers. Some young women fighters have reportedly crossed borders to join armed groups across the region.

**Rising to the Challenge:
Women's Campaign for Peace**

From the early days of the war, women in rural and urban centers mobilized to protest the atrocities and call for peace. In May 2000, with the RUF flouting the 1999 Lomé accords, a group of elderly women came together, demanding a meeting with Sankoh. On arriving at the RUF compound, they were mistreated and insulted. Frustrated, the women tried a different tactic. They collectively hitched up their skirts, bent over, and bared themselves to Sankoh and his coterie. In Sierra Leone, such an action by women is the worst curse that can be brought upon anyone.

The news had a galvanizing effect on Sierra Leoneans. They had an obligation to uphold the women's honor and support the curse. But the women's actions also gave people the courage to stand up to the RUF. Coinciding with the arrival of the new UN mission and British Special Forces, the women's protest and subsequent public demonstrations, were pivotal in the struggle for peace, culminating in Sankoh's arrest.

**Caring for Ex-Combatants:
Women's Contributions to Reintegration**

Across Sierra Leone, women as individuals and in groups have been critical to reintegrating former combatants, particularly those excluded from official programs. Some women whose children were killed have opened their homes to former child soldiers. Others have set aside their own suffering and offered help, believing that, "If left abandoned, the child ex-combatants would have nothing positive to do...and would prove a threat to a fragile peace."⁶

In the study survey, 55 percent of respondents indicated that women in the community played a significant role in helping them reintegrate. This was higher than responses for assistance given to them by traditional leaders (20 percent) or international aid workers (32 percent). They said community women provided guidance, shared meager resources, and, perhaps most important, helped facilitate their skills training and

education by providing childcare, clothes, and food. Women's organizations have also provided models for many of the female ex-combatants; over 65 percent of respondents said that they would like to join such organizations, which they see as offering practical assistance.

Nationally, the Forum for African Women Educationalists and the Progressive Women's Association are the main organizations active in reintegration programs. Among local organizations, Caritas-Makeni, affiliated with the Catholic Church and operating in central Sierra Leone, has developed a foster care program for young mothers, enabling them to attend school while their children are tended. Caritas-Makeni also offers counseling and programs on health and alternative income generation for those who have entered the sex trade.

Among international actors, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) offer strong models for working with local groups and reaching former combatants excluded from the national programs. UNICEF has an innovative program of providing resources to schools that accept former child combatants. In addition, UNICEF, with the support of USAID, runs training centers that offer mothers childcare and food. A number of their programs combine vocational training with basic literacy and numeric skills. Non-traditional trades such as welding, carpentry, and house building are among those taught to women. Forty-nine percent of survey participants said such training, as well as education, are critical in facilitating their adjustment to civilian life.

Conclusion

Sierra Leone's DDR process failed women and girls. As many were classified as "dependents" only, their real experiences were not acknowledged, and they were precluded from receiving the benefits provided to "combatants." The assumption that women and girls were victims only, with no role in either the execution of war or the building of peace, is proving detrimental to their future, with potentially negative consequences for the country's recovery and the region's security.

First, despite their horrific experiences in the war, women and girls have shown tremendous agency and initiative. Even during their captivity, those in the

INTRODUCTION

In December 2003, Sierra Leone ended its official disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program. From the time of its initiation in 1998, 72,500 former combatants passed through the program, including 4,751 women (6.5 percent) and 6,787 children (9.4 percent), of whom 506 were girls.¹ From the outset there was recognition of the large presence of child soldiers (up to 50 percent of fighters in rebel forces were believed to be under 18) and women (estimates ranged between 10 and 30 percent) among the various forces, so the program was in principle, designed to include them. At completion, however, while the program was noted for its effective outreach to male combatants, women and children were underserved. Despite this significant shortcoming, the program has been hailed as a success by the UN, the World Bank, and others, and a model upon which other DDR processes could be based.²

The DDR program also failed to provide support to civilian populations faced with the reality of reintegrating former fighters. Instead, women as individuals and in groups took on the responsibility of assisting these fighters, particularly the children and youth among them, as they returned to civilian life. The majority of these community-based efforts, however, received little or no aid or recognition from the national and international programs established to guarantee not just successful demobilization, but ultimately effective reintegration and rehabilitation.

This report revisits the Sierra Leone conflict and peace process from the perspective of women. Drawing on field-based interviews and data, it outlines the diverse roles played by women and girls in the war and highlights the importance of women's activism for peace. This study presents key findings of the experiences of women and girls in the DDR program, focusing on obstacles to access, entry, and full participation. It documents women's individual

and collective contributions to the reintegration of fighters, concluding with an analysis of the importance of a gender perspective to DDR efforts and practical recommendations to support the development of such programs.

Outlined here are the rationale for this study, assumptions of the research, an explanation of methodology, and the working definitions that frame this report.

Rationale

Limited research has been conducted to assess DDR programs' ability to respond to the experiences of women and girls within fighting forces, in Sierra Leone or elsewhere.³ Still less is known about how programs that do or do not address gender considerations may contribute to or hinder peaceful transitions. Drawing on the Sierra Leone conflict (1991-2000) this report uses quantitative and qualitative methods and gender analysis to document and examine women and girl ex-combatants' roles and experiences within the forces and official DDR processes.³

In addition to a lack of information on the experiences of women and girls in official DDR programs, knowledge is scarce regarding the contributions that women make to official and community-based DDR processes. As conflicts increasingly involve civilian populations, women are more and more often called upon to "unofficially" assist in demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants, especially child soldiers. In Sierra Leone, children constituted half of some of the fighting forces; up to one third of these were girls.⁴ This study, therefore, also documents women's previously unrecognized actions to strengthen official and community-based DDR, assist ex-combatants, and contribute to peace building within Sierra Leone and the region.

¹Results presented in this study draw in part on data collected under a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, "Girls in Militaries, Paramilitaries, Militias, and Armed Opposition Forces" (Montreal: Rights and Democracy, 2003). Principle investigators for the CIDA grant were Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, Professor of Women's Studies, University of Wyoming, USA; the full results are presented in the forthcoming book, *Where Are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War* (Montreal: Rights and Democracy).

Assumptions

This study rests on the assumption that effective DDR processes are critical for achieving sustainable peace. Further, it presupposes that it is insufficient to prioritize the disarmament and demobilization elements alone at the expense of the reintegration component. Finally, it acknowledges that the burden of reintegration and longer-term rehabilitation is largely placed on the families and communities into which former combatants return; too often official national and international DDR programs overlook this key component.

The study does not assume that women are more peaceful than men by nature. Indeed it shows that women play many roles during times of war, ranging from frontline combatants to community peacemakers. They should therefore be recognized as active agents rather than passive victims in peace processes, including DDR. To exclude their voices and experiences and to ignore their contributions ultimately undermines peace.

Methodology

Throughout August and September 2002 in Sierra Leone, over 60 in-depth interviews were conducted with community leaders, social workers, NGO staff, psychologists, traditional and religious leaders, as well as with government officials, representatives of international organizations and women and girls formerly in the fighting forces.

Secondary quantitative data on the fighting forces and their participation in DDR programs with particular emphasis on children and girls was gathered from the Sierra Leone National Center for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the Child Protection Unit of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Sierra Leone.

Finally, a survey using quota sampling was used to gather quantitative data.⁵ The Sierra Leone survey was a quota sample of girls and young women formerly associated with the fighting forces during the 1991-2002 war. Sub-categories of the study population included captive "wives" of commanders and girls involved in pro-government Civil Defense Forces (CDF). Study sites were selected with the assistance of UNICEF in Sierra Leone and international and local NGOs working with child ex-combatants or war-affected communities in Sierra Leone.⁶ The

sampling took place in different regions of the country and included the Western Area (the area including and surrounding the capital Freetown) and two of three provinces, the North and the East. Throughout August and September 2002, surveys were conducted in a variety of locations including remote villages, "suburbs" of urban centers, urban centers, and interim care and training centers for war-affected youth.

The survey contained 99 questions pertaining to basic demographic data, entry into the force, roles and experiences within the force, experiences of physical abuses within the respective forces and in community reintegration, experiences of time spent in the army barracks, official disarmament and demobilization, direct community entrance, reintegration, skills training, assistance needs, and current status. Fourteen open-ended questions were included in the survey itself; issues ranged from questions regarding why a girl joined an armed force if she reported joining, skills learned in fighting forces that could assist the respondent now, to difficulties and assistance during reintegration.

A full description of the research methodology can be found in Appendix 1.

Definitions

Peace Processes

Just as scholars have identified the "lifecycle" of conflict,⁷ current thinking in the field identifies a lifecycle of peace. The establishment of peace is not a single event, but rather a process characterized by progress and setbacks, successes and failures. Observers of peace processes, including those who live in societies with protracted conflict, are all too familiar with premature celebration of ceasefires and peace accords that are later violated. Even if a settlement holds, the transition to a state of peace is a long-term operation. It requires extensive logistical and financial measures to create or reestablish the physical, social, and political infrastructure necessary for the country to transition towards a culture of peace.

Perhaps the most realistic approach to understanding the peace process is to acknowledge that, though negotiations are "the best-known stage in a process of peace," as Anderlini et al. write in *Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*,

PART 1: THE TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

Pre-Colonization to Independence

Prior to colonization no ethnic tribe dominated the geographic area that is now Sierra Leone. The largest ethnic groups, the Mende and Temne, have long been divided into chiefdoms in the south and the north respectively. A country rich with natural resources—timber, ivory, palm oil, and valuable mineral deposits including gold, bauxite, and diamonds—Sierra Leone fell into British control in the early 1800s. During its movement to abolish slavery, Great Britain allowed thousands of freed slaves to find refuge in the West African territory, effectively reshaping the demographic composition of Sierra Leone. Other ethnic groups including the Kono, Limba, Kissi, and Krio migrated into the new British territory.

Democratic reforms following World War II established an assembly for the territory led primarily by Paramount Chiefs. Fearing marginalization, the Krio elite, along with other chiefs, created the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), led by Sir Milton Margai, a Mende. The creation of the Temne-dominated All People's Congress (APC) followed in 1957, splitting the assembly's composition and dividing it ethnically between the Mende (SLPP) of the south and the Temne (APC) of the north. Margai was elected Prime Minister after successful constitutional talks in London in 1960. A year later, Sierra Leone became independent, women gained the right to vote, and a parliamentary system within the British Commonwealth was established. The years after independence gave way to protracted political clashes between the two parties until 1967, when the APC won in a democratic election.¹⁷

Cold War to Civil War

Adopting a policy of non-alignment during the Cold War, the Sierra Leone government upheld the colonial practice of emphasizing the export of raw materials over industrial production. Independent mining made up the bulk (80 percent) of economic export from Sierra Leone. Continuing a tradition of maintaining power through asset control and patron systems, by the early 1970s, the APC, with Siaka Stevens as president, controlled 52 percent of the national diamond industry. In 1978, facing increased opposition from professionals and trade unionists, Stevens consolidated his power. He destroyed many of the political institutions established in the British parliamentary system, rendering them ineffective. Tightening its grip, the

APC leadership cut off access to natural resources to those outside its sphere.¹⁸

One result of these actions was increased frustration and unrest among youth and students unable to support themselves and their families. The political ideals expressed by jobless university students, graduates, and dropouts supplanted the unorganized political frustrations among the uneducated youth, who were sometimes used as thugs by the political leadership. Buoyed by public support, the youth promoted the idea of pan-Africanism, drawing parallels between the colonial past and the post-colonial present. The APC tried to attract distinguished "radicals" among the youth class as potential candidates for the party, but none accepted.¹⁹

The economy faltered throughout the 1980s, due in part to lost revenues from diamond smuggling. Yet those within the patron system, including politicians, powerful chiefs, and traders, prospered while the average citizen's standard of living continued to decline.²⁰ Government expenditures on health and housing dropped and state-sponsored scholarships decreased. Looking for allies to overcome the West's containment of Muammar Qaddafi's regime, Libya eagerly nurtured the political discord among young Sierra Leoneans.²¹ One of those who traveled to Libya was Foday Sankoh, formerly a corporal in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). It was in a Libyan military training camp that Sankoh met Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). In 1987, the two agreed to support each other's efforts to overthrow their respective governments. Financiers and recruits were found in the main diamond mines of Sierra Leone, located in the Eastern and Southern Provinces, in some cases more easily accessed from Liberia than from the Sierra Leone capital of Freetown.²²

In August 1985, the APC named Joseph Saidu Momoh as successor to Stevens after several years of economic decline, increased political opposition, and Stevens' increasingly autocratic approach. Corruption, the collapse of the economy, and heavy cuts in social programs, partly due to International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs, had severely weakened the country.²³ Momoh attempted to re-establish a multi-party government with elections scheduled for 1991. However, armed

rebel forces led by Foday Sankoh, calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and backed by Liberia, launched their first attack into Sierra Leone just prior to the elections, thwarting the president's efforts to stabilize the economy. Initially, RUF forces consisted of three groups: those trained in Libya with fighting experience in Liberia, young men from Liberia and Sierra Leone who had little or no work, and seasoned NPFL fighters from Taylor's army.²⁴

Violent Conflict and the Rise of the Civil Defense Forces

In March 1991, RUF rebels invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia and occupied the eastern regions of the country, securing lucrative diamond reserves. In exchange for weapons, drugs, and supplies, Sierra Leonean diamonds were smuggled into Liberia for sale on the international market, generating millions of dollars annually. Controlling the diamond mines also allowed Sankoh to recruit, forcibly and voluntarily, young miners and locally unemployed men and boys into his fighting forces. By the mid to late 1990s, global exposure of these "blood diamonds" led to an international outcry against their export and sale and initiated numerous UN investigations and resolutions.²⁵

Within the first 18 months of RUF attacks, over 400,000 people were internally displaced while hundreds of thousands became refugees. The war quickly came to involve not only Liberia, but also Guinea and Côte D'Ivoire. It destroyed hundreds of hospitals and schools and tens of thousands of homes. Because of a lack of health care, failing schools, and the widespread destruction of infrastructure support systems, the population grew increasingly vulnerable. The Sierra Leone countryside became militarized as a result of the presence of international forces, widespread proliferation of small arms, and a general suspicion towards one's neighbor, especially in areas protected by local militias.²⁶

Women and girls reported atrocities committed by all fighting forces during the war.²⁷ Early in the conflict the RUF perpetrated widespread violence across southern and eastern Sierra Leone. Violence against women and children and general terror in rural and urban centers quickly became cornerstones of the movement and were encouraged by RUF leadership.²⁸

As government revenues fell from the loss of mineral sales, so too did the salaries and the resolve of the SLA. Soldiers committed gross human rights violations, including rape, mutilations, looting, property destruction, and murder. They forced women and girls to exchange sex for "protection" and used them as prostitutes.²⁹ With the rebellion spreading virtually unchecked in the south and east, rebels preyed on civilians for food, supplies, and labor.³⁰

Subjected to violence by both the RUF and the SLA, local militias known as Civil Defense Forces (CDF) emerged.³¹ CDF gained prominence with the rise of the Kamajors, the largest traditional hunting society, in the eastern and southern provinces. Other hunting groups were the Tamaboro, Donso, Kapra and later, the Gbethis in the north. With the exception of the Gbethis, these groups existed prior to the war, relying on perceived magical powers and customary hunting weapons such as spears. Combining skill and valor, these groups at times thwarted RUF offensives.³²

As the war progressed and the RUF gained ground, the government supplied the CDF with weapons and financial and logistical support. Although under the supervision of Samuel Hinga Norman, who was the deputy defense minister, chairman of the CDF, and a Kamajor, the CDF did not feature prominently in the president's overall war strategy. This was a result of the army's unease at what it perceived as competition from other fighting forces and possibly due to fear of the CDF gaining political leverage over the president's hold on authority.³³

In 1995, the government hired Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African "mercenary" force composed of 2,000 former South African Defense Force combat veterans. The intervention of EO along with the CDF propped-up the failing Sierra Leonean government. EO's rapid deployment and well-trained soldiers attacked RUF forces and regained control of resource-rich areas. Its military victories allowed local traders to re-establish trade networks and, more importantly, enabled a corporate web of allied mining partners to fence off valuable mining zones, squeezing everyday miners into smaller low-paying illicit operations.³⁴ With the assistance of local landowners or policemen, these traders kept wages low, forced slave-like labor, and traded diamonds on the informal market.³⁵ Those who did not cooperate were removed from political positions and trading zones.³⁶

Women and Girls in Fighting Forces

The presence of women and girls within the former rebel RUF and AFRC fighting forces was known early on in the war.³⁷ Much less is known about their presence or roles in the SLA or the CDF. Drawing on field-based data and secondary sources, this study concludes that the estimated number of girls and young women in fighting forces was higher than previously reported (see Table 1).³⁸ This increase is partly due to their presence as fully initiated members of the CDF.³⁹

Table 1: Estimated Number for Total Forces, Child Soldiers, and Girl Soldiers

Force	Total	Child Soldiers	Girl Soldiers
RUF	45,000	22,500	7,500
AFRC	10,000	5,000	1,667
SLA	14,000	3,500	1,167
CDF	68,865	17,216	1,722
Total	137,865	48,216	12,056

Of the study population, nearly all stated “abduction” and “forced recruitment” as their means of entry into the various forces. Ten-year-old Maria B.⁴⁰ was outside her home playing with friends under the moonlight when the RUF attacked.⁴¹ All of them tried to escape, but she was captured. She was told to carry looted items for the rebels and was given a five-gallon container of palm oil; anytime she tried to rest she was beaten.

Agnes V.⁴² was nine years old and on vacation with her family when rebels attacked the village. After looting the village, the rebels rounded up around 50 people, locked them in a building, and began to set it on fire. A junior commander pleaded with the senior commander to release the young girl. She was then selected by the junior commander to be his captive “wife.” The people remaining in the building were burned. Agnes was forced to be the captive “wife” of the commander for the next nine years. During the commanders’ absences from the camp, she was in charge of the military compound, including organizing raids and fighting units.

Mariama M.⁴³ was seven years old when she was captured and spent 10 years with the AFRC/RUF as a fighter. She received basic military and weapons training with machine guns and two-grip pistols. She was trained with approximately 50 other girls and 100 boys.

Once recruited, women and girls had numerous roles, including that of frontline fighters. In fact, nearly half (44 percent) of the study population received basic military and weapons training from their commanders or captor “husbands.” However, nearly all women and girls performed additional roles:

- 72 percent as cooks;
- 68 percent as porters;
- 62 percent as assistants for the sick and wounded;
- 60 percent as “wives;”
- 44 percent as food producers;
- 40 percent as messengers between rebel camps;
- 22 percent as spies;
- 18 percent as communications technicians; and
- 14 percent as workers in diamond mines for their commanders or captor husbands.

Notably, all of the study population who reported their primary role as “fighter” also reported that they were forced to be captive “wives.” According to Kama F.,⁴⁴ who at age 15 was an RUF frontline fighter, it was better to be a fighter and the “wife” of a common soldier because you could protect yourself with your own weapon, you had access to food and loot, and your chances of escaping were greater, unlike captive “wives” of commanders who were closely guarded with little chance of escape.

Women and Girls as Full Members of the CDF

Official claims that the pro-government CDF were composed only of males are inaccurate.⁴⁵ Women and girls were fully initiated members of the CDF.⁴⁶ This study focuses on the two largest CDF: the Kamajors and Gbethis. Although the Kamajors were originally a male-only traditional hunting society, in response to the increased pressure from the RUF it became a

self-defense force and enlisted women and girls beginning in the early 1990s and continued this practice throughout the war. The Gbethis, never a traditional male society, were created as one of the CDF in the mid 1990s in response to increased rebel attacks. They enlisted and initiated women and girls where they acted as integrated members of the CDF and were included in all ceremonies, amulets, and scarification. They served as commanders, frontline fighters, initiators, spiritual leaders, medics, herbalists, spies, and cooks.⁴⁷

Ramatu T.⁴⁸ was a fighter with the Kamajors and fought alongside other girls and women Kamajors in Kenema and Bo Districts. Describing her initiation she says,

They use native herbs, which you drink and they bathe you in. These herbs make it so you don't feel like returning to your family. The initiator placed charms around my neck so that bullets are deflected, and a special charm to protect against knives and pangas; they will just bounce off my body. After this they gave me my special dress and herbs and charms. I was instructed not to bathe for several days because it would reduce the magic. Later, they rubbed the blood of a human being on my skin, and I found that I was not afraid of anything. I had a strong and fearless heart.

Some women and girls joined the Kamajors and Gbethis at the request of their husbands who were already initiated in the militias. Mamuna K.⁴⁹ was married to a Gbethi man who asked her to join for her own protection. Mamuna, who was pregnant, sent her remaining children into Freetown for their safety and joined the Gbethis the same year. Importantly, Mamuna was an herbalist and her role within the Gbethis was to prepare the baths and drinks for those undergoing initiation. Within the group she was regarded as crucial to maintaining the magical powers of the fighting force, as she collected and prepared herbs for the fighters' food and drink.

Others were abducted and conscripted by the Kamajors and Gbethis. At times, women and girls worked with their male counterparts to capture civilian adolescents and children whom they forcibly initiated and trained as fighters.⁵⁰ Some "joined" or became "wives" to male CDF fighters as a matter of survival. Mariatu R.⁵¹ agreed to become a "wife" of a

fighter and join the Gbethis when an RUF attack on her village left her and her elderly parents as the only survivors. Upon joining, Mariatu was able to bring her parents and herself within the ring of protection offered by the Gbethis.

Many adolescents and children "joined" the Kamajors and Gbethis with the approval of their parents. This was especially the case when the Paramount Chief of the area endorsed a particular unit of the CDF; it then became mandatory that all families contribute a member to the CDF.⁵² Dissension was rare. For example, in Kenema Township, Kenema District, where the Kamajors were especially active during the war, the burned homes are not the result of rebel activities. Instead, they belong to families who did not contribute a family member to the Kamajors, and thus were suspected rebel sympathizers. According to one informant, "There is not a house in Kenema [Township] left that did not contribute someone to the Kamajors."⁵³

Women and girls in the Kamajors and Gbethis observed widespread human rights violations by members of the CDF, including cannibalism, human sacrifice, and sexual abuse. For example, Ramatu T.⁵⁴ reported that a common practice among her Kamajor force was for adult Kamajor males to enter a village and capture an adult civilian. They would then cut the person's throat, turn them upside down, and "squeeze them from toe to head" to drain their blood into a bucket. All members of the fighting party, including the women and girls, would then drink the blood so they would not be afraid during the attack. Perhaps in part because of their participation in such violent acts, as well as their involvement in activities such as warfare, that went against traditionally acceptable roles for females, all young women and girls formerly with the CDF in the study population reported stigmatization, threats, and abuse upon returning to the communities they had fought to protect.

"Wives" of RUF Commanders in Camps and Command Structure

The RUF was loosely configured, and camp and command structure varied throughout the country. In general, a commander held "houses" or compounds in which his or her recruits and captives served. While there were a number of female RUF commanders, the majority were males.⁵⁵

Captive “wives” of commanders exerted substantial power within the RUF compounds. These “wives” were predominately girls. When the commander was away, they were in charge of the compound. They kept in communication with the commander and would select and send troops, spies, and support when needed. These girls and young women decided on a daily basis who in the compound would fight, provide reconnaissance, and raid villages for food and loot. Some counseled their captor husbands on war strategies, troop movement, and upcoming attacks.⁵⁶

Saramba M.⁵⁷ spent five years with the RUF as a commander’s “wife.” During that time she distributed weapons to boy and girl fighters prior to village raids and attacks on enemy forces. She also chose boys and girls for spy missions to infiltrate camps of the SLA, CDF, and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and to report on force locations and size. At times, such spying led to the deaths of these children and sexual abuse by male soldiers, particularly in the case of girls who were told to become intimate with the men in these forces to gather information.⁵⁸

In the absence of the commander, when food and loot were delivered to the camps, it was brought to his captive “wife.” She would then decide how these goods were to be apportioned among those in the compound.⁵⁹ Lynette S.⁶⁰ distributed food and loot to groups of boy fighters within her RUF compound to try to persuade them not to harass or sexually abuse the young children in the camp. She expressed deep sympathy for the young children and had a number of strategies she would employ to try and influence her commander “husband” to also look out for the well being of the children.

Bodyguards accompanied the commanders’ captive “wives,” both to provide protection in case of attack on the compound and to prevent their escape. Between four to six children might serve as bodyguards; 25 to 50 percent were girls.⁶¹ Ester C.,⁶² a commander’s “wife,” was guarded by six boys and three girls; the youngest boy was six. They were armed with AK-47s and two-grip pistols. Nearly all bodyguards and the commander’s captive “wife” or “wives” carried guns and other weapons.⁶³

In some cases, as documented in Kono District, commanders’ captive “wives” were replaced by new or

more favored girls. Subsequently, the rejected “wives” were sent by their commander husbands to the front lines to fight.⁶⁴ Ramatu S. and Inna T.⁶⁵ described RUF camps in the south with strictly enforced separations between civilians and soldiers. RUF commanders believed that a separation of camps would prevent civilians from witnessing atrocities committed by soldiers or learning about force size and strength should they escape and inform government factions. Consistent with this strategy, “wives” of commanders or soldiers who were rejected were forbidden from returning to the civilian camps and were instead sent to the front lines.

Commanders’ “wives” were in charge of Small Boys Units (SBU) and Small Girls Units (SGU).⁶⁶ The SBU were made up of boys aged 6-15 used primarily for scouting to prepare attacks and food raids, but were dispatched to execute some of the most violent killings and mutilations.⁶⁷ The SGU were made up of similarly aged girls and were used primarily for raiding villages and spying, although they too were sent to fight and commit atrocities.^{68b} In some cases, commanders’ “wives” used loot to mitigate abuse by the SBU or to reward them for not abusing the girls within the compound. In other cases, they could order punishment of the SBU or SGU for “disrupting life in the compound.”⁶⁹

Fighters, male and female, had their own “families” within the compound, which consisted of children they had captured and who were under their protection and care. Girl fighters could and did serve as heads of these “families.”⁷⁰ Food and loot were distributed on the basis of these “families.” Much has been said about girls trying to attach themselves to boys or men within the compounds to avoid gang raping.⁷¹ While this appears to be accurate, this study also found that older children and adolescents who were not attached to a “family” were not given food and had to survive as scavengers. Thus, attachment of girls to boys or men was also means to secure food as well as (some) protection against sexual assault.⁷²

The presence, roles, and experiences of women and girls within the fighting forces in Sierra Leone has a number of important implications for the design of those processes that seek to build human and national security and peace in the post-conflict period. It is evident that despite their trauma, women and girls showed tremendous agency. They developed a number

of skills and strategies that enabled them to survive and regain some control over their lives during their time with the fighting forces.

From the standpoint of DDR programs, however, the need for strict categorization of individuals as "combatants" or "non-combatants," and the reluctance on the part of the international community and local governments to acknowledge that women and girls are integral to the fighting often devalues the multiple roles they play in conflict. This is not only detrimental to disarmament and demobilization, it also harms the women and girls. By being treated as passive victims or "dependents," they are again stripped of control of their lives and their sense of dignity. Moreover, by not acknowledging the skills and resources that they have attained, DDR processes risk losing tremendous social capital that could be utilized for post-conflict reconstruction.

The Role of Women in the Peace Process

Throughout the war, rural and urban women from all classes and ethnic groups mobilized to form active organizations, conduct marches, and lead rallies for peace and justice. Many women's organizations participated in peace processes during and after the war, including the Mano River Women's Peace Network, Women's Movement for Peace, Forum of African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Sierra Leone Women's Forum, Network of Women Ministers and Parliamentarians, and the Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace. They educated civilians on electoral proceedings, recruited and trained observers, and pressured the military to respect the results of elections.⁷³ Their efforts were critical in shaping informal and formal peace processes, and in bringing about an eventual end to the conflict.⁷⁴

The first attempt at a ceasefire came in January 1996, after a bloodless coup that overthrew the brief military dictatorship of Valetin Strasser. Brigadier General Maada Bio opened negotiations to cease hostilities with the RUF. Women's groups, led by Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN), pressured Bio's military government, the National Provisional Ruling Council to hold demo-

cratic elections. WOMEN was the first non-partisan women's group in Sierra Leone that promote women's representation and concerns in the period before elections.⁷⁵ It incorporated many smaller women's groups under one umbrella organization. Yet, when elections were held, only five women were on a list of 68 candidates representing the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP).⁷⁶ Although given the opportunity, the RUF did not submit candidates of its own. The SLPP won the elections, led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.

Kabbah's first attempt at brokering a peace plan was the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord. Drafted between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government, the accord called for a cessation of violence and the transformation of the RUF into a political party, with a power-sharing incentive to entice the RUF to lay down its arms. Although women suffered greatly from the war and were active in civil movements for peace, none were present at the Abidjan negotiations.⁷⁷

At the signing of the Abidjan peace accord, some girl captives were released from RUF control as a goodwill gesture. However, mutual distrust in implementing the provisions of the accord, and RUF reluctance to lay down arms without the unconditional departure of EO ultimately led to its failure. Other contributing factors included the government's belief that military victory remained possible and the RUF's fear of judicial reprisals.⁷⁸

The government's failure to consistently pay or supply its soldiers, its increasing dependency on and financial support of the CDF, and the high price tag of EO led to the splintering of the SLA. Some soldiers joined the RUF or became part of the new rebel Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), which aligned itself with the RUF. In 1997, the AFRC overthrew President Kabbah's regime. Former Army Major Johnny P. Koroma headed the AFRC in Freetown. Shortly thereafter, the RUF was invited to join the regime. Support for the AFRC came from professionals, civil servants, politicians, and other members of the socio-economic elite who felt alienated from the Kabbah government.⁷⁹

⁷³While much is written on the SBU, this study presents some of the first data on the presence and roles of the SGU. We interviewed girls who headed the SGU, girl members of the SGU, commander's wives who were in charge of the SGU, and boys within the SBU who confirmed the presence of the SGU.

Growing concern in the region regarding a joint AFRC/RUF government in Freetown brought about the intervention of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) to restore the Kabbah regime. ECOWAS determined to act militarily to prevent further chaos, economic ruin, and violence. In March 1997, with the approval of the UN, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, the military wing of ECOWAS, attacked Freetown, forced the AFRC/RUF regime out and restored Kabbah to power. Key policy objectives of the Kabbah government were to de-legitimize the AFRC/RUF, uphold the rule of law, create a competent and trustworthy national army, and defeat the rebellion.⁸⁰ Kabbah's restored government continued to rely on ECOMOG for protection, as well as the support of the CDF.

ECOMOG's presence, however, contributed to violence against civilians. Violation of women and girls' human rights by ECOMOG soldiers was widespread. Girls desperate for income would prostitute themselves or become "girlfriends" of ECOMOG troops for protection. ECOMOG soldiers coerced others into spying on enemy camps. Girls were made especially vulnerable during RUF attacks on ECOMOG forces, and it was common for suspected "girlfriends" of ECOMOG soldiers to be targeted by the RUF for torture and murder. At the same time, girls from RUF and AFRC camps would be sent into ECOMOG areas to befriend soldiers, establish sexual relations with them, and collect intelligence.⁸¹

In January 1999, a joint AFRC/RUF attack on Freetown resulted in the deaths of over 5,000 civilians. Thousands more were mutilated and raped, and over 5,000 were abducted, mostly women and girls. Recognizing the improbability of a military victory over the AFRC/RUF, the government sought a peace plan and eventually agreed to the 1999 Lomé accord. The Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), as a founding member of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, played a leading role in the negotiations that led to the signing of the 1999 Lomé peace accord, officially ending the war (though fighting and unrest continued into 2002). It called for RUF inclusion in a power-sharing government and granted blanket amnesty to gross violators of human rights.⁸² In addition to pardoning RUF leader Sankoh, it placed him at the head of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources.⁸³

Two women were involved in the Lomé process, one a member of the government delegation and the other a representative of the RUF. Although they were not chief negotiators, the final document reflected at least some gender-specific issues as a result of women's participation. For example, Article 28 calls for special attention to victimized women and girls in formulating and implementing rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development programs. The formation of commissions to promote good governance was also called for in the peace accord. Yet within the key entities including the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Religious Leaders, there were no women represented at the time of writing.⁸⁴

In October 1999, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) deployed troops to support the implementation of the Lomé peace accord and bolster the government in the DDR process. However, because there were vast areas still under RUF control, UNAMSIL forces were unable to fully restore peace. In particular, fighting in the diamond-rich eastern province persisted. Small RUF raids and offensives against UN troops yielded large numbers of UN weapons and armored vehicles. RUF attacks peaked on May 3, 2000, when 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage. Less than a week later, British Special Forces arrived in Freetown, expelled the RUF from the city, and restored a sense of security. Subsequently, British forces trained and armed Sierra Leonean troops and drove the remaining RUF soldiers from their territory, allowing UN peacekeepers to return.⁸⁵

Women Tipping the Balance Toward Peace

The Lomé accord collapsed when the RUF broke the ceasefire following UNAMSIL's assumption of control of the diamond-rich areas of eastern Sierra Leone. Recruits from Liberia continued to enter the country, facilitating RUF control over the resource-rich region. When Sankoh's intentions of continuing the war despite Lomé surfaced, women assembled in the streets demanding "Nor again! Enough is enough!"⁸⁶ Their slogan was a response to both the inadequate representation of women after the 1996 elections and Sankoh's tactics, which the women understood to be a means for him to re-arm for war. The women on

the streets called for an end to male domination and male-biased decisions within parliament. They were particularly critical of the decision to appoint Sankoh as a minister and repeatedly called attention to the fact that he was refortifying for war.⁸⁷

Women's activism reached a high point in 2000 when they ultimately played a catalytic role in bringing an end to the conflict. A group of elderly women, representing churches and mosques, requested a meeting with Sankoh, who was living in Freetown. The women came as an interfaith group with an agenda of peace at any cost. Upon arrival they were abused by Sankoh, his guards, and advisors, who refused to listen and mistreated them. The assembled older women stood outside the house of Sankoh, hitched up their skirts, bent over, and bared themselves. In Sierra Leone, such an action by women of this age and standing constitutes the worst curse, sign of shaming, and insult that can be brought upon anyone.

When word of what had happened reached the streets, people were shocked. But they were also mobilized, both because they now had courage to stand up to Sankoh and the RUF, and because they had an obligation to enforce the curse of these respected, senior, religious women. Previously, people had lived in fear of retaliation and violence by the RUF as Sankoh sent death squads to any part of the capital where people spoke out. Yet when such a curse is given, it is the family and society's obligation to back the curse. Men in particular were mobilized to defend the power and honor of the women. May 8, 2000, was set as the date for mass peace protests and demonstrations.

The families of the women, religious organizations, labor and trade unions, and adolescents and school children committed to join the peace protests. Since it appeared that many people would not be going to work or school, the government declared it an unofficial holiday. The mass demonstrations on May 8, 2000 marked the turning point in the conflict.⁸⁸ This time the women marched to Sankoh's house with parliamentarians and civil society leaders. Sankoh's guards opened fire, killing a number of the protesters. On May 13, British troops captured and arrested Sankoh, charging him with the murder of unarmed protestors. With the incarceration of Sankoh, the RUF began to splinter, creating a vacuum in which General Issa Sessay became the new RUF leader and eventually the head of the RUF, a newly formed political party.

The war was officially declared over in January 2002, when hostilities between the CDF and RUF soldiers in eastern Sierra Leone ceased.⁸⁹

When the war ended there were approximately 400,000 internally displaced people and up to 500,000 refugees in Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, and Côte D'Ivoire. At least 55 percent of the refugees were women.⁹⁰ Women's organizations continue to address these ongoing issues. For example, recognizing the regional dimensions of the conflict, the Mano River Union Women's Network for Peace visits women refugees in Guinea and Liberia encouraging them to become a part of the peace process, addressing problems such as sexual assaults in camps and food shortages, and, with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), reuniting women with family members and returning them to their homes in Sierra Leone.⁹¹

PART 2: THE ROLE AND EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN DDR

DDR Design and Implementation

DDR was initiated by the government of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in the aftermath of the 1996 Abidjan accords. A National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (NCRRR) was established with a department that had responsibility for disarming the varying factions.⁹² In 1998 the department was restructured as the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR), after which the program began. Its goals were threefold:⁹³

- 1) collect, register, and destroy all conventional weapons and munitions turned in by combatants;
- 2) demobilize the *initially* estimated 45,000 combatants from the SLA, RUF, AFRC, and the CDF, 12 percent of whom were thought to be women;⁹⁴ and
- 3) support ex-combatants through demobilization to prepare them for reintegration.

DDR was conducted in three phases, the first beginning in 1998. Phase I was conducted by the NCDDR, chaired by President Kabbah, and ECOMOG, which was mandated to assist in disarmament, weapons collection, and demobilization. In 1999 with the Lomé accords in place, Phase II was initiated, running until April 2000; DDR was conducted by NCDDR and the United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which was mandated to assist in disarmament and monitoring of demobilization. UNOMSIL was replaced in October 1999 by a significantly larger peacekeeping mission to support the DDR effort. Phase III, which ran from May 2001 to January 2002, was conducted by NCDDR and the new United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).⁹⁵

Reception centers were established for disarmament and demobilization throughout the country. From September 1998 through May 2001, during Phases I and II, a series of questions and performance of disassembly and reassembly of a gun, usually an AK-47, were used to assess combatants and their DDR eligibility status (combatants 18 years or older). It was believed that the ability to assemble and disassemble a weapon was a good litmus test to determine whether an individual had participated in the conflict as an

armed combatant—the requirement for participation in the DDR program. During this time, women accounted for six percent and girls for 0.6 percent of participants. In Phase III (May 18 2001 through January 2002) group disarmament was allowed, meaning a group could bring in weapons together. This helped marginally to increase women's participation to seven percent and girls to 0.7 percent.⁹⁶

Combatants voluntarily presented themselves at the reception centers to disarm and surrender all weapons and ammunition, and to be assessed for eligibility in the program. While officially those under 18 years of age were not required to present a weapon to enter DDR, this study found widespread discrepancy among UN and NCDDR officials and staff of NGOs working within the DDR process as to whether or not children had to turn over a weapon.⁹⁷ According to nearly all interviewees who passed through DDR, despite official policy the weapons test was repeatedly administered to children to determine their admission into programs.

Qualifying adults (18 years of age and above) were sent to a demobilization center where they received pre-discharge orientation, their benefits packages, a small amount of resettlement and transportation money, and were discharged. Children (17 years of age and below) were to be sent to Interim Care Centers (ICCs) and could select to enter skills training or an educational program of their choice.⁹⁸

Late in the program it was decided that “wives” of (male) ex-combatants could apply for micro-credit to help maintain their families, as the men complained about their inability to sustain families. However for a female applicant to access the loans, she had to be present with a “husband,” who was willing to identify her as his wife. No woman could claim benefits alone, regardless of the number of children she cared for. If women had been permitted to apply alone, it could have enabled them to abdicate their “relationships.” But this was not considered by senior DDR officials, one of whom said that “even if they were raped and abducted, 70 percent of the women and girls wanted to be with their ‘husbands’.”⁹⁹

perceived requirement kept some who would have qualified from attempting to enter the program. Of the study group that did not go through DDR, 46 percent cited not having a weapon as the basis for their lack of participation. There were several reasons girl ex-combatants found themselves without weapons at this critical time. Although they had been in the fighting forces, many in the CDF were ordered

tion site after only three days, "There were too many people crowded in, too many men with nothing to do. The security was bad."

Second, female ex-combatants, particularly women and girls from the CDF, reported fearing RUF former fighters housed at the centers. Christiana R.¹⁰⁵ left an adult center due to the sleeping accommodations.

Table 3: Girls in Fighting Forces and Formal DDR

Force	Estimated Number of Girls in Force	Number of Girls in DDR	Percentage of Girls in DDR	Percentage of Total Force in DDR
RUF	7,500	436	6%	54%
AFRC	1,667	41	2%	89%
SLA	1,167	22	2%	No data
CDF	1,772	7	0.4%	54%
Total	12,056	506	N/A	N/A

Sources: Names withheld. Personal interviews. August 2002; Names withheld. Personal interviews. September 2002; Sesay; *Statistical Data from the National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*; *Statistical Data from the United Nation's Children's Fund*.

to hand in their weapons prior to demobilization and were then left behind as the men were transported to the assembly centers. Other girls indicated that their guns were taken away by their commanders and handed to male fighters. Additionally, many who were not "primarily" fighters had used weapons from a communal source but did not possess a gun themselves.

In further discussion, interviewees revealed six key concerns that affected their attitudes towards DDR and the reasons they chose not to join or remain in programs. First, some girls and young women indicated they did not know about DDR or felt there was nothing to gain by going to the centers. Twenty-one percent of the sample that did not go through DDR reportedly feared reprisals at the centers and thus avoided the entire process. Other respondents perceived the facilities to be dangerous with large numbers of men and inadequate protection. According to Agnes E.¹⁰⁴ who left a disarmament and demobiliza-

"As a woman," she said, "I could not stay there." With regard to children in particular, young women and girls explained that interviews conducted by DDR and ICC staff in the presence of other children and youth did not protect their affiliation with regard to fighting force. CDF girls reported immediate threats to their lives when RUF youth became aware of their affiliation, and they left the ICCs shortly thereafter. For example, Bintu O.¹⁰⁶ was interviewed in a room where other adolescents stood around looking in. As soon as it was known that she was a Kamajor, the former RUF children began to threaten her, and she left the center that evening.

Third, there was the widely perpetuated myth that women and girls were not involved in the CDF. This denial was propagated by influential figures such as then Deputy Minister of Defense and National Coordinator of the CDF Samuel Hinga Norman, who was himself a Kamajor.¹⁰⁷ For some women and

girls, official denial was considered a direct attempt to prevent them from entering DDR programs and collecting benefits. At the end of the war, Norman was promoted to Minister of Internal Security, which caused a number of this study's informants to insist that they remain anonymous when discussing issues of women and girls within the CDF. Recently, however, the Prosecutor for the Sierra Leone Special Court ordered the arrest of Norman and he is currently awaiting charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including for the use of child soldiers within the CDF.¹⁰⁸

Fourth, there was a mistaken belief that children in the CDF were not separated from their families and communities. As a result, many were not classified by UNICEF and international NGOs as "separated children" and therefore could not receive other forms of aid. This is significant, as a number of UN, government, and NGO programs and benefits were designated for "separated children," including child combatants. It was not uncommon for NGOs to report that they did not work with children in the CDF "since they were never separated," and particularly with girls, since there was the assumption that the CDF did not include female members.¹⁰⁹ However, among the women and girls interviewed for this study, some with the Kamajors and Gbethis, had spent significant time away from their families and communities, including traveling the length of the country to fight with other CDF.¹¹⁰

Fifth, over-classification of girls and young women abducted by the RUF, AFRC, and SLA as "camp followers," "sex-slaves," and "wives" by some within the international community and the Sierra Leone government prevented the establishment of DDR programs to address their actual lived experiences. According to DDR officials, "wives," including those abducted, were to be explicitly excluded from formal entrance into DDR.¹¹¹ The focus of DDR was on the main fighting forces, and "minority" groups would not be taken into consideration.¹¹² However, since women and girls frequently played multiple roles, narrow classification of them as "wives" resulted in programmatic errors. Of the study population, 60 percent reported having served as a "wife," yet only eight percent reported this as their primary role.

Additionally, in the case of the CDF in particular, there was the erroneous belief that male CDF fight-

ers could not have sexual or casual contact with a girl or woman; it was largely considered impossible for female members of the CDF to exist in the category of CDF "wife" or "sex slave." This myth gained international legitimacy in October 1998 when a boy Kamajor refused to shake the hand of UNICEF head Carol Bellamy "because he was not allowed to touch a woman."¹¹³ This story was widely circulated and repeated in contexts that helped strengthen the belief that women and girls were not included in the CDF.¹¹⁴ However, among Sierra Leoneans, it was understood that interactions with members of the opposite sex, including sexual relations, were permitted for both male and female members of the Kamajors and Gbethis. It was common, especially among those Kamajors and Gbethis who were married to each other or lived together.¹¹⁵ The only caveat was that sexual contact nullified the perceived magical powers of a fighter's charms, and thus after such contact, fighters had to reapply the charms to regain these supposed powers.

Finally, it is important to note that cultural notions of childhood in Sierra Leone affected the way in which young women and girls engaged with the DDR program. In many rural and urban areas, childhood and adulthood are defined not by chronological age but by actions undertaken by the person, such as a boy harvesting and making palm wine or a girl having a baby.¹¹⁶ When girls who had borne children arrived to disarm, some entered the programs as women since this is how they were now "culturally" defined. Indeed, it was reported to the researchers by those in charge of DDR programs and officials who screened participants that it was not uncommon for girls under 18 with children to enter DDR as women.¹¹⁷ Thus they did not benefit from the programs that were established for child combatants, and were largely left unsupported since the DDR program did not have adequate mechanisms to address the needs of women in the forces.

For those who did enter the DDR process (i.e. half of the study sample) many noted the paucity of supplies, particularly in terms of their physical needs as women. At the ICCs where child combatants and "separated children" were taken and demobilization centers where adults were taken, 43 percent reported not receiving adequate clothing; 54 percent did not receive proper sanitation materials, including soap, shampoo, and feminine hygiene products; and 23 percent did not

have access to medical care when requested. Women respondents also reported very poor conditions at adult demobilization centers.

In terms of the length of their stay at demobilization centers, the young women and girls surveyed had experiences that contradicted official claims. For example, while UN data indicate that nearly all children remained in the centers for at least six months, among those surveyed for this study, only 20 percent had remained for that length of time.¹¹⁸

Finally, only 44 percent of the sample reported receiving the benefits they were promised in demobilization. In particular, lack of financial payment was noted as a leading cause of rising tension among child ex-combatants and resulted in rioting, strikes, and attacks against NGO staff and property in 2002.¹¹⁹

In the Reintegration Phase

As in many war-torn countries, the reintegration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone is complex and sensitive. For the young women and girls, in particular, there is a range of issues that create concern. In response to an open-ended question, 50 percent of the study population named material deprivation, including lack of food, clothing, and housing, as the greatest challenge for their reintegration. Others noted separation from family, rejection, and abuse by family or community, fear of a return to war, and the inability to attend school as major concerns.

When asked what factors helped to mitigate these issues, responses included the end of the war, support from their community or family, and support from NGOs. However, the most critical and often identified need was for education—a core component of most DDR programs for children. Seventy-five percent of the study population indicated a desire to attend school and gain literacy skills. Forty-nine percent stated that skills training would be essential to their successful reintegration.

Sierra Leone ranks among the lowest countries in the world in female literacy and education. Purposeful destruction of schools by the fighting forces further devastated the education system. Well-meaning social workers associated with implementing DDR programs at times discouraged or prevented older ex-combatant girls and girl mothers from entering school, instead urging them to attend skills trainings.¹²⁰ They

argued that since so many of these young women now had children and few had husbands to assist with income, they would need to develop skills rather than continued education to support themselves. At the same time, a number of women and girl mothers were unable to attend skills trainings because of a lack of adequate care for their children (this is related to stigmatism and rejection by families who may welcome a girl back, but not her child or children).¹²¹ There is also a misperception that the older girls and young women considered themselves too old to attend school. Thus, while education was an option for those who went through official DDR, many of the young women and older girls were discouraged to pursue that option. Notably, this argument was not put forward to adolescent boys or men. NGO records themselves reveal unbalanced ratios of boys and girls enrolled in education programs.¹²²

**Expanding the Safety Net:
Women's Contributions to Reintegration**

The reintegration of children and youth from fighting forces is a significant factor in any peace process. Yet few resources and limited time are given to the "R" in DDR. While significant research is being done on the need to support long-term reintegration and rehabilitation processes, in most cases, the burden of caring for ex-combatants still falls to individuals and communities. Women in Sierra Leone, though under-resourced and unheralded, have filled in these programmatic gaps and done much to reintegrate former combatants, particularly women and child soldiers. Working alone, as leaders and members of NGOs, and through the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs, women have taken in and cared for child soldiers, provided women and child former fighters with critical services and training, and thereby worked to normalize and bring stability to their communities and their nation.

Shellac Davies, a leading peacemaker in Sierra Leone, has observed the trauma inflicted on child soldiers and the mixed responses they receive in their home communities. At the end of the war, the attachment between commanders and the child rebels disintegrated, but children often felt that they couldn't go home. "The children were in a dilemma," says Davies. "Mothers who survived the manslaughter but were witnesses to the evil acts committed by their children virtually disowned them. 'A child who committed such an atrocity could not have been born from my womb,'

many mothers were known to have said."¹²³ However, Davies has documented the work of some women and mothers to reintegrate the very children who committed the atrocities. It was these women who "realized that the children involved in the war were both victims and perpetrators." She goes on to describe how the children's violence was the result of their own victimization at the hands of commanders:

*Urged by their commanders... within the rebel movement, they were known to have committed most of the atrocities experienced during the war. Those children under the influence of drugs obeyed commands to kill their parents, burn down houses, and amputate the limbs of their siblings and other members of the community.*¹²⁴

In the Bo District (south central Sierra Leone), a group of women decided to take back those children and youth from the fighting forces between the ages of 6 and 25. "The women claimed that such a move was their own contribution to upholding the peace," says Davies adding, "It should be noted that some of those women had lost their own children and relatives as a result of the war."¹²⁵

Women in Makeni (Bambali District, north central Sierra Leone) also organized themselves to care for children coming out of the fighting forces. Women in this region, known as the rebel stronghold, experienced the realities of the rebel war in particularly brutal ways. They were forced to become "wives" of the commanders, rape was a weapon of war used against them, and they were forced into various functions including acting as human shields for rebels during attacks. "The women there knew those children who committed atrocities in Makeni and its environs," says Davies. "Some of those young boys and youths were urged to rape women who could pass as their mothers, aunts, or elder sisters."¹²⁶

Despite these experiences, in their pursuit of peace the women were willing to play a pivotal role in the re-integration of these child ex-combatants. Davies notes: "If the peace so far achieved is to prove meaningful and sustainable then society has to take up its responsibility of caring for its children."¹²⁷ As individuals and through collective action, women in communities are leading efforts to reintegrate women and girl ex-combatants. "The women argued that if those children were left uncared for now that peace has been

achieved they would easily revert to their old ways," says Davies. "They argued that left abandoned these child ex-combatants would have nothing positive to do and or think, and will prove a threat to the fragile peace now in existence."¹²⁸

Fifty-five percent of the study population indicated that women in the community had played a significant role in their reintegration. This is noteworthy as it was higher than their responses for being assisted by traditional healers (14 percent), traditional leaders (20 percent), international aid workers (32 percent), health workers (51 percent), and on par with religious leaders and social workers, many of whom are women.¹²⁹ Interviewees noted that women in the community provided them with helpful guidance, shared meager resources, and, perhaps most importantly, helped to facilitate skills training and education by providing childcare, clothes, or food. The basic assistance given in the form of childcare was critical in enabling many ex-combatants to enter skills training programs.

At the Community Level

As staff of NGOs working to reintegrate combatants, women contributed to building peace throughout the country at the grassroots level. For example, Esther A.,¹³⁰ a reintegration and HIV/AIDS program officer with a local NGO that works with child ex-combatants and war-affected children, was captured by the RUF along with three of her siblings. She watched as her siblings, all university graduates, were killed. She narrowly escaped.

*After all that has happened to me, I still want to work with these children. Really the past is not easy, you cannot force people to tell their stories. I share my story with the children. I share my losses. They see this reality that they, the RUF, were the ones who took my beloved people, and yet I am here helping them. You can forgive, but you can never forget.*¹³¹

Esther's colleague, Ramatu S.¹³² was trained as a teacher before joining an NGO as a psychosocial supervisor for child combatants. In addition to her full workdays with children and adolescents and caring for her own two children, Ramatu has taken five girl mothers with their children and two foster children, all former members of fighting forces, into her home so they have a place to live and recover.¹³³

With regard to women's collective action, the Luawa Skills Training Center (LSTC) in Kailahun, the Women's Progressive Movement (WPM) in Freetown, and Caritas-Makeni have been innovative in their efforts in the Makeni area. Founded by six women, LSTC now has 120 members. It serves as a reintegration program and assists women abductees, ex-combatants, and victims in their efforts at independent living. The organization offers tailoring and garra tie-dying classes. Once women learn the skills and sell their products, they are required to give some of their earnings back to the organization.

WPM was founded in 1998. Its mission is to find abducted children, provide financial and medical assistance, and help women become independent. When the parents of abducted children cannot be found or their relatives shun them, members of WPM adopt them. Today, nearly every member has taken on at least one child and in many cases, several.

Affiliated with the Catholic Church, locally based NGO Caritas-Makeni operates in central Sierra Leone with a staff comprised mostly of nuns and female social workers. In a country with a 60 percent Muslim population this organization has been effective in reaching beyond Catholic communities. In their programs in the Districts of Port Loko, Tonkolili, and Bombali, it has instituted programs that allow for girl mothers to bring their children to skills training or to care for them while their mothers attend school. They provide a room and mat for the child to sleep on and food for the mother and child during the day. This contributes to higher retention rates in the programs and helps prevent their involvement in illicit activities such as prostitution, which is on the rise.¹⁵⁴ Caritas-Makeni also offers a program on alternative income generation for those who have entered the sex trade and reproductive health and safe sex education.

At the National Level

Women in international and national NGOs are also working with young women and girls to incorporate them into their skills training programs.¹⁵⁵ National women's organizations such as the Progressive Women's Association (PROWA) and the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) are among the groups running skills training centers, which include education for basic literacy. With branches across Africa, FAWE established its Sierra Leone chapter in 1995 during the war. It is now a national

women's organization with branches throughout the country. It offers a range of training programs to girl and women ex-combatants including tailoring, carpentry, tie dying, and masonry. FAWE has rebuilt schools and community centers that were destroyed and in some areas, has constructed and opened schools for girls. Some of its programs cater to girl mothers and other vulnerable girl populations with the aim of increasing literacy and education.¹⁵⁶ FAWE is the only organization to accept pregnant girls into the classroom.¹⁵⁷

In March 1999 FAWE began the Rape Victims Program. Their projects include radio programming, visits with school children, counseling, and referrals to team doctors. Female survivors who became pregnant were given pre- and post-natal care by the organization. FAWE has partnered with over 30 ministerial and government agencies, UN agencies, international and local NGOs to carry out their work.¹⁵⁸

PROWA is operating in the Kono District, an area that has been heavily impacted by the war and where, at the time of publication, few international NGOs were active. PROWA was one of the few organizations in the area to offer skills training to female ex-combatants. Additionally, it is one of the few organizations that encourages and allows pregnant girls to participate in their programs. Since Kono was the last area to disarm and an RUF stronghold, many girls who recently came out of the bush are in Kono and in need of assistance, thus increasing the importance of the efforts of this women's group.

The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has focused its support for women in Sierra Leone at various levels, working with other UN agencies, with national ministries, and with community-level official and non-government organizations to ensure gender-sensitive policies. In particular, UNIFEM has worked to ensure that special attention is given in the Truth and Reconciliation process to crimes against women, and that the needs and concerns of female survivors are addressed. In addition, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's Affairs, due in part to the advocacy efforts and technical support of UNIFEM, recently received government approval and funding for a gender directorate. The ministry works with UN agencies and international and local NGOs to provide accelerated education and skills training for ex-combatant children.¹⁵⁹

UNICEF, in partnership with the Sierra Leone government, and local and international NGOs, has developed model programs for encouraging the schooling and reintegration of former child combatants. To summarize, communities that receive ex-combatant children (who benefited from DDR and elect to attend school) into the education system are “rewarded” by receiving books, supplies, and sports equipment. Schools and communities receive materials based on the number of ex-combatants they accept. Thus, ex-combatants are not perceived as “benefiting” from violent behavior in the fighting forces; instead all children in the school benefit by having their peers return. At the same time, accelerated schooling is offered for older child ex-combatants who have missed school years due to the war.¹⁴⁰ In partnership with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), UNICEF has developed targeted programs for young mothers, combining childcare and food with vocational training and basic literacy skills. There is also a focus on training women in non-traditional skills such as welding, carpentry, and the construction of houses.

These initiatives, led by individuals, communities, NGOs, and national mechanisms, and in some cases, supported by international aid, are relatively small and inexpensive compared to official DDR efforts. Yet their impact is notable: Over 65 percent of the study population said that women have reached out to help them and that they would be interested in joining a women’s organization to assist others.

CONCLUSION: THE CENTRALITY OF GENDER PERSPECTIVES TO DDR

The presence, roles, and experiences of women and girls within the fighting forces in Sierra Leone are more complex than previously reported. This inaccurate assessment resulted in operational and programmatic errors on the part of the UN, multilateral organizations, international NGOs, donor governments, and the government of Sierra Leone. In short, the inadequate attention to women and girls, coupled with a lack of gender sensitivity regarding their particular circumstances and needs, had a detrimental impact on the DDR process as a whole. Bias in design and implementation of DDR programs resulted in the near exclusion of women and girls from DDR programs and benefits, with those within the SLA and the CDF particularly marginalized.

Disarmament and demobilization camps and procedures were constructed to attract large numbers of male fighters and did not give adequate attention to ensuring that the human rights of women and girls were protected and preserved. The efforts of child protection agencies operating in Sierra Leone are among the best to date. Still, due to biases within the DDR program, alternative approaches must be sought to address the needs and rights of the many excluded women and girls that potentially fall under the umbrella of war-affected children and youth.

A range of factors including inadequate funding resulted in limitations to reintegration and longer-term rehabilitation elements of the program. Yet the successful reintegration of ex-combatants is an essential component of national and human security, necessary to build sustainable peace.¹⁴¹ Some international programs have recognized the need to address reintegration from the ex-combatants' and the community's perspectives. In addition, there is growing understanding that financial assistance alone is not sufficient for effective reintegration, that the needs and aspirations of ex-combatants and their families must be addressed, and that local support systems, psychosocial services, and other referral centers should be established to assist all ex-combatants in their efforts to return to a peaceful and productive lifestyle.¹⁴²

But while these efforts are developing, it is critical to ensure that women and girls are fully integrated, and that there is greater understanding of the roles they played in the war.

By being over-classified as "dependents," the real experiences of women and girls were not acknowledged and they were precluded from receiving benefits provided to other combatants. This assumption—that women and girls were victims only, with no significant role in either the execution of war or the building of peace—is detrimental for their future and could adversely affect the country's recovery.

First, as observed during 2002, the exclusion of child and female combatants from official DDR processes can lead to increased levels of insecurity.¹⁴³ For in the same way that disaffected male youths and ex-fighters might lead rebellions and form militias, so can women and girls. In 2002, riots increased, particularly among former child and adolescent combatants, and ICCs were attacked.¹⁴⁴ Social workers reported that adolescent women and girls were sometimes the leaders of these protests. Without support or care from their former "partners" or "husbands," their own families, the community, or the state, many of the young women—particularly those with children born as a result of their captivity—resorted to civil unrest as a means of accessing basic goods for the survival of their children. For these young women and girls, the stakes are, in effect, greater than for some of the men and boys.¹⁴⁵

Second, the exclusion of women and girls from official programs and assistance has significant social consequences including poverty, crime, and prostitution. Inevitably it also leads to an increase in HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the exclusion of single mothers means the exclusion of their children. Thus the emergence of another generation of disaffected marginalized youth is possible.

Third, despite the horrors they endured, the women and girls showed tremendous agency and initiative during their times in the forces. Within the confines of their environment they regained some control of their own lives by developing skills to ensure their survival and strategies to protect others. Yet when the DDR program was implemented, there was virtually no recognition of the multiple roles they played or skills they gained. Many have ambitions for education and independence. They feel tremendous responsibility for their offspring and aspire to give them better lives. But when they are treated as passive victims rather than as former combatants who played a sig-

nificant role in the conflict, they are again stripped of opportunities and a sense of self-dignity. International human rights laws oblige national, and particularly international, actors to ensure that women are treated equal to men.

Finally, women have held leadership roles throughout Sierra Leone's history. During the war, despite the widespread violence, women were fundamental to the reorganization of civil society, mass mobilization for peace, and the eventual cessation of the war. Women's organizations such as the YWCA played central roles in the processes that led to the signing of the Lomé peace accord.

The YWCA of Sierra Leone openly encourages women to "unite and initiate programs for self sufficiency and take up leadership roles in our communities and country as a whole."¹⁴⁶ National organizations such as FAWE and PROWA are rebuilding schools and educating children including ex-combatants. Local community members and informal networks and groups support some of those who did not pass through DDR programs or receive benefits. Women, individually and collectively, are playing important roles in assisting in the material, social, and cultural reintegration of former fighters.

Women's commitment to rehabilitating ex-combatants is a matter of basic survival. Unlike the international community, they have no "exit strategy." If the peace fails, violence returns to their doorsteps. But such groups are under tremendous pressure. They have meager resources. Their work is often undocumented and unacknowledged in official processes, and they receive limited support from the international community and donor governments. In a region that continues to be plagued with instability, recognizing the key role that women and women's organizations play and providing adequate resources to support them, is a cost-effective and essential ingredient for ensuring sustainable reintegration and ultimately, peace.

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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY

Data Collection: Interviews

Mazurana and Carlson designed the study and served as the primary researchers. They conducted fieldwork in Sierra Leone in August and September 2002. A structured survey with 50 women and girls formerly in the fighting forces was used for gathering data. Mazurana and Carlson also interviewed over 60 community, traditional, and religious leaders, parents of abducted girls and boys, and social and health workers who interact with the girls. The researchers interviewed the female ex-combatants in cooperation with NGO staff, social workers, and/or psychologists. Study participants were familiar with those serving as interpreters. In advance of the interviews, researchers explained the study to their translators and discussed the kinds of questions they might ask study participants. Most other interviews, such as with NGO staff and UN officials, occurred in English.

Prior to beginning interviews, the researchers and/or translator described the study to participants, including the study sponsorship, the purpose of the study, and why the individual was asked to participate. The researchers then explained the procedure of the interview, including that interview data and their identities would remain anonymous; participants were told that they could refrain from answering any question if they were uncomfortable, and they could end the interview at any time with no fear of penalty to themselves. No inducements were offered to the respondents prior to interviews that might have influenced their willingness to participate.

Mazurana designed the survey, consulting with a biometrician about issues of sample size and the precision with which she could estimate percentages. She then obtained reviews from two practitioners before finalizing the design. A survey using quota sampling was used to gather quantitative data.

Quota sampling was chosen because it was not possible for the researchers to do random sampling under the research conditions in Sierra Leone, due to challenges including locating mobile populations, concerns regarding anonymity, poor communication and transportation conditions, as well as security risks throughout the country. While quota samples are biased, they can do a good job of reflecting the population parameters of interest. The researcher then documents the bias.

Data Management and Analysis

All surveys were recorded on the survey form with additional details offered on any of the questions recorded in field notes. Mazurana managed all field notes and surveys, identifying the main categorical components within each, including age at entry into force, force name, entry routes, roles, training with the force, experiences of human rights violations within force, exit routes, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Mazurana then compared categorical data first by force and then comparatively among the forces. When possible, both force and country findings were compared to previously published data, including historical facts, to assist in checks for accuracy. For analyses of surveys, working in Microsoft Excel®, Mazurana designed the database, Carlson entered the data, and Mazurana quality checked the data. Mazurana then used histograms and descriptive statistics for initial analysis.

Precision of Estimates

For Mazurana and Carlson's study population in Sierra Leone (N=50) the precision of estimates is + 0.14 for 10,000 females within the fighting forces (95 percent confidence interval for a single population proportion) and - 0.2 for a population of 529 girls who went through disarmament and for a population of 506 girls that went through official demobilization conducted via ICCs.¹⁴⁷

Bias

Although every effort was made to ensure that the study population reflected an accurate quota sample, the broader group of women and girls from which the study population was chosen was itself biased in several ways. First, the group from which the study population was chosen consisted only of women and girls who came or were taken to NGOs for assistance. In some cases, the girls had not come forward but were identified for NGOs by community leaders as having served in the fighting forces. Although girls who had not participated in

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF ACRONYMS

All People's Congress	APC
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council	AFRC
Civil Defense Forces	CDF
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration	DDR
Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group	ECOMOG
Executive Outcomes	EO
Forum of African Women Educationalists	FAWE
Interim Care Centers	ICCs
International Monetary Fund	IMF
National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration	NCDDR
National Patriotic Front of Liberia	NPFL
Nongovernmental organizations	NGOs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
Progressive Women's Association	PROWA
Revolutionary United Front	RUF
Sierra Leone People's Party	SLPP
Sierra Leone Army	SLA
Small Boys Unit	SBU
Small Girls Unit	SGU
Truth and Reconciliation Commission	TRC
United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL
United Nations Children's Fund	UNICEF
United Nations Development Fund for Women	UNIFEM
United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL
Women Organized for a Morally Enlightened Nation	WOMEN
Young Women's Christian Association	YWCA

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About Women Waging Peace

Women Waging Peace, a program of Hunt Alternatives Fund, advocates for the full participation of women in formal and informal peace processes around the world. Over 250 members of the "Waging" network, all demonstrated leaders with varied backgrounds, perspectives, and skills, bring a vast array of expertise to the peace-making process. They have met with over 1000 senior policy shapers to collaborate on fresh, workable solutions to long-standing conflicts.

About The Policy Commission

The Policy Commission is conducting a series of case studies to document women's contributions to peace processes across conflict areas worldwide. The studies focus on women's activities in conflict prevention, pre-negotiation and negotiation, and post-conflict reconstruction—including governance; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and transitional justice and reconciliation. This body of work is pragmatic and operational, offering suggestions, guidelines, and models to encourage policymakers to include women and gender perspectives in their program designs.

Advisory Group to the Policy Commission

Hizkias Assefa
Professor of Conflict Studies
Conflict Transformation Graduate Program
Eastern Mennonite University;
Founder and Coordinator
African Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Network

Leon Fuerth
J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
former Minister of Finance, Liberia;
Coauthor, UNIFEM's
Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment

Jane Holl Lute
Assistant-Secretary-General
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations

Rita Manchanda
Program Executive
South Asian Forum for Human Rights

Jane Mansbridge
Faculty Chair
Women and Public Policy Program
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Luz Méndez
President
Advisory Council
National Union of Guatemalan Women


Thandi Modise
Chairperson, Portfolio Committee on Defense
Parliament of South Africa

Olara Otunnu
Under-Secretary-General and
Special Representative for
Children and Armed Conflict
United Nations

John Ruggie
Evron and Jeane Kirkpatrick
Professor of International Affairs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Nancy Soderberg
Vice President
International Crisis Group


Number	Item	Content
215	Report of Non-Governmental Organization	No Peace Without Justice, "Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Program" Draft Copy, 9 March 2004 (reference to excerpt preface, chapters 1-3, 5).



No Peace Without Justice
Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping Program

Draft Copy for Review

9 March 2004



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No Peace Without Justice wishes to acknowledge the financial assistance of the **European Community** and the **Open Society Initiative - West Africa** to its programmes. The views expressed herein are those of No Peace Without Justice and therefore in no way reflect the official positions of the European Commission or OSI-WA.

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Printed in Sierra Leone by *NABsTech*, 18 Siaka Stevens Street, Freetown.

Cover Photo: Youth on peninsular road near Freetown. Pascal Turlan, 2002.

Cover Design & Publication Layout: Thomas Longley.

Maps: Basemap from Sierra Leone Information Systems (SLIS), Development Assistance Coordination Office, Freetown, Sierra Leone

Photo Overleaf: Youths in Segbwema, Kailahun District. Catherine Gambette, 2003.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report

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N O P E A C E W I T H O U T J U S T I C E

FORWARD

The purpose of this report is to examine information gathered in Sierra Leone by No Peace Without Justice's Conflict Mapping Program and analyse it through the lens of international humanitarian law, particularly those crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Special Court.

Accountability exists in many forms and at many levels; this report focuses on accountability for the violation of the laws of war in the belief that it is only by holding responsible those who violate those laws can there be deterrence for future would-be perpetrators. Too often, there are those who argue for the preservation of general amnesties and other guarantees of immunity in the name of "stability" or "moving on"; yet too often, history shows that the only way to achieve real stability and to move forward is to account for what has happened in the past.

Accountability for violations of international humanitarian law for conflicts such as that experienced by Sierra Leone requires more than one avenue; even the formal institutions established for this purpose – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court – can only do so much. This report hopes to contribute to the accountability process, to the strengthening of the rule of law and to sustainable peace by adding to the historical record of what happened during the long years of the conflict.

The Conflict Mapping Program deliberately took a wide approach: chronologically, it covers the whole period of the conflict and substantively, it covers all violations of humanitarian law, irrespective of whether they are subject to the jurisdiction of Sierra Leone courts or of the Special Court. Thus, it hopes to demonstrate two main things. First, that what happened to the people of Sierra Leone were crimes, whether they are prosecuted or not. Second, to demonstrate that all such crimes are worthy of an account, from the harassment of one person in a remote village, obliged to give all he owns to an invading force, to the systematic killing of hundreds or thousands of people.

The world characterised the conflict in Sierra Leone in two words: diamonds and amputations. For certain, those two factors construct a persuasive framework by painting acts of great horror and ruthlessness against a background of solid greed. However, the conflict was about much more than that, as the facts gathered and analysed for this report show. There is another story of a decade of cruelty and petty humiliations, systematic brutality, murder, theft and exploitation: a million or more tales of human suffering, sadness and loss. The conflict in Sierra Leone was characterised by extreme levels of violence against a civilian population from all sides, even from those supposed to be their protectors. The violence focused on the domination of a country and her resources, particularly her people: the most valuable resource of all.

If the rule of law is to be upheld, the perpetrators of these acts, which are astonishing not only in their brutality but also in their repeating pattern across more than a decade, must be held to account. Such perpetrators rely upon people not watching closely and not speaking out, in keeping quiet and living with fear in their hearts and minds; they rely on the language of "forgive *and* forget". It is hoped that this report goes some small way towards removing the shield of impunity for the planners and perpetrators of such predatory enterprises and that in its reading, the plight not only of the hundreds or thousands killed but also the one person who lost everything will remain in our memory.

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*Through the years we have worked in Sierra Leone, we have made many close and valuable friends. This report is dedicated to two friends who are no longer with us, to **Idrissa Kendor**, one of NPWJ's Conflict Mapping Recorders, and to **Mr S.A. Sankoh**, former Treasurer of the Special Court Working Group, whose enthusiasm and dogged determination are sorely missed.*

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
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CONFLICT MAPPING PROGRAM

Preface: An overview of NPWJ activities in Sierra Leone

1. No Peace Without Justice

No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) is an international non-profit organisation working for the establishment of an effective international criminal justice system and in support of accountability mechanisms for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, with a view to strengthening democracy and the rule of law worldwide.

Since its creation in 1994, NPWJ has been engaged in activities to promote public awareness on the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as to pressure Parliaments, Governments and other decision-making bodies with the aim of accelerating the entry into force of the first permanent international jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

NPWJ's international activities have involved a series of inter-governmental regional conferences in Europe, Africa, Asia, North America and Latin America to foster the prompt creation of the ICC. At an academic level, NPWJ has organised a series of seminars and workshops to create a "Task Force" to enable the participation of developing and less developed countries in the process towards the establishment of the Court. On the eve of the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference, NPWJ launched a project of concrete technical cooperation called the "Judicial Assistance Program" (JAP) to assist small delegations to participate in ICC-related negotiations. To date, some 15 countries have benefited from this program, profiting from the competence and expertise of more than 40 jurists, lawyers, law professors and researchers.

In August 1998, NPWJ launched an ad hoc campaign to support the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concerning the crimes perpetrated in Kosovo. This was followed in 1999 by an extensive Humanitarian Law Documentation Project, conducted under the auspices of the International Crisis Group, which gathered statements from witnesses of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during the Kosovo conflict, primarily for use by the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY. In addition, the "analysis" part of the project produced a report generalising the findings and helping to reconstruct chains of command.¹ A third purpose was to build local capacity to continue this work and promote human rights after the project ended in December 1999.

In June 2000, NPWJ also launched a Judicial Assistance Program related to internationalised courts, including the Serious Crimes Panel established by the United Nations in East Timor after the obtainment of independence and the then-proposed Special Court for Sierra Leone. Following the entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002, NPWJ has continued its international activities to universalise the jurisdiction of the ICC aimed at enlarging the membership of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute and continues to assist developing countries to participate in

¹ See "Reality Demands" on the ICG website for the report from this project: www.crisisweb.org.



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ICC-related meetings. NPWJ has also expanded its scope of action to other issues such as the fight against Female Genital Mutilation and the direct promotion of the enforcement of democracy.

NPWJ projects are carried out in collaboration with a variety of international and regional entities, such as the United Nations and the European Union, as well as groups of Non-Governmental Organisations, such as the International Coalition of NGOs for the ICC and others. NPWJ publishes a quarterly newsletter and operates a website at www.npwj.org.

2. No Peace Without Justice in Sierra Leone

NPWJ's involvement in Sierra Leone began with the secondment of experts in international criminal law to the Government of Sierra Leone in June 1998 on the occasion of the Rome Diplomatic Conference that adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since 2000, NPWJ-seconded experts have been working in Freetown and New York, within the Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and the Office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in relation to the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

Since 2001, NPWJ has also been engaged in a wide-ranging field-based Outreach and public information campaign on the Special Court, in cooperation with Sierra Leonean grassroots organisations and civil society groups. In 2002, after the Special Court came into existence, NPWJ's Sierra Leone project considerably expanded both its scope of activity (and its expenditure) to include a Conflict Mapping program and a Legal Profession program designed specifically for the Sierra Leonean Legal Profession.

NPWJ's most recent Sierra Leone program, which ran from July 2002 to October 2003, included four principal components:

1. The Judicial Assistance Program ("JAP" Program), namely the secondment of expert personnel to the Government of Sierra Leone in Freetown and New York to assist with dealing with requests of assistance and other requests by the Special Court and to build the capacity of the relevant Government Departments to deal with these requests, as well as to provide advice on issues relating to international law in general;
2. The Outreach Program, namely cooperation with local grassroots organisations to carry out public information and education on the Special Court and on accountability mechanisms in general, in order to facilitate a sense of ownership of these mechanisms and increase reliance on the rule of law and the mechanisms of democracy; this included the organisation of "Training the Trainers" workshops throughout the country, seminars, the production of outreach materials in different media, community events including street theatre and creating a robust network of non-governmental organisations centred on issues of accountability;
3. The Legal Profession Program, namely the promotion of the role of the Special Court within the legal profession in Sierra Leone and the role of the Sierra Leonean legal profession within the Special Court, in order to enhance the relevance of the Special Court in the lives of legal professionals and the potential of the Special Court for leaving a legacy of respect for the law and knowledge of international human rights standards; this included training seminars, public lectures and the production of reports and informational materials;



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- 4. The Conflict Mapping Program, namely the reconstruction of the chain of events during the ten-year war through the scrupulous selection and debriefing of key individuals throughout the country whose profession, role in their community or in the forces involved in the conflict, placed them in a position to follow events as they unfolded.

Each program, while distinct in their specific aims, was conducted so as to reinforce the other programs and thereby increase the contribution of each program to the project's overall aim of strengthening the ability of Sierra Leone society to address violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The most striking example of this was the close cooperation between the Outreach and Conflict Mapping programs. While the Outreach Program trained villages and towns on the Special Court, through "Training the Trainers" sessions and community events, these same communities continued to participate in accountability efforts by providing the Conflict Mapping program with their own views on and experiences of the conflict, by being consulted on the events and by directly taking part in the gathering of information. In addition, the project as a whole operated so as to maximise the participation of Sierra Leoneans in decision-making processes, both in relation to project policy as well as the design, implementation and follow-up for activities. This was premised on the belief that for Sierra Leone's accountability mechanisms to make a meaningful impact and achieve their goals, there must be "ownership" of the processes by Sierra Leoneans. It is also underpinned by the notion that, as a matter of policy, Sierra Leoneans are best placed to know what activities and approaches would be the most effective to reach the people of Sierra Leone.

2.(a). Judicial Assistance Program

Since 2000, NPWJ-seconded experts have been working in Freetown and New York, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice, to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its negotiations for the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This component of the project addresses the consequences of the conflict in Sierra Leone by increasing governmental awareness of and commitment to accountability mechanisms, which is vital for the successful operations of these mechanisms. Increasing the awareness of the Government and Parliamentarians of the benefits of international human rights and humanitarian law increases the likelihood of legislation passing through Parliament, which in turn strengthens the rule of law by providing legal mechanisms by which to seek redress for its violation.

In July 2000, responding to the request of Sierra Leone to provide specialised assistance, NPWJ seconded a legal expert to the Sierra Leone Mission to the UN in New York to continue assisting the Sierra Leone Ambassador to the UN, which had begun during the negotiations for the establishment of the ICC in 1998. In August 2000, a further two legal experts were seconded to the Office of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice in Freetown, Sierra Leone. This ensured that the Government, with the advice of NPWJ-seconded personnel, was able to form a co-ordinated response, both in Freetown and in New York, and to convey that response in the best possible way at the best possible time. By maintaining this close contact, NPWJ-seconded legal experts have kept the often delicate negotiations balanced and have ensured that the concerns of Sierra Leone were not lost in the debate.



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The work of NPWJ-seconded legal experts has centred around advising the Sierra Leone Government on critical issues arising in relation to the Special Court and issues of international criminal justice in general, including representing the Government during meetings and negotiations. This, together with detailed legal and policy analyses and recommendations on a range of issues raised directly and indirectly by the ongoing negotiations, has enabled Sierra Leone to formulate policies and address all the relevant issues in a timely manner.

In addition, NPWJ-seconded legal experts have been assisting the Attorney-General and the Sierra Leone Mission with various other tasks relating to international human rights and humanitarian law. For example, in New York, NPWJ-seconded legal experts have been participating in the VI (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, while in Freetown, the Government has often taken advantage of the presence of NPWJ-seconded international law experts to provide information and analyses on matters within their areas of expertise, such as the requirements of implementing legislation for the International Criminal Court.

2.(b) Outreach Program

During the team's stay in Freetown in 2000, NPWJ identified a need for public sensitisation and education, given that what was being reported concerning the Special Court in the local media was often wildly inaccurate. The NPWJ Sierra Leone Mission was therefore expanded in 2001 to include an Outreach Program, designed to facilitate public information and sensitisation on the Special Court. The Outreach Program increased awareness of the mandate and operations of the Special Court, including promoting knowledge about human rights and humanitarian law issues to the public at large. The Outreach Program worked through the medium of local organisations, in particular the Special Court Working Group, by building the capacity of such local organisations to formulate and disseminate information coherently and in simple terms. Part of this process includes working with local organisations to formulate the issues in language and ways easily understandable by the general public. This fosters the role of civil society in promoting accountability within Sierra Leonean society and creates a stronger civil society by supplementing them with potent means to raise the issues publicly, both in general and in terms of prompting the Government to ensure international standards are promoted.

The Outreach Program commenced with "The Freetown Conference on Accountability Mechanisms for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in Sierra Leone", held in the Lagoonda Complex on 20 to 22 February 2001 and attended by over 100 mainly Sierra Leonean participants. The conference provided a vehicle for the exploration of mechanisms designed to provide accountability for atrocities committed in Sierra Leone during the course of the conflict. It focussed on the two mechanisms then envisaged for Sierra Leone (the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) and the interaction between those institutions as well as exploring how traditional or customary justice could be incorporated into or operate alongside those mechanisms. Two key recommendations were adopted at the plenary session of the Conference, both based on participants' perceived need for ownership of accountability mechanisms by the people of Sierra Leone: holding training workshops on the Special Court and establishing a coalition of interested Sierra Leonean NGOs to conduct the bulk of public sensitisation and information



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sharing about the Special Court. This concrete set of recommendations formed the basis for much of NPWJ's subsequent outreach work.

The "Training the Trainers" seminars presented a detailed overview of the provisions of the (then) draft Statute and Agreement for the Special Court. To place the Special Court in context, the seminars began with a brief introduction to the purposes and principles of international humanitarian and criminal law and discussed practical issues surrounding the Special Court. A number of identical workshops were held over a period of days, limiting the number of participants within each session to ensure the maximum opportunity for discussion. This model was employed over a number of months to facilitate holding seminars both in Freetown, the capital city, and in the provinces. The series of seminars thus held in 2001 attracted a total of over 600 participants from a diverse range of human rights, civil society and other organisations, including the RUF and the CDF. Training sessions were also held at the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) camp in Lunsar and "extra-ordinary" sessions were held for specialised groups, such as the legal profession and human rights monitors.

An additional motive for the training seminars conducted in March 2001 was to identify those members of Sierra Leone civil society who were interested in establishing a "Special Court Working Group", a coalition of Sierra Leone civil society organisations who were interested in the issues and who could play a crucial role in outreach and sensitisation, including ensuring that information being disseminated about the Special Court by various groups within Sierra Leone would be uniform and consistent. NPWJ organised a number of meetings of the Special Court Working Group (SCWG); over the course of 2001, the number of participants in working group meetings grew to a total of 39 members representing as many organisations. The SCWG, which met every two weeks in plenary and more often in smaller specialised groups, discussed the types of messages concerning the Special Court that would need to be directed to specific groups within Sierra Leone, together with the modalities through which the sensitisation program would be implemented. The SCWG adopted its constitution on 30 June 2001 and held elections for the national executive in July 2001, from which time the Special Court Working Group Sierra Leone (SCWG-SL) was established as an independent entity.²

During 2002-2003, the NPWJ Outreach Program gathered momentum and expanded in terms of the range of activities undertaken, its geographical reach and its implementing partners, which at the end of 2003 included the Special Court for Sierra Leone itself. NPWJ continued to work with the SCWG, including facilitating the establishment of 12 District Working Groups and the holding of elections for the national executive in August 2003, as required by the constitution. NPWJ also cooperated with the SCWG to hold "top-up training" for existing and new SCWG members, to ensure people were kept well informed about ongoing developments in relation to the Special Court. Among the targeted training held in 2002-3, NPWJ held a seminar for performing artists, which saw the creation of "The Right Players", a group of Sierra Leonean dramatists who write and perform skits, short plays and songs on themes related to the Special Court. Building on this and the targeted

² The Special Court Working Group subsequently changed its name to the Coalition for Justice and Accountability. Given that during the time period covered by this preface they were still known as the SCWG, that is the name this preface will use.



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training held for market women, NPWJ organised a series of Market Tours for the Right Players, in which the Right Players staged short plays about the Special Court in 16 markets across the Freetown area, with NPWJ staff on hand to answer questions from the audience.

Together with the Peace and Conflict Studies Department of Fourah Bay College at the University of Sierra Leone, NPWJ organised a series of public lectures, which commenced with the first public engagement of the newly-elected President of the Special Court, Judge Geoffrey Robertson. These lectures were video-taped and broadcast on SLBS, Sierra Leone's national television station. In addition to television, NPWJ continued to facilitate the SCWG's "Special Court Hour", held every Saturday on Radio UNAMSIL since 2001, and helped to establish and support similar radio shows in five locations across the country. Again in conjunction with the SCWG, NPWJ held a series of training sessions for the newly-established District Working Groups in 13 locations in the provinces. These sessions were attended by over 520 participants, ranging from NGO and civil society activists to the Sierra Leone Police and Sierra Leone Army, traditional leaders and the local Law Officers' Departments. These were followed by two major conferences in the provinces for the District Working Groups, based on the model adopted for the Freetown Conference in 2001, which resulted in concrete plans of action for the District Working Groups for the coming months. During August 2003, NPWJ and the Special Court for Sierra Leone built on these seminars and conferences by conducting a major series of training seminars across the country targeting specific groups such as the military, children, women and others.

The Outreach Program continued to develop and distribute materials on the Special Court, including production of the "Special Court Times", a newspaper-sized broadsheet on issues related to the Special Court, and its accompanying "Pocket Edition", which contained "Frequently Asked Questions" about the Special Court. In addition, NPWJ produced a number of small informational pamphlets, reproduced the constitutive and supporting legal documents of the Court³ and assisted the Special Court to put together a booklet covering all aspects of the Special Court, illustrated by local artists. NPWJ also produced a series of informational materials on the International Criminal Court, to accompany two seminars hosted by NPWJ, one for civil society in conjunction with the Coalition for an International Criminal Court and other foreign and local NGOs, including the National Forum for Human Rights, and one at the request of Sierra Leone Parliamentarians.

2.(c) Legal Profession Program

In 2002, after the Special Court came into existence, NPWJ's Sierra Leone project expanded to include a Legal Profession Program, aimed specifically at the Sierra Leonean Legal Profession and working primarily in partnership with the Sierra Leone Bar Association. The Legal Profession Program promoted knowledge of human rights and humanitarian law norms within the legal profession in Sierra Leone. A robust legal profession with knowledge about human rights will lead to a profession capable of defending human rights through various means, including legal means. This in turn strengthens the rule of law by enabling the Sierra Leone legal profession to ensure they have the knowledge required to work effectively with and within Sierra Leone's accountability mechanisms.

³ Namely the Agreement establishing the Special Court, the Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Rules of Detention and the indictments.



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The activities undertaken within the Legal Profession Program included training seminars, roundtable discussions and the drafting of explanatory and critical documents. The program also encouraged the Special Court to involve itself in the legal community so that the Court may make a sustainable contribution to the rule of law in Sierra Leone. To that end, NPWJ together with the Sierra Leone Bar Association and the Special Court held a half-day seminar on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court in December 2002. During this seminar, selected members of the Bar Association made submissions to the newly sworn in Judges on different aspects of the Rules, in particular with reference to the laws of Sierra Leone. In addition, NPWJ brought an international law expert to Sierra Leone to consult with the Special Court and others on potential models for defence before the Special Court. Both activities resulted in reports that were made available to, among others, the Judges of the Special Court during their first plenary meeting to consult on the Rules in early 2003.

The Legal Profession Program also worked closely with the Outreach Program on the public lecture series, including selecting an international law expert to provide specialised training for the members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association on the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court.⁴ In July 2003, NPWJ in partnership with the Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales held a week-long "IHL Training Seminar" for members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association and other interested legal practitioners. This training resulted in a set of lecture notes, which was widely distributed in Sierra Leone and abroad. In addition, many of the trainers participated in another NPWJ activity, the Lawyers' Guide to the Special Court, which is a guide to the substantive and procedural law relating to the Special Court.⁵

A major component of the Legal Profession Program was providing access to relevant library resources through the establishment of the NPWJ International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Library in Freetown. This library was a continuation of the "Book Donation" program launched in 2000, whereby foreign universities, individuals and others donated legal books and materials to NPWJ's international law reading room and resource centre in Sierra Leone. NPWJ was fortunate to receive a large donation from the Colombia University Human Rights Law Program, which was shipped to Sierra Leone in 2002 and formed the backbone of the library, which also included donations from Penguin Publishers, the Canadian Law Book Company, Geoffrey Robertson QC (as he then was), Caroline Morgan and others. The library was officially opened at the beginning of 2003 by Desmond de Silva, QC, the Deputy Prosecutor of the Special Court. NPWJ hired a qualified librarian to manage the collection, which included a digital library compiled by NPWJ, and to oversee the library itself, which also contained internet stations and photocopying facilities. The majority of users consisted of human rights activists and university and school students, who used the library for research on human rights, humanitarian law and related matters. Following the conclusion of the NPWJ Sierra Leone project in 2003, NPWJ embarked on a partnership with the Campaign for Good Governance, who are now housing the library at their Freetown headquarter office and ensuring continued public access to the collection.

⁴ Staff of the Special Court also attended these training seminars.

⁵ The Lawyers' Guide is available from www.specialcourt.org.



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2.(d) Conflict Mapping Program

In 2002, NPWJ launched the Conflict Mapping Program, which reconstructs the chain of events during a conflict through gathering information in the field and analysing the decision-making processes to ascertain the role of those who bear the greatest responsibility for policies of systematic and massive violations of the laws of war. This analysis is based on testimonial and other data overlaid with order of battle and command structures of the various forces as they evolved over time and space. This chronological and geographical mapping of the conflict, including reconstructing the order of battle and chain of command, serves to prevent denial of those events. An analysis of events according to international law establishes prima facie accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. In so doing, it both serves to strengthen the rule of law and to promote and defend human rights by publicising the price for violating them. In addition, establishing the chain of command within the armed forces operating in Sierra Leone and assembling these disparate pieces of information to create the bigger picture of the decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone enables the crucial first phase of establishing who bears direct and command responsibility for crimes committed during the conflict. This will enable the people of Sierra Leone to establish who should be held accountable for those crimes, thereby avoiding the trap of blaming a group or segment of society and promoting peaceful conciliation.

Beginning in 2002, the Outreach Program increased its geographic spread. This opened up new channels, networks and possibilities for collaboration and consequently increased the diversity and size of NPWJ's network of partner organisations and individuals. In addition, the Outreach Program deepened NPWJ's pre-existing relationships with many key sectors of society. These factors made it possible to conceive of a field based nation-wide Conflict Mapping Program in two main ways. NPWJ's extensive and trusted network of partners would be essential in devising and implementing any system of collecting information. Following this, NPWJ's network of partners embedded in communities throughout the country would also be essential in maximising the possible impact of the program: in encouraging people to participate in the program; in promoting the underlying rationales of accountability; and then in disseminating the results.

Meaningful long-term conciliation and reintegration can only take place if the accountability process belongs to each and every community – and if each community is able to participate in it. Rehabilitation and reintegration is not simply a matter of locating next of kin and assisting in individual reintegration; it is about enabling society and each community to move forward and to accept individuals back into their fold. The outreach and information gathering processes have contributed towards establishing confidence in the accountability mechanisms, by providing victims and witnesses with the opportunity to recount their stories and the stories of others in such a way as to help them understand their personal and their communities' experiences in the context of the conflict.

In the implementation of the Conflict Mapping Program, NPWJ worked closely with local partner organisations, with whom an excellent relationship had been built over the previous two years. The Conflict Mapping Program has therefore involved as much of the country as possible in conducting sensitisation and documentation in this manner so as to encourage a sense of ownership of the processes by the people of Sierra Leone.

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The results of this work, which are found in this report, together with the work of organisations in Sierra Leone undertaking human rights reporting, are hoped to support the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court. It must however be emphasised that the process in itself is as important as the final document, because the direct involvement of Sierra Leoneans (both as interviewer and interviewee) in this program has allowed them to be at the heart of the accountability work being carried out in the country.

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Chapter One: Methodology

The purpose of the Conflict Mapping Program, as outlined in the preface, is two-fold: to gather reliable information so as to put together an accurate picture of what happened in Sierra Leone and to make the process meaningful for Sierra Leoneans. Initially, on the basis of NPWJ's experience in other situations, it was determined that there were four main ways in which a report such as this one could be produced, namely:

1. Individuals recounting their own experiences;
2. Individuals giving an overview of what happened in their area, through their own experience and what they have learnt from others;
3. Groups recounting their experiences in a shared environment; and
4. Open source materials.

The question facing the program during the conceptual phase was which method to select in order to maximise both the quality of the information gathered and the impact of information-gathering on Sierra Leoneans, given the resources and constraints. The main constraints were limited financial resources; a limited amount of time; the size of the country and lack of ease of movement, including the condition of the roads; and the fact that Sierra Leone experiences torrential rains for six months of the year, making many roads completely impassable.

In addition, each method listed above has its own pros and cons. For example, while the first method involves Sierra Leoneans to the greatest degree, every single person in the country would have to be given an opportunity to tell their story in order to gather enough information to be able to put together an accurate picture of what happened across the country. This would be difficult if not impossible to achieve at the national level for a ten-year conflict with limited resources and limited time. On the other hand, while the last method can also give a very comprehensive picture of what happened across the country, it would have limited to no impact on or involvement of the people of Sierra Leone.

Given these factors, it was considered that the most appropriate method for NPWJ to conduct a Conflict Mapping Program that focused on the whole of the country rather than a limited geographical area was to use information gathered from people in Sierra Leone with a good general overview of the conflict in their area ("key persons"),⁶ supplemented with open source materials. In order to maximise community participation, enhance the quality of the information and overcome potential cultural and linguistic barriers, it was considered that the best people to take records from people with an overview were Sierra Leoneans from the same geographical area as the key persons ("Conflict Mapping Recorders" or "CMRs"). In addition, it was considered that in order to enhance community "ownership" of the accountability mechanisms, the Conflict Mapping and Outreach Programs should as much as possible be conducted together. Marrying the sensitisation and the documentation processes ensures that the perception of the communities reached is not that of

⁶ Key persons provided information to NPWJ on the basis of confidentiality, subject to certain exceptions for which the consent of the key person was obtained prior to taking the record, including use of the information in the compilation of this report.



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being "told" about the accountability process as something that happens elsewhere and is relevant to others, but rather of truly taking part in it.

While this method was the most appropriate in the circumstances, it comes with its own potential drawbacks, which had to be addressed during the conceptual phase so as to minimise their possible impact during implementation. There are seven major areas of concern of such importance that failure to recognise and address them would have compromised the value of both the process and outcomes of the program, described here as "critical areas". These are addressed comprehensively in the following sections, but are worth discussing briefly here.

The first critical area is the quality of the CMRs and their ability to draw out relevant information from the key person so as to compile a record that could be used during the analysis phase. This was addressed through a rigorous two-fold selection process. In the first instance, NPWJ outlined the program to partner NGOs in the regions, often members of the SCWG, who would nominate persons they considered suitable to be CMRs. Following that initial nomination, NPWJ held a training session for the potential CMRs, including a practical exercise in record-taking, and selected CMRs on the basis of the results of that training. In addition, CMRs were trained in recognising their own potential biases and how to overcome them and, at the very least, to identify those biases for the analysts.

The second critical area concerns the quality and usability of the records, which is distinct from the quality of the person taking the record, although the two often correlate. This was overcome by rigorous training in how to take a record and what information might be relevant, which included practical exercises in taking a record before interviewing the first key person. In addition, once the first record had been taken, NPWJ personnel reviewed the record with the CMR, to point out potential problems and provide advice on how to take a more comprehensive record.⁷

The third critical area is the type of the key persons interviewed by the CMRs in terms of the kind of information they might provide. In order to overcome this concern, CMRs were provided with rigorous guidelines and criteria for ideal candidates for key persons. Once CMRs had made their initial selection of the key persons they wished to interview, NPWJ personnel went through the list with them and discussed their choices, suggesting alternatives where the initial choices were inappropriate.

The fourth critical area is the accuracy of the information provided by the key persons. This was addressed by providing CMRs with guidelines and training in interviewing and how to take a record, including the importance of accuracy and not "making up" information to fill in gaps, as well as recognising potential bias in key persons.

The fifth critical area concerns the accuracy of the information itself. Given that the conflict ranged over the course of a decade and many key persons were either relatively young when events happened or were relatively elderly at the time they gave their record, not to mention the potential

⁷ In most cases, CMRs were required to go back to the first key person to fill in information that was lacking in the record, which would generally improve the comprehensiveness of the remaining records that were taken.



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effects of post traumatic stress disorder, even with the best intentions on the part of both the CMRs and the key persons there is always the possibility that people are mistaken. This was addressed by reviewing the first factual analysis with well respected local human rights activists who were not involved in the Conflict Mapping Program and who themselves had a good general overview of what happened in a particular District. In addition, it was addressed by providing the factual analysis to other local and foreign experts and by cross-checking the information with open source materials.

The sixth critical area was geographical coverage. In its original conception, the Conflict Mapping Program was to have one CMR per chiefdom, in order to have saturation coverage across the whole country. However, time, financial and logistical restraints meant that this was not possible, as there are 149 chiefdoms across the country, plus the rural Western Area, not all of which are accessible at all times of the year. In order to avoid making arbitrary decisions about which chiefdoms to cut and with a view to minimising the damage to the report as a whole, NPWJ therefore discussed this issue with the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), the leading human rights NGO in Sierra Leone with human rights monitors in every District, and the SCWG. NPWJ sought their advice on which chiefdoms could be covered by a CMR from a neighbouring chiefdom (termed "linked") and which chiefdoms were not the scene of a great deal of activity during the conflict and could be cut altogether. In addition, NPWJ discussed with CGG the chiefdoms about which they would be able to provide information, on the basis of their regular human rights reporting work as well as a special human rights violations reporting project they undertook during 2001.

The final critical area related to processing the raw information generated by the project – in short, information management. Failure to secure, store and accurately break down the records into a practical format for analysis would undermine efforts to build an accurate reconstruction of the events described in them. In November 2002, NPWJ together with Sensible Data srl, an Italian IT company specialising in emergency situations, began developing a customised database that would allow the narratives in the records to be broken down into incidents, storing simple information about the incident alongside data about the exact location and date of its occurrence. As soon the first completed records began to be collected in mid May, they entered a process of digitisation. In late June, once all the records were collected, records were broken down into incidents by a team of specially trained database analysts. A thorough system of cross-checking was implemented throughout to maintain the accuracy of information from record through to database.

1. Selecting and training Conflict Mapping Recorders

The gathering of information in the field in Sierra Leone was conducted by national human rights workers or "Conflict Mapping Recorders", trained and supervised by NPWJ personnel, in communities and villages throughout the country.

1.(a) Selection of CMRs

While the selection of the CMRs in the communities was one of the most important parts of the program, it also presented one of the greatest challenges from a quality control perspective. In this process, NPWJ was very heavily reliant on the judgment and expertise of its collaborating organisations and their representatives, with whom a relationship of trust had been built over the previous two years.



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As a system of quality control, NPWJ tried to ensure the collaborating organisations selected their best people to nominate as CMRs, by discussing with the organisations the purpose of the program and providing the following checklist for indicators that people could make good CMRs:

- They should have a good level of knowledge about the conflict in their chiefdoms.
- They should have a good level of written and spoken English.
- They should be able to overcome their bias as much as possible.
- They should show willingness and have time for the program, since much of its success lies in the quality of their records.

Following the initial selection stage by local partners, NPWJ held a training workshop at which the final selection was made (see below), based on how the CMR responded to the training and their performance in the practical exercise of taking a record. By the end of April 2003, the selection stage was complete and NPWJ had hired a total of 136 CMRs to cover 146 chiefdoms.⁸ Twenty-two CMRs were hired to cover the Western Area, which is a densely populated area to which many IDPs fled during the war. In each District, NPWJ appointed a focal point, who was the main contact person for that District and who assisted with logistical and other arrangements, including bringing the final records to Freetown for review purposes. These CMRs and the focal points represented a broad cross section of civil society and included human rights activists, teachers and others.

1.(b) Training of CMRs

NPWJ conducted training workshops in various locations in the Western Area and in the 12 headquarter towns throughout the country. In order to provide greater participation and information sharing, as well as due to time and logistical constraints, CMRs travelled from their chiefdoms to the headquarter town rather than NPWJ personnel travelling to each chiefdom. In addition, this allowed the focal point to meet every CMR selected and identify possible logistical obstacles. The training was divided into three distinct components: the introductory workshop, the training workshop and the review process.

The first visit, called an "introductory workshop", was dedicated to meeting with community leaders and collaborative organisations to introduce the program. This session was the final part of the "Training the Trainers" seminar held by the NPWJ Outreach Program and the Special Court Working Group. This placed the Conflict Mapping Program in the context of the Special Court, accountability mechanisms and the difficulties faced in reconstructing accurately the events of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The introductory workshops laid the groundwork for the quality of the CMRs selected, following the considerations outlined above, as well as the relevance of the key persons identified. One of the main aims of this session was to engage the participants, so that over the following days they could identify potential CMRs for the training workshop and compile a list

⁸ CMRs were paid a small stipend to cover transport and incidental costs incurred during their time spent taking records. It should be noted, however, that CMRs were not paid according to the number of records they took but were paid a sum that had been set in advance. It was felt that paying according to the number of records taken could harm the quality of the records, as there was the possibility, however remote, that some people may take more records, which could be of reduced quality, in order to increase their remuneration.



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of potential key persons for reviewing at the end of that training workshop. This stage was completed for the whole country by mid April 2003.

The second visit was the "training workshop", a one-day session composed of sensitisation on the Special Court to ensure that CMRs would be well versed in crimes under international law, in particular those within the jurisdiction of the Court, to enable them to take all the relevant details from their key persons. This sensitisation was followed by a workshop on the Conflict Mapping Program itself, concluding with the selection of Conflict Mapping Recorders to take records from key persons. The training focused on explaining the Conflict Mapping Program, how conflict mapping differs from human rights reporting, how to take a record, what type of information to focus on and discussed the fact that these interviews would be taxing and draining on both the CMRs and the key persons. The session culminated in practical exercises in record taking. In addition, this stage included training in the crucial first step of selecting appropriate key persons who have a good general overview of the conflict in their area. On the basis of performance during this training session, including perceived understanding of the process and principles and the quality of the practice record, NPWJ selected a limited number of individuals to work as CMRs. This stage was completed for the whole country in the first week of May 2003.

The third stage consisted of reviewing the first records collected by the CMRs for content and organisation before the final two records were taken from key persons selected by the conflict mapping recorders in consultation with NPWJ. This stage was essential to provide top up training (if necessary), to address problems the CMRs may have encountered, to ensure the quality of the records taken and to ensure that CMRs never felt abandoned. The fact that this process took place after the collection of each CMR's first record and before the collection of subsequent records enabled NPWJ to undertake a thorough system of quality control on an ongoing basis. This stage was completed for the whole country in June 2003. Thus each location was visited at least three times by NPWJ according to a schedule worked out in advance with local partners, especially the SCWG, and the NPWJ Outreach Program.

The structure of the training was developed by NPWJ in consultation with local partners during October and November 2002 and was reviewed on an ongoing basis to incorporate lessons learnt during the training process. The first round of training commenced in December 2002 in Freetown, followed by further meetings and the training of conflict mapping recorders in the rural Western Area, near Freetown. Although this ran the risk of appearing there was a "Freetown bias",⁹ NPWJ selected the Western Area as the first point of entry to enable NPWJ to perfect the conflict mapping training before taking it into the provinces, as logistically it is more difficult to perfect such processes in the provinces. Lessons learned from the training in the Western Area were incorporated into the planning process for the provincial training and in late March 2003, following preparatory work undertaken in consultation with the SCWG and the Outreach program, conflict mapping training began in the provinces.

⁹ A common criticism by Sierra Leoneans of foreign NGOs and others in Sierra Leone is that they focus too much on the capital, Freetown, and do not focus enough on the provincial and rural areas in Sierra Leone.



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Partly in consideration of the time frame and the impending rainy season, which starts in May and during which many roads become impassable, NPWJ hired a Sierra Leonean team comprised of the best CMRs from the Western Area to undertake the training workshops and the collection of the first records in some parts of the country. This enabled there to be two conflict mapping training teams working simultaneously in different locations around the country, allowing full coverage of the whole country by the conclusion of the time frame for the gathering of records.

2. Key persons

The Conflict Mapping Program was primarily based on the scrupulous selection and debriefing of selected individuals ("key persons") whose profession, role in their community or in the forces involved in the conflict placed them in a position to follow events as they unfolded.

To facilitate proper identification and selection of key persons, CMRs were provided with the following guidelines for characteristics of people who would likely be best suited to being a key person:

1. The widest possible overview of the conflict in their area.
2. They were present in their chiefdom for much of the conflict.
3. Reliability.
4. Trustworthiness.
5. They have a good reputation in their community.
6. They would usually be regarded in their community as a person that others can confide in.
7. Honesty.
8. They are able to pass on their knowledge to the Conflict Mapping Recorders accurately and fully.
9. They are as free from bias as possible or at least are able to recognise their own bias.
10. They will usually be recognised as local community leaders in some respect.

In addition, CMRs were provided with the following list of people who may make good key persons:

1. Teachers.
2. Doctors.
3. Lawyers.
4. Counsellors/Social workers.
5. Youth Leaders.
6. Women's Movement Leaders.
7. Senior Police from the local area.
8. Local Magistrates.
9. Chiefs.
10. Section Leaders.
11. Local Commanders from the different fighting factions.
12. Any person in the local community who has been able to gain an overview of the conflict through a number of other persons talking to them or through holding some respected and trusted position in their community.

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To facilitate and monitor the quality of the records and the key persons selected for interviews, the CMRs were asked to provide a report prior to conducting an interview, in order to maintain the focus of the process and the standard of the key persons selected. These reports covered the following matters:

1. Why that key person was selected from their list of potential key persons.
2. How the selected key person meets the criteria, for example how and why that key person has an overview of the conflict in that area.
3. The nature of the information provided by that key person.
4. The key person's knowledge of the conflict.

Each CMR was to select three key persons in their chiefdom from whom to take a record, based on the time necessary to take a record and the time frame within which the record-taking phase had to be completed. Nevertheless, the main emphasis was on quality and not quantity when identifying key persons to be interviewed. It was therefore the case that fewer key persons were selected for interviewing in some chiefdoms where the scale of the conflict was minimal or where there was a smaller population.

Following these criteria, the Conflict Mapping Program gathered records from 401 key persons across the country, who ranged in age between 19 and 82. Of these, 6.7% were former members of one of the fighting factions; 6.7% were women; and 10.7% had been captured by one or more of the fighting factions and used either as forced labour or were recruited into a fighting faction.¹⁰ The most common occupation of key persons was a farmer, most of whom had occupied some position of authority during the conflict (such as Town or Section Chief) and many of whom were members of a fighting faction, most commonly the Civil Defence Forces. Other occupations included Paramount Chiefs, Town Chiefs and other chiefdom authorities, teachers, fishermen, housewives, retired military personnel and civil servants.

3. Database

The information gathered by CMRs from key persons comprised over 400 records, each containing an average of 30 pages, with a total of approximately 5,500 separate incidents, that is, instances of an alleged violation of international humanitarian law or key strategic or other information contained in a record. Given the amount and breadth of information, it had to be collated and stored in such a way as to enable easy search and retrieval in order for it to be used by analysts.

NPWJ therefore entered this information into a database designed specifically for the purposes of analysis according to order of battle and chain of command information. Prior to the completion of the design and programming of the database,¹¹ typists entered the records in their entirety into digital format. The resulting files underwent rigorous proofreading to ensure they were exactly the same as

¹⁰ These people are not included in the 6.7% who were former members of a fighting faction, which refers only to those people who joined willingly, according to the information they provided to the CMR.

¹¹ The database was designed and developed by Sensible Data s.r.l. Sensible Data is an IT company that specialises in information technology, data processing and secure communications for emergency and humanitarian operations: www.sensible.it.



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the record provided by each CMR. These documents then formed the basis of the data entry process and were used extensively during the analysis phase.

For data entry purposes, each record was broken into incidents, which consist of discrete parts of information, usually chronological, containing examples of serious violations of international humanitarian law or other relevant information. Each incident was classified according to what crimes were allegedly committed, who allegedly committed them, what weapons they allegedly used and other pertinent information. To ensure accuracy and consistency in the classification of incidents, NPWJ personnel provided training to data entry operators in the basics of international humanitarian law as well as a manual outlining how different factual scenarios should be classified. To ensure accuracy of the database as a whole and to enhance its effectiveness for analysis purposes, each entry went through a thorough process of checking and cross-checking, to ensure that it was consistent, complete and correct.¹²

4. The analysis

4.(a) **District level analysis**

At the conclusion of the data entry stage, NPWJ's analysts began piecing together what happened during the 10 years of war in Sierra Leone, using three tools: the database; detailed maps, mostly at District level; and the typed records. The result of this stage, which involved collating and cross-checking vast amounts of information, was a rough outline of what happened in each District during the conflict, highlighting troop movements, chains of command and events, including acts likely to constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Following this stage, the rough drafts for each District were reviewed in Freetown with field monitors from the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) responsible for that District. CGG's field monitors are very experienced human rights activists with an in-depth knowledge about what happened during the conflict in the District for which they are responsible. NPWJ specifically did not hire any CGG field monitors as Conflict Mapping Recorders, so that their experience could be better utilised once the first analyses were done, to ensure that there were no major errors or inconsistencies in the District-level analyses, thus providing a crucial first level of cross-checking.

In addition, over a six month period, NPWJ debriefed a former high-level member of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who provided a great deal of information on the inner workings of the RUF and an overview of the conflict since it began in 1991. The hours spent working with this key person yielded a statement of over 100 pages, plus various documents and maps describing the structure, procedures and geographical locations of the RUF, which were of immense benefit during the analysis phases. A senior Kamajor was also debriefed for the same purposes, although not as extensively.

¹² In compiling the database and the data entry process, NPWJ hired personnel who had worked on the ICG Humanitarian Law Documentation Project so as to enable this phase to benefit from lessons learnt during that project.



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The process as a whole enabled analysts to piece together the conflict as it happened across time and space and, in particular, to draw out patterns of conduct that may constitute crimes against humanity, namely those crimes committed in a widespread or systematic manner.

4.(b) The first draft factual analysis

Once these stages were complete, experienced analysts began the long process of putting all the information together, which consisted of three stages. First, a "first review" was conducted of the rough drafts, checking for internal sense and consistency. Second, each rough draft went through a more thorough review, addressing potential problems in the analysis, often going back to the original records and maps to clarify issues. Finally, the rough drafts for each District were put together and cross-referenced, which enabled the compilation of the general overview of the conflict. This first stage was based purely on the information gathered in the field and, as such, did not incorporate any information from open sources or other materials.

4.(c) The second draft factual analysis

The first draft factual analysis formed the backbone of the work that followed, namely the incorporation of information from open sources and other materials, going back to the records when necessary to iron out inconsistencies and to fill in details. Further, at this time, cross-checking, filling in details and checking dates and other information was undertaken when there was conflicting, contradictory or inadequate data. To facilitate this process, NPWJ incorporated a range of diverse information into a fully searchable open source database, with 8,500 entries comprised of news reports,¹³ UNAMSIL press briefings,¹⁴ situation reports from NGOs and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations press briefings and documents, press releases from other relevant bodies, such as mining companies, and other relevant information. Other open source materials were also used, including reports from major human rights organisations, particularly Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

The primary purpose for open source and other material was to provide background material, cross-check the information gathered from key persons and to fill in gaps where any existed. Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the main source of information for the facts as analysed in this report was Sierra Leoneans themselves, through the records of key persons gathered by Conflict Mapping Recorders throughout the country. Wherever open sources provided information used in the report, that is noted in a footnote to the relevant portion of the text.

The result of this was the second draft factual analysis, which incorporated all verified information from the first draft, with the addition of open sources and other material that had not been gathered directly by NPWJ in the field, but which was useful for confirming or correcting the data. This second draft factual analysis was then sent to a selected number of "resource persons", namely Sierra Leoneans and foreigners with expertise in the conflict in Sierra Leone who had agreed to

¹³ The main sources used were BBC and AFP wire reports and reports from the Xinhua News Agency.

¹⁴ Often, the records did not contain as detailed information about events that occurred from late 2000, partly because the decade-long conflict was beginning to come to an end. As such, UNAMSIL press briefings – which were regular and very detailed about UNAMSIL deployment in particular – were used to bring structure to the recollections of key persons, where necessary.

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review the information contained in the draft report and help clear up any lingering inconsistencies or unclear information.

4.(d) The legal analysis

While the factual analysis was being perfected with the assistance of resource persons, NPWJ put together a legal analysis of the events that happened during the conflict. This involved researching, presenting and discussing the relevant principles of international humanitarian and criminal law, which were then applied to the information contained in the factual analysis, so as to ascertain what crimes under international law and Sierra Leonean law were committed during the conflict.

The draft of the legal analysis was sent to NPWJ's network of international law experts, many of whom have had experience working on similar projects, such as the Humanitarian Law Documentation Project in Kosovo, or practicing before international courts or tribunals. These people are to the legal sections what the CGG field monitors and the factual resource persons are to the factual sections.

5. Notes on the report

One difficulty in a country with limited resources is the availability of detailed, comprehensive and up-to-date maps. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has begun producing detailed maps, which were vital for the analysis of the information gathered during the Conflict Mapping Program. Difficulties were nevertheless encountered because a number of villages mentioned in the records – which span back to 1991 – were completely destroyed during the conflict and, as such, no longer exist. Wherever possible, this report tries to identify the location of such villages based on the information contained in the reports.

Due to the fact that OCHA maps were used in the analysis phase and specially-constructed maps were provided by OCHA as visual aids for the report itself, this report adopts the spelling of place names used on the OCHA maps. If that was not available, this report uses the spelling used in the records. Throughout, the report tries to be as specific as possible about the location of a particular place, adopting the formula of naming first the town or village, then the chiefdom and District, where it is different from the District under analysis. For example, if Peyema is being discussed as part of the factual analysis for Bo District, it will read: "Peyema (Lower Bambara Chiefdom)"; however, if it is being discussed as part of the factual analysis for Pujehun District, it will read "Peyema (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Bo District)". In addition to avoid any possible confusion, the word "Town" was used to distinguish a town from a District, for example, "Pujehun Town", although "Town" is not an official part of the place name.

Finally, while it may appear counter-intuitive in a report on a conflict in which many victims and perpetrators were named in the media, this report does not "name names" of either victims or perpetrators. While the case for not naming victims is clear, it was decided also not to name perpetrators, even where they might be considered to be "notorious". This decision was taken because the allegations made are often extremely serious and would require further investigation before public disclosure could be considered. It must be borne in mind that the information analysed in this report has not been tested to the level required for sustaining a conviction, for

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example through cross-examination in court, nor have the alleged perpetrators had the opportunity to tell their side of the story or answer the allegations made in this report. Therefore, although some names are well known and the decision not to include them may seem artificial, it was decided that the best approach would be to omit entirely any references to names.

6. Partners

NPWJ would have been unable to complete the Conflict Mapping Program without the support and assistance of a number of partners. First and foremost, the Special Court Working Group, both in Freetown and across the country, was invaluable at every stage of the process from the initial design of the training seminars, to planning the up country trips, to providing us with CMR candidates. They also assisted us in undertaking training on the Special Court, together with the Outreach Program, during the first phases of training of the CMRs.

Another crucial partner was the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), who provided assistance both as a member of the SCWG and independently. In particular, the CGG field monitors provided vital assistance by going through the preliminary District-level analyses for their District to verify the accuracy of the information and fill in any gaps. CGG field monitors are particularly well placed to undertake this task, as they are based in the District and have been gathering information on human rights abuses for CGG, one of Sierra Leone's leading and most reputable organisations.

A proper understanding of the movement of forces and how events interplayed would not have been possible without the use of maps provided by OCHA. The illustrative maps contained in the report were produced with the generous assistance of OCHA personnel, who put together District-level maps that contain as many of the places mentioned in the report whose location could be identified.

Special recognition should go to the European Commission, who financed the bulk of our 2002 and 2003 activities in Sierra Leone, including the Conflict Mapping Program.

Finally, the Special Court for Sierra Leone provided much needed co-financing during the analysis stage of the Conflict Mapping Program. It must be emphasised, however, that this assistance was limited to financial assistance only and in no way implies endorsement by the Special Court of any of the material or conclusions, factual or legal, contained in this report.

Indeed, the content and conclusions drawn in this report are the sole responsibility of No Peace Without Justice and cannot be attributed to any of our partners.

The present report does not and cannot mention or even truly reflect the varied range of tasks carried out by all NPWJ personnel in the Conflict Mapping Program or other programs in the project. Nor can it acknowledge fully or exhaustively the wide range of assistance and support given to us by our partners, friends and people we met throughout the country. Rather, the purpose of this report is to provide as comprehensive as possible a picture of what happened during the

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decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone, analysed over time and space according to chains of command and order of battle information. With this picture, we hope to demonstrate that what happened to the people of Sierra Leone over the course of more than 10 years was a crime – the result of deliberate policies to commit systematic and massive violations of the laws of war – and by so doing to give a voice to the countless victims of these crimes, to play our part in ensuring they will not be forgotten.



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Chapter Two: A General Overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002

Sierra Leone is located on the south-west coast of Africa, bordered on the north and north-east by Guinea, on the east and south-east by Liberia and on the west coast by the Atlantic Ocean. Sierra Leone's compact shape and coastal situation mean that her international borders are only 555 miles in total, sharing 397 miles with Guinea and 158 miles with Liberia. Sierra Leone's territory covers 27,699 square miles (71,740 km²), housing a pre-conflict population estimated at 4.3 million. The 13 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone had strong administrative structures in the provinces prior to British colonisation in the late 18th or early 19th century, which were utilised by the British when they expanded control from Freetown across the rest of the country. This is echoed in today's legal and administrative systems, which are comprised of both traditional structures and traditional or customary law as well as a Westminster style Parliament and the application of British common law.

Sierra Leone is endowed with mineral resources, namely diamond, gold, bauxite, rutile and iron ore. Although only 6.7% of the land is arable, it also produces cash crops, in particular, coffee, cocoa, ginger and rice. Of the 800 km of waterways running through the country, 600 km is navigable the year round. Very few of the major highways running through the country are paved and there are no common carrier railroads, rendering travel through the country difficult during the rainy season, which runs from May to October. Indeed, rainfall along the coast can reach 495 cm (195 inches) per year, making Sierra Leone one of the wettest countries in West Africa. Prior to the rainy season, from December to February, the dry haramattan winds carry sand from the Sahara, depositing large amounts of sand throughout the country and bringing corresponding dust storms.

The early years of independence, which Sierra Leone attained in 1961, are marked by a number of military coups until 1968, after which the one-party State was established in the late 1970s. Once prosperous Sierra Leone would experience a steady decline throughout the 1980s, widely regarded to be the result of rampant corruption, which would set the stage for the conflict that erupted in the 1990s.

On 23 March 1991, combined forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) entered Kailahun District from Liberia through the town of Bomaru in Upper Bambara Chiefdom. On 27 March 1991, another group of RUF/NPFL entered Kailahun District from Liberia through the town of Koindu in the north of the District. By mid April, these two fronts would join in the centre of the District, having by then occupied the majority of it. On 28 March 1991, a third RUF/NPFL group crossed the Mano River forming the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone, in the south-east part of the country. They immediately occupied Zimmi, the southern-most town on the road network in Pujehun District.

As at 23 March 1991, units of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) were stationed in the towns of Koribondo (Bo District), Daru (Kailahun District), Gandorhun (Kono District) and Kenema Town (Kenema District). RUF/NPFL forces would move towards these locations to confront directly the SLA in an aggressive inland-moving campaign that was accompanied by systematic attacks against the civilian population.

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In April 1991, the RUF unit that had entered Bomaru was engaged with the SLA at Daru Barracks in the south of the District. This was an important SLA position on the northern bank of the Moa River, as it controlled further inland access by road. Occupying Daru Barracks would be a continuing objective of RUF/NPFL forces throughout 1991 and 1992. Again in April, the RUF/NPFL unit that entered through Koindu town immediately attacked SLA forces stationed some 20 km south in the town of Buedu, forcing them to retreat to Kailahun Town.

When the RUF/NPFL forces entered a town or village, civilian residents were gathered together in the centre of town, at the Court Barrie, where the RUF/NPFL forces introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" seeking to redeem the people of Sierra Leone from the corrupt All People's Congress (APC) Government. NPFL members were immediately identified as Liberian through their foreign accent and use of Liberian dialects. Enlisting, conscripting and training of both adults and children started immediately, particularly in Kailahun, where numerous training camps were established; the ranks of the RUF swelled quickly.

Reacting to such events, the Government of Sierra Leone requested and received support from the Governments of Nigeria and Guinea, who sent forces to provide security for strategic locations in and around Freetown. The Government of the United States would also provide indirect logistical and training assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone throughout 1991.

The RUF/NPFL unit entering Pujehun District from Liberia spread out across the District in a 45 mile arc from the town of Zimmi. They attacked through Pujehun Town, northwards into the southern chiefdoms of Bo District and north-east toward Koribondo Town, where the SLA was garrisoned. RUF/NPFL forces would attack the SLA in villages on the route to Koribondo until August 1991. The advance of RUF/NPFL forces in April allowed them access to land running south-west into Bonthe District, where RUF/NPFL occupied a number of small towns in the extreme south and east of the District, eventually trying but failing to occupy the District headquarter town of Bonthe, on Sherbro Island. Around this time, SLA forces were deployed in Bonthe Town and by the end of the year had opened new bases in the south-east of the District. RUF/NPFL forces moved into the southern chiefdoms of Kenema District using the main road linking Zimmi to the south of the District. Combined Guinean and SLA forces checked their advance through Kenema District into Kenema Town, where the main SLA brigade was located.

As they advanced, RUF/NPFL forces uniformly abducted civilians, simply killing them, or forcing them to carry looted property and perform domestic tasks. Almost without exception, sexual violence against women accompanied the arrival of RUF/NPFL forces in a locality. The burning of civilian residences and targeting of government and traditional authorities, in addition to the violence against civilians, caused massive panic and an exodus of civilians northwards inland. Rudimentary administrative structures – pass systems, checkpoints and appointment of their own personnel as town and chiefdom authorities – were put in place by the RUF/NPFL as they advanced. This would continue throughout the following years.

In June 1991, RUF/NPFL forces moved further north into Kono District along the main road to the District headquarter town of Koidu, staging a number of attacks on SLA positions in the south

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of Kono District. Throughout August and September, SLA forces from Koribondo would react offensively, forcing RUF/NPFL forces to retreat back through Pujehun District along the routes by which they had entered. In recapturing Pujehun and pushing the RUF/NPFL southwards, the SLA collaborated with forces of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a Liberian movement engaged in warfare with the NPFL in Liberian territory.

To consolidate their own advance and successes against RUF/NPFL forces, SLA forces in Kono District began supporting the establishment of civilian vigilante groups, armed with bladed weapons and short-barrel shotguns. Throughout Pujehun District, SLA forces executed civilians suspected of collaborating with RUF/NPFL forces in even the most menial of ways.

By December 1991, RUF/NPFL forces had consolidated positions in Kailahun District and were compressed into small pockets of activity away from main towns in Pujehun District.

In April 1992, junior officers from the SLA Tiger Unit led by 25 year-old Captain Strasser moved from the war front to Freetown to complain about poor conditions. They successfully staged a coup, ousted the APC Government and established a military government known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Following the coup, SLA forces looted many civilian shops and residences in the Western Area, which was accompanied by the infliction of violence upon civilians.

In early 1992, the SLA, now under the command of the NPRC, continued to unseat RUF/NPFL forces throughout Pujehun District. Moving southwards from Koribondo (Bo District), SLA and ULIMO forces retook the network of roads crossing the Sewa River and moved towards Pujehun Town. With the assistance of the SLA, a civil militia group comprised of local hunters called the "Donsos" gained in strength in Kono District, participating as auxiliary forces to the SLA and ULIMO. The Donsos, together with other local hunting societies across the country -- the largest of which were the Kamajors -- would later join forces under the umbrella of the Civil Defence Forces.

RUF/NPFL forces attempted again to enter Kenema District, having failed in 1991. Entering Kenema from points in the east of the District, RUF/NPFL were resisted by ULIMO and freshly deployed SLA forces. SLA secured these positions until late 1993.

RUF/NPFL forces continued to attack Kono District, uniformly attacking the civilian population as they advanced until their expulsion from the District in early 1993. In mid 1992, in response to this increasing northwards movement of RUF/NPFL forces, the NPRC Government initiated, supported and strengthened the process of mobilising a civil militia group in Koinadugu District, in the extreme north-east of Sierra Leone. Comprised of local hunters, the "Tamaboros" -- as they became known -- were deployed to Kono District to engage RUF/NPFL forces. In late October 1992, RUF/NPFL forces occupied Koidu Town and were able to attack further inland in the northern chiefdoms of Kono District. Combined SLA, ULIMO and civil militia forces pushed them out of Koidu Town and Kono District in early 1993.

By May 1992 in Pujehun District, combined SLA and ULIMO forces had pushed RUF/NPFL forces back across the Moa River, leading by the end of the year to their retreat back into Liberia



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across the Mano River. Pockets of RUF/NPFL activity continued to pressure the SLA in the southern chiefdoms of Pujehun District and in the extreme south-east of Bonthe District.

The SLA intensified attacks on "collaborators" from October 1992 to February 1993. To the SLA, there appeared to be little distinction between civilians who cooperated enthusiastically with the RUF/NPFL and those who found themselves with little choice or simply failed to escape when the RUF/NPFL entered an area. The criteria used to determine who was and was not a "collaborator" were largely arbitrary. The SLA forced civilians to mine diamonds, provide food and carry out other forms of manual labour. In Pujehun Town, the SLA started providing basic military training, weapons and ammunition to civilians.

In Kailahun District, RUF/NPFL forces continued to attack Daru and other SLA positions in the west of the District. At the end of 1992, the RUF/NPFL grip on the northern chiefdoms of Kailahun District was unchallenged. Within these areas, a special unit of NPFL forces known only as "TAP 20" executed terror operations against the civilian population, including the widespread killing and cannibalism of civilians. Later, in 1993, "TAP 40" and "TAP Final" would continue this operation.

In the early months of 1993, SLA forces established positions in advance of Daru and started to engage RUF/NPFL forces stationed in the northern chiefdoms of Kailahun District, where RUF/NPFL forces had first entered Sierra Leone. The SLA built on this eastward progression by successfully preventing the RUF/NPFL from moving northwards into Kono District. By mid-1993, the SLA had rolled back and confined RUF/NPFL forces to the far eastern part of Kailahun District.

RUF/NPFL activity in Pujehun District resumed in December 1992 to January 1993 when the RUF/NPFL moved a large force into the District, crossing the Moa River, entering Pujehun Town and Potoru, a strategic town giving access to Kenema District. Their push into Pujehun District, while brief, was accompanied by a brutal attack against the civilian population; the RUF/NPFL forces routinely killed, raped and abducted people and burnt down large numbers of civilian residences. However, their control of these two towns and the surrounding areas was quickly overturned by SLA and ULIMO forces. RUF/NPFL forces were then confined to the bordering chiefdoms with Liberia and in the swampland south of Pujehun District. RUF/NPFL forces also made intermittent attacks on locations in the south-east of Bonthe District, following the course of the Wanjei River.

In December 1993, the then Head of State announced a unilateral ceasefire, RUF/NPFL forces having been repelled almost entirely back to Liberia. Taking advantage of this ceasefire, in the last days of December 1993, RUF forces moved across the border from Liberia into Kenema District, occupying its seven southern chiefdoms by March 1994 and inflicting violence on the civilian population. By this point, NPFL had withdrawn from Sierra Leone to fight ULIMO forces in Liberia. "Camp Zogoda", established in March 1994 to the north of the Moa River in the south-west of Kenema District, became the RUF's main base until 1996. From Camp Zogoda, RUF forces were able to stage ambushes on the main Bo-Kenema highway, a major arterial route.

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In early 1994, the number of forces under arms in the SLA swelled to around 12,000 owing to a recruitment drive by the NPRC Government. RUF forces in Pujehun District fully repelled the SLA eastwards towards Koribondo, allowing their forces to push northwards into Bo District. SLA forces stationed in Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island used boats to patrol the coastal waters off Sherbro Island, engaging on the water RUF forces entering the mouth of the Sewa River. The RUF had control over the boundary between Bonthe and Pujehun Districts, setting up a number of town and village level administrations and continuing to inflict similar violence on the civilian population as had begun earlier in Kenema District.

Although in April 1994, RUF forces made incursions into Kono District, they were from the beginning of 1994 unable to undermine significantly the hold over the District exercised by the Donsos and SLA forces in the northern chiefdoms and the Civil Defence Units, mainly composed of local hunters known as the Kamajors, in the south. This prevented RUF forces moving directly through to Koinadugu District, to the immediate north of Kono District. However, an alternative route was found.

Thus the RUF expanded their operations in a westerly direction from the three Districts bordering Liberia, continuing to inflict serious violence against the civilian population as part of an attack that had begun in Kenema District in 1993 and would last until the end of 1994. Thousands of civilians in Pujehun District were asked by SLA forces to go to an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp in Gondama (Bo District), placed under the protection of foreign forces. RUF forces established a base in the north of Kenema District in February 1994, thus preceding their advance through Kenema District from the south and guaranteeing control over the entire District, bar Kenema Town, by April 1994. From this northern base, RUF forces staged ambushes on the main Koidu-Makeni highway in Tonkolili District, making it impassable for civilian and military traffic alike. In April, RUF forces attacked the towns of Masingbi and Makali, both along the Koidu-Makeni highway, very close to the northern tip of Kenema District. SLA forces sent from Makeni were repelled from Makali by the RUF. RUF forces would move progressively further along this road, attacking Matotoka in July. Getting ever closer to Magburaka Town, by October the RUF were able to loop round through Tonkolili District into the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District. A string of attacks on the Magburaka-Alikalia highway by an RUF expeditionary force culminated in a heavy attack on Kabala Town on 7 November 1994. This force would leave Kabala the next day and return to Tonkolili District in the following week, leaving in its path a trail of destruction and hundreds of civilian deaths.

The RUF grip on Pujehun and Kenema Districts presented opportunities for the RUF to further infiltrate Bo and Bonthe Districts. In early 1994, RUF forces executed countless "hit and run" attacks on villages in the eastern chiefdoms of Bo District along the entire boundary with Kenema District. Initially, these were "food-finding missions", mostly staged from Camp Zogoda. Between June and December, however, these missions became more substantial, with RUF forces attacking but not occupying towns just across the District boundary. In November, RUF forces attacked an IDP camp in Gerihun; but were repelled by SLA forces. On 24 December, RUF forces attacked the IDP camp at Gondama, killing hundreds of civilians displaced from the fighting in the preceding

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years. On 25 December, Kenema Town was attacked but left unoccupied. Towns in the centre of Bo District, including the District headquarter town of Bo on 27 December, were attacked by the RUF; none of these towns were occupied. RUF forces re-entered Bonthe District, occupying the eastern chiefdoms, using the natural features of the District to expand their control in areas in the three chiefdoms on the east and south.

Responding to RUF advances into Bo and Tonkolili Districts, groups of civilians were formed into civil militia, variously labelled "Civil Defence Units" or "Territorial Defence Forces". In Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District), these units were gathered, trained and armed under the auspices of the Resident Government Minister for Bo District. In Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom alone, 2,800 civil militia were under arms by June 1994.

Initially, these units were deployed alongside SLA forces, used to operate checkpoints, identify RUF "collaborators" and carry out patrols within chiefdoms. Despite this cooperation, tensions between the SLA and civil militia groups had been simmering since 1993 throughout the country. This was due to widespread civilian mistrust of the SLA, owing to their involvement in the same enterprises of killing civilians, raping women, looting private property and exploiting mineral resources. For example, in the Tongo Field area of Lower Bambara Chiefdom, the SLA engaged in diamond mining in Tongo Town itself and forced civilians to work at the mining sites. In nearby Peyema, also in Lower Bambara, the RUF did the same. These practices were aggravated further by numerous attacks on civilian settlements and ambushes on civilian traffic carried out by unknown assailants suspected to be members of the SLA. Two such attacks occurred in Moyamba District in 1994. Civilians branded such SLA members "So-bels", or "Soldier-Rebels".

By late December 1994, RUF forces had entered the western chiefdoms of Tonkolili District, having had access to the eastern chiefdoms since April. Earlier in 1994, it is highly likely that RUF forces began establishing a foothold in the Kangari Hills in the south of the District, which they would use as a launching point for attacks on the surrounding villages. Since June, SLA forces had been stationed in Mile 91, which is located on a key junction; to the west lies Masiaka, the gateway to Freetown. Leading north-east from Mile 91, the highway goes to Magburaka. Leading south-east, the highway runs through to Bo, Kenema and Kailahun. On 22 December, the SLA were forced out of Mile 91 by the RUF, although they regrouped outside of the town and regained control the following day. Many locations in the chiefdoms around Mile 91 were attacked as the RUF forces established a new Brigade base in the Kaitkant Hills, spanning the borders of Tonkolili with Port Loko and Bombali Districts. The location of the Kaitkant Hills between the two main highways leading into the Western Area allowed the RUF to begin a new phase of their campaign, opening up for the first time since 1991 the possibility of attacking Freetown. By the end of 1994, rumours of imminent RUF attacks on Moyamba District, so far unaffected by the RUF, were widespread. Since 1992, SLA forces had been deployed in the District, although they had also been harassing civilians, including stealing property, which intensified from December 1994 to early 1995.

As the RUF expanded the territory over which it had control throughout 1994, violence against the civilian population continued unabated. The proliferation of "hit and run" missions into Bo District, across Kenema District and in Tonkolili District resulted in the widespread burning and looting of

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civilian residences, accompanied by a high number of civilian deaths. Sexual violence against women was perpetrated by RUF forces during raids. Beating, molestation and abduction of both men and women for use as porters to carry stolen property or for conscription into the fighting force continued. The RUF assaults on Bo, Kenema and Kabala resulted in the denigration and destruction of public infrastructure such as government offices, hospitals, schools and Police barracks.

As 1995 began, RUF forces controlled the southern Districts of Kailahun, Pujehun and Kenema. Deployments of SLA within the occupied Districts occasionally offered short-term effective resistance to RUF attacks, but had little long-term strategic influence. Camp Zogoda continued to be the RUF's main base in the south and it was common practice for abducted civilians and looted property from the whole occupied area to be sent to the camp. The RUF expanded their operations in Bo District, opening a new base, "Camp Bokurr", in the north-east. The Bo-Freetown highway, at least until Mile 91, and the entire Bo-Kenema highway were under RUF control. The IDP camp in Gerihun was attacked again, this time successfully. RUF forces killed over 100 civilians. Even before 1995 ended, the RUF controlled all of Bo District and would attack the civilian population there until April 1996, systematically killing civilians, burning houses and committing similar acts of violence against civilians.

The strong grip on Pujehun and Bo Districts and on the south-east part of Bonthe District allowed a rapid and large-scale expansion of RUF forces into the whole of Moyamba and Bonthe Districts. Entering the eastern part of Moyamba District in January 1995 from Bo District, RUF forces proceeded southwards and took control of the bauxite mining area of Mokbanji before moving south-west to upper Bonthe District, the location of the economically important Sierra Leone Rutile Mining Company. By February 1995, RUF forces controlled all the northern chiefdoms of the District, using the developed road network in this area. These attacks on the south of Moyamba District and the north of Bonthe District paralysed an economic area vital to the Government of Sierra Leone. From the north of Bonthe District, RUF forces rapidly spilled over into the southern chiefdoms of the District. Despite this, they failed to gain control of Sherbro Island and Bonthe Town. This movement in Bonthe District was carried out during the same period of a concerted action accompanied by attacks against civilians in Moyamba District.

Throughout January and February 1995, RUF forces attacked villages and towns in the chiefdoms of Tonkolili District in which the Kaitkant Hills are located. In early January, the RUF extended military operations into Port Loko District, attacking two key towns on the Freetown-Makeni highway. On 1 January 1995, RUF forces advanced north-west from their Kaitkant Hills base and from positions near Mataboi in Bombali District, towards the town of Foredugu in Port Loko District. The RUF force, which numbered 500, overcame the SLA forces stationed in the town, forcing their retreat. RUF forces attacked other villages in the Foredugu area. From Foredugu, RUF forces attacked Lunsar, but were beaten back by SLA forces stationed in the town. Lunsar would fall to the RUF later in the year.

At the end of January 1995, RUF forces moved north from Port Loko District and attacked Kambia, the headquarter town of Kambia District. RUF forces did not attempt to occupy Kambia



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Town and the attack was staged primarily to demonstrate their ability to strike in areas previously thought to be secure.

In early March 1995, RUF forces moved north into Kono District from Kailahun District and the Tongo Field area in Kenema District, taking advantage of SLA groups abandoning a comprehensive defensive position in favour of illicit mining operations. Throughout March, April and May, RUF forces occupied many towns in the western, diamond-rich area of Kono District, including Koidu Town, which was accompanied by violent acts against the civilian population.

The pattern of RUF activity in Moyamba District in March-April 1995, part of an overall attack from December 1994 to April 1995 across several Districts, clearly shows that their immediate objective was to attack Freetown. The RUF did not initially intend to settle in Moyamba District, rather use it as a transit into the Western Area and the capital. RUF forces attacked Moyamba Junction, in the north of the District, to paralyse any SLA response to a simultaneous attack on Moyamba Town. The group that attacked Moyamba Town would then follow the Moyamba-Freetown road, attacking the major roads and settlements on its way, before being slowed down by SLA forces in the north-west of the District. In March, RUF forces settled in Moyamba District, progressively reaching all the chiefdoms and establishing a strong base in the north, known as "Camp Fol Fol". As the RUF consolidated their hold over Districts in the south and encamped in Moyamba District, SLA forces increased security activities throughout the Western Area, adopting defensive deployments at locations along the road running around the Freetown Peninsula and on the main inland highway.

Also in early March 1995, RUF forces deployed from their Kaitkant Hills base and attacked Mile 91, partly in response to reports of an advance by SLA forces towards RUF positions. In late March, SLA forces coordinated by members of a private military company called the Gurkha Security Group attacked RUF forces at Kaitkant Hills using intensive bombardment from a helicopter gunship and a Guinean Airforce fighter jet. Evacuating the base, RUF forces consolidated at the recently established Camp Fol Fol (Moyamba District). From this location, RUF forces raided the surrounding chiefdoms in Moyamba District between March to May 1995.

In early April, RUF forces moved into the Western Area in a bid to attack Freetown. RUF forces attacked settlements in Koya Rural District in a triangular area delimited by Songo to the east, Waterloo to the west and Fogbo Jetty to the south. RUF forces met resistance from SLA forces. Many civilians were killed and many civilian houses were burnt down by RUF forces. By late April, the RUF had pushed its front lines into Waterloo, where they attacked SLA and Guinean positions in the town. Replacing the Gurkha Security Group, the Government of Sierra Leone contracted another private military company called Executive Outcomes at the beginning of May 1995.

Executive Outcomes started training activities at the Benguema Training Centre near Freetown and formed a "Special Task Force" using a large number of demobilised Liberian militia from ULIMO. The Special Task Force attacked the RUF, pursuing them out of the Western Area. Following this, civilians and SLA forces in the Western Area attacked and killed persons suspected to be "rebel collaborators".

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In mid-May, the RUF established a camp at Ro-Source in the west of Bombali District and commenced attacking nearby towns. RUF activity in northern Port Loko District, near Camp Ro-Source, recommenced, following a lull during the RUF push into the Western Area.

Moving to the north-east, Executive Outcomes, together with the SLA and civil militia, attacked RUF positions in Kono District from land and air. They successfully recaptured Koidu Town from the RUF by June. By the end of 1995, Executive Outcomes had control over the western chiefdoms of Kono District, where the mining areas are to be found. This did not, however, prevent RUF forces from launching "food-finding missions" into the eastern chiefdoms of Kono District and the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District.

In June 1995, the RUF commenced a second wave of attacks in Port Loko District, advancing beyond the Foredugu area towards Port Loko Town, attacking on two fronts. The first advance came from the south, possibly again from Kaitkant Hills or from Camp Fol Fol. The second advance was from the north, through Gbinti Town from Camp Ro-Source in Bombali District. Both advances converged upon Port Loko Town on 8 June 1995. RUF forces attacked and entered Port Loko, but did not capture the town from the SLA forces stationed there. Following this attack, RUF forces took up temporary positions in the chiefdoms to the north and east of Port Loko Town. By mid June, a contingent of Guinean soldiers deployed into Port Loko, commencing heavy artillery bombardments on the RUF's positions. This forced an RUF retreat towards Camp Fol Fol (Moyamba District) and Camp Ro-Source (Bombali District). Following their stalled advance on Freetown and the failure to take Port Loko Town, RUF activity concentrated on the strategic town of Masiaka and other towns in the surrounding area across June 1995.

In October 1995, the Special Task Force, comprised of Executive Outcomes, SLA and ULIMO members, deployed to Bonthe District and started dislodging the RUF forces from their positions, notably in the primary mainland town of Matru Jong. Joined later by Kamajors, the Special Task Force progressively dislodged the RUF from their positions throughout Bonthe District. In late 1995, RUF forces, defeated in certain areas of the District, gathered thousands of civilians at Bauya Junction, killing hundreds of them. A few years later, over 1,000 human skulls would be discovered in that area. RUF activity in Port Loko District continued unabated, with the attack and brief occupation of Lunsar in December.

In 1996, Executive Outcomes controlled the diamond mining areas of Kono District, also taking control of other strategic sites. In collaboration with the Kamajor Society, Executive Outcomes took control of the Sierra Rutile mining operation in mainland Bonthe District and were contracted by the Sierra Ore and Metal Company (Sieromco) in Moyamba District. Alongside the SLA, Executive Outcomes were hired by the owners of the hydroelectric plant at Bumbuna (Tonkolili District) to provide security.

In January 1996, the NPRC Deputy Chairman overthrew the NPRC Chairman, thereby seizing power. In the weeks preceding the Presidential and Parliamentary elections planned for 26 February 1996, RUF forces in a number of locations across Sierra Leone threatened civilians, posing the

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question about whether they wanted peace before elections, or vice versa; the implication being that “elections before peace” would lead to reprisals against the civilian population. A national consultative conference held in Freetown in February gauged the national mood and decided that elections should go ahead. This decision was not without dissenters other than the RUF, including sections of the SLA and a number of Paramount Chiefs.

In late January and across February, RUF forces attacked Madina, Kukuna and Rokupr in Kambia District and Kamakwie in Bombali District, resulting in huge damage to civilian residences and some particularly brutal killings of civilians. RUF forces staged attacks on villages in Moyamba District, killing, raping and mutilating civilians. Just before Election Day, the NPRC commenced peace talks with the RUF in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. On Election Day itself, RUF forces attacked the towns of Kenema and Magburaka, the elections nevertheless proceeding in the wake of killing, rape and looting.

Following the February elections which resulted in the formation of a government by the candidate of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), Guinean armed forces were deployed at two locations in the north-west of Sierra Leone. Nigerian forces set up checkpoints in the Western Area and the Nigerian 28th Battalion arrived in Port Loko District. An entire SLA battalion deployed from Freetown to the far east of Kono District. Guinean forces were also deployed in small numbers in southern Koinadugu District and established a base in Kambia District.

Around this period, the various civil militia groups that had formed throughout Sierra Leone were united under a central coordination system known as the Civil Defence Force (CDF) and the Kamajor leader was appointed to the position of Deputy Defence Minister by the newly elected President. The Kamajor Society was the largest component of the CDF, which also included the Gbethis, the Kapras the Donsos and others.

The process of initiating Kamajors already underway in Bonthe District since 1995 spread in 1996 to Bo District. The Kamajor High Priest and Chief Initiator was moved from Bonthe District to Bo District to initiate young men into the Kamajor Society. By late 1995, Kamajor Societies were formed in some of the southern chiefdoms of Bo District. By mid-1996, the initiation process had spread throughout Kenema, Bo and Pujehun Districts and into parts of Moyamba, Kailahun and Tonkolili Districts.

In the early stage of this process, recruitment for the Kamajor Society was carried out exclusively through the traditional authorities, who nominated men from their chiefdoms for initiation. However, as the war escalated and the territory over which the Kamajors gained control increased, new initiates did not require this nomination by traditional authorities.

The most striking feature of 1996 is the exponential increase in strength of the Kamajor Society throughout the Southern and Eastern Provinces. By early 1996, a Kamajor Society had formed in every chiefdom of Bo District. Initiates in Bo District were first sent to locations in Bo Town and Jiama Bongor Chiefdom where they were initiated and given basic military training. In the first half of 1996, initiates from Kenema were sent either to Kenema Town or a location in Bo District for

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training. In the southern Kenema chiefdoms, Kamajors were initially gathered into two battle groups, one of which was known as the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee. Alongside Nigerian, Guinean and SLA forces and other Kamajor groups from chiefdoms in Bo and Pujehun Districts, the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee successfully destroyed the RUF stronghold of Camp Zogoda. In the north of Kenema District, Kamajor units successfully confronted and eliminated RUF camps, including "Camp Joe Bush", undermining completely the hold over Kenema District that was enjoyed by the RUF throughout 1995. In late 1996, Kamajors attacked another main RUF base known as "Camp Booloko", just north of Bo District. Also in late 1996, Kamajor units in Moyamba District attacked the RUF at Camp Fol Fol, removing one of the RUF's main staging points for attacking Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts. On other occasions, Kamajors from different chiefdoms regrouped in order to engage the RUF more efficiently. Kamajors from Bonthe District were also active in Moyamba District, assisting those chiefdom authorities that did not have a Kamajor Society.

In Tonkolili District, other components of the CDF were formed. Civil militia movements known as the Gbethis and the Kapras were formed in the south and north of the District respectively. The Gbethis were active in the area surrounding the Kaitkant Hills, a former RUF stronghold. In June 1996, Gbethis worked alongside SLA forces stationed in Mile 91, before being driven out of town by SLA forces after a skirmish concerning the division of contributions offered by civilians under their control. The Gbethi leadership demanded that the civilian population provide support for their positions, punishing with physical violence those "RUF collaborators" who did not cooperate willingly. The Gbethis set up checkpoints and patrolled villages at night, looking for "strangers" and fining civilians who failed to give notice of their arrival. Similar practices were carried out by members of the CDF throughout the territory they occupied.

On 30 November 1996, the Government of Sierra Leone negotiated a peace agreement with the RUF leadership in Côte d'Ivoire. One of the key provisions of the Abidjan Peace Accord, as it became known, was the removal of all foreign forces and Executive Outcomes from the country; Executive Outcomes would leave the country by early 1997.

At the beginning of 1997, SLA and CDF forces continued to confront the RUF. "Camp Libya" in Pujehun District, one of the RUF's longest held positions, fell to a combined SLA and CDF attack in the first months of 1997. Until May, Kamajors also engaged the RUF, sacking the RUF's main defence headquarters in the Kangari Hills. RUF activity in Bombali District continued from Camp Ro-Source with a number of food-finding raids into Port Loko. In mid May, RUF forces captured the northern town of Kamakwie, meeting no resistance and capturing an ammunition dump from the SLA forces stationed there.

The tensions between the CDF and SLA that were ignited in 1996 burned on into 1997, with numerous armed confrontations between the two forces throughout the country. For example, in Tonkolili District, SLA forces ambushed a Kamajor night patrol and attacked Gbethis defending Yonibana. Kamajors in Pujehun District forcibly dismantled SLA checkpoints. These tensions led the SLA to abandon some chiefdoms. Already in the middle of 1996, civilians from Moyamba District had asked the governmental authorities in Freetown to withdraw the SLA forces from the

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District. SLA forces moved out shortly after and left the security of the District to the Kamajors who, by the end of the year, had control of the south of the District, while RUF forces were still active in the north of the District. The CDF, however, was partially weakened in Kono District with the disbanding of the Donsos in February 1997 as a sign of good faith in the wake of the Abidjan Peace Accord.

Civilian populations fared badly throughout areas controlled by both CDF and SLA forces. Throughout Moyamba and Bonthe Districts, civilians suspected of being "RUF collaborators" or who were considered to be insufficiently supportive or respectful of the CDF, were subjected to gruesome punishments. In the areas they controlled, Kamajors put in place rudimentary administrative structures, preventing regular local authorities from exercising any power and took actions affecting various aspects of civilian life. These practices continued throughout the following years. The SLA also continued their illicit mining and looting activities, often using civilians to carry the loads.

On 25 May 1997, junior elements of the SLA overthrew the elected government of President Kabbah. This coup d'état resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by an SLA officer awaiting trial in Pademba Road Prison in Freetown, charged with treason for a planned coup attempt. Immediately following the advent of the AFRC, its leadership called for the RUF to join them and share power, an offer the RUF leadership promptly accepted. Immediately following the coup, AFRC forces looted extensively throughout Freetown and the Peninsula area. A large RUF force moved into the Western Area, initially concentrating around Waterloo and Hastings, stealing from and harassing civilians.

Following the coup, former-SLA deployments gave the AFRC a strong foothold throughout the country, particularly in the major towns of Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Koidu, Pujehun and Bonthe. The AFRC did not inherit territory the SLA did not control, such as CDF strongholds. Nevertheless, AFRC positions were reinforced and strengthened when RUF forces allied with them, moving from the bush towards towns where the AFRC was deployed. The RUF also established new positions throughout the north. RUF forces moved into Port Loko District, living amongst the civilian population. In Bombali District, they occupied a number of strategic locations. They also established a large base in Kambia District. At this time, the RUF/AFRC staged a sharp and brutal attack against the civilian population, including massive killings, abductions, rapes and other acts of severe violence; staged simultaneously across the whole country, every District would be affected to different degrees.

The RUF/AFRC immediately found itself in a tense standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in Freetown. Nigerian forces were reinforced by sea and air in the days following the coup. At the beginning of June, Nigerian forces attempted to unseat the RUF/AFRC but the operation was called off the day it had begun, when RUF/AFRC forces overpowered and briefly held hostage around 300 Nigerian soldiers. Nigerian forces took control of Freetown International Airport in the following days, although civilians were killed during exchanges of mortar fire between Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces throughout the year.



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Throughout 1997, the RUF/AFRC appeared to have two closely related priorities. The first was to destroy the base of support for the CDF movement. The second was to consolidate their hold over the country and find ways of supporting their regime. Accordingly, the RUF/AFRC began suppressing political dissent, civil society and student activism in Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces in Freetown arrested many journalists, activists and demonstrators. Some were tortured and killed, others detained in freight containers and other places.

In June, the CDF rejected a call by the leadership of RUF/AFRC to demobilise and surrender their arms and register at Police Stations. Instead, the CDF retreated to strongholds where there was no previous SLA – now RUF/AFRC – deployment and commenced attacking combined AFRC and RUF positions. CDF forces in Bonthe District did not, however, go underground, as RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island and not on the mainland.

On the boundary between Kenema and Kailahun Districts, RUF/AFRC forces established a base known as “SS Camp” and used this to attack surrounding villages and towns in the hunt for “CDF collaborators”. Throughout the areas in which they were deployed, RUF/AFRC forces attacked civilian settlements and hunted through the bush for civilians, stealing any property they found. In general, screening systems were put in place, especially at checkpoints, where RUF/AFRC forces were searching civilians thoroughly for any evidence that they were supporters of the CDF. Such brutal tactics swelled the numbers of civilians willing to give active support and be initiated into the Kamajor Society.

In some places, more sophisticated methods of extracting support from civilians were put into place by the RUF/AFRC, including local tax administrations and systems allowing the regime to communicate demands to civilians less violently. Nevertheless, the number of “food-finding missions” ballooned, including such plainly-titled looting sprees as “Operation From your Hand to My Hand, from Your Pocket to my Pocket”. In Tonkolili District, RUF/AFRC forces concentrated their actions in the chiefdoms around Mile 91 and in the area around Magburaka, where they were strongly engaged by the CDF from the south and west of the District.

In Moyamba District, a CDF stronghold, the RUF/AFRC commenced an aggressive campaign, culminating in the attack on and week-long occupation of Moyamba Town in July 1997. RUF/AFRC forces perpetrated large scale violence against civilians in retaliation for the earlier rejection by civilians of SLA protection. Until CDF forces repelled the RUF/AFRC from Moyamba Junction, the Mile 91-Bo highway fell under RUF/AFRC control, evidenced by intense attacks on towns and their civilian inhabitants along the route. The mainland of Bonthe District remained under CDF control, but they were forced to move from Bonthe Town after the RUF/AFRC deployment in the town. Throughout 1997, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the diamond-rich areas of Kono District, continuing the established practice of forcing civilians to work in the mines.

In August 1997, ECOWAS imposed a trade and arms embargo on Sierra Leone and extended the mandate of their Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to cover sanctions enforcement in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG artillery and Alfa Jets began shelling vessels approaching Freetown’s Kissy Terminal; stray ECOMOG shells resulted in the deaths of civilians in Freetown’s densely populated



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east end. Eventually, ECOMOG and the RUF/AFRC negotiated a ceasefire in late October. This, however, did not hold firm and there were many breaches of the letter and spirit of the ceasefire agreement.

Starting in September 1997, having regrouped in villages and strongholds, CDF forces successfully launched attacks on RUF/AFRC positions. These actions would yield greater results in early 1998 with the inland advance of ECOMOG forces. In late December 1997, CDF forces intensified pressure on provincial RUF/AFRC positions by preventing civilian and military traffic from moving towards Freetown and vice versa. The consequences of "Operation Black December" – namely the deprivation of food and other supplies - were sharply felt in the towns of Bo, Kenema and Pujehun. From then until March 1998, the CDF would engage in a systematic attack against the civilian population, including massive killing of "RUF collaborators", the widespread use of small cages in which they imprisoned people and similar acts of brutality.

Between 6 and 12 February 1998, following renewed RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG positions, ECOMOG forces invaded Freetown and gained control of the Western Area, forcing RUF/AFRC forces to retreat inland. From the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces retreated along the main highway to Masiaka, where they split into three groups. The first headed directly towards Magburaka through Mile 91. The second group moved to Makeni (Bombali District) through Lunsar. These two groups would meet after 14 February and move to Kono District, occupying main towns along the route. The third group regrouped at a pre-existing RUF/AFRC base in Port Loko District and moved northwards into Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces counter-attacked ECOMOG and CDF positions on the roads to Port Loko Town. All these groups left in their wake a trail of destruction, including the loss of civilian life and property.

The RUF/AFRC forces reaching Makeni and Magburaka moved into Kono District along two routes. One group moved along the main highway though southern Tonkolili District, enduring ambushes from CDF forces positioned along the route. The second group moved into Koinadugu District, both by the main highway through Foredugu and along a secondary road though Bumbuna, before moving south into Kono District.

By 21 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces had reasserted control over Koidu Town and its immediate environs. A large RUF/AFRC base known as "Superman Camp" was established in the east of Kono District and served as a training base through 1998 and 1999. Shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout the District and parts of the southern chiefdoms of Koinadugu District.

At the beginning of March, ECOMOG forces deployed from Port Loko and moved into towns throughout the Northern Province, following the retreating RUF/AFRC forces and reaching Lunsar, Magburaka, Masingbi and Makeni. By mid March, they had entered Kabala, Foredugu and Alikalia (Koinadugu District). In addition, by mid March, ECOMOG had also occupied the towns of Kamakwie (Bombali District), Falaba and Mongo Bendugu (Koinadugu District), which are the key access routes to the Guinean border for the entire Northern Province. ECOMOG forces also



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deployed from Guinea to Kambia Town. Throughout their deployment, ECOMOG forces were assisted by CDF members in patrolling these areas.

From the southern entry point, ECOMOG moved directly north and in early February entered Kenema Town, which had been deserted by RUF/AFRC forces a few days earlier. Since December 1997, CDF forces had undermined RUF/AFRC control over Kenema District. Shortly after entering Kenema Town, ECOMOG and CDF forces overran SS Camp. By March 1998, the RUF/AFRC had retreated from Kenema District entirely, although in April they made a few minor incursions from Kailahun District.

As ECOMOG forces coming from Kenema Town retook Bo Town from the RUF/AFRC in early March, CDF forces dislodged the RUF/AFRC from Pujehun District. RUF/AFRC forces withdrew from Sherbro Island in the days following the ECOMOG intervention, leaving the District entirely under the control of the CDF (Kamajors). From Bo Town, ECOMOG deployed in Mile 91, where they engaged in patrolling the area, assisted by the CDF. By March 1998, the entire Southern Province was free of the presence of RUF/AFRC forces and would remain so throughout the year, although RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown who went through the Northern Province towards Makeni and ultimately Koidu Town made a few rapid incursions into the north of Moyamba District. Nevertheless, the level of violence inflicted upon civilians and those alleged to have collaborated with the RUF/AFRC heightened in 1998 since CDF forces, primarily Kamajors, were unchallenged throughout this Province and in most of Kenema District. The CDF progressively exercised greater control over civilian life, replacing both State and traditional structures with their own invasive and largely arbitrary system of administration.

By April, ECOMOG units attacked and occupied Koidu Town and other major towns on the main highway, forcing the RUF/AFRC further into Kono District. ECOMOG forces based in Kenema Town, together with SLA and CDF forces, reinforced the Moa Barracks at Daru and other positions in the south of Kailahun District. Between March and May, RUF/AFRC forces attacked these positions as ECOMOG Jets attacked the RUF/AFRC headquarters in Buedu, in the far east of Kailahun District.

Following their ejection from Freetown and the commencement of ECOMOG provincial operations, RUF/AFRC forces launched "Operation Pay Yourself". In all the areas passed through or occupied while retreating from the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property. Between mid February and mid March, towns and villages throughout the entire Northern Province and, to a limited extent, the north of Moyamba District were attacked. RUF/AFRC forces took anything that could be of use, from livestock and other food items, domestic items such as mattresses and cooking pots and motor vehicles, trucks and motorcycles. Although looting had been standard practice throughout the previous RUF campaigns and "food-finding missions" had been commonplace since 1992, the scale and intensity of "Operation Pay Yourself" was unprecedented in Sierra Leone.

A heightened level of violence against civilians accompanied "Operation Pay Yourself". Shortly after the reinstatement of the exiled Sierra Leonean President on 10 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces

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launched "Operation No Living Thing". During a period running from February to June, in locations across Sierra Leone, but primarily in Kono District, hundreds of civilians were killed, or had limbs amputated and hundreds of women were raped. This operation marked a specific period of military activity during which the scale and intensity of violence against civilians in Sierra Leone was elevated to new and unprecedented levels. Thousands of civilians in Kono District were abducted and brought into the mining areas in the western part of the District to work, many of them dying as a result of the squalid living conditions.

From April to early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces in Kambia, Koinadugu and Bombali Districts expanded the territory over which they had control and consolidated their positions in some areas in Tonkolili District. A striking feature of this period in 1998 was how ineffective CDF forces and other civil militia groups in Bombali and Koinadugu Districts were compared to their high concentration and success in the Southern and Eastern Provinces and, to a lesser extent, in the south and west of Moyamba District. In those areas where ECOMOG cooperated with what groups did exist and CDF forces deployed alongside them, their forces often had success in holding rural outposts, gaining good intelligence and extending their influence throughout smaller settlements in the surrounding bush. There are episodes, however, indicating that ECOMOG was reluctant to leave main fortified positions, or support others in so doing, thereby handing RUF/AFRC forces immeasurable advantages.

In Koinadugu District, RUF/AFRC forces gradually expanded their activity around the two main roads arcing in towards Kabala from the south of the District, while at the same time moving fluidly through bush areas bypassing ECOMOG positions and continuing their operations without needing recourse to main roads and tracks. A strong ECOMOG and SLA presence in Kabala guaranteed that the RUF/AFRC never captured Kabala for more than five days in late July 1998, despite many attacks during the course of 1998. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC placed all other major towns in the District under constant pressure, offering RUF/AFRC forces easy access to the area surrounding Kabala Town and influence over the arterial roads leading to it. ECOMOG forces were prevented from moving south, pre-empting any attempt to reinforce or counter-attack from Kabala.

In Bombali District, the RUF/AFRC adopted a similar strategy. They expanded their territorial hold and continued the occupation of towns to east of Makeni Town, thereby controlling the major east-west axis roads through the District. Throughout November, RUF/AFRC advanced closer to Makeni Town. Additionally, they secured control over a main latitudinal road, which gave the RUF/AFRC free access to the eastern boundary of Port Loko District.

In Port Loko District, RUF/AFRC forces intensified activity to the north of Port Loko Town between May and November 1998, with the formation of large looting squads and the gradual encroachment on Port Loko Town. ECOMOG forces based in the town were reinforced by CDF from numerous locations. CDF forces proved effective in Port Loko District, creating with ECOMOG a defensive arc around the north of Port Loko Town that prevented RUF/AFRC forces infiltrating southwards from Kambia District. During this period, RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages in the south of the District. As for Tonkolili District, CDF continued engaging the RUF/AFRC forces concentrated in the north-west of the District. A massive IDP camp hosting

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thousands of civilians fleeing fighting in Kono District was opened in Masingbi in the west of the District.

In mid April, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 10-strong team of military and security observers to Sierra Leone, who arrived in May 1998. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), comprising around 70 military observers and accompanying logistic support, was established on 13 July 1998.

In October 1998, a splinter group of the RUF/AFRC comprised primarily of ex-SLA members commenced operations in the Okra Hills area in the south of Port Loko District. The "West Side Boys", as they later became known, staged "hit and run" attacks on a large number of villages in the area that would continue until April 1999, with a lull in January and February when the West Side Boys were in Freetown. During this period, the West Side Boys systematically killed civilians, stole property and burnt houses. In addition, they ambushed civilian and military traffic on the main highway to Masiaka, often making the road impassable.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG forces in Masiaka (Port Loko District), and Kamalo, in the north of Bombali District in November 1998. These preparations would put the logs beneath the stones of a large-scale RUF/AFRC action in December. Kono Town was overrun by RUF/AFRC forces on 20 December 1998, beginning a chain of attacks across the Northern Province that culminated in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. These would be accompanied by massive violence systematically inflicted on the civilian population in all areas in which the RUF/AFRC had a presence. While retreating south from Koidu, ECOMOG left with thousands of civilians, hundreds of whom were abducted by the RUF/AFRC during ambushes on convoys.

On 21 December, RUF/AFRC forces from Port Loko District attacked Songo and Mile 38 and moved into Waterloo – the gateway to Freetown – by 22 December. This foothold was reinforced over the following days, as RUF/AFRC forces began moving from Kono District on 21 December. RUF/AFRC forces advanced from Koidu towards Magburaka and Makeni, taking control of both towns by 24 December. The attack from Magburaka was coordinated with attacks on Makeni from RUF/AFRC positions immediately north-east of the town. ECOMOG was forced to retreat north to Kamakwie, which by 28 December would also be in RUF/AFRC hands.

RUF/AFRC forces continued the westwards movement from Makeni directly to Port Loko Town, where they were supplemented by RUF/AFRC forces already in Port Loko District and prepared for the assault. From 28 December 1998 until 3 January 1999, they launched a sustained attack from three directions on ECOMOG forces stationed in Port Loko Town. Meanwhile, on 30 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces in Kailahun District moved from their headquarters in Buedu and successfully forced SLA and ECOMOG units out of the town of Segbwema. This move was undertaken to pre-empt any possible counter-attack on Freetown from SLA and ECOMOG forces based at the Moa Barracks in Daru. In mid January, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mile 91, blocking the highway leading to Freetown and pre-empting any ECOMOG counter-attack.

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After staging a number of preliminary attacks on towns west of Waterloo in the Western Area, RUF/AFRC forces advanced on Freetown. On 6 January, RUF/AFRC entered the eastern end of Freetown and advanced into the centre. On the first day, RUF/AFRC forces released 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison. During their advance in the capital, hundreds of civilians were killed, mutilated or raped in the eastern end of Freetown. At night, in the Freetown suburbs held by the RUF/AFRC, civilians were forced to gather in the streets and sing songs about peace in support of the RUF/AFRC. Others were burned alive in their homes. Behind ECOMOG lines, civilians were gathered in the National Stadium and screened; a number were lined up against the walls and shot dead by ECOMOG forces. The westward movement of RUF/AFRC forces into Freetown was halted by ECOMOG at the Congo Cross Road Bridge on Freetown's Main Motor Road, held by ECOMOG, SLA and CDF forces. By 9 January, unable to advance further into the Freetown urban area and under constant attack from ECOMOG Alpha Jets, the RUF/AFRC were forced to retreat gradually from Freetown back towards Waterloo.

In the following days, ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC out of the Greater Freetown Area. During the retreat, RUF/AFRC destroyed much of the State infrastructure in the centre of town, killed and mutilated civilians and burnt down many houses. RUF/AFRC forces held firm in Waterloo until late February and remained in control of Masiaka and Mile 91. The towns of Lunsar and Magburaka, however, remained under firm RUF/AFRC control for much longer.

Following the assault on Freetown, the RUF/AFRC clearly concentrated their actions on mining activities, strengthening their positions in the Northern Province and planning actions to take place on Guinean territory. At this time, the RUF/AFRC commenced a large defensive operation, at the heart of which was their continuing occupation of Makeni and Kono District. The RUF/AFRC defensive headquarters was also moved to Makeni at that time. Between February and July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces consolidated their positions as of December 1998 and expanded their control over Kambia District. The RUF/AFRC's strength throughout the Northern Province guaranteed a strong hand during the peace negotiations that started in the aftermath of the Freetown invasion.

Across the Northern Province and Kono District, RUF/AFRC forces devised methods of rationalising the use of civilians by making them participate in their own administration. Throughout Koinadugu, Bombali and Kambia Districts, RUF/AFRC commanders selected individuals to form committees of "G-5" civil-military intermediaries, communicating RUF/AFRC demands for food and human resources to local communities. The G-5 committees administered the collection of house and trade taxes, food and other financial contributions from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. In western Tonkolili District, civilians were required to register with the RUF/AFRC military police. Unregistered civilians were deemed "CDF collaborators" and were flogged, fined or killed. However, G-5 committees proved to be inadequate in providing enough subsistence resources for the combined RUF/AFRC forces, and "food-finding missions" again proliferated through the Northern Province. In a cynical irony, the same commanders that supported the G-5 system by ordering their subordinates to cease looting and theft also ordered the commission of food-finding missions, again increasing the levels of violence inflicted on civilians. Facing shortages, RUF/AFRC forces raided trade fairs in Guinean towns just over the border from Kambia District, prompting the Guinean armed forces to bombard suspected RUF/AFRC positions in the District.

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In late January 1999, SLA forces deployed in Bumbuna, a town in the north of Tonkolili District. This brought a limited amount of relief to the civilian population who quickly converged on the town. The area surrounding Bumbuna remained under RUF/AFRC control, although Kamajors from the south of the District continually attacked this concentration of RUF/AFRC forces. This fighting led to the substantial destruction of much of the central chiefdoms of Tonkolili District.

CDF forces strengthened their deployment in Port Loko District, where they established a recruitment and training centre, and the south of Tonkolili District. CDF forces directed excesses of violence at civilians as a means of encouraging the creation of more Gbethi Societies in the District, as people frequently joined in order to avoid harassment by the CDF. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Port Loko Town in May 1999. In April 1999, CDF, SLA and ECOMOG forces retook control of Mile 91, which rapidly saw the influx of thousands of civilians from the areas around Makeni and Magburaka.

In the north of Kenema District, the RUF/AFRC retook control of Tongo Field, the most important diamond mining area in the District. CDF forces continually attacked RUF positions in Tongo Field, but did not disrupt mining operations. South-east of Tongo Field, RUF/AFRC forces maintained a hold over Segbwema (Kailahun District), denying the CDF, ECOMOG and the SLA the opportunity of moving north into Kono District from Moa Barracks. The RUF/AFRC diamond mining office was established in Koakuima, to the immediate south of Koidu. All diamonds mined by RUF/AFRC operations were trafficked through Koakuima onto their final destinations. Throughout 1999, hundreds of civilians from Kono District who had not fled into neighbouring Guinea were abducted to work in the mining areas of the District. RUF/AFRC forces continued to inflict physical violence on civilians, although on a lower scale than in 1998. Throughout RUF/AFRC-occupied areas of Sierra Leone, civilians were forcibly transported into Kono District to work in the mines.

In Koinadugu District, RUF/AFRC intensified gold mining operations in Diang Chiefdom, at the same time putting pressure on the SLA Brigade stationed at the strategic hydroelectric plant in nearby Bumbuna (Tonkolili District). RUF/AFRC forces had unimpeded access along all main roads in Koinadugu District, surrounding Kabala Town completely. RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters were established in Kayima, in Kono District and in Gberifeh (Koinadugu District) splitting between them responsibility for administering the expansive Neini Chiefdom.

The RUF/AFRC divided Bombali District into two, establishing headquarters in Makeni for the south and Kamakwie for the north. The intermediate territory remained under complete RUF/AFRC control. The RUF/AFRC began conscripting large numbers of able-bodied men in Bombali and Tonkolili Districts, in part due to CDF attacks on Magburaka Town. The RUF/AFRC increased their control over the northern chiefdoms of Bombali District, crossing the Little Scarcies River and establishing stronger supply lines by land through to Kambia Town, which was occupied completely in February 1999. The RUF/AFRC's increasing hold over Kambia District was sealed with the establishment of additional RUF/AFRC bases and a brigade headquarter in the District. The RUF/AFRC also occupied many of the wharf towns on the Great Scarcies River, thereby



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On 11 November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town of Musaia (Follosaba Dembelia Chiefdom) and occupied the town for the day. An unknown number of civilians were beaten with iron bars, sticks and belts. An unknown number of civilians were tied up and left in the sun.

Early on 28 November, SLA forces retreated from Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) through Yiffin, to Alikalia. Their commander reported to the ECOMOG commander that his unit had been ordered to move to Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) to defend the hydroelectric plant from attack.

On 8 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Alikalia, meeting resistance from ECOMOG and local CDF. The engagement continued throughout the night. Around midday on 9 December 1998, the ECOMOG Commander ordered ECOMOG to retreat, because they had expended all their ammunition, so they retreated towards Makeni. The ECOMOG Commander further informed the CDF that this was a "brigade attack", so CDF forces retreated into the surrounding bush. RUF/AFRC forces burned down over 200 houses and discovered a large amount of ammunition buried beneath the former ECOMOG headquarters.

Following the RUF/AFRC capture of Alikalia, Neini chiefdom was divided into two operational regions by RUF/AFRC. The towns of Alikalia and Firawa came under the control of the RUF/AFRC Brigade Headquarters at Gberfeh (Mongo to Sebeneh Chiefdoms). The towns of Banda Karafaia, Yiffin, Sumbaria and Drutor came under the control of the Brigade Headquarters at Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District). Committees of civilian intermediaries were appointed in all these towns, their role being to ensure the provision of foodstuff, manpower and other material needs of RUF/AFRC forces. These intermediaries were known collectively as "G-5" and were expected to cooperate fully with both resident RUF/AFRC units and new units entering and leaving town. In Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom), for example, the G5 were ordered to provide to the RUF/AFRC Kayima Brigade the sum of 800 cups of rice each month, in addition to 20 cups each day for the Commander. In Alikalia, G5 were to provide 900 cups of rice and 600 cups of beans to RUF/AFRC Brigade Headquarters at Gberfeh.

The capture of all the major towns in Diang, Neini and Neya chiefdoms refocused RUF/AFRC strategy away from bush fighting and raiding, towards occupation and consolidation of control. Patrols were sent into the bush to encourage civilians to return to the towns.

b) Events in 1999

The RUF commander in Yiffin held a meeting informing the population that the RUF/AFRC had taken over the government and that President Kabbah had fled to Guinea. In February 1999, he ordered "G5" to gather the people from the bushes and these civilians were forced to work in a government farm for them. During this month of time civilians were subject to violence, tortures and forced labour, women were taken from them and raped, all huts burnt down. Another unit of RUF/AFRC was active in the Mambolo chiefdom and attacked towns and villages among which



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Madina, Dugbongbon, Kakarima and Fadugu. Around 10 January RUF/AFRC forces raided Kabala and went back to Fadugu.⁴⁵⁷

On 12 January a group of RUF/AFRC forces reinforced Kumba Wullen Balia (Neya Chiefdom) from Kono District. The leaders of those forces were saying that they wanted to join the fighters at Makeni to launch an attack on Guinea, but ECOMOG and SLA were based in Kabala, blocking the most convenient route Guinea.

Around 15 and 20 January 1999, a very large RUF/AFRC force comprised of different units led by different commanders on their way to Freetown stopped in Fadugu, Mambolo chiefdom causing the population to retreat to the surrounding bush.⁴⁵⁸

On 28 January in Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom) there was a battle between SLA forces and ECOMOG against RUF/AFRC forces.⁴⁵⁹

In February 1999, AFRC forces attacked Tomania (Sengbe Chiefdom) and then they skirted northwards on the main road avoiding Kabala, via Serekolia (Mongu Chiefdom), Gbenikoro (Sengbe Chiefdom), Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom), towards Makeni town. During this expedition, they were ambushed by CDF forces. In Tomania, they captured all the women and took them to a flat rock behind the town where they were sexually abused. They also abducted men and women to carry their looted foodstuff to Serekolia.⁴⁶⁰

Another RUF/AFRC unit was active in Wara Wara Bafodia chiefdom, where attacks were made on Magbgbe, Bafodia and Kakonsio. In Bafodia town, the RUF commanders gathered the population and divided it into three groups. One group remained in Bafodia, the second was deported to another village, possibly Katawuyia, and the third to Kakoyia. After five days the RUF forces left for Kamawie.⁴⁶¹

From 15 to 20 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces passing through Fadugu (Mambolo) on the way to Freetown, arrested civilians, captured them and killed some of them. Seventy houses were burnt down and women, both young and old, were sexual abused.⁴⁶²

On 16 February 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces attacked Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), where they spent the day. During the attack, the RUF/AFRC forces amputated the limbs of four civilians, including children under five years of age, and they raped five women. Two of the amputees died. They also took property and abducted five people to carry the loads.

⁴⁵⁷ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁵⁸ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁵⁹ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁰ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶¹ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶² More detail is required on these incidents.



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Between March and April 1999, a battle went on in Gbenekoro and Fogo, (Diang Chiefdom) between RUF forces and CDF forces. Towards mid-April, in Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces entered the town and introduced themselves as “SLA loyal forces” to the residents. After extorting money from them for three days, some of the RUF/AFRC forces left Katawuyia (Diang Chiefdom).⁴⁶³

In Mambolo chiefdom, on 16 March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces were present in the villages of Kamandai and Kamajmbo.⁴⁶⁴

On 28 April 1999, a high-command meeting was held in Firawa (Neini Chiefdom) to organise the RUF convention. A number of important commanders were present at the meeting, during which time property was taken from people in the town, who were also forced to undertake tasks for the RUF.⁴⁶⁵

At the beginning of May in Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom), the RUF commander was replaced, after which the forces executed a looting operation known as “JAJA”.⁴⁶⁶ The joined RUF/AFRC forces made preparations for an attack on Kabala. They attacked the town from different direction in Mambolo Chiefdom from the southwest and from the northwest through Yagala, but were repelled by SLA forces.

On 18 July 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the gold-rich mining area of Binkokoh (Diang Chiefdom). In Foraya, the RUF forces killed 3 people, looted the whole village, demanded gold and abducted some young boys and girls to carry the stolen property.⁴⁶⁷ On 3 August, the RUF/AFRC forces moved from Binkokoh to attack Barakan and Dalakuru (Diang Chiefdom), which are also gold-mining areas. While in Dalakuru, the RUF/AFRC forces raped a woman.

In September 1999 the CDF attacked the RUF/AFRC position in Dondoya (Diang Chiefdom). In the southern Neya chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the towns of Dalawullay-feh, Bendu III and Yarawadu.

On 3 September RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kafogo and Fadugu, (Mambolo), where they, given their great number, overwhelmed the ECOMOG, CDF, SSD and SLA checkpoints and entered Fadugu carrying sophisticated weapons like RPG, AK47, AK58, G3 and AA guns. In Fadugu, the RUF forces burnt 80 houses, took all the property they could find, abducted some girls and boys to use them as forced labour and killed some people.

On 17 September 1999 in Diang chiefdom there were several attacks by RUF/AFRC forces, based in Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). The RUF forces attacked Kombonkalia and Nyawulunya (both in

⁴⁶³ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁴ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁵ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁶ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁶⁷ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.



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Diang Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces were resisted by an organised group of youth⁴⁶⁸ in Nyawulenai (Diang chiefdom), therefore the town was totally burnt down while Kombonkalia (Diang Chiefdom) was spared because did not put up any resistance. The same day the CDF, based in Faraya, attacked RUF/AFRC positions in Dondonya (Diang Chiefdom).

In October 1999, CDF-Kamajors coming from Kono district attacked Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom), an important RUF/AFRC base. The CDF took property and burnt down the town, but the RUF commander was not captured. Consequently, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the nearby town of Henekuma (Diang Chiefdom), where 27 civilians were killed, property was taken and the town was described as being completely destroyed.

On 16 and 19 October 1999, RUF/AFRC forces planned an attack on Kabala. They entered Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom) and looted all the surrounding villages in Mambolo chiefdom. Following this, they moved on to Kabala, but failed to occupy the town. The group was reorganized in Fadugu and moved towards Freetown. In the following days many locations in the chiefdom were looted by RUF/AFRC forces.⁴⁶⁹

In November 1999, in Bafodia (Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces engaged SLA forces. The RUF/AFRC forces were driven from the town and SLA forces subsequently left for Kabala. On 3 November 1999, one senior AFRC commander, coming through Folosaba Dembeia Chiefdom via Musaia compound, attacked Kamasigie and then continued towards Kamakwie. In Neini chiefdom people were abducted and taken to mines in the Kono district.⁴⁷⁰

In December 1999 news arrived that an important RUF commander had been captured in Koidu town, Kono district. On 22 December, Kenyans troops from UNAMSIL (KENBATT) in transit from Makeni to Kabala were attacked by RUF forces in Fadugu, but nevertheless managed to reach Kabala.

i) Events in 2000⁴⁷¹

During 2000, the RUF/AFRC forces attempted to take control Kabala many times, but SLA and ECOMOG forces stationed in the town managed to hold it under their control. At the beginning of 2000, the SLA forces were also based in Makakura (Mambolo Chiefdom).

Deportation of civilians by RUF forces to the mining areas continued. For example, in January, RUF forces gathered the citizens of Kurubonla and Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) to find people to be taken to work in Kono mines. Following this, they sent some civilians they had located to Kono district.

In February the UNAMSIL KENBATT coming from Makeni to Kabala were attacked by RUF/AFRC in Fadugu. The Kenyan troops were again able to reach Kabala.

⁴⁶⁸ More information is required from the records on this group, including who they were organised by and how old they were.

⁴⁶⁹ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁷⁰ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁷¹ In general, more detail is required from the records on events that occurred in 2000.



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On 16 February 2000, the RUF forces withdrew from Alikalia moving around the northern circuit road, avoiding Kabala, to Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) and then Senkunia (Mongo Chiefdom). In Falaba and Senkunia, RUF forces conducted food-finding missions, during which property was taken and civilians were abducted. In Firawa (Diang Chiefdom) RUF forces gathered 400 civilians to carrying items the RUF forces had stolen to Kono district.

On 10 March 2000, knowing that RUF/AFRC forces would be holding a meeting in Kurubonia (Neya Chiefdom), a Guinean helicopter gunship attacked the town. On 24 March, medical personnel from an unknown organisation visited Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) to carry out a program of immunisation but the RUF/AFRC Commander refused them entry and seized their vaccination kits. In April 2000, RUF forces moved to Ganya and Sinkunia (Mongo) from Alikalia, the headquarter town of RUF/AFRC.

In May 2000, RUF forces were redeployed throughout Mongo chiefdom. They passed through Gbenikoro (Diang Chiefdom), Korifaia (Neini Chiefdom) and Morofindu before establishing bases in Gbenikoro, Gberefeh (Senebeh or Mongo Chiefdom) and Serekoro (Mongo Chiefdom). In Yalunka, there was an engagement between RUF and CDF forces. Also in Feraya (Neini Chiefdom) RUF forces gathered civilians together for a meeting, following which many people fled to Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom).

In June 2000, CDF attacked Kanikoro (Diang Chiefdom), where they took civilian property.

Also in June 2000, RUF forces attacked several towns in Neya chiefdom, including Porpon, where they killed 25 people and burnt down 70 houses, taking property such as rice, corn, groundnut, guns, which were later transported to Yiraia. The RUF forces then attacked Tenkeya, killing four people, burning 15 houses and taking property. This unit also attacked Maraliya, killing two people, burning down 12 houses and taking all the property in the town. They then attacked Yarandor, Kekowafeh, Bondofeh, Bunbania and Terero II, in all of which houses were burnt down and all the property was taken away. Many villages in Sandoh chiefdom were burnt down like Farandala, Dunamaro, Waldu, Kayima and Teleya.⁴⁷²

In July CDF-Kamajors attacked the RUF/AFRC base at Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) and Sumbaraya. The RUF commander managed to escape capture, but the Kamajors killed his mother, sister and nephew. The body of the RUF commander's mother was left hung on a stick above the road entering in the town. The town was completely burnt down, all fruit-trees were cut down and also the old zinc from the houses were punctured with nails to prevent their use as roofing. All the stolen property gathered from other villages were taken away by the Kamajors.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷² It is possible that these events took place in 1998. Further clarification is required from the records on when these events took place.

⁴⁷³ Clarification is required from the records on who took the property initially, the RUF or the CDF, and what happened to it after the CDF took it away.



N O P E A C E W I T H O U T J U S T I C E

In Firawa (Nieni Chiefdom) RUF/AFRC forces captured about 400 young civilian men to be taken to Kono district for mining.

In August 2000, RUF/AFRC forces left Alikalia to surrender either to UNAMSIL or to ECOMOG troops in Kabala.⁴⁷⁴ On 14 August a group of RUF/AFRC forces from Kono and Kailahum district passed through Alikalia on their way to attack Kabala. The town of Kabala was attacked on 17 August 2000, where they fought a battle against the SLA and CDF based in the town.

During this month, RUF forces regularly tried to attack Kabala, but were repelled by SLA forces. After the attack on Kabala, at the end of the month, RUF forces stormed Wara Wara Bafodia chiefdom attacking towns and villages such as Kapongo, Kassaye and Gbentu.

On 26 September 2000 Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkuria Chiefdom) and Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) were attacked by CDF, who beat people and took most of people's belongings.⁴⁷⁵ In retaliation for these attacks, on 3 October 2000, RUF forces mobilized their troops and launched an attack on Falaba and Sinkunia and took over the towns and burnt them down and left, abducting 50 civilians including women and children.

In October 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Fadugu town (Mambolo Chiefdom), where a fight without casualties took place. Two days later, another group reached them.

On 12 October, an unknown group of civilians with guns entered Musaia, (Follosaba Dembelia). They held a meeting with villagers who appreciated their intention to fight against government soldiers. At night, they started to fight and a battle took place. One house was burnt, people abducted and torture, and women and children were raped and property was taken.⁴⁷⁶

In November 2000, the RUF/AFRC forces were based in Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). They launched several attacks on towns such as Kalkoia, Koinodug, Dankwalie and Falaba. In the same month, RUF forces moved from Badala and Alikalia to Falaba and Firawa. During December 2000, there was a fight among some of the AFRC and RUF forces. The group of RUF forces moved from Alikalia (Diang) to Yiffin, (Neini). In December in Firawa, operations geared for the ceasefire commenced.

j) Events in 2001⁴⁷⁷

During 2001, military activities started to decrease. Probably without a specific plan to seize power, the RUF forces tried to hold a fairly strong grip on the provinces to achieve a good bargaining power in eventual peace negotiations. The RUF groups went around in the district looting livestock

⁴⁷⁴ More information is required from the records about the surrender, including how it came about and to whom they surrendered.

⁴⁷⁵ It is not clear from the records whether the people being beaten were RUF or civilians. Clarification is required from the records on this.

⁴⁷⁶ More detail is required from the records on this incident, in particular on who the "civilians with guns" were (or were likely to be) and who did the raping, beating and burning.

⁴⁷⁷ In general, more detail is required from the records on events that occurred in 2001.



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and foodstuffs. In 2001, the disarmament process commenced under the supervision of UNAMSIL forces and despite a few sporadic incidents of fighting, mostly between the CDF and the RUF, fighting ceased.

Early in January 2001, RUF forces retreated from Alikalia moved to Kono district. However, they returned on 10 January 2001 from Kono to Firawa (Nieni Chiefdom) via Falaba (Serulia Chiefdom) and Gbindi. On their way they engaged in a battle against CDF. On 14 January, UNAMSIL troops visited the town of Alikalia and gathered the RUF leaders, taking them to Kabala for disarmament. On 26 March 2001, CDF-Kamajors arrived in Alikalia. On 4 July 2001 a group arrived in Alikalia, declared themselves RUF fighters and requested food from the civilians. The next morning they left to Gberefeh (Senebeh, or Mongo Chiefdom). This group, together with another based in Gberefeh attacked CDF positions in Sereya (Mongo Chiefdom). In Sereya they found a list of people registered with the Kamajors and they killed, wounded or amputated them all. Then they moved back to Gberefeh, where a MP loyal to Foday Sankoh ordered them to disarm. Guns were packed and taken to Alikalia. There, the RUF forces faced a serious attack from the Kamajors and were defeated, all properties taken away from them. They, then, left and went to Kabala where they pleaded to be reintegrated into civil society. On 16 August 2001 UNAMSIL troops arrived in Alikalia to overview the disarmament.

In February 2001, the RUF/AFRC forces based in Gberefeh (Senebeh or Mongo Chiefdom) organized a farewell party, packed all the property they had taken throughout the conflict and left to Alikalia to be finally demobilized and reintegrated into society. The trip took five days and when they arrived in Alikalia, CDF-Kamajors and UN troops entered the town forcing the RUF forces to disarm. This episode caused them to flee the town leaving behind all that they had looted from civilians since the beginning of the war in 1991.

In March 2001, RUF/AFRC forces came from Kono district to Nieni chiefdom in search of food and they looted every house, then the RUF forces conveyed the looted properties to Kayima (Kono District). A similar incident took place in May 2001 in Firawa (Nieni Chiefdom), with RUF forces coming from Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkuria Chiefdom).

RUF/AFRC forces returned to Sinkunia on 15 June 2001, while another group, on the same day, went to Alikalia and held a meeting with G5 and the village chiefs announcing the end of the war and the beginning of disarmament and asking for people's political support to the RUF, soon to be transformed into a political party.

On 24 August 2001 RUF/AFRC went from Falaba, Sulima chiefdom to Kabala to submit to disarmament. This was the last group of RUF/AFRC forces to disarm in the District.

In November, CDF from the whole district went to Alikalia for disarmament. In December 2001, Kamajors led by Mohamed Mansaray fought a battle against RUF forces, shortly after UNAMSIL troops arrived, prompting disarmament.

This was the final episode of the decade long war in Koinadugu District.

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3. Conclusion

[to be drafted pending incorporation of comments from resource persons]

d. Port Loko District

1. Introduction

Port Loko District is located in the north-west of Sierra Leone. It is bordered by the Western Area, Moyamba District and Tonkolili District to the south, Bombali District to the east and Kambia District to the north. To the west lies the Atlantic Ocean.

There are 11 chiefdoms in Port Loko District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Bureh Kasseh Makonte (BKM)	Mange
Buya Romende	Foredugu
Dibia	Gbinti
Loko Massama	Petifu
Kaffu Bullom	Mahera
Koya	Songo
Maforki	Port Loko
Marampa	Lunsar
Masimera	Masimera
Sanda Magbolontor	Sendugu
Tinkatupa Makama Safroko (TMS)	Malekuray

A high quality, asphalted highway runs from the Western Area to Songo and Mile 38, passing through the densely forested Okra Hills area to Masiaka (all Koya Chiefdom). At Masiaka, the highway splits into two and the quality of the road declines sharply into intermittent stretches of soil track, unsealed road and broken asphalt. Seen from another perspective, all main routes from inland Sierra Leone converge on Masiaka, making it difficult to overstate the town's strategic significance. The road continuing east from Masiaka leads through Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) to Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and on to both Kabala and Kono Districts. The major routes to the Eastern and Southern Provinces converge on the Masiaka–Mile 91 length of road. The northern fork runs across the Rokel Creek to Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), from where both the District headquarter town of Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom) and Lunsar Town (Marampa Chiefdom) can be reached.

The Masiaka–Ro-Gberray–Port Loko axis continues north through BKM Chiefdom across the long road bridge over the Little Scaries River at Mange, continuing into Kambia District and the Republic of Guinea. This is the only major road crossing over the Little Scaries River and handles the majority of road traffic between Conakry and Freetown, making it a considerable strategic and economic asset to whoever controls it. Moving west from Port Loko Town, the highway continues directly to Lungi, the coastal location of Freetown International Airport. Although there is an airstrip at

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Hastings (Waterloo RD, Western Area), Freetown International Airport is the principal airport in Sierra Leone. From Freetown to Lungi is approximately four hours by road; across the Freetown Estuary, the helicopter ride is less than 10 minutes. The Masiaka–Ro-Gberray–Lunsar axis continues through Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) towards Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), the political and administrative centre of the Northern Province.

A secondary road network connects the chiefdom headquarter towns of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom), Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) and Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). It is joined in Dibia and Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdoms by roads leading into Sanda Tendaren and Libeisaygahun Chiefdoms (both Bombali District), which bypass Makeni and re-join the arterial route to Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

Port Loko District was not affected directly by the conflict before 1995. In January 1995, RUF activity was focused in the four eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, bordering Bombali and Tonkolili Districts. RUF activity in early January concentrated on pressuring the two towns of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom), both on the arterial route between Freetown and Makeni. SLA forces were driven from Foredugu and Lunsar was under pressure for the whole of 1995. RUF activity in these areas followed from the extension of RUF forces into the western chiefdoms of Tonkolili District in late 1994. This was marked by a large attack on Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) in late December 1994 and RUF dominance of Malal Mara Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), in which the RUF established a brigade headquarters in the Kaitkant Hills. From here, RUF forces staged attacks on towns in both the north, moving into Kambia District, and the south of Port Loko District, facilitating their movement into the Western Area by May 1995. In June, RUF forces staged a large-scale assault on the District headquarter of Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). RUF forces also attacked Mile 38 and Masiaka (both Koya Chiefdom) in June, in addition to staging ambushes on the main roads. The triangle formed by Lunsar, Port Loko and Masiaka has been the crucible of the conflict in Port Loko District.

Following this, RUF activity in the District diminished significantly, with only a few ambushes and small attacks reported from July through to the end of the year. RUF attacks routinely included killings, torture and the abduction of large numbers of civilians to use as forced labour. Additionally, RUF forces routinely stole civilian property and burned civilian residences to the ground. In 1996, RUF forces continued to attack Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and staged ambushes on the highway north of the town. Generally, however, 1996 was a quiet year in Port Loko District. Elections were held in February, marking the end of four years of military rule and a peace agreement was struck between the elected government and the RUF in Abidjan in November 1996. At least until May 1997, the ceasefire provided for in the Abidjan Peace Accord appears to have been generally observed in Port Loko District. In May 1997, the AFRC – who were soon joined by the RUF – overthrew the elected government and found itself in a tense standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in country. Following armed confrontations with the AFRC that resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths, Nigerian forces took over the international airport at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom), occupying Lungi and surrounding villages. Combined RUF/AFRC forces launched an operation to steal large amounts of civilian property in Masimera Chiefdom, calling it “From your hand to my hand; from your pocket to my pocket.” RUF forces also attacked CDF positions at Mange and

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Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) and established a camp at Bainkoro, near the Little Scaries River between Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms. The Little Scaries River, bisecting Sanda Magbolontor and BKM Chiefdoms, took on increasing significance at this time; running inland, it passes through the north of Bombali District.

ECOMOG was formally deployed in Sierra Leone in August 1997 and began training civil militia groups in Port Loko District in cooperation with traditional authorities. ECOMOG deployed in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and assisted the CDF in securing BKM Chiefdom. CDF forces deployed along the northern route to Mange and the route from Port Loko, through Kagbantama, to Barmoi Junction. The CDF also deployed along the south bank of the Little Scaries River in BKM Chiefdom, creating a defensive arc around the north of Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom).

In February 1998, ECOMOG intervened militarily against the RUF/AFRC, driving them out of Freetown. As a result, RUF/AFRC forces commenced "Operation Pay Yourself" in Port Loko District, stealing extensively from civilian settlements along their line of retreat through Mile 38, Masiaka (both Koya Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) towards Makeni. RUF/AFRC forces also attacked towns in the northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District. In March 1998, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations, moving from Port Loko Town, taking control of Masiaka and forcing the RUF/AFRC out of Lunsar, where they had killed civilians and destroyed much of the infrastructure. RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout the eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, raiding villages for food. In April, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masimera Chiefdom and commenced the amputation of limbs from civilians amid attacks of astounding ferocity. In September, the RUF/AFRC again began surrounding Port Loko Town, staging attacks in BKM, TMS and Maforki Chiefdoms. Assisted by the CDF, ECOMOG held onto the stretch of road between Port Loko and Mange (BKM Chiefdom).

In December 1998, RUF/AFRC intensified attacks on ECOMOG and pushed south into Koya Chiefdom, again attacking Masiaka and Songo. A large RUF/AFRC force attacked Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) between 28 December 1998 and 3 January 1999. By the time Port Loko was attacked, the RUF/AFRC had broken out of Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) and Kailahun Districts and had taken every major town from ECOMOG en route to Freetown along the northern axis roads. The RUF/AFRC push towards the Western Area was along the main highway through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), Masiaka and Songo to Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). For the first three months of 1999, the Masiaka area was occupied by RUF/AFRC forces and was under constant attack from the CDF. In March, Gbethis hunted down suspected "collaborators", torturing and summarily executing significant numbers of the people they caught. Those villages that did not actively support the Gbethis were targeted and looted, their inhabitants subjected to torture or simply killed. Lunsar remained under the control of the RUF/AFRC.

Peace negotiations between the RUF and the elected government resulted in the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Subsequently, there were tensions between the RUF and the AFRC, resulting in clashes between the two, but not a complete severing of their alliance.

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In early January 2000, UNAMSIL moved into positions throughout Port Loko District. A single Nigerian battalion was based at Freetown International Airport at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and a second covered Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), securing both the towns and the main highways. RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages throughout the eastern and northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, stealing food and property. In May 2000, the RUF/AFRC provoked a crisis by holding hostage over 200 UNAMSIL personnel at Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom). They also provoked the UK to send paratroops to Freetown and commence training the SLA. The SLA secured Masiaka in April 2000, but the RUF repeatedly attacked Port Loko Town from many different approaches. The RUF/AFRC also remained in control of Lunsar, despite SLA attempts to recover the town in June 2000. Attacks on civilian settlements across Port Loko District continued, although UNAMSIL maintained a "horseshoe" of security between Songo, Masiaka, Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom) and Port Loko Town.

An RUF/AFRC splinter group formed in October 1998 in the Okra Hills, an area spanning the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom, crossing southwards over the Rokel Creek into Koya Chiefdom towards the township of Magbeni and onto the stretch of highway between Mile 38 and Masiaka (all Koya Chiefdom). The West Side Boys, as they later became known, were formed primarily of ex-SLA forces that had aligned with the AFRC coup. They conducted an intense series of "hit and run" missions on settlements in this area, routinely killing and raping civilians and stealing civilian property and food. They abducted hundreds of civilians, inscribing "West Side Boys" on their bodies and executing them in retaliation for battlefield losses. On the highways within the Okra Hills area, they ambushed civilian and military traffic. At various points, the West Side Boys changed sides, allying with the RUF/AFRC during the 1999 Freetown invasion and then with the SLA in defending Masiaka from the RUF/AFRC in May 2000. The West Side Boys earned international notoriety for taking foreigners hostage, a tactic that resulted in their complete defeat by UK paratroops in September 2000.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1995

RUF activity in Port Loko District in 1995 began in early January in Buya Romende Chiefdom. Between 1 and 5 January 1995, RUF forces moved from their base in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District on the boundary with Marampa Chiefdom to the south of Buya Romende Chiefdom) and attacked the villages of Mabettor and Royana, where they burnt down an unknown number of houses.

RUF forces numbering around 500 attacked the headquarter town of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) early in the morning of 2 January 1995. Foredugu is located on the main highway leading east to Makeni and south-west to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). Residents fled into the nearby bush on hearing heavy machine gun fire. SLA forces stationed in Foredugu were unable to repel the RUF attack. The surrounding villages of Robis Junction, Romende, Makinkiba, Handalai, Paiteful Junction and Gbomru (all Buya Romende Chiefdom) were also attacked. During these attacks RUF forces burnt down eight houses in Mabettor, five in Royana and 42 in Foredugu. RUF forces also

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killed nine people, mostly with guns, amputated a man's hand with an axe and abducted an unknown number of people.

From then until 5 January 1995, RUF forces moved north from Foredugu and attacked Rogberen Gberen, a settlement in the far north of Buya Romende Chiefdom. Hundreds of civilians were killed during this attack. The RUF forces established a camp at Rogberen Gberen and used abducted civilians to dig trenches. From Rogberen Gberen, RUF forces staged an attack on Mabureh village (Buya Romende Chiefdom), where they decapitated the Section Chief and a prominent businessmen. Before returning to their camp, RUF forces burnt down at least 50 houses and stole a lot of civilian property.

On 15 January 1995, around 45 RUF members moved towards the headquarter town of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, in the north-west on the boundary with Masimera Chiefdom). They came from the south of the chiefdom through the villages of Rokatic and Robom Limba. Before reaching Lunsar, they were repelled by SLA forces stationed in the town.⁴⁷⁸ The RUF exerted continuous pressure on Lunsar, staging numerous attacks on unknown dates between January and July 1995. On 16 February, the NPRC announced that it had commenced heavy bombardment of a medium-sized "rebel base" in the Lunsar area.⁴⁷⁹

The RUF delivered a letter⁴⁸⁰ to the residents of Kantia (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) towards the end of January 1995, announcing their intention to use the road passing through Kantia as a route to attack Kambia, the District headquarter town of Kambia District. The people of the town resolved to attack the RUF forces if they pursued this course of action. Consequently, male members of the Gbangbani traditional society formed a local militia and established a checkpoint on the roads entering the village. A day after delivering the letter, RUF forces attacked Kantia. A local man confronted the RUF as they tried to pass the checkpoint; the RUF members tortured and killed him with his own cutlass. On entering the village, RUF forces sought out the Local Court Chairman at his home and beat him to death with pestles⁴⁸¹ and sticks. The RUF forces remained in Kantia for at least a day before moving south to Kanokie village (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), arriving there in the late evening. At Kanokie, the RUF forces divided and entered the village in two groups, taking palm wine from civilians and shooting dead a 12-year-old boy who was carrying a cutlass. The RUF commanding officer issued an order to the villagers stressing that anyone caught fleeing the village would also be shot. The RUF forces stayed overnight in Kanokie, leaving for Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) before dawn the following morning. RUF forces looped southwest from Kanokie arriving in Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District) on 23 January 1995, before moving north to attack Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) on 25 January 1995.

⁴⁷⁸ This detail is reported by the key person as occurring on 1 January 1994, but cross-checking during analysis makes it clear that this refers to an RUF attack on Lunsar on or around 15 January 1995.

⁴⁷⁹ Xinhua, 16 February 1995.

⁴⁸⁰ There are many reports of the RUF leaving letters on the road for villagers to find.

⁴⁸¹ Club-shaped implements used for fine-pounding wheat and other granular foods in mortars.



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Around 21 January 1995, RUF forces coming from Bombali District passed through Dibia Chiefdom on the way to Safroko Section in the north of TMS Chiefdom. From Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), RUF forces moved through Rogbakai⁴⁸² (six miles south-east of Maron), Rotombo, Maron and Roctolan along the road north towards the headquarter town of Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom). At this time, around 20 members of the SLA were stationed in Gbinti. In Gbinti, between 21 and 23 January 1995, RUF forces killed a number of people, burnt down at least 70 houses with petrol bombs, stole property and abducted civilians, including around 23 school children. After about four hours in Gbinti, during which there was fighting between the SLA and RUF forces, the RUF forces left with the people they had abducted and moved south to Roctolan (TMS Chiefdom).

RUF forces again attacked Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) between 3 and 5 March 1995, killing 12 SLA members in an ambush on the outskirts of the town.⁴⁸² In response to this attack, the Government of Sierra Leone closed sections of the Makeni–Freetown highway to traffic as SLA forces combed the bush for RUF forces.⁴⁸³

Through intense activity in Ribbi, Bumpe and Kaiyanga Chiefdoms (Moyamba District)⁴⁸⁴ immediately south of Port Loko District, the RUF were able to attack the town of Songo (Koya Chiefdom) by 7 April 1995. Songo is located on the boundary between Port Loko District and the Western Area, just south of the main asphalt highway leading to Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) and the ring road around the Freetown peninsular into Freetown itself.

In the morning of 7 April 1995, about 100 RUF members, some in full military fatigues and others in casual dress, launched an attack with artillery and heavy machine gun fire on Songo. The attack came from the west end of the town, near the Roman Catholic Primary School, and was met with no resistance from SLA forces. Despite a build-up of SLA troops in Songo (Koya Chiefdom) in early April, those SLA forces previously stationed in Songo had withdrawn to nearby Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom) before the RUF assault of 7 April.⁴⁸⁵ News that the SLA had captured RUF members in Mabang (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom) had caused the majority of Songo's residents to flee the town, moving west into Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) and south into Ribbi Chiefdom (Moyamba District). Despite this, during their attack on Songo, RUF forces killed 20 people, including an unknown number of women and children. The Songo Police station was also looted and destroyed. On 8 April 1995, SLA forces counter-attacked, pushing RUF

⁴⁸² AP, 6 March 1995.

⁴⁸³ Xinhua, 7 March 1995.

⁴⁸⁴ On 15 March 1995, RUF forces attacked Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District). On 17 March, RUF forces took control of Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and Moyamba (Kaiyamba Chiefdom, Moyamba District). On 18 March, RUF forces clashed with SLA forces for control of the strategic Mabang Bridge over the Ribbi River. On 20 March, SLA forces counter-attacked the RUF at Bradford, but this did not halt the RUF westward movement and their crossing the Ribbi River to access Songo (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

⁴⁸⁵ SLA forces had concentrated in Mile 38 following a successful ouster of the RUF from the town on 28 March 1995.



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forces out of Songo and retaking control of the town. While this RUF group was displaced from Songo, attacks in the agricultural area around Newton (Koya RD, Western Area) intensified.⁴⁸⁶

On 10 May 1995, the RUF forces again attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) from Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom. During this attack, the RUF forces burnt houses and killed civilians, in particular members of the youth movement, as a result of which the youth movement was destroyed. Between 14 and 18 May, RUF forces established a base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District), bordering Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms in Port Loko District.

From the beginning of June 1995, there were rumours of an imminent attack on Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Consequently, many inhabitants left the town, moving to nearby villages and to Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom), the coastal location of Sierra Leone's international airport. On 7 June 1995, some RUF forces crossed the Lunsar-Makeni highway towards Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom), which is approximately 15 km from Port Loko. In Port Loko Town, members of the Civic Development Unit, an organisation primarily formed to clean roads and collect rubbish, started working with the SLA to increase security in the town. An SLA commanding officer responsible for Port Loko called a town meeting in the Court Barrie, where he reassured the population that the town was well protected.

Nevertheless, in the evening of 8 June 1995, the RUF attacked the Port Loko along two lines of advance. The first RUF group arrived from the north-east, moving through Burreh Section (BKM Chiefdom), attacking Port Loko Town in the early evening. The second group, numbering 150, arrived some hours later from the east having travelled the Malekuray road through TMS Chiefdom. Their advance along this route, which begins at Kamasundu Junction, makes it likely that this RUF group had a camp at Rogberen-Gberen or Kamasundu (both Buya Romende Chiefdom), from where attacks on the areas on the North-South axis between Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) had been commonplace since January 1995.

The RUF group moving through TMS Chiefdom attacked a number of villages. In Robenkia (TMS Chiefdom), RUF forces shot dead a young civilian man wearing combat fatigue-style trousers and poured acid on another young man who was caught trying to escape. On 8 June, 30 SLA members in two 4x4 vehicles arrived in Malekuray village (TMS Chiefdom). The SLA commanding officer met with community leaders, requesting that they provide him with early warning when the RUF arrived in the town. During the meeting, residents overheard information passed to the SLA commanding officer by radio informing him that the RUF had already bypassed the town and had arrived in Robat (TMS Chiefdom), to the west of Malekuray. The SLA moved from Malekuray and engaged the RUF near Robat, as a result of which three SLA members were killed and the remaining group were forced to retreat into the bush. The RUF forces then moved west from Robat over the road bridge to Romaka, through the villages of Ropolon, Rotombo, Tawa, Rolal I and II and then into Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) by the late evening.

⁴⁸⁶ See Western Area analysis for 1995.



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During their attack on Port Loko Town, RUF forces killed an unknown number of people, burnt down around 30 houses and abducted up to 200 people, predominantly children. RUF forces ceased their attack in the early hours of 9 May, retreating in two directions when the SLA was reinforced.

One group of RUF retreated to Kamalo (BKM Chiefdom), on the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom, where they established a temporary base, killing a number of people and burning down some houses. Two days later, on 11 June 1995, SLA forces held a meeting in Port Loko with the Town Chief and some senior military officers who had come from Freetown. On 14 June 1995, Guinean forces deployed under the Mano River Union arrived in Port Loko Town. Using heavy artillery, they shelled the RUF base at Kamalo, forcing their withdrawal north towards Romeni (BKM Chiefdom), where the RUF forces put around 16 people abducted in Port Loko Town into a house and set fire to it. The following day, they made a ritual sacrifice and left Romeni northward along the main road. Three days later, on 18 June 1995, the RUF forces attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom). After burning houses and stealing property in Gbinti, RUF forces moved to their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District).

Another group of RUF forces retreated from Port Loko Town towards Rokatimpi (TMS Chiefdom) on 9 June, avoiding the main highways as they moved south towards Moyamba District. On 10 June, they went to Rosent (TMS Chiefdom), close to the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom. They stayed in Rosent for around 12 days, raiding the surrounding villages. From 16 to 20 June, Guinean forces based in Port Loko Town also fired long-range weapons towards Rosent. At the end of this period of heavy bombing, RUF forces moved in two groups from Rosent, dispersing throughout Tinkatupu Section (TMS Chiefdom) to avoid artillery barrages. One group fanned out through Romaka and the other group fanned out around Masangban and Worreh (all TMS Chiefdom). The two groups rejoined in Robat, near Rosent (but closer to the boundary with Maforki Chiefdom), where they abducted an unknown number of men and women. They then moved to Maranka, where they abducted more people before moving to Malekuray by 20 June. Here, RUF forces carried out a house-to-house search, destroying what private property they could find, defecating in houses and ruining food items like rice and palm oil. On the night of 20 June, RUF forces danced and fired into the air before leaving on 21 June, abducting at least six people. They moved south through Marforay and Mafira, resting close to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) before attacking and driving the SLA forces out of the town. On the same day, RUF forces crossed the Rokel River south of Lunsar and continued to Masimera (Marampa Chiefdom). The RUF continued south into Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), before moving to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District) by 23 June.

RUF activity near the junction town of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) continued as their forces retreated from Port Loko. On 16 June 1995, the RUF forces again attacked Masiaka and were repelled by the SLA forces stationed there. This pattern was repeated on 18 June 1995 and again at other times during 1995.

Between 10 and 16 June 1995, RUF forces coming from the north-eastern part of Masiaka went to Mansumana, where they attacked the town and surrounding villages, including Masherry-Potho, which is nine miles from Mile 38 (all Koya Chiefdom). At this time, the RUF forces were searching



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for food. In the following days, there were more RUF attacks on Mile 38, after which they were driven out of the area by SLA forces coming from the western part of Mile 38 along the Freetown Highway.

RUF forces attacked both Masiaka and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom) on 18 June, but were repelled by SLA forces. Fifteen civilians were killed in Mile 38. On 20 June, RUF forces ambushed SLA forces near Mile 38. On 22 June, RUF forces cut off the main highway near Mile 38 at two points by setting fire to large trailers and setting up a defensive position around their skeletons. On or around 28 June 1995, SLA forces again attacked Mile 38 with support from a Sierra Leone Armed Forces Alpha Jet, which bombarded the town. During this attack, a large number of civilians and members of the SLA were killed, houses burnt down and vehicles destroyed.

At this time, ambushes and fighting along this road were common, as a result of which the SLA forces mounted checkpoints along the road. In July 1995, the SLA set up a checkpoint at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforiki Chiefdom), controlling traffic moving north along the arterial road from Masiaka and Mile 38 towards Port Loko Town (Maforiki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and other inland northern towns such as Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). Harassment of civilians by SLA and other government security personnel intensified at this checkpoint following the RUF assault on Port Loko Town. On 9 September 1995, RUF forces ambushed SLA forces on the highway at Karrifay (Buya Romende Chiefdom) killing two; one of whom was buried in Foredugu and the other was left on the highway. RUF forces took the property that was in the SLA truck and forced civilians to carry it for them. On 11 September 1995, seven Guinean soldiers travelling to Makeni in a military vehicle were killed in an RUF ambush on the east-west road between Foredugu and Madina (Buya Romende Chiefdom).⁴⁸⁷ RUF forces took the weapons and ammunition from the military vehicle before setting fire to it.⁴⁸⁸

Towards the end of 1995, the RUF launched numerous attacks on Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), but were again repelled by the SLA forces based there. At this time, there were no fatalities in Lunsar, but RUF forces killed people in surrounding villages in Marampa and Buya Romende Chiefdoms, including Pan House, Marampa, Rogbele and Foredugu. In December 1995, the RUF forces were successful in dislodging the SLA forces. The RUF forces entered Lunsar and killed four people, raped an unknown number of women, abducted 10 people and burnt down 55 houses, although they did not occupy Lunsar at this time and left soon afterwards.

b) Events in 1996

During 1996, Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms were free from RUF activity. Although the RUF maintained a base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District), bordering both chiefdoms, from there they concentrated on attacking towns in Bombali District;⁴⁸⁹ the RUF forces were also focusing on attacking towns in Kambia District in the run up to the 26 February elections. Koya Chiefdom, bordering the Western Area, was also free from RUF activity. Throughout the

⁴⁸⁷ AP, 15 September 1995.

⁴⁸⁸ Xinhua 15 September 1995.

⁴⁸⁹ See the analysis for Bombali District, 1996.



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year, unspecified civil militia were deployed in Kasseh Section (BKM Chiefdom), which to a large extent prevented RUF infiltration throughout BKM Chiefdom.

In January 1996, an RUF force entered the north of TMS Chiefdom from Libeisyagahun Chiefdom (Bombali District). These forces passed through a number of towns, where they captured up to 300 civilians, in particular from Futa and Madina in the centre of the chiefdom. The RUF forces then moved to a hill called Fantima Hill, on the boundary with Buya Romende Chiefdom close to Makola Valley, in a forest called Kagberen-Gberem. TMS Chiefdom would remain mostly quiet from then until February 1998.

On 5 February 1996, RUF forces stole and destroyed two vehicles near Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom). They moved east from the direction of Robis (Buya Romende Chiefdom) along the Makeni Highway. Consequently, civilians mobilised themselves into a civil militia armed with cutlasses and launched an attack on the RUF forces but were repelled when the RUF forces open fire with machine guns. In March 1996, Guinean or Nigerian forces stationed in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) arrived in Foredugu, where civil militia joined them. It should be noted that throughout the year, the RUF forces continued to launch attacks on Lunsar.

On 26 February 1996, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in Sierra Leone. There are no reports of harassment of civilians prior to the election in Port Loko District. During March and April, RUF forces based in Masimera (Marampa Chiefdom) went south to Rokatic, where they took property and abducted some people; this would continue intermittently until the end of 1997.

NPRC-initiated peace talks commenced with the RUF in February, resulting in a ceasefire in May 1996. On 30 November 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed between the leadership of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone, providing for the immediate and total cessation of hostilities. In November and December 1996, the Nigerian forces were deployed in Port Loko Town.

c) Events in 1997

During 1997, RUF/AFRC attacks appear to have taken place mainly on ECOMOG and Government positions, although very few incidents are reported. It is likely that RUF/AFRC forces were scattered all over the eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko District and were engaged solely in food-finding missions. At least until May 1997, the ceasefire provided for in the Abidjan Peace Accord appears to have been generally observed in Port Loko District.

However, there were exceptions. In April 1997, Kanokie (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) was raided by RUF forces, who spent a few hours in the town and stole various food items and livestock. Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) was attacked on 20 May 1997 and 22 RUF members were seized by the SLA.⁴⁹⁰ Residents of Gbinti began to participate more actively in civil defence initiatives as a result of this attack. In May 1997, prior to the coup, RUF forces attacked Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) from the Kantia-Sendugu road. In Sendugu, the RUF forces initiated a house-to-house

⁴⁹⁰ AFP, 20 May 1997.



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search. At this time, at least one person was killed and several people were abducted, including the Chief Imam and a well-known teacher.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'etat and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released an SLA officer from Pademba Road Prison, installing him as their leader and as Head of State in June. This prompted an intense standoff between the Nigerian forces stationed in Sierra Leone and the AFRC, which requested the RUF to join with it.

In the evening of 26 May, a large number of jubilant RUF forces entered Mile 38 and the nearby villages of Massherri-Potho and Masankara (all Koya Chiefdom), on the main highway towards the Western Area. They surrounded the village at the main junction and forced all the residents onto the streets to sing songs. This lasted throughout the night. In Rosint Buya (Buya Romende Chiefdom), after the coup of 25 May, RUF/AFRC forces lived alongside civilians. They stole property and forced civilians to carry their property and carry out domestic work like fetching water and pounding rice. People refusing to carry their load were beaten and one man from Rosint Buya was shot dead. It is also reported in general terms that children were conscripted into the ranks of the RUF/AFRC and girls were used for sexual purposes.

Freetown's position as a key logistic point for ECOMOG in Liberia meant that Nigerian forces had maintained a near continuous presence at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) since 1990. In the days following the coup, Nigerian forces concentrated in the Western Area as their main base at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD, Western Area) was reinforced. On 3 June, RUF/AFRC forces captured a number of Nigerian forces at Lungi after their abortive attempt to take full control of Freetown International Airport. Between 5 and 9 June, Nigerian forces regained full control of Freetown International Airport during an operation supported by heavy artillery from the Nigerian 231st Field Artillery Regiment. Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces intermittently traded machine gun and mortar fire across 10 and 11 June,⁴⁹¹ which left at least 5 people dead.

The standoff continued throughout 1997. On 9 July, there was a resurgence of heavy mortar fire between Nigerian and RUF/AFRC forces.⁴⁹² The Nigerians sought to push RUF/AFRC forces back from the Lungi area and RUF/AFRC forces sought to prevent the pro-government FM 98.1 Radio Democracy broadcasting from inside the Nigerian perimeter. News reports show that 10 members of the Nigerian forces and 60 civilians were killed during this action.⁴⁹³ RUF/AFRC forces substantially looted villages around the International Airport during their assault on Nigerian positions in the airport. Significant exchanges of fire in the airport area occurred on 29 July; 10, 13, 14 and 23 August; 22 September; and 9 October. On or around 4 September, around 11 members of the Nigerian forces were killed when their vehicle ran over a landmine on the road near between Lungi and Port Loko Town. On 22 November at Tagrin (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom), Nigerian forces released 28 RUF/AFRC prisoners of war captured at various points since 2 June.

⁴⁹¹ Xinhua, 11 June 1997.

⁴⁹² AFP, 9 July 1997.

⁴⁹³ AFP, 13 July 1997.



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After the coup, RUF/AFRC forces scattered throughout Masimera Chiefdom introduced a system of theft they called, "From your hand to my hand; from your pocket to my pocket", which encouraged the recruitment of more civilians into the CDF. Following this, CDF and ECOMOG were deployed together in Mange (BKM Chiefdom) and ECOMOG forces were also deployed near Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), from where roads lead to Koya and Masimera Chiefdoms. However, "loyal SLA soldiers"⁴⁹⁴ fighting alongside ECOMOG were not trusted and, accordingly, were given only light weapons. During this period, RUF/AFRC forces were engaged mainly in food-finding missions, during which villages were looted.

RUF/AFRC forces coming from Kambia District attacked Barmoi Junction and Mange (BKM Chiefdom) after September 1997. Little resistance was offered by the Gbethis deployed at Mange, where RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 18 houses and stole property.

At the same time, Guinean troops deployed at the crossing-point over the Little Scaries River at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) put severe pressure on the RUF/AFRC forces based in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District). After July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Ro-Source to a new base in Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom), on the Mabole River between the chiefdoms of Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia (Port Loko District), just north of Gbinti. RUF/AFRC forces used canoes to cross the river and stage food-finding raids on nearby villages. Pressure was mounted on the RUF/AFRC base at Bainkoro by both ECOMOG and CDF; deployed over the river from Bainkoro, these forces were able to use artillery on the RUF/AFRC base. The RUF/AFRC retreated from Bainkoro in September 1997, reportedly moving north towards Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District).

From 27 August, Nigerian forces stationed in Sierra Leone were formally deployed as ECOMOG under the authority of ECOWAS. In August, ECOMOG forces were deployed in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and began encouraging the enlisting of youths into the CDF from that time. Chiefdom authorities were requested to send men to Port Loko Town for initiation. In BKM Chiefdom, for example, ECOMOG trained 250 men from Makonte Section, merging this force with other men trained in Bureh and Kasseh Sections. The CDF command in BKM Chiefdom was based in Mange.

d) Events in 1998

After the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown on 12 February 1998, the intensity of the war escalated in Port Loko District.⁴⁹⁵ Atrocities were committed throughout the District, especially during the first months of the year. Throughout 1998, RUF/AFRC forces deployed and took positions in all the chiefdoms and main towns of the District surrounding Maforki Chiefdom. Starting in September 1998, the movement of troops in BKM, TMS, Masimera and Marampa Chiefdoms and the abduction of many civilians for recruitment demonstrate that RUF/AFRC

⁴⁹⁴ Meaning SLA not affiliated with the RUF/AFRC.

⁴⁹⁵ This section and the following sections on 1999-2001 do not include any incidents involving the West Side Boys, which have been dealt with in a separate section at the end of this chapter. This has been done for reasons of clarity and simplicity, since the West Side Boys operated in a limited area according to a pattern that was clearly identifiable and repeated throughout 1998-2001.



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forces were preparing an attack on Port Loko Town and were also probably already en route to Freetown. The chain of events accelerated in September 1998 and at the end of the year, Port Loko Town fell to the persistent RUF/AFRC attacks.

After the coup and throughout 1997 and 1998, RUF/AFRC forces were present in Masimera and Marampa Chiefdoms; it is reported that none of the 373 villages of Masimera Chiefdom were left without those forces entering or attacking them during this period. When RUF/AFRC forces attacked or entered a town or village, they burnt, stole, raped, killed and captured a number of people, forcing some to carry their loads. After the merger of the RUF forces with the AFRC forces, important bases were operated in the south of Tonkolili District (Yoni, Malal Mara and Kholifa Mabang Chiefdoms), at the south-east boundary of Port Loko District.

After ECOMOG commenced operations to remove the RUF/AFRC from Freetown on 6 February 1998, many RUF/AFRC forces regrouped in Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom) at the border with Dibia and Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdoms. From there, some deployed through Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District). On 12 February 1998, an RUF/AFRC unit called Brigade Advance left Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom) for Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom, Kambia District), where they burnt down eight houses and abducted 50 civilians, who were forced to carry stolen property. On 14 February, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District), where they killed eight civilians, took property and burnt down an unknown number of houses. On 19 February, RUF/AFRC forces launched simultaneous attacks from Kambia Town on the towns of Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Mange (BKM Chiefdom). CDF and ECOMOG forces based in Mange were overpowered by the RUF/AFRC forces and retreated to their headquarters in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Six people were killed, 62 houses were burnt down and an unspecified number of people were abducted by the RUF/AFRC during the attack on Mange (BKM Chiefdom). The same day, RUF/AFRC forces returned to their base at Bainkoro. A Guinean ECOMOG contingent equipped with armoured tanks and accompanied by members of the CDF left Port Loko Town and moved on Bainkoro, but was repelled by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG established a temporary base in Kabatha (Maforki Chiefdom), a key junction approximately five miles from Port Loko Town.

On 21 February, RUF forces left Bainkoro for Kasseh Section (both BKM Chiefdom). They attacked the villages of Rokon and Robath Kantakathe, where they encountered resistance from the Gbethis. RUF/AFRC forces were driven from the town and pursued by the Gbethis from Kasseh Section (BKM) to a village called Magbankitha in Malekuray Section (TMS Chiefdom). The CDF Commander in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) called for air support from Nigerian ECOMOG, who bombarded RUF/AFRC positions, forcing them to retreat to an unknown location.

During the same period, in early 1998, RUF/AFRC forces were retreating from Freetown along the Freetown–Masiaka Highway through Koya Chiefdom. The general retreat north moved towards Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), where RUF/AFRC troops began arriving on or around 14 February. That day or the next, RUF/AFRC

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forces⁴⁹⁶ attacked Masherry-Potho and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom). In both locations, RUF/AFRC forces conducted house-to-house searches, forcing civilians to carry the stolen property. They chased civilians into the bush, flogged those they caught and killed those who refused to give information about the location of their possessions. In Masherry-Potho, around 25 civilians were killed during the RUF/AFRC attack; at least three civilians were also mutilated. RUF/AFRC forces amputated the left hand of a man abducted from Masherry-Potho to carry stolen property when it became obvious he was unable to carry the load. RUF/AFRC forces dug deep trenches across the Freetown–Masiaka Highway, presumably to hold up ECOMOG movement out of the Western Area. Following this, they retreated north towards Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), burning all the houses along their route. Many civilians were abducted and forced to carry stolen property. A man from Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom) had both hands amputated by RUF/AFRC forces when he attempted to escape. He was left at the village of Ro-Lal (Koya Chiefdom) and instructed to inform President Kabbah that the RUF/AFRC would return to Freetown.

RUF/AFRC forces were seen in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and the surrounding villages between 14 February and 1 March 1998. ECOMOG military intelligence received reports that the RUF/AFRC were taking up strong defensive positions in Lunsar.⁴⁹⁷ During this time, RUF/AFRC forces launched “Operation Pay Yourself,” which in essence was a widespread looting spree. RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints in the Delco Compound, Mabesseneh and Tainratha areas of Lunsar and stripped passers-by of all valuable and tradable items. On 15 February, RUF/AFRC forces kidnapped three missionaries and two foreign aid workers from the Mabeseneh Hospital in Lunsar.⁴⁹⁸ They were taken to Camp Charlie, near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), before being released in Masiaka on 27 February. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property, burned down many residences in Lunsar and killed and decapitated an unknown number of civilians, forcing other civilians to bury the corpses. The Catholic Mission, Murialdo Vocational Institute, the Sierra Leone Primary School, the Sierra Leone Muslim Brotherhood Primary School and other institutions in Lunsar were severely vandalised.

In the early evening of 1 March 1998, troops from the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade entered Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) from Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). They engaged RUF/AFRC snipers en route at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom) and exchanged fire with RUF/AFRC forces for about an hour as they entered Lunsar. Apart from that, ECOMOG met no resistance from RUF/AFRC forces in Lunsar.⁴⁹⁹ From Lunsar, ECOMOG forces staged an attack on Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), taking hold of the town on 3 March 1998. Two days earlier, on 1 March, around 400 RUF/AFRC members surrendered to Guinean ECOMOG at Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom).⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁶ Some of these forces were dressed in full combat fatigues, while others wore camouflage t-shirts with red handkerchiefs tied around their heads.

⁴⁹⁷ R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-8.

⁴⁹⁸ AFP, 15 February 1998.

⁴⁹⁹ R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-38.

⁵⁰⁰ AFP, 1 March 1998



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(Magbema Chiefdom) ⁴²³. The road bridge over the Little Scarcies River would not be open until 22 March 2001 since it had been damaged significantly.⁴²⁴ On 25 February, the first formal UNAMSIL-RUF Contact Group meeting was held in Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). In early March, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees commenced negotiations with the RUF command and the Government of Guinea to create a demilitarised "humanitarian corridor" running from Forecariah through Pamelap and then Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District).⁴²⁵ This would go some way to enable the secure passage of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Guinea to Sierra Leone.

On 22 March, the UNAMSIL force commander visited Rokupr and Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) following the reopening of the bridge at Mange.⁴²⁶ As a result of this , UNAMSIL had expanded its patrols to cover Mange, Kambia and Rokupr by 30 March.⁴²⁷ In April, UNAMSIL gained access to Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom). At the ECOWAS-sponsored six monthly ceasefire review meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 2 May, the RUF leadership agreed to withdraw from Kambia District by 30 May.⁴²⁸ Disarmament plans for Kambia and Port Loko Districts were also agreed upon in Abuja. Following this, UNAMSIL gained access to the towns of Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom) and Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom).

On 18 May, UNAMSIL opened a disarmament centre at Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom).⁴²⁹ A disarmament centre was also opened at the Court Barrie in Madina (Bramaia Chiefdom). On the same day, a Guinean helicopter gunship briefly bombarded Rokupr. The following day, the President of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone travelled to Conakry to discuss the bombardment with the Guinean authorities, who said that their attack was "unfortunate" and was a consequence of a "communication gap".⁴³⁰ On 29 and 30 May, the 11th Battalion of the SLA and 30 SSD members deployed to Kambia Town.⁴³¹ On 10 August 2001, a committee comprising representatives of the RUF, UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone declared disarmament complete in Kambia District.⁴³²

3. Conclusion

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

⁴²³ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 12 January 2001.
⁴²⁴ UNAMSIL Press Release, 22 March 2001.
⁴²⁵ UN Security Council Press Release SC/7029, 8 March 2001.
⁴²⁶ UNAMSIL Press Release, 22 March 2001.
⁴²⁷ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 3 April 2001.
⁴²⁸ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 4 May 2001.
⁴²⁹ UNAMSIL Press Release, 19 May 2001.
⁴³⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 22 May 2001.
⁴³¹ BBC Online News, 30 May 2001 (05:37 GMT 06:37 UK) and UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 1 June 2001.
⁴³² UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 14 August 2001.

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c. Koinadugu District

1. Introduction

Koinadugu District is located in the northwest of Sierra Leone. It shares a border with Guinea to the north and east, with Kono and Tonkolili Districts to the south and with Bombali District to the west. The town of Kabala is the Headquarter Town of Koinadugu District. There are eleven Chiefdoms in Koinadugu District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Dembelia Sinkunia	Sinkunia
Diang	Kondembaia
Follosaba Dembelia	Musaia
Mambolo (Kasunko)	Fadugu
Mongo	Mongo Bendugu
Neini	Yiffin
Neya	Krubola
Sengbe	Yogomaia
Sulima	Falaba
Wara Wara Bafodia	Bafodia
Wara Wara Yagala	Gbawuria

[geographical overview and summary of factual analysis to be drafted pending incorporation of comments from resource persons]

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1992

On 29 April 1992, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Valentine Strasser and elements of the SLA, overthrew the government of the All Party Congress.

In the first half of 1992, Fadugu town (Mambolo) experienced an influx of civilians from Makeni town (Makari Gbanti, Bombali) and Kono District. On 2 May 1992 a local civilian militia was formed in Fadugu town (Mambolo). For this militia, local blacksmiths manufactured single-barrel shotguns known as "Chaka Bulla." Others were armed with sticks through which nails were driven, metal bars, axes and cutlasses. Reports indicate that the Government of Sierra Leone was setting up and recruiting for a civilian militia called the "Donsos," the headquarter of which was Koidu town (Gbense, Kono District). An unknown number of civilian militia from Mambolo chiefdom joined the Donsos.

In mid 1992 the SLA started reinforcing their positions in the eastern Chiefdoms of Neya and Mongo in the towns of Kumba Wullen Balia and Tumonia.⁴³³ In July 1992, in Mongo Bendugu (Mongo), the Paramount Chief of Mongo met with a 12-man SLA unit and informed them that there was no problem with security in the entire chiefdom.

⁴³³ This town could be Tomania, Sengbe Chiefdom.



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Between July and October 1992, SLA senior staff members visited all 11 chiefdoms in Koinadugu, urging local leaders to gather local hunters into a civilian defence movement. Paramount Chiefs recall receiving letters from the NPRC government echoing this request. At about the same time civilian militia started to be formed in various chiefdoms and were gathered to be trained by the SLA in the tactics of guerrilla warfare and ambushes in the headquarter town of Kabala, Wara Wara Yagala chiefdom. They were named the Tamaboros. They were to be used to fight alongside the SLA and SSD. The Tamaboros were operating under the political leadership of the then NPRC Minister of Defence, Mr. Komba Kambo. The field commander of the Tamaboros was Pa. Khanko Modi Samura, of Ghaya town in Sulima chiefdom. Local commanders were selected from the five tribes of Koinadugu, namely the Yalunka, Kuranko, Limba, Fullah and Madingo. In August 1992, 450 "Tamaboros" were deployed to confront RUF forces in Kono and Kailahun districts in the months following. It is likely that the bulk of deployment to Kono followed the RUF attacks on Koidu (Kono District) from 22-23 October 1992 onwards.

Recruitment to the Tamaboros continued through November and December 1992. In late November 1992, a member of the Sierra Leone Police entered the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) with a message for the Section Chief from the Neini Paramount Chief ordering him to gather all hunters in the section and send them to Yiffin town within 7 days. Later, on 23 December 1992, 43 hunters left the town of Firiwa (Neini Chiefdom) for the town of Yiffin, further south in the Neini Chiefdom.

In September 1992, SLA forces were sent the headquarter town of every chiefdom in Koinadugu District. In September, at the SLA base in Yarawadu (or Yarawadugu, Neya Chiefdom), SLA troops detained a Guinean man suspected of being a member of the RUF. The hands and feet of the man were bound together behind his back, and he was suspended on a lateral stick, his head facing towards the ground. Within 24 hours the man had died. SLA forces ordered villagers of Yarawadu to bury the body, and blocked all roads out of the town until this was done.

For two weeks in November 1992, townspeople of Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom) saw large and continuous convoys of civilians travelling through the town. There were few vehicles. Those in the convoy said they were moving from Kono because of RUF attacks.

Across 1992 SLA forces were stationed on the border of Neya chiefdom with the Kono Chiefdoms of Toli, Lei and Sandor. There were SLA bases in the villages of Yarawadu and Durukoro to the extreme south-east, and in Kurubonla (Neya), Mansofinia (or Mansofenia, in Neya Chiefdom) on the main motorable road crossing the north of the chiefdom. The SLA soldiers were little paid or even unpaid for months, so there were some incidents of looting.

b) Events in 1993

In early 1993 there was a meeting in Yiffin (Neini), between NPRC officials and the Chiefs to form a militia to help the NPRC government to fight the RUF. Following this, in 1993 the Tamaboros started to be deployed. Their effectiveness became a threat at government level where they were perceived as a potential alternative source of power and therefore the then Minister of Defence Paul Nyuma prompted their dissolution.



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In 1993 Tamaboros, moved to combat RUF forces in Kono District. The first battle took place in Sewafe River, in Kono District.

In June 1993, a group of SLA entered the village of Kumba Wullen Balia (Neya), abducted three people and took them to Tagbadu where they had to catch some animals to be slaughtered for food. The SLA forces left, releasing the people they had abducted.

On 15 September 1993 at a meeting in the community centre in Kabala town (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) the Tamaboros were officially disbanded. Tamboros were given a half a sack of rice and some kerosene. The Paramount Chiefs were given a wall clock and a radio each.

c) Events in 1994

In March 1994 civilians fleeing Kono District started to arrive in the southern chiefdom of Neya, in the towns of Mansofinia and Kurubonla.

Following an attack on Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) on 1 November 1994, RUF forces moved eastwards along the main road through Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) towards Diang chiefdom and the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom). This first group would attack Kabala by 7 November. A second RUF group would leave Mansofinia on 8 November and arrive in Alikalia by 11 November.

Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF forces moving from Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) between 1 and 5 November 1994. Two SLA soldiers organised local hunters, who were ordered by the Section Chief to gather their weapons, to move towards Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and ambush the advancing RUF forces. Two miles from Alikalia, this group engaged a large number of RUF forces, but were repelled by superior firepower and dispersed into the surrounding bush. RUF forces attacked Alikalia shortly after, burning 68 houses. Two members of the RUF forces were killed in the attack.

On 5 November 1994, a meeting was held in the southern town of Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) between RUF commanders during which an attack on Kabala Town was planned. This group would move north towards Kabala on 8 November.

Also on Saturday 5 November 1994 convoys of civilians moving from Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) passed through the town of Kondembaia (Diang Chiefdom) moving towards Kabala. Residents were informed that RUF were advancing on the town. SLA forces stationed in Kondembaia used long-range weapons to check the RUF advance, forcing a retreat to the town of Badala town on the Seli river, some 6 miles from Kondembaia. RUF forces had entered Badala earlier in the day, and had informed residents that they were safe, before commencing their attack. SLA forces moved towards Badala and blocked the bridge of over the Seli River, both halting the northward movement of RUF forces and preventing civilians from moving towards Kondembaia. Two hundred people were killed when RUF forces burned down the house they were in. The number of civilian deaths was high



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because it was the Saturday market day (called "Lumor" locally). SLA troops were ultimately dislodged from the bridge.

Early on 6 November 1994 RUF forces departed Badala, and moved across the Seli river northwards towards Kabala, bypassing the town of Kondembaia, to where the SLA had retreated. They attacked a number of villages within a 10km area to the immediate south of Kabala. Surkurela (Dieng Chiefdom) and Kamadugu Sokurela (Neini Chiefdom) were attacked. RUF forces arrived in Fasowaya (or Fasawaia, Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) early on 7 November and cooked a large amount of food. RUF forces were in three groups around the Fasowaya area. The first group was on a patch of farmland called Maworona, the second on the farm of Madam Fatmata Roko, and the third at a location called Centre Bolt's Garden.

In the afternoon of 7 November 1994, RUF forces moved from their Fasowaya encampment and attacked Kabala. Shortly before the attack, residents of Kabala recall hearing an announcement over the radio informing them that the SLA were about to test their AK47 rifles, and therefore nobody should worry. There was limited resistance from the small SLA contingent stationed in the town. Reports indicate that Guinean and Nigerian troops were also present. They would be reinforced on 11 November by SLA forces retreating from Kono District. During the attack, RUF forces killed a prominent former Tamaboro leader, beating him severely with metal bars before cutting his throat. At least four other civilians were killed by RUF forces. In addition to burning over 100 residences, RUF forces looted and destroyed public buildings, including the Police Barracks, the District Office, the District Council Hall and the hospital. Twenty civilians were abducted to carry stolen property. RUF forces also destroyed the businesses of many civilians thought to have been Tamaboros. Fleeing the battle much of the Kabala people fled the town of Kabala heading northeast towards Fadugu and Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) and also towards the town of Tomania (Mongo Chiefdom).

Following the attack, RUF forces left Kabala in the morning of 8 November 1994, moving directly southwards through the villages of Yisimaia (Sengbe Chiefdom), Fasowaya (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom) and Kamadugu Sokurela (Neini Chiefdom). In Fasowaya, 18 civilians were abducted to carry looted property. They continued southwards off the main motorable road, moving through Singbini (Neini Chiefdom) before veering westwards towards the town of Foria (Diang Chiefdom). A further 18 civilians were abducted in Singbina. Reports indicate that this RUF group, active in Diang chiefdom prior to the 7 November attack on Kabala, abducted over 3000 civilians.

By 10 November 1994, the RUF forces responsible for the attack on Kabala on 7 November reached Dondoya (Diang Chiefdom). Instead of taking the main motorable road from Foria (which continued south towards Alikalia and Yiffin) RUF forces headed to Darakuru (Diang). Darakuru is one of the main gold mining areas in Sierra Leone. RUF forces camped in Darakuru until 13 November 1994, during which time they received 300 ounces of gold from the residents of the village in return for not attacking Darakuru. This group of RUF moved into Tonkolili District.

RUF forces departed Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) on 8 November, moving to Yiffin on 9 November 1994. Before entering Alikalia on 9 November, RUF forces overpowered armed significant resistance from local militia. Eleven civilians and four local militia were killed by RUF

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forces during this attack. Reports suggest that this second RUF group may have joined the RUF forces moving southwards towards Darakuru following the 7 November attack on Kabala.

d) Events in 1995

Throughout 1995, RUF and SLA activity was concentrated in the Neya chiefdom, to the extreme southeast of Koinadugu District. Across 1995, the RUF would push their line of operation westwards towards Freetown, staging large attacks on Moyamba Port Loko, Mile 91, Songo and Waterloo attacking Waterloo town in mid 1995. The RUF's presence in Koinadugu in 1995 was primarily a spillover from the war in Kono, where food supplies were running short.

"Food finding" missions were launched by both RUF and SLA forces around the towns of Mansofenia and Kurobonla, both on the main motorable road through Neya chiefdom. During RUF "Food finding" missions, there were incidents of rape and other violence against civilians, but nowhere near the intensity of the attacks in Neya, Neini and Diang chiefdoms in late 1994. In August 1995, a 50 civilian militia were mobilised in the south of Diang chiefdom.⁴³⁴

On 16 February 1995, RUF forces arrived in Mansofinia (also Mansofenia, Neya) and requested to be fed and lodged by the villagers, who obliged. On 17 February, they abducted five villagers and moved to the village of Kamaya (Neya Chiefdom), arriving at towards midnight. Following a search of the village, RUF forces opened fire, rounding up the population of the village and performed a search of every residence. Early in the morning of 18 February, RUF forces had found and taken 15 five gallon tanks of palm oil, four bags of husk rice, two bags of husk groundnut, two bags of salt and one full bag of beans. On 19 February, villagers from Kamaya were ordered by the town chief to carry the stolen food items back to Mansofenia through Henekuma village (Neini Chiefdom). In Henekuma, more food items were stolen from villagers and two men were abducted to carry them. On 20 February, the convoy returned to Mansofenia.

On 22 February 1995, RUF forces based in Mansofenia divided into two groups and also divided the property that had been taken the previous days. The first unit moved to nearby Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom). The second unit headed south towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

As a consequence of these incidents, the SLA were redeployed in the Southeastern chiefdom of Neya in the towns of Gberawalia and Kumba Wullen Balia. A number of incidents of looting by SLA forces are reporting between February and March 1995.

In February 1995, SLA forces entered the village of Nelikoro (also Nerekolo III, Neya chiefdom). Twenty civilian men were arrested and questioned about the location of livestock nearby the village. A farmer was tied up and forced to watch as his wife was raped by 5 members of the SLA. SLA forces then took some livestock and abducted an unknown number of Nelikoro residents to transport the livestock to Gberewaya (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

⁴³⁴ There is one report of an attack on Kabala, taken from a key person from another District, which is not corroborated by any record taken in Kabala town or in Koinadugu District, therefore it does not appear to be reliable.



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In March 1995, SLA forces entered Kumba Wullen Balia. They abducted at least 5 civilians and took them to nearby Yirandu (Neya Chiefdom) where they were forced to kill and butcher a cow, and carry another cow suspended upside-down by its legs on a stick over their shoulders. Marching towards Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom), SLA forces captured a further 5 civilians to assist with carrying the cow. On their arrival in Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom), the civilians were locked in a building without food or water until the following day.

RUF forces came from Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) to Mansofinia in May 1995 before moving to Seredu (Neya Chiefdom). In Seredu, they entered the town firing in the air, and arrested 10 women and 8 men. Many villagers fled into the surrounding bush. All 10 women were raped and then forced to fetch water and cook for the RUF forces. The men were forced to fetch firewood and palm wine. RUF forces also took palm oil, rice and poultry from farms in the surrounding area. After five days, they returned to Yiraia, abducting 25 villagers from Seredu to carry property stolen in the previous days.

In August 1995, reports reached the villages of Foria, Yanqulia, Soria and Kumunkaia (Diang Chiefdom) of renewed RUF activity in Yiffin town (Neini Chiefdom) and Neya chiefdom. All four villages are on the same road, running north to Kabala from Kono. Fifty hunters were mobilised, with only five single barrel guns between them.

Food finding missions by RUF units along the Mansofenia – Kurubonla road (Neya Chiefdom) continued into November and December 1995. RUF forces entered the town of Mansofinia on 13 October 1995 and took food items. The next day they also entered the villages of Kurubonla and Worokoro (Neya Chiefdom), searching for livestock. In December RUF forces again entered Mansofinia (Neya Chiefdom) and Daboroma, near Kurobonla. In Mansofinia they abducted 20 men and forced them to carry the loads to Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) and also to Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom).

e) Events in 1996

In general, there RUF forces carried out raids in Neya Chiefdom and attacks on Foria and Aliakalia in Diang chiefdom. There were frequent patrols from the town of Kurubonla into Mongo and Neya Chiefdoms. Food finding raids were carried out from Kaiyai (Sandor Chiefdom). The RUF forces had total freedom of movement throughout Neya chiefdom. RUF activity concentrated entirely in the southern chiefdoms, the most intense attack being on Foraya (Diang Chiefdom).

No incidences were recorded in first half of 1996. The first record of resumed RUF activities was a meeting in Kurubonla (Neya Chiefdom). On 13 June 1996, RUF forces commanded by three different commanders met in Kurubonla (Neya Chiefdom). A decision was made to split into two groups: one to go north to Bendugu (Mongo Chiefdom) and the other to head south to Mansadu, Kono District. Both groups claimed to be looking for a senior SLA officer. On 15 June 1996, the northern group headed towards Bengdugu (Mongo Chiefdom), staying in the village of Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom), returning to Kuribonla (Neya Chiefdom) on 18 June. On 19 June, they departed Kurubonla for Koidu. During this mission, there were no reports of any violent incidents. The



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Chiefs of both Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom) and Kuribonla (Neya Chiefdom) cooperated with the RUF forces, ordering villagers to provide food when requested by the RUF.

On 15 August 1996, RUF forces attacked Foraya (Diang Chiefdom) from Nyamulnya, (Diang Chiefdom) at the south end of the town.⁴³⁵ Foraya is on the main northern road to Kabala, between the towns of Alikalia and Kondembaia, both attacked heavily by RUF forces in 1994 prior to their attack on Kabala on 7 November. With five shotguns, civil militia mobilised in August 1995 managed to repel the RUF assault and capture three members of the RUF, who were taken to ECOMOG forces present in Alikalia. ECOMOG forces gave three AK47 rifles in exchange for the RUF prisoners. The fate of the prisoners is unknown.

The RUF forces moved from Kurabonla along the main towards Masadu (Mongo Chiefdom) on 15 September. In the evening they attacked the villages of Madine, Kumba Wullen Balia and Masandu. In Madine, two houses were burnt down, one man was shot dead, 10 men arrested and property was taken.

On 5 November 1996, RUF forces attacked Alikalia (Neini) RUF forces looted property, burnt houses and killed 13 civilians. RUF forces also raped an unknown number of women.

On 26 November, armed RUF forces arrived in Kurubonla from Kaiamy (Sandor Chiefdom) from Kono and stayed overnight in the village. The town chief provided them with food. On 27 November 1996, they moved south eastwards through the villages of Marilia (Neya Chiefdom) and Toria (Neya Chiefdom). In Toria, the village was surrounded and all the houses searched. Food items were taken and 25 villagers were abducted to carry the load back to Kurobonla, where the Chief offered the commander one cow for the safe return of the Toria abductees.⁴³⁶ From Kurobonla, the RUF unit moved to Mansofenia, where the 25 abductees from Toria were released. The Unit continued towards Kayia (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

In December 1996,⁴³⁷ RUF forces attacked Mansofinia where they arrested 20 young men and forced them to carry loads of property to Kaiyma, in Kono district.

On 12 December 1996, RUF forces attacked Foraya (Diang Chiefdom) from the village of Kulanko (Neini Chiefdom) using heavy machine guns, mortars and RPGs. ECOMOG forces, SLA and local militia engaged the RUF, but were repelled and retreated from the town northwards towards Badala, a crossing point over the Seli river. RUF forces killed one SLA soldier and captured one Nigerian ECOMOG soldier, about whom there is no further information.

f) Events in 1997⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵ It is possible that this incident took place at a hill called Gbakan, but this is not marked on the maps and requires further clarification.

⁴³⁶ It is not clear from the record whether this offer was accepted.

⁴³⁷ More clarification is required from the records on the date, specifically when during December this happened.

⁴³⁸ The records contain contradictory information on what happened in Koinadugu District in 1997. This whole section therefore requires further clarification, including verification through open source research.



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In April 1997, RUF forces established a base in Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom). Then they moved on to attack Dolar⁴³⁹ and moved south to Kurubonla (Neya chiefdom). The ECOMOG forces occupied Kabala and moved on to Koinadugu, Sengbe chiefdom, searching for RUF forces.

In May 1997, RUF forces left Sengbe chiefdom towards a bordering chiefdom, apparently escaping from the advance of ECOMOG troops. Chasing the RUF forces the ECOMOG troops attacked Gberefeh (Sengbe Chiefdom) and Dolar⁴⁴⁰ to unseat the RUF/AFRC bases. During this month, CDF captured some members of the RUF and took them to the ECOMOG base in Mongo chiefdom.⁴⁴¹ The RUF/AFRC forces counterattacked in Serekolia and Gberefeh where they engaged in a battle against the Tamaboros.

There were RUF/AFRC bases in Sereya (Mongo Chiefdom), whose presence caused people to flee to Guinea.⁴⁴²

In meantime, in the south eastern chiefdom of Neya, RUF forces attacked a number of towns, including Kurubonla, Porpon and Henekum, and set bases in Yiraia, Bendu, Kulia, Kumba Wullen Balia, Nerekoro, Mansofinia, Yarawalu and Konkowaboro. In these places they continued looting, killing and abducting people to carry their loads.⁴⁴³

In June 1997, senior RUF/AFRC commanders were based in Koinadugu town (Sengbe Chiefdom), where their men captured 80 young men, they raped women and girls in the bush and they killed 98 people. Then they moved on to Dankawali.⁴⁴⁴

In June RUF/AFRC forces coming from Mongo and Neya Chiefdoms, went to Freetown, passing through the towns of Kurubonla and Mansofinia. In Mansofinia RUF/AFRC formed the G 5, mixed units of RUF forces and civilians who were charged with various administrative functions, and stayed in the district.⁴⁴⁵

In July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the eastern part of the District in Neya, Mongo and Sengbe chiefdoms, attacked many towns and villages and they planned the attack on Kabala town, at the time a stronghold of ECOMOG and CDF. The battle took place on 27 July 1997.⁴⁴⁶

On 17 September 1997, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Kabala. The RUF forces did not meet any resistance from SLA and many people were killed. The next day the SLA, who had apparently

⁴³⁹ The location of this town is not clear, although it is likely to be either Mongo or Sengbe Chiefdom.

⁴⁴⁰ The location of this town is not clear, although it is likely to be either Mongo or Sengbe Chiefdom.

⁴⁴¹ More information is required from the records about the location of the ECOMOG base in this chiefdom.

⁴⁴² More information is required from the records on this matter.

⁴⁴³ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁴⁴ This requires more detail, in particular whether all of these incidents took place on one day or over the month of June.

⁴⁴⁵ More information is required from the records here about the "G5" system.

⁴⁴⁶ More detail is required from the records about this battle and these incidents.



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delayed fighting the RUF forces for strategic reasons, started firing on their position killing many RUF forces and their commander, who was subsequently buried in one of the main mass graves.

On 19 September 1997, an RUF commando group left Mansofinia and headed to Kulero. On the way, they attacked Sumaworia and Sondordu (both in Neya Chiefdom). In Sumaworia, they abducted everyone in the town, including men, women and children. The women were then taken into empty houses and raped, while their husbands were forced to watch. Similar incidents took place in Sondordu. During that month a group, coming from Kumba Wullen Balia, attacked Kilimendu and Mansadu.

The RUF/AFRC forces operated in Neya chiefdom until the end of September 1997 in the towns of Kurubonla, Sangabania, Kamaron and Bumbunkoro, where they abducted everybody and forced men and women to work for them. During the night, women were raped all over the town.⁴⁴⁷

In October one AFRC group attacked the towns of Koromandor and Kumba Wullen Balia. During the same month in Sengbe chiefdom a fight took place between two senior RUF/AFRC commanders, as a result of which one left the chiefdom. In November 1997, the RUF forces went from Makeni to Fadugu, Mangolo chiefdom, while in the first half of December another group of RUF forces attacked Kondodalema, Sangbania and Kurubonla in Neya Chiefdom.

RUF forces attacked Mansonia (Neya Chiefdom) on 26 December 1996, where they held a meeting and asked the people for food. On this occasion, they beat people and raped women. After four days they left the town forcing men and women to carry the loot to Kurubonla, where five vehicles came to collect them and left to Safaru in Kono district.⁴⁴⁸

In December 1997, AFRC, RUF and G5 were based in Sengbe chiefdom where they took property, abducted and beat people. The people were forced to cook, wash their cloths and build guard-posts. They were also sent in search of food. Many people would be flogged, especially when the RUF forces had casualties in a battle. RUF forces destroyed roads and bridges.⁴⁴⁹

g) Events in 1998

Intense RUF/AFRC activity and food finding missions staged from the two towns of Mansofenia and Kurobonla on the main motor road though Neya chiefdom continued. Following ECOMOG intervention, "Operation Pay Yourself", during which RUF forces stole property in many different locations at the same time, was reported across Neini, Diang, Sebeneh chiefdoms.

In early January, a 20-man RUF/AFRC unit entered the village of Kumba Wullen Baia. In nearby Bola Mamburia, RUF forces temporarily detained 15 people and took property from their premises. A man and his son were shot dead for refusing to carry loads of property. The unit left Kumba Wullen Baia for the RUF base at Mansofenia.

⁴⁴⁷ More detail is required from the records on these incidents.

⁴⁴⁸ More detail is required from the records about this attack.

⁴⁴⁹ More detail is required from the records about this attack.



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At some point before 5 January 1998, a 50-man RUF/AFRC unit entered Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom), describing their mission to the town Chief, as a "routine patrol". On 5 January, they left Kuronbonla heading southeast towards Yarawadugu (Neya Chiefdom), a border town with both the Republic of Guinea and Toli chiefdom (Kono District). On their arrival in Yarawadugu, RUF/AFRC forces sealed off the roads, fired shots in the air and went house-to-house removing the occupants and taking them into the streets. The Section Chief offered the RUF/AFRC forces some livestock to feed them for the duration of their stay.

Around midday on 12 January, RUF forces used a machete to cut off four fingers from the right hand of the Section Chief. An unknown number of civilians in the town were whipped and beaten by RUF forces, who looted extensively. Twenty-six men and 15 women, all civilians, were forced to carry the looted property. RUF forces burned down four houses before departing Yarawadugu.

Between 12 and 13 January 1998, this RUF unit returned to Kurubonla from Yarawadugu passing through the villages of Tilikoro, Fasombnuya, Sandia, Tenkeya, Toroya and Marliya. In Tilikoro, two men were caught and their property taken away. In Fasonbnuya, three men were caught, and property including radios, cassette tapes and a gun was taken. Five houses were also burned down. Many houses in other towns were also burnt down, including 10 in Sandia, two in Tenkeya, 10 in Toraya and 6 in Marliya. On 13 January, the unit arrived in Kurubonla, whereupon the people who had been abducted to carry stolen property on the patrol were released. A truck from the RUF base at Yiraia (Neya Chiefdom) was provided to carry the 50 man unit back to Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District).

On 15 January 1998, RUF forces burned a total of 11 houses in the villages of Dunamara, Fandala and Henekuma (all Neya Chiefdom) en route from Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District) to Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom). In Mansofenia, RUF forces began to burn houses. Villagers report begin surprised, having been informed earlier by one of the RUF commanders that Mansofenia was an RUF base. That RUF commander shot dead another RUF commander with a pistol.⁴⁵⁰

In February 1998, the combined forces of the ARFC and the RUF were driven out of Freetown by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention force.

After 14 February 1998, a 1000-man RUF/AFRC unit known as "Junta One" arrived in Fadugu (Mambolo HQ town) and proceeded to attack many surrounding villages as part of "Operation Pay Yourself". Attacks were made upon Kagbasia, Kafogo, Kassasie, Thankorosidia, Madina, Kasandakoro, Kakayo and Kamanda.⁴⁵¹

On 15 February 1998, ECOMOG forces entered Fadugu town forcing ARFC/RUF forces to retreat towards Kabala. Fadugu town became the focus point for surrenders by RUF/AFRC forces present in the surrounding villages, as a result of which ECOMOG set up a screening process.⁴⁵² At least

⁴⁵⁰ More detail is required from the records on this.

⁴⁵¹ More detail is required from the records on these attacks.

⁴⁵² More detail is required from the records on the screening process.



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two killings of surrendered RUF/AFRC forces by ECOMOG soldiers are recorded. ECOMOG cooperated with the CDF to set up a town defence plan that included civilians.

CDF forces had made the main route between Magburaka and Koidu impassable to retreating RUF/AFRC forces, so the main route used was through Bumbuna (Kalansogoia, Tonkolili) and Bendugu (Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili) into Neini chiefdom. After 14 February 1998, a large convoy of RUF/AFRC vehicles moved through the towns of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) and Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom) through towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District). In both Alikalia and Yiffin, until early March 1998, there are reports of continual harassment of civilians and their property being taken by RUF/AFRC forces as part of "Operation Pay Yourself".

Throughout March and April 1998 in Sebeneh chiefdom, the number of RUF/AFRC forces present grew. There are also reports of continual looting of civilian property and expropriation of dwellings to house RUF/AFRC forces and their families. Civilians in Kalkoia (Sengbeh Chiefdom) report seeing small ECOMOG patrols shortly after the arrival of the main ECOMOG 2nd Battalion reached Kabala in early March. Shortly after ECOMOG arrived in Kabala, RUF/AFRC forces occupied the town of Serekolia (Mongo Chiefdom).

After 13 March 1998, ECOMOG forces commanded by entered the town of Alikalia from the north. A company of ECOMOG forces remained in Alikalia, whilst a platoon was dispatched to Yiffin town (Neini Chiefdom), in pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG met little resistance on entering Yiffin. In both Yiffin and Alikalia, ECOMOG forces and Section Chiefs accepted the surrender of unknown numbers of RUF/AFRC forces, who were issued with documents identifying them and then sent to Kabala or Makeni for further questioning by ECOMOG.

Immediately after entering both Yiffin and Alikalia, ECOMOG met with the Section Chiefs and requested that hunters be gathered together to assist ECOMOG troops. In Alikalia, 50 hunters were rapidly assembled and registered at the ECOMOG base. ECOMOG firstly provided training to those who registered in how to use an AK-47 rifle, and secondly ordered those trained to search the bush around Alikalia town for RUF/AFRC forces.

By 14 March 1998, ECOMOG troops had deployed to the northern town of Sinkunia (Dembelia Sinkunia Chiefdom) to the North of Kabala. Civilians in nearby Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) report arresting and tying up a local ARFC leader and handing him over to ECOMOG forces in Sinkunia. After 14 March 1998, ECOMOG forces arrived in Falaba town.

On 26 March 1998, an RUF/AFRC unit attacked the town of Kosaba in the Republic of Guinea, bordering Mondo chiefdom. The previous day this unit abducted 40 civilian men in Kamaron and Kiridu (both in Mongo Chiefdom) to guide them through to Kosaba. Two civilians were killed during the attack. RUF/AFRC forces took items like foam mattresses, guns, radios and foodstuffs from Kosaba. The abductees were forced to carry the looted property back to the RUF/AFRC base in Mansofenia.



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On 28 March 1998, ECOMOG forces stationed in Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) received reports of an RUF/AFRC buildup to the south of the town. A young boy reported that RUF/AFRC forces had captured his friend and killed him as a ritual sacrifice. An ECOMOG armoured car fired from Falaba (Sulima Chiefdom) in the direction of Alia (Alieya Chiefdom) village. In the early hours of the morning on 29 March, RUF/AFRC forces responded and attacked Falaba town with heavy machine guns and RPGs, killing 18 civilians, looting and burning down over 50 houses. ECOMOG withdrew to their pre-existing position in Sinkunia. Falaba was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces again on 3 April, thereby securing RUF/AFRC control of Falaba until the arrival of Guinean troops in late May 1998. The Guinean contingent remained until late November 1998.

On 30 March 1998, ECOMOG in Alikalia received reports from civilians of a large concentration of ARFC/RUF forces around Worombaia in the southern tip of Neini chiefdom, bordering with Tonkolili District. ECOMOG forces based in the town and 40 local hunters were dispatched by ECOMOG from Alikalia. Failing to locate RUF/AFRC forces, they returned to Alikalia in early April 1998.

In early April 1998, a contingent of Guinean ECOMOG troops attacked Serekolia town (Mongo), entering from the direction of Kabala. Residents report seeing 13 trucks, an unknown number of ground troops and a helicopter gunship. RUF/AFRC forces retreated from Serekolia towards Kurobonla. ECOMOG moved through Serekolia, and established a base in the nearby town of Mongo Bendugu (Mongo). There are also reports that shortly after moving from Serekolia, RUF/AFRC forces established a base in the town of Seria (Mongo Chiefdom), close to Mongo Bendugu, and on the main road southwards to the other RUF/ARFC bases in Neya chiefdom.⁴⁵³

On 11 April 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces arrived in the village of Mansofenia (Neya Chiefdom). They had more than 20 Honda motorcycles and a large and a varied amount of weaponry including RPGs, LMGs, AK-47s, shotguns, mortars, grenades and bladed weapons. The town was sealed off by RUF/AFRC forces. On 13 April, a large meeting of civilians and all military forces was convened. The RUF/AFRC forces were divided into five groups, to be based at Mansofenia, Yiriaia, Kurobonla (Neya Chiefdom), Mansodugu (Mongo Chiefdom) and Alikalia (Diang Chiefdom). On 20 April, some of the RUF/AFRC forces moved towards Kurobonla, and a much smaller group moved to Mandodugu. The Alikalia and Mansofenia groups remained in Mansofenia.

Late morning on 27 April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Yiffin from the easterly directions of Krutor and Konombaia village (both in Nieni Chiefdom).⁴⁵⁴ ECOMOG forces were ambushed with an RPG whilst setting up defences and retreated from Yiffin. The ECOMOG commander informed the Section Chief that the town should be evacuated because they were unable to defend against the RUF/AFRC attack. Many civilians fled the town into the nearby bush. RUF troops had red material tied around their heads and AFRC had white pieces tied around their heads. The house of the Town Chief was destroyed with an RPG. The chief was shot in the mouth but escaped to Alikalia. A number of the RUF/AFRC forces wore uniforms similar to that of ECOMOG and informed

⁴⁵³ More information is required from the records on this base and whether it in fact existed.

⁴⁵⁴ It is likely this groups moved from Mansofenia but further clarification is required from the records on this.



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civilians that they should head to the centre of town where they would be protected. RUF/AFRC forces gathered between 200 and 300 people in a barn, firing into the building before setting it on fire. Later that afternoon, RUF/AFRC forces left Yiffin in the direction of Alikalia. On 28 April 1998, returning civilians buried over 200 dead civilians in a mass grave in Yiffin. Two ECOMOG forces were also killed in the attack, after which Yiffin was left undefended.

Around midday on 28 April 1998, RUF/AFRC troops attacked Alikalia. ECOMOG forces and hunters (specifically, two hunters and one ECOMOG soldier) were at that time dug into trenches, having been warned of the attack by civilians escaping the RUF/AFRC attack on Yiffin on 27 April. They exchanged fire for about four hours, before repelling the RUF/AFRC attack. On 29 April 1998, the ECOMOG platoon arrived in Alikalia from Yiffin.

In early May, RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Mansofenia established a form of cooperation with civilians. Under the threat of their property being taken, civilians were ordered to provide a certain amount of livestock, palm oil, salt, groundnuts and other food items to support RUF/AFRC forces. Men from the village were to provide firewood and women were to deliver water and cook for RUF/AFRC forces.

In early May 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces (possibly moving from Kurobonla to the south) attacked and occupied the town of Gberefeh (either Mongo or Segbeneh Chiefdom), at the beginning of a motorable road leading to Serekoilia town (Mongo Chiefdom). Local hunters engaged them, but ran short of ammunition and were driven into the bush. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces set fire to a 10-wheel truck full of agricultural machinery and burnt down all the houses in the villages. Only the town mosque was left untouched. Two trucks of ECOMOG forces from the Guinean ECOMOG base in Mongo Bendugu were sent towards Gberefeh to engage the RUF/AFRC forces, but returned to Mongo Bendugu without having dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces from Gberefeh.

In the following days, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the villages of Dambafayi and Farama. In Farama, RUF/AFRC forces burned down all the houses, and killed a prominent town chief. There are reports that RUF/AFRC then stationed themselves in Serekoilia town.

On 5 May 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town of Tomania (Mongo Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC commanders met with the local chief and elders, informing them that they intended to attack the town of Dankawali (Sengbe Chiefdom). Between 8 and 10 May 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Dankawali. Three Nigerian ECOMOG forces and eight civilians were killed during the attack. Civilians fleeing the attack moved eastwards to Tomania.

On 6 May 1998, the town of Badala, a crossing point over the Seli river, was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces from the direction of Dalakuru. RUF/AFRC forces amputated both hands of one man and disfigured the lips, nose, eyes and forehead of another.

On 9 May 1998, Kondembaia town was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces. Both hands of two men were amputated and seven girls were raped by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces retreated to



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Fadugu town (Mabolo Chiefdom), to the north. Kondembaia was attacked again on 22 May from the direction of Diang Sokurela. Eleven people were killed in the attack and an unknown number of people had both hands amputated.

On 10 May, RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG forces stationed in Alikalia from the direction of Kulankor and Firawa in the north of Neini chiefdom. ECOMOG forces engaged the RUF/AFRC attack, which ceased after about 2 hours. Local militia were ordered by an ECOMOG commander to remove all undergrowth within a 300 metre perimeter around Alikalia. More trenches were dug, and for three weeks local militia and ECOMOG forces were placed on 24 hour-guard around the town.

By the early morning of 22 May 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces attacking from the RUF base at Koinadugu village (Sengbe Chiefdom) had captured the town of Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom). The 40-man ECOMOG unit was briefly driven from town. One CDF member was shot dead and his body cut up by RUF forces. Eleven civilians were killed in the attack and an unknown number of houses were burned down. On the same day, by 1000, ECOMOG reinforcements from Kabala arrived, but were ambushed in Kafogo village, nearby Fadugu. On 23 May, ECOMOG, SSD and CDF forces attacked Fadugu with the assistance of air support. RUF/AFRC forces retreated towards Kabala. ECOMOG forces immediately performed a house-to-house search of Fadugu, during which civilian property was taken.

On 2 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered Yiffin (Neini Chiefdom), under heavy rainfall. Using cutlasses, they tore the corrugated zinc roofing from an unknown number of houses, claiming they were "repairing" the properties. RUF/AFRC forces remained in Yiffin until the next day, singing songs and harassing civilians throughout the night.

On 3 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kondembaiai (Diang). In this attack, RUF/AFRC forces cut off the limbs of an unknown number of children between the ages of three and five. The RUF/AFRC forces searched every house in town, with the exception of the mosque and the Roman Catholic church.

On 6 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from the direction of Yiffin and Kulankor (both in Diang Chiefdom) attacked Alikalia town. ECOMOG and local militia repelled the RUF/AFRC attack by midday on 7 June 1998. RUF/AFRC forces killed three civilian men in the bush nearby Alikalia and one woman was shot in the stomach while attempting to escape. On 9 June 1998, ECOMOG commanders in Alikali ordered a unit of 40 local militia to travel to Firawa (Diang Chiefdom), to establish the whereabouts of the RUF/AFRC forces that attacked Alikalia. On the road to Firawa, this unit stopped at Kulanakor and learned from residents that the RUF/AFRC forces had moved to Gbefereh (Senebeh Chiefdom) in search of livestock. On their return to Alikalia, on 10 June, ECOMOG ordered the local militia to return to the trenches, where they stayed until 17 June before being allowed to freely move around the town.

On 30 June and 10 July 1998, soldiers of the SLA 1st Battalion moved through Alikalia towards Yiffin, dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces, on way to engage RUF at Kayima (Kono District). ECOMOG in Alikalia were informed by the commander that SLA forces would remain in Yiffin as



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an advance defence for Alikalia. One company of SLA forces remained in Yiffin, whilst the remainder advanced to attack RUF/AFRC positions in Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom, Kono District).

At the end of June 1998, Alikalia, Yiffin and Kabala were out of the control of the RUF/AFRC. On 24 June, the CDF was officially formed in Diang chiefdom.

In early July 1998, RUF/AFRC forces established combat bases in the villages of Koinadugu and Yamadugu (both in Sengbe Chiefdom).

Before 26 July 1998, reports reached the town of Firawa (Neini Chiefdom), immediately south of Koinadugu and Yamadugu (Sebeneh Chiefdom), that RUF/AFRC forces were gathered in the village of Banda Karafaia (Neini Chiefdom). On 26 July 1998, CDF forces laid an ambush for RUF/AFRC forces on the road into Firawa. After 2 hours, CDF retreated into the town, informing residents that they should hide in the bush. RUF/AFRC forces entered the empty town, burning down 20 houses and killing one civilian. They remained in Firawa until 28 July, until they moved westwards towards the town of Foria (Diang Chiefdom).

In the evening of 27 or 28 July 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and occupied Kabala town from the direction of Makeni. They were armed with AA guns, RPGs, mortars and other weapons and arrived in about 30 vehicles including Toyota land cruisers, Land Rovers and Mercedes Benz cars. While RUF/AFRC forces looted private property, there are no reports of violent incidents or burning of houses. Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG troops stationed in Kabala secured their defensive positions and remained in town until they were reinforced. The occupation lasted until the evening of either 1 or 2 August, when RUF/AFRC forces were driven from Kabala by ECOMOG forces and the SLA 2nd Battalion.⁴⁵⁵

Retreating from Kabala, RUF/AFRC forces settled in towns and villages on the arterial road leading eastwards from Kabala through Sebeneh chiefdom. These included Yamadugu, Koinadugu and Kalkoia (Sebeneh Chiefdom). Another unit moved further south, arriving in the town of Gberefeh (Sebeneh Chiefdom).

In the early hours of 11 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Fadugu (Mangolo Chiefdom) in an operation called "Operation Die." They were armed with RPGs, AK-58s and AK-47 machine guns. RUF/AFRC forces came through the Madingotown area of Fadugu, avoiding the ECOMOG checkpoint on the road from Kafogo and Kabala. ECOMOG forces engaged the RUF/AFRC forces but were unable to repel the attack. The Paramount Chief of Mambolo was shot dead at his home by RUF forces, who afterwards set fire to his corpse. Sixty-eight houses were burned down and eight civilians were killed, two of them being set on fire. The RUF/AFRC forces moved from the town later in the day on 12 September. The attack was primarily to loot ECOMOG ammunition dumps in the town.

⁴⁵⁵ Clarification is required from the records about the exact dates these incidents took place.



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On 18 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Karia (Diang Chiefdom) from the direction of Darakaru, in gold-rich area of Diang chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces burned 36 houses and abducted 10 civilians. One hundred SLA soldiers were deployed to Karia at the request of the chiefdom elders.

On 23 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces left Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom) for the town of Kamaron (Mongo Chiefdom), arriving in the early evening. Twenty-five men and 15 women were detained by RUF forces in a church in the town. RUF/AFRC forces entered every house in the town and took property, including food items, livestock and domestic goods. The stolen property was loaded onto trucks and driven to Kuronbonla. Fifteen houses were burnt when the RUF/AFRC forces left Kamaron the next day.

On 8 October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom) from Firawa (Neini Chiefdom) in the north. Although CDF and ECOMOG resisted the attack, RUF/AFRC burned down over 20 houses along their retreat route. CDF and ECOMOG forces pursued the RUF/AFRC unit over 2 miles out of Alikalia towards Firawa.

On 16 October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kuronbonla (Neya Chiefdom) and destroyed the bridges over the Bafin and Bagbe rivers along the main road through Mongo chiefdom. This was to prevent ECOMOG forces stationed in Mongo Bendugu (Mongo Chiefdom) from entering the Neya chiefdom, and putting pressure on the RUF/AFRC bases in Kuronbonla and Mansofenia. At the Bagbe crossing point, they destroyed the concrete on both ends of one of the main support rails, causing the wooden slats that made up the bridges to fall into the river. The bridges were rendered impassable to vehicles.

On 28 October 1998, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces from Kurobonla attacked the ECOMOG base at Mongo Bendugu. Since they had earlier destroyed both bridges over the main road, the attack was carried out on foot. Two RUF/AFRC forces were sent into Mongo Bendugu to surrender to ECOMOG, distracting their attention away from the main attack, which came along the southern road from Seria. RUF/AFRC forces killed over 20 civilians and three ECOMOG soldiers. ECOMOG retreated from the town to an unknown location, leaving behind arms and ammunition. RUF/AFRC forces took possession of this weaponry, in addition to looting livestock and domestic goods from civilian residences. An unknown number of civilians were captured and forced to carry the stolen property over 30 miles to Kurobonla.⁴⁵⁶

Between 1 and 7 November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Alikalia. They were repelled by combined ECOMOG and CDF forces who, having received warning from a local farmer, engaged the RUF/AFRC attack a mile out of Alikalia. On 2 November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kamarantak (Diang Chiefdom). SLA forces based in the village repelled the attack.

⁴⁵⁶ There are reports at this time of in-fighting within the RUF, which requires further information.



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Agreement). On the same day the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, RUF/AFRC forces in Thama Village (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) tied up, beat and executed four young boys. Residents of the village buried their corpses in a mass grave in Thama.

After the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, the RUF/AFRC established a large training camp in Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), on the Guinea-Makeni road. The Gbendembu camp replaced a camp located previously located in Kailahun District. It was set up both to bolster the RUF/AFRC ground force in Sierra Leone, and to train forces for attacks on towns in Guinea. Many civilians in Gbendembu were forced to work in the training camp preparing food for trainees. Conditions in the camp were harsh, and food was scarce. To ensure they did not escape, trainees were monitored continually by RUF/AFRC security forces. RUF/AFRC "Food Finding Missions" became commonplace in villages surrounding Gbendembu, and a specific group of RUF/AFRC "Night Combatants" carried out frequent looting raids in the area overnight. This contributed to a sense of heightened terror amongst civilians in and around the town.

In August 1999, "Operation Pay Yourself" began in Magbema. This was an ongoing RUF/AFRC slogan targeting towns and villages with a looting spree, the stolen property from which served as pay for the forces. This operation lasted for 72 hours. If any civilians refused to provide RUF/AFRC forces with food or with whatever goods they sought, they were either beaten or killed. Also in August, RUF/AFRC established "G5" civilian-military liaison committees throughout Safroko Limba Chiefdom. Like in other places, the G5 committee was tasked with administering the collection of daily contributions of foodstuff from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. Shortly after its establishment, RUF/AFRC forces were ordered to search the bush surrounding settlement to collect food for themselves.

In the southern headquarter tension was beginning to exhibit itself between RUF and AFRC commanders and ranks in Makeni (Bombali Sembora). In August, a senior RUF commander was captured and detained in Port Loko District by an AFRC splinter called the West Side Boys.³⁶³ The West Side Boys, based in the Okra Hill Area of lower Maforki Chiefdom and Koya Chiefdom in Port Loko District eventually released the senior RUF commander, who commandeered a number of vehicles in Lunsar (Port Loko District) and Magbema and returned to Makeni. In August 1999, in Makeni's Independence Square, one of the RUF commanders shot an AFRC commander at point blank range, killing him immediately. RUF and AFRC members fought for control of Makeni. Following this battle, the AFRC forces left Makeni and moved into Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) led by a different commander³⁶⁴. During their withdrawal from Makeni, AFRC forces abducted civilians en route to Lunsar to carry wounded AFRC personnel.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.³⁶⁵ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

³⁶³ See factual analysis for Port Loko District for further information.

³⁶⁴ This information will require further clarification, since it is also mentioned in the factual analysis for Tonkolili District.

³⁶⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999)



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(UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;³⁶⁶ 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.³⁶⁷

e) Events in 2000

On 5 January, a contingent of 450 Kenyan UNAMSIL peacekeepers and military observers (MILOBS) tried to enter Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom) but was denied entry by RUF/AFRC forces on the grounds that they had not been authorised by the RUF/AFRC high command to deploy in the town. By 6 January, companies of Kenyan UNAMSIL peacekeepers had set up camp in Makeni. In January 2000, RUF/AFRC forces in Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) stoned a civilian to death after accusing him of killing an RUF/AFRC member. The civilian's body was left unburied and dragged along the road to the nearby village of Mongoreh (Safroko Limba).

In February or March 2000, diamonds were found in Kambia Makuhun (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) by residents of the village. A member of RUF/AFRC senior command oversaw the mining operation, in which abducted civilians were forced to work as miners. Those accused of stealing were given 200 lashes. Within the month, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) and Makeni to reinforce Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom), a village at the intersection of a route that leads to Kambia Makuhun and the Gbundema–Kamakwie highway. On 24 February, the RUF/AFRC commander in Kamakwie captured the Paramount Chief of Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom and released him after two weeks when each household in the chiefdom had contributed 5,000 Leones to the RUF/AFRC. Other RUF/AFRC forces entered Kamaranka, and held a town meeting to announce that they planned to use AK-47 machineguns to chase a chicken belonging to a local lady. A young boys was shot in the leg during the chase. Later in year in Kamaranka, three RUF/AFRC members raped a women in the Kamaranka Police Station.

On 2 or 3 May, the Kenyan contingent of UNAMSIL stationed in Makeni came under attack from RUF/AFRC positions in the town. A number of British UN Military Observers were also deployed with the Kenyans. An RUF brigadier entered the Kenyan base, assaulted a Bangladeshi Major and with a group of other RUF forces abducted an unknown number of Kenyan peacekeepers. One Kenyan peacekeeper was shot dead at point blank range by an RUF/AFRC member. As the RUF brigadier tried to take a Kenyan officer, gunfire broke out between the two groups.³⁶⁸ RUF/AFRC forces in Makeni celebrated the attack on the peacekeepers. On 5 May 2000, 208 members of UNAMSIL's Zambian contingent were disarmed and captured en route to Makeni by RUF/AFRC forces based in Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces returned to Foredugu and Makeni with vehicles, communication sets, weapons and uniforms confiscated from the peacekeepers. The RUF/AFRC high command in Makeni encircled the Zambians partly to delay their advance so other RUF/AFRC forces could prevent a UNAMSIL helicopter from reaching the Kenyan contingent in Makeni. The Zambian captives were taken from Makeni to Kailahun District.³⁶⁹ Kenyan UNAMSIL broke out of Makeni on or around 11 May, and headed to UN outposts in Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and to Kabala (Wara Wara

³⁶⁶ BBC, 29 November 1999

³⁶⁷ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999

³⁶⁸ BBC Online News, 11 May 2000 (13:14 GMT 14:14 UK).

³⁶⁹ See the factually analysis for Kailahun District for further information.



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Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District), which was held by the “loyal” SLA. Kenyan UNAMSIL soldiers were attacked by RUF/AFRC snipers in Panlap, a village on the highway to Kabala. On or around 12 May, UK forces airlifted four UN MILOBs from Magburaka following their escape from Makeni.³⁷⁰

The RUF/AFRC had captured around 500 UNAMSIL peacekeeper since the beginning of May, prompting a crisis for the peacekeeping mission. On 8 May, the UK military commenced “Operation Palliser”, deploying to Sierra Leone the *HMS Ocean* and other vessels with around 800 soldiers from the Parachute Regiment.³⁷¹ UK forces secured the Freetown area and commenced re-training the SLA in June.³⁷² Between 8 and 14 May, RUF/AFRC forces unsuccessfully tried to occupy Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) in a bid to move into the Western Area. Other towns in Port Loko District, including Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) also came under attack from RUF/AFRC forces.³⁷³ By 28 May, following the series of events outlined below, UNAMSIL announced that virtually all the peacekeepers had been released by the RUF. In June RUF/AFRC and SLA forces fought for control of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), a key town in the RUF/AFRC’s defensive arc around Makeni. RUF/AFRC secured the town by 21 June.

Between May and July 2000, helicopter gunships began flying over the Makeni and towns along the main highway nearby Makeni, such as Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and Masungbo (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom). In early May, a gunship attacked Binkolo, destroying two civilian residences. On seeing the gunship RUF/AFRC forces would run from their positions and seek cover in the surrounding bush. On 9 May, the gunship attacked RUF/AFRC positions on the Masungbo-Makeni highway. On 29 May, a helicopter gunship dropped leaflets³⁷⁴ over Makeni. RUF/AFRC forces in Makeni Lorry Park attacked the helicopter. Five civilians were killed in the engagement, although it is not possible to say which side was responsible. The explosions could be heard in Binkolo, some 10 km from Makeni. On 7 July, a gunship flew over Binkolo, hovered and then left. On 29 July, the gunship returned to Makeni, and attacked RUF/AFRC positions killing at least one civilian and damaging three houses. Similar attacks by gunship were made in Kambia District, becoming more intense after 26 May 2000. Gunship attacks are also noted around this time in Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

Between August and October, RUF/AFRC commanders requested youths in Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and Bombali Bana (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) to be trained at the RUF/AFRC camp in Gbendembu. By this time, nearly two battalions of RUF/AFRC combatants had been trained at Gbendembu and deployed on missions in Guinea.

³⁷⁰ BBC Online News, 12 May 2000 (15:37 GMT 16:37 UK).

³⁷¹ On 24 May, soldiers from the 42 Commando Royal Marines replaced the paratroopers.

³⁷² See the factual analysis for the Western Area in 2000 for further information.

³⁷³ See the factual analysis for Port Loko District in 2000 for further information.

³⁷⁴ Leaflets dropped from Government of Sierra Leone helicopter gunships in Kambia stated that their next sortie would not be with leaflets, but Gatling machine guns, 57mm rockets, 23mm guns and 30mm grenades.



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In the morning of 3 September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Guinean town of Madina Oula. The RUF/AFRC had been concentrating forces in Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom) in the weeks before the attack, and conscription with Tambakha Chiefdom had greatly increased. RUF/AFRC forces attacked Guinean forces there but were forced to withdraw after three days when Guinean forces were reinforced. On their return to Fintonia on or around 7 September, RUF/AFRC forces held a town meeting and accused the civilian residents of providing information to the Guinean forces. As punishment, RUF/AFRC force burned down 15 houses in the town. Shortly after the attack on Madina Oula (Guinea), RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kambia District and attacked the Guinean border town of Pamelap.³⁷⁵

In response to RUF/AFRC encroachments, Guinea forces adopted a "Hot Pursuit" policy, in which RUF bases inside Sierra Leone along the Guinean-Sierra Leonean border were attacked in addition to the pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces inside Guinea. Guinean armed forces also moved their security checks three miles inside the territory of Sierra Leone. The RUF/AFRC unit based in Sanya (Tambakha Chiefdom) came under pressure from the new Guinean security policy and moved their base to a location nearby Sekusoria (Tambakha Chiefdom), a town on the border with Guinea. In early October, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Sekusoria but Guinean forces learned of these plans in advance and reinforcements arrived in the town in advance of the attack. In the weeks following the attack on Madina Oula, Guinean Forces attacked Tukukuray. The villages of Sanya and Somathai were attacked as well by Guinean forces and vigilantes. On 10 October, RUF/AFRC forces from Kambia District again attacked the Guinean town of Pamelap.

In late September, RUF/AFRC forces raided Thama (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and went house-to-house looking for valuable items. Seventeen civilians were abducted and forced to carry the stolen items to Makeni, a journey of over 40 miles.

f) Events in 2001

On 3 January, the RUF high command met with the UNAMSIL force commander in Magburaka.³⁷⁶ In January, the RUF/AFRC agreed with UNAMSIL to open the stretch of highway connecting Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni Town. On 31 January and 13 February, the UNAMSIL Core Contact Group met with the RUF/AFRC command in Makeni Town. At the latter meeting the RUF/AFRC returned 56 weapons, some communications equipment, and nine vehicles seized from UNAMSIL since deployment.³⁷⁷ On 16 February, a Bangladeshi UNAMSIL unit conducted a long-range patrol to Makeni from Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), passing through 16 RUF/AFRC checkpoint en route. The patrol met with the RUF brigadier in Makeni.³⁷⁸ Patrols continued throughout February, also moving from Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni. On 14 March, around 240 Nigerian UNAMSIL soldier commenced deployment to Lunsar,³⁷⁹ increasing to 776 by 23 March

³⁷⁵ See the factual analysis for Kambia District in 2000 for further information.

³⁷⁶ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 3 January 2001

³⁷⁷ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 13 February 2001

³⁷⁸ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 16 February 2001

³⁷⁹ UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001 and IRINWA, 16 March 2001



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2001.³⁸⁰ On 17 April, Nigerian UNAMSIL soldiers moved from Lunsar and commenced deployment to Makeni.³⁸¹ On 25 May, RUF/AFRC forces released 591 child combatants to UNAMSIL in Makeni.³⁸²

On 24 September, disarmament commenced in Bombali District. UNAMSIL established reception centres in Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom), Makeni (Bombali Sebori Chiefdom)³⁸³ and in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) in late October.³⁸⁴ On 15 November, 150 Sierra Leone Police deployed to Makeni.³⁸⁵

3. Conclusion

** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

b. Kambia District

1. Introduction

Kambia District is located in the north-west of Sierra Leone. The Republic of Guinea runs along the entire northern boundary of Kambia District, with the Atlantic Ocean lying to the west. Port Loko District is to the south of Kambia District and Bombali District is found to the east.

There are seven chiefdoms in Kambia District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Bramaia	Kukuna
Gbinleh Dixon	Tawaya
Samu	Kychom
Magbema	Kambia (District Headquarter)
Mambolo	Mambolo
Masungbala	Kawulia
Tonko Lima	Madina

The bulk of Kambia District is situated between the Little Scarcies River and The Great Scarcies River. The Great Scarcies River³⁸⁶ initially forms the border between Sierra Leone and the Republic of Guinea before running south through Kambia District into the Atlantic Ocean near Kassiré (Samu Chiefdom). Gbinleh Dixon and Samu Chiefdoms are located on the north bank of the Great Scarcies River, forming the boundaries with Magbema, Mambolo and Bramaia Chiefdoms. Traders from Guinea and Sierra Leone transport goods to Freetown along the Great Scarcies River, passing

³⁸⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 23 March 2001

³⁸¹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 17 April 2001.

³⁸² UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 29 May 2001.

³⁸³ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 25 September 2001.

³⁸⁴ OCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 16 Oct - 05 Nov 2001

³⁸⁵ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 16 November 2001.

³⁸⁶ Called the Kolente River in Guinea.



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through the wharf towns of Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom), Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom) and Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom). The Great Scarcies also passes nearby the district headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom).

There are four key land routes in Kambia District. The first runs north from Port Loko Town (Maforli Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom), where it continues north across the Great Scarcies River to the Guinean border at Pamelap (Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom). From there, the highway leads to Conakry, the capital city of Guinea. This route passes over a long road bridge at Mange, which was held by the RUF/AFRC for most of the period spanning August 1997 to March 2001. The second important route runs from Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) into Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom) and then directly to Kambia Town. This route can also be used to by-pass the road bridge at Mange and rejoin the Mange-Kambia highway at Sendugu Junction, just south of Kambia Town. The third route runs from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District). This route allows movement between the large town of Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom, Bombali District) and locations in Kambia District. The final key land route also runs from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) through Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) northwards to the Guinean border.

Between 1991 and 1995, Kambia District was not directly affected by the conflict. At the end of January 1995, the RUF extended their operations northwards into Kambia District from Port Loko District. The RUF did not attempt to hold any territory in Kambia District in 1995, but attacked the district headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom), killing 20 people. The force was heavily armed, carrying AK-47 machine guns, RPGs, small arms and grenades, as well as an array of bladed weapons; there would be little change in this configuration throughout the conflict. RUF forces abducted a large number of children and other civilians and also kidnapped seven Italian nuns to draw international attention to the RUF movement. The attack on Kambia Town was viewed as a demonstration of the ability of the RUF to strike throughout Sierra Leone. The inadequate response and poor discipline of the SLA led to a sharp deterioration in civil-military relations in Kambia District.

RUF forces returned to Kambia District in February 1996, concentrating on securing land and river routes between northern Bombali District and Kambia District. Shortly before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections on 26 February 1996, RUF forces staged a number of attacks on towns in the District, killing civilians and stealing civilian property. RUF forces attacked two key points on the road linking Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). The town of Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom), just north of Madina on the road to Guinea, was also attacked. In addition, they attacked a wharf town and crossing on the Little Scarcies River near Kabbah Ferry (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District), enabling seaward river access to Sanda Magbolontor and BKM Chiefdoms in Port Loko District and Mambolo and Magbema Chiefdoms in Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), a large wharf town and economic centre on the Great Scarcies River. From May until November, Guinean forces moved into Sierra Leone and established a base at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). In cooperation with local guides, Guinean forces patrolled the roads around the border

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

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with Guinea to prevent RUF infiltration. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF leadership signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. The resulting ceasefire held firm in Kambia District until May 1997.

In May 1997 the RUF resumed hostilities, moving from Bombali District to attack Madina (Bramaia Chiefdom), stealing property from the town's Catholic Mission. On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a successful coup and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); soon after, the AFRC leadership joined with the RUF. The RUF/AFRC immediately established a brigade headquarter for Kambia District in the village of Yibaya (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). As the year progressed, the RUF/AFRC moved into Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom) and established a training camp at Kamba (Magbema Chiefdom). At this time, there was an escalation in the mistreatment of civilians. During attacks on villages, murder, rape and abduction were commonplace. Many civilians were forced to carry stolen property. News of high profile and brutal killings spread through the District, prompting many civilians to cooperate with the RUF/AFRC and take on roles as porters or administrators in order to protect themselves from the consequences of non-cooperation.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Kambia and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom). During the attacks, they looted extensively, as well as killing and abducting civilians. The RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters remained in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) and a series of intense raids were staged on nearby towns and villages across September and October 1998. A number of civilians were killed and mutilated in barbaric ways by RUF/AFRC forces; others had one or more limbs amputated by RUF/AFRC members. Guinean forces strengthened their deployment on the border with Sierra Leone and commenced artillery bombardment of suspected RUF/AFRC bases. RUF/AFRC forces occupied another point on the Great Scarcies River and, in addition to taxing road and river traders, began imposing a high weekly tax on the houses in RUF/AFRC occupied areas. The Great Scarcies River took on increasing logistical importance to the RUF/AFRC; since CDF and ECOMOG forces fortified Port Loko District, control of points of the river allowed RUF/AFRC forces to generate significant revenue by taxing traders. In addition, it allowed supplies to be transported to other RUF/AFRC bases inland. At this time, a series of hard punishments were administered by the RUF/AFRC command to RUF/AFRC members that were caught committing violent acts against civilians. However, the effectiveness of these disciplinary measures is overshadowed by a pattern of escalating violence towards against the civilian population. Cruel and high profile punishment of civilians and RUF/AFRC members created an atmosphere of terror that was reinforced by the hunt for "rebel collaborators" in the aftermath of successful Guinean attacks on various villages.

In February and March 1999, after the RUF/AFRC had failed in its bid to capture Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces occupied towns across Kambia District, including Kambia Town and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom). Guinean forces in Kambia Town retreated to positions outside the town and engaged RUF/AFRC forces throughout March for full control over the town. Guinean artillery inflicted huge damage on civilian residences in the town. The wharf town of Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom) and Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) were also both occupied. Uncharacteristically, RUF/AFRC forces entered Rokupr and Mambolo without firing a shot,

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

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wearing white strips of cloth tied around their heads. While civilians welcomed their arrival, the peace did not last long, as RUF/AFRC forces began taxing the civilian population and abducting young men to join their movement. The RUF/AFRC now had full control over all the main wharfs on the Great Scarcies River and began appointing civilian chairpersons and secretaries to administer an extensive system of collecting house taxation and food “contributions” from the civilian population. The consolidation of control over Kambia District was part of a general RUF/AFRC strategy to secure Makeni and encircle Port Loko Town. Bases in Port Loko District at Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom) complimented the RUF/AFRC hold over the Mange Bridge, rendering the main northern route to Makeni and inland unusable. In mid 1999, the RUF/AFRC extended activity to Kassiré (Samu Chiefdom) and began moving into Guinea by night to rob traders. Guinean forces started the artillery bombardment of upstream traffic on the Great Scarcies River, resulting in many unidentified corpses floating past the downstream wharfs. Guinean forces also started using long-range patrols and helicopter gunships to secure the border area.

In 2000, the RUF/AFRC moved their brigade headquarters to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). In April, UNAMSIL commenced long-range patrols into Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces disarmed a company of Nigerian UNAMSIL peacekeepers in May 2000, releasing them after a few days. Guinean forces intensified their bombardment of towns where RUF/AFRC forces were stationed, resulting in many civilian deaths. RUF/AFRC forces took up positions on the Guinean border and late in the year attacked towns inside Guinean territory. The Guinean bombardment continued into 2001. In the first months of 2001, the RUF/AFRC opened up the highway between the towns of Port Loko and Kambia, allowing UNAMSIL to patrol parts of the District. In May, RUF/AFRC forces commenced disarmament in Kambia District at UNAMSIL-run centres in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) and Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). The SLA also returned to the District in May and by August 2001, disarmament was complete across the District.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1995

From the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), RUF forces pushed into Port Loko District during the first three weeks of January 1995, focussing on the road network linking the towns of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Foreduku and Kamasundo (both Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces then moved into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District), which borders Kambia District, where they attacked villages on the main road through the chiefdom and also attacked Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) before moving into Kambia District. Despite the deployment of SLA forces in the District headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom), RUF forces entered Kambia District on 23 January 1995, advancing towards Barmoi³⁸⁷ (Masungbala Chiefdom), 10 miles from Kambia Town near the border with Port Loko District.

At dawn on 25 January 1995, RUF forces attacked Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom). The attack came from the direction of Kolenten Secondary School and lasted for around four hours. The RUF forces did not face any resistance from SLA forces stationed in the town and killed about 20 civilians

³⁸⁷ Also spelt Gbamoye.



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and a policeman. Around 300 civilians were rounded-up at the Long Communication Pole part of town and screened by RUF forces. Since they were unable to control 300 people, the majority were released, with 70 civilians remaining in RUF custody. Three young boys who escaped abduction were caught by RUF forces in Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) and publicly tortured to death. During the attack, RUF forces entered the hospital compound and abducted around 50 schoolchildren³⁸⁸ and seven expatriate nuns from the Rome-based order of the Xaverian Missionary Society of Mary, who were operating a dispensary. RUF forces paraded the nuns and around 100 other civilian residents around the town for three hours before moving south to an unknown destination, possibly Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District).³⁸⁹

Around five hours after the attack, two truckloads of SLA forces arrived in Kambia Town. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that over 24,000 civilians had fled into Guinea immediately after the 25 January RUF attack on Kambia Town.³⁹⁰ In the wake of the attack, both local youths and the SLA stole civilian property.

On 31 January 1995, the RUF leader requested the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to act as an intermediary between the RUF and the NPRC concerning the release of the seven nuns.³⁹¹ On 13 February, the RUF leader made a number of demands on the Italian Ambassador to Sierra Leone for the release of the nuns, namely the provision of medicine, a satellite phone and a generator.³⁹² RUF forces finally released the nuns onto the Lunsar-Makeni highway on 21 March 1995, their demands remaining unmet.³⁹³

Kambia District was quiet for the remainder of 1995, although rumours about new RUF attacks persisted throughout the District. The RUF moved into the Western Area by April 1995 and attacked Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) in June 1995.

b) Events in 1996

January and February 1996 were extremely tense politically, with ongoing disagreements between the NPRC, the SLA and the RUF concerning the elections scheduled for 26 February. In mid-January, the NPRC leader was overthrown by his deputy and fled to Guinea. Throughout this time, the RUF concentrated on securing land and river routes between northern Bombali District and Kambia District. First, RUF forces attacked two key points on the road linking Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and the headquarter town of Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). Second, RUF forces attacked key wharfs on the Little Scarcies River near Kabbah Ferry (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District),³⁹⁴ allowing seaward river access to Sanda Magbolontor and BKM Chiefdoms in Port Loko District and Mambolo and Magbema Chiefdoms in Kambia District.

³⁸⁸ AFP, 27 February 1995 reports that parents of around 50 children abducted by the RUF on 25 January 1995 appealed to international agencies for assistance in securing their release.

³⁸⁹ All details of kidnap from AFP, 26 January 1995.

³⁹⁰ Facts on File World News Digest, 23 February 1996 quoting UNHCR 31 January 1996.

³⁹¹ AFP, 31 January 1995.

³⁹² AFP, 13 February 1995.

³⁹³ Xinhua, 21 March 1995 and AFP, 22 March 1995.

³⁹⁴ See factual analysis Bombali District in 1996 for further information.



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RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), a large wharf town and economic centre on the Great Scarcies River.

On 31 January 1996, staff of the Catholic Mission in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) intercepted a radio message that RUF forces were planning to attack Madina the following day at 08.00. The Paramount Chief was contacted immediately and a town meeting was held at the Court Barrie in Madina. On 1 February 1996, RUF forces entered Kambia District using the route from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) that runs up the centre of the District. The RUF forces attacked Madina Town between 06.00 and 08.00, meeting no resistance. Seventeen houses were burnt down, one man was killed and two other men were forced to carry items the RUF forces stole during the assault on the township. After the attack, the RUF forces returned to the Kamakwie area, possibly to their camp at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom, Bombali District) for a meeting with another RUF group that in the meantime had attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom).

In the morning of 20 February 1996 an RUF force numbering around 300 targeted Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), using Makatic Section as entry point to the town. Rokupr, which is divided into the town proper and the large, economically important Rice Research Station, is less than 13 miles due south of the District headquarter town of Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom). As with the attack on Kambia, SLA forces were inadequately equipped and numbered too few to resist the RUF offensive. During the attack, RUF forces killed a popular Islamic cleric who had identified one of the RUF members. An unknown number of people were abducted but released the same day. RUF members looted around 250 houses, burnt down eight houses and stole rice; the Rice Research Station was also severely looted.

On 23 February 1996, peace talks between the RUF and the NPRC leadership commenced in Abidjan, the commercial and administrative centre of Cote d'Ivoire. Between 23 and 26 February 1996, RUF forces attacked Kamakwie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom, Bombali District), at the eastern end of the road axis from Madina and Kukuna. On 25 February, RUF forces attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom). During the attack, the RUF forces burnt down between 30 and 50 houses and looted extensively. The brother of a prominent politician was shot dead by RUF forces and an old woman and a baby were burnt to death in one of the houses. From Kukuna, RUF forces went to Makindota (Tonko Limba Chiefdom), moving to their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) on 28 February 1996.

Three months later, in May 1996, Guinean forces set up a base in Madina (Magbema Chiefdom), where they stayed for about six months, working together with a locally mobilised civil defence,³⁹⁵ as RUF forces began moving towards the northern part of the District along the Guinean border. During this period, Guinean forces patrolled all around the Madina - Kukuna route.

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF leadership signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. This provided for the immediate and total cessation of hostilities.³⁹⁶

³⁹⁵ The affiliation of these civil defence people, if any, is unknown.

³⁹⁶ See factual analysis for the Western Area in 1996 for further information.



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c) Events in 1997

A small RUF force again attacked Madina on 18 May 1997. Using a red Toyota Hi-Lux stolen in the prior attack on Madina, they took medicine, clothes, generators and furniture from the Catholic Mission. The stolen property was taken to the main road leading to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and then to the Ro-Source base (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District). RUF forces attacked Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) on the same day.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a successful coup and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); soon after, the AFRC leadership joined with the RUF. Shortly after the coup, RUF forces based in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) moved on to Tonko Limba Chiefdom to establish a base in Yibaya,³⁹⁷ a village in the centre of the chiefdom less than 10 miles from the international border with the Republic of Guinea. The RUF established another base south of Yibaya at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Yibaya was the first seat of the joint RUF/AFRC command in Kambia District. There were few attacks on civilians in the area surrounding Yibaya, primarily for fear of provoking Guinean forces to return to Madina. Yibaya would be the launch point for attacks on the main towns in Kambia District.

Shortly before the signing of the Conakry Peace Plan on 23 October 1997, around 500 RUF/AFRC members under the command of a senior member of the RUF/AFRC leadership carried out "Operation Stay in Madina" (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). A young man was appointed by the RUF/AFRC as Town Chief, and was put in control of revenue-generating activities. This led to a general escalation of ill-treatment of the civilian population by the RUF/AFRC forces in the villages surrounding Madina. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property, beat civilians, raped women and forced young and strong men to carry stolen items. The RUF/AFRC forces established a "Combat Camp" in Kamba (Masungbala Chiefdom), where many important commanders came to deploy their forces all over Kambia District. RUF/AFRC forces also established a checkpoint four miles south of Madina at Nuemeya Mabande village to screen road traffic through the "Mene Curve" route from Port Loko to Kambia.

In Kamba, an unknown number of members of the Dina Ba Yeh Sor³⁹⁸ religious group were accused by the RUF/AFRC commander of stealing 15 gallons of palm oil from the nearby village of Banka Makunloh (Masungbala Chiefdom). They were stripped, tied up and beaten unconscious³⁹⁹ by four members of an RUF Small Boy Unit. The captives were then swung "like a hammock" and thrown away. News of this incident quickly spread through Masungbala and Tonka Limba Chiefdoms, prompting many civilians to cooperate with the RUF/AFRC, taking on roles such as load carriers and public relations officers for fear of the consequences of non-cooperation.

d) Events in 1998

Between 6 and 12 February 1998, ECOMOG forces entered Freetown and removed the RUF/AFRC forces from the bulk of the Western Area. In March 1998, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations: in brief, within four days of commencement, ECOMOG forces had taken

³⁹⁷ Also spelt Yibaia.

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RUF forces moved from their base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Kambia District, advancing into Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom) on 12 February 1998. In Barmoi, RUF/AFRC forces burnt down eight houses, abducted 50 civilians and forced them to carry stolen property. Another RUF/AFRC commander was left in charge in Barmoi and the former commander moved on to attack Kambia Town on 14 February 1998. In Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom), the RUF/AFRC forces killed eight men, stole a large amount of property and burnt down a large number of houses. On 19 February 1998, the same force simultaneously assaulted Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) and Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District), overcoming ECOMOG forces deployed in Mange and pushing them back into BKM Chiefdom.⁴⁰⁰

Guinean ECOMOG forces deployed from the Republic of Guinea to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) at some point in late February or early March 1998.⁴⁰¹ On 23 February, youths in Kambia Town captured and burnt alive two RUF members in retaliation for an attack on Barmoi (Masungbala Chiefdom), where RUF/AFRC forces had disrupted the town market. Another two captives were handed over to the Guinean forces.⁴⁰²

At this time, RUF/AFRC forces were already based in Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). On 8 April 1998, an important conference occurred between many commanders in Madina. It was during this meeting that the AFRC High Command planned the operation "Stay in Kambia", but the plan was later executed on 11 February 1999. Following the conference, the RUF/AFRC field commander gathered the town residents together and asked them for support. He also stated that civilians should report to him any incidences of violence committed by RUF/AFRC members; any RUF/AFRC members caught carrying out such activities would be shot on sight. On 15 April, the RUF/AFRC commander executed two RUF/AFRC child combatants who had reportedly raped a woman in the village of Gboray Laya (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). The two corpses were buried in a single grave behind the Madina town market. After this event, RUF/AFRC forces tied up a Sierra Leone police officer, placed him in the boot of a car and left it in the sun; he was later released.

Residents of Banka Makunloh (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) who had crossed into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District) requested⁴⁰³ the Gbethi Society to provide them with security. On 24 August 1998, Gbethis (CDF) from Port Loko District attacked RUF/AFRC forces stationed at Katherie⁴⁰⁴ (Tonka Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District), killing an RUF/AFRC captain. RUF/AFRC forces retaliated by capturing and decapitating 15 residents of Katherie, subsequently placing their

⁴⁰⁰ See factual analysis for Port Loko District in 1998 for further information.

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severed heads on poles at the town entrance points. During the attack, three civilians had their hands and ears amputated by RUF/AFRC forces. Others, including a three year-old baby, were wounded when RUF/AFRC members attacked them with bladed weapons.

From 12 September to early October 1998, the RUF/AFRC command based in Madina focused activity on Tonko Limba Chiefdom, attacking the villages of Yibaya, Kathantinah, Kakula, Kamabala, Kasengeta, Kabasa, Kamasasa, Katimbo and Kakonteh. During the attacks on Yibaya, Kathantinah and Kakula, RUF/AFRC forces killed 16 civilians. These three villages were occupied by Guinean ECOMOG forces on or around 16 September 1998.⁴⁰⁵

In Kamabala (Tonka Limba Chiefdom) RUF/AFRC forces, who had earlier infiltrated the town disguised as IDPs, mistreated and killed eight people. RUF/AFRC forces impaled the son of a prominent elder on a sharpened pole, and bayoneted another woman in the right leg for refusing to pay them money. RUF/AFRC forces burnt down all the grass houses in the village before heading into the bush to collect money from village residents who had fled the attack. In Kakonteh (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces cut a finger off a young mother and injured her with blows to the head from a cutlass when she stopped them from decapitating her baby.⁴⁰⁶ An unknown number of others were killed during the attack and all the houses but one were burnt. In Kangawala (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces abducted, raped and then released a number of women. In Katimbo (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces injured a man with blows to the head from a machete and amputated a hand each from two other civilians. In early October 1998, a land dispute broke out between the villages of Yibaya and Kakula (both Tonka Limba Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Yibaya assisted residents to occupy the disputed land, meeting resistance from the people of Kakula; in the resulting battle, 16 people were killed.

On 28 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces staged a surprise attack on Kukuna (Bramala Chiefdom). Guinean ECOMOG forces stationed in Kukuna engaged the RUF/AFRC forces and, receiving reinforcements, repelled the RUF/AFRC from the town. RUF/AFRC forces killed 13 civilians, around seven of whom died from blood loss following the amputation of one or more limbs.⁴⁰⁷ RUF/AFRC forces abducted 10 civilians, and burnt down around 60 houses. Much of the public infrastructure, including the Court Barrie and health facilities, were also destroyed during the battle. Following the attack, it is reported in general terms that Guinean ECOMOG began hunting for RUF/AFRC collaborators.

In the light of this attack, in the final months of 1998, Guinean forces decided to launch artillery attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Sella Limba Chiefdom (Bombali District). After 22 October, Guinean ECOMOG deployed 3,000 troops along the border with Sierra Leone, and a further 1,000 into Kambia District, including Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom).⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁵ AFP, 16 September 1998.

⁴⁰⁶ The woman and her child were both taken to the government hospital in Kambia.

⁴⁰⁷ Amputation detail only. All Africa News, 30 September 1998.

⁴⁰⁸ BBC, 25 October 1998.



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From October onwards, RUF/AFRC forces moved toward the south-west of the District, occupying Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom), a small town situated along the banks of the Great Scarcies River. Rosinor is also a key trading and transit point from where produce is taken to Guinea for sale. RUF/AFRC forces entered the town along the river from the direction of Rokupr. They first fired into the air to frighten the town residents and then stole property from the wharf area of Rosinor. RUF/AFRC forces frequently made such raids, forcing civilians to hide their belongings in the bush surrounding the town. In December, RUF/AFRC forces requested the traditional authorities of Rosinor to find them accommodation in the town and eventually occupied two large houses. RUF/AFRC forces taxed each resident of Rosinor two cups of rice and Le 2,000.⁴⁰⁹ Those defaulting were locked up in a cell, or had essential household items like cooking utensils and pots taken away until they paid. RUF/AFRC forces established two checkpoints in Rosinor, one at the wharf and another at Yomkeleya (Samu Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC members below 15 years of age patrolled the wharf area and taxed alighting boats a sum of between Le 10,000 and Le 20,000 depending on their destination. RUF/AFRC forces stole bags of rice and other property from traders passing through the Rosinor stretch of the river while those at the Yomkeleya checkpoint collected money from vehicles entering the town. More junior RUF/AFRC members took each day's stolen property for collection at the house of the RUF/AFRC commanding officers. The RUF/AFRC command in Rosinor established a guardhouse where RUF/AFRC members caught committing serious crimes⁴¹⁰ would be beaten and imprisoned for a few days without rations.

At the end of 1998, a substantial number of the RUF/AFRC forces deployed in Kambia District headed to Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to support the attack on Makeni and then the assault on Freetown. The Madina brigade was moved to Makeni, leaving behind a skeleton force in Madina.

e) Events in 1999

RUF/AFRC forces invaded Freetown between 6 and 20 January. In preparation for the 6 January invasion of Greater Freetown, RUF/AFRC force staged preliminary attacks in late December on towns in Port Loko District and the Western Area, including Port Loko Town, Ro-Gberray (both Maforki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), Masiaka, Songo (both Koya Chiefdom), Newton (Koya RD, Western Area) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Also in late December, the towns of Makeni (Bombali Seborra, Bombali District) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) were occupied by the RUF/AFRC. ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC back from Freetown to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999. RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from the Western Area running through Port Loko District throughout this time. During January, Kambia District remained a key destination for IDPs and humanitarian organisations continued to ship relief supplies to Kambia

⁴⁰⁹ As a very rough guide, one million leones is approximately equivalent to 500 USD. This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

⁴¹⁰ It is not specified what constituted a serious crime.



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Town (Magbema Chiefdom). Throughout February, the RUF/AFRC occupied all the key towns in Kambia District and imposed an extensive system of house, traffic and trade taxation in those areas.

On 5 February, an RUF/AFRC member at Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom) beat and tortured a well-known riverboat captain by making knife cuts on his back and dripping rum onto the wounds.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) on 11 February 1999, engaging Guinean ECOMOG forces at a checkpoint along the route. The RUF/AFRC established a base in Kambia Town, where they remained until late May 2001. Many of the town's residents and those of nearby villages towards Guinea, passing through Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom towards the Pamelap border crossing. On entering Kambia Town, RUF/AFRC forces targeted prominent SLPP supporters and organisers in the town; they also burnt down many houses and stole property. Guinean ECOMOG forces established checkpoints near Kambia Town and at the bridge over the Great Scarcies River, intermittently firing artillery at RUF/AFRC positions in the town. The primary result of these bombardments was the destruction of civilian residences and other property.

RUF/AFRC forces informed those remaining in Kambia Town that they would not inflict havoc on the civilians in the town, as they may have heard from others. This reassured people, who began resettling in the towns and villages in the area. However, the RUF/AFRC forces soon started harassing people, asking them constantly for food and restricting their movement. To move from one point to another, people had to buy a "passport" from the RUF/AFRC forces, which initially cost Le 500 and later rose to Le 1,000. The rate of killing was not as high as the previous years and people were now mainly killed when they refused or were unable to give food or money. For example, in Kambia Town, a fisherman who came back from the sea without fish was killed by a member of the RUF/AFRC forces.

RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Mambolo Town (Mambolo Chiefdom), on the south bank of the Great Scarcies River, on 11 and 12 February. RUF/AFRC forces killed three civilians and raped one woman in front of her husband. They also looted shops and abducted civilians to carry the stolen property as they left the town towards Kamba, a village near Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). Around this time, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Seed Multiplication Project near Mambolo, destroying much of the machinery and stealing around 5,000 bushels of rice, which they transported to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) and sold to traders.

Also on 11 February, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) searching for food items and valuable property. This mission was code-named "Operation Feed Yourself" and had not been designed to include the killing of civilians or the destruction of property. Two days later, RUF/AFRC forces returned to Kukuna from the direction of Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces shot dead two civilians with mental health problems and raped a number of young women. A large amount of property was stolen. As a result of these actions, civilians fled from Kukuna to Guinea. While maintaining Madina as their Brigade headquarter, at some point after 13 February the RUF/AFRC deployed a force of between 20 and 50 in number to Kukuna.⁴¹¹

⁴¹¹ The command of the detachment in Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) rotated a number of times between 1999 and 2001.



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RUF/AFRC forces entered Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) on 25 February 1999 from the direction of Royanka and Kambia Town. Their entrance was unusual in that RUF/AFRC forces had tied pieces of white cloth around their heads and claimed to be seeking peace. Between Ahmaddiuaa Muslim Secondary School and the wharf area of Rokupr, the town residents organised a procession to welcome the RUF/AFRC forces. The RUF/AFRC commander addressed a crowd in the Wongbo Hall, promising that any of his forces caught inflicting violence on civilians would be punished. By the beginning of March, however, the RUF/AFRC had commenced conscripting youths of the town into the RUF/AFRC and taking them to a training camp they had established at the nearby village of Kamba (Magbema Chiefdom).⁴¹² Residents of villages near Kamba were ordered to register with the RUF/AFRC command at Kamba, which meant that the village had to present at least Le 200,000 and a large amount of food and livestock to the RUF/AFRC command. With the exception of Rokupr Town,⁴¹³ RUF/AFRC forces imposed a monthly tax of Le 1,000 per house in all villages in Magbema Chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces publicly molested or confiscated the property of those who failed to pay the house tax.

At the beginning of March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces returned to Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom), and established a base in the town. As they had done in Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) on 25 February, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town peacefully, singing and dancing and claiming to want peace. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC members stripped those civilians that joined the dance of quality clothing and jewellery. RUF/AFRC forces quickly occupied a number of houses in the town and established checkpoints at the Mambolo Wharf and on the Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Mateite (Mambolo Chiefdom) Highway. To assist them with the administration of the town, the RUF/AFRC command also appointed numerous chairpersons and secretaries from among the town's residents. While in Mambolo, the RUF/AFRC stole civilian building materials and started rebuilding the Mambolo Jetty, constructing a number of roundabouts on which they painted the faces of the RUF/AFRC leadership.

Guinean ECOMOG forces counter-attacked RUF/AFRC forces in Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom) between 12 and 18 March, seizing parts of the town.⁴¹⁴ The attacks were in response to reports that RUF/AFRC forces had taken control of a customs point on the border at Gbalamya (Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom) and had advanced on the town of Pamelap, just across the border from Kambia Town.⁴¹⁵

Beginning in March, many RUF/AFRC came to Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom) from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom), Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom, Bombali District) and other towns on the Great Scarcies River. They travelled northwards upriver, crossing the Guinean border and heading by night to the town of Dagagbay, the site of an important trade fair, where they robbed Guinean traders, killing those that tried to resist. At least until June, RUF/AFRC forces continued to come to Rosinor. The Guinean Government decided to strengthen its deployment of forces in towns like

⁴¹² Kamba is about 8 miles north east of Rokupr, across the Mange-Kambia highway.

⁴¹³ The reason for this exception is unknown.

⁴¹⁴ AFP, 18 March 1999.

⁴¹⁵ African News Service, 12 March 1999.



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Bubuya, Koya and Funkdeh just within Sierra Leonean territory. Despite regular patrols and engagement with RUF/AFRC units at Rosinor, Guinean forces did not prevent RUF/AFRC forces from harassing civilians and stealing property. Indeed, the Guinean forces often turned back civilian river traders, suspecting them to be RUF/AFRC members. In general terms, whenever Guinean forces detected an RUF/AFRC unit travelling up river into Guinea, artillery fire would be brought to bear on the Great Scarcies River between Rosinor and Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom); many unidentified corpses were subsequently found floating in the river

On 16 May 1999, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom) by motorboat from Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom). Kassirie is located at the mouth of the Great Scarcies River and, like other towns further upriver including Mambolo (Mambolo Chiefdom), Rokupr, Kambia (both Magbema Chiefdom) and Rosinor (Samu Chiefdom), is an important transit and trade route between Sierra Leone and Guinea. To frighten residents, RUF/AFRC forces fired in the air with AK-47s while going house-to-house kicking down doors and stealing property. A motorbike belonging to the local police post was also taken. The stolen property was loaded onto the motorbikes and taken to the RUF/AFRC base at Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces also attacked on Mapotolon (Samu Chiefdom), about 10 miles from Kassirie, where they captured two men.

In mid-May 1999, RUF/AFRC forces returning from missions in Port Loko District⁴¹⁶ captured six men from Rokamba (Masungbala Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC brigade commander later personally executed the six captives at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom).

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May in the Togolese capital, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement).

The second RUF/AFRC attack on Kassirie (Samu Chiefdom) occurred during the ceasefire period, in the evening of 11 June 1999. RUF/AFRC forces stole civilian property during the attack. Senior members of the RUF/AFRC command addressed the residents of Kassirie, informing them that they would punish any RUF/AFRC member who killed or stole. Shortly after this, the RUF/AFRC command in Kassirie appointed a civilian Chairperson to act as an intermediary, administering the collection of a monthly contribution to the RUF/AFRC from the civilian population. In early July, a helicopter gunship bombarded Kassirie, killing two civilians. On 16 July 1999, Guinean ECOMOG forces acting on information passed to them by residents of the town successfully ambushed RUF/AFRC forces entering Kassirie. ECOMOG forces killed at least three members of the RUF/AFRC and captured a number of others. RUF/AFRC forces retaliated in the following days and burnt down over 100 houses in Kassirie.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the RUF/AFRC began requiring the inhabitants of villages throughout Tonka Limba Chiefdom to pay money and feed the RUF/AFRC

⁴¹⁶ The RUF/AFRC Madina Brigade was involved in planning attacks in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District) at this time.



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forces. On market day in Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom), which occurs every Friday, RUF/AFRC forces levied Le 500 and three cups of rice or oil from each house; those who defaulted were ill-treated. For example, at Kasuroh village, just north of Madina, RUF/AFRC forces broke the leg of an old man who refused to let them take his livestock. In Mapotolon (Samu Chiefdom), local youths responded to this ill-treatment by killing a number of RUF/AFRC members in the village. The RUF/AFRC forces in Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) launched a heavy attack on Mapotolon in retaliation, surrounding the village and burning down every residence.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.⁴¹⁷ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November,⁴¹⁸ 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.⁴¹⁹

f) Events in 2000

In late April, UNAMSIL commenced long-range patrols in Kambia District, particularly around the border areas. UNAMSIL plans to continue deployments into Kambia District were interrupted when the RUF/AFRC disarmed and detained around 300 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in different locations across Sierra Leone. In early May 2000, RUF/AFRC forces disarmed a 100 strong Nigerian UNAMSIL contingent near Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom). They were released in Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom) a few days later.

The RUF/AFRC moved the Kambia Brigade headquarters to Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) at some point in early 2000. On 26 May 2000, a Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunship bombarded Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), killing three people and wounding two others. Shortly before this, around late March or early April 2000, the same gunship had dropped leaflets telling the RUF to surrender and disarm to UNAMSIL, warning that the next time it would be bombs,⁴²⁰ not leaflets. This practice was also carried out in Bombali and Tonkolili Districts. RUF/AFRC forces would shoot at civilians attempting to take one of the leaflets. After 26 May 2000, the helicopter gunship came regularly, which resulted in civilian deaths in Rokupr, Kambia Town (both Magbema Chiefdom) and Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom). This continued until June 2000, when the Guinean forces bombarded Rokupr on numerous occasions, killing up to 17 civilians.

In June 2000, RUF/AFRC forces harassed civilians in Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom). On 15 June, a member of the RUF/AFRC started beating any civilians who would not hand over their bicycles to him. Three days later, a man who had defaulted on a daily payment to the RUF/AFRC was beaten 300 times with an axe handle by RUF/AFRC members. He passed out and was then detained in a large box before being released.

⁴¹⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

⁴¹⁸ BBC Online News, 29 November 1999.

⁴¹⁹ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999.

⁴²⁰ The leaflets refer specifically to Gatling machine guns, 57mm rockets, 23mm guns and 30mm grenades, accompanied by a picture of a Mi-24 "Hind" helicopter gunship.



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Guinean forces started reinforcing the border areas and continued to bombard RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District. The RUF/AFRC also established a "Combat Camp" at Gbalamuya (Gbinleh Dixon) using forces redeployed from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom), Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom), Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom, Bombali District). On 6 or 8 September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Pamelap on the border in Guinea, stealing property and forcing people to carry the items back to Kambia Town and Madina. Two well-known Italian Xavarian missionary priests were also abducted at Pamelap and taken to Madina, where they were allowed by the RUF/AFRC command to continue their work. They were released at Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom, Bombali District), although the RUF/AFRC Kambia Brigade command was not informed, leading to a house-to-house search of Madina and surrounding villages, and a wave of arrests of RUF/AFRC officers. Those arrested were taken to Kamakwie, where they were severely beaten with canes with razor blades embedded in them.

The RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Pamelap on 10 October 2000.⁴²¹ Guinean forces reacted to the RUF/AFRC military activities in the Guinean towns of Pamelap, Moola and Tassin by bombarding all the towns along the Great Scarcies River from Pamelap and Madina Woula, Kassirie, Rosinor (both Samu Chiefdom), Rokupr, Kambia (both Magbema Chiefdom), Kukuna (Bramaia Chiefdom) and some locations in Gbinleh Dixon Chiefdom. Sustained periods of bombardment of these locations continued throughout October, as did RUF/AFRC attacks within Guinean territory. During those attacks, RUF/AFRC forces killed or abducted many civilians and burnt down many houses. The entire Kambia District remained firmly under RUF/AFRC control.

In November 2000, many civilians fled Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom) to nearby villages, fearing the consequences of being unable to continue paying money to the RUF/AFRC forces, who became concerned as there were progressively fewer civilians to provide them with food. RUF/AFRC forces sent a civilian chairperson to order people to return to Rokupr, otherwise RUF/AFRC forces would start amputating their limbs, as a result of which many people travelled to Freetown by boat.

Throughout 2000, Gbethis (CDF) were based in BKM Chiefdom (Port Loko District), on the south bank of the Little Scarcies River. Intermittently, they came into Kambia District and engaged RUF/AFRC positions. Their presence was thus a threat for the RUF/AFRC forces, who on one occasion learnt that the Gbethis had crossed the river. They therefore went to Mapolon (Masungbala Chiefdom) to confront the Gbethis and a battle took place, during which over 100 people, including civilians, RUF forces and Gbethis were killed.

g) Events in 2001

Guinean infantry and airborne operations against RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District continued into 2001. The RUF command in Kambia District commenced regular "contact group" meetings with representatives of UNAMSIL. On 3 January, the RUF leader met with UNAMSIL force commander and invited UNAMSIL to deploy to Kambia District.⁴²² On 12 January 2001, the RUF opened the road between Mange (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Kambia Town

⁴²¹ BBC Online News, 10 October 2000 (17:51 GMT 18:51 UK).

⁴²² UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 5 January 2001.



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abducted during this attack and taken to an RUF base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko chiefdom). In the same period, in the village of Kagberi (Sella Limba Chiefdom), about 4 km west of Kamakwie, RUF forces captured and killed a farmer. They cut open his stomach and for an unspecified reason placed some “gari”³⁴⁹ inside it. Although no location was specified, it is likely that these same RUF forces also shot a deaf and mute man in Kagberi for not responding to their orders

RUF forces withdrew from Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to their camp at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), 15km east of Kamakwie. Abductees held at Masonkorie camp had their movement severely restricted and there are reports that female abductees were raped. Following the attacks on Kamakwie, the RUF unit stationed at Masonkorie redeployed to Kambia District.

Between 26 February 1996 and May 1997 no incidents are recorded within Bombali District. On 30 November 1996 the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed between leadership of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. Beginning early May 1997, Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) began to experience steady RUF activity. Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked during this month.

On 10 May 1997, the SLA deployed heavily armed units at a number of unknown locations in Bombali District.³⁵⁰ In the evening of 12 May 1997, SLA forces in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) came under attack from RUF forces. RUF forces met little to no resistance and displayed considerable knowledge of the SLA deployment within the town, including the exact location of an SLA ammunition dump. RUF forces killed over ten people during the attack. RUF forces captured an officer of the Sierra Leone Police, who was dressed in civilian clothes. Amongst his possessions they discovered a handgun, with which they subsequently killed him. RUF forces raped an elderly woman before killing her with a blow to the head from the butt of a handgun. RUF forces seized an SLA ammunition dump located within the town during the 12 May attack, although there is no indication of the quantity of ammunition taken. RUF forces selected the most prestigious residences in sections I and II of Kamakwie and burned them down. At 14:00 on 13 May 1997, RUF forces again returned to their base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). By 20 May, government sources claimed Kamakwie was secure and free from RUF activity.³⁵¹ Sometime during May or June of 1997, likely following the 12 May assault on Kamakwie, RUF forces raped and killed a woman in the village of Kaforad (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), about three miles from Kamakwie.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces overthrew the elected government. This coup d'état resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by an SLA officer released from prison by the coupists. Shortly after the coup, the RUF and AFRC joined. AFRC forces, comprising primarily SLA elements remained stationed in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). There are no reports of any atrocities committed by the ARFC in Kamakwie after this time. There are reports that troops clearly identified as belonging to the RUF had free access to Kamakwie.

³⁴⁹ Dried, cracked cassava-root.

³⁵⁰ AFP, 10 May 1997

³⁵¹ Detail from AFP 20 May 1997



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Following the AFRC coup, the towns of Karina and Kamabai (both Biriwa Chiefdom) were occupied by RUF/AFRC forces. Both towns are located along the main east of the Batkanu – Gbendembu highway, on a key junction joining the north-south highway from Makeni to Kabala. Like Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Mataboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), control of these towns serves to restrict movement north out of Makeni, the district headquarter town, cutting it off from Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). Karina is situated on top of a hill simplifying greatly the rearing of herd animals. In May 1997, it had a very high degree of agricultural productivity, including a large cattle stock, making it a valuable location for the RUF to control.

In the early hours of 27 May 1997, the town of Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces carrying guns and other weapons. Soldiers surrounded the central mosque and killed 10 civilians celebrating the Muslim feast of “Jonbedeh”, including the Section Chief. Of those escaping this attack on the mosque, an unknown number were injured. The majority of residents of the town heard gunfire and fled into the surrounding bush. RUF/AFRC forces raped an unknown number of women, and abducted 30 young civilian men and women. During the attack, numerous houses were burned down including those belonging to the town chief and the section chief. RUF/AFRC forces stole property. On the same day, RUF/AFRC forces moved west towards the village of Mandaha towards Gbendembu town (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), taking with them the 30 abductees. Some of the abductees were given military training and forced to join the RUF/AFRC, and some were forced into sexual slavery. The next day, the residents of Karina returned to the town and buried ten corpses in a mass grave. Given that Karina was on a regular patrol route from the RUF/AFRC camp at Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom), the burial was performed quickly, as residents feared the return of RUF/AFRC forces.

Also on 27 May 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Malongbo (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), nearby Karina. A father and son were killed when RUF/AFRC forces set their house on fire. An old man was killed when RUF/AFRC forces set fire to his grass house. RUF/AFRC forces amputated the hand of a civilian man, before shooting him dead in response to his complaints that he was now useless to his community.

From May 1997 to October 1997, Guinean forces were stationed at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). During August and September 1997, the RUF/AFRC base at Ro-Source came under pressure from long-range rockets fired by Guinean forces at Madina. RUF/AFRC forces moved from their camp at Ro-Source (Ro-source) and established a new camp at Bainkoro (between Dibia and Sanda Magbolonthon Chiefdoms, Port Loko).

On 16 December, ECOMOG jets bombed RUF/AFRC positions outside of Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), claiming that the RUF/AFRC was constructing a runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country more freely in violation of ECOWAS and UN sanctions.³⁵²

c) Events in 1998

³⁵² AFP, 16 December 1997.



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Between 6 and 14 February 1998, ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown, dislodging the combined RUF/AFRC forces and forcing their retreat into provincial Sierra Leone. This general retreat moved northwards, along the Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) –Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) - Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) axis.³⁵³ After 14 February, RUF/AFRC forces were stationed in Lunsar, to the west along the highway from Makeni Town (Bombali Sebor). RUF/AFRC forces also attacked key locations in Kambia District, including the economic centres of Kambia Town and Rokupr (both Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District).

On 13 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the village of Masongbo (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom), 3 km west of Makeni along the main Freetown-Makeni highway. They were identified as RUF/AFRC because of their half military, half civilian attire. One member of the RUF/AFRC fired a single round between the legs of a civilian man in order to extort money from him; another civilian was robbed. On 14 February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces regrouped in Makeni (Bombali Sebor Chiefdom) following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown. On the same day, ECOMOG Alpha Jets attacked Teko Barracks in Makeni. In addition, ECOMOG targeted the Makeni Police barracks, believing them to be the RUF/AFRC brigade headquarters. At least five civilians were killed during this attack.

RUF/AFRC commenced “Operation Pay Yourself”, which lasted 17 days in Makeni (Bombali Sebor Chiefdom), from 14 February 1998 until 3 March 1998. “Operation Pay Yourself” was executed in response to the failure of the AFRC to resist attacks on Freetown by ECOMOG forces between 8 and 14 February 1998.³⁵⁴ A similar operation was launched between the same dates in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District). RUF forces were reported as entering Makeni from the Magburaka (Kholifa Rhowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) highway with Toyota Hi-Lux and Mazda pick-up trucks. They were armed with AK-47s and G3s. At night, RUF/AFRC forces fired upon the exterior of houses before entering and performing searches. During these searches, mattresses, watches, foodstuffs, and personal and saleable items were taken. RUF/AFRC forces retreated from Makeni in the wake of ECOMOG forces

In the early evening of 1 March 1998, troops from the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade entered Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). They engaged RUF/AFRC snipers en route at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and exchanged fire with RUF/AFRC forces for about an hour as they entered Lunsar. Apart from that, ECOMOG met no further resistance from RUF/AFRC forces in Lunsar.³⁵⁵

On 2 March 1998, ECOMOG forces moved from Lunsar and arrived at the village of Magbema, 2km west of Makeni (both Bombali Sebor Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces retreated northwards from Makeni in the direction of Kamaboi (Biriwa Chiefdom), to the east of Makeni, which had been under RUF control since May 1997. Some forces moved further towards Kabala Town (Wara Wara

³⁵³ See factual analysis for Western Area and Port Loko District in 1998 for further information.

³⁵⁴ Clarification is required from the records about the date, as the starting date of “Operation Pay Yourself” is reported at different times across different Districts, the earliest being in the Western Area in 1997.

³⁵⁵ R.A. Adeshina, pp.36-38.



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Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District), settling in the town of Fadugu (Mambolo Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). On 2 or 3 March 1998, ECOMOG arrived in Makeni and established a base at Teko Barracks, taking control of Makeni. At some point after ECOMOG entered the town, forces from the CDF 9th Battalion were deployed to assist in patrolling the Makeni area.³⁵⁶ An ECOMOG major stated that any civilian who is caught and found to have been an RUF/AFRC collaborator “will be treated as if they are not human” and commenced house to house searches, screening civilians and searching for possible RUF/AFRC infiltrators.

Around midday on 22 March 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kambia Mapulen (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). They were driven to Kambia Mapulen through the town of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) on the main northern road to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), in a big truck with a civilian driver. Some of the RUF/AFRC forces were dressed in full military attire and others were dressed in civilian clothes. All were well armed with G3 and AK-47 rifles, and support weapons including RPGs. The RUF Commander first called a village meeting and informed the assembled civilians that they were being “liberated from their struggle”. As the meeting progressed, RUF/AFRC forces surrounded the village. In the afternoon, the RUF/AFRC forces began firing on civilians, who fled the village. One girl did not escape the attack, was captured and raped by five members of the RUF/AFRC. The RUF/AFRC forces left the village along the same road they entered in the direction of Kamaranka. Villagers returned to find their valuables and livestock looted by the RUF/AFRC forces.

At this point, ECOMOG forces had taken control of Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). ECOMOG met little resistance and easily took control of Kamakwie. During this time, RUF/AFRC forces were based at Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) at the other end of a highway leading directly to Kamakwie. In April and May 1998, ECOMOG informed representatives of the village of Laya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) that they had insufficient logistical capacity to patrol the road between Kamalo and Laya.

In April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces entered the northern Tambakha Chiefdom, passed through the Northern Jungle from Wara Wara Bafodia Chiefdom (Koinadugu District) on their way to the chiefdom headquarter town of Fintonia. Duguta (Tambakha Chiefdom), a village along their route, was the first town to be attacked in the chiefdom. Reports indicate that the RUF/AFRC did not fire a shot as they entered, although RUF/AFRC forces aged between 13 and 16 years were given orders to shoot should anyone try and escape. Fifty residents were held under armed guard for the duration of the attack. Twenty-five homes were burned down and 30 people were abducted and forced to carry stolen property, including livestock and poultry. Nobody was killed, although threats were made to abductees by RUF/AFRC forces that anyone caught resting would be killed.

In the early hours of one Wednesday in April 1998, over 100 RUF/AFRC forces eventually arrived at and attacked Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom). They were armed with AK-47 rifles, RPGs and bladed weapons. The town was surrounded within 30 minutes of their arrival. Over 20 people were caught trying to escape the town. They were rounded up and placed into groups. During the

³⁵⁶ All Africa News, 11 December 1998 taken from Concord Times
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RUF/AFRC attack, eleven people were killed, sixty-eight houses were looted and burned. At least 17 civilians were abducted to carry stolen property. Those abducted were ordered by RUF/AFRC forces to assist them in avoiding "Government positions", because of their familiarity with the terrain.

On the same day the same RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kottoh (Tambakha Chiefdom) in the Outanma Kilimi National Park, three miles west of Fintonia. At this village, they amputated the hand of an old civilian man, who died from loss of blood whilst heading south to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to seek medical attention. Following this assault, the same RUF/AFRC forces proceeded towards Komoyah (Tambakha Chiefdom), which is about sixteen miles south west of Fintonia. RUF/AFRC forces killed 10 civilian men one after the other in this attack and amputated the arms of a further 11 civilian men. An unknown number of houses were also looted by RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces visiting Komoyah following the attack reported that RUF/AFRC forces had erected a checkpoint, a rope across the road. They had tied the amputated arms along the length of the rope and left the amputees dying nearby. ECOMOG forces took the amputees to their base at Kamakwie, where they received medical attention. From here, RUF/AFRC forces continued westwards to Sarakuda (Tambakha Chiefdom) where they killed an old woman.

Overnight between 10 and 11 May 1998, RUF/AFRC force attacked Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), a town on the road to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) that sits upon the Batkanu-Gbendembu route. During the attack, the Chiefdom Speaker and another prominent elder were killed. Seven other civilians were also killed. Many of the brick houses in the town had been burnt down, and much of the property stolen by RUF/AFRC forces.

In late June 1998, Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) once again came under attack by RUF/AFRC forces. The town was surrounded before the RUF/AFRC forces announced their presence with a single signature shot. Further sporadic firing by RUF/AFRC forces caused many of the residents to flee the town. An hour after RUF/AFRC forces first entered the village, a large group of RUF/AFRC forces in full combat fatigues passed through the village in a westerly direction, heading towards Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). Following these military forces were between 1000 and 1500 people in civilian dress carrying looted property. In Mayainku village (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), on the road to Batkanu, RUF/AFRC forces abducted a man, who was later found dead, his body containing many bullet holes. In Mamaya (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), also on the road to Batkanu from Gbendembu, RUF/AFRC forces raped a 10-year old girl, who later died of blood loss.

In July 1998, villagers in Gbendembu heard from displaced persons that the village of Loihindi (both Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), east of Gbendembu on the route to Kabala, had been attacked by RUF/AFRC forces. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces had mutilated a young boy and an old man.

In July 1998, the village of Masiba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces from the direction of Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces went from house to house searching for civilians. Those captured were first tied up as the search continued,

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and were then taken to the village of Kortulay (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and forced to take the rice of the Section Chief. The captives then transported the rice in the direction of Biriwa Chiefdom. Two days after the initial attack, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masiba again, to recapture a number of abducted civilians who had escaped and returned to Masiba. The second RUF/AFRC attack on Masiba came from the village of Hundowa, to the north. A trader was shot dead in the centre of town. RUF/AFRC forces broke into all the houses in Masiba, looting what could be carried. At least 10 houses were burnt down. The escapees were recaptured by RUF/AFRC forces. Following this attack, the RUF/AFRC forces immediately moved to the nearby village of Wanworowah (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), where they captured 20 civilians. The men were hung beneath trees and set on fire. The women were cut with blades on their chests and backs.

On 17 July 1998, in Laminaya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), 28 civilians were killed by RUF/AFRC forces. A man was handcuffed and then burned to death, and RUF/AFRC forces mutilated a woman's genitals. Laminaya was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces again in the afternoon of 5 September 1998.

On 23 July RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Matoko in the north of Biriwa chiefdom, about 20 miles from the village of Laya (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). RUF forces opened the attack at 2200 with an RPG, and went house-to-house searching for civilians. Many fled into the surrounding bush. Over 20 of those that were captured were tied in pairs and shot dead by RUF/AFRC forces. The attack ceased at 0200 on 24 July 1998.

On 29 July, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Kalangba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) south of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) on the North-South Kamakwie-Makeni highway. There are no further details about this attack.

Since late May 1997, RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the town of Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom). From this location, RUF/AFRC forces were able to establish a strong presence in the area, bolstered by forces driven from Makeni in early March 1998 by ECOMOG forces. RUF/AFRC activity in the neighbouring town Karina and its environs was mainly limited to "food finding missions" or "Jar-Jar". The July 1998 attacks on Masiba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom) described above are good examples of "food finding missions": civilians were captured and instructed to lead RUF/AFRC forces to sources of salt, livestock, crops and vegetables. The same civilians were then force by RUF/ARFC forces to transport the stolen food to RUF bases.

On 2 August, ECOMOG began planning an operation to remove RUF/AFRC forces from their camp as Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), deploying an artillery battery at Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), and sending a Nigerian infantry platoon to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). Across seven days in mid-August ECOMOG artillery and air support bombarded Ro-Source continually. On or around 22 August, a group of civilians volunteered to head to Ro-Source and provide information to ECOMOG. They reported that the village was deserted, and that there



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were many corpses littering the area.³⁵⁷ RUF/AFRC activity nevertheless continued in and around Ro-Source into 1999.

On 1 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked the town of Kalangba, south of Gbendembu (both Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom). On 5 September RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town of Laminaya to the east of Kamalo town (both Sella Limba Chiefdom). Many civilians had moved to Kamalo following these attacks, seeking protection from the ECOMOG forces stationed in the town.

Around midnight on 8 September 1998 RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village of Maharibo (Sando Loko Chiefdom), immediately to the east of Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces were armed with AK-47s, RPGs, machetes, grenades, and G3s, and dispensed heavy machine gun fire throughout the town. The shooting stopped at 0300. RUF/AFRC forces gathered the villagers into the centre of the town, and requested information about the security arrangements in Kamalo, which had been held by ECOMOG forces since early March 1998. Following the attack, RUF forces departed westwards for Bankabie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), a village immediately south of Kamalo and joined with other RUF/AFRC units. RUF/AFRC units that participated in this attack re-established Camp Ro-Source (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), which had previously been abandoned in September 1997.

About fifteen miles south of Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom), on 8 October, two groups of RUF/AFRC forces joined at a camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom), where some 500 RUF/AFRC forces were already deployed. RUF/AFRC forces abducted a man rumoured to have mystical powers, and forced him to perform religious rites for the unit. These included creating talisman to guarantee RUF forces would not suffer injuries, in addition to offerings of kola-nuts, sacrifices of goats and sheep for military success. The RUF/AFRC were certain that that another group of RUF/AFRC forces would arrive at the camp on 20 October. Once that unit arrived, all RUF/AFRC forces stationed at the camp would prepare for an attack on Kamalo. In the northern part of Magbaiamba Ndowahun Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked the village of Gbendebu on 27 October. RUF forces captured one civilian and divided him into two sections by splitting his body in two from head to groin. On 31 October, the group of RUF/AFRC forces who had been expected entered the RUF camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

By the end of October 1998, around 500 "loyal" SLA troops had been deployed to Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), south of where the RUF/AFRC were concentrating for the attack on Kamalo. The CDF deployed at Kalangba frequently patrolled Gbendembu. Parents were encouraged by the CDF commander to send their children to be initiated into the CDF, or "washed", so they could become bulletproof. A number of people died when trainers shot them at during the final stages of initiation.

As RUF forces prepared to attack Kamalo (Sella Limba Chiefdom) from the south, ECOMOG reinforced their positions in the town on 13 November 1998 with troops from Kamakwie. On 14

³⁵⁷ Account from R.A. Adeshina, p. 115-116



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November, RUF forces attacked Kamalo. During this assault, RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of ECOMOG forces, who were buried by civilians two days later, on 16 November. In addition, 80 homes were burnt and an unknown number of civilians were killed. Five RUF/AFRC wounded were returned to the camp outside Masomba (Sella Limba Chiefdom). ECOMOG and SLA forces were driven out of Kamalo and retreated north to the town of Kamakwie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom), still at this stage held by ECOMOG.

On 21 November RUF/AFRC forces headed south from Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) along the main highway and on 21 November they attacked Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces abducted seven men and two women, burnt down homes, and took property. The village clinic was also destroyed. They then established a base there that was still in operation in December 1998. On 22 November, ECOMOG deployed to Kamaranka, but did not engage forces at a nearby RUF/AFRC camp identified by two youths who had escaped from the camp the night before. ECOMOG troops remained in Kamaranka. It is reported in general terms that ECOMOG forces treated civilians accused to being "rebel collaborators" with extreme brutality. On 23 November 1998 in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), ECOMOG forces tied-up and beat to death a well known and popular businessman accused of being a "rebel collaborator" by a woman in the town.

CDF forces established a checkpoint Ferrah Loko village, on the main Makeni-Kamakwie highway south of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). On 27 November 1998, CDF forces detained two civilians at the checkpoint and accused them of being "rebel collaborators". The civilians were led to a nearby river and shot dead with AK-47s. On 28 November, at the same checkpoint, CDF confiscated a quantity of prescription drugs to be used in the treatment of an outbreak of cholera in Kamaranka from a pharmacist travelling from Makeni (Bombali Sebora Chiefdom) to Kamaranka.

In December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked many villages in Sella Limba Chiefdom, around the headquarter town of Kamakwie. Six miles from Kamakwie, at the crossing point over the Mongo River at Kabbah Ferry, RUF/AFRC forces burnt several houses and looted property in their attack on the village. Then, seven miles from Kamakwie, the town of Kamaportho (Sella Limba Chiefdom) was also attacked. RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of civilians, burnt homes and looted properties.

Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) was attacked on 9 December by RUF/AFRC forces again entering the town from the west along the Batkanu-Gbendembu Highway. ECOMOG and SLA forces stationed in the town were driven out by RUF/AFRC forces. During the engagement, RUF/AFRC forces lined up eleven civilians and shot them one after the other. RUF/AFRC forces set fire to two machine guns located in the vacated ECOMOG position. ECOMOG and "loyal" SLA forces regrouped to the south of Gbendembu and launched a counter attack. During the attack RUF/AFRC forces killed 23 SLA forces and amputated the limbs of six civilians. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces were successfully dislodged from Gbendembu. Residents buried the dead civilians in mass grave near the Wesleyan Church. The 25 dead SLA soldiers were taken to Makeni (Bombali Sembora). Civilians buried an unknown number of RUF/AFRC dead in the bush surrounding Gbendembu.

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On Monday 20 December, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Binkolo town (the headquarter town of Safroko Limba Chiefdom), near Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom) on the main road to Kabala (Wara Wara Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District). On 21 December, RUF forces took property, including food items, and burnt down 133 homes. Five people were shot dead in the attack. RUF/AFRC forces established and manned checkpoints in Binkolo between 30 December 1998 and 4 January 1999.

On 23 December, RUF/AFRC forces took control of Magburaka Town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). Later that day RUF/AFRC forces commenced a major assault on Makeni from three directions. The nearby towns of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), Karina and Kamabai (both Biriwara Chiefdom) to the northeast were already under RUF/AFRC control. Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and Kamolo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) to the northwest were both under pressure from RUF/AFRC forces. From the south, RUF/AFRC forces entered Bombali district through Magburaka town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and continued towards Makeni, whilst another RUF/AFRC force launched their attack on the town from the north. RUF/AFRC forces also moved from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), attacking Makeni from the west.

On 24 December at 1200 RUF/AFRC forces succeeding in dislodging ECOMOG forces from the Teko Barracks in Makeni. ECOMOG forces retreated north to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom). Teko Barracks was home to the brigade headquarters of the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade. ECOMOG forces ran short of ammunition and were overpowered by the attacking RUF/AFRC force. During the attack, RUF/AFRC forces inflicted heavy casualties on ECOMOG, and managed to capture the ECOMOG brigade intelligence officer and much of the brigade documentation.³⁵⁸ By 26 December, ECOMOG had withdrawn from Makeni.

In late December, RUF/AFRC forces Fintonia (Tambakah Chiefdom) was attacked. Many people were abducted some of whom were made to carry looted goods. Eleven civilians were killed and at least one woman was sexually assaulted and forced to be a sex slave for RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces abducted over 40 people, 11 were killed. 68 houses were burned down. Civilians were forced to carry looted items for the RUF/AFRC forces.

On 24 December 1998, SLA forces retreating from Makeni towards Koinadugu District arrived in the village of Bombali Bana (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom), 3km west of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), to the north of Makeni. Bombali Bana was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces after 24 December 1998. In this attack, 25 houses were burned down. Throughout the night of 25-26 December report hearing the movement of convoys of vehicles moved towards Makeni through Binkolo on the Kabala-Makeni highway. Between 30 December 1998 and 1 January 1999, convoys of civilians carrying sacks of rice on their heads, and livestock over their shoulders, were being escorted by armed RUF/AFRC forces through Binkolo towards Makeni.

³⁵⁸ Detail only. R.A. Adeshina, p.133



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After 26 December, ECOMOG forces retreated from the town of Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) through the village of Konba towards Kambia District, and eventually to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). On 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered the town immediately, without engaging ECOMOG. RUF/AFRC forces quickly set up an administration, and started recruiting young men and women from throughout Sella Limba Chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces also crossed into Kamakwie from Tambakha Chiefdom, stealing much of the kerosene and food waiting to be ferried across the Little Scarcies River to Kamakwie. Soon after arriving in Kamakwie, RUF/AFRC forces sought to extend their authority over the Mongo River north towards the border with Guinea. Also on 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces advanced into Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and engaged ECOMOG positions.

d) Events in 1999

Through December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces cleared ECOMOG forces from within a corridor from Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) through Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkalili District) and Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District, Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Freetown between 6 and 20 January. Following an intense battle for the control of metropolitan Freetown, ECOMOG forces pushed RUF/AFRC forces back to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999.

At the beginning of 1999 the RUF/AFRC focused on several initiatives to consolidate their gains of late December 1998, and corral ECOMOG in Port Loko District. Initially, RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from Western Area running through Port Loko District towards Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom). Additionally, RUF/AFRC forces took control of the key junction town of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). In the first months of 1999, however, ECOMOG forces pushed along the main highway from the Western Area into Port Loko District, retaking Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from RUF/AFRC forces by late April, and creating a relatively secure route between Masiaka and Port Loko Town through Rogberray (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Maforki and BKM Chiefdoms, and those behind Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom)³⁵⁹ remained primarily under ECOMOG control. In April, ECOMOG also moved from Masiaka and retook control of Mile 91.

The RUF/AFRC consolidated in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Makeni (Bombali Sembora), and took control of all the key towns in Kambia District.³⁶⁰ From this point through to disarmament in 2001 and 2002, Makeni was the RUF/AFRC headquarter for the southern part of Bombali District. An additional headquarter was also established in Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to oversee the expansive northern region of the district and the Mongo River crossing at Kabba Ferry. In Port Loko District, the RUF/AFRC lines started at Mange, which was the first line of defence for their positions in wharf towns on the Great Scarcies River, including Rokupr and Kambia Town (both Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District). Makeni was connected to Kambia Town by a lengthy route looping north and then west through Kamakwie and Madina

³⁵⁹ Kaffu Bullom and Lokomassama Chiefdoms.

³⁶⁰ See factual analysis for Kambia District in 1999 for further information.



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(Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). This gave RUF/AFRC forces access to the major international border crossings with Guinea. At their base in Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District), RUF/AFRC forces controlled access to the main routes Sanda Magbolontor and Dibia Chiefdoms (both in Port Loko District) into Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom (Bombali District). To the south, RUF/AFRC forces occupied Magburaka Town and positions on the main highway to Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District), which was also under RUF/AFRC control. Makeni was the heart of this RUF/AFRC defensive operation.

At the beginning of 1999, RUF/AFRC forces controlled Kamabai, a main town in the Biriwa Chiefdom, to the north east of Makeni. There are frequent mentions of RUF/AFRC forces forcing residents to vacate to provide lodgings for RUF/AFRC forces. There was also massive theft of private property and food during The RUF/AFRC encampment. RUF/AFRC forces were armed with rifles, grenades, cutlasses, bayonets, and RPGs and forced civilians to join them.

In January, numerous RUF/AFRC bases were established along the Makeni– Guinea and Makeni-Freetown highways. One RUF/AFRC base was established in Mabaibunda (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom) and another was established a base at Matakoko. A camp was set up in Makoth (Makari Gbanti chiefdom). Kamalo (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) was occupied in late December 1998 and checkpoints were established in the following weeks. South of Kamalo, RUF/AFRC forces established two checkpoints in Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom).

By 10 January the RUF/AFRC had all of Sanda Loko Chiefdom under its control, in addition to the north-south road linking Makeni (Bombali Sembora Chiefdom) with Kamakwie. The RUF/AFRC command in Kamalo established a G5 committee, and announced to the town residents that it would punish any of its personnel caught inflicting violence on civilians.

In early January, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mateboi (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), capturing four civilians and burning down houses that remained from their attack in May 1998. CDF forces attacked RUF/AFRC forces in Ro-Source at some point in January or February 1999 but were unsuccessful. Over 50 CDF personnel were killed by RUF/AFRC forces and buried by civilians in a mass grave at Ro-Source. RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mateboi later in January, gathering 27 civilians in the town market and shooting them dead. A woman was injured with a cutlass, but did not die and was taken to Makeni for medical treatment. Throughout Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC force used civilians to assist with “Food Finding Missions”. The RUF/AFRC set up a civilian G5 committee in Mateboi to assist with the collection of contributions of 30 cups of rice and 5 litres of palm oil from every civilian in the town. Shortly after this system began, those civilians remaining began leaving for bush camps to avoid making contributions to the RUF/AFRC.

In January, a group of around 20 RUF/AFRC members set up camp in Masiba (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) and informed the town residents that they were here to protect them from raids by other RUF/AFRC groups. Nevertheless, RUF/AFRC forces in the town beat civilians regularly. One man was beaten for 24 hours continually, and then taken by the RUF/AFRC town commander to the nearby bush. The RUF/AFRC commander executed the civilian with two gunshots in the back of his head. He was not fully dead when the RUF/AFRC commander ordered

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other civilians to bury him. Another young boy was beaten severely by RUF/AFRC members, who also used a bladed weapon to inscribe "RUF" on his chest. Between January and August, two other civilians were treated the same way by RUF/AFRC forces in Masiba. In August, RUF/AFRC forces tied up a civilian in Masiba and attacked him with a cutlass.

Also in January, RUF/AFRC forces set up a base and checkpoints at main entrances of the town of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom). By then, Bombali Bana village (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) was already experiencing regular RUF/AFRC food finding missions. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town on 26 January because of suspicions that there were CDF and Kamajor supporters among the populace. During the RUF/AFRC attack, two civilians were shot dead and another tortured to death before being transported on a wheelbarrow to the nearby village of Pamlap (Bombali Sembora Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces also burned down 25 houses.

ECOMOG's success in March and April in pushing the RUF/AFRC off the main highways in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District) and Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District) had the effect of cutting off a major route for goods and supplies for the RUF/AFRC operations in the north. The RUF/AFRC sought to establish other sources of revenue and supply, trading and stealing from markets in Guinean border towns. At this time in the northern chiefdom of Tambakha, RUF/AFRC forces were beginning to move towards the Guinean border. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter town of Fintonia, on the northerly Kamakwie–Madina Oula³⁶¹ (Guinea) route on 11 January. RUF/AFRC forces were also based seen in border villages such as Sanya and Symbecki (both Tambakha Chiefdom), where they regularly sold items stolen during attacks to intermediaries who would sell them at the weekly market in the Guinean border towns of Madina Oula, Sekusoria and Lakantha. In Kambia District, RUF/AFRC forces used the Great Scaries River to access trade fairs in towns just over the Guinean border.³⁶² The Guinean authorities tightened border security checks on traders. In relation to the Guinean operations, RUF forces in Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) attempted to conscript civilians.

By March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces had effective control over the surrounding area of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and proceeded to take food from its inhabitants. In Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom, food-finding missions were conducted in Kamaranka and Kambia Mapalun in April. At a meeting that occurred sometime between before peace negotiations commenced, a G5 committee of RUF/AFRC forces and civilians met to discuss food contributions to the RUF/AFRC war effort. An order was passed requiring civilians to contribute food to RUF/AFRC forces on a daily basis. The RUF commander officially ordered the beginning of food-finding missions around Binkolo in middle to late 1999.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May in the Togolese capital, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace

³⁶¹ In late January 1999, UNHCR established a refugee camp in Madina Oula, although Sierra Leonean refugees had been seeking safety there since 1997. AFP, 28 January 1999.

³⁶² See the factual analysis for Kambia District for 1999 for further information.



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The date of 25 May 1997 was rejected as having too many political overtones, while 6 January 1999 was rejected as giving the impression of favouring Freetown over the provinces. The date of 30 November 1996 was therefore considered the most appropriate, as it represented the first time the fighting factions had attempted to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Additionally, it was considered to encompass the most serious crimes committed in the provinces, thereby ensuring the Court would not be too 'Freetown-centred'. Sierra Leone and the United Nations therefore agreed that this would be a suitable starting date for the Court. It has to be queried whether these reasons provide sufficient justification for setting a start date for the Court that is halfway through the conflict, a compromise criticized by Sierra Leoneans from all along the social, political and professional spectrum.³²⁹ The perception in Sierra Leone is that the Statute unjustly favours Freetown over the provinces, as the November 1996 date corresponds to the time when the capital first became a target of attack. For the provinces, the conflict has generally been one long, continuous experience from the beginning of the 1990's, whereas Freetown witnessed intermittent, although extreme, episodes of violence only from the mid-1990's onwards.

Following consultations with civil society groups and others, the Government of Sierra Leone sought to alter the date so as to give the Court temporal jurisdiction over the whole of the conflict in Sierra Leone, i.e. commencing in 1991. This was sought both to provide greater recognition to the situation in the provinces throughout the war, as well as to be more faithful to the tenets of IHL, which applies from the commencement of a conflict rather than at an arbitrarily-set date midway through the conflict.³³⁰ However, the general feeling within the United Nations was that this issue should not be reopened, lest 'delicate' balances achieved during the negotiations be upset, thereby requiring the re-opening of other aspects of the Statute or Agreement. In addition, the United Nations considered that an extension of the Court's temporal jurisdiction would increase the burden on the Prosecutor and the Court to an unacceptable level. The United Nations also maintained that the Prosecutor would in any event also be relying on evidence relating to events before 1996 (provided it is relevant to cases before the Court), therefore crimes committed prior to 1996 would not necessarily be excluded from consideration by the Court.³³¹ In order to avoid further delay, the Government therefore withdrew its request, while still maintaining the legitimacy of the reasons behind making it.³³²

Another factor to be considered when examining the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction is the amnesty granted under the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999. The UN Secretary-General denied that this would act as any bar to the determination of the start-date of the Special Court's jurisdiction, reasoning that the "United Nations has consistently maintained the position that

³²⁹ Freetown newspapers, for example, have consistently attacked this issue on numerous occasions. In addition, it was criticised in every one of the 26 Special Court Training Seminars conducted by NPWJ, which were held in Freetown, Bo, Kenema and Mile 91 in 2001, when negotiations on the creation of the Special Court were still ongoing. These seminars attracted a total of over 600 participants, including civil society and human rights organisations, lawyers, Paramount Chiefs, police, teachers, combatants and ex-combatants: not a single voice was raised in support of retaining the start-date at 1996.

³³⁰ 11th Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 September 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/857.

³³¹ Letter from the Office of Legal Affairs to the Government of Sierra Leone (19 October 2001).

³³² Letter from the Government of Sierra Leone to the Office of Legal Affairs (29 November 2001).



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amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”³³³ In addition, he reiterated the disclaimer issued by his Special Representative for Sierra Leone at the time of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement to the effect that “the amnesty provisions contained in article XI of the Agreement (‘absolute and free pardon’) shall not apply to international crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”³³⁴ However, the Statute acknowledges that amnesties will be valid in respect of the included provisions of Sierra Leone law.³³⁵ This makes for a situation in which the Special Court will be able to hear violations of international humanitarian law committed since 30 November 1996 but only hear violations of the Sierra Leone provisions committed from the date of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, namely 7 July 1999, in effect creating a dual start-date for the Special Court’s temporal jurisdiction.

As noted, international humanitarian law begins to apply from the moment hostilities commence until such time as there is a conclusion of peace or a peaceful settlement is reached. Thus international humanitarian law applied across the territory of Sierra Leone from 1991, the date that hostilities first commenced. As such, this report looks at the time period of the whole of the conflict, from 1991 until 2002, when considering what violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law were committed in Sierra Leone during the conflict.

6. Personal jurisdiction of the Special Court (Article 1(1))

Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) states that the Special Court should have jurisdiction over those who bear the “greatest responsibility” for crimes committed within Sierra Leone. This was understood to be a limitation on the number of accused who would be tried, according to their command authority and the gravity and scale of crimes committed. The UN Secretary-General’s report recommended this be altered to “those most responsible” in order to widen the potential pool of defendants before the Special Court.³³⁶ However, the Security Council refused to accept this change, preferring instead to remain consistent with the wording of Resolution 1315 (2000).³³⁷ Therefore, the Statute retains the wording of “those who bear the greatest responsibility”. It should be emphasised that article 1 contains no other limitations on personal jurisdiction, in particular it does not limit jurisdiction based on nationality, political affiliation or official position.

Article 1 also specifically refers to the ability of the Special Court to try peacekeepers who otherwise satisfy the requirements of the personal jurisdiction. Article 1 basically replicates what is found in most Status of Forces Agreements, namely those agreements between troop-contributing and troop-receiving States. According to these types of agreements, the primary responsibility for prosecuting peacekeepers for crimes committed on the territory of the recipient State remains with the sending

³³³ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, para. 22.

³³⁴ *Ibid*, para. 23.

³³⁵ Article 10 of the Statute provides: “An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.” The omission of Article 5, which inscribes the provisions of Sierra Leone law, indicates that amnesties granted in respect of these crimes will be a bar to prosecution.

³³⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, paras. 29-31.

³³⁷ Letter from the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 22 December 2000.

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State. Article 1 contains an exception to this principle, whereby it may be possible to try peacekeepers before the Special Court if the sending State is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute peacekeepers for crimes committed in Sierra Leone. The Special Court may hear such cases upon receiving authorisation from the Security Council,³³⁸ which may act on the proposal of any State.³³⁹

The aspect of the Special Court that has, perhaps, provoked the most public debate is its position vis-à-vis accused below the ages of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes. Pursuant to article 7 of the Statute, the Special Court shall have no jurisdiction over persons under the age of 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime but persons between the ages of 15 and 18 at the time of alleged commission of the crime may be brought before the Special Court,³⁴⁰ although the Prosecutor is directed to have resort to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, where appropriate. If convicted, juvenile offenders may not be sentenced to imprisonment, instead the Special Court may order a variety of correctional care. Nevertheless, the personal jurisdiction limitation of bearing the “greatest responsibility” always made it unlikely that children aged below 15 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime would be prosecuted before the Special Court; more recently, the Prosecutor of the Special Court has stated publicly that no child will be prosecuted before the Special Court.³⁴¹

7. Individual criminal responsibility (Article 6)

7.a Direct criminal responsibility

Following well-established principles of customary international law, article 6 of the Statute states that any person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 shall be individually responsible for the crime. The accused does not necessarily have to be a member of the armed forces in order to attract liability; civilians, for example, can also be held criminally responsible for violations of the laws of war.³⁴² Criminal responsibility for the crimes contained in article 5, namely those under Sierra Leonean law, falls to be determined by the relevant laws of Sierra Leone.

The fact that the accused was acting under the orders of a Government or superior does not relieve the individual of his or her criminal responsibility, although – according to general principles of law as well as the Statute – it may be taken into account in mitigation of sentence. According to these principles of liability, if a commander orders that certain acts be committed, he or she would bear

³³⁸ Although many Status of Forces Agreements require the consent of the sending State before trials are launched against their forces, there does not appear to be such a limitation in the Statute of the Special Court, presumably due to the involvement of the Security Council.

³³⁹ As at the time of writing, no peacekeepers have been publicly indicted by the Prosecutor of the Special Court.

³⁴⁰ The position represents a break with the Statute for the ICC, which provides that the “Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime”: article 26.

³⁴¹ Press release of the Special Court, “Special Court Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children”, 2 November 2002.

³⁴² See above, discussion on violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II.



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direct responsibility for those acts, as the Statute specifically refers to ‘ordering’ that the act be committed as a basis for liability.

7.b Command responsibility

The laws of war also impose what is known as “command responsibility”, referring to the principle by which a superior will be responsible for the acts of subordinates under his or her control.³⁴³ This concept, which is longstanding in military hierarchies,³⁴⁴ has also become a well-established principle in customary international law, particularly following its development at the Nuremberg, Tokyo and post-Nuremberg Trials.

Command responsibility is concerned with being in a position of command, namely that the commander is in a certain relationship towards his or her subordinates, rather than actually giving commands. Thus the commander will be responsible for any acts of his or her subordinate, irrespective of whether the commander actually issued an order to commit such acts. If a command is actually given, as noted, the commander will bear direct responsibility for acts carried out pursuant to that command. The theory of command responsibility as been described by the ICTY as follows:

“The distinct legal character of the two types of superior responsibility must be noted. While the criminal liability of a superior for positive acts follows from general principles of accomplice liability ... the criminal responsibility of superiors for failing to take measures to prevent or repress the unlawful conduct of their subordinates is best understood when seen against the principle that criminal responsibility for omissions is incurred only where there exists a legal obligation to act. As is most clearly evidenced in the case of military commanders ... international law imposes an affirmative duty on superiors to prevent persons under their control from committing violations of international humanitarian law, and it is ultimately this duty that provides the basis for, and defines the contours of, the imputed criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the Statute.”³⁴⁵

This type of responsibility is applicable in two situations: first, where the superior knew or ought to have known the acts were about to be committed or were being committed and did nothing to stop their commission. Second, where the superior knew that such acts had been committed and failed to punish those responsible for their commission. The ICTY Trial Chamber has described the relevant elements for the imposition of command responsibility in the following way: (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (ii) that the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator.³⁴⁶ As with direct responsibility, command responsibility is not limited to military personnel but extends

³⁴³ See, in general, Bantekas, I., ‘The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility’ (1999) 93(3) *American Journal of International Law* 573.

³⁴⁴ See, for example, Charles VII’s Ordinance “Ordonnances des Rois de France de la Troisieme Race”, cited in Meron, T., *Henry’s Laws and Shakespeare’s Wars*, 1993, Cambridge University Press, p.149, fn.40.

³⁴⁵ *Prosecutor v Delelic et al*, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 16 November 1998, para. 334.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid*, para. 346; the first two of these grounds was appealed and the Appeals Chamber upheld the decision of the Trial Chamber in this respect.



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also to civilian commanders. It is also worth emphasising that the principle of command responsibility does not limit or extinguish the individual criminal responsibility of the subordinates for the acts they have committed.

Command responsibility applies during any armed conflict, both international and non-international in nature. The ICTY Appeals Chamber addressed this issue recently, stating that, "the fact that it was in the course of an internal armed conflict that a war crime was about to be committed or was committed is not relevant to the responsibility of the commander; that only goes to the characteristics of the particular crime and not to the responsibility of the commander. The basis of the commander's responsibility lies in his obligations as commander of troops making up an organised military force under his command, and not in the particular theatre in which the act was committed by a member of that military force."³⁴⁷

³⁴⁷ *Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic, Alagic and Kubura*, Case No. IT-01-47, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, para. 20.

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Chapter Five: Factual Analysis



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C. Northern Province

a. Bombali District

1. Introduction

Bombali District is in the centre-north of Sierra Leone. The town of Makeni is both the district headquarters of Bombali, and the administrative centre of the Northern Province. The northern boundary of Bombali District is formed by the Republic of Guinea. Koinadugu District is found to the east and north east of Bombali District, and Tonkalili District is located to the south and south east. Kambia and Port Loko Districts border Bombali District to the west.

There are 13 chiefdoms in Bombali District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter Town
Biriwa	Kamabai
Bombali Seborra	Makeni
Gbanti Kamaranka	Kamaranka
Gbendembu Ndowahun	Kalangba
Libeisaygahun	Batkanu
Magbaiamba Ndowahun	Hunduwa
Makari Gbanti	Masongbon
Paki Masabong	Mapaki
Safroko Limba	Binkolo
Sanda Loko	Kamalo
Sanda Tendaren	Mataboi
Sella Limba	Kamakwie
Tambakha	Fintonia

A main highway runs from the Western Area through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni (Bombali Seborra). At Makeni, the highway splits. The southern fork runs to Magburaka, the headquarter town of Tonkalili District. The northern fork runs through the towns of Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom) and Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) to Kabala, the headquarter town of Koinadugu District. Makeni and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) are linked by a poor quality secondary road that runs north-south through the towns of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) and Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). Running north from Kamakwie, the road continues to a ferry point over the Little Scarcies River into Tambakha Chiefdom. A route running north through Tambakha Chiefdom leads directly to the international border with Guinea and the Guinean town of Madina Oula. From Kamakwie, a road runs west over the Little Scarcies River into Kambia District, and the town of Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District). A route runs east from the main Makeni-Kabala highway nearby Karina, through Gbendembu, Mataboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom). From Batkanu, the road continues west into the northern chiefdoms of Port Loko District, ending at Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District).



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The Little Scarcies River runs latitudinally through the north of Bombali District, forming the boundary between Sella Limba and Tambakha Chiefdoms. It also forms the boundary between Bombali and Kambia Districts before running into Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom (Port Loko District).

Bombali District was not directly affected by the conflict until early 1994. Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces attacked a number of locations in Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom on the boundary with Port Loko District. During the RUF attacks, which lasted for around two weeks, civilians were targeted, killed and raped. Many homes were burned down. SLA forces stationed in Makeni were involved in countering RUF incursions in Tonkolili District to the south. During 1994, civilian unrest and mistrust of the SLA boiled over into a demonstration in Makeni Town (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), which was brutally suppressed by SLA forces. RUF activity in early 1995 was concentrated on attacking the Western Area, through major assaults on towns like Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF forces briefly extended their activity into Kambia District in early 1995. In May 1995, RUF established a base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), a village on land between two rivers that is inaccessible by land except by an impractical detour. From Ro-Source, RUF forces attacked nearby villages raping women, abducting civilians to carry stolen items, and burning down houses. Later in the year, RUF forces established a base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The RUF forward operating bases in 1995 were in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and later at Camp Fol-Fol in the South of Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District.

Before the Parliamentary and Presidential elections scheduled for 26 February 1996, RUF forces attacked villages on Batkanu-Gbendembu road, killing civilians and looting property. A civilian was burnt alive in his vehicle by RUF forces. RUF forces also attacked Kamakwie Town (Sella Limba Chiefdom), in the north of Bombali District, opening their attack with indiscriminate fire from with RPG. RUF forces killed and cut open the stomach of a farmer, and shot a deaf and mute man before withdrawing to their camp at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The elections in Bombali District passed without any widespread violence, and the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed in late 1996. The ceasefire held until early May 1997, when RUF forces again attacked Kamakwie, meeting no resistance from the SLA. Here they seized the contents of an SLA ammunition dump. The RUF again withdrew to their camp at Masonkorie.

On 25 May 1997, an element of the SLA overthrew the elected government and formed a military regime called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Shortly after the coup, the RUF and AFRC joined. RUF forces took up positions in Bombali District at Karina and Kamabai (both in Biriwa Chiefdom), taking control of the prosperous agricultural area. In Karina, RUF forces shot dead ten civilians attending a Muslim feast, and abducted a large number of others to be trained to fight for the RUF/AFRC or used as sex slaves by RUF/AFRC members. Other settlements around Karina were attacked. In late 1997, Guinean long-range artillery fire from Madina (Tonko Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District) forced the RUF/AFRC to temporarily abandon the Ro-Source base. They established a new base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District). Relations between Nigerian forces stationed within Sierra Leone and the RUF/AFRC deteriorated rapidly across 1997 as Nigerian forces, given an ECOMOG mandate in late 1997, used force to police a trade and arms

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embargo. In late December, ECOMOG jets bombed RUF/AFRC positions outside of Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), claiming that the RUF/AFRC was constructing a runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country.

In early February, ECOMOG forces attacked Freetown, dislodging the combined RUF/AFRC forces and forcing their retreat into provincial Sierra Leone. On 14 February, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces retreating from the Western Area began concentrating in Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), commencing a 17 day spree of looting and violence known as "Operation Pay Yourself". RUF/AFRC forces performed house to house searches, stealing valuable items and food from civilians. In early March, ECOMOG commenced provincial operations and moved from Port Loko (Maforiki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) through Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Makeni, establishing a base at Makeni's Teko Barracks. CDF forces deployed in the town, and a hunt for "collaborators" began. ECOMOG also occupied the northern towns of Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Following ECOMOG's arrival in Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces dispersed throughout Bombali District, staging hit-and-run attacks on settlement on the Makeni-Kamalo axis, and attacking towns in the northern Tambakha Chiefdom. In the chiefdom headquarter of Fintonia (Tambakha Chiefdom), RUF forces executed 11 civilians and burned down large numbers of houses. Civilians from the town were abducted to assist RUF/AFRC forces in navigating the dense jungle terrain. In late April, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the arms from over ten civilians in Komoyah (Tambakha Chiefdom). They erected a rudimentary checkpoint, a rope across the road and tied the amputated arms along the length of the rope, leaving the amputees for dead nearby. Mid-year, towns on the Batkanu-Karina axis, and throughout the north of Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom came under attack from RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces strengthened their positions in Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom) and commenced frequent food-finding missions or "Jar Jar" throughout the west of the Chiefdom. By August, RUF/AFRC forces were again active in Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom). ECOMOG artillery shelled the base from Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) for seven days continuously, leaving the base littered with the corpses of RUF/AFRC forces.

At the end of October 1998, RUF/AFRC forces concentrated around Kamalo (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) in preparation for an attack of the town. Villages to the east of Kamalo were raided by RUF/AFRC squads. This forced many civilians to seek safety behind ECOMOG lines in Kamalo. During these preliminary attacks, RUF/AFRC forces cut a man in half from head to groin. Despite reinforcing in advance of the RUF/AFRC attack, ECOMOG withdrew north from Kamalo to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom), taking casualties. From Kamalo, RUF/AFRC forces moved south attacking Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom). During both attacks, large number of houses were burnt down, and civilians killed. ECOMOG forces, and SLA and CDF forces that had been infused into ECOMOG took up positions at Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), Kamaranka and Kamakwie on the northern axis running from Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom). The CDF began initiating local youths around Gbendembu, "washing" them spiritually to render them bullet-proof.



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In early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked SLA and ECOMOG forces in Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), killing over 20 SLA soldiers and amputating the limbs of six civilians. In the closing weeks of late December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces cleared ECOMOG forces from within a corridor from Koidu (CHIEFDOM, Kono District) through Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkalili District) and Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District, Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Freetown between 6 and 20 January. In late December, RUF/AFRC forces in Bombali District were closing in on Makeni, attacking towns to the north including Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom), Karina and Kamabai (Biriwa Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC had also broken out of Kono District, and were moving on Makeni along the highway through Tonkalili. On 24 December, RUF/AFRC force assaulted Makeni from three directions, forcing ECOMOG to retreat to Kamakwie, which fell to the RUF/AFRC in the days following. A huge RUF/AFRC force moved through Makeni towards Port Loko District, and onwards to the Western Area.

Makeni (Bombali Seboria Chiefdom) now became the RUF/AFRC stronghold until April 2001. The town was at the heart of the RUF/AFRC's defensive operation following their failure to hold onto territory in the Western Area. The RUF/AFRC occupied Kambia District and the key entry points into the district. Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) was also under RUF/AFRC control, as was the town of Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). The RUF/AFRC controlled all the northern border routes in Guinea. Bombali District was divided into two commands, seated at Makeni and Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Throughout RUF/AFRC controlled territory, local RUF/AFRC began establishing joint civilian and military cooperation committees known as G5 committees. Without fail, the establishment of the G5 committee was accompanied by promises that RUF/AFRC commanders would prevent their forces from inflicting violence upon civilians. The G5 committees administered the collection of periodic - sometimes daily - contributions of money and food from the civilian population to the RUF/AFRC. ECOMOG's move to secure the highways between the Western Area, Port Loko and Mile 91 removed vital trade routes that could supply RUF/AFRC with basic goods and supplies. The G5 system appeared not to provide adequate resources to feed or pay RUF/AFRC members. The few instances of extremely brutal punishment metered out by RUF/AFRC commanding officers to their subordinates - on RUF/AFRC member was beaten with a cane infused with razor blades, another was stoned to death - did not to restrain RUF/AFRC forces from carrying out "food finding missions", stealing civilian property and food. To supplement the resources gained through G5 Committees and "food finding missions" the RUF/AFRC began selling stolen property in Guinean trade fairs just over the border from Tambakha Chiefdom. Often, the same commanders that promised discipline and the rule of law ordered these missions.

On 7 July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement, consolidating a ceasefire that had been in force since May 1999. The RUF/AFRC continued to consolidate within Bombali District, setting up a training camp at Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom). Intense raids, both day and night were conducted around the training camp, intensifying the terror of the civilian population. The training camp at Gbendembu was also used to

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train recruits and conscriptees for missions inside Guinea territory. In late 1999, infighting between the leadership of RUF and the AFRC in Makeni led to a division of operational areas, although the depth of the split between the two groups is not clear. UNAMSIL commenced deployment in late 1999 to bolster the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

In January 2000, the 450 peacekeepers tried to deploy in Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom) but were delayed a few days en route at an RUF/AFRC checkpoint because they did not have the correct papers. In February, diamonds were discovered in Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom, leading to a concentration of RUF/AFRC forces in the chiefdom. In May, the RUF/AFRC surrounded and attacked UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Makeni, killing an unknown number and attacking them with sniper fire as they fled to Kabala. RUF/AFRC forces also disarmed over 200 Zambian UNAMSIL peacekeepers and took them to Makeni, and then to Kailahun. The RUF/AFRC captured a significant haul of armoured vehicle, weapons, uniforms and communications apparatus from UNAMSIL. Simultaneously, the RUF/AFRC again pushed towards the Western Area, attacking towns in Port Loko District and on the main highway through Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District). By mid-May, the RUF/AFRC advance had stalled. Between May and July, Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunships commenced attacking RUF/AFRC positions in and around Makeni, resulting in frequent civilian deaths and destruction of property when RUF/AFRC forces engaged with Anti-Aircraft guns. Similar attacks occurred in Kambia, Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts. The RUF/AFRC often deserted their positions as the gunship appeared.

In September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces in Tambakha Chiefdom staged attacks on attacked border towns just inside Guinean territory. Guinean armed forces adopted a "Hot Pursuit" policy, bombarding RUF/AFRC positions inside Sierra Leone and moving their border security forces three miles within Sierra Leonean territory. Civilian movement was restricted, and as the RUF/AFRC reprisals against civilians for suspected collaboration with Guinean force intensified.

Negotiations between UNAMSIL and the RUF/AFRC continued in line with the Aduja Ceasefire Agreement and its review process. In the first few months of 2001, the RUF/AFRC had opened the Lunsar-Makeni highway and returned to UNAMSIL much of weaponry and hardware it had confiscated in 2000. Long range UNAMSIL and MILOBs patrols commenced and by April Nigerian UNAMSIL had deployed into Makeni. The disarmament process in Bombali began in late September, accompanied by the arrival of Sierra Leone Police to Makeni (Bombali Seborá)

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events between 1992 and 1994

Following RUF attacks in Kono District on 22 October 1992, residents of the village of Kamaranka (Gbanti Kamaranka Chiefdom) who had moved to Kono District to mine diamonds, returned to their village on foot, a distance of over 100km. Many residents of Kambia Mapulen (Gbati Kamaranka Chiefdom) packed up their belongings and fled to larger towns such as Makeni (Bombali Seborá Chiefdom), Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District) and Freetown (Western Area). On 21 January 1994, the NPRC Resident Minister for the Northern Province arrived in Kambia



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Mapulen for a meeting with the chiefdom elders, during which he promised to provide security for civilians.

The RUF entered Bombali District in February 1994. RUF forces attacked the villages of Rogboreh, Makalan and Mateboi (all Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom), to the northwest of Makeni town, and bordering Port Loko District. The troops were armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and hand grenades and wore military-style uniforms. Thirty people were abducted from Rogboreh and a number of women were raped. Following the attack on Rogboreh, RUF forces chanted slogans about the leader of the RUF. Rogboreh was occupied for 2 weeks, during which no houses were burned. An RUF Commander was identified as killing three people in Makalan, taking their property. In Mateboi, RUF forces burned down an unknown number of homes.

On 3 April 1994, 200 SLA soldiers in Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) were also under the command of the Resident Minister for the Northern Province. On 11 April, SLA forces deployed from Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom) and recaptured the town of Makali from RUF forces.

In Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom), on 18 April 1994, there was a public demonstration by civilians in response to a strongly-held belief that those SLA forces had been responsible for earlier attacks on the villages of Masanga and Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and on Magburaka town (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). SLA forces fired on civilian demonstrators, killing at least two people.

In the late morning of 1 November 1994, a large RUF force attacked the town of Bungbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), southwest of Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom). One hundred and ninety-three houses were burned during the attack. Civilians displaced from Bungbuna moved westwards to Binkolo (Safroko Limba Chiefdom). On 2 November 1994, SLA forces moved from Teko Army Barracks in Makeni and repelled the RUF forces from Bungbuna. Over the following week, these forces eastwards towards the town of Alikalia (Neini Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

b) Events in 1995 and 1996

RUF activity in 1995 was concentrated on attacking the Western Area, through major assaults on town like Port Loko (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Although the RUF established two camps in Bombali District – at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom) and Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom) – the RUF forward operating bases in 1995 were in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara, Tonkolili) and later at Camp Fol-Fol in the south of Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili. The bases in Bombali would take on a greater significance in 1996, as the RUF suffered a series of military defeats and failed to move into Freetown or hold territory in the Western Area.

Between 1 and 5 January 1995, RUF forces attacked the town of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from the direction of Makeni (Bombali Seborra Chiefdom) and Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom).

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

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In May 1995, RUF forces entered the Bombali District from Kambia or Port Loko, neighbouring districts to the west. Between 14 and 18 May 1995, RUF moved eastwards from Romeni (BKM Chiefdom, Port Loko District) towards Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom, Port Loko District) crossing into Bombali District and establishing a base on an island between two river at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom)³⁴⁸. RUF forces operated from Ro-Source until at least September 1997. RUF forces again attacked the village of Mateboi (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), southeast of Ro-Source along the primary route between Batkanu and Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom) in May 1995. RUF forces raped five women and burnt down 10 homes. Civilians were abducted and forced to carry stolen property to an unknown destination. In the same year, RUF forces also established a base at Masonkorie, a village in Sanda Loko Chiefdom, 15km east of the town of Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom).

Sometime in February 1996, before the Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 26 February, RUF troops left their camp in the Kangari Hills, (Malal Mara Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) crossed the Makeni–Freetown highway and headed in the direction of Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). From this point, RUF forces took an alternative route towards the town of Gbendembu (Gbendembu Ndowahun Chiefdom), avoiding the main Batkanu–Gbendembu road, and attacked Makundu village (Sanda Tenderen Chiefdom). At least four civilian men were killed during the attack. Subsequently, 200 RUF forces moved in the direction of Gbendembu, attacking the town early in the morning on 22 or 23 February 2003 having camped the previous night in dense forest to the west of the town.

It is likely that RUF forces were active around the Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) area from 1 February, since they had control over Madina (Tonka Limba Chiefdom, Kambia District). On or around 23 February 1996, civilians in Kamakwie learned of the RUF attack on Gbendembu (Gbendembu-Ndowahun Chiefdom) prior to the subsequent attack on their town. Attacking Gbendembu, RUF forces were armed with AK47s, G3s, RPGs and hand grenades. Properties were looted and the doors of homes were destroyed. Civilian traffic travelling northwards from Gbendembu towards Kamakwie was targeted by RUF forces. The driver and passenger of a passing car were shot and wounded, and their car looted. RUF forces burned the car with the dying occupants trapped inside.

Between 23 and 26 February 1996, an RUF of between 150 and 200 personnel attacked Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom) to the north of Makeni, north east of their base at Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom), and 15 Km west of the RUF base at Masonkorie (Sanda Loko Chiefdom). The attack came from the south of the town, through the village of Kathumpeh (Sella Limba Chiefdom). The main north-south road through Kamakwie passes through Gbendembu. The attack commenced in the morning, when a member of the RUF entered the town on a motorbike and began firing indiscriminately, possibly with an RPG. In addition to the burning down of 67 houses, RUF forces also burned offices of several international NGOs operating in the town. At least two people were

³⁴⁸ Given the attacks in the north eastern chiefdoms of Port Loko in early January 1995, and accounts in the records detailing attacks on locations in these chiefdoms as coming from the direction of Mateboi (Sanda Tenderen, Bombali), it is likely that the RUF had a presence around Ro-Source well before June 1995.



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These missions will only be entitled to such protection so long as they retain their civilian character, that is, provided that they do not take a direct part in hostilities, which has been defined as undertaking acts of war that, by their nature or purpose, are likely to cause actual harm to personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces.³⁰⁵ These provisions expressly do not apply to “United Nations operations authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies”.³⁰⁶

c) The recruitment and use of child soldiers

The elements of the war crime of the recruitment and use of child soldiers are:³⁰⁷

1. The perpetrator conscripted or enlisted one or more persons into an armed force or group³⁰⁸ or used one or more persons to participate actively in hostilities.
2. Such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.
3. The perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were under the age of 15 years.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15, or using them to participate actively in hostilities, is a war crime under all conditions, whether the child is recruited into national armed forces or armed groups, whether the conflict is international or non-international and whether the child is coerced or has volunteered. This crime was first included in Additional Protocol II, article 4(3)(c) and subsequently in other instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, article 38(3) and the Rome Statute for the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(vii).³⁰⁹ An examination of State practice and *opinio juris* in this area, which is beyond the scope of the current report, demonstrates that the act of conscription, enlistment and use of child soldiers is a crime under customary international law.³¹⁰

³⁰⁵ *Prosecutor v Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 100.

³⁰⁶ *Report of the Secretary General on the Scope of Legal Protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*, UN Doc. A/55/637, endnote 1.

³⁰⁷ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(vii) and below, notes 199-200.

³⁰⁸ With respect to armed conflicts that are international in nature, this element prohibits the conscription or enlistment of children into the national armed forces: see the Rome Statute, article 8(2)(b)(xxvi).

³⁰⁹ The entry into force in 2002 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict raises the minimum age for compulsory recruitment and participation in hostilities to 18. This signifies the gradual emergence of a new standard, albeit one that has not yet reached the status of customary international law.

³¹⁰ See NPWJ and UNICEF, *International Criminal Justice and Children*, 2002, available from www.npwj.org, and the Amicus Brief submitted by UNICEF and others, including NPWJ, to the Special Court for Sierra Leone in *The Prosecutor v Norman*, SCSL-03-08-PT-129, filed on 21 January 2004, both of which go into this issue in great detail.



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4.h Other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4): The facts

As noted, there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone that began in March 1991 and continued until January 2002. As such, IHL – including the crimes listed in article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court – applied across the whole territory of Sierra Leone for that time period both in those places where actual combat was not taking place as well as those areas where fighting was occurring.

In respect of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against peacekeeping personnel, it should be recalled that the Rome Statute of the ICC reflects customary international law in limiting the crime to intentional attacks against personnel and objects “as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict”. The critical question is, therefore, whether UNAMSIL military peacekeepers had civilian status or whether they were combatants. UNAMSIL was established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,³¹¹ authorising the use of force in certain circumstances, which gives rise to the *prima facie* conclusion that they were combatants, rather than civilians.³¹² It is therefore submitted that UNAMSIL peacekeepers did not have civilian status, at least not to the level of certainty required to sustain a criminal conviction. As such, this report considers that the elements of this crime are not made out in relation to various actions against UNAMSIL peacekeepers.

4.h.i Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the general and specific attacks committed against the civilian population as outlined above and the attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;
- (b) **Intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles**, for the attacks committed against humanitarian personnel and objects, specifically the abduction of personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and World Health Organisation (WHO) and the stealing of property from the United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the IDP camp in Bo and Pujehun Districts;
- (c) **Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities**, for the abduction of tens of thousands of

³¹¹ Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), 22 October 1999.

³¹² See Shrags, D, ‘Current Developments: UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage’ (2000) 94(2) *American Journal of International Law* 406; see in particular page 409, in which Ms Shrags states that “The [Secretary-General’s] instructions apply to members of UN forces when they are actively engaged in situations of armed conflict as combatants ... They accordingly take effect in enforcement actions when the use of force is authorized *in pursuance of a Chapter VII mandate*, and in peacekeeping operations *when it is permitted in self-defence*’ (emphasis added).



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children³¹³ under the age of 15 years, some being as young as 10 at the time of their abduction, conscripting them into the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces and using them to participate actively in hostilities and in the commission of crimes under international humanitarian law as members of the regular forces and as members of “Small Boy Units” and “Small Girl Units”.

4.h.ii Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the West Side Boys

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the specific attack against the civilian population as outlined above and for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;
- (b) **Intentionally directing attacks against humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles**, for the abduction of 40 UNOMSIL and civil society workers in August 1999.³¹⁴

4.h.iii Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the SLA

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, the following war crimes were committed

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the specific attacks against the civilian population as outlined above and for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;
- (b) **Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities**, for using children under the age of 15 to carry arms and ammunition to the warfront in Pujehun District in January 1992.

4.h.iv Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of the CDF

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for the general and specific attacks

³¹³ The first instance of recruitment of children by the RUF/NPFL was recorded in March 1991; children would continue to be abducted and used as soldiers throughout the conflict by the RUF and their allies until at least June 2000, which is the last recorded instance of this practice.

³¹⁴ The members of the United Kingdom armed forces captured in August 2000 were clearly combatants and, as such, the elements of this crime in relation to that incident are not satisfied.



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against a civilian population as outlined above and for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above;

(b) **Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities**, for the initiation of boys aged under 15 in Kenema in May 1997, the use of children aged as young as 13 in hostilities in Kenema in 1999, the initiation of children aged below 15 in Pujehun District in late 1997, the use of children aged under 15 as spies and soldiers in Pujehun District in February 1998 and the conscription of children and their use as soldiers in Kailahun in May 1998.

4.h.v Other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by members of ECOMOG

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the war crimes that were committed, members of ECOMOG committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

(a) **Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities**, for attacks against individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities as outlined above.

4.i Crimes under Sierra Leonean law (Article 5): the law

Article 5 of the Statute of the Special Court reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed the following crimes under Sierra Leonean law:

- (a) Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926 (Cap. 31):
 - (i) Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary to section 6;
 - (ii) Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to section 7;
 - (iii) Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes, contrary to section 12.
- (b) Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861:
 - (i) Setting fire to dwelling - houses, any person being therein, contrary to section 2;
 - (ii) Setting fire to public buildings, contrary to sections 5 and 6;
 - (iii) Setting fire to other buildings, contrary to section 6.”

Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) explicitly refers to Sierra Leonean law as being among the provisions over which the Special Court should have jurisdiction. The provisions were selected to cover specific situations that were “considered to be either unregulated or inadequately regulated



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under international law.³¹⁵ The elements of these crimes are governed by Sierra Leone Statute and case law³¹⁶ and, as such, do not require any connection with an armed conflict.

a) Abuse of girls

The provisions of the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926* listed in the Statute of the Special Court are designed to protect girls under the age of 16 from sexual abuse and exploitation. They vary in terms of the ages of the children they protect, from under 13 in the case of section 6, through between 13 and 14 in the case of section 7, to under 16 in the case of section 12. The different crimes are considered to have different levels of seriousness and entail different penalties under Sierra Leone law, from 15 years in the case of section 6, which is a felony, to 2 years in the case of sections 7 and 12, which are misdemeanours.

The elements for the crimes under sections 6 and 7 are that the accused “unlawfully and carnally” knew and abused a girl within the stated ages. The elements for section 12 are that the accused took or caused to be taken an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of and against the will of her father or mother or any other person having lawful charge of her.

There are two possible defences to the crimes under these provisions. First, ‘belief of age’ is a defence to the charge: thus if the accused can prove that he had reasonable cause to believe the victim was of or over the required age, this will be a complete defence.³¹⁷ In addition, in keeping with the common law applicable in Sierra Leone related to these types of crimes,³¹⁸ if the accused can show that the victim was his wife, particularly under the customary law of Sierra Leone, this will also be a defence.³¹⁹ However, consent of the girl is no defence to the crime, as lack of consent is not an element of the crime.

b) Wanton destruction of property

These provisions only cover setting fire to specific buildings, namely dwelling houses, public buildings and “other” buildings, which include any type of building not explicitly mentioned elsewhere in the *Malicious Damage Act, 1867*.³²⁰ It should, however, be emphasised that setting fire to a house will only fall within the jurisdiction of the Special Court should a person actually be inside, due to the elements of section 2 of the *Malicious Damage Act, 1867*.³²¹ Furthermore, the Statute of the Special Court does not incorporate the other provisions of the *Malicious Damage Act, 1867*, thereby

³¹⁵ *Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, para. 19.

³¹⁶ In this regard, it should be noted that regular case reporting in Sierra Leone ceased in 1973 for a number of reasons, mainly to do with lack of resources, and it was only in 2002-3 that the first steps started being taken towards its reintroduction.

³¹⁷ *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926*, proviso section 15(3).

³¹⁸ Many common law countries have abolished immunity for spousal rape, considering it to be a breach of human rights, in particular those relating to the dignity of the person and discrimination on the basis of sex; arguably, Sierra Leone law also constitutes a breach of the rights of the child.

³¹⁹ Thompson, B., *The Criminal Law of Sierra Leone*, 1999, University Press of America, USA, p. 70.

³²⁰ These are: a church, chapel or other place of divine worship (section 1); a house (with no person inside), outhouse, manufactory, farm building or similar building (section 3) and railway stations (section 4).

³²¹ Apparently, the person inside the house may be the accused person: *R v Pardoe* (1894) 15 Digest 1027, 11-547.



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excluding setting fire to buildings other than those listed above and excluding other types of damage to all buildings.

An essential element of this crime is that there was actual burning, no matter how slight, of some part of the building or property in respect of which the charge is laid.³²² Each of the crimes listed in article 5(b) constitute a felony under Sierra Leone law, with penalties ranging from 14 years (section 6), through 16 years (section 5) to life imprisonment (section 2).

The mental element is that the act must be committed “unlawfully and maliciously” in order to constitute an offence. In this instance, “malice” does not mean malevolence or ill will, but refers instead to the intention of the accused. The mental element is therefore that the accused either intended to do the act, without just cause or excuse,³²³ or was reckless and foresaw or ought to have foreseen the result, even if that result was not necessarily intended.³²⁴

4.j Crimes under Sierra Leonean law (Article 5): the facts

Sierra Leone law applied throughout the territory of Sierra Leone throughout the time period covered by the conflict, without the need to prove any contextual elements such as those applicable to crimes against humanity (a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population) or violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (the existence of an armed conflict). It should, however, be noted that an amnesty applies in relation to crimes committed before 7 July 1999,³²⁵ so that those crimes cannot be prosecuted in the national courts of Sierra Leone or before the Special Court. Nevertheless, this report characterises acts as crimes where the elements of the crimes are met, irrespective of whether they can be prosecuted or not.

One of the signature acts committed during the conflict in Sierra Leone was the widespread burning of residential houses. While this is a crime under Sierra Leone law,³²⁶ it is not a crime over which the Special Court has jurisdiction: the Special Court is limited to those circumstances in which a person is inside the house at the time it is burnt. Similarly, while wanton destruction of property is a crime under international law, it is not a crime over which the Special Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, while there is evidence of the burning of hundreds of thousands of houses – effectively destroying the lives of hundreds of thousands of people – this in itself is not a crime that can be prosecuted before the Special Court.

³²² *R v Stallion* (1833) 15 Digest 1026, 11-541 (no flame visible); *R v Parker* (1839) 15 Digest 1027, 11-542 (charring); and *R v Russell* (1842) 15 Digest 1027, 11-543 (scorching).

³²³ *Bromage v Prosser* (1825) 4B & C 247, 255 per Bayley J.

³²⁴ *R v Pembrton* (1874) LR 2CCR 119, 122 per Blackburn J.

³²⁵ See below for a discussion of the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court, including the issue of the Lomé Amnesty.

³²⁶ *Malicious Damage Act, 1861*, section 3.



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4.j.i Crimes under Sierra Leone law committed by members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes under Sierra Leone law:

- (a) **Offences relating to the abuse of girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1926**, for the rape of scores of girls aged under 13 years, with some aged as young as 10, the rape of girls aged between 13 and 14 years and the abduction of girls aged under 16 years for their use as “wives”,³²⁷
- (b) **Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861**, for the burning of people in residential premises, including locking people inside houses before setting fire to them, and for the burning of public buildings, including schools, courthouses and other buildings;

4.j.ii Crimes under Sierra Leone law committed by members of the West Side Boys

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following crimes under Sierra Leone law:

- (a) **Offences relating to the wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage Act, 1861**, for the burning of people in residential premises, in particular the locking of 73 people in a house prior to it being set on fire in April 1999.

5. Temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court (Article 1(1))

The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that its temporal jurisdiction runs from 30 November 1996 to a future date as yet undetermined.³²⁸ This date was selected on the basis of three considerations during the negotiations:

- (a) the temporal jurisdiction should be reasonably limited in time so that the Prosecutor is not overburdened and the Court overloaded;
- (b) the beginning date should correspond to an event or a new phase in the conflict without necessarily having any political connotations; and
- (c) it should encompass the most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups and in all geographical areas of the country.

Three different dates were discussed in this context:

- (a) 30 November 1996 (i.e., the date of the failed Abidjan Peace Accords);
- (b) 25 May 1997 (i.e., when the AFRC launched its coup d'état against the government of Sierra Leone); and
- (c) 6 January 1999 (i.e., when the AFRC and RUF launched their attack on Freetown).

³²⁷ This report proceeds on the basis that the fact that members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC labelled these girls as their “wives” does not establish there was a marital relationship sufficient to mount a defence to this charge.

³²⁸ Statute of the Special Court, article 1(1).



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chiefdoms. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the SLA committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of dozens of civilians, including those alleged to be RUF “collaborators” and those they accused of not respecting their “orders”, including the killing of 12 young people from Damawuro and the killing of a man in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) in March;
- b) **Imprisonment**, for detaining an alleged RUF “collaborator” in a cell in Blama in March and for detaining civilians in a guardroom for some days in Blama;
- c) **Enslavement**, for the forceful use of civilians to work at mining sites in the Tongo Field area;
- d) **Rape**, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as “wives” and for sexual violence committed against several women and girls.

4.d.iv Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the CDF

The CDF committed a general attack against the civilian population lasting from January 1996 until October 1999. This attack was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it was an organised pattern of conduct. The facts clearly demonstrate that there was a policy to commit such an attack, with civilians being targeted for a variety of reasons; reprisals against civilians for having cooperated with the RUF were systematic and particularly brutal throughout this period. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including civilians arbitrarily labelled as “RUF collaborators”;
- b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians under their control to harvest food for the CDF in Tonkolili District in October 1999;
- c) **Imprisonment**, for the detention without charge of people in cells and cages, particularly at checkpoints;
- d) **Torture**, for the use of “FM ropes”,²⁴³ beatings, dripping melted plastic on people and other acts inflicting pain and suffering on people under the control of the CDF;
- e) **Rape**, for sexual slavery, namely forcing women to become “wives”, and for sexual violence committed against women;
- f) **Other inhumane acts**, for the effect on the civilian population of acts of cannibalism and displaying internal organs at checkpoints.

Within that general attack, there were a series of specific attacks committed against the civilian population. Of the three identified attacks committed against the civilian population, one will be

²⁴³ “FM rope” stands for “Frequency Modulation”. A victim would be tied up with a length of nylon, which would be progressively tightened. The more the nylon tightened, the more pain and suffering it would cause and the more the victim would “talk”, hence the analogy with a radio tuner.



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discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the CDF.²⁴⁴ It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

CDF Attack from November 1997 to May 1998

During this period, the CDF engaged RUF/AFRC forces throughout the Southern Province, repelling them from most of the areas previously under their control. The CDF actions in those areas demonstrate a clear pattern of violent activities directed against civilians, in particular against suspected RUF/AFRC “collaborators”, leading to the infliction of severe physical violence and the draconian regulation of every aspect of civilian life. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killing of dozens of civilians, including the killing of alleged RUF/AFRC “collaborators” in Bonthe Town in February 1998;
- b) **Imprisonment**, for the detention of civilians in cells or specially designed cages, including the detention in a cell for two days of civilians in Bonthe Town in February 1998, the detention of civilians in a cage at Baiama Junction (Bo District) in February 1998 and in Kwellu (Moyamba District) in December 1997;
- c) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe physical and mental violence, notably by the use of cages and FM ropes across the Southern Province, including tying up suspected collaborators with an FM rope, beating them and locking them up in Blama (Kenema District) in February 1998;
- d) **Rape**, for the use of three women as sex slaves in Makpele Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in January 1998;
- e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism, including the decapitation of a civilian and the drinking of his blood in Nomo Chiefdom (Kenema District) in December 1997.

4.e Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 3): The law

Article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission of serious violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 June 1977. These violations shall include:

- (a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
- (b) Collective punishments;
- (c) Taking of hostages;

²⁴⁴ Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the CDF Attack from January 1996 to September 1996 in Bonthe District, which included attacks on Moyamba District from April to August 1996; and the CDF attack from December 1998 to May 1999 in Tonkolili, Moyamba and Port Loko Districts.



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- (d) Acts of terrorism;
- (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
- (f) Pillage;
- (g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;
- (h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 were, as noted, concerned mainly with international armed conflicts, that is, conflicts involving two or more States. The Geneva Conventions were expanded on in 1977 with the adoption of the two Additional Protocols, the first of which was also concerned with international armed conflicts. However, article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, which has been described as a “treaty in miniature”, contains the minimum set of protections applicable in any armed conflict.²⁴⁵ Additional Protocol II expands on common article 3 to specify in more detail the protections that apply during a non-international armed conflict.

In order for these norms to become applicable, they must have been in force at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, whether through customary international law or because the State in question had ratified these instruments and, as such, was bound by these provisions. In respect of the first possibility,²⁴⁶ it is clear that common article 3 has the status of customary international law;²⁴⁷ indeed, most States have criminalised the acts listed in common article 3 within their domestic penal codes. Additional Protocol II as a whole is generally not regarded as having the status of customary international law, but article 4(2) relating to fundamental guarantees both reaffirms and supplements common article 3 and, as such, has the status of customary international law.²⁴⁸

Nevertheless, in order not to offend the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*,²⁴⁹ it is not sufficient simply to show that these instruments had the status of customary international law at the time the alleged crimes were committed. It must also be established that the violation of those norms attracted individual criminal responsibility: the ICTY Appeals Chamber has found that customary

²⁴⁵ It should be noted that while common article 3 refers to its applicability in non-international armed conflicts, it is now recognised that customary international law dictates that these protections are applicable in *any* armed conflict, not just those that are non-international in nature.

²⁴⁶ Note that Sierra Leone succeeded to the Geneva Conventions on 10 June 1965 and acceded to the Additional Protocols on 21 October 1986, therefore these instruments were, in any case, in force in the territory of Sierra Leone at all relevant times.

²⁴⁷ See for example *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999 and *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 608.

²⁴⁸ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 608-10.

²⁴⁹ According to this principle, nobody may be found guilty of a criminal offence for acts that were not criminalised, whether under national or international law, at the time of their commission: see the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, article 15(1).



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international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common article 3, as supplemented by other general rules and principles, in particular Additional Protocol II.²⁵⁰

4.e.i Contextual elements of violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II

Once it is established that these instruments were in force, there are two sets of elements that need to be met, one of which can be described as “contextual” elements, the other of which are the elements of the acts enumerated in article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court. The contextual elements are as follows:

1. The applicability of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II must be established.
2. The personal jurisdiction (relating to victims and perpetrators) and the geographical jurisdiction must be met.
3. There must be a nexus between the act constituting the crime and the armed conflict.
4. The act constituting the crime must be a serious violation.

1. Applicability of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II

Both common article 3 and Additional Protocol II contain conditions of applicability that must be considered in order to determine whether or not they apply at a particular location or during a particular time. As noted, the inclusion of these crimes within the Statute of the Special Court is not in itself sufficient to conclude that these instruments apply to the situation in Sierra Leone, nor is it sufficient to establish that the instruments were in force at the time in question.

Common article 3 applies during any armed conflict,²⁵¹ thereby ruling out its application during internal disturbances and tensions. Whether an armed conflict exists or not²⁵² must be determined on an evaluation of the intensity and organisation of the parties to the conflict; indeed, the *Tadic* decision refers to “protracted armed violence”.²⁵³

The situations to which Additional Protocol II will apply are more limited than those to which common article 3 will apply.²⁵⁴ It is worth noting that while Additional Protocol II develops and supplements common article 3, the more restrictive conditions of its applicability are not automatically extended to common article 3, which continues to apply during any armed conflict. In order for Additional Protocol II to apply, the following elements must be satisfied:

- (a) An armed conflict is occurring between the armed forces of a State and dissident armed forces or other organised groups.

²⁵⁰ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 134. The Appeals Chamber reached this conclusion following consideration of the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, elements of international practice showing that States intend to criminalise serious breaches of customary rules and principles applicable during a non-international armed conflict as well as national legislation aimed at implementing the Geneva Conventions.

²⁵¹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 137.

²⁵² See above for a discussion on what constitutes an armed conflict.

²⁵³ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995 (*Tadic* Jurisdiction Decision), para. 70.

²⁵⁴ In this respect it should be noted that if the requirements for Additional Protocol II are met, then the lower threshold conditions for common article 3 are also automatically met.



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- (b) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups were under responsible command.
- (c) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups exercised control over territory such that they were able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations.
- (d) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups are able to implement Additional Protocol II.

(a) An armed conflict is occurring between the armed forces of a State and dissident armed forces or other organised groups

The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals refers to the fact that “armed forces”, namely those fighting on behalf of the State, covers all armed forces described in national legislation.²⁵⁵ It is unclear whether this would cover armed forces fighting on behalf of the State that are not so described in national legislation but are established as a result of some other procedure. In the absence of a decision on this matter, it is submitted that a test similar to that in *Tadic* related to forces under the control of a foreign power could be adopted to determine whether armed forces are fighting on behalf of the State on whose territory the conflict is being fought.²⁵⁶ The test could therefore be: overall control of an armed group or individuals by the State; specific instructions to an armed group or individuals by the State; and actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.²⁵⁷

(b) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups were under responsible command

This requirement refers to the degree of organisation of the groups, namely that they were able to carry out military operations and that they were able to impose discipline in the name of the *de facto* authority,²⁵⁸ although it does not imply that there needs to be a hierarchical system identical to that employed by the armed forces of a State.

(c) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups exercised control over territory such that they were able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations

While the previous requirement refers to the command *ability* of the groups, this requirement considers whether the military operations actually carried out were continuous and planned. This requires that the groups in fact dominate part of the territory that is no longer under government control.²⁵⁹

(d) The dissident armed forces or other organised groups are able to implement Additional Protocol II

This refers to the degree of organisation of the dissident armed forces or other organised group, such that they can carry out obligations under Additional Protocol II, which includes matters such as

²⁵⁵ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 625; *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 256.

²⁵⁶ This question could be relevant, for example, if there are protracted periods of fighting between dissident armed forces and armed forces not described in national legislation that are in fact fighting on behalf of the State, without the involvement of the armed forces of a State.

²⁵⁷ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.

²⁵⁸ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 626.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*



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searching for sick, shipwrecked or wounded personnel and providing them with medical care and attention.²⁶⁰

2. Personal and geographical jurisdiction

i) Personal jurisdiction: Perpetrators

Anybody who commits a violation of common article 3 or Additional Protocol II can be held accountable; there is no category of persons to whom these provisions cannot apply. The early jurisprudence of the ICTR focused on whether there were certain criteria that needed to be satisfied in order for an accused to fall within the *ratione personae* for perpetrators. Thus the Trial Chamber in *Akayesu*, while recognising that this should not be interpreted restrictively and that civilians could be held liable for violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, applied a “public official” test to determine whether a person could be held liable. According to this test, if a person was not a combatant, they could be held liable only if they were public officials or agents or exercised some public authority such that they were mandated and expected to support or fulfil the war effort.²⁶¹ However, this was overturned by the Appeals Chamber, who held that this test was not supported either by the language of the Statute nor customary international law. Considering that the core of common article 3 is the protection of victims, which implies effective punishment of perpetrators,²⁶² the Appeals Chamber held that common article 3 and Additional Protocol II are applicable to everyone.²⁶³ As such, the existence of a special link or relationship between the accused and the armed forces of a State is not a pre-condition for the applicability of these instruments.²⁶⁴

ii) Personal jurisdiction: victims

Common article 3 and Additional Protocol II are concerned primarily with the protection of civilians, namely people who do not bear arms. Thus common article 3 refers to persons who are taking no active part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those who are placed *hors de combat*, namely those who are no longer fighting due to injury or some other similar incapacity, whereas Additional Protocol II refers to those persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take a direct part in hostilities.

To take a “direct part” in hostilities means to undertake acts of war that, by their nature or purpose, are likely to cause actual harm to personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces.²⁶⁵ Should a civilian undertake such acts, they would lose their right to protection as civilians and could thereby fall within the class of combatants, thus becoming legitimate military targets.

The central question in this respect is, therefore, whether the alleged victim was taking a direct part in hostilities at the time of the alleged offence. If they were not, then they fall within that class of

²⁶⁰ Additional Protocol II, part III.

²⁶¹ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, paras. 630-4.

²⁶² In this consideration, the Appeals Chamber cited the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the *Celebici* case, para. 143, which stated that the quintessence of international humanitarian law is the respect for a few essential rules of humanity that are valid everywhere, under all circumstances, and which exist above and outside war.

²⁶³ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 443.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, para. 444.

²⁶⁵ *Prosecutor v Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 100.



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persons protected by common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. As such, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis whether a victim has the status of a civilian and, as such, whether the provisions of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II apply.

iii) Geographical jurisdiction

The geographical jurisdiction refers to the geographical territory within which common article 3 and Additional Protocol II apply. As noted, international humanitarian law applies across the territory affected by the conflict from the moment hostilities commence until there is general conclusion of peace or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, a peaceful settlement is reached.²⁶⁶ Customary international law, as reflected in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, makes it clear that the application of the law is not confined to the narrow geographical scope of the actual theatre of combat operations. Rather, international humanitarian law applies throughout the territory affected by the conflict whether or not actual combat is taking place in parts of the territory under the control of a party to the conflict.²⁶⁷

In addition, international humanitarian law also has a temporal scope, namely from the commencement of hostilities until the conclusion of peace or the reaching of a peaceful settlement. Customary international law, as reflected in the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, also requires that the temporal factor not be given a restrictive interpretation. As such, there only needs to be some kind of nexus between the act and the conflict, but not that the act itself occurs during the midst of battle.²⁶⁸

3. Nexus between the crime and the conflict

There must be some kind of link between the crime and the armed conflict, whether it be “closely related”,²⁶⁹ “in conjunction with”,²⁷⁰ or – more reflective of customary law – “in the context of or associated with”.²⁷¹ This requirement stems from the fact that international humanitarian law, concerned as it is with law during an armed conflict, does not protect persons against crimes unrelated to the conflict,²⁷² which should be dealt with by other means.

The ICTY Appeals Chamber has addressed this issue in *Kunarac*, holding that an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit the crime, his or her decision to commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed. Hence, establishing that the perpetrator acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict would be sufficient to conclude that the acts were closely related to the armed conflict. In determining whether or not an act is sufficiently related to the armed conflict, the

²⁶⁶ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70.

²⁶⁷ *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 57.

²⁶⁸ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70 and *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 183.

²⁶⁹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 573.

²⁷⁰ *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 369.

²⁷¹ See generally the ICC Elements of Crimes, contextual elements for article 8(2)(e).

²⁷² *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, paras. 368-9.



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Appeals Chamber suggested a number of factors that may assist in making that factual determination: the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and the fact that the crime was committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator's official duties.²⁷³

4. The violation must be serious

The chapeau of article 3 of the Statute of the Special Court gives the Special Court jurisdiction over "serious violations" of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II. Broadly speaking, the requirement that it be 'serious' refers to "the breach of a rule protecting important values involving grave consequences for the victim".²⁷⁴ The jurisprudence of the Tribunals makes it clear that violations of the fundamental guarantees related to the protection of victims during an armed conflict are, by their very nature, considered to be serious.²⁷⁵

4.e.ii Elements of enumerated acts constituting violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II

For the most part, the elements of the crimes constituting violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II mirror the elements required for crimes against humanity. This has been explicitly stated, for example, for murder,²⁷⁶ torture²⁷⁷ and rape²⁷⁸ and it is reasonable to predict that the same approach would be adopted for other crimes. There are, however, some crimes within common article 3 and Additional Protocol II that have no direct counterpart within crimes against humanity, which are discussed briefly below.

a) Mutilation

The elements of the war crime of mutilation are:²⁷⁹

1. The perpetrator subjected one or more persons to mutilation, in particular by permanently disfiguring the person or persons, or by permanently disabling or removing an organ or appendage.
2. The conduct was neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person or persons concerned nor carried out in such person's or persons' interests.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.

²⁷³ *Prosecutor v Kunarac*, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para. 58.

²⁷⁴ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 616.

²⁷⁵ *Prosecutor v Rutaganda*, Case No. ICTR-96-3, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 106.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, para. 107.

²⁷⁷ *Prosecutor v Kunarac*, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 465. It should be noted that the purpose element will apply in relation to torture as a war crime: see above for a discussion of the elements of the crime against humanity of torture.

²⁷⁸ *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.

²⁷⁹ See *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285 and the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(e)(xi)-1.



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4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

b) Cruel Treatment

The elements of the war crime of cruel treatment are:²⁸⁰

1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons.
2. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

c) Taking of hostages

The elements of the war crime of taking hostages are:²⁸¹

1. The perpetrator seized, detained or otherwise held hostage one or more persons.
2. The perpetrator threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain such person or persons.
3. The perpetrator intended to compel a State, an international organisation, a natural or legal person or a group of persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or the release of such person or persons.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

d) Outrages on personal dignity, including degrading and humiliating treatment

The elements of the war crime of outrages on personal dignity are:²⁸²

1. The perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons.
2. The severity of the humiliation, degradation or other violation was of such degree as to be generally recognised as an outrage upon personal dignity.
3. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

²⁸⁰ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(iii).

²⁸¹ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(i)-3. See also *Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic*, Case No. IT-98-34, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 March 2003, para. 246.

²⁸² See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(ii). See also *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.



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The Elements of Crimes of the ICC explicitly states that “persons” can include dead people, going on to say: “It is understood that the victim need not personally be aware of the existence of the humiliation or degradation or other violation. This element takes into account relevant aspects of the cultural background of the victim.”²⁸³

The ICTR has interpreted “humiliating and degrading” treatment as treatment designed to subvert the self regard of the victims.²⁸⁴ The ICTY held that rape could amount to an outrage on personal dignity and therefore could be covered by this provision.²⁸⁵ In *Aleksovski*, the ICTY held that the use of detainees as human shields or trench diggers, beatings and the constant fear of being robbed or beaten could constitute outrages upon personal dignity.²⁸⁶

e) Indecent assault

The elements of the war crime of indecent assault are:²⁸⁷

1. The accused inflicted pain or injury on the victim or victims.
2. The act inflicting pain or injury was sexual in nature and was committed by coercion, force, threat or intimidation.
3. The act was non-consensual.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

f) Pillage

The elements of the war crime of pillage are:²⁸⁸

1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property.
2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or personal use.
3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

²⁸³ ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(c)(ii), footnote.

²⁸⁴ *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.

²⁸⁵ *The Prosecutor v Furundzija*, Case No. IT-95-17/1, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 172-3.

²⁸⁶ *Prosecutor v Aleksovski*, Case No. IT-95-14/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 24 March 2000, para. 36.

²⁸⁷ *Prosecutor v Musema*, Case No. ICTR-96-13, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 285.

²⁸⁸ See ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(e)(v). See also *Prosecutor v Jelisić*, Case No. IT-95-10, ICTY Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, paras. 48-9.



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The crime of pillage encompasses isolated acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for private gain as well as organised forms of the seizure of property, for example as part of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory. However, as indicated by the use of the term “private or personal use”, appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute the crime of pillaging.²⁸⁹

4.f Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (Article 3): The facts

Certain conditions must be met before common article 3 and Additional Protocol II will apply. For common article 3, the condition is the existence of an armed conflict. As stated, there was an armed conflict occurring on the territory of Sierra Leone from March 1991 until 18 January 2002. As such, common article 3 applied throughout that time across the whole territory. For Additional Protocol II, the conditions centre around the degree of organisation of the armed forces against whom the State’s armed forces are fighting. While it is not intended to go into this issue for each of the fighting factions, the analysis of the non-State fighting factions involved in the conflict of Sierra Leone clearly reveals that these conditions are met, in that at any given point during the conflict, dissident or other armed groups were organised, were under responsible command, exercised control over the territory such that they were able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and were able to implement Additional Protocol II.

Given that, the provisions of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II applied throughout the territory of Sierra Leone throughout the conflict, whether or not actual combat was taking place. Therefore, although there were lulls in the fighting at different times in different places throughout Sierra Leone, IHL continued to apply in those places as well as those areas where fighting was occurring until the end of the conflict as a whole.

Aside from these, there are other contextual elements that need to be established in order for an act to constitute a violation of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II, namely that the victims are civilians, the violation is serious and that there is a nexus between the act and the armed conflict. These contextual elements were taken into account in describing the crimes listed below;²⁹⁰ for example, murder of a civilian has been included whereas murder of a combatant during a battle has not been included. Similarly, acts that could otherwise amount to a violation of the law but were not committed “in the context of or associated with” the armed conflict have not been included.

In every military action there is the requirement of proportionality, such that a military commander must weigh the military advantage to be gained as against civilian casualties. There is also the requirement that a distinction be made between legitimate and non-legitimate targets, which is highlighted by the prohibition on indiscriminate firing. In Sierra Leone, there were many instances of significant civilian deaths that resulted from what appeared to be predominantly military actions and it is not possible to determine to the requisite degree of certainty whether the military attack was

²⁸⁹ ICC Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(e)(v), footnote.

²⁹⁰ It should be noted that due to the meaning in international law of the term “terrorism” and the types of acts to which this term is generally applied, such as hijacking planes, this category of crimes has not been considered in this report.



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proportional or what was the intended target. In those cases where it is possible to make that determination, this report characterises such deaths as murders.

4.f.i Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the RUF, the RUF/NPFL and the RUF/AFRC

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, the following war crimes were committed:²⁹¹

(a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**

- (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of tens of thousands of civilians for a variety of reasons, including for allegedly “collaborating” with forces aligned against the RUF movement, for supporting the elected Government and for failing to show sufficient support for the RUF movement, which was often determined on an arbitrary basis, and by a variety of means, including decapitations, disembowelling pregnant women and throwing babies into the bush or into burning houses, and by using a variety of weapons, including shooting people, hacking people to death with bladed weapons and by locking people in houses that were then set on fire;
- (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people under the custody or control of the RUF and their allies for the purposes of inflicting punishment or obtaining information, including by the means outlined below;
- (iii) **Mutilation**, for the hundreds of mutilations, amputation of limbs, the carving of words into people’s skin with razor blades and other similar acts;
- (iv) **Corporal punishment**, for the beating and flogging of tens of thousands of civilians;

as well as for several other acts that inflicted violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, including the frequent instances of the infliction of severe pain and suffering by means such as the dripping of melted plastic into people’s eyes and onto their bodies, setting people on fire, forcing people to lie on the ground and stare at the sun, cutting off people’s genital organs and a variety of other similar acts;

- (b) **Collective punishments**, for the arbitrary infliction of various degrees of punishment as reprisal actions for real or imagined wrongs on groups of civilians, such as the retaliatory killing of 100 people and the burning of 200 houses in Kailahun District in March 1992;
- (c) **Taking of hostages**, for the abduction of civilians, their continued detention under threat of death or personal injury and thereby using the detainees as a bargaining tool to achieve various aims with third parties;
- (d) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **humiliating and degrading treatment**, for the severe humiliation, degradation and violation of the dignity of tens of thousands of civilians, including by forcing traditional authorities and elders to sit on the floor,²⁹² by forcing adults to “frog jump” or “pump”, for shaving the heads of female abductees, by decapitating,

²⁹¹ For those crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that are not listed here, there is no evidence that members of the RUF, RUF/NPFL, RUF/AFRC committed those crimes.

²⁹² Note that this element takes into account the cultural background of the victim, such that the infliction of these acts on elders, adults and women in the Sierra Leone context amounts to a violation of their dignity.



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- mutilating and displaying corpses, severed body parts and internal organs in public places, by frequent acts of cannibalism, including the drinking of blood,²⁹³ by forcing men to watch the rape of their wives, by forcing parents to watch the rape of their children, by gambling on the sex of a baby who has yet to be born and settling the bet by disemboweling the mother, for the use of detainees as human shields in a few cases and by keeping the civilian population in constant fear of being robbed, beaten, abducted, having their children abducted and having their houses burnt down and for a variety of other similar acts;
- (ii) **rape**, for the rape, often by multiple assailants, of hundreds²⁹⁴ of women and young girls, including girls as young as 10 and including the rape of women and girls who had been abducted as “wives”;
 - (iii) **any form of indecent assault**, for sexual violence committed against thousands of civilians, including children, and for forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
- (e) **Pillage**, for the stealing of personal property including food, domestic animals, cooking utensils, money and valuable items from hundreds of thousands of civilians in villages and towns and at checkpoints, for the stealing of personal property from civilian residences and for the stealing of property from other buildings, including companies, organisations, churches and others, none of which was justified by military necessity;
 - (f) **The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process**, for the capture and execution of hundreds of civilians on varied grounds, in particular on the accusation of being a member, collaborator or relative of one of the other fighting forces, and for the infliction of often severe punishment for real or imagined wrongs, such as stealing or adultery, without any form of trial;
 - (g) **Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts**, for the daily threats meted out to civilians wherever the RUF, RUF/NPFL or RUF/AFRC had a presence to kill them, steal their property, beat them and commit a variety of other brutal actions against them.

4.f.ii Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the West Side Boys

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following war crimes:

- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
 - (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians;
 - (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under the control of the West Side Boys, including beatings;
 - (iii) **Mutilation**, for various acts of mutilating civilians, including the carving of words into people’s skin with razor blades;

²⁹³ Note that in the context of this crime, “persons” can also include dead people and that the victim does not necessarily need to be aware of the humiliation, degradation or other violation of dignity.

²⁹⁴ It is likely that thousands of women and girls were raped as descriptions of “sexual assault”, the “breaking of marital homes” and similar references likely refer to rape. However, this report has taken a cautious approach and only characterised an act as “rape” when the facts as described specifically meet the elements of the crime.



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- (iv) **Corporal punishment**, for the frequent instances of beating and flogging civilians;
- (b) **Collective punishments**, for reprisal killings and other punishments inflicted in retaliation for military defeats suffered by the West Side Boys;
- (c) **Taking of hostages**, for the capture of 40 UNOMSIL, ECOMOG and civil society workers, under the threat of continued detention, in August 1999 for the purpose of securing the release of the AFRC leader from RUF custody and for the capture of United Kingdom military personnel in August 2000, under threat of continued detention, for the purpose of seeking their integration into the SLA, the release of detained members of the West Side Boys and a review of the Lomé Peace Agreement;
- (d) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **rape**, for the rape of scores of women;
 - (ii) **any form of indecent assault**, for sexual violence committed against hundreds of civilians, including children, and for forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
- (e) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property from thousands of civilians, including at checkpoints and from civilian residences, none of which was justified by military necessity.

4.f.iii Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the SLA

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the SLA committed the following war crimes:²⁹⁵

- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
 - (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians for a variety of reasons, mainly for “collaborating” with the enemy, which was often determined on an arbitrary basis;
 - (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of serious pain and suffering on people under the custody or control of the SLA for the purposes of inflicting punishment or obtaining information;
 - (iii) **Corporal punishment**, for the beating and flogging of hundreds of civilians, including traditional and local authorities;
- (b) **Collective punishments**, for the targeting of towns and villages suspected of being supportive of the RUF and the consequent infliction of punishment on them, including the burning of property and the bombing of a prison;
- (c) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **humiliating and degrading treatment**, for the severe humiliation, degradation and violation of the dignity of hundreds of civilians, including by forcing adults to “frog jump” or “pump”, by forcing men to watch the rape of their wives and by keeping civilians in constant fear of being robbed or beaten by the armed forces that were supposed to be providing them with protection;
 - (ii) **rape**,²⁹⁶ for the rape of scores of women and girls;

²⁹⁵ For those crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that are not listed here, there is no evidence that members of the SLA committed those crimes.



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- (d) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property including food from thousands of civilians, including at checkpoints and from civilian residences, none of which was justified by military necessity;
- (e) **The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process**, for the capture and execution of hundreds of civilians accused of being “collaborators” often on an arbitrary basis, including having come from an RUF-held area, without any form of trial.

4.f.iv Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of the CDF

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the crimes against humanity and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the CDF committed the following war crimes:

- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
 - (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, mainly people suspected of being members, relatives or collaborators of the RUF and their allies;
 - (ii) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under the control of the CDF, including the common use of FM ropes, detaining people in cages made of sharp sticks, pouring hot ashes on people and other similar acts;
 - (iii) **Mutilation**, for various acts of mutilating civilians, including the cutting off and chewing of a woman’s ear in Moyamba District;
 - (iv) **Corporal punishment**, for the frequent instances of beating and flogging civilians, including traditional and local authorities;
- (a) **Collective punishments**, for the targeting of towns and villages suspected of being supportive of the RUF and their allies and the consequent infliction of punishment on them, including the burning of property and the execution of inhabitants;
- (h) **Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular—**
 - (i) **humiliating and degrading treatment**, including forcing adults to “frog jump” or “pump”, the decapitation and mutilation of corpses, targeting the traditional and local authorities and keeping the civilian population in constant fear of being physically violated;
 - (ii) **rape**, for the rape of scores of women;
- (b) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property from thousands of civilians, in particular at checkpoints, none of which was justified by military necessity;
- (c) **The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without due process**, for the capture and execution of suspected RUF members and collaborators without any form of trial;
- (d) **Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts**, including threatening to kill people and use their bodies as roadblocks in Port Loko District in March 1999.

4.f.v Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II by members of ECOMOG

During the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, in addition to the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of ECOMOG committed the following war crimes:

²⁹⁶ There was no evidence that enforced prostitution was committed by the SLA during the conflict, although there was ample evidence of sexual slavery.



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- (a) **Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular—**
- (i) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of 100 alleged RUF supporters in Kailahun District in May 1998 and killings that occurred as a result of the artillery and aerial bombardment of market places and other heavily populated civilian areas;²⁹⁷
 - (ii) **Corporal punishment**, for the frequent instances of beating and flogging civilians;
- (b) **Pillage**, for the stealing of property from thousands of civilians, often at checkpoints, none of which was justified by military necessity.

4.g Other serious violations of international humanitarian law (Article 4): The law

Article 4 of the Statute of the Special Court reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following serious violations of international humanitarian law:

- (a) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
- (b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
- (c) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities.”

These provisions give the Special Court jurisdiction over additional crimes under international humanitarian law that have achieved the status of customary international law, including the imposition of individual criminal responsibility for their violation. They are also all included in the Rome Statute of the ICC both for conflicts of an international nature²⁹⁸ and for conflicts that are not international in nature.²⁹⁹ As these crimes were not included in the Statutes of the ICTY or ICTR, there is no jurisprudence directly on these provisions and the only authoritative pronouncement on the elements of the crimes comes from the Elements of Crimes of the ICC and in the writings of eminent jurists.

a) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population

The elements of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population are:³⁰⁰

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.

²⁹⁷ While this report characterises these deaths as murder, more information is needed as to whether civilians were the target during these attacks and/or whether these deaths were proportionate to the military advantage gained.

²⁹⁸ See Rome Statute of the ICC, article 8(2)(b).

²⁹⁹ See Rome Statute of the ICC, article 8(2)(e).

³⁰⁰ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(i).



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3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population confirms the fundamental and long-standing distinction between combatants and civilians³⁰¹ and the prohibition on intentionally directing attacks against the latter.

b) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

The elements of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions are:³⁰²

1. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The perpetrator intended such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles so involved to be the object of the attack.
4. Such personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles were entitled to that protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that protection.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict not of an international character.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.

The crime of intentionally directing attacks against personnel and objects of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions also recognises the fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants.³⁰³ This provision is explicitly directed towards such missions in recognition of the need to extend special protection to them in light of their nature and purpose.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ See earlier, section X.

³⁰² See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 8(2)(e)(iii).

³⁰³ This is an evolving area of international law and is currently under extensive discussion in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly: see

<http://www.un.org/law/UNsafetyconvention/index.html>, last visited on 28 February 2004.

³⁰⁴ See *Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the Special Court*, UN Doc. S/2000/955, para. 16.

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5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.

6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The crime of other forms of sexual violence has been addressed in the ICTR, which has held that sexual violence is any act of a sexual nature that is committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive.²¹⁸ In addition, the crime of other forms of sexual violence is comprehensively addressed in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC.

h) Crime against humanity of persecution

The elements of the crime against humanity of persecution are:²¹⁹

1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, or religious grounds.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The crime of persecution is premised on the discriminatory intent of the perpetrator. Thus both acts enumerated in article 2 of the Special Court Statute as well as other acts can constitute persecution when they are carried out against a particular group on prohibited discriminatory grounds, namely on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. Indeed, the ICTY has characterised persecution as follows: "Persecution is grounded in discrimination. It is based on the notion that people who share ethnic, racial or religious bonds different to those of the dominant group are to be treated as inferior to the latter. In the crime of persecution, this discriminatory intent is aggressively achieved by grossly and systematically trampling upon the fundamental human rights of the victim group."²²⁰

The material element of persecution as a crime against humanity, in addition to the requirement that the acts be carried out on discriminatory grounds, is that there is a gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right laid down in customary international law or conventional law, reaching the same level of gravity as other enumerated acts.²²¹ The acts that constitute persecution need not themselves be physical acts and must be evaluated in context by looking at their overall cumulative

²¹⁸ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 688; sexual violence can also fall within the scope of "other inhumane acts" (para. 688).

²¹⁹ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(h) and below, notes 128-40.

²²⁰ *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 751.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, para. 621. See also the Elements of Crimes of the ICC for the crime against humanity of persecution.



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effects,²²² rather than the effect of one specific act. Indeed, it is a requirement that the *effect* of the acts be discriminatory; discriminatory intent is not itself sufficient to warrant characterising an act as persecution, the act must also have discriminatory consequences.²²³

The question of which grounds are prohibited is not a closed issue and customary international law has developed to the extent where, in addition to those grounds listed in article 2(h) of the Special Court Statute, the following grounds are also prohibited: cultural, gender and other grounds that are universally recognised as impermissible under international law.²²⁴ The restriction of the grounds in the Statute of the Special Court can therefore be seen as a jurisdictional limitation only, similar to the requirement of a nexus with an armed conflict in the ICTY Statute²²⁵ and the requirement that the attack itself be committed on discriminatory grounds in the ICTR Statute.²²⁶

Early jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR considered the question of whether discriminatory intent was required for *all* crimes against humanity,²²⁷ not just for persecution. The Trial Chambers initially adopted the position that not only did the attack have to be carried out on discriminatory grounds²²⁸ but that each of the enumerated acts also had to be committed with discriminatory intent to constitute a crime against humanity. However, the Appeals Chamber of both the ICTY²²⁹ and the ICTR²³⁰ overturned this position, holding that the perpetrator did not have to have discriminatory intent each time an act constituting a crime against humanity was committed, in part because this would render the crime of persecution redundant.

i) Crime against humanity of other inhumane acts

The elements of the crime against humanity of inhumane acts are:²³¹

1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act.
2. Such act was of a character, i.e. in terms of gravity and nature, similar to any other act referred to in article 2.

²²² *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 622 and *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 349.

²²³ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 432. See also *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 733.

²²⁴ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(h).

²²⁵ ICTY Statute, article 5; see also *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 545.

²²⁶ ICTR Statute, article 3; see also *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580.

²²⁷ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997 and *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998.

²²⁸ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 578.

²²⁹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 305.

²³⁰ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 464.

²³¹ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(i) and below, notes 143-4.



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3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of the act.²³²
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

This is a “catch-all” provision that covers all other acts of similar gravity that are not enumerated in article 2. The International Law Commission has noted the impossibility of listing all the various acts that may fall within this category of crimes against humanity, stating that it includes “acts of similar gravity that are intended to cause and in fact actually cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity, health or human dignity”.²³³ This has been followed in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR and in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which provides greater guidance as to what may constitute an inhumane act.

There must be some nexus between the act and the suffering of the victim, which does not necessarily require physical injury to the victim as such. Mental injury consequent on witnessing acts committed against other people may constitute an inhumane act where the perpetrator intended to inflict suffering on the victim or knew such suffering was likely to occur and was reckless as to whether that suffering would result.²³⁴

4.d Crimes Against Humanity (Article 2): The facts

The accusation of having committed a crime against humanity is a very serious one; indeed, it could be said that it is the most serious crime over which the Special Court has jurisdiction. In order for an act to be considered a crime against humanity, there is no need that it occur in the context of or be associated with an armed conflict of any type. Rather, what needs to be demonstrated is that the prohibited act was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and that the accused knew of the broader context in which his or her act is committed.

An analysis of the individual events that occurred across the whole of Sierra Leone shows very clearly that the same patterns were employed time and again throughout the country and throughout the conflict. In order for satisfy the contextual elements for crimes against humanity, there must be a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population.²³⁵ An attack against the civilian population is different from an armed attack or a military attack; in fact, as noted, the existence of an

²³² This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need make a legal determination that his or her conduct constitutes a crime against humanity.

²³³ ILC Commentary on article 18 to the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. See also *Prosecutor v Kupreskic*, Case No. IT-95-16, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, para. 566, for a discussion of what might constitute an inhumane act falling within this category.

²³⁴ *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 153. This is reflected in article 30 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, dealing with the *mens rea* of the perpetrator.

²³⁵ In the following analysis, only those acts committed by the fighting forces concerned that were committed in relation to such an attack and with the knowledge of the broader context of the attack have been characterised as crimes against humanity.



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armed conflict is not an element of crimes against humanity. Rather, an attack consists of prohibited acts being committed against a civilian population on a widespread or systematic basis.

For the purposes of this report, the conflict has been analysed according to patterns of conduct and patterns of attack over time and over geographical space, based on a strict application of the law to the facts. The attacks have therefore been identified based on whether similar conduct was occurring at the same time in different locations, at different times in the same location, or against a large number of victims at different times in different locations; such attacks satisfy either the widespread or systematic requirement, or both. In identifying such attacks, this report errs on the side of caution: there are a number of other potential attacks that took place during the conflict in Sierra Leone that have not been included in this discussion because the facts as analysed in this report do not necessarily yield the level of certainty about the widespread or systematic nature of the attack required to sustain a criminal conviction.

The information gathered for this report reveals that there were two general attacks against the civilian population: one by the RUF and one by the CDF. A series of more specific attacks was also committed by each faction within the context of those broader attacks. In the case of the other fighting factions, it was not possible to identify general attacks against a civilian population stretching over a period of years. The West Side Boys committed an attack against the civilian population during the period spanning late 1998 to early 1999. In the case of the SLA, there were clearly a number of specific attacks committed against the civilian population between 1991 and 1996. However, for ECOMOG, it was not possible to identify any attack committed against the civilian population on a widespread or systematic basis, although there are numerous incidents of specific acts being committed against civilians, which are examined in the section on war crimes.

The selection of the specific attacks for analysis has been undertaken on the basis of the proportion of attacks committed by each faction. An examination of the conflict as a whole reveals the commission of 33 discrete widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population:²³⁶ 21 committed by the RUF and their allies; eight committed by the SLA; three committed by the CDF and one committed by the West Side Boys. Accordingly, the legal analysis below reflects the fact that more crimes were committed by the RUF without absolving the members of any other fighting faction of responsibility for the crimes that they committed. Similarly, the description of specific crimes in the various categories of crimes against humanity are not exhaustive of *all* the crimes committed during a particular attack, but are highlighted as representative examples of the types of crimes that were committed.²³⁷

4.d.i Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the RUF, the RUF/NPFL and the RUF/AFRC

The RUF, joined by the NPFL between 1991 and 1993 and the AFRC from 1997 onwards, committed a general attack against the civilian population lasting from 1991 until 2000. This attack

²³⁶ As noted, these attacks were selected on the basis of a strict application of the law to the facts as analysed in this report. Nevertheless, based on the information gathered, any additional attacks that may have taken place are unlikely to alter significantly the proportion of attacks committed by each faction.

²³⁷ All of the specific examples listed in these sections are detailed in the factual analysis.



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was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it constituted an organised pattern of conduct. That there was a policy to attack the civilian population is clearly demonstrated by the targeting of civilians in virtually every month in every District in which the RUF or their allies had a presence, particularly during military advances and retreats, but also when military manoeuvres were not being undertaken. Those instances in which there was relative calm usually represent periods during which the RUF was regrouping and rearming or periods during which the population had fled. During the period spanning from 1991 to 2000, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killings of thousands of civilians;
- (b) **Extermination**, for several mass killing events, namely the gathering of hundreds of civilians at different times in different locations to be shot or hacked to death;
- (c) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of thousands of civilians and their use as porters, cooks, food-gatherers, domestic work, construction work and for similar purposes;²³⁸
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of hundreds of women and girls, including girls aged below 14, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of hundreds of women and girls as “wives”, for sexual violence, including numerous incidents of sexual abuse and sexual assault, including forcing people to have sex with members of their own families;
- (e) **Imprisonment**, for the arrest and detention of hundreds of civilians, who were held for weeks without charge;
- (f) **Torture**, for the infliction of pain and suffering on people under RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC custody and control, including severe beatings and floggings, dripping melted plastic or rubber into people’s eyes and onto people’s bodies and a range of other equally grave acts;
- (g) **Other inhumane acts**, for the variety of severe acts of violence committed against civilians throughout the attack, including mutilation, amputation, beatings, floggings and a range of other similar acts as well as for the effect on the population of cannibalism, drinking blood, displaying internal organs and severed heads at checkpoints, parading severed heads around villages and forcing civilians to sing and dance at gunpoint in celebration of the actions of the RUF/NPFL, the RUF and the RUF/AFRC.

Within that general attack, there were a series of specific attacks committed against the civilian population. Of the 21 identified attacks committed against the civilian population,²³⁹ six will be

²³⁸ The crime of enslavement requires that the perpetrator exercise any or all of the powers of ownership over the abducted person. As such, this report does not characterise as enslavement the thousands of incidences where civilians were abducted but the purpose is not revealed; in addition, it does not characterise as enslavement the thousands of incidences where civilians were abducted and forced to carry loads for a short period of time before being released.

²³⁹ Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the RUF/NPFL attack in Kailahun, Kenema and Pujehun Districts from January to June 1992; the RUF/NPFL attack from May 1992 to early 1993, primarily the movement from Kailahun to Kono District; the RUF/NPFL attack in Pujehun District from December 1992 to the end of January 1993; the RUF attack across several Districts from December 1993 to September 1994; the RUF attack on Bo from January 1995 to April 1996; the RUF attack from May to June 1995 in Port Loko, Bombali and Koinadugu Districts following the failure to take Freetown; the RUF attack in Kono District from April to



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discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the RUF/NPFL, the RUF and the RUF/AFRC throughout the conflict. It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

a) The RUF/NPFL attack from March to July 1991

In March 1991, the RUF/NPFL entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, arriving first in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts and spreading across Bonthe, Bo, Kenema and Kono Districts before being gradually pushed back in early August. During that time, the pattern of conduct employed by the RUF/NPFL reveals a clear policy to direct attacks against the civilian population, as evidenced by the abduction, killing, sexual assault, massive burning of houses and countless other actions inflicted on civilians. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/NPFL committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder**, for the numerous intentional and reckless killings of civilians, including the killing of 100 people in Pujehun District in July 1991 and the killing of 62 people in Kailahun District in June 1991;
- b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of civilians and their use as porters, guides, food-gatherers and similar purposes, including the abduction of 800 civilians to work in farms in Kailahun District in July 1991;
- c) **Imprisonment**, for the detention of children who refused to be conscripted in Kailahun District in May 1991;
- d) **Torture**, for the numerous beatings administered to people under the control of the RUF, for the dripping of rubber or plastic into people's eyes in Bonthe District in May 1991 and for tying a man up under the sun for one week in Bo District in May 1991;
- e) **Rape**, for the rape and sexual assault of dozens of women, including the rape of a 10-year-old girl in Kailahun District in May 1991, and for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives";
- f) **Other inhumane acts**, for ordering people to dance while women were being raped in Pujehun District in June 1991 and for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism.

b) The "TAP" operation: April 1992 to May 1993

From April 1992 to May 1993, successive groups of NPFL forces committed an ongoing attack against the civilian population, which was striking in terms of the similarity of the conduct

September 1995; the RUF attack in Moyamba District from August 1995; the RUF attack in the northern Districts in the lead up to elections from January to February 1996; the RUF/AFRC attack from May to December 1997 in Freetown, during which journalists and civil society were particularly targeted; the RUF/AFRC attack from July to January 1998 in District Headquarter towns in Bonthe, Kailahun, Kenema, Tonkolili, Bo and Pujehun Districts; the RUF/AFRC attack from February to November 1998, during which there named policies to commit certain acts, including "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Pay Yourself"; the RUF/AFRC attack in the Northern Province from February 1999 to February 2000; the RUF/AFRC attack in Kono District for the purposes of mining from 1999 to March 2001; and the RUF/AFRC attack on the Northern Province from May to November 2000.

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employed, including cannibalism, and the brutality inflicted on civilian men, women and children in the areas of Kailahun District over which the RUF/NPFL forces exercised control. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the NPFL committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional killing of scores of people, including people who tried to escape, people who were abducted for use as porters and people selected for their large size in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of dozens of people for use as porters;
- (c) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people under RUF control, including the severe cutting of people's flesh and dripping melted plastic or rubber into people's eyes in Luawa Chiefdom;
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women, including young girls, and often by multiple assailants, including the rape of women by multiple assailants in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992 and the rape of a woman in Kissi Teng Chiefdom in February 1993;
- (e) **Other inhumane acts**, for cooking people alive, pounding a baby in a mortar and for the effect on the population of frequent acts of cannibalism, including the people who had been selected for their large size in Penguia Chiefdom in May 1992.

c) RUF attack between December 1994 and May 1995

From the end of 1994, the RUF had consolidated its control over Kailahun, Pujehun and Kenema Districts. From there, they expanded across Bo, Bonthe, Moyamba and Port Loko Districts in a clear push towards Freetown, which culminated in April 1995 in attacks on settlements in the Western Area. Throughout this westward expansion and their subsequent retreat on being repelled from the Western Area, the RUF engaged in an attack on the civilian population in towns through which they passed. This attack was both widespread, in that it affected a large area of the country and a large number of victims, and systematic, in terms of the remarkable similarity among the acts carried out across these Districts. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional and reckless killing of thousands of people, including the killing of dozens of civilians at an IDP camp in Bo District in 1994;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of people for use as porters, food-gatherers and cooks;
- (c) **Rape**, for the rape of scores of women and girls, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as "wives" and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members;
- (d) **Torture**, for beatings and other acts inflicting pain and suffering on people under RUF control, including dripping melted plastic in people's eyes,
- (e) **Other inhumane acts**, including amputation of limbs, branding people with hot irons and carving words on their bodies with razor blades.

d) RUF attack on Bonthe District: 1995

Throughout 1995, the RUF were progressively taking firm control of Bonthe District; their arrival in towns across the District was accompanied by severe brutality against civilians and the deposing and



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replacement of traditional authorities. The attack was carried out in a systematic manner, in that it was clearly conducted according to an organised plan. From January to November, not a month passed without significant violations being committed against the civilian population. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of 300 people in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom) in February;
- (b) **Extermination**, for rounding up thousands of civilians from many different places and killing hundreds of them in Bauya Junction (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom) in October;
- (c) **Enslavement**, for abducting civilians and forcing them to work, including as food-gatherers, cooks and porters;
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of scores of women and girls, including the rape of young girls in front of their parents, for sexual slavery, namely the abduction of women as “wives” and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members;
- (e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the amputation of limbs, for the effect on the population of leaving mutilated corpses on the road, for severe beatings and for pouring petrol over a man and setting him on fire.

e) RUF/AFRC Attack in May and June 1997

On 25 May 1997, the AFRC staged a military coup, and were joined in power soon after by the RUF, thereby establishing a presence in areas previously held by the SLA. Between the end of May and the middle of June, the RUF/AFRC staged a sharp and brutal attack against the civilian population across the country that would affect every District to greater and lesser degrees. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including reprisal killings against civilians for failing to be “sufficiently supportive”, the killing of civilians deemed to be “enemy collaborators” and civilians who refused to work;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians as food-gatherers, cooks and porters;
- (c) **Imprisonment**, for the arbitrary arrest and detention without charge of dozens of journalists, lawyers and civil society activists;
- (d) **Torture**, for the infliction of severe pain and suffering on people detained by the RUF/AFRC, including severe beatings;
- (e) **Rape**, for the rape and sexual abuse of dozens of women, including young girls, and the padlocking of women’s genital areas in Pujehun District;
- (f) **Other inhumane acts**, for the mutilation of several civilians, the amputation of one or more of their limbs, the effect on the population of displaying people’s intestines at checkpoints and forcing people under gunpoint to dance and sing in support of the RUF/AFRC.

f) RUF/AFRC Attack from December 1998 to January 1999

From December 1998, the RUF/AFRC orchestrated a campaign to retake Freetown, moving from various Districts, particularly in the north, towards the Western Area. As they advanced, as well as during their retreat, the RUF/AFRC implemented a systematic attack against the civilian population



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that reached its peak during the invasion and brief occupation of parts of Freetown. This attack was striking particularly in terms of the sheer number of acts committed against the population and the destruction wrought in such a short period of time. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the RUF/AFRC committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including alleged “enemy collaborators” and the killing of 27 people in a market place in Bombali District in January 1999;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of hundreds of civilians for their use as porters and cooks;
- (c) **Torture**, for the regular and severe beatings administered to people under the control of the RUF/AFRC, including one man who was beaten for 24 hours and then buried alive in Bombali District in January 1999;
- (d) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women and girls;
- (e) **Other inhumane treatment**, for forcing people at gunpoint to dance and sing in support of the RUF/AFRC in Freetown’s East End in January 1999, for the mutilation of dozens of civilians, including carving words onto their bodies, and the amputation of one or more of their limbs.

4.d.ii Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the West Side Boys

The West Side Boys committed an attack against the civilian population in Port Loko District lasting from October 1998 to April 1999 across Koya and Maforki Chiefdoms.²⁴⁰ This attack was both widespread, in that it took place on a large scale and with a multiplicity of victims, *and* systematic, in that it was an organised pattern of conduct. The facts clearly demonstrate that there was a policy to commit such an attack, with civilians being targeted for a variety of reasons. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the West Side Boys committed the following crimes against humanity:

- (a) **Murder**, for the killing of dozens of civilians, including the killing of two civilians by hanging and the public execution of 20 civilians and the burning of 73 civilians in a house in April 1999;
- (b) **Enslavement**, for the abduction of civilians for their use as porters;²⁴¹
- (c) **Rape**, for the rape of dozens of women and girls and for sexual violence, including forcing people to have sex with their own family members
- (d) **Other inhumane acts**, for the mutilation of several civilians, including carving words onto their bodies.

²⁴⁰ There was a lull in this attack in January and February 1999, during which time the West Side Boys were participating in the attack on Freetown. Nevertheless, the actions before and after that time form part of the same attack against the civilian population.

²⁴¹ The crime of enslavement requires that the perpetrator exercise any or all of the powers of ownership over the abducted person. As such, this report does not characterise as enslavement the incidences where civilians were abducted but the purpose is not revealed; in addition, it does not characterise as enslavement the incidences where civilians were abducted and forced to carry loads for a short period of time before being released.



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4.d.iii Crimes Against Humanity Committed by members of the SLA

While there was no general attack spanning a number of years, the SLA committed a number of specific widespread or systematic attacks at different periods between 1991 and 1996 that reveal a policy to commit an attack against a civilian population, generally for the purposes of reprisals, abducting civilians for the purposes of mining or other work and to obtain property. Of the eight identified attacks committed against the civilian population, two will be discussed below as being representative of the types of actions carried out by the SLA.²⁴² It should, however, be emphasised that the selection of these attacks is in no way intended to reflect any judgment about the relative importance of the attacks not selected for further exploration.

a) SLA attack from January to April 1992

As the SLA started gaining successes over RUF/NPFL forces across Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, they progressively and rapidly launched attacks on civilians. Beginning by targeting civilians they arbitrarily labelled as RUF/NPFL “collaborators”, often in the areas they had retaken from the hands of RUF/NPFL forces, the SLA soon expanded these activities to encompass the entire civilian population in those areas. During this period, in addition to the war crimes and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court that were committed, members of the SLA committed the following crimes against humanity:

- a) **Murder** for the intentional or reckless killing of hundreds of civilians, including the killing of alleged “collaborators” at Makibi Bridge in Pujehun Town and the tying up of alleged collaborators and throwing them off the Yonni Bridge (Kpaka Chiefdom, Pujehun District) in early 1992;
- b) **Enslavement**, for the use of civilians under SLA control for work, including breaking down houses and uprooting cocoa and coffee plantations in Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom, Kailahun District) and as food-gatherers in Pujehun District in early 1992;
- c) **Deportation**, for the use of radical measures such as setting fire to houses as part of a clear action to evict civilians from an area in Pujehun District in early 1992;
- d) **Rape**, for the rape of several women, including the rape of a woman in Makpele Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in early 1992, and for other acts of sexual violence;
- e) **Other inhumane acts**, for the amputation of ears and hands, the plucking out of eyeballs and for putting civilians in a bag that was then set on fire in Kpanga Krim Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in early 1992.

b) SLA attack in Kenema District from March to July 1994

Between March and July 1994, while RUF forces were continuing expanding their operations in the District, SLA forces together with members of ULIMO-J conducted an attack against the civilian population in the area remaining under their control. The widespread or systematic nature of the attack is evidenced by the numerous acts of violence committed against civilians across different

²⁴² Those attacks that are not discussed in detail in this report are: the SLA attack in Bonthe District from June to July 1992; the SLA Attack from October 1992 to February 1993, particularly in Kono District; the SLA attack from March to June 1994; the SLA attack in Moyamba District from December 1994 to February 1995; the SLA attack in Kenema District from March to June 1994; and the attack carried out by the Special Task Force in October 1995 in Bonthe District.



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simply to “killing”, with a footnote indicating that this is interchangeable with the phrase “caused the death of”.¹⁶¹

b) Crime against humanity of extermination

The elements of the crime against humanity of extermination are:¹⁶²

1. The perpetrator unlawfully killed or caused the death of one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.
2. The conduct constituted, or took place as part of, a mass killing of members of a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator acted:
 - (a) With the intent to cause someone’s death; or
 - (b) With the intent to cause grievous bodily harm and with the knowledge that that bodily harm was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death would actually occur.
4. The accused acted with the knowledge that his or her act was part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a large number of individuals were systematically marked for killing or were killed.
5. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
6. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Extermination contains an element of mass destruction, requiring that the act of extermination be “collective in nature rather than directed towards singled out individuals.”¹⁶³ This mass destruction can include direct killing of individuals but can also include causing the conditions of life calculated to bring about such destruction, for example by detaining individuals and withholding food or by introducing a deadly virus into a population and withholding vital medical supplies.¹⁶⁴ Generally, a numerically significant proportion of the population must be destroyed to constitute the crime against humanity of extermination.¹⁶⁵

distinguished on this point, as they have found that pursuant to the ICTR Statute, this crime requires an element of premeditation, due to the elements of the crime of *assassinat* under French law: see *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 588 and *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, paras. 138-9 for discussions on this issue.

¹⁶¹ Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(a), para. 1.

¹⁶² See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(b), *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 229 (for the fourth element) and below, notes 72-6.

¹⁶³ *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment of 29 November 2002, para. 227.

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, *Kayishema* Judgment, para. 146.

¹⁶⁵ *Prosecutor v Krstic*, Case No. IT-98-33, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 August 2001, para. 503, *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 227. See, however, *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 640, where the Trial



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The ICTY recently considered the crime against humanity of extermination in *Valsjevic*, in particular the required level of participation of the accused. The Trial Chamber concluded that in order to be guilty of the crime against humanity of extermination, an accused person has to be responsible for a “large number of deaths”,¹⁶⁶ even if the accused’s involvement was remote or indirect. Further, the accused must have known of the “vast scheme of collective murder and have been willing to take part therein”.¹⁶⁷

c) Crime against humanity of enslavement

The elements of the crime against humanity of enslavement are:¹⁶⁸

1. The accused exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The ICTY has held that the crime against humanity of enslavement has the same elements as the war crime of slavery and violates both treaty and custom based international humanitarian law.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, the prohibition against slavery is an “inalienable, non-derogable and fundamental right, one of the core rules of general customary and conventional international law”.¹⁷⁰

The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that “the traditional concept of slavery, as defined in the 1926 Slavery Convention and often referred to as “chattel slavery”, has evolved to encompass various contemporary forms of slavery which are also based on the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.”¹⁷¹ Thus the indicia of slavery include the following: “control of someone’s movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour”.¹⁷² This is mirrored

Chamber considered this must be considered on a case-by-case basis and that no specific minimum number of victims is required.

¹⁶⁶ *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 227.

¹⁶⁷ *Prosecutor v Vasiljevic*, Case No. IT-98-32, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 29 November 2002, para. 228; see also *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003. But see *Prosecutor v Stakic*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 640, which specifically rejected the requirement of a “vast scheme of collective murder”.

¹⁶⁸ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(c) and below, notes 78 to 83.

¹⁶⁹ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, paras. 352, 353.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, para. 353.

¹⁷¹ *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 117.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, para. 119.



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in the footnote to the Elements of Crimes of the crime of humanity of slavery, which reads as follows:

“It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.”¹⁷³

Given that the definition of slavery is exercising “any or all” of the powers attaching to “ownership” over a person,¹⁷⁴ the exaction of forced labour from a person held captive would be sufficient to establish the commission of this crime, provided the other elements are also established. It should further be noted that the lack of consent is not an element of the crime, although “consent may be relevant from an evidential point of view as going to the question whether the Prosecutor has established the element of the crime relating to the exercise by the accused of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership.”¹⁷⁵

d) Crime against humanity of deportation

The elements of deportation as a crime against humanity are:¹⁷⁶

1. The accused deported, without grounds permitted under international law, one or more persons to another State, by expulsion or other coercive acts.
2. Such person or persons were lawfully present in the area from which they were so deported or transferred.
3. The accused was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such presence.¹⁷⁷
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Deportation is to be distinguished from forcible transfer, with the former referring to the displacement of people across national borders and the latter simply referring to the forced movement of people, which can occur within the confines of national borders.¹⁷⁸ The ICTY has made it clear that “forced displacement” – charged in the *Krnjelac* case as persecution – is a stand-

¹⁷³ Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(c), footnote.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 120.

¹⁷⁶ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(d) and below, notes 86-7.

¹⁷⁷ This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need to be aware that the presence is lawful, just the facts that go to make up that lawfulness; in other words, the perpetrator does not need to make a legal determination that the victim is lawfully present in the area.

¹⁷⁸ *Prosecutor v. Krnjelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 474.



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alone crime and is not a lesser, included offence of deportation.¹⁷⁹ This is mirrored in the Rome Statute of the ICC, which refers to the crime against humanity of “deportation or forced transfer of population”.¹⁸⁰

e) Crime against humanity of imprisonment

The elements of imprisonment as a crime against humanity are:¹⁸¹

1. The accused imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise severely deprived one or more persons of their liberty.
2. The gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental rules of international law.
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the conduct.¹⁸²
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The crime against humanity of imprisonment, which incorporates deprivation of liberty, has only been considered in two cases at the international criminal tribunals.¹⁸³ The ICTY has held that the elements of this crime are not limited by the elements of the similar crime of unlawful confinement, which is a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, but that any form of arbitrary physical deprivation of liberty might constitute imprisonment.¹⁸⁴ This is mirrored in the Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in which the elements of this crime differ from those for the crime of unlawful confinement.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has recently stated that “acts of forcible displacement underlying the crime of persecution ... are not limited to displacements across national borders”, without making a definitive pronouncement on the crime in general: *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 September 2003, para. 218. The recent Trial Chamber decision in *Stakić* held that the crime encompasses “forced population displacements both across internationally recognised borders and *de facto* borders, such as constantly changing frontlines, which are not internationally recognised *Prosecutor v. Stakić*, Case No. IT-97-24, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 679. While this may be indicative of evolving customary international law, the distinction between the crime of deportation and the crime of forced displacement is retained for the purposes of this report.

¹⁸⁰ Rome Statute of the ICC, article 7(1)(d).

¹⁸¹ See the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(e) and notes 91-6.

¹⁸² This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need to be aware that the conduct is in violation of fundamental rules of international law, just the facts that go to make up that violation; in other words, the perpetrator does not need to make a legal determination that his or her conduct violates international law.

¹⁸³ The first of these cases, *Kordić*, considered that this crime was identical in its elements to the crime of unlawful confinement as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, whereas the second case, *Krnojelac*, considered that imprisonment as a crime against humanity should not be limited by the elements of unlawful confinement as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.

¹⁸⁴ *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 112.

¹⁸⁵ See the Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(e) (imprisonment) and article 8(2)(a)(vii)-2 (unlawful confinement).



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One of the elements of the crime against humanity of imprisonment is that the deprivation of liberty is imposed arbitrarily, namely that no legal basis can be invoked to justify the deprivation of liberty.¹⁸⁶ Therefore, a determination has to be made regarding the legality of imprisonment as well as the procedural safeguards pertaining to the subsequent imprisonment of the person or group of persons in question,¹⁸⁷ including the fact that the deprivation may be initially justified but may become arbitrary “if the deprivation is being administered under serious disregard of fundamental procedural rights of the person deprived of his or her liberty as provided for under international law.”¹⁸⁸ This is mirrored in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which refers to the gravity of the conduct being in violation of fundamental rules of international law.¹⁸⁹

f) Crime against humanity of torture

The elements of the crime against humanity of torture are:¹⁹⁰

1. The perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more persons.
2. Such person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator.
3. Such pain or suffering did not arise only from, and was not inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

The essential element of the crime against humanity of torture is “the infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental”.¹⁹¹ Torture can therefore be distinguished from ill treatment or other inhumane acts by the level of intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted; the standard adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, for example, is “very serious and cruel suffering”.¹⁹² The ICTY Appeals Chamber has also addressed this question, stating that, “In assessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the Trial Chamber must first consider the objective severity of the harm inflicted. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental effect of the treatment upon the particular victim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim’s age, sex, or state of health will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the harm.”¹⁹³ The ICTY Appeals Chamber

¹⁸⁶ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 115 (footnote deleted).

¹⁸⁷ *Prosecutor v Kordic*, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 302-3.

¹⁸⁸ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, footnote 347.

¹⁸⁹ Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(e), para. 2.

¹⁹⁰ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(f) and below, notes 99-113.

¹⁹¹ *Prosecutor v Kunarac et al.*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 142.

¹⁹² *Republic of Ireland v UK* (Series A, No 25), European Court of Human Rights, (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, 18 January 1978.

¹⁹³ *Prosecutor v Kvocka et al.*, Case No. IT-98-30/1, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 November 2001, paras. 142-3.



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has further stated that rape, as an act necessarily implying pain and suffering, can amount to torture provided the other elements are established.¹⁹⁴

The Convention Against Torture, which requires States to criminalise torture as a self-standing offence, contains the element that the torture be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”.¹⁹⁵ However, both the ICTY Appeals Chamber¹⁹⁶ and the Elements of Crimes for the ICC¹⁹⁷ recognise that this element is applicable only to torture pursuant to the Convention and that customary international law does not impose such a limitation in the context of crimes against humanity.

Where the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence and the Elements of Crimes of the ICC diverge is on the question of whether a purpose is required as an element of this crime. Both the ICTY¹⁹⁸ and the ICTR¹⁹⁹ have held that one of four purposes is required for conduct to rise to the level of torture, namely that the conduct was committed for the purposes of 1) obtaining information or a confession from the victim or a third party; 2) punishing the victim or a third party; 3) intimidating or coercing the victim or a third party; or 4) for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, although the conduct need not have been committed solely for one of the prohibited purposes.²⁰⁰

The Elements of Crimes of the ICC, however, specifically states that “[i]t is understood no specific purpose need be proved for this crime”.²⁰¹ This was considered by the vast majority of delegations at the Preparatory Commission to reflect customary international law, in part because the Rome Statute – which includes only those crimes already established under customary international law – does not contain any reference to a purpose element.²⁰² This can be distinguished from the elements of the war crime of torture, which does contain the purpose requirement²⁰³ so as to distinguish it from inhuman treatment,²⁰⁴ which is included within the offence of torture.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, for the purposes of crimes against humanity, the international community has affirmed that torture does not require that the conduct in question be carried out for any particular purpose.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁴ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 149-51.

¹⁹⁵ The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, article 1(1). The Convention against Torture entered into force on 26 June 1987.

¹⁹⁶ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 142, 144-8.

¹⁹⁷ Elements of Crimes, Article 7(1)(f), p 119.

¹⁹⁸ *Prosecutor v Krnojelac*, Case No. IT-97-25, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 March 2002, para. 185.

¹⁹⁹ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 594.

²⁰⁰ *Prosecutor v Kumarac et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, para. 155. These purposes are also included in the Convention Against Torture, article 1(1).

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, footnote.

²⁰² Lee, pp. 5 and 90-2. The Preparatory Committee also referred to the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the separate opinion of Fitzmaurice J in *Ireland v UK*, who stated that a certain purpose is not a necessary requirement and that the distinguishing feature of torture is its severity: Series A, o.25 (1976), pp. 129 ff.

²⁰³ Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(a)(ii)-1, para. 2.

²⁰⁴ Lee, p. 91.

²⁰⁵ The Rome Statute of the ICC, article 8(2)(a)(ii), prohibits “torture or inhuman treatment”.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p 92.



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g.i) Crime against humanity of rape

The elements of the crime against humanity of rape are:²⁰⁷

1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight:
 - (a) of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ; or
 - (b) of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Much of the jurisprudence of the ICTR about this crime has focused on the discussion of whether rape should be defined as a contextual framework, or whether the elements of the crime should be explicitly defined. The general trend at the ICTR has been to adopt a contextual framework, according to which rape is defined as “the physical invasion of a sexual nature committed under circumstances that are coercive”.²⁰⁸

However, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, considering this matter in the context of common elements in national legislation and the trend for States to broaden the definition of rape, which has as its core element forced physical penetration, has followed the approach of defining the elements of the crime. Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that rape means the non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by the perpetrator’s penis or another object used by the perpetrator, or of the victim’s mouth by the perpetrator’s penis.²⁰⁹ Consent must be given freely and voluntarily, which must be assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.²¹⁰

The question of consent is further addressed in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court, which set out the following guiding principles:

- “(i) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;

²⁰⁷ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-1 and below, notes 115-9.

²⁰⁸ *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 598.

²⁰⁹ *Prosecutor v Kvarnec et al*, Case No. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 12 June 2002, paras. 127-8.

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, para. 120.



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- (ii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;
- (iii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence;
- (iv) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of [the] sexual nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.²¹¹

It is submitted that explicitly stating the elements of the crime, rather than adopting a loose conceptual framework, is the more appropriate approach, as it gives more certainty to the law in respect of this crime. Indeed, this is the approach adopted in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which also incorporates aspects of the contextual approach and, as such, better reflects customary international law.

g.ii) Crime against humanity of sexual slavery

The elements of the crime against humanity of sexual slavery are:²¹²

1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

While the crime of sexual slavery is not addressed in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, it is nevertheless comprehensively addressed in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC. While not explicitly stated in the elements, the framers understood that “deprivation of liberty” in this context may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.²¹³

g.iii) Crime against humanity of enforced prostitution

The elements of the crime against humanity of enforced prostitution are:²¹⁴

²¹¹ Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court, rule 96. Unlike the ICTR, however, evidence of consent does not first have to be raised before a Judge in Chambers: cf. ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 96. For further reading, see the Lawyers’ Guide, available from www.specialcourt.org.

²¹² See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-2.

²¹³ *Ibid*, footnote 18.

²¹⁴ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-3.



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1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent.
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

g.iv) Crime against humanity of forced pregnancy

The elements of the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy are:²¹⁵

1. The perpetrator confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

g.v) Crime against humanity of other forms of sexual violence

The elements of the crime against humanity of other forms of sexual violence are:²¹⁶

1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature.
2. The act was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent.
3. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other offences in article 2(g) of the Statute of the Special Court.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the conduct.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-4.

²¹⁶ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(g)-6 and below, note 126.

²¹⁷ This element is intended to clarify that the perpetrator does not need to be aware that the conduct is in violation of fundamental rules of international law, just the facts that go to make up that violation; in other words, the perpetrator does not need to make a legal determination that his or her conduct violates international law.



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None of the agreements would last for any appreciable length of time, instead taking on the appearance of temporary lulls in the fighting, during which each of the armed forces and groups would regroup, sometimes retrain and on all occasions prepare for further fighting.

By the end of 2001, disarmament was well under way in all Districts across the country, leading the President of Sierra Leone to declare an official end to the war during a symbolic weapons-burning ceremony on 18 January 2002. Such a declaration does not necessarily mean that an armed conflict has concluded, as this falls to be determined by whether there is a general conclusion of peace or a peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, those conditions had clearly been met by that time, therefore this report is taking 18 January 2002 as the date on which the armed conflict ended.

4.b.ii Nature of the armed conflict

The fact that there was a non-international armed conflict – that is, between government authorities and organised armed groups – is clear. The more complex question is whether the armed conflict was international in nature at any point and, if so, when and for how long.

Because the Special Court only has jurisdiction over those crimes specifically included in the Statute, the answer to this question does not have a practical effect on the work of the Court. Nevertheless, it is useful from the perspective of contextualising the conflict in Sierra Leone and, furthermore, as an indication of whether international or internationalised courts should have jurisdiction over all crimes under international humanitarian law and then determine on the basis of evidence presented to them whether a conflict was international or non-international in nature.

The test of whether an armed conflict is an international armed conflict is based on the presence of forces that are under the control of a foreign power. This falls to be determined by who was controlling the different fighting factions at any given time, for which the ICTY has identified a test consisting of three parts, namely:

1. Overall control of an armed group or individuals;
2. Specific instructions to an armed group or individuals; and
3. Actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.¹³³

Factual information gathered in Sierra Leone reveals very clearly that the RUF was operating under direct orders from Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL¹³⁴ to greater and lesser degrees throughout the entire conflict, particularly during the early years of the conflict. Indeed, NPFL forces had entered Sierra Leone together with the RUF in 1991 under the direct orders of their leader. Throughout the conflict, logistics and weapons were supplied from Liberia – first through the NPFL and subsequently through the Liberian President, who was the former NPFL leader – in exchange for property taken by RUF/NPFL forces and later by RUF forces from civilians and other commodities, in particular diamonds mined throughout the country.

¹³³ See *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.

¹³⁴ This section does not consider the position of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) or other foreign forces engaged in Sierra Leone, which is also beyond the scope of this report.



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Therefore, given that the test of control is satisfied, the conflict in Sierra Leone was international in nature during those periods when Charles Taylor was an official of the State of Liberia. For those periods when he was not an official of the State of Liberia, even during times when the NPFL controlled up to 90% of the territory, there is at least a question about the nature of the conflict, although the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this report. However, as noted, the fact that the conflict was international in nature for at least some periods of time does not alter the crimes over which the Special Court has jurisdiction and it is those crimes that this report will focus on in the following sections.

4.b.iii Conclusion

The facts clearly demonstrate that there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone from 23 March 1991 until the most definitive statement of peace, namely in 18 January 2002. In addition, albeit with less clarity, the facts also demonstrate that at times, this armed conflict was international in character, at the very least from 1997 until sometime in 2001. Given this, international humanitarian law began to apply in Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991 and continued to apply across the whole territory until 18 January 2002.

4.c Crimes Against Humanity (Article 2): The law

Article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone reads as follows:

“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population:

- (a) Murder;
- (b) Extermination;
- (c) Enslavement;
- (d) Deportation;
- (e) Imprisonment;
- (f) Torture;
- (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence;
- (h) Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds;
- (i) Other inhumane acts.”

Aside from the Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court, there is no other document defining crimes against humanity and their legal elements. There are eleven international texts defining the crimes and they all differ slightly. Although the term originated in the preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,¹³⁵ which codified then existing customary law relating to armed conflict, the crimes were first defined in article 6(c) of

¹³⁵ The preamble states that until a more complete code on the laws of war is established, “the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result ... from the laws of humanity”.



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the Nuremberg Charter following the end of World War II. The category of crimes has been included in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR and, in 1998, in the Rome Statute of the ICC.

The UN Secretary-General's report on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states that "The list of crimes against humanity follows the enumeration included in the Statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, which were patterned on article 6 of the Nürnberg Charter."¹³⁶ Considerations on this by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR clearly state that these crimes had the status of customary international law as at the time of the establishment of those Tribunals, i.e. in 1993 and 1994 respectively.¹³⁷

4.c.i Contextual elements of crimes against humanity

There are two sets of elements for crimes against humanity; one of which may be described as the "contextual" elements; the other of which may be described as the elements of the acts enumerated in article 2 of the Special Court Statute. The contextual elements – spelt out in the chapeau to article 2 – must be met in all cases for an act to constitute a crime against humanity. These elements are:

1. There is an attack against a civilian population;
2. The attack is widespread or systematic;
3. The act in question was committed as part of that attack; and
4. The accused knew of the broader context in which his or her act is committed.

1. An attack against a civilian population

The "attack against a civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts enumerated in article 2.¹³⁸ Thus the "attack" does not refer to an armed conflict as such, or even to an armed attack or a military attack, but instead refers to one of the acts enumerated in article 2. As such, the attack does not need to be a physical attack but can consist of other forms of inhumane mistreatment of a civilian population.¹³⁹

Customary international law does not require that the attack itself be committed on discriminatory grounds.¹⁴⁰ The case law of the ICTR can be distinguished on this point, as the jurisdiction of the ICTR over crimes against humanity is limited solely to cases where the attack was carried out on discriminatory grounds.¹⁴¹ The Statute of the Special Court does not contain such a limitation, therefore, in keeping with customary international law, there is no requirement that the attack itself be committed on prohibited discriminatory grounds.

¹³⁶ *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, UN Doc. S/2000/915, para. 14.

¹³⁷ See, for example, the *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995 and *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001.

¹³⁸ See the preamble to the ICC Elements of Crimes.

¹³⁹ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 327.

¹⁴⁰ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 283, 292 and 305. See also *Prosecutor v Blaskic*, Case No. IT-95-14, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 3 March 2000, paras 244, 260.

¹⁴¹ ICTR Statute, article 3. See also *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 1 June 2001, para. 464, footnote excluded.



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A “civilian population” refers to a population that is predominantly civilian in nature, i.e. that the people comprising the population do not take a direct part in the hostilities or no longer take a direct part in hostilities, including those who are placed *hors de combat*, namely those who are not fighting because they are wounded or otherwise incapacitated.¹⁴² The presence of non-civilians within the population will not deprive that population of its civilian character.¹⁴³ In addition, the specific situation of a victim at the time of the commission of a crime is the critical point at which to determine the person’s standing as a civilian rather than his or her general status.¹⁴⁴ The definition of “civilian” and “civilian population” is of critical importance in international humanitarian law, which prohibits targeting civilians, a civilian population and civilian objects, such as schools and hospitals. To constitute a crime against humanity, the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack, although it is not required that the entire population of a territory is victimised.¹⁴⁵

2. The attack is widespread or systematic

To fulfil the contextual elements for a crime against humanity, an attack must be *either* widespread *or* systematic, but does not have to be both.¹⁴⁶ ‘Widespread’ means that the attack takes place on a large scale and is perpetrated against a number of victims, whereas ‘systematic’ refers to an organised pattern of conduct.¹⁴⁷

Early jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals considered whether ‘systematic’ required the existence of a pre-conceived policy or plan, either of a State or some other organised group.¹⁴⁸ The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has concluded that while a widespread or systematic attack can be evidence of a pre-existing policy or plan, and in practical terms such a policy or plan would in all likelihood be necessary for an attack to be carried out in a widespread or systematic manner, such a policy or plan is not in itself a necessary element:

“There was nothing in the Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes ... proof that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or systematic, are legal elements of the crime. But to prove these elements, it is not necessary to show that they were the result of the existence of a policy or plan. It may be useful in establishing that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread or systematic (especially the latter) to show that there was in fact a policy or plan, but it may be possible to prove these things by reference to other matters. Thus, the existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element of the crime.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴² See, for example, common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.

¹⁴³ *Prosecutor v Tadić*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 638.

¹⁴⁴ *Prosecutor v Blaskić*, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March 2000, para. 214.

¹⁴⁵ *Prosecutor v Bagilishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-1, ICTR Trial Chamber, 7 June 2001, para. 80.

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Akayesu*, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 2 September 1998, para. 580. See also the Rome Statute, article 7.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Prosecutor v Kumarac*, Case No. IT-96-23&23/1, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 12 June 2002, para. 98. In reaching this conclusion, the ICTY Appeals Chamber reviewed a wide range of precedents, including article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Nuremberg Judgement, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military



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3. The act was committed as “part of” the attack

An act must have been committed or intended to be committed as part of the attack against a civilian population to qualify as a crime against humanity. There must therefore be a nexus between the act and the attack,¹⁵⁰ namely that the act was related to the attack.¹⁵¹ As such, this excludes random or isolated acts – those not forming “part of” the attack – from the definition of crimes against humanity.

While the attack itself will generally involve a large number of acts, as evidenced by the definitions of ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’, a single act may constitute a crime against humanity if it is perpetrated as part of a larger attack. This has been made clear by the ICTY Trial Chamber, which stated that:

“Crimes against humanity are to be distinguished from war crimes against individuals. In particular, they must be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number of victims might be recognised as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the specific context identified above.”¹⁵²

4. The accused knew of the broader context in which his or her act was committed

As with most crimes, there is a mental element to crimes against humanity that must be satisfied in order for an accused to be found guilty of that crime. This element is twofold, namely that the accused acted with knowledge of the broader context of the attack and the accused knew that his or her act formed part of the attack on the civilian population.¹⁵³

Simple knowledge on the part of the accused is sufficient to satisfy this requirement; it is not necessary to show that the accused shared the purpose or goal behind the attack against the civilian population.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the motive with which the accused commits the act is irrelevant. There is no requirement that an act must not have been carried out for purely personal reasons; the only requirement is that the act is related to the attack and the accused knows it is so related.¹⁵⁵

Tribunal, Nüremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1945, in particular, pp. 84, 254, 304 (*Streicher*) and 318-19 (*von Schirach*); Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No 10; *In re Ahlbrecht*, ILR 16/1949, 396; *Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia and Anor* (1991) 172 CLR 501; Case FC 91/026; *Attorney-General v Adolph Eichmann*, District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61; *Mugesera et al. v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, IMM-5946-98, 10 May 2001, Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division; *In re Trajkovic*, District Court of Gjilan (Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), P Nr 68/2000, 6 March 2001 plus various reports of the UN Secretary-General and the International Law Commission.

¹⁵⁰ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 251; *Prosecutor v Kordic*, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 33.

¹⁵¹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 271.

¹⁵² *Prosecutor v Mrksic, Radi and Slijivancanin*, Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61, 3 April 1996, IT-95-13-R61, para. 30.

¹⁵³ See, for example, *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 656 and *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 331.

¹⁵⁴ *Prosecutor v Semanza*, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 15 May 2003, para. 332.

¹⁵⁵ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 271, 272.

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This is made clear in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which states that: “The perpetrator *knew that the conduct was part of* or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”¹⁵⁶ This is elaborated in the chapeau to the elements of crimes against humanity, which states that:

“[This element] should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack.”¹⁵⁷

4.c.ii Elements of enumerated acts constituting crimes against humanity

Once the contextual elements are met, the elements of the acts that constitute crimes against humanity also have to be established. There are nine types of acts that can constitute a crime against humanity, as outlined in paragraphs (a) to (i) of article 2 of the Statute of the Special Court. Although not all of these acts have been considered by the ICTY or ICTR, they have all been elaborated in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC.

a) Crime against humanity of murder

The elements for the crime against humanity of murder are:¹⁵⁸

1. The perpetrator unlawfully killed or caused the death of one or more persons.
2. The perpetrator acted:
 - (a) With the intent to cause someone’s death; or
 - (b) With the intent to cause grievous bodily harm and with the knowledge that that bodily harm was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death would actually occur.¹⁵⁹
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.

Customary international law does not require the element of premeditation for the crime against humanity of murder and, as such, all the different types of murder known to common law would satisfy this requirement.¹⁶⁰ This is mirrored in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which refer

¹⁵⁶ See, for example, the ICC Elements of Crimes, article 7(1)(a), para. 3, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, p. 116 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁷ Chapeau of the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, p. 116.

¹⁵⁸ See the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, article 7(1)(a) and below, note 68.

¹⁵⁹ See also the Rome Statute of the ICC, article 30 (2) for a description of the required *mens rea*.

¹⁶⁰ *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 138. See also *Prosecutor v Kordic*, Case No. IT-95-14/2, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 26 February 2001, para. 235 and *Prosecutor v Jelisić*, Case No. IT-95-10, ICTY Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, para. 51. The decisions of the ICTR can be



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International humanitarian law has two main sources: treaty law and customary international law; it can also be found in general principles of law and in judicial decisions and the writings of eminent jurists,⁹⁴ as subsidiary means that are of particular importance in this field. Treaty law refers to the obligations binding on a State because they are a party to a treaty containing those obligations. Customary international law, on the other hand, refers to those obligations that are binding on States irrespective of whether they are contained in a treaty or not. The existence of customary international law is determined by reference to State practice and *opinio juris*.⁹⁵ State practice is the actions undertaken by States and *opinio juris* means that States undertake such actions because they believe they are under a legal obligation to do so.⁹⁶ State practice in the absence of *opinio juris*, no matter how uniform or consistent, will therefore not amount to customary international law; one example is the cancellation of diplomats' parking tickets, which is a standard practice but does not give rise to legal consequences if it is not followed. Official statements and declarations can provide evidence of *opinio juris* and can even amount to State practice in some circumstances, depending on their context. Generally, customary international law is binding on all States. However, it is not binding on a persistent objector, namely a State that has consistently made its objections manifest during the emergence of a new rule,⁹⁷ except if it amounts to *jus cogens*, which is a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permissible and, as such, is binding on all States.⁹⁸ It should be borne in mind that customary international law is a continually evolving process and what was customary international law 20 years ago will not necessarily be customary international law today.

While international humanitarian law regulates the conduct of war, not all of its provisions attract individual criminal responsibility. For example, the violation of the provision stating the prisoners of war shall be permitted to use tobacco⁹⁹ is not considered to be a crime. However, there are a wide number of provisions, based both in treaty and customary law, that do attract individual criminal responsibility, so that people who violate the obligations in those provisions can be held accountable in a court of law. These provisions are considered to form part of a discrete area of law called international criminal law.¹⁰⁰ Many of these provisions will be discussed in the following sections on the crimes over which the Special Court has jurisdiction. The classic modern examples of the enforcement of international humanitarian law are found in two military tribunals established after World War II: the Nuremberg Tribunal, established to try the 22 major Nazi war criminals and

⁹⁴ Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1)(c)-(d).

⁹⁵ *North Sea Continental Shelf Case* [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 44.

⁹⁶ See the Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38(1)(b), listing one of the sources of international law as "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law".

⁹⁷ Stein, T. L., 'The Approach of a Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law' (1985) 26 Harv. Int'l L.J. 457, p. 458.

⁹⁸ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, article 53; norms amounting to *jus cogens* can only be replaced by norms of a similar character. The prohibition on genocide is generally considered to be *jus cogens*: see, for example, Bassiouni, M. C., 'International Crimes: *Jus Cogens* and *Obligatio Erga Omnes*' (1996) 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 63, p. 68.

⁹⁹ Third Geneva Convention 1949, article 26.

¹⁰⁰ These provisions form part of International Criminal Law, which is also considered to include a range of other offences such as drug trafficking, piracy and fraud: see, for example, Bassiouni, M. C., *International Criminal Law* (2nd edn), 1999, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY.



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the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, established to try major war criminals in the Pacific. The Nuremberg Charter, which gave the Tribunal jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace,¹⁰¹ is often cited as the basis for the development of international criminal law in the latter half of the twentieth century. In fact, “[t]he 1949 Geneva Conventions were prepared in the wake of the Nuremberg trials and were heavily influenced by them”.¹⁰²

2.b The International Criminal Court (ICC), including the Elements of Crimes

The preliminary and traditional problem with international humanitarian law is its lack of enforceability. Despite the advances made after World War II by the International Military Tribunals and several notable cases tried in domestic courts, including Eichmann, Barbie and Trouvier, it is only with the advent of the ad hoc tribunals and subsequent developments through the 1990s and beyond that this historic lack of enforceability is being addressed.¹⁰³

In the early 1990s, the international community took steps to enforce international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, through the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) in 1993 and 1994 respectively. These Tribunals were established by Security Council Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁰⁴ Crimes within their jurisdictions include genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war. The decisions of these tribunals, which are based on customary international law as identified by the judges, represent the first major post-Nuremberg decisions on crimes under international humanitarian law. While the decisions of these international tribunals are not binding on other courts, whether domestic and international, this growing body of jurisprudence is at the very least highly persuasive and was referred to extensively by the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court (ICC) when the time came to elaborate the Elements of Crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.

Indeed, the main step forward in the codification of international criminal law since Nuremberg and Tokyo is the creation of the International Criminal Court. In many ways, the ICC can be seen as a logical next step of the process begun at Nuremberg and traced through the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, albeit a step that would be blocked for 50 years by the Cold War, among other things. The main difference between the ICC and the tribunals that preceded it is that the Statute of

¹⁰¹ Nuremberg Charter, article 6; note that conspiracy to commit any of these acts was also within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

¹⁰² *The Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995.

¹⁰³ For further reading, see McCormack, T. and Simpson, G., *The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches*, 1997, Kluwer Law International, Boston.

¹⁰⁴ ICTY: Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), 25 May 1993; ICTR: Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994. The Security Council is mandated under Chapter VII with determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, pursuant to article 39(1) of the UN Charter. Having made that determination, the Security Council may then make recommendations or decisions regarding measures to be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. Any such decisions are binding on all member States (article 25) and are superior to all other international obligations (article 103).



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the ICC was negotiated by all member States of the United Nations, thereby representing for the first time a truly universal attempt to codify those laws and customs of war that attract individual criminal responsibility.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998, after weeks of intensive negotiations and debate, and entered into force on 1 July 2002. Following the Diplomatic Conference, the Preparatory Commission comprised of representatives of States¹⁰⁵ with significant input from international organisations and non-governmental organisations, debated the particulars of the supporting documents for the Rome Statute, in particular the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.¹⁰⁶ During the negotiations, the often long debates centred around what was and what was not customary international law, with delegates accepting the former and rejecting the latter. As such, the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, found in articles 6 to 8, are the best possible indication of customary international law at the time of the adoption of the Rome Statute, as are their Elements of Crimes, which were approved at the June 2000 session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court and subsequently adopted during the first meeting of the Assembly of States Parties in September 2002.¹⁰⁷

2.c Note on procedural law

Along with substantive provisions on international criminal law, the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC have also contributed to the development of a set of procedural rules for international courts and tribunals. Thus each of the international criminal tribunals and the ICC has its own “Rules of Procedure and Evidence”, which represent a cross-fertilisation between major legal systems.¹⁰⁸ The rules have a large impact on the evidence that is accepted at trial and, as such, forms the basis for judgments. As such, these rules have contributed to the development of the procedural and substantive elements of this area of law. While the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court fall outside the ambit of this report, interested readers are directed towards NPWJ’s *Lawyer’s Guide to the Special Court*, which goes into these Rules in detail.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ The Republic of Sierra Leone was one of the most active participants in these discussions and made numerous statements, both in formal and informal negotiations, as to what constituted customary international law in respect of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.

¹⁰⁶ Both the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as adopted, are found in UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3.

¹⁰⁷ See Politi, M. and Nesi, G. (eds.), *The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Challenge to Impunity*, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, UK, 2001, p 25 and Lee, RS (ed), *The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence*, Transnational Publishers Inc, USA, 2001, pp. 5, 8 and, generally, Chapter 6, “Reflections on the Elements of Crimes”. While there is some debate as to whether the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes entirely reflect customary international law, they are used in this report as the most authoritative statement of customary international law to date, due to their manner of negotiation and adoption.

¹⁰⁸ The Rules were made in different ways: for the ad hoc tribunals and the Special Court, they are made by the Judges themselves, whereas for the ICC, they were the product of lengthy negotiations between States, which took place at the same time as the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes.

¹⁰⁹ NPWJ’s *Lawyer’s Guide to the Special Court* is available from www.specialcourt.org.



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3. Special Court for Sierra Leone: Background and establishment

In June 2000, the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone requested the assistance of the United Nations to establish a court to try people who committed crimes in Sierra Leone during the conflict. On 14 August 2000, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution requesting the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to allow the Special Court to be established.¹¹⁰ It also asked the Secretary-General to report back to the Security Council on a number of points raised in the resolution, including: from what date the Special Court should have jurisdiction, where an alternative seat for the Special Court outside Sierra Leone might be located, how appeals should be made and how much assistance will be required from the international community in terms of finance and personnel.

Negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations began in September 2000 in New York, continuing later that month in Freetown. The Secretary-General reported back to the Security Council on 4 October 2000. This was followed by an exchange of letters on some of the more contentious areas in the Sierra Leone-United Nations negotiations between the Security Council and the Secretary-General in December 2000 and January 2001, which detailed some changes the Security Council believed should be made to the draft Statute and Agreement. These changes were agreed to by Sierra Leone and the Agreement for the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, to which the Statute is annexed, was signed in a ceremony in Freetown on 16 January 2002 by then Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and the then UN Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs. This Agreement forms the legal basis for the Special Court and in addition to the substantive functioning of the Court includes matters such as privileges and immunities of officials, staff and the premises of the Special Court, which was supplemented by a Headquarters Agreement signed on 21 October 2003 by the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and the Registrar of the Special Court.

In early 2002, the Prosecutor, Registrar and Judges of the Special Court were named by the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, each of whom was responsible for appointing a number of officials. The Special Court began its operations in late July 2002, when the Registrar, the Prosecutor and some initial staff arrived in Freetown. The first set of indictments was approved on 7 March 2003, arrests were made on 10 March 2003 and initial appearances began on 15 March 2003 at temporary facilities in Bonthe, a small town in southern Sierra Leone. A number of indictments were approved in the following months and all detainees were moved to the Special Court's detention facilities in New England, Freetown, once construction on the site of the Special Court was complete. Since that time a number of pre-trial motions have been heard by the Judges of the Special Court, including applications for provisional release¹¹¹ and jurisdictional matters, heard by a panel of Judges of the Appeals Chamber sitting for the first time in October 2003.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000), 14 August 2000.

¹¹¹ All of the applications for provisional release have, at the time of writing, been denied.

¹¹² It should be noted that the courtroom for the Special Court was, at the time of writing, still under construction and pre-trial hearings were being held at a temporary courtroom on the New England site.



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4. Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court

In his letter of 12 June 2000, the President of Sierra Leone suggested that the Special Court have as its applicable law a blend of international and domestic Sierra Leone law.¹¹³ Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) therefore recommended that the Special Court was to have jurisdiction over crimes under international law and selected crimes under Sierra Leonean law. Pursuant to the Statute of the Special Court, the crimes under international law fall under the broad categories of crimes against humanity; violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II; and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including crimes against peacekeepers and the use of child soldiers.¹¹⁴ These are crimes under international humanitarian law that were considered to have had the status of customary international law at the time the alleged crimes were committed.¹¹⁵ Violations of common article 3 and Additional Protocol II and the “other serious violations of international humanitarian law” both require the existence of an armed conflict as a condition of applicability, therefore this will be discussed separately at the beginning of this section. The crimes under Sierra Leonean law cover offences relating to the abuse of girls and wanton destruction of property, taken from Sierra Leone legislation dating from 1926 and 1861 respectively; these are the only crimes under Sierra Leone law over which the Special Court has jurisdiction.¹¹⁶

This selection of subject matter jurisdiction was done to pre-empt any challenge to the Court’s legality on the basis of the principle of *nullum crimen sine lege*,¹¹⁷ since the acts these provisions are purporting to address had been criminalised at the time those acts were allegedly committed.¹¹⁸ It should be emphasised that the Statute of the Special Court does not create the crimes to which it refers: rather, articles 2 to 5 of the Statute simply provide that the Special Court has jurisdiction over pre-existing crimes. Therefore, an examination of the applicability and content of the norms referred to within the Statute – whether as a result of customary international law or voluntary adoption of norms by Sierra Leone – is necessary to determine the elements of the crimes.

¹¹³ UN Doc. S/2000/786, ‘Framework for the Special Court’, para. 3.

¹¹⁴ Crimes against humanity (article 2); violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (article 3); and other serious violations of international humanitarian law (article 4).

¹¹⁵ See, for example, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone*, UN Doc. S/2000/915, para. 12.

¹¹⁶ This may leave a gap in accountability for violations committed during the conflict, leaving aside the question of the Lomé Amnesty for now. For example, if a person is tried for murder as a crime against humanity before the Special Court and the contextual elements are not proven, that person must be acquitted. The Special Court has no jurisdiction to find that person guilty of murder under Sierra Leone law. However, the *non bis in idem* principle then bars any trial of that person in domestic courts for murder based on the same facts. See the Statute, article 9(1): “No person shall be tried before a national court of Sierra Leone for acts for which he or she has already been tried by the Special Court.”

¹¹⁷ According to this principle, nobody may be found guilty of a criminal offence for acts that were not criminalised, whether under national or international law, at the time of their commission: see the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, article 15(1).

¹¹⁸ One of the indictees has filed a motion challenging the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the recruitment of children, submitting that this was not a crime under customary international law at the time of the alleged commission of the alleged acts. Oral arguments were heard in November 2003 and, at the time of writing, the Judges of the Appeals Chamber have not yet decided the matter.



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Thus the elements elaborated below are drawn primarily from the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which are the best current indication of customary international law, and the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. While their decisions are not binding *per se* on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, they are persuasive. According to the Statute, the Appeals Chamber “shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda”;¹¹⁹ furthermore, it is also in the interests of certainty of the law and consistency of the application of its provisions that the Special Court for Sierra Leone follow these decisions.

4.a The existence and nature of an armed conflict: the law

International humanitarian law applies during times of armed conflict, whether international or non-international in nature. The exception to this is crimes against humanity, namely certain acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and genocide, namely certain acts committed against a national, racial, ethnic or religious group with the intent to destroy that group in whole or in part, as such.¹²⁰ According to customary international law, the prohibitions against these acts apply during times of war and times of peace.¹²¹ In all other cases, however, in order to apply these norms, it must first be determined whether an armed conflict existed, before going on to consider whether the conflict was international or non-international in nature.

The ICTY considered the definition of an armed conflict early in its history and stated the following:

“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.”¹²²

International humanitarian law draws a distinction between international armed conflicts, i.e. those between two or more States, and non-international armed conflicts, i.e. those between a State and a non-State organised armed group or between such groups. The majority of provisions in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol I apply only to international armed conflicts.

¹¹⁹ Statute of the Special Court, article 20(3).

¹²⁰ See the Genocide Convention 1949.

¹²¹ The ICTY Statute limits the jurisdiction of that Tribunal to crimes against humanity committed in the context of an armed conflict (see article 5) but the Statute of the Special Court contains no such limitation, so this aspect of ICTY jurisprudence will not be discussed in the present report.

¹²² *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995 (*Tadic* Jurisdiction Decision), para. 70.



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Nonetheless, article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II lay down a set of basic minimum rules and basic protections applicable in any armed conflict.¹²³

Whether an armed conflict is international or non-international in nature depends on the parties to the conflict. In essence, a conflict will be “international” when it is conducted between two or more States and will be “non-international” when it is conducted between a State and another armed force not qualified as a State or between such forces.¹²⁴ The character of a conflict can change during its course from being non-international in nature to being international in nature.¹²⁵ In the *Tadic* decision, the ICTY Appeals Chamber specifically addressed the question of when a conflict that is *prima facie* internal in nature may be regarded as involving forces acting on behalf of a foreign power, thereby rendering the conflict international in nature.¹²⁶ The Appeals Chamber identified three specific tests concerning the necessary degree of control by a foreign power to determine whether this had occurred, namely overall control of an armed group or individuals; specific instructions to an armed group or individuals; and actual behaviour of an armed group or individuals, irrespective of any specific instructions.

The Statute of the Special Court only gives the Court jurisdiction over crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. Particularly given the three-part test identified by the Appeals Chamber, it is debatable whether the drafters of the Statute for the Special Court should have limited the jurisdiction of the Special Court only to crimes committed within an non-international armed conflict. A more sensible approach would have been to leave that determination to the Special Court itself, so it could have applied the test of whether the conflict was rendered international in nature on the basis of evidence presented to it.

4.b The existence and nature of an armed conflict: the facts

It seems almost counter-intuitive to be asking the question of whether an armed conflict existed in Sierra Leone. The facts as adduced in this report, including the descriptions of fighting between various forces at different times, as well as the numerous public reports from the media, human rights organisations and others seem to negate the need for even raising the issue. Nevertheless, it is important to examine this question, in particular to determine when the conflict began, which determines when international humanitarian law begins to apply, and also to determine the nature of

¹²³ *Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic*, Case No. IT-98-34, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, 31. March 2003, para. 228.

¹²⁴ *Prosecutor v Kayishema*, Case No. ICTR-95-I, ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 170.

¹²⁵ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, para. 84. In addition, there can be both non-international and international armed conflicts taking place side by side. Note, however, that the ICTY Appeals Chamber discussed the issue of the applicable law in such a situation. Addressing the argument that the existence of two types of conflicts meant the application of two different legal regimes in the same place at the same time, the Appeals Chamber stated that such an interpretation would “authorize the International Tribunal to prosecute and punish certain conduct in an international armed conflict, while turning a blind eye to the very same conduct in an internal armed conflict” (para. 78). This led the Appeals Chamber to consider that “to the extent possible, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Tribunal should extend to both internal and international armed conflicts” (*Ibid*).

¹²⁶ See *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 15 July 1999, point IV.B.3.



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the conflict, in order to determine what provisions of international humanitarian law are applicable.¹²⁷

4.b.i Existence of an armed conflict

As noted, an armed conflict is deemed to have begun whenever there is “protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”¹²⁸ Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) forces coming from Liberia first entered Sierra Leone through Kailahun District on 23 March 1991, at which time they engaged the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in battle. From the very beginning, the RUF was organised according to a military structure, including identifiable chains of command, rules of engagement and disciplinary structures. From that time, RUF/NPFL forces would spread throughout the country, engaging the SLA in battle and establishing their own bases, including for recruiting and training.

As the conflict progressed, different fighting factions became involved, including loosely organised groups of local hunters and “vigilantes”; the more organised and structured Civil Defence Forces; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), who took over power during a coup in May 1997; Nigerian and Guinean forces, both independently at the invitation of the Sierra Leone Government and as part of ECOMOG; Executive Outcomes, the South African private military company who entered Sierra Leone under contract with the Sierra Leone Government; and the United Nations military peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL). Some of these armed forces and groups would, at different points, also begin fighting each other, notably the Civil Defence Forces and the SLA, both before and after the establishment of the AFRC during the coup of May 1997.

Thus to greater and lesser degrees from 1991 there was protracted armed violence between both governmental authorities and organised armed groups¹²⁹ on the one hand and between such groups¹³⁰ within the territory of Sierra Leone on the other hand. It is therefore clear that an armed conflict began in Sierra Leone in March 1991, thereby triggering the application of international humanitarian law.

The question of when the armed conflict ended turns on when a general conclusion of peace was reached or when a peaceful settlement was achieved.¹³¹ At various times throughout the conflict, attempts were made to reach a peaceful settlement between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. A number of ceasefires were declared and peace agreements were negotiated and signed, notably in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on 30 November 1996 and in Lomé, Togo, on 7 July 1999.¹³²

¹²⁷ It should of course be remembered that for crimes against humanity, customary international law does not require the existence of an armed conflict; rather, it requires a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population and that prohibited acts be committed as part of that attack.

¹²⁸ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70

¹²⁹ For example, RUF/NPFL v SLA; RUF v SLA; RUF v CDF; RUF/AFRC v CDF; RUF v SLA/ULIMO; RUF v ECOMOG; SLA v CDF.

¹³⁰ For example, RUF/NPFL v local hunters/vigilantes.

¹³¹ *Prosecutor v Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-I, Appeals Chamber, Jurisdiction Decision, 2 October 1995, para.70

¹³² The ECOWAS Six-month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone, signed in Conakry, Guinea, on 23 October 1997, should also be noted in this context.



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was not contracted to engage in direct military actions against the RUF. In February 1995, RUF forces killed two senior GSG advisers and the aide-de-camp of the NPRC Chairman during a road ambush near the Kaitkant Hills in Tonkolili District.⁵⁹ The NPRC Government let GSG's contract lapse in April 1995.

b. Executive Outcomes

In late April or early May 1995, the NPRC contracted Executive Outcomes, a South African private military company, to train SLA forces.⁶⁰ At the time Executive Outcomes was contracted, RUF forces had pushed through Moyamba District into the Western Area and were engaging SLA and Guinean forces in and around Waterloo, not far from metropolitan Freetown. Near Freetown, Executive Outcomes created a "Special Task Force" of around 600 re-mobilised Liberian militia from the ULIMO-J movement. The Special Task Force assisted the SLA and organised civil militia in forcing the RUF to withdraw from the Western Area. Executive Outcomes rapidly expanded operations into the Provinces, securing the diamond-rich areas of Kono District. The Special Task Force also engaged RUF forces in Bonthe District later in the year. In March 1996, the newly-elected President of Sierra Leone retained the services of Executive Outcomes.

Executive Outcomes were also hired by mining and hydroelectric companies in Kono, Moyamba and Tonkolili Districts to provide security at their sites. Their departure from Sierra Leonean territory would be one of the main terms insisted on by the RUF during the peace negotiations that led to the signing of Abidjan Peace Agreement on 30 November 1996 between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone. Article 12 of the Peace Agreement provided that, "The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group."⁶¹ In early 1997, Executive Outcomes left Sierra Leone.

c. Sandline International

Sandline International is a British private military company⁶² linked both to Executive Outcomes and to an array of companies with commercial mining interests in Sierra Leone. On 23 December 1997, Sandline International entered into a contract with the exiled Government of Sierra Leone to assist the Government in removing the RUF/AFRC regime through the "provision of technical knowhow, military logistics and equipment" to a value of around 10 million US dollars. This included the provision of 2,500 assault rifles, 180 rocket launchers, 50 machine guns and quantities of ammunition and spare magazines.⁶³ A number of finance problems reduced the money available

⁵⁹ For background information, see Cillers, J. and Mason, P. (eds.), *Peace, Profit and Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, 1999, pp. 129-33: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Books/PeaceProfitPlunder/Chap7.pdf> [Link alive: 7 January 2004].

⁶⁰ Associated Press Worldstream, 11 May 1995.

⁶¹ For the full text of the Agreement, see <http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html>.

⁶² For the company profile of Sandline International, see <http://www.sandline.com/site/>.

⁶³ Sir Thomas Legg, KCB QC and Sir Robin Ibbs, KBE; *Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation, 27 July 1998* (the "Legg Report"), paras. 4.15-4.18. Full text and annexes of the report are available from the Official Documents section of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth website: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/complete.zip> [Link last visited: 28 February 2004].



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to around 1.35 million US dollars. Sandline International flew 35 tonnes of weapons costing 700,000 US dollars to Freetown International Airport at Lungi.⁶⁴ Landing on 23 February 1998, the shipment arrived well after ECOMOG forces had driven the RUF/AFRC from the Western Area. The arms shipment was placed in storage by ECOMOG, who passed on a small number of weapons to the CDF commander for use by the Kamajors.⁶⁵ Sandline International was also responsible for establishing an operations base at Lungi for use by the returning Government of Sierra Leone.

In late March 1998, a few weeks after the Sierra Leone President's reinstatement to power, UK Customs and Excise investigated Sandline International's arms shipment as a possible breach of UK law implementing the arms and oil embargo imposed on 8 October 1997 by the UN Security Council.⁶⁶ Ultimately, Customs and Excise decided that it was not in the public interest to prosecute Sandline International.

The details of the investigation and allegations made in the media, led to a political row in the UK concerning the possible involvement of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials and ministers in the breaking of UN sanctions. On 18 May, the UK Government announced an independent inquiry into what had become known as "the Sandline affair", to be led by Sir Thomas Legg. The report of the Legg Inquiry led to a series of administrative and policy changes concerning internal Government communications, particularly in the FCO, and the clear elucidation of future Government policies concerning both economic sanctions and private military companies. Following the submission of the findings of the Legg Inquiry, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee also conducted its own investigation into the handling of the Sandline Affair by the FCO.⁶⁷

3. Peacekeeping forces

a. **Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Observer Group (ECOMOG)**

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional organisation comprising 15 member States, including Sierra Leone. It was created in 1975 and its founding Treaty was re-affirmed by all member States in July 1993. The ECOWAS Treaty allows ECOWAS to "establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate",⁶⁸ although it does not have a standing military component.

Since 1990, the forward operating base of the ECOMOG mission in Liberia had been located in Lungi, near the Freetown International Airport. The military mandate of ECOMOG, however, did not encompass Sierra Leone until 29 August 1997, when the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government authorised ECOMOG to "employ all necessary means" to enforce a comprehensive

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, para. 4.24.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, para. 7.9.

⁶⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), 8 October 1997.

⁶⁷ The Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons:

<http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmfaaff/116/11602.htm>.

⁶⁸ Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, article 58(2)(f). Available online at: www.sec.ecowas.int.



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trade embargo on Sierra Leone.⁶⁹ In addition to the ECOMOG forces already deployed in Sierra Leone in support of operations in Liberia, additional forces from ECOWAS member States were also deployed alongside the SLA in Sierra Leone pursuant to a series of defence pacts and agreements between those States and Sierra Leone. In early 1993, for example, Nigerian forces were deployed in Kono District while Guinean forces were active in Kailahun District. However, according to the Abidjan Peace Accord signed on 30 November between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, all foreign forces were to leave the county.⁷⁰

The evolution of ECOMOG's direct military involvement in Sierra Leone began with the AFRC coup on 25 May 1997. Nigerian forces reinforced the ECOMOG deployment at Lungi and the Nigerian force headquarters at Kossoh Town, near Freetown. On 2 June 1997, Nigerian forces – not acting under ECOMOG, the mandate of which did not cover Sierra Leone – attempted and failed to unseat the combined RUF/AFRC forces.

The military situation between the RUF/AFRC and Nigerian forces remained tense throughout 1997. Following the failure of diplomatic negotiations carried out by the ECOWAS Committee of Five, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government imposed a trade, arms and petroleum products embargo on Sierra Leone on 27 August 1997. As noted, this decision also expanded ECOMOG's mandate to include monitoring and supervising ceasefire violations and enforcing the sanctions and the embargo instituted by the authority of the Heads of State and Government against the RUF/AFRC regime.⁷¹

Although Nigerian forces had established a de facto naval blockade of the Port of Freetown since the coup, the ECOMOG mandate allowed them to intensify enforcement operations. The UN Security Council supported the ECOWAS action and applied its own sanctions regime to Sierra Leone, authorising ECOWAS to ensure its strict implementation.⁷²

The continuous shelling of strategic locations in Freetown, the effects of the embargo and the RUF/AFRC's inability to dislodge ECOMOG from Kossoh and Jui prompted them to continue the negotiations started early in the year. ECOWAS mediators, led by the then Nigerian Foreign Minister, hammered out a peace plan. This led to a ceasefire on 21 October 1997, followed on 23 October by the signing of the ECOWAS six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998).⁷³ The central provisions of this agreement were the maintenance of a ceasefire and the return of the elected Government by 22 April 1998.

⁶⁹ ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Decision on Sanctions Against the Junta in Sierra Leone, 29 August 1997, article 7: "The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision."

⁷⁰ Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 30 November 1996, article 12.

⁷¹ ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, Decision on Sanctions Against the Junta in Sierra Leone, 29 August 1997.

⁷² UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), 8 October 1997.

⁷³ ECOWAS Six-month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998). Available online at: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_09231997.html [Link last visited 28 February 2004].



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On numerous occasions during the remainder of 1997, RUF/AFRC, CDF and ECOMOG forces violated the spirit and the letter of the Conakry Peace Plan. During the seventh meeting of the ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held in Abuja on 19 December 1997, “the Ministers deplored the incessant and unprovoked attacks on ECOMOG peace-keepers. They reaffirmed ECOMOG’s right of self defence”.⁷⁴ In early January, ECOMOG had begun planning a military intervention to remove the RUF/AFRC from Freetown. On 6 February 1998, as the impasse in implementing the Conakry Peace Plan appeared to deepen, ECOWAS reaffirmed the three options available for the resolution of the conflict, namely: the pursuit of dialogue; the imposition of a sanctions regime; and the possible use of force.⁷⁵ On the same day, ECOMOG forces in Freetown commenced a military intervention that led to their capture of Freetown and the Western Area by 12 February.

Following the success of their Freetown intervention, ECOMOG forces commenced provincial operations in March. The ECOMOG force was divided into three brigades. The 24th Infantry Brigade would execute operations in the Northern Province and parts of the Eastern Province. The 26th and 15th Infantry Brigades would take responsibility for operations in the Southern Province and the remainder of the Eastern Province. After April, four “loyal” SLA battalions were put under the command of the ECOMOG 24th Infantry Brigade.

ECOMOG’s mandate in Sierra Leone was expanded following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 7 July 1999. ECOMOG forces became a key component and actor in the peace process.

To reflect the provisions of the Lomé Agreement, ECOWAS redefined the mandate of ECOMOG on 25 August 1999. Although the Government of Nigeria had announced the drawdown of its contribution to ECOMOG, their withdrawal was delayed to ensure that there was no security vacuum during the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).⁷⁶ At this time, ECOMOG’s additional responsibilities included monitoring the ceasefire, providing security for and disarming ex-combatants at DDR sites and guarding any arms and ammunition retrieved during the disarmament process. ECOMOG gradually scaled down its operations and UNAMSIL deployed in the areas previously under the control of ECOMOG. Out of the six Nigerian battalions deployed in Sierra Leone, four were absorbed by UNAMSIL and the remaining two had left Sierra Leone by 2 May 2000.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Final communiqué, point 14.

⁷⁵ ECOWAS eighth meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, New York, 5-6 February 1998. Full text available at: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/ecowas020698.html> [Link last visited: 28 February 2004].

⁷⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 5 - 16 January 2000 and IRIN West Africa, 31 January 2000. On 23 December, the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana informed the Secretary-General of their intention to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone.

⁷⁷ IRIN West Africa, 2 May 2000.



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b. United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

On 22 October 1999, in the aftermath of the Lomé Peace Agreement and following the extension of the ECOMOG mandate, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 (1999) establishing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Initially, the authorised force strength of UNAMSIL strength was 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers⁷⁸ to “cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement”. This included establishing a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone and assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in implementing the DDR plan.

UNAMSIL had been preceded in 1998 by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL),⁷⁹ composed of military observers and aiming at “monitor[ing] the military and security situation in Sierra Leone” and the “disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants”, at “assist[ing] in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law” and at “monitor[ing] the voluntary disarmament and demobilisation of members of the Civil Defence Force”.⁸⁰ The presence of UNOMSIL within Sierra Leonean territory and the number of its personnel would vary over the subsequent months, as its terms of deployment were amended taking into account the security situation in Sierra Leone. UNOMSIL personnel were highly dependant on ECOMOG forces for their security.

In establishing UNAMSIL, the UN Security Council decided that UNAMSIL was to “take over the substantive civilian and military components and functions and to that end” decided “that the mandate of UNOMSIL shall terminate immediately on the establishment of UNAMSIL”.⁸¹ Furthermore, despite the ECOWAS statement of impending withdrawal from Sierra Leone, the United Nations included the role and functions of ECOMOG in the resolution, stating the “need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL”, “commend[ing] the readiness of ECOMOG to continue to provide security for the areas where it is currently located”

⁷⁸ For a full text of the resolution, see <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99>.

⁷⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.

⁸⁰ UNOMSIL was initially established for a six-month period between 13 July 1998 and 13 January 1999. Its authorised deployment contained up to 70 military observers. As hostilities between ECOMOG and the RUF/AFRC resumed in January 1999, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 March 1999 in UN Resolution 1220 (1999), 12 January 1999, paragraph 2 of which authorises the Secretary General “to reduce the number of military observers in UNOMSIL and to retain in Conakry a small number who would return to Sierra Leone when conditions permit together with necessary civilian substantive and logistical support staff under the leadership of his Special Representative”. UNOMSIL’s mandate was extended to 13 June by Resolution 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999. At this time, however, there were only eight military observers and they were not deployed inside Sierra Leone. Resolution 1245 (1999) of 11 June 1999 expanded the mandate of UNOMSIL until 13 December. On 20 August 1999, Resolution 1260 (1999) authorised the expansion of the mission to include 210 military observers to monitor the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement and to assist with the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program. The full texts of all the above-mentioned resolutions are available online at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98>. Additional sources of information on UNOMSIL can be found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm>.

⁸¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), 22 October 1999, para. 10.



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and noting the need “to conduct other operations in accordance with their mandate to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement”.

UNAMSIL force numbers would increase over the subsequent months as ECOMOG forces left Sierra Leone. In May 2000, hostilities resumed and UNAMSIL forces were targeted directly by RUF/AFRC forces. The capture of nearly 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers by RUF/AFRC forces, a series of military events including the intervention of the UK Armed Forces and expanded combat operations by the SLA identified a clear need not only for an increase in UNAMSIL’s force strength, but a reform of its structure. In late 2000, the UN Security Council increased the number of authorised personnel in UNAMSIL to 13,000⁸² and ultimately to 17,500.

The first of these expansions would be decided on 7 February 2000, with the Security Council approving the extension of the military component of the UNAMSIL to 11,100 military personnel, deciding the revision of UNAMSIL’s mandate and approving its extension for a period of six months.⁸³ UNAMSIL’s force strength was increased to a ceiling of 17,500⁸⁴ by 30 September 1999. While the mandate of UNAMSIL was renewed in September 2003,⁸⁵ recent UN Security Council Resolutions have authorised the gradual drawdown of UNAMSIL, paving the way for a possible withdrawal by December 2004.⁸⁶

⁸² UN Security Council Resolution 1299 (2000), 19 May 2000.

⁸³ UN Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000), 7 February 2000.

⁸⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1346 (2001), 30 March 2001.

⁸⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 1508 (2003), 19 September 2003.

⁸⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1492 (2003), 18 July 2003.



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Chapter Four: Legal Analysis

1. Introduction

NPWJ's Outreach and Conflict Mapping Programs focused on the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone so that the people of Sierra Leone might understand more about how the Court could assist in the accountability process, by gaining an understanding of the types of crimes on which the Court would be able to adjudicate. This section is, in many ways, intended to be an extension of that program, therefore this analysis focuses on the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and related matters, including the principle of individual criminal responsibility. As such, it is not intended to be an academic analysis of all aspects of the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction. Rather, it is aimed at filling out the factual analysis contained in this report by outlining the crimes and their elements in more detail than was possible during the training seminars and demonstrating how this law might apply to the facts uncovered from the information gathered during the Conflict Mapping program.

This section will first give an overview of what is international humanitarian law (IHL), including its sources and key provisions. It will go on to examine whether or not there was an armed conflict in Sierra Leone and, if so, its duration and its nature. The section will go on to discuss the legal aspects of each category of crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction, in the order in which the crimes are listed within the Statute of the Special Court. The discussion of each category of crimes will conclude with an identification of what crimes were committed during the conflict, by applying the law as discussed to the facts as described in the factual analysis. The section will conclude with a discussion of the personal and temporal jurisdiction of the Court, namely the people over whom the Court has jurisdiction and when the acts had to be allegedly committed in order to be considered by the Court, finishing with a brief discussion of the principles of individual criminal responsibility, both direct and command responsibility.

It should be noted that in some circumstances the same set of facts can be characterised as a crime against humanity, a war crime and a crime under Sierra Leone law. For example, the rape of a 10 year-old can be the crime against humanity of rape, where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack; the war crime of rape, when committed during an armed conflict; and a crime under Sierra Leone law, namely a violation of section 6 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1926. In such a situation, this report considers that the legal basis for each of those crimes has been made out and reflects this in the list of crimes committed, although an accused may be charged with only one of those crimes. Conversely, there are some crimes that do not have counterparts and, as such, some facts only fit into one category of crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction. These include the crime against humanity of enslavement, the war crime of pillage, the serious violation of international humanitarian law of the conscription of children and the crime under Sierra Leone law of the burning of public buildings.

For reasons of clarity and manageability, the crimes are also identified according to the fighting faction identified as being responsible. However, it must be emphasised that responsibility for these crimes cannot be extended to every member of the fighting faction: the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law are premised on the basis of individual criminal responsibility, both direct and command responsibility. As such, liability will only fall on the people who devised and

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implemented the policies to commit such crimes, i.e. the leaders and planners, the commanders responsible for the individuals who committed the crimes and each individual who committed that crime.

As mentioned, the facts as described in this report are the result of the collection of information from key persons throughout Sierra Leone; that is, persons who by virtue of their profession or their position in society were in a position to have an overview of the conflict in particular in their area. This information has been used to compile the factual analysis section of this report, on which the following legal analysis is based. Every care has been taken to establish the veracity of the information gathered in Sierra Leone, including cross-checking and, to an extent, supplementing this information with open source and other materials.⁸⁷ Details that could not be verified or information on events coming from only one source were generally not included in the final report. However, it must be borne in mind that this information has not been tested to the level required for sustaining a conviction, for example through cross-examination in court, nor have the alleged perpetrators had the opportunity to tell their side of the story or answer the allegations made in this report. Therefore, although every care has been taken to ensure the correctness of the facts contained in this report, these limitations must be borne in mind when considering the following analysis.

2. Applicable law

2.a Introduction to international humanitarian law (IHL)

International humanitarian law, also known as “the laws of war”, is the area of international law that regulates conduct during an armed conflict. In the modern era, the development of the rules of IHL began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in an attempt to mitigate some of the consequences of the conflicts prevalent at the time. In essence, they attempted to regulate wars to prevent unnecessary suffering being inflicted upon combatants and civilians. Their development attempted to set specific rules concerning what were and were not legitimate targets in conflict and refined the distinction between combatants and civilians. The protection of persons not taking an active part in hostilities became a basic principle of IHL.

Traditionally, there have been two branches of international humanitarian law: the “Hague law”, concerned with means and methods of warfare, and the “Geneva law”, concerned with the more humanitarian issues, including the protection of civilians; this distinction is largely illusory, as there is a wide degree of overlap between the two.⁸⁸ The prohibition on intentionally directing attacks against civilians, which is applicable irrespective of the nature of the armed conflict, is one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law. This prohibition derives from one of the key tenets of international humanitarian law, that a distinction be made between legitimate and illegitimate

⁸⁷ For a full description of this process, see section A on the methodology of the Conflict Mapping program.

⁸⁸ See McCoubrey, H., *International Humanitarian Law: The Regulation of Armed Conflicts*, 1990, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Great Britain, pp. 1-2. Indeed, the Hague Law of 1907 and its annexed Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which have the status of customary international law, were to a large degree complemented and supplemented in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I: Roberts, A. and Guelff, R., *Documents on the Laws of War* (3rd edn.), 2000, Oxford University Press, Great Britain, p. 68.



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military targets. Accordingly, some targets will always be illegitimate, such as undefended towns and objects employed solely for the provision of humanitarian assistance, while some targets will always be legitimate, such as military installations. Additionally, some methods of attack, such as carpet bombing, and some weapons, such as indiscriminate weapons, may not be employed. A key feature underpinning international humanitarian law is the principle of proportionality, according to which the military advantage expected to be gained in any attack must be balanced against the likely incidental or collateral damage to non-military persons and objects. Therefore, in all cases where either the target, methods, or weapons are not prohibited, the military commander must apply the principle of proportionality to weigh whether or not a particular target can be attacked in a particular way using particular weapons.

Currently, the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and the two Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977,⁸⁹ form the heart of international humanitarian treaty law and are its most frequently cited sources.⁹⁰ The 1949 Geneva Conventions, much but not all of which are now considered to be customary international law, were aimed at both codifying customary international humanitarian law as it had emerged following World War II and at developing law to address the experiences of World War II.⁹¹ These four Conventions concern the treatment of:

- (I) sick and wounded combatants on land;
- (II) sick and wounded combatants at sea;
- (III) prisoners of war (POWs); and
- (IV) civilians.

The Geneva Conventions marked the first inclusion in a humanitarian law treaty of a set of war crimes explicitly attracting individual criminal responsibility – the “grave breaches” of the conventions.⁹² Each of the four Conventions contains its own list of grave breaches, expanded by Additional Protocol I of 1977. Grave breaches are crimes considered so serious that all States Parties are required to prosecute persons accused of such offences, or to hand them over to other States Parties willing to conduct such prosecutions. However, the grave breaches provisions only apply in international armed conflicts as opposed to non-international armed conflicts⁹³ and then only to acts against persons protected by each of the Geneva Conventions (“protected persons”), namely sick and wounded combatants on land and sea, POWs and civilians who find themselves in the hands of a State of which they are not nationals. The primary responsibility for enforcement of these grave breaches provisions, and indeed of international humanitarian law in general, rests with States themselves.

⁸⁹ Sierra Leone succeeded to the Geneva Conventions on 10 June 1965 and acceded to the Additional Protocols on 21 October 1986.

⁹⁰ McCoubrey, *supra*, n. 2, p. 15. Note also the Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 1925, which has the status of customary international law (Roberts and Guelff, *supra*, n. 2, p. 157) and is reflected in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)(b)(xviii).

⁹¹ Roberts and Guelff, *supra*, n. 2, pp. 195-6.

⁹² See, for example, the Fourth Geneva Convention, articles 146-7.

⁹³ See below for a discussion of this distinction.



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The BFC moved between front lines depending on the battles in preparation and ongoing military activity, while the BGC remained in the rear at headquarters. The BGC's primary function was to take care of logistics, under the orders of the BFC. The Battle Front Line Commander moved between the front lines according to logistical needs. RUF forces were divided into brigades,²⁷ battalions, companies, platoons and sections. A section was composed of 8 to 10 combatants and five sections made a platoon. A platoon was composed of 30 or more combatants and five platoons made a company. A company was composed of 100 or more combatants and five companies, plus an administrative one, made a battalion. A battalion comprised around 1,000 combatants; three battalions made one brigade.

Representatives from specific supporting units were attached at battalion level. The G-5 Unit was responsible for coordinating relations between combatants and civilians, including the collection of taxation and food contributions from civilians. G-5 was also responsible for disseminating political ideology. The Army Agricultural Unit was to take care of all farming and food production in the battalion. The S-4 Unit was responsible for the storage and distribution of food and was battalion quartermaster. The Intelligence Office Unit was responsible for monitoring all operations within the battalion and for sending intelligence reports to headquarters. The Combat Medic Unit was responsible for all medical affairs and the health for everybody in the battalion. The G-4 Unit took care of all arms and ammunitions. Armoury was a sub-unit and was responsible for the maintenance of all arms. The Logistics and Motor Pool was responsible for the maintenance of all mechanical and vehicular equipment in the battalion. The Signal Unit was responsible for internal and external communications. The Military Police (MP) Unit was responsible for disciplinary actions and, therefore, for the maintenance and enforcement of law and order. Military Police (MP) also escorted prisoners and were attached to brigades, battalions and companies. The Internal Defence Unit was responsible for all necessary investigations in the battalion and also served as a link between the G-5 and other operational units.

When they entered Sierra Leone in 1991, the RUF established a headquarters in Pendembu (Kailahun District), where they remained until 1993 when SLA forces retook the town. From 1994 until they joined the AFRC in Freetown, the RUF leader was not settled in one place but was generally mobile.²⁸ When the RUF joined with the AFRC in Freetown, the high command established headquarters in Freetown in the Defence Headquarter at Cockerill. Following the retreat from Freetown in February 1998, a War Office was opened in Buedu (Kailahun District, on the border with Liberia). This was the administrative headquarter, the permanent radio base and the

²⁷ Growing rapidly after the first attack in March 1991, the RUF had one and a half brigades. Following the retreat from Freetown in 1998, the RUF had three brigades, one in Kailahun District, one in Kono District and one in Bombali District.

²⁸ During this period, it is not completely clear whether the RUF retained a headquarters as such and if it existed, where it was located.



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base for one of the most senior RUF officers. Important meetings involving the senior RUF command took place in Buedu until disarmament in 2001. The RUF defensive headquarter was moved as RUF forces captured towns, but remained in Makeni (Bombali District) from 1999. As the RUF's positions stabilised following the general retreat from Freetown in 1999, the territory under their control was subdivided further and a number of brigade headquarters were established.

The appointments of the most senior officers within the movement were approved personally by the RUF leader. Some appointments were approved by the Liberian President, in particular when the RUF leader was in custody in Nigeria in 1997 and then Sierra Leone in 1998. When the RUF leader was again arrested after the 8 May 2000 events,²⁹ the then Battle Field Commander was made Interim Leader and would take instructions directly from the Liberian President.

The RUF set up a disciplinary system to deal with offences committed by its members. When an RUF member committed an offence, he or she was sent to the Military Police (MP), which would obtain a statement and issue a report. When the offence reached a certain level of severity, the MP had to refer the matter to the General Staff Officer Class One (GSO1),³⁰ who in turned would convene a Board of Investigation. The report of the Board of Investigation would then be sent to the RUF leader or the most senior RUF officer,³¹ who would be responsible for taking appropriate measures, including recommending that a court martial be conducted. For minor offences, local commanders were vested with certain powers to conduct investigations and administer punishment in line with the gravity of the offences committed. Most of the time, commanders settled cases at the front line without going through the proper channels. The senior officers in charge of the RUF were allegedly aware of this conduct, but did not intervene to deter it. During the 11-year conflict, very few courts martial were conducted.³²

c. National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL)

The National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) emerged in the neighbouring country of Liberia in 1989. The NPFL's aim was to oust the Liberian President, who had been in power since 1980 and whose regime was accused of being corrupt and excessively tribalistic. Backed up by foreign

²⁹ On 8 May 2000, a crowd gathered outside the Freetown residence of the RUF leader to protest the resumption of hostilities in Sierra Leone and the taking hostage of UN peacekeepers by RUF forces. RUF bodyguards fired on the crowd, killing around 20. The RUF leader was detained by the Sierra Leone Police on 17 May and was subsequently held in custody.

³⁰ As an example of the structuring of the RUF, the functions given to the GSO1 were as follows: to maintain an ongoing roadmap or prepare a yearly forecast of events concerning general training, including bush camps, recreational sports, ceremonial parades and the planning and implementation of training courses; maintenance of a list of all courses to be undertaken by RUF members throughout the year; to maintain a manifest of the seniority of officers and senior NCO's in the RUF for promotions; appointments and reversions; to request course bids based on existing vacancies for various courses stating educational qualifications required; to be in charge of general discipline; and to post officers.

³¹ Depending on the period, it was sent to the RUF leader, to the Battle Field Commander, or to the officer who later became the Interim Leader.

³² For example, a Board of Investigation was seized of a case involving a senior RUF officer who allegedly diverted some Guinean currency and failed to give it to the movement. The Board investigated some of the most senior RUF officers.



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countries, the NPFL movement rapidly expanded its actions across the country towards Monrovia, the capital. In August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent to Monrovia a peacekeeping force known as the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG established a rear base near Freetown's International Airport in Lungi. In September 1990, the President was arrested, tortured, killed and his body paraded through Monrovia by an NPFL splinter group called the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). An Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was formed in November 1990. Despite a reconciliation accord signed in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, between the President of the IGNU and the NPFL leader in October 1991, fighting continued in Liberia. In March 1991, the NPFL assisted the RUF in launching its "revolution"³³ in Sierra Leone. NPFL members started fighting alongside the small RUF force. The strength and involvement of NPFL forces in Sierra Leone would decline over the subsequent years owing to the emergence of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), a counter-revolutionary force comprised of supporters of the late President. The NPFL's physical withdrawal from Sierra Leone did not, however, lead to the withdrawal of the NPFL's active support for the RUF.

In March 1994, pursuant to the Cotonou Agreement signed in July 1993 between the NPFL, ULIMO and the Interim Government of National Unity, a tripartite Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG), headed by a five-seat Council of State replaced the IGNU. The three signatories each obtained one seat in the Council of State. Hostilities continued in Liberia and a splinter group of the NPFL, the NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC) emerged and formed a coalition with the ULIMO-J. Following a new peace agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria in August 1995, a new six seat Council of State was established, and the coalition obtained a seat in the Council.³⁴ Pursuant to a peace accord signed between the same fighting factions in August 1996 – referred to as Abuja II – disarmament started and in February 1997, the various groups were disbanded. In July 1997, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held in Liberia; the NPFL leader was elected President of Liberia, his National Patriotic Party also winning a majority of seats in the National Assembly.

d. United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO)

The United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), mainly composed of former members of the Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) and other refugees who had found refuge in Sierra Leone and who were supporters of the late Liberian President, emerged in 1991 as an opposing force to the NPFL. In September 1991, ULIMO forces attacked NPFL forces in the west of Liberia, using Sierra Leonean territory as a staging point. ULIMO rapidly started fighting alongside the SLA to push the combined RUF/NPFL assault back into Liberia.

Over the subsequent years, the existence of this fighting force would be punctuated by rivalries between two personalities, leading to various splits and reunifications. In May 1992, the ULIMO Chairman was removed and the movement was split between two potential leaders, one of whom was accused of using ULIMO to wage a holy war while the other was accused of financial

³³ This is how the RUF referred to its actions in Sierra Leone. The RUF would further consider itself a government, referring to property stolen from civilians by RUF members as "government property".

³⁴ For a full text of these peace agreements, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/pa_liberia.html.



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impropriety and hijacking the movement for political ends. Nevertheless, between August and December 1992, ULIMO reunified and resumed fighting with the NPFL. Following this, two branches of ULIMO clearly appeared: a Freetown-based branch, fighting alongside the SLA in Sierra Leone, and a branch based solely in Liberia.

A reunification congress between the two branches in October 1993 and a selection of joint communiqués issued in early 1994, some at the initiative of the Sierra Leonean NPRC Chairman, did not prevent the two branches from fighting. One of the main points of disagreement was the participation of the ULIMO Liberian branch in the Cotonou peace process for Liberia in July 1993.³⁵ In June 1994, the violence committed against civilians by ULIMO fighting alongside the SLA led a delegation of Sierra Leonean Chiefs to call for the withdrawal of ULIMO from Sierra Leone and also resulted into the disarmament of some members of the Freetown-based branch by the SLA.³⁶

In 1994, the two branches were clearly identified by two different acronyms: ULIMO-J (Freetown) and ULIMO-K (Liberia); the letters “J” and “K” referred to the names of the respective branch leaders. From the end of 1994 until 1996, ULIMO forces as such were not active within Sierra Leonean territory. In May 1995, demobilised ULIMO-J members based in Freetown were remobilised by Executive Outcomes, a private military company hired by the Government of Sierra Leone. The Special Task Force, as the ULIMO-J/Executive Outcomes force became known, assisted the SLA in driving back the RUF from the Western Area. The Special Task Force continued to operate under the umbrella of the SLA and Executive Outcomes in Bonthe District and briefly in Bo Town in late 1995 and 1996.

The ULIMO-J branch was formally included in the peace process in Liberia in August 1995. By signing the Abuja Agreement,³⁷ the parties agreed to form a six-seat Council of State to exercise executive power in Liberia. The leader of the ULIMO-K branch represented ULIMO in the Council of State while the NPFL-CRC/ULIMO-J coalition received one seat and the ULIMO-J wing gained ministerial positions.³⁸ However, factional fighting resumed and ULIMO-K and the NPFL collaborated to capture the leader of the ULIMO-J, who they accused of murder. This fighting culminated in the widespread destruction in Monrovia, the capital, in April 1996.

Peace negotiations resumed and resulted in the signing of a supplement to the Abuja Accord, referred to as Abuja II, which would be the first step towards the end of the conflict in Liberia. This provided for the representation of both ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J in the Council of State. ULIMO was officially disbanded in early 1997, pursuant to the Abuja II Agreement. Nevertheless, ULIMO resurfaced in Sierra Leone in 1997 and 1998 when some former members joined the Kamajors and others fought alongside the RUF/AFRC.

³⁵ This accord was signed by the NPFL, ULIMO and the Interim Government of National Unity in Cotonou, Benin; the ULIMO leader of the Liberian Branch appeared in the agreement as the leader of the ULIMO. No mention of different branches was made.

³⁶ Those disarmed ULIMO members were encamped at Waterloo refuge camp in the Western Area.

³⁷ This supplemented the previous Akosombo, Cotonou and Accra Agreements.

³⁸ For a full text of the Agreement, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/pa_liberia.html.



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e. **Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)**

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'état and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released over 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison, including their leader, an SLA officer who had been charged with a coup attempt in 1996. The AFRC immediately suspended the Constitution of Sierra Leone and the elected President escaped to the Republic of Guinea by helicopter. In an address to the nation, the AFRC leader advanced as a justification for the coup the polarisation of the country "into regional and tribal factions",³⁹ and the lack of control of the President over the situation". Amidst international condemnation of the explosion of violence and looting that accompanied the coup, the AFRC leader was sworn in as Head of State on 17 June 1997.

Immediately after the coup, the AFRC invited the RUF to share power. On 28 May, the RUF leader – at that time in custody in Nigeria for a firearms offence – broadcast a statement over SLBS Radio, encouraging RUF solidarity with the AFRC. Part of his statement is worth quoting: "You will always get instructions from me through [the AFRC leader]. They are our brothers. Let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put the situation under control, especially in the Western Area. As you [sic] the field commander, instruct your other Commander ... to stand by for any reinforcement needed by [the AFRC leader] for any eventualities. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately."⁴⁰ On 30 May, the RUF declared their support for the AFRC on SLBS television and radio and on 1 June, the AFRC declared the RUF leader to be the Deputy Head of State of Sierra Leone. The RUF/AFRC Cabinet hierarchy was as follows: Chairman and Head of State, Vice Chairman and Deputy Head of State, Chief Secretary of State, Secretaries of State and Public Liaison Officers. In June 1997, the RUF/AFRC created a 17-member supervisory team to prevent the apparatus of civilian government from grinding to a halt following lengthy strikes by public sector workers.⁴¹

Immediately after the coup and throughout 1997, the RUF/AFRC found itself in an escalating military standoff with Nigerian forces stationed in Freetown and Lungi. ECOWAS established a Committee mandated to negotiate with the RUF/AFRC regime. On 29 August 1997, at its 20th Annual Summit, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone, effective throughout all ECOWAS member States.⁴² The ECOWAS embargo included military hardware, supplies and spare parts, petroleum and petrol-derived products; an export ban was also imposed. A travel ban was imposed on AFRC members and their families, in addition to a freeze on their assets. Moreover, ECOWAS formally expanded the mandate of ECOMOG to include the use of force to impose sanctions

³⁹ The President of Sierra Leone had appointed the leader of the Kamajors, a pro-government local militia, as the Deputy Defence Minister in 1996.

⁴⁰ BBC Media Monitoring, 30 May 1997 transcribing SLBS, 28 May 1997.

⁴¹ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 24 - 30 June 1997.

⁴² Decision on sanctions against the junta in Sierra Leone, Twentieth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29 August 1997.



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against Sierra Leone.⁴³ Effectively, this gave legal backing to a complete navel blockade of the Port of Freetown and the prohibition of air-freight traffic. On 8 October, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1132 (1997), imposing a range of global arms, oil and travel sanctions on Sierra Leone.⁴⁴ During peace talks in Conakry, Guinea, on 22 and 23 October 1997, the ECOWAS Committee of Five⁴⁵ and representatives of the RUF/AFRC agreed to an immediate ceasefire and a six-month peace plan guaranteeing a return to civilian government by 22 April 1998.

Following RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG positions and other breaches of the Conakry Peace Plan, ECOMOG intervened militarily. Starting on 6 February 1998, ECOMOG drove the RUF/AFRC regime from power and its forces from the Western Area. Ousted from Freetown, the RUF/AFRC alliance survived but the balance of power between the allies was inverted. The situation of the AFRC members was varied: most fled from Freetown into the Provinces with their leader, others surrendered to ECOMOG forces and many of the senior officers were charged with treason, convicted and executed in 1998.⁴⁶

Following the RUF/AFRC invasion of Freetown in January 1999, most of the AFRC forces withdrew to Makeni (Bombali District) and the rift between RUF and AFRC forces deepened. The AFRC leader did not take part in the peace negotiations in Lomé, Togo that concluded with the signing of a Peace Agreement between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone.⁴⁷

While provisions in the Lomé Peace Agreement granted the RUF leader status equivalent to Vice President, the AFRC leader was appointed as Chairman of a governmental body called the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace. Following serious infighting between RUF and AFRC forces in the Northern Province in October 1999, the rift between the two groups further deepened. Both forces controlled different areas of the country. Nevertheless, the alliance between the leadership of the two forces was still valid. The two leaders issued joint statements and continued to

⁴³ *Ibid.* "Article 7. The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision."

⁴⁴ On 29 August 1997, ECOWAS had issued a recommendation on the application of sanctions against the AFRC regime: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 23 August - 1 September 1997.

⁴⁵ Initially, ECOWAS established the Committee of Four. In August 1997, a fifth nation, Liberia, was added to the Committee of Four, which became known as the Committee of Five.

⁴⁶ ECOMOG forces, SSD and even civilians arrested many alleged members and collaborators of the AFRC regime and brought them to Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, where – despite only having the capacity for 400 – the number of inmates rose to between 3,000 and 5,000. Following the reinstatement to power of the President, civilians and military personnel were tried on treason grounds and on 19 October, 24 ex-members of the SLA who had joined the SLA were executed by firing squad.

⁴⁷ AFRC members alleged that their former leader was detained by the RUF second-in-command in Kailahun District: BBC Online News, 7 August 1999.



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appear together publicly.⁴⁸ The AFRC leader visited RUF/AFRC strongholds in an attempt to engage AFRC commanders in the disarmament program.⁴⁹

When RUF forces disarmed and held hostage of UNAMSIL peacekeepers in early May 2000, the AFRC leader called on his forces to support the Government and halt the RUF advance on Freetown. In May and June 2000, AFRC forces fought the RUF alongside the SLA in Masiaka and Lunsar. The AFRC leader's declaration marked a public shift in relations between the AFRC and the RUF, compounding the division of operational areas that happened in late 1999. AFRC forces were remained active on the ground in only two principal locations.

f. The West Side Boys

Between October 1998 and the end of 2000, the West Side Boys, a splinter group from the RUF/AFRC alliance, concentrated its actions in the Okra Hills (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District). While it is not possible to say the West Side Boys did not fall under the command of the RUF/AFRC, their actions followed a clear pattern that was different from the RUF/AFRC and later RUF actions in Port Loko District. Although the group considered the AFRC leader to be their figurehead – the absence of the AFRC leader in Lomé and their belief that their interests had been inadequately represented⁵⁰ was the origin of the West Side Boys taking UNOMSIL, ECOMOG and NGO officials hostage in 1999 – the AFRC leader publicly dissociated himself from the group and officially disbanded the AFRC in mid-August 2000. The West Side Boys, primarily ex-SLA who aligned with the RUF/AFRC, achieved international notoriety by kidnapping 11 UK Royal Marines in late August and provoking a decisive military response from the UK that would all but destroy the West Side Boys.

g. Civil Defence Force (CDF)

As RUF/NPFL forces expanded activities the Southern and Eastern Provinces, numerous civilian initiatives emerged between 1991 and 1993 to assist the SLA. Across the Districts, NPRC and SLA authorities, traditional structures and popular personalities⁵¹ supported the foundation of civilian security schemes. This led to the creation of a number of vigilante groups sometimes known as Civil Defence Units (CDU), whose main role was to operate checkpoints. The traditional authorities selected civilians, usually experienced hunters and well-known community people, to join these CDUs. This quality control system guaranteed that Paramount Chiefs could exercise a degree of actual and moral authority over the CDUs. In addition, the mobilisation of tribal-based hunting societies was actively encouraged and supported by the NPRC authorities. Various State agencies were involved in administering the general mobilisation of various hunting societies, which included

⁴⁸ The RUF leader announced that the RUF/AFRC alliance was transformed into a political organisation called the Alliance for Peace. UN OCHA, 30 September 1999. In early November, the two leaders issued a joint statement guaranteeing the safety of humanitarian staff and resources even in times of insecurity. IRIN West Africa, 4 November 1999.

⁴⁹ IRIN West Africa, 18 November 1999 and 6 December 1999.

⁵⁰ They also believed that their leader was held hostage by a senior RUF commander in Kailahun District: IRIN West Africa, 12 August 1999.

⁵¹ In Kenema and Kailahun Districts, for example, a renowned local personality who was a former professor played the role of a catalyst in the regrouping of the Kamajors group.



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the “Donsos” in Kono District, the “Tamaboros” in Koinadugu District and the “Kamajors” in the Eastern and Southern Provinces. Affiliates of the Kamajor Society were the largest in number of these societies.

These local militia used their intimate knowledge of their immediate localities to assist the SLA in fighting the RUF/NPFL. Both the civil militia and CDUs were given bladed weapons and rustic single-barrel shotguns and deployed alongside the SLA during combat against RUF forces. As the conflict expanded westwards across the country, similar initiatives emerged in Moyamba and Tonkolili Districts. Traditional hunters known as “Kapras” and “Gbethis” regrouped in the Northern Province.

The organisation of local militias entered a new phase in 1995, when initiation of civilians into the Kamajor Society began in Bonthe District (Southern Province). Hidden behind a veil of secrecy, Kamajor initiation ceremonies revolve around an assortment of mystical beliefs and charms performed by a High Priest Initiator.⁵² The purpose of the ceremony was to render initiates fit to serve at the war front, through the granting of special powers such as the ability to be “bulletproof” and being able to smell enemies. Initiators of the Gbethi Society called this process “washing”. Once initiated, Kamajors had to adhere to the rules of the Kamajor Society, which governed the conduct of the members. Infractions of the rules were believed to deprive Kamajors of the powers they had been granted at the time of initiation. In the early stages of this process, hunters and youths were nominated for initiation by chiefdom authorities. Once initiated, Kamajors were sent back to the chiefdom from which they originated.


The number of initiates and the rate of initiation into the Kamajor Society increased rapidly throughout 1995 and 1996. Kamajor deployment alongside SLA forces steadily expanded into the other Districts of the Southern Province and into the Eastern Province. By 1996, almost every chiefdom in the Southern and Eastern Provinces had their own Kamajor Society. The initiation of men into the Kamajor Society brought with it the structuring of this local militia at a chiefdom level. Other organised pro-government militias – Gbethis, Kapras and Donsos – were active in the Northern Province and in Kono District.

The Civil Defence Force (CDF) emerged in late 1995 or early 1996 as a union of the various local militias active across the country. Members of the Kamajors were the main force within the CDF and presented strong resistance to RUF attacks throughout the Southern Province and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern Province. The role and efficiency of the CDF in fighting the RUF received formal recognition from the newly-elected President in early 1996, who appointed the then leader of the Kamajor Society as Deputy Defence Minister. This strong symbolic support was backed up with practical support when the Government of Sierra Leone provided the CDF with staple food items and gave them responsibility for providing security throughout the country. Although originally aligned with and to some extent subordinate to the SLA, the CDF progressively distanced itself from SLA forces, objecting to their action and behaviour. Rivalry and tension between the two groups erupted, frequently resulting in armed clashes.

⁵² The first Chief Initiator was an herbalist believed to have magical powers.


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On the national level, the internal organisation of the CDF was as follows:⁵³



Below battalion level, the CDF adopted a regular structure similar that of the SLA, dividing battalions into companies, platoons and sections of varying numbers. The CDF also put in place administrative structures at the chiefdom level. For example, in Dasse Chiefdom (Moyamba District), the Chiefdom Ground Commander was assisted by a Deputy Chiefdom Ground Commander, below whom was Section Commanders and then Patrol Commanders. The CDF also

⁵³ The then Deputy Defence Minister was made National Coordinator in the aftermath of the military coup in May 1997. Accordingly, although the coordination of the local militias within the CDF took place in 1995 or in early 1996, the schematised internal structure applies only for the period starting in June 1997.



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appointed civilians as Welfare Officers to liaise between civilians and CDF forces. Chiefdom commands often merged to form battalions comprising over 500 armed personnel.⁵⁴

Following the military coup in May 1997, the AFRC leader officially disbanded the CDF and asked its members to surrender and disarm to the Sierra Leone Police. The CDF command rejected this order and CDF members remained armed, initially keeping a low profile before regrouping to fight the RUF/AFRC. The scale of their military actions increased and progressively more initiates joined the various components of the CDF, in particular the Kamajors. With the increase in the rate of Kamajor initiations came a number of problems. The CDF started to lose control over the selection of initiates and there was some loss of discipline among the newly-initiated. The role of the traditional authorities in selecting initiates was, opening the door for the initiation of children below the age of 15. Increasingly, but notably in 1998, a dichotomy between new members and “old Kamajors” came to the fore.⁵⁵

Following the restoration of the elected Government, the President of Sierra Leone placed the CDF under the control of ECOMOG.⁵⁶ CDF forces were deployed in Freetown; both Kamajors and members of a group called the Organised Brotherhood of Hunting Societies (OBHS) were deployed at checkpoints throughout the Western Area and deployed alongside ECOMOG. CDF forces would be active in defending Freetown in January 1999. In September 1998, the President decided to formalise their position, stating that a Civil Defence Force with a CDF Administrator would be appointed to liaise with the SLA in every District. The District CDF would report directly to the Paramount Chiefs, thus restoring much of the authority that had been eroded during the development of the CDF.⁵⁷ However, the CDF continued to impose a progressively more insidious system of administration throughout the territory it occupied, invading many aspects of civilian life.

2. Private military companies

a. Gurkha Security Guards Limited

In January 1995, the NPRC Government entered in a three-month renewable⁵⁸ contract with the Gurkha Security Guards Limited (GSG), a British company based in the Channel Islands. Nepalese Gurkhas have long been trained and incorporated into the UK armed forces pursuant to a tripartite agreement between the governments of Nepal, India and Britain. The British Government made significant cuts to the number of Gurkhas serving in the armed forces, resulting in their increased availability to private security and military firms. GSG's contract was to train and advise the SLA in jungle warfare tactics and provide security for the SLA base at Camp Charlie, near Mile 91. GSG

⁵⁴ For example, in Bonthe District, Dema, Sittia and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms merged to form a battalion, while the CDF battalions were formed through pairing the chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim and Nongoba Bullom, Jong and Imperi, Kpanda Kemo and Bum, and Sogbini and Yawbeko. In Bo District, nine battalions were formed to cover 15 chiefdoms.

⁵⁵ In April 1998, for example, the High Priest and Chief Initiator called for registration of the Kamajors “because of growing lawlessness among them”: AFP, 29 April 1998.

⁵⁶ CDF fought alongside ECOMOG forces for the restoration to power of the Sierra Leonean President.

⁵⁷ Broadcast to the Nation on Peace and Security by the Sierra Leone President, 2 September 1998.

⁵⁸ AFP, 23 March 1995.



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controlling a valuable economic and strategic asset. ECOMOG forces created checkpoints on main roads leading to Kambia Town, but this did little to prevent the RUF/AFRC moving freely throughout the District.

Throughout 1999, the West Side Boys raided villages located on each side of the Rokel Creek in Koya and Maforki Chiefdoms (Port Loko District). Initially operating from a base in the densely forested Okra Hills inside Koya Chiefdom, the West Side Boys opened a new base on the other bank of the Rokel Creek in Maforki Chiefdom.

Except for brief "food-finding missions" carried out by RUF/AFRC units into parts of northern Moyamba District, the CDF hold over Moyamba, Bonthe, Pujehun, Bo and most of Kenema Districts, bar the mining area in the north, remained unchallenged.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement). Shortly after the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed, the main RUF/AFRC training centre at Camp Superman (Kono District) was supplanted by a new one in Gbendembu Town, north of Makeni. This was primarily to train conscripts for missions into Guinea.

After a few months, however, hostilities resumed in Bombali District, with the RUF/AFRC attacking civilians. Internal divisions within the RUF/AFRC created following the retreat from Freetown heightened, resulting in violent confrontations between the senior commanders of the combined movement as the disarmament process grew nearer. To a certain extent, the RUF and the remnants of the AFRC started controlling different parts of the country. In Kailahun District, disagreements over disarmament between the RUF leader and the most senior RUF officer resulted in the flight of the latter to Liberia.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment in late November 1999 and by 10 January, 4,500 UNAMSIL troops were present in Sierra Leone. The UNAMSIL force was initially deployed alongside ECOMOG forces and was gradually reinforced as the United Nations Security Council expanded the size of the mission.

Despite the official launching of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program by the Sierra Leonean President in Freetown on 4 November 1999 and a nationwide sensitisation tour conducted by the leaders of the RUF, the AFRC and the CDF, hostilities rapidly resumed. The CDF in Kono District engaged the RUF/AFRC forces in the north and east of the country but failed to impact upon the strongly embedded RUF/AFRC forces, who retained their positions in the north of Tonkolili District and in the areas bordering Bombali and Port Loko Districts.



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In early May 2000 and following the withdrawal of the last Nigerian ECOMOG contingent, RUF forces launched a number of attacks against UNAMSIL peacekeepers in Kambia, Port Loko, Tonkolili, Bombali and Kailahun Districts, leading to the taking of around 500 UN peacekeepers as hostages. Following the capture of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, RUF forces first advanced south-west along the main highway towards Masiaka and Songo, unsuccessfully attempting to occupy the towns. As these events unfolded, the bodyguards of the RUF leader fired on a crowd of thousands of civilians gathered around his home in Freetown, killing around 20 people. The RUF leader was later captured in Freetown and detained by the Government of Sierra Leone. RUF/AFRC forces then attacked Port Loko Town, but were repelled by UNAMSIL and SLA forces. UK armed forces arrived in Freetown to provide security for the Freetown area and, in the following months, to re-train the SLA. By the middle of July, the RUF/AFRC had released all the UNAMSIL peacekeepers it had previously captured. The SLA also staged a number of counter-attacks, attempting to retake Lunsar and using a helicopter gunship to bombard RUF/AFRC positions in and around the major towns of Makeni, Magburaka and Rokupr and other locations in the Northern Province, resulting in civilian casualties.

On 30 August, 11 UK Royal Marines were taken hostage by the West Side Boys in the Okra Hills area. Following a breakdown in negotiations, UK paratroops rescued the hostages in September 2000, practically destroying this volatile splinter group in the process.

Starting in July, the hostilities had become sporadic and in August 2000, RUF/AFRC forces surrendered to UN peacekeepers in Kabala. The disarmament process continued, although the RUF/AFRC were still engaged in mining activities, mainly in the centre of Koidu Town.

In May 2000, RUF forces in Kono District started engaging Guinean forces in the Guinean area known as "The Parrot's Beak", using the hundreds of civilians they had abducted and trained during the previous months. In early September 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Guinean towns of Pamelap and Madina Oula and carried out similar actions in the Parrot's Beak area from Kailahun District. Throughout September and October, Guinean forces also adopted a "hot pursuit" policy, in which RUF bases inside Sierra Leone along the Guinean-Sierra Leonean border were directly attacked in addition to the pursuit of RUF/AFRC forces from inside Guinea. This was manifested through intensified artillery and helicopter gunship bombardment of towns just south of the border in Sierra Leone, resulting in many civilian casualties and in the large-scale displacement of the population, mainly Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in Guinea. Guinean armed forces also moved their security checks three miles inside the territory of Sierra Leone in Bombali District and erected some checkpoints in Kailahun District. RUF/AFRC forces nevertheless continued to attack Pamelap and Guinean infantry and airborne operations against RUF/AFRC positions in Kambia District continued into 2001.

Representatives of the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone met in Abuja, Nigeria, to negotiate the reactivation of the ceasefire and peace agreement signed in Lomé in July 1999. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was signed on 10 November 2000. In December 2000, RUF forces went to Guinea to bring back Sierra Leonean refugees as a proof of their commitment to the peace process. By January 2001, thousands of Sierra Leoneans were thus brought back to the east of Kono District,

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where they were relocated by the RUF to different towns across RUF territory. Harassment, however, continued and many civilians were sent to Koidu to work in the mines.

In the first three months of 2001, RUF/AFRC forces entered into negotiations with UNAMSIL. This resulted in the opening of a number of key stretches of road leading into Kambia and Bombali Districts and the eventual deployment of UNAMSIL peacekeepers throughout those areas.

In March and April 2001, Donsos and Kamajors who had sought refuge in Guinea were armed by Guinean authorities and launched successful attacks on RUF forces in the east of Kono District, thereby opening three flanks in Kono and Kailahun Districts. They were, however, prevented from entering Koidu Town when the RUF requested the intervention of UNAMSIL to remind the CDF of the terms of the successive ceasefire agreements.

The November 2000 ceasefire was renewed in Abuja on 4 May 2001 and it was agreed that an accelerated disarmament should be carried out on a District-based level. To this end, disarmament was to take place successively and simultaneously in two Districts. The DDR program started in Kambia and Port Loko Districts, where in May 2001, reception centres were opened. In Port Loko District, the DDR process was accompanied by sporadic looting of civilian settlements by demobilised members of all factions. The stealing of corrugated zinc roofing material from houses was commonplace. Nevertheless, disarmament continued across the country throughout 2001; the last two Districts to be disarmed were Kailahun and Kenema. Mining activities would continue in Kono District until the last days of the disarmament.

Following disarmament and demobilisation of members of all the different fighting factions, the Sierra Leonean President declared that the war was over and held a symbolic "Arms Burning Ceremony" at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District) on 18 January 2002.



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
Chapter Three: Overview of Armed Forces Involved in the Sierra Leone Conflict

1. Fighting factions

a. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF)

The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) is commonly known and referred to as the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). When RUF/NPFL forces commenced military operations in the south and east of Sierra Leone in March 1991, the SLA was under-staffed, under-equipped and often poorly trained. The SLA had three battalions deployed in the Eastern and Southern Provinces.

Until 2002, when the Government of Sierra Leone embarked on significant military reforms, the senior hierarchy of the SLA was as follows:



Army Branch forces below Army Chief of Staff were and are divided into brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and sections, with a conventional officer and non-commissioned officer ranking hierarchy. In addition to barracks in provincial Sierra Leone, the SLA has a number of major installations in the Western Area, including the Defence Headquarters at Cockerill and the Armed Forces Training Centre near Waterloo.

From the beginning of the war in 1991, the SLA did not engage RUF forces unaccompanied. In addition to ad-hoc civilian security initiatives and local militias, including those evolved from traditional hunting societies throughout Sierra Leone, the SLA fought alongside foreign forces primarily from other West African countries at different times throughout the conflict. This foreign involvement was also expressed through the provision of logistics, resources, military training and guidance to the SLA. As the war progressed, the SLA collaborated with a Liberian fighting force engaged in the Liberian conflict called ULIMO and a selection of international private military companies, including the Gurkha Security Guards and Executive Outcomes. In 1992, a contingent of the SLA made up part of the ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Liberia.

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On two occasions during the 11-year conflict, in 1992 and in 1997, members of the SLA overthrew the Government of Sierra Leone, establishing military regimes in its place. The two juntas were very different in nature. On 29 April 1992, junior officers of the SLA came to Freetown to complain about the desperate situation on the war front. They successfully staged a coup, ousting the then President and the All People's Congress (APC) establishment. They created the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), swearing in 25 year-old Captain Strasser as Head of State. Shortly after the coup, SLA members looted civilian property in major centres, particularly in Freetown and the Western Area. In December 1992, SLA members suspected of having planned a coup were convicted of treason and executed, resulting in international condemnation of the NPRC. The NPRC engaged in an extensive recruitment drive, more than doubling the number of infantry available to the SLA by 1994. New recruits received only summary military training before being sent to the front lines and were unable to contain the RUF advance across the country, despite initial successes in 1993.

The swelling of the SLA ranks was accompanied by some breakdowns in discipline, compounding many of the problems already caused by the dramatic subversion of the traditional military hierarchy by junior officers. SLA attacks against civilians, including theft and summary executions of suspected RUF "collaborators" and the SLA's inability to protect civilians from RUF attacks led to a profound deterioration in civil-military relations. Many called the SLA "So-bels", or "Soldier-Rebels", noting that in some cases there was little to distinguish the two. The NPRC regime came to an end with the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in February and March 1996, during which the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was elected President of Sierra Leone.

Just over a year later, on 25 May 1997, SLA officers staged a military coup, ousting the Sierra Leonean President and establishing a military regime called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The elected Government moved into Guinea. Unlike the NPRC, the AFRC chose not to fight the RUF; rather, the AFRC Chairman — Johnny Paul Koroma — called upon the RUF leadership to join the AFRC regime, which they promptly did. The majority of the SLA aligned with the AFRC, but some "loyal SLA" retained an allegiance to the elected Government. As the coup was driven by non-commissioned officers, most of the senior SLA officers who did not want to take part in the new regime went into hiding, chased by AFRC members. This military regime was ousted from power in February 1998 by an ECOMOG military intervention.

The situation of the SLA became a priority for the Sierra Leonean President after his reinstatement on 10 March 1998. During a presidential address delivered on 22 May 1998, President Kabbah revealed he had appointed the former ECOMOG Task Force Commander as Chief of Defence Staff to "use his wide experience in helping [Sierra Leone] to develop guidelines for putting together a new army."¹⁵ Two months later, the disbanding of the "unpatriotic Army" was announced.¹⁶ The

¹⁵ Presidential address delivered on the occasion of the State Opening of the Second Session of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone, 22 May 1998: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/kabbah052298.html>.

¹⁶ Statement of the Sierra Leonean President at the Special United Nations Conference on Sierra Leone held at the United Nations, New York, 30 July 1998.



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framework of the new army, composed of 5,000 members was announced to Sierra Leoneans in early September.¹⁷ Newly trained SLA members began fighting alongside ECOMOG forces. Earlier in the year, former SLA members were hastily retrained by ECOMOG forces and absorbed into the ECOMOG force structure to help fight the retreating RUF/AFRC forces in the Provinces.¹⁸

In the middle of 2000 and at the request of the Sierra Leonean Government; the United Kingdom started providing assistance in the “national restructuring exercise” of the SLA by providing advice and training.¹⁹ UK forces carried out a series of six-week basic training courses for around eight battalions of the SLA.²⁰ The 180-strong team began arriving in Freetown on 10 June 2000,²¹ dovetailing with the withdrawal of the Royal Marines after 15 June 2000.²² On 24 July, nearly 1,000 SLA members graduated from the UK-run training course,²³ the first group of a total of around 8,000 who would eventually be trained this way. SLA forces again began to participate in combat actions against the RUF/AFRC in mid 2000.

Following the initial rounds of UK short-term training programs, a UK-led long-term International Military and Training Team (IMATT) was established to push a wider process of military reform. In 2002, the SLA was renamed Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) and the separate army, navy, and air force command structures were restructured.²⁴

b. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) commenced attacks inside Sierra Leone on 23 March 1991, at which time little information about the RUF was available to the public. The RUF finds its origins in a movement to overthrow the regime of the All People’s Congress (APC). In an internal RUF document written in the early stage of the conflict and entitled “Reasons Why We Took Up Arms to Fight”, it is stated that, “We are fighting against corruption, because the past and present government seized political, economic and social justice in this country”.²⁵ In 1991, the RUF was composed of around 230 members. These included former Fourah Bay College students, political opponents of the APC, former members of the SLA and other public figures that considered themselves victims of the APC regime. The majority were trained in Liberia at Camp Namma,

¹⁷ See point 10 of the Broadcast to the Nation on Peace and Security by the Sierra Leonean President.

¹⁸ The ECOMOG 128th Infantry Battalion was created to remedy the ECOMOG personnel shortage in their “mopping up operations” in the province and was mainly composed of former SLA members: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., pp. 66-7.

¹⁹ Address by the Sierra Leone President at the Pass Off Ceremony for the First 1000 Military Personnel, under the UK Short-term Training Program, Benguema Training Centre, 22 July 2000:

²⁰ The UK Military handed over to the UK-led International Military and Advisory Training Team (IMATT) in September 2001.

²¹ BBC Online News, 10 June 2000 (19:28 GMT 20:28 UK).

²² IRIN West Africa, 14 June 2000.

²³ IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2000.

²⁴ IRIN West Africa, 22 January 2002. See also the speech of the Sierra Leone President at the Opening of the New Defence Ministry Building, Tower Hill, Freetown, 21 January 2002.

²⁵ See also the RUF’s manifesto, *The Footpaths to Democracy, Towards a new Sierra Leone*. For a full text of this manifesto, see <http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html#RUF>.



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
although eight of the original members – referred to as “vanguards” –were trained in warfare and the “ideology”²⁶ in Libya. RUF numbers swelled rapidly following their entry into Sierra Leone.

At first, many civilians joined the RUF voluntarily, seeing it as a solution to corruption and poverty. Nevertheless, the RUF commenced abducting and conscripting civilians shortly after, a practice that continued throughout the conflict. The RUF conscripted thousands of Sierra Leoneans of all ages and of both sexes to be trained as fighters at large training bases. These were opened from time to time depending on the state of the RUF advance, on the number of new conscripts and recruits and on the logistic support available. While one senior RUF officer was responsible for the opening of bases and the provision of training, this did not stop other, smaller training bases from being opened under localised commands. When the RUF needed “manpower” for planned actions, RUF members known as “Safari Teams” were sent to the villages to bring back civilians in accordance with pre-agreed figures. Children under the age of 15 were abducted, conscripted and trained to operate as Small Boy Units (SBU) and Small Girl Units (SGU). Adults were organised into platoons and trained. Instructors in the training bases were responsible for providing training on drill, military tactics, weapons and ideology, among other things.

The NPFL clearly supported and even controlled, to an extent, RUF operations in Sierra Leone. NPFL members fought alongside RUF forces and the NPFL provided logistical support to the RUF as a whole. When they first entered Sierra Leone and during the early stage of the conflict, NPFL members, who not only outnumbered the RUF but also held most of the commanding positions, dominated the RUF forces. Although the NPFL withdrew from Sierra Leone in 1993, links with the NPFL and its leader were never severed completely.

Following the SLA coup in May 1997, the AFRC invited the RUF to join the regime. RUF forces joined with and strengthened AFRC positions throughout areas of Sierra Leone that the SLA had previously controlled. RUF members held ministerial positions in the Council of the AFRC and the movement re-branded itself the “Peoples’ Army”.

From the beginning of the movement, the RUF, who leader was a retired signals corporal from the SLA, adopted a military-style internal organisation and disciplinary system, with clearly identified positions and tasks allocated to its members:



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In March 1998, RUF/AFRC activities resumed in TMS Chiefdom, although the three sections were concerned at different times: Tinkatupa and Safroko Sections as early as April and May and Makama Section in December. Tinkatupa Section is sandwiched between Safroko Section to the north and Makama Section to the south. In early March, Gbethis (CDF) deployed at Masangban, Rogbanneh, Romamboi and Robaka, all in Tinkatupa Section. Shortly after their arrival, Gbethi members started harassing civilians for contributions of money and food. It is also reported in general terms that during this period, Gbethis raped women and flogged men.

After Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) had come under the control of ECOMOG from around 1 March, RUF/AFRC forces were dispersed throughout Buya Romende Chiefdom. They settled in numerous locations including Buya, Ro-Sint Buya, Foredu, Gbonsama and Massenebe (all Buya Romende Chiefdom). At this time, RUF/AFRC activity in the chiefdom focussed on Jar-Jar operations, which involved the formation of squads dedicated to the widespread robbery of civilian property, both for subsistence and enrichment. Squads of around 150 RUF/AFRC members roved around villages in the chiefdom on a daily basis taking food and valuables, flogging people and forcing civilians to carry stolen property to RUF/AFRC camps.

Between 17 and 19 April, around 300 RUF/AFRC forces moved from a camp called "Kenema"⁵⁰¹ in Libeisayahun Chiefdom (Bombali District) to TMS Chiefdom. They established a base at Maboko in the Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), from where they raided surrounding villages between 19 April and 5 May. It is reported in general terms that during these raids, RUF/AFRC force regularly killed civilians and abducted others to carry stolen property. On 25 April, an ECOMOG platoon and an unknown number of Gbethis deployed from Lunsar to Sendugu (TMS Chiefdom), close to the RUF position at Maboko. An ECOMOG soldier on a motorbike driven by a civilian sped through Maboko and then called for air support. An ECOMOG jet bombed this location and another location in Maron (TMS Chiefdom); this second bombardment killed four civilians. Another civilian was killed during a subsequent ECOMOG air bombardment of a nearby village called Petifu. ECOMOG deployed to Maron and Sendugu but despite this, the RUF/AFRC continued to operate from Maboko.

On a Friday⁵⁰² in April 1998, a series of killings took place in the village of Rosint (Masimera Chiefdom). In the late afternoon, sporadic gunshots were heard all over the village. Three different groups of RUF/AFRC forces entered the village from different directions. The group from Masimera Town (Marampa Chiefdom) were a "Born Naked" unit, because they only wore underwear and sandals. The Mile 91 group – self-styled "Death Squad", commanded by a Liberian – were dressed in mixed civilian-military attire. The Royeben group dressed in full military fatigues.⁵⁰³

⁵⁰¹ Most likely on the road from the Batkanu/Ro-Source area. In April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces, driven by ECOMOG from Makeni and Kamakwie started targeting and occupying towns situated on the east-west road from Karina (Biriwa Chiefdom, Bombali District) to Batkanu (Lebeisayahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). Westwards movement into TMS, Dibia and Buya Romende Chiefdoms (Port Loko District) logically extends this pattern of attacks.

⁵⁰² Dating this incident at either 3, 10, 17 or 24 April 1998.

⁵⁰³ This unit may have been comprised primarily of ex-SLA.



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The groups had apparently decided to determine who stayed in Rosint by gambling on the sex of an unborn baby. Therefore, RUF/AFRC forces gathered 18 civilians under a tree close to the entrance of the village. These RUF/AFRC forces executed a pregnant woman by cutting through her lower abdomen and removing the foetus from her uterus. As the baby was female, the Royeben group withdrew from the village into the nearby bush; they had earlier gambled that the baby was a boy.

The remaining RUF/AFRC forces made preparations to amputate limbs from village residents, bringing a cutlass and an axe over to a log near the village mosque. RUF/AFRC members forced a woman to lay her hand across the log and, after a count of three, amputated her hands. RUF/AFRC personnel attacked her daughter with a machete and a female RUF/AFRC member cut her granddaughter in half. The left foot of an 8-month old baby was amputated and her mother was decapitated with a cutlass. RUF/AFRC members put the severed head on a pole near the village primary school. Another man was also decapitated with a long cutlass for being unable to provide the RUF/AFRC with five sheep. The RUF/AFRC forces punctuated the killing and amputation with song and dance. Thirteen civilians were detained overnight in a house under the threat of death.

Very early the following morning, RUF/AFRC members forced the detainees to pray at the mosque and then cook for them. The RUF/AFRC forces then resumed amputations, cutting the wrist of a woman six times before succeeding in amputating her hand, then shooting her dead after she managed to escape; they forced the other abductees to laugh loudly. Following this, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the left hand of a woman. Her nephew was held down by four RUF/AFRC members and decapitated. The woman managed to escape into the bush, arriving three days later at Mabesseneh Hospital in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) where she received emergency treatment. Staff at the hospital reported that at least seven others from Masimera Chiefdom had arrived in Lunsar with amputated limbs.

In March or April 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Makaytay (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC commander announced his intention to establish a permanent base in their chiefdom. RUF/AFRC members used a sharp knife to amputate the left ear of a pregnant woman, before sending her to Sendugu. Residents of Gbaneloko (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) gave her assistance in getting to the Sendugu Health Centre, where she related her story to residents. In mid March, RUF/AFRC forces entered Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), firing machine guns for around two hours. A large number of civilians were abducted; one of the captives, a pregnant woman, was killed later on the roadside. Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom), a few miles south of Sendugu, subsequently came under attack by the RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces deployed in Dibia Chiefdom retreated to Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom), on the road between Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) and Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom). Many civilians displaced due to the RUF/AFRC attack on Sendugu fled to Kabantama. ECOMOG advanced on Gbinti a week later, following reinforcements arriving from Port Loko Town.

Between 3 and 5 May, RUF/AFRC forces resumed activity in TMS Chiefdom, killing the Regent Chief of Makasi (TMS Chiefdom) by machete blows to the head and an elder of the village. Around 12 houses were also burned during the attack. At Rogbanthi and Ro-Gberray (both Maforki Chiefdom), houses were burnt and people were abducted. At Masengeh, where many civilians had

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sought safety from RUF/AFRC attacks in the area, two civilians were killed and all 30 houses in the village were burnt down. ECOMOG strengthened their Maboko position in Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom), with a 50-strong unit remaining in place until October 1998. During this period, members of ECOMOG killed a well-respected elder, frequently beat and harassed civilians and killed and ate their livestock and other food. Additionally, ECOMOG forces raped at least three women while in Maron (TMS Chiefdom). In October, ECOMOG were replaced by around 30 ECOMOG-trained Gbethis (CDF) from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). These forces remained in Maron until February 1999. During this period, Gbethis decapitated a businessman suspected of being an RUF/AFRC spy, dancing the severed head around the village, harassed civilians and confiscated their livestock.

Around 400 heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces with six vehicles moved from the Lunsar area between 17 and 18 May, engaging engaged Gbethis (CDF) stationed in Robaka (TMS Chiefdom). The Gbethis were driven from the town and sustained heavy casualties, including three deaths. RUF/AFRC forces burned 13 houses during the attack. From Robaka, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masangban, Futa and Gbanah (all TMS Chiefdom), burning over 60 houses in total. Throughout June, RUF/AFRC forces carried out food-finding missions to the villages of Masu, Gbonah, Gbanneh, Kalangba and Rosent (all TMS Chiefdom).

On 4 June 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masimera village (Marampa Chiefdom), killing four civilians and burning down 300 residences; an unknown number of civilians drowned fleeing the RUF/AFRC attack.⁵¹⁴ Beginning in August 1998, rumours of imminent RUF/AFRC attacks spread throughout Maforki Chiefdom. Seven vehicles were stolen during RUF/AFRC ambushes on the highway between Rokel Bridge and Port Loko Town.

RUF/AFRC forces established a temporary base at Kathente (BKM Chiefdom) in late August or early September 1998, from which they used canoes to cross Little Scaries River and raid many surrounding and nearby villages. During this period, Konika (BKM Chiefdom) was attacked and at least two civilians were killed. RUF/AFRC forces killed one civilian with a bladed weapon and amputated the forelimbs from a young mother. At Small Kambia village (BKM Chiefdom), the RUF/AFRC forces burnt down an unknown number of houses but no deaths were reported.

Very early on 6 September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kagbantama (Kasseh Section, BKM Chiefdom), likely attacking from a temporary base in Kathente, rather than from their established base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom), or Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces entered the village and mounted a heavy machine gun high up in a tree at the entrance the village. RUF/AFRC forces cut the throats of three young men, killing them. They stripped the zinc roofing from six houses, put bullet holes in other roofing and burned down a further 18 houses. Medical supplies and a large power generator were stolen from the hospital. Leaving Kagbantama, RUF/AFRC forces headed to their permanent base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom). En route, they burnt and stole from civilian residences in the villages of Ma-Umaro, Marenka, Mayisna, Mahera and

⁵¹⁴ AFP, 4 June 1998.



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Tasso (all BKM Chiefdom). At this time, Gbethis (CDF) were not deployed in the Kasseh Section of BKM Chiefdom, although they were deployed to Kagbantama following the 6 September attack.

A 150-strong RUF/AFRC group attacked ECOMOG between 28 and 30 September at the key Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforiki Chiefdom), killing 16 civilians and leaving over 30 wounded. ECOMOG forces suffered four fatalities and 16 wounded, forcing their retreat to Port Loko Town on 2 October. Following ECOMOG's retreat, the highway was closed to civilian traffic, severely restricting the movement and livelihoods of inhabitants of Maforiki Chiefdom, by cutting off the main overland route from Port Loko Town both to Freetown and inland. In the months of November and December 1998, several attacks were launched on villages in Maforiki Chiefdom. For example, in November 1998, at Ro-Gbesseh, a village hosting displaced persons, over 20 men were abducted, people were killed and some houses were burnt. At Ro-Gberray Junction in early December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces looked for able-bodied men to join their movement, capturing over 10 men for this purpose. Also in December 1998, an unknown number of civilian corpses were found in Makokbo, Ma-Purseh, Ma-Barrkay and Ro-Gbil (all Maforiki Chiefdom).

During the last three months of 1998, RUF/AFRC forces using the Kambia-Port Loko route through Mange in BKM Chiefdom moved in the direction of TMS Chiefdom, burning down villages along that route (located mainly in Maforiki Chiefdom). RUF/AFRC forces put continuous pressure on the Mange Bridge. Gradually, RUF/AFRC forces moved to cut off and encircle Port Loko Town in preparation for the large-scale assault on the town that would occur on 28 December 1998. Aside from Mayoyisor, which was burnt to the ground, many villages including Rogbonko, Kabatha, Malal, Konta, Kalie and Mathineh were also attacked. At Mathineh, an unknown number of civilians were locked in a house, which was then set on fire. RUF/AFRC forces reached TMS Chiefdom in late November and set fire to villages, including Maramba and Robot, where all the houses except the mosque were burnt down.

Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom) and its main and strategic town, Mange, were attacked for the second time in October 1998. Between 7 and 11 October, CDF and RUF/AFRC forces fought for control of the long road bridge over the Little Scaries River at Mange,⁵⁰⁵ the CDF eventually took control. After this attack, RUF/AFRC forces spread to most of the villages in Bureh Section. "Loyal"⁵⁰⁶ SLA forces and the CDF,⁵⁰⁷ including Kamajors, were also deployed in Bureh Section. However, the combined RUF/AFRC forces eventually took control of the town of Mange, burnt some houses, took property and abducted young men and women. They also opened a recruitment centre for abductees and sent other abductees to Kambia Town (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District), which at this time was a major RUF/AFRC headquarters. People were also tortured and some civilians had their limbs amputated. RUF/AFRC forces then spread out to other villages in Bureh Section and began occupying villages in Makonteh Section. In November 1998, RUF/AFRC forces executed a group of CDF and threw their bodies into the river. At this time, Mange Hospital, which was receiving medicine from a Red Cross Helicopter, was used to treat wounded RUF/AFRC

⁵⁰⁵ 11 October 1998, BBC Online News.

⁵⁰⁶ That is, those members of the SLA who had not joined the AFRC but remained under the command of the elected President.

⁵⁰⁷ The CDF 14th Battalion. Detail only from All Africa News, 9 December 1998, "No Rebels at Gberay Bridge".



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forces. SLA forces made several attempts to dislodge the fighters from Mange but were unable to cross the strategic bridge across Little Scaries River.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Masimera Town (Marampa Chiefdom) in early December 1998. During this attack, many school children were abducted, women were raped and people were mutilated and killed. One group of armed men, dressed in military fatigue, pretended to be Government soldiers coming to protect Masimera Town and came to Royeben village, where they asked for men to assist them. Ten men were provided and all of them left for Masimera, where they arrived late at night. The civilians were then ordered to return back home to their village, but were captured by a second group dressed similarly to the group that had come to Royeben. All of the civilians but one escaped and the group went to Masimera; on their arrival, the whole town was in flames. The next day, two people were killed with cutlasses for refusing to chase a fowl. Other villages around Masimera Town were burnt down, including Mapelise and Rosent. Four people were killed with cutlasses, among them a woman who had previously been raped many times by numerous members of the RUF/AFRC.

RUF/AFRC forces again moved on Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) throughout late November and December 1998. During the first attack, on 27 November 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces passed through Foredugu at night and attacked the town, but were repelled by ECOMOG forces. On their way back to Foredugu and Robis Junction (Buya Romende Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces captured and killed a pro-Government soldier

In early December 1998, the RUF/AFRC were positioned in Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom), on the main route through TMS Chiefdom, which they had used as a staging point for their first bid to capture Port Loko Town in June 1995. In Malekuray, they fired their weapons for some time and bayoneted a civilian. After this, the RUF/AFRC forces set fire to the town and left for the next village, Maforay (TMS Chiefdom), where they burnt some houses. They continued on towards Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), to reach a base at Masokoma, known as "Combat Camp".

Between 1 and 4 December, Nigerian jets bombarded RUF/AFRC positions near Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), killing at least 70 RUF/AFRC members.⁵⁰⁸ Following this, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Lunsar before dawn on 5 December 1998 from the direction of Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) and Kumrabai (Marampa Chiefdom). A small company of ECOMOG and CDF forces managed to ambush RUF/AFRC forces at nearby Mamara but did not prevent RUF/AFRC forces from entering Lunsar. ECOMOG reinforcements arrived from Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and attacked RUF/AFRC with RPGs, mortar and heavy machine gun fire from an armoured vehicle. During the attack, three members of ECOMOG and an unknown number of civilians were killed. RUF/AFRC forces took large amounts of property and abducted an unknown number of civilians to carry the load. In addition, they managed to loot the ECOMOG battalion headquarters, stealing a number of new radio sets and ECOMOG uniforms, in addition to rifles and ammunition.⁵¹⁹

⁵⁰⁸ AFP, 3 December 1998.

⁵¹⁹ R.A. Adeshina, pp 130-2 ff.



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It is unclear whether or not RUF/AFRC forces took full control over Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) in mid-December, but they certainly remained in the immediate area. It is clear that on 8 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Magbenthan and Mamusa, (both Marampa Chiefdom) on the highway between Lunsar and Ro-Gberray, burning all the houses. ECOMOG units displaced from fighting in other districts began arriving in Lunsar for redeployment after 15 December.⁵¹⁰

RUF/AFRC forces began pushing south into Koya Chiefdom and on 7 December they assaulted Masiaka⁵¹¹ and Magbontoso, a village further west along the highway near Mile 38. RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Masiaka between 14 and 16 December.⁵¹² During this attack, RUF/AFRC forces were coming from three different areas with the main aim of dislodging the Guinean forces and to take their arms and ammunition. The RUF/AFRC forces burnt one armoured tank, some houses and the Guinean ECOMOG HQ, but were unable to seize any weapons. After a battle that night, which left over 20 civilians dead, the Guinean forces were able to repel the RUF/AFRC forces who, while leaving, abducted many civilians, including school children.

On 21 and 22 December, RUF/AFRC forces bypassed Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and attacked the towns of Songo (Koya RD, Western Area) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). On 23 December, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and occupied Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). On 25 December, following a month long campaign of gradual encirclement, RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), forcing ECOMOG to retreat northwards to Kamakwie (Sella Limba Chiefdom, Bombali District), which itself fell to the RUF/AFRC on 30 December. The main road to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Masiaka was left undefended as Guinean troops withdraw from Masiaka to defend Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) from an RUF/AFRC attack on or around 26 December 1998.

Gbethis (CDF) from Mile 91 came to Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) to reinforce the CDF and ECOMOG forces based in the town. Between 28 and 30 December 1998, very large numbers of heavily-armed RUF/AFRC forces converged on Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), midway between Port Loko Town and Lunsar. On 30 December, Nigerian ECOMOG retreated in full from Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), leaving the town in the hand of RUF/AFRC forces.⁵¹³ RUF/AFRC forces then staged a major assault on Port Loko Town. RUF/AFRC units moved from Kambia Town and Rokupr (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District), Mange (BKM Chiefdom) and Macoba (just north of Mange), but also from Ro-Source (Sanda Tendaren Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District).

In the late morning of 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered Port Loko Town and engaged the joint Nigerian and Guinean ECOMOG contingent positioned at the Falaba Primary School. During the attack on Port Loko Town, civilians were killed, including the Paramount Chief, women were raped and houses were looted. RUF/AFRC forces eventually captured the eastern part of the town,

⁵¹⁰ R.A. Adeshina, pp 130-2 ff.

⁵¹¹ A strategic location where the main Freetown highway divides into two highways, one leading to Port Loko Town and the other to Mile 91.

⁵¹² First date from record, later date from AFP, 16 December 1998

⁵¹³ BBC and AFP, 30 December 1998.



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called old Port Loko, and fought for the control of the whole town. However, the bombing of RUF/AFRC positions from the air strengthened ECOMOG resistance. On 3 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces left the town using the same route to the east along which they had advanced. It is highly likely that the bulk of these forces moved into the Western Area in preparation for the 6 January assault on Freetown. In the wake of the RUF/AFRC retreat from Port Loko, ECOMOG and CDF groups stole a large amount of civilian property.

e) Events in 1999

RUF/AFRC forces invaded Freetown between 6 and 20 January. As noted, there were preliminary attacks in late December on the towns of Port Loko, Ro-Gberray, Lunsar, Masiaka, Songo, Newton and Waterloo in preparation for the 6 January invasion. ECOMOG forces pushed the RUF/AFRC back to Waterloo, where they remained in force until at least 25 February 1999. RUF/AFRC forces retained control over the arterial routes from Western Area running through Port Loko District throughout this time.

RUF/AFRC forces occupied Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) following ECOMOG's retreat on 26 December. Following the general retreat of RUF/AFRC forces from Greater Freetown (Western Area) towards Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area) after 20 January, RUF/AFRC forces began building up in Masiaka. During the occupation of Masiaka, CDF forces surrounded the town and exerted constant pressure on the RUF/AFRC. Between 18 and 24 January there was a tense standoff between the two forces, resulting in a stalemate. After 24 January, RUF/AFRC units began occupying villages near Masiaka to increase the security of their Masiaka position and to break the deadlock with the CDF. Between 24 January and 15 February, at Ma-Kanry village (Koya Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces killed an unknown number of civilians, alleged to be hostile "collaborators". On 15 March, a RUF/AFRC splinter group called the West Side Boys⁵¹⁴ exchanged gunfire with regular RUF/AFRC forces based in Masiaka. This skirmish was reportedly caused by disputes about the division of stolen property. On 3 April, ECOMOG Alfa Jets commenced fly-passes over Masiaka and nearby villages. RUF/AFRC forces reportedly rounded up civilians, placed them on the town streets and started using bladed weapons to carve the initials "RUF" on the civilian captives. On 17 April, Nigerian forces backed up by air support advanced on Masiaka, capturing the town on or around 29 April 1999. Withdrawing RUF/AFRC forces burnt down around 300 residences.

RUF/AFRC forces also occupied the town of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) between 14 January and 22 April 1999. Mile 91 is about 30 miles east of Masiaka along the main highway on the first main road junction leading south to Bo and Kenema. As at Masiaka, RUF/AFRC forces were beaten back by a heavy ECOMOG assault. RUF forces established a sub-office responsible for monitoring military activities in the Maforki area at Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom). In March 1999, RUF/AFRC activities resumed at Konta (Maforki Chiefdom), where an old woman, a man and a young girl pounding cassava leaves were given 100 lashes each by RUF/AFRC personnel. In April, three women from Masubah (Maforki Chiefdom) were taken away and raped by 15 men.

⁵¹⁴ For more information about the West Side Boys, see below.



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The Gbethis (CDF) strengthened their positions in Port Loko District during early 1999, particularly in the areas bordering Dibia Chiefdom and the RUF/AFRC base at Bainkoro (BKM Chiefdom). These positions would present an obstacle to activity spreading from RUF/AFRC-held territory in Sanda Tendaren and Libeisaygahun Chiefdoms (both Bombali District) bordering Dibia Chiefdom. Following appeals from the Regent Chief to the Paramount Chief of Port Loko Town, members of the Gbethi Society were sent to secure Kasseh Section (BKM Chiefdom) in February 1999. At first, these men had only shotguns, machetes and sticks. During a patrol on 3 February near Romeni, just north-east of Port Loko Town (both Maforki Chiefdom), the Gbethis captured an ex-SLA soldier suspected of being an RUF commander. They decapitated him and danced his severed head around Port Loko Town, demanding money and chanting, "Die dae, die nor dae. Rebel dae for die, die dae for rebel", meaning: "Death does not exist, death is for rebels and rebels are meant to die".

In March 1999, the CDF established a recruitment base at Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom) and a training camp at Makomp, just north of Port Loko Town. Kagbantama is on the main road leading from Port Loko Town to Gbinti and Sendugu, the headquarter towns of Dibia and Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdoms respectively. ECOMOG had retreated from Dibia Chiefdom to Kagbantama in March 1998. At the Makomp camp, recruits to the CDF were instructed in the use of supernatural charms and clothes that could allegedly render them bullet-proof. Additionally, they were trained in the use and maintenance of a rifle. The main task of the CDF in Kasseh was to secure the east bank of the Little Scaries River, preventing southward RUF/AFRC infiltration from upstream towns like Bainkoro and other locations in Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom. After 18 February, SLA units deployed to Kasseh Section (BKM) but were driven from the section by civilians, following incidents of looting and poor discipline. In late March or early April, Gbethis at Makomp ambushed three SLA members who had been issued written permission to pass from CDF command in Port Loko Town. A CDF commanding officer cut one of the SLA members in half from head to pelvis. He was arrested by the CDF authorities, but returned to his unit after only two days of detention.

The traditional authorities of Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom) turned down a request from the CDF in BKM Chiefdom in late March 1999 to establish a Gbethi Society. Consequently, Gbethis from Kagbantama (Kasseh Section, BKM Chiefdom) began to harass residents of Safroko Section (TMS Chiefdom) throughout March and April. For example, in March 1999, a CDF group came to Rosar (Safroko Section, TMS Chiefdom) and captured a civilian they accused of being a "rebel". Gbethis brought him back to Kagbantama, where they tied him up and dripped melted plastic on his body. On 5 April, Gbethis from Kagbantama returned to Rosar, following a general report that the inhabitants were "all rebels". Gbethis formed a firing squad, lined 27 men into two rows and shot them dead. The next day, 6 April 1999, Gbethis from Kagbantama again attacked Rosar. During the attack they raped an unknown number of women, stole property and burnt down 45 houses in the village, leaving only the mosque standing. At Maron village (TMS Chiefdom) on 8 April, Gbethis killed a blind man and threatened to kill the Section Chief and elders because they had refused to join the Gbethi Society. The Gbethis consequently accepted Le 400,000 and some food items in satisfaction. On 9 April in Makapr (TMS Chiefdom), near Maron, Gbethis from Dibia Chiefdom shot a civilian man twice and amputated one of his hands. They also took property and burnt down seven houses. On 23 April, at Mafonkay (TMS Chiefdom), Gbethis shot dead two elders and a child.

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At Makili, they killed one man, raped two women and burnt houses, after having taken property from inside. These Gbethis came from Kagbantama but also from Kareneh (Dibia Chiefdom), following the orders of a commander who was moving from section to section, initiating people into the Gbethi Society.

By the end of March 1999, RUF/AFRC activities resumed in Makama Section (TMS Chiefdom). At this time, an RUF/AFRC patrol from "Combat Camp" arrived in Malekuray and announced to residents that their commander wanted to make peace with them and the nearby villages of Mafengbeh, Robenkia and Makaneh. For acceding to this localised "peace treaty", the village elders would be given a "clearance paper", which they were ordered to display should any RUF/AFRC forces threaten the village or its residents. In return, the population had to contribute money and food to the RUF/AFRC. This arrangement was called "G5" and had been in operation in other areas of Sierra Leone held by the RUF/AFRC since at least December 1997. In brief, it provided the RUF/AFRC with a more rational, less strenuous way of extracting resources from the civilian population. On 13 April 1999, those residents of Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) who returned to their chiefdom in accordance the terms agreed in the "peace treaty" met some Gbethis at Maforay (TMS Chiefdom), who killed two civilians. Shortly after, the CDF commander and over 100 Gbethis came to Malekuray. For making this deal with the RUF/AFRC, the CDF commander for the area threatened to kill all the inhabitants of Malekuray and use their bodies as roadblocks. The Section Chief, Imams, the headman and 10 elders were abducted and taken away to the CDF base. The Regent Chief of Masu eventually negotiated the release of those abducted, in return for which residents of Malekuray and surrounding villages would give the CDF food, livestock and Le 200,000. On 14 April, however, around 30 armed RUF/AFRC members from Combat Camp came to Malekuray. The "clearance paper" proved to be worthless. The RUF/AFRC forces shot dead five civilians; four other civilians were killed in the town, one wounded severely with a machete. Other people sustained knife wounds but survived. The RUF/AFRC forces said the attack was in retaliation for the village's support for the Gbethis. Caught between the RUF/AFRC and the Gbethis, most of the inhabitants left Malekuray for the bush or bigger towns.

Following the release of the RUF leader from Government custody on 15 April 1999, it was announced over radio that former SLA soldiers who had joined the AFRC regime should surrender to the United Nations Military Observers (UN MILOBS) for re-engagement. This resulted in in-fighting between RUF and AFRC forces. Nevertheless, disarmament started in November 1999.

On 7 May 1999, RUF/AFRC forces again attacked Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), reportedly on a food-finding mission. They moved through the villages of Maimera, Makamasa and Badara, killing 13 people in total and burning 10 houses. The large build-up and coordination exhibited in the RUF's earlier assaults on Port Loko Town was not present in this attack. The Malian ECOMOG contingent resisted the RUF/AFRC attack, incurring 7 fatalities and 11 casualties; at least 20 RUF/AFRC members were killed during the attack. Few houses were looted during the attack and an unknown number of civilians were killed. By 7 May, Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom) was reportedly accessible to humanitarian organisations, having been cleared of RUF/AFRC by

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ECOMOG.⁵¹⁵ On 13 and 14 May, Songo and Mile 38 (both Koya Chiefdom) were attacked by RUF/AFRC forces.⁵¹⁶

Despite the ongoing peace negotiations, RUF/AFRC forces continued to attack civilian settlements in Masimera Chiefdom. For example, after 20 June 1999 a chiefdom Police Officer was killed in his garden in Masimera. In nearby Mathilie, RUF/AFRC forces amputated the limb of a civilian man. In Makonton, RUF/AFRC members amputated a woman's limb; another woman was shot dead for refusing to have sexual intercourse with one of the RUF commanders. In mid-1999, Lunsar remained under RUF occupation. Following infighting between AFRC and RUF forces in Makeni (Makarí Gbanti, Bombali District), AFRC forces decamped to Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), but shortly after were chased out by RUF forces.

Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (Lomé Peace Agreement). Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, a demobilisation centre was opened at the Lungi Military Barracks (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and in early November a centre opened near Port Loko Town. By 30 November, around 500 RUF personnel had registered as ex-combatants.⁵¹⁷

Throughout 1999, RUF/AFRC forces in Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom) killed an unknown number of civilians suspected of being "spies" or Government forces. After the ceasefire on 24 May 1999, ECOMOG and UNOMSIL MILOBS were deployed to Government-held and RUF/AFRC-held areas in Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom), including Mange and Mile 18. These foreign forces engaged in routine patrols, but were unable to access Makonteh Section because of the poor quality of the bridges and the difficulties imposed by the rainy season. RUF forces violated the ceasefire, often during food-finding raids; they looted villages like Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and abducted people to carry the stolen property.

On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone, to replace the previous observer mission and assist with the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.⁵¹⁸ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) commenced deployment with the arrival of advance teams on 29 and 30 November;⁵¹⁹ 4,500 UNAMSIL were troops were present in Sierra Leone by 10 January 2000.⁵²⁰

From October through to the end of 1999, a few isolated but brutal incidents are reported in Port Loko District. One Sunday in late October, RUF/AFRC forces in Magbankay (Masimera Chiefdom) killed a civilian man as a rite foreseeing their "peaceful stay" in the chiefdom. After he was killed, his

⁵¹⁵ UN HACU, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1 - 17 May 1999.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁷ IRIN West Africa, 30 November 1999.

⁵¹⁸ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

⁵¹⁹ BBC, 29 November 1999

⁵²⁰ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 1999.



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genitals, tongue and eyes were removed from his body. These body parts were given to a virgin girl, who buried them near a small stream following a ceremony in Masimera Town. In another incident in Masimera, girls and women abducted in various villages near the Rokel River were raped, taken to a nearby bank of the river and shot dead.

In November, tensions between the RUF and the remnants of the AFRC led to a series of clashes in Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). By 2 November, Lunsar was reportedly under the sole occupation of the RUF. This was part of a wider RUF operation that established their dominance over Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).⁵²¹ On 8 November, a number of ex-AFRC who had entered the demobilisation process in at a centre in Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) rioted at a nearby market over the delayed award of financial incentives to disarm.⁵²² In addition to demanding food, clothing and medical supplies from local traders, they looted numerous civilian residences.⁵²³ A number of small skirmishes were reported between ECOMOG and demobilised ex-AFRC in mid December.⁵²⁴ On 22 December, ECOMOG reported that its forces had shot dead three ex-AFRC members in the village of Matank (Marampa Chiefdom), near Lunsar.

f) Events in 2000

In early January, UNAMSIL moved into positions throughout Port Loko District. A single Nigerian battalion was based at Freetown International Airport at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and a second covered Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), securing the towns and the main highways. A Battalion of Kenyan troops was sent to secure Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Magburaka (Kholida Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). Nigerian forces deployed under ECOMOG would remain in county to provide additional back up to the incoming UNAMSIL forces.⁵²⁵ Zambian UNAMSIL forces commenced deployment to Sierra Leone, arriving in Lungi between 21 and 26 April coming to a full strength of 775 by 2 May 2000.⁵²⁶

Disarmament began in November 1999 in Port Loko District, but after some months, some combatants still in the bush refused to disarm and continued attacking villages in 2000 and 2001. During 1999 and 2000, RUF/AFRC forces camped at Foredugu Junction (Buya Romende Chiefdom), just north-east of Lunsar on the main highway from Makeni, at that point under firm RUF occupation until at least February 2001.

Between January and July 2000, RUF/AFRC forces had free movement along the main north-south highway running through Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom and consequently through the towns of Sendugu (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom) and Gbinti (Buya Romende Chiefdom). From Gbinti, the RUF could move freely south through Kamasundo (Dibia Chiefdom) to Foredugu (Buya Romende

⁵²¹ IRIN West Africa, 2 November, quoting ECOMOG sources.

⁵²² BBC, 9 November 1999; IRIN West Africa, 10 November 1999.

⁵²³ UN HACU, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 7 - 20 Nov 1999.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁵ UN OCHA, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 5 - 16 Jan 2000.

⁵²⁶ IRIN West Africa, 21 April 2000, 26 April 2000 and 2 May 2000.



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Chiefdom); this would allow RUF forces to stage attacks on Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom), Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Ro-Gberray (Maforki Chiefdom).

RUF/AFRC forces coming from Makeni in January 2000 headed to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom), abducting two people at Maron (TMS Chiefdom). They then proceeded to Gbinti, where they engaged Gbethis (CDF). The Gbethis were defeated and the RUF/AFRC forces stole property, burnt an unknown number of houses and advanced into Kambia District. In March 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Sendugu along the main north-south route through Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom towards Bombali District. They were around 120 in number, equipped with AK47s, hand grenades, cutlasses and knives. This RUF/AFRC Company carried out another series of looting operations dubbed "Operation Pay Yourself", camping for two weeks in Sendugu and stealing from the surrounding villages. At Rorange, they shot a woman who did not want to give them her bag of milled rice. The following day, Gbethis from Barmoi Junction (BKM Chiefdom) attacked Sendugu, forcing RUF/AFRC forces to retreat north-east.

In May 2000, the commander of both the RUF and AFRC forces in the Sendugu area ordered that any member caught trying to abscond and enter a DDR program would be shot on sight. That same month, near Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), RUF forces intercepted a convoy composed of civilians and RUF/AFRC members seeking to disarm. All the passengers were killed, including the RUF/AFRC members, who were accused of trying to join the DDR program in Port Loko. Consequently, civilians believed that most of the RUF/AFRC forces living in Maforki and Marampa Chiefdoms would not disarm.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Thombo (Maforki Chiefdom) in May 2000, killing civilians and members of the CDF. At Rothawa, armed men dressed only in trousers killed a civilian and took property. RUF/AFRC forces also attacked Ro-Lal, where one civilian was killed and two houses were burnt down.

On 5 May 2000, 208 members of UNAMSIL's Zambian contingent were disarmed and captured by RUF forces based at Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom). RUF forces returned to Foredugu with vehicles, communication sets, weapons and uniforms stolen from the peacekeepers. By 28 May, following the series of events outlined below, UNAMSIL announced that virtually all the peacekeepers had been released by the RUF. On 8 May, the UK commenced "Operation Palliser", deploying to Sierra Leone the *HMS Ocean* and around 800 paratroopers from the Parachute Regiment.⁵²⁷ Initially, UK forces secured the airport and Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom) and commenced the evacuation of UK nationals and other expatriates.

Between 8 and 14 May, RUF forces unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom). At that time, Masiaka was defended by an unknown number of AFRC "loyalists"⁵²⁸ who had split from the RUF at the end of 1999 and realigned themselves with the elected government, in

⁵²⁷ On 24 May, members of the 42 Commando Royal Marines replaced the paratroopers.

⁵²⁸ BBC Online News, 10 May 2000.



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addition to regular SLA and CDF forces.⁵²⁹ A contingent of Guinean UNAMSIL had withdrawn from the town.

RUF troops attacked SLA forces stationed in Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) on 12 May 2000 with heavy machine gun and RPG fire. On 15 May, they advanced west towards Port Loko Town, where 500 RUF forces attacked the town in the early evening of 16 May 2000; Nigerian and SLA forces engaged the RUF, forcing their retreat soon after. During the attack, one member of the Nigerian forces was killed and six members of the SLA and five members of the Nigerian forces were injured.⁵³⁰

On the morning of 17 May, the RUF leader was captured travelling in a civilian vehicle in Freetown. The UK Secretary of Defence stated to the BBC that Sankoh was being held in "protective custody" by UK forces.⁵³¹ Also on 17 May, RUF forces attacked UK positions 6 miles east of the International Airport at Lungi. Repelling the attack, UK paratroops killed three RUF members.⁵³² On 18 May, Jordanian UNAMSIL peacekeepers were deployed at Masiaka and further north at Rokel Bridge.

Although this UNAMSIL action pushed the RUF/AFRC north, with subsequent attacks focussing on Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom), the RUF still maintained pressure on Port Loko Town, regularly staging probing attacks on SLA and UNAMSIL positions in the town area and arterial roads after 16 May. On 20 and 23 May, RUF forces engaged SLA forces in the Port Loko Town area from the Lungi Road. In the evening of 28 May, they again attacked from the direction of Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom), briefly penetrating the town centre. On 1 and 4 June, RUF forces staged evening attacks on Port Loko Town from Bureh Section (BKM Chiefdom); during the 4 June attack, an RPG fired by RUF forces killed one civilian and injured six. On 12 June, RUF forces attacking Port Loko Town killed a CDF member. On 22 June, a Sierra Leone Government helicopter gunship inflicted casualties on the RUF during an attack on Port Loko Town.

On 24 May, RUF forces ambushed an SLA truck near Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), killing four members of the SLA and two foreign journalists.⁵³³ On 1 and 2 June, combat troops from the Indian UNAMSIL contingent took up positions around Ro-Gberray Junction, taking full control of it by 5 June.⁵³⁴ The same day, the RUF staged a major attack on Ro-Gberray lasting 12 hours, during which three Nigerian peacekeepers, five civilians and 23 RUF members were killed. Also on 5 June, a 12-strong RUF squad led by a former SLA member attacked the village of Romonukeh (Maforki Chiefdom), burning six houses and abducting one civilian man.

⁵²⁹ BBC Online News, 10 May 2000.

⁵³⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 17 May 2000.

⁵³¹ BBC Online News, 17 May 2000 (18:03 GMT 19:03 UK).

⁵³² BBC Online News, 17 May 2000.

⁵³³ BBC Online News, 25 May 2000 (06:55 GMT 07:55 UK).

⁵³⁴ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 5 June 2000.



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Between 1 and 21 June, SLA⁵³⁵ and RUF fought for control of Lunsar (Marampa). After 8 June, Lunsar was reportedly under the control of the SLA, which repelled an RUF counter-attack on 13 June with the assistance of the West Side Boys.⁵³⁶ The RUF retook Lunsar on 21 June 2000,⁵³⁷ remaining in control of the town until 14 March 2001 when, on the invitation of the RUF, UNAMSIL deployed in the town.⁵³⁸

Two RUF attacks are reported in Makama Section (TMS) during 2000. On 29 June, 50 SLA members who had deployed to Malekuray (TMS) in March 2000 retreated, at which time RUF forces killed an old man. During the second attack on Malekuray, on 30 July, RUF forces were repelled by CDF forces and no casualties are reported. Both attacks came from the direction of Kambia-Makama, east along the road from Malekuray.

Before 10 July 2000, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kanokie (Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom), some of them shouting "people of Kanokie, don't be afraid, we are on transit to Sendugu, your village is not our target". They left the village with no reported incidents of violence. From 10 to 13 July 2000, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Sendugu, burning down 11 residences and abducting an unknown number of civilians. A few weeks after this attack, youths and elderly men formed the Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom CDF to increase security throughout the chiefdom.

RUF attacks on Port Loko Town continued between July and September 2000, with small-scale attacks on 2 and 11 July from the Lungi road. RUF forces attacked Port Loko on 2 and 20 August using the Malekuray (TMS) road and again on 27 August using the Lungi route. In August 2000, the RUF leadership formed peacekeeping committees in Buya Romende, Marampa and Masimera Chiefdoms, possibly to boost their credibility ahead of the talks with UNAMSIL that would take place in 2001.

On 20 August 2000, a small number of RUF forces attacked Massembah (Maforki Chiefdom), killing two civilians and injuring two others. On 2 September at Yankasa (Maforki Chiefdom), four people were killed and 10 injured, including a pregnant woman. Two civilian girls were captured and the village was looted. RUF forces again attacked Port Loko Town on 1 September. One RUF group killed 20 SLA near Kabatha, while the SLA and UNAMSIL repelled without casualties a second RUF group that moved into Port Loko Town along the Lungi road. On 10 September, the RUF staged a final attack on Port Loko Town along the Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) road, sustaining at least 50 fatalities and a high number of casualties. RUF forces withdrew to Makeni through TMS Chiefdom to Kamasundo (Dibia Chiefdom), killing one person at Robombo and raping women at Maron. They proceeded to Gbinti (Dibia Chiefdom) and onwards to Batkanu (Libeisaygahun Chiefdom, Bombali District). For the remainder of September and throughout October, no events of significance are reported.

⁵³⁵ It is unclear whether UNAMSIL troops assisted in the defence of Lunsar on these dates.

⁵³⁶ See below for more detailed information on the West Side Boys.

⁵³⁷ BBC Online News, 21 June 2000 (17:57 GMT 18:57).

⁵³⁸ UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001.



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RUF forces from Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) entered the villages of Bainkoro and Robaku in Tinkatupa Section (TMS Chiefdom) soon after 10 November 2000. They abducted three civilian men to use as guides. The group travelled to Makapr, shooting and injuring a civilian woman. Moving to Lunsar, they stole livestock and food items. At Magberi, RUF forces burnt down eight houses. Around 45 SLA forces stationed in Malekuray (TMS Chiefdom) engaged this RUF group near Masangban, recovering some of the stolen property.

g) Events in 2001

The RUF allowed UNAMSIL access to two important roads in Port Loko District on 12 January 2001. First, the RUF opened the stretch of highway connecting Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom) and Foredugu (Buya Romende Chiefdom) to Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District). Second, the RUF opened the road between Mange (BKM Chiefdom) and Kambia (Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia District),⁵³⁹ although the road bridge over the Little Scaries River would not be open until 22 March 2001.⁵⁴⁰ The following day, the UNAMSIL Force Commander met with representatives of the RUF in Lunsar to discuss the humanitarian situation and the deployment of UNAMSIL to Lunsar.⁵⁴¹ On 25 February, the first formal UNAMSIL-RUF Contact Group meeting was held in Mange (BKM). On 14 March, around 240 Nigerian UNAMSIL troops commenced deployment to Lunsar,⁵⁴² increasing to 776 by 23 March 2001.⁵⁴³

In Maforki Chiefdom, there were many incidents of RUF forces stripping corrugated zinc roofing from civilian residences. For example, in February 2001, some houses were unroofed at Rogbath, Robis, Masokor, Mathera, Rothudekun, Makambisa and Babara. In March, houses including the mosque were unroofed at Taindukum, Mabala, Rokoreh and Roforoad, all located in the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom. Similar operations were undertaken in April and June. During this period, there appears to have been no further theft, burning or killing.

Between 18 and 29 May, UNAMSIL opened a disarmament camp at Kabatha Junction near Port Loko.⁵⁴⁴ On 14 June, disarmament commenced in Lunsar. On 10 August, UNAMSIL, the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone issued a joint communiqué stating that disarmament was completed in throughout Port Loko District.⁵⁴⁵

Nevertheless, as disarmament proceeded, there were a number of violent incidents. In May 2001, a group of over 200 well-armed RUF fighters with vehicles seized from UNAMSIL peacekeepers at Makeni fought with the Gbethis (CDF) at Roctolon (TMS Chiefdom), killing some civilians and some Gbethis. The RUF forces then passed through Patifu, where they killed one man, and through Maron, where they stole civilian property before returning to Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District). In June 2001, RUF forces entered to Rosar and Maron, moving through

⁵³⁹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 12 January 2001

⁵⁴⁰ UNAMSIL Press Release, 22 March 2001

⁵⁴¹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 15 January 2001

⁵⁴² UNAMSIL Press Release, 14 March 2001 and IRINWA, 16 March 2001

⁵⁴³ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 23 March 2001

⁵⁴⁴ UNAMSIL Press Release, 29 May 2001

⁵⁴⁵ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 14 August 2001



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Kagbantama (BKM Chiefdom). At Maron (TMS Chiefdom), they captured women, who were later raped, and went to Lunsar. On 21 October 2001, RUF members coming from the Lunsar area attacked the village of Maron in Safroko Section (TMS). This is the final recorded event of the conflict in Port Loko District.

h) The "West Side Boys": Okra Hills, Maforki and Koya Chiefdoms, 1998-2000

The Okra Hills is a densely forested geographical area between Makambisa and Gberibana in the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom, crossing southwards over the Rokel Creek into Koya Chiefdom towards the township of Magbeni and onto the stretch of highway between Mile 38 and Masiaka. Between 15 October 1998 and mid-2001, this area was subjected to patterns of attacks by an RUF/AFRC splinter group comprising mainly ex-SLA AFRC members. The forces involved from 1998 onwards share a common thread of leadership and following the RUF/AFRC general retreat from Freetown, they re-branded themselves the "West Side Boys", although there was no substantive change in their composition. Accordingly, the group shall be referred to as the West Side Boys throughout this section.

Between 15 October and 29 December 1998, the West Side Boys attacked over 30 villages in the geographical area between Gberibana and Makambisa in the lower part of Maforki Chiefdom, bordered by the Rokel Creek to the south.⁵⁴⁶ There is little to distinguish any of these attacks from one another. The attacks were all launched from camps near Foredugu and Magbeni (both Koya Chiefdom), in the dense jungle and bush of the Okra Hills area, adjacent to the stretch of the main highway running between Mile 38 and Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom). Following these attacks, the West Side Boys forces did not remain in the villages. Throughout, the West Side Boys were directed by one of only three commanding officers and no settlement was attacked twice during this period. The settlements were undefended by SLA, ECOMOG or CDF forces, yet the West Side Boys commenced each attack by laying down heavy machine gun fire into the village. Routinely, the West Side Boys inflicted serious damage on civilian residences and stole substantial amounts of personal property, livestock and food items from civilians. The West Side Boys forces killed a total of 16 people in 33 attacks, with two instances where civilians were killed by hanging. Members of the West Side Boys raped over 20 civilian women. In total, around 80 civilians, the vast majority being male, were abducted during the series of attacks.

It is not possible to say that the West Side Boys did not fall under the command of the RUF/AFRC. However, the overall pattern of RUF/AFRC activity in Port Loko District between 15 October and 29 December 1998 suggests that the actions of the West Side Boys were only loosely connected with the RUF/AFRC's overall strategy. RUF/AFRC activity in other areas of Port Loko District was focussed on pressurising Port Loko Town and Ro-Gberray Junction (both Maforki Chiefdom), in preparation for the unsuspected RUF/AFRC breakout from Kono in December 1998 and the

⁵⁴⁶ The following villages were attacked on the following days: Gberibana, Rofurawa, Gbontho-Yama on 15 October; Mabala, Magbenthen, Rokoreh and Mapolie on 17, 21, 27 and 31 October respectively; Mamiakanuh, Robis, Kalukeh, Robala on or around 3 November; Rofindu and Roseinti on 7 November; Masawrie on 10 November; Gbonkomayer and Mathule on 15 November; Pethunr on 29 November; Rokoith and Robemeh on 1 December; Rokonther, Robamblaie and Tiama on 7 December; Magbangbara, Madora, Masebeh, Makeleh and Masemur on 13 December; and Magbontho, Madegbar and Robarreh on 29 December.



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eventual invasion of the Western Area in early January 1999. As of September 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces occupied Mange Town (BKM Chiefdom), to the north of Port Loko Town, and controlled Sanda Magbolontor Chiefdom, with access to the highway from Sendugu through Gbinti and Kamasundo (both Dibia Chiefdom) to Foredugu. By September 1998, RUF/AFRC attacked the key junction at Ro-Gberray (Maforki), intermittently cutting off Port Loko from road traffic from the capital. In early December, RUF/AFRC forces pushed south into Koya Chiefdom, attacking Masiaka and Magbontoso, a village further west along the highway, near Mile 38; AFRC forces again attacked Masiaka between 14 and 16 December. The West Side Boys do not appear to have taken part in these initial assaults, although they did have a presence in Masiaka until March 1999.

On 21 and 22 December, RUF/AFRC forces bypassed Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) and attacked the towns of Songo (Koya RD, Western Area) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) was occupied by RUF/AFRC forces following ECOMOG's retreat on 26 December. Between 28 and 30 December 1998, very large numbers of heavily-armed RUF/AFRC forces converged on Ro-Gberray Junction (Maforki Chiefdom), midway between Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom) and Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom). On 30 December, Nigerian ECOMOG retreated in full from Lunsar, leaving the town in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces.⁵⁴⁷ On 30 December, RUF/AFRC forces assaulted Port Loko Town. Again, the principal officers of the West Side Boys are not implicated directly in these attacks.

In the Okra Hills area itself, on 30 December, the dense pattern of hit-and-run attacks that had characterised the presence of the West Side Boys in late 1998 ceased entirely. After 22 December 1998, principal officers of the West Side Boys are identified as having taken part in attacks on Waterloo, Hastings, Joe Town and Tombo (all Waterloo RD, Western Area) during the preliminary RUF/AFRC advance into the Western Area. It is not possible to confirm whether the West Side Boys also took part in the 6 January 1999 RUF/AFRC assault in Freetown.

By 20 January 1999, ECOMOG had regained control of the bulk of the Freetown metropolitan area, and by 25 February had driven RUF/AFRC forces from Waterloo (Waterloo RD, Western Area). After 25 January, RUF/AFRC and West Side Boys forces occupying Masiaka were under pressure from the CDF. Although the RUF/AFRC would not be pushed out of Masiaka until 29 April, the West Side Boys left the town on 15 March 1999.

In March, the West Side Boys attacked and captured the village of Magbeni and established a camp there. On 7 March, a week before their withdrawal from Masiaka, the West Side Boys attacked Gberibana and resumed their intense hit-and-run attacks in lower Maforki Chiefdom. From Magbeni, they made frequent attacks on traffic on civilian traffic between Mile 38 and Masiaka.

On 9 March, West Side Boys attacked Rufura; two days later, they attacked Magbangbara, and engaged Gbethis (CDF) defending the village, killing four of them. The West Side Boys⁵⁴⁸ attacked Masuba, south of Rokel Creek on 15 March 1999. Civilians fled to the nearby bushes and villages, but over 10 inhabitants were killed, including three children who drowned in the Rokel River while

⁵⁴⁷ BBC and AFP, 30 December 1998.

⁵⁴⁸ Some were dressed in military uniforms while others were dressed in civilian attire.



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trying to escape. The West Side Boys harassed civilians who had fled to the bush, beat them and took their property. Civilians who were captured were forced to carry the loads to the West Side Boys' base. One man was told to have sex with his mother and when he refused, he was shot dead. In Masuba, the 56 houses of the village were burnt down. On the same day, West Side Boys attacked Laminaya and Romaforay. On 25 March, they attacked Romaforama and Mabassy.

In April 1999, around 20 civilians were killed publicly at their base in Gberibana in reprisal for an earlier CDF attack on a West Side Boys patrol at Magbanbara, which had left five members of the West Side Boys dead. In the forest nearby their base, there was a specific place where the West Side Boys would kill abductees, especially those who did not follow their orders. Some captured civilians also had the words "West Side Boys" inscribed on their backs. That same month, an attack took place at Maghailma⁵⁴⁹ in the late afternoon, during which 16 people were killed. The following day, they locked 73 people they had abducted from surrounding villages in a house, which they then set on fire.

In the evening of 17 May 1999, the West Side Boys fired on an ECOMOG vehicle patrolling the Mile 38–Masiaka highway. ECOMOG forces exchanged fire with the West Side Boys for about 2 hours until they ran out of ammunition and returned to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom). Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire that entered into force on 24 May.

As peace talks continued in June 1999, a large number of civilians were burnt alive in their houses at Man'armmah by the West Side Boys. Other villages attacked in June and July include Mathera, Rothuidekum, Makambisa, Makorobolie, Kasankor, Mekensebeh and Rotaindekun. At Mabonie on 20 July 1999, the West Side Boys burnt down the entire village, raped girls, killed around 10 people and took food items. The peace talks led to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (the Lomé Peace Agreement).⁵⁵⁰

On 4 August 1999, the West Side Boys kidnapped a group of around 40 UNOMSIL, ECOMOG and civil society workers who had entered the Okra Hills area to negotiate the release of some 200 children being held by the West Side Boys. The group included the Bishop of Makeni and five UK officers serving as military observers in UNOMSIL.⁵⁵¹ The kidnap met with immediate condemnation from the United Nations Secretary-General⁵⁵² and a UK-led negotiation team was dispatched to Sierra Leone. Around half of the hostages were released on 9 August and the remainder released the following day; around 200 women and children were also released.⁵⁵³ The group reportedly said to negotiators that they were loyal to the AFRC, comprised of primarily ex-SLA and their key demand was the release from RUF custody of the AFRC leader. They did not

⁵⁴⁹ The month is not specified, but this happened after the attack on Masimera Town in December 1998.

⁵⁵⁰ The full text is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html.

⁵⁵¹ BBC Online News, 5 August 1999 (23:12 GMT 00:12 UK).

⁵⁵² UN Press Release, 5 August 1999, SG/SM/7089, AFR/162.

⁵⁵³ IRIN West Africa, 10 August 1999, quoting the Sierra Leone Information Minister.



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refer to themselves as the “West Side Boys”. A foreign journalist told the BBC that there were no RUF members present.⁵⁵⁴

Aside from this kidnapping, few attacks are noted between mid-July and December 1999. This corresponds with a sharp drop in the general levels of violence throughout Port Loko District. Additionally, disarmament centres had opened in Port Loko and Lungi. On 15 July 1999 the West Side Boys attacked Mekensebeh village and killed a civilian by hanging her. On the same day, they attacked Rotaindekun, killing four men and raping four girls. On 7 November 1999 they attacked Royabah and Marikor. One month later, the West Side Boys attacked Gberek Thuraka, Mapoyen and Ropoyen, stealing civilian property, livestock and food items. Most of the civilians fled towards Port Loko Town (Maforiki Chiefdom) and sought refuge in an IDP camp. Although attacks on villages became less frequent, the West Side Boys mounted many checkpoints along the main highway between Mile 28 and Masiaka, attacking both civilian and military traffic. Between 7 December and May 2000 there are no reported incidents of attacks on villages in the Okra Hills area.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a larger peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which replaced UNOMSIL. In May 2000, the RUF took hostage over 200 UNAMSIL soldiers at Foredugu, prompting a serious challenge to the peace process. The RUF again moved on Masiaka and Port Loko Town, failing to take control of either town. Between 1 and 21 June 2000, the West Side Boys fought alongside the SLA in (unsuccessfully) defending Lunsar from the RUF attack.⁵⁵⁵

On or around 9 July 2000, State radio broadcast a message from the Government of Sierra Leone issuing an ultimatum to the West Side Boys to disarm to UNAMSIL by 16.00 on 11 July.⁵⁵⁶ UNAMSIL military observers entered into negotiations with the West Side Boys to facilitate disarmament. However, on 11 July, UNAMSIL military observers in Masiaka reported that no West Side Boys had disarmed;⁵⁵⁷ nine days later the situation still remained the same.⁵⁵⁸ Before dawn on 22 July 2000, UNAMSIL carried out “Operation Thunderbolt”. This operation, which focused on the Okra Hills area,⁵⁵⁹ successfully cleared the roadblocks mounted by the West Side Boys on the main highways between Freetown and Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom). UNAMSIL strengthened patrols along the highways through the Okra Hills following “Operation Thunderbolt”. After this operation, UNAMSIL reported that 40 West Side Boys had surrendered to the UNAMSIL Jordanian contingent for disarmament, bringing the total number of West Side Boys in the DDR program to 80.⁵⁶⁰ By 9 August, around 200 had joined the DDR program.⁵⁶¹ Nevertheless, vehicle hijackings and attacks on civilians along the Mile 38–Masiaka highway continued throughout this period.

⁵⁵⁴ BBC Online News, 6 August 1999 (07:23 GMT 08:23 UK).

⁵⁵⁵ OCHA Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-25 Jun 2000.

⁵⁵⁶ IRIN West Africa, 10 July 2000.

⁵⁵⁷ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 11 July 2000.

⁵⁵⁸ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 20 July 2000.

⁵⁵⁹ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 24 July 2000.

⁵⁶⁰ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 28 July 2000.

⁵⁶¹ Numbers taken from interceding UNAMSIL Press Briefings.



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Sporadic attacks in the Okra Hills area continued into 2000. Although the pattern follows the same formulaic style of attacks adopted by the West Side Boys in 1998, it is not certain that the West Side Boys carried out these attacks. At Masoka in June 2000, armed men in combat uniform and civilian dress entered the town firing their weapons, took palm oil and rice and burnt down three houses. At Matheperr, in the early morning, armed men killed one man, burnt two houses and moved around noon to Rothyah, where they burnt down three houses, captured two boys and took property. At Magbamgbara, armed men burnt down five houses but met SLA forces and five of the armed attackers were killed. On 7 July 2000, armed men attacked three villages, burning two houses at Robis; capturing two men and burning five houses at Ro-Mafomara; and burning seven houses at Rogbath. In August 2000, armed men attacked Magbembah, burning down four houses and capturing three women. At Brebana, three houses were burnt, property was taken and one pregnant woman killed.

On 27 August 2000, the West Side Boys captured 11 soldiers from the UK Royal Irish Regiment engaged with the Short Term Training Team near Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and an SLA liaison officer. The patrol had taken an unauthorised deviation to visit Magbeni.⁵⁶² On 29 August, a senior UK officer met with the leader of the West Side Boys, as a result of which the West Side Boys released five of the captives two days later. The leader of the West Side Boys called the BBC on a satellite phone and demanded their reintegration in the government army, the release of their supporters from jail and a review of the Lomé Peace Agreement; all these demands were immediately rejected by the Government of Sierra Leone.⁵⁶³ On 6 September, the UK deployed paratroops from 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment.

At dawn on 25 September, UK Special Forces and Paratroops executed "Operation Barrass". Arriving by helicopter gunships and transport, they attacked the West Side Boys' camps at Gberibana (Maforki Chiefdom) and Magbeni, on either side of the Rokel Creek, rescuing the remaining hostages, killing 25 West Side Boys and incurring one fatality.⁵⁶⁴ The UK forces captured 18 West Side Boys, including the majority of the group's leadership. Over 30 West Side Boys who had abducted around 15 civilians to use as human shields were captured by Jordanian UNAMSIL.⁵⁶⁵ The town of Magbeni was deserted for three weeks because of the smell of human remains found in the surrounding bush.

Following "Operation Barrass" the total number and rate of entry of West Side Boys into the DDR program increased. By 15 September, UNAMSIL had registered 294 members of the West Side Boys at the DDR camp in Lungi. By 20 September, this figure had reached 371.

During 2001, attacks in the Okra Hills area were primarily made by demobilised former members of every faction looking for items to sell. Between 10 February and 11 June 2001, demobilised West

⁵⁶² Information revealed by a Ministry of Defence inquiry into the events: see BBC Online News, 14 September 2000 (20:45 GMT 21:45 UK).

⁵⁶³ BBC Online News, 31 August 2000 (19:59 GMT 20:59 UK)

⁵⁶⁴ BBC Online News, 10 September 2000 (20:51 GMT 21:51 UK)

⁵⁶⁵ UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 11 September 2000



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Side Boys stole the corrugated zinc roofing from civilian residences in numerous villages.⁵⁶⁶ No further attacks by the West Side Boy are reported.

3. Conclusion

**** TO BE DRAFTED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE****

e. Tonkolili District

1. Introduction

Tonkolili is one of the five Districts of the Northern Province, together with Bombali, Koinadugu, Port Loko and Kambia Districts. It is bordered on the north and east by Koinadugu District and on the south-east by Kono District. Kenema, Bo and Moyamba Districts compose its southern border, from east to west. To the north-west is Port Loko District and to the north is Bombali District. Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) is its headquarter town.

There are 11 chiefdoms in Tonkolili District:

Chiefdom	Headquarter
Gbokolenken	Yele
Kafe Simira	Mabonto
Kalansogoia	Bumbuna
Kholifa Mabang	Mabang
Kholifa Rowalla	Magburaka
Konike Barina	Makali
Konike Sanda	Masingbi
Malal Mara	Rochin
Sambaia Bendugu	Bendugu
Tane	Matotaka
Yoni	Yonibana

Its central position in the country would lead Tonkolili District to be affected by the conflict both from the Southern and Northern Districts. The main Sierra Leonean highway linking Freetown to Kono runs for a large part through Tonkolili District. An other major road, which runs through Tonkolili District link Freetown to Bo District and beyond, Kenema District. Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom), Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom) and Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom), all located on the main highway are the main towns of the District and their control would be a steady objective for the different fighting factions throughout the country.

Two major hilly areas are to be found in the District. Malal Mara Hills referred as Kaitkant Hills in the north-east of the country, at the border with Port Loko District and Kangari Hills in the south of the District, bordering Bo District. Those two areas are located at strategic positions, as they allow control of a wide region covering different Districts.

⁵⁶⁶ In sequence, these are: Rogbath, Robis, Masokor, Mathera, Rothhdekum, Makambisa, Babara, Taindenkum, Rokoreh, Roforoad, Roseitn, Masawuri, Robala, Roseint, Gbpothoyama, Mapolie, Thekeyeh, Makoyeh, Matikor, Laminaya, Roboulloh, Mayefura and Mamiekanuh.



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Tonkolili District is a gold mining area and gold can be found in almost every chiefdom, except Malal Mara, Kholifa Mabang and Yoni Chiefdoms in the south of the District.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1993

Following the continuous influx of civilians fleeing the fighting in Kono District, civilians in Tonkolili District considered forming civilian militias in the chiefdoms. Their purpose would be to increase security in the chiefdoms by monitoring the movement of people.

In July 1993, the Paramount Chief of Kalansogoia Chiefdom⁵⁶⁷ organised a meeting of five elders from each of the 62 villages in the chiefdom. During this meeting, it was agreed to form a youth group in each village. This group would establish simple checkpoints across roads using a bush-stick gate, patrolling day and night to screen people coming into the villages. This was aimed at preventing RUF forces from infiltrating the chiefdom, at least from the main roads.

In September 1993, the youths who were organised in this way were officially called Civil Defence Units (CDU). The units, armed only with cutlasses and sticks, were answerable to the Paramount Chief and would refer cases where they were unwilling to let a traveller past a checkpoint to the Town Chief. Strict rules applied in the villages concerning the lodging of strangers. Anybody who lodged an outsider without referring first to the Town Chief was fined Le 10,000. This money was used to buy basic equipment like torches and batteries for the CDUs.

b) Events in 1994

Throughout 1994, RUF forces pushed west along the main road from Kono to the towns of Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Makeni (Bombali District). Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom) was the watershed of RUF attacks on this town in April and May. However, the RUF made the highway severely hazardous for traffic due to the continuous ambushing of civilian travellers and convoys and likely began establishing a foothold in the Kangari Hills at this time.⁵⁶⁸ Between October and December, RUF forces pushed further west, establishing a brigade headquarter in the Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom), from where they assaulted the strategic towns of Mile 91 and Yonibana. From this location, the RUF pushed into the Western Area and Port Loko in 1995. Tensions between civilians and the SLA were exacerbated by the formation of Civil Defence Units in the District as well as the stealing of civilian property, the looting of civilian premises and the extortion of money and property at checkpoints by the SLA, reportedly due to poor discipline.

In February 1994, news of an attack on Bendugu (the headquarter town of Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom) reached the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom).⁵⁶⁹ In March 1994, RUF forces were spotted in the bush of Konike Barina Chiefdom. On or after 25 March, two

⁵⁶⁷ Kalansogoia Chiefdom is to be found in the north of Tonkolili District, sharing border with Koinadugu District on the east and north and Bombali District on the west. Bumbuna, surrounded by hills, is the headquarter town.

⁵⁶⁸ The Kangari Hills are located in the south of Tonkolili District across two chiefdoms and expand in the north of Bo District. The base was probably established in Konike Barina Chiefdom.

⁵⁶⁹ To the north-east of Tonkolili, bordering Koinadugu District.



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miners arrived in the headquarter town of Makali and related that while they were at Mondema, RUF forces had come out of the bush and stolen their bailing machine⁵⁷⁰ before returning to the bush.

People fleeing from Masingbi, the headquarter town of Konike Sanda Chiefdom (sharing a border on the west with Konike Barina Chiefdom and on the east with Kono District) reached Makali on 1 April 1994 with the news that Masingbi had been attacked. Many residents of Makali fled into the surrounding bush. Two days later, on 3 April, 200 members of the SLA from Makeni (the headquarter town of Bombali District) arrived in Makali, encouraging people to come out of the bush. They requested inhabitants to assist them by cooking and providing them with Le 100,000 to buy food from Magburaka.

On 9 April, RUF forces launched an attack on Makali from the direction of Makong, on the edge of the Kangari Hills, south-west of Makali. Earlier in the day, SLA forces had split into four groups and moved into the bush surrounding Makali, but were unable to repel the RUF attack. During the attack, a substantial part of the town was burnt down. Civilians returning to the town following the attack found many bodies in the town, including that of a policeman and a driver. On 11 April, 60 SLA forces moved from Makeni to secure Makali.

SLA forces arrived by helicopter in April at the SDA Primary School playfield in the headquarter town of Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom), in the centre of the District on the highway that leads directly to Kono.⁵⁷¹ Shortly after their arrival, the SLA forces moved out of the town to an unknown location. On 12 and 13 April, many civilians fleeing from Masingbi and Makali reached Matotoka, together with some SLA forces who were fleeing Makali. On 14 April, many of the residents of Matotoka left the town, which prompted the Paramount Chief and government officers to travel to Kabala (Koinadugu District) to request that local hunters from the north (known as Tamaboros⁵⁷²) provide security for the chiefdom. An unknown number of Tamaboros settled in the headquarter town on 3 May 1994, provided with machine guns and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) from the Ministry of Defence.

After 20 May 1994, 175 civilians from Mamurie and Makong villages gathered at Rowaka (Konike Barina Chiefdom). They intended to hunt for food at Rosimbec,⁵⁷³ in the Mamure Section of Konike Barina Chiefdom, in the forested area 5 km south-west of Makali. The SLA commander at Makali had warned them that civilians should avoid this forest area, since RUF forces were suspected to be there; the earlier attack on Makali had come from this direction. As they approached Rosimbec, the civilians, some of whom were armed with cutlasses, met men in uniform whom they believed to be SLA forces. Although the armed men told the civilians they were SLA forces here to escort the group to Rosimbec, they turned out to be members of the RUF. They told the civilians to drop their

⁵⁷⁰ A device used to pump water from pits during excavation for minerals.

⁵⁷¹ Thus, from Magburaka, to go to Kono on the highway, vehicles passed through Matotoka (Tane), then Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom) and then through Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom) before reaching Kono District.

⁵⁷² In early 1994, the Tamaboros who had been assisting the SLA in Kono District since 1993 went back to their District of origin, Koinadugu District. Those Tamaboros were believed to have very strong mystical powers.

⁵⁷³ Also called Simbek.



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cutlasses and go into some houses, which they then locked. The RUF forces killed all 170 captured civilians one after the other, stacking some of the bodies like bundles of wood and dumping others in a ditch. The bodies were later discovered by an SLA patrol sent to look for the missing civilians.

Makali was attacked for the second time in May 1994. After an intense gun battle, SLA forces drove away the RUF forces, with no reported casualties. On 3 June 1994, RUF forces attacked Mapakie, which is located near Matotoka. Tamaboros moved there to engage RUF forces. In the bush, they encountered men in military uniforms but did not attack them, believing them to be SLA personnel. On 11 July, an unknown number of RUF forces in full military dress attacked Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom). SLA and Tamaboro forces drove the RUF from the town, killing a female RUF member during the attack. After a short time and a quarrel with SLA forces about the weapons that the Government had provided them, the Tamaboros left the chiefdom.

The highway linking Koidu (Kono District) to Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom), passing through Konike Sanda, Konike Barina, Tane and Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdoms, was the scene of many ambushes during the conflict. For example, in mid-June 1994, a convoy of about 125 trucks left Magburaka and took the highway through Makaku to Kono. They were escorted by an SLA armoured vehicle and an unknown number of SLA members dispersed through the vehicles comprising the convoy. After 5:30 pm, as the convoy passed through Mamuri (Tane Chiefdom) and approached Rowaka (Konike Barina Chiefdom), it fell into an ambush, with RUF forces firing heavily on the convoy. The trucks attempted to turn back, but instead crashed into each other. Some people jumped out from the trucks. Many people were killed during that ambush, including the driver of a truck and two female passengers. The RUF forces ordered them out of the truck; two boys who tried to escape were shot and died. Passengers were asked to form a line and were searched for anything of value. Ten trucks were destroyed, although most were simply searched and luggage and other items were taken. A one month-old baby was taken from its mother and thrown into the bush because an RUF member said he was making too much noise. One man who had been wounded in the attack started crying for help. One of the RUF members offered assistance, but instead shot him three times. Passengers were then captured and told to carry the load the RUF forces had gathered from the vehicles back to Rosimbec, where 170 civilians had been killed one month earlier.

On the initiative of the elders of the chiefdoms of Yoni and Kholifa Mabang, a 1000-strong Civil Defence Unit composed of youths was formed in June 1994. Members of the Poro, Bundo, Ojeh and Koffo secret societies were involved in setting up these CDUs. The same principles as those applied in Kalansogoia Chiefdom were employed: CDUs would control the main roads through the chiefdoms and check the identity of the people passing through. They conducted house-to-house searches at night, screening residences for strangers and levying a Le 20,000 fine on the house if they discovered someone who had not been reported to the town authorities. If CDU personnel had any concerns about a traveller, they would refer the matter to the town elders, who could order further screening by the SLP. The person would be escorted to the Police Station at Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom). CDUs were based in the areas immediately surrounding the towns of Mile 91 and Yonibana, but patrolled the smaller villages in the two chiefdoms.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

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In 1994, mistrust between civilians and SLA forces deployed to protect the chiefdoms came to a head. This mistrust was due to two beliefs widely held by the public. First, that some SLA forces at this time had defected from the army and joined the RUF. Second, that RUF forces in military fatigues often pretended to be SLA forces in order to attack villages by surprise. One incident that occurred in late June 1994 highlights the negative attitude civilians had towards the SLA forces at this time. Armed men claiming to be SLA were arrested by members of the CDU at Kumrabai Matuku (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) and brought to the Mile 91 Police Station for interrogation. Interrogators concluded that these armed men were genuine SLA members from Bo, which was reportedly confirmed by the SLA commander officer in Bo Town. The two SLA members remained in the chiefdom and installed two checkpoints at Mile 91, one on the road leading to Bo and the other on the road leading to Magburaka. Reports suggest that this was the sole SLA presence in Mile 91 until July.

A week later, in July 1994, two trucks loaded with SLA forces arrived in Mile 91 from Bo Town. After visiting the Paramount Chief at the nearby chiefdom headquarter of Yonibana, they returned to Mile 91. There, they reinforced the checkpoints established and operated by their colleagues. Nevertheless, the arrival of the SLA forces in Yonibana frightened some of the inhabitants of the town, who fled to the south of the chiefdom. At the checkpoints, SLA members started to take civilian property. In August 1994, the SLA commander came from Bo to try to resolve the matter. It was agreed with the elders that the community would feed the soldiers, with each household at Mile 91 giving the SLA forces Le 500 and two cups of rice per week.

In August 1994,⁵⁷⁴ armed men dressed in camouflage and country clothes decorated with charms and talismans and who identified themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem the country, attacked Yele from a southern direction. Yele is in the south of Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, near the border with Valunia Chiefdom (Bo District) and Kamajei Chiefdom (Moyamba District). At the time of the attack, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were living in the area. The few SLA forces who were in the town at the time pulled out, overpowered and outnumbered. The RUF forces burnt the hospital and abducted young boys.

During the final days of October 1994, RUF forces⁵⁷⁵ attacked the headquarter town of Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom, to the north of the District). During this attack many houses were destroyed, property was stolen and one member of a CDU was killed. They spent the night in the town before heading north-east to the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom). Bumbuna was attacked in the late morning on 1 November 1994 by hundreds of armed men. As civilians escaped into the surrounding bush, the RUF spent the whole day burning and looting the town. Returning from the bush, civilians counted 193 houses burnt and found the bodies of four civilians.

⁵⁷⁴ Although this information was reported as taking place in 1993, it is likely that it happened in 1994, since RUF forces were pushed back to the Liberian border around the middle of 1993 and the description of the attack coincides with an attack reported in open sources in August 1994: AFP, 29 August 1994.

⁵⁷⁵ These forces were dressed mainly in mixed casual attire, although some wore full military uniforms.



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On 2 November 1994, SLA forces deployed from Teko Barracks in Makeni (Makani Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and repelled the RUF forces from Bumbuna. RUF forces moved east towards Sambaia Bendugu Chiefdom, abducting civilians to carry the property looted from the town. The following day, RUF forces entered Sangonie, a village located four and a half miles from Bumbuna, with 15 people they had abducted from Bumbuna. They then passed by Kegbema Junction, where they captured more civilians. This large RUF force headed to Koinadugu District and attacked towns along the route to the District headquarter town of Kabala on 7 November 1994.

The RUF launched another wave of attacks in Yoni, Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms,⁵⁷⁶ to the west of the District in December 1994. Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom) is a strategic location on an intersection between the roads going to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Taiama (Kori Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

On 22 December 1994, rumours reached civilians in Yoni Chiefdom that RUF forces had crossed the Yele River.⁵⁷⁷ Early in the morning of the following day, 23 December, armed men in military camouflage uniforms and others in black t-shirts with red headbands entered Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, near the boundary with Yoni Chiefdom). The armed men gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" and said that they were on their way to attack Mile 91. The commander of the groups also said that if they were to encounter resistance in Mile 91, they would return to Mafolatha.

In the morning of 23 December 1994, this RUF group attacked Mile 91 along the main roads from Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom) and Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District). RUF forces killed three civilians and burnt down eight houses during the attack on Mile 91; they initially captured the town, but were displaced shortly afterwards when SLA forces regrouped and counter-attacked. Driven from Mile 91, RUF forces left the town in a northerly direction towards Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, which is to the north-east of Yoni Chiefdom. SLA forces also moved out of the town, after kicking in the doors of many civilian residences and stealing civilian property. Shortly after this attack, other SLA forces coming from Bo Town⁵⁷⁸ were deployed at Mile 91.

The RUF forces moved back to Mafolatha with the stolen property and the civilians they had captured at Mile 91. On 26 and 27 December 1994, the RUF group settled at Makelleh, three miles from Mafolatha in Yoni Chiefdom. Before leaving the town, they burnt down around 100 houses and abducted an unknown number of young men, women and children. On 27 December 1994, some houses were also burnt at Mafolatha.

On their way to their base at Kaitkant Hills (Malal Mara Chiefdom), RUF forces entered many villages, burning, looting and raping. On 28 December, 16 houses were burnt and property was taken in Mabariwa, three miles east of Mafolatha. On the same day, Marokie village was attacked; 14

⁵⁷⁶ Yoni and Malal Mara Chiefdoms share a boundary with Port Loko District.

⁵⁷⁷ Yele River is probably the name given to the river that flows south of Yele Town, in the south of Gbokolenken Chiefdom, which shares a boundary with Moyamba and Bo Districts.

⁵⁷⁸ An SLA Brigade was deployed in Bo Town.



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houses burnt down and property, including livestock, was taken. They stayed for two days (28 and 29 December) at nearby Rochain, where multiple RUF members raped three young mothers in the front of the village inhabitants, who they had gathered at the Court Barrie. Before leaving, RUF forces burnt down 30 houses, stole property and abducted an unknown number of people to carry their loads. In addition, an unknown number of young boys and girls all below the age of 18 were abducted to be trained as fighters.

During the final days of December, RUF forces launched an attack on Rokanrr (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), in the north of the chiefdom near Malal Mara Chiefdom. The RUF commander told the people that they should show them the way to go to Kaitkant Hills, as it was the first time they were using that road. In Rokanrr, RUF forces tied a village elder to a tree and shot him in the head for having questioned the commander about what kind of contribution the farmers of the village could give to the revolution, given they were not combatants but merely farmers. Before leaving the village, RUF forces burnt eight houses and abducted six people. On their way to the Kaitkant Hills base, the RUF forces killed eight captives who had protested that the loads on their heads were too heavy to bear.

The small Malal Mara Chiefdom is comprised mainly of woodland. The Rokel River, coming from Port Loko District, bisects the chiefdom north to south. The Kaitkant Hills are located in the west of the chiefdom at the boundary with Marampa Chiefdom (Port Loko District). The Kaitkant Hills are a strategic location, surrounded by thick forest, from which Port Loko, Bombali and Tonkolili Districts can be easily reached. Following the attack on Mile 91 and the influx of fleeing people coming from Yoni and Kholifa Mabang Chiefdoms, tension increased in Malal Mara Chiefdom. The Paramount Chief sent messages to the eight sections of the chiefdom for the youths to organise themselves.

During the last days of December and following their attack on Mile 91, RUF forces dispersed and attacked many villages in the different sections of Malal Mara Chiefdom. On 27 December 1994, four armed men entered Ropollon village, followed shortly after by a large group of armed men accompanied by children and women. Inhabitants were chased from their homes, as a result of which most of them fled to the bush. Those who were found in the village were instantly killed. An unknown number of young men coming from Rochin (Malal Mara Chiefdom) were confined in a house and beaten to death by RUF members with clubs, machetes and sticks. When they returned from the bush, civilians discovered bodies bearing wounds inflicted by bladed weapons. Most of the dead were identified as displaced persons from Mile 91. Civilians buried 19 bodies in a mass grave at the side of the Islamic prayer ground. Two other people were buried in single graves.

In the evening of 27 December, RUF forces reached the headquarter town of Rochin (Malal Mara Chiefdom). After gathering inhabitants at the Court Barrie, RUF forces killed an unknown number of them with bladed weapons. On 29 December 1994, seven civilians from Rokimbie (located in the northwest of the chiefdom, within the Kaitkant Hills), including a pregnant woman, were taken to Rochin and locked in a room. While in the room, the captured civilians could hear the forces debating on whether they should be killed. They opened the room and asked the captives to go out one after another, attacking them with cutlasses; only one person survived. RUF forces visited



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Ropollon village again on 30 December 1994 and 2 and 4 January 1995, burning houses on each visit. During their final visit, on 4 January 1995, RUF forces told people to vacate the chiefdom, as the RUF were now “the owners” of it. On hearing this, many people left the area.

c) Events in 1995

In the first months of 1995, Malal Mara Chiefdom, especially Matanka Section in the west of the chiefdom within the Kaitkant Hills area, continued to suffer attacks from RUF forces coming from their base at Kaitkant Hills. This base was said to be the 3rd Brigade camp of the RUF and was used to control the Freetown–Bo highway, to cut off the supply of food and other items to the routes leading to the three Provinces and to spread into Port Loko District. The hills were also used to store the property that RUF forces took from villages and during ambushes.

In January 1995, RUF forces attacked many villages in Matanka Section, killing many people and unroofing houses for the zinc before burning them down. At Robina, RUF forces killed many civilians, who were then buried in a mass grave in the backyard of a civilian’s house. Because many civilians decided to reside permanently in the bush, rather than return to their villages, RUF forces started trailing them in the bush. Those captured were used as forced labour, either to construct houses or as porters.

In February 1995 RUF forces based at the Kaitkant Hills again assaulted Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. On 2 February 1995, in the late evening, RUF forces entered Mafolatha. The RUF commander told the gathered inhabitants that they had come to conscript young people to the “armed struggle”. The following day, multiple RUF members raped two young mothers and a member of a Small Boy Unit raped another girl under 18. Thirty people were abducted and conscripted into the RUF. Inscriptions were carved onto their bodies with razor blades, or they were branded with hot irons.

Relations were deteriorating between the SLA forces and the residents of Mile 91 and Yonibana. SLA members, who had been deployed to Mile 91 in January 1995 to replace those who were moved to Ma-Sesay village on the main Freetown–Mile 91 highway, were operating the checkpoints; these checkpoints were opened to traffic entering and leaving the town only once a day, at 8:00 am. Civilians were used by the SLA forces to find food in the surrounding villages. During the night, it was common practice for SLA forces to break into civilian houses to find food. Civilians were also sometimes used to carry the food to Mile 91 for the SLA forces. This harassment was concentrated across February and March, which is the main harvest time for rice, groundnuts and maize.

Another RUF unit entered Gbagbai, near Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) on 2 February 1995. RUF forces shot one man in the head and two people had two of their fingers amputated. They raped four women and abducted between 25 and 30 young people below the age of 18 to carry stolen property and livestock. RUF forces then headed for Masiprr (Yoni Chiefdom), where they stayed until 4 February. Seventeen houses belonging to civilians who were “insufficiently supportive” of the RUF were burnt. Five women were raped and many children under 18 were abducted for conscription into the RUF. The headman of the village was stripped naked and was given 24 lashes; on-looking children were told to clap. Before they left, RUF forces took cattle from the town, after which they left to go towards Malal Mara Chiefdom.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

DRAFT FOR REVIEW ONLY: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION



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In March 1995, RUF forces crossed the Rokel River and entered Magbondo, north of Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. Magbondo was very difficult for people to leave, because it is located near the river and is a swamp area. The RUF commander addressed the gathered inhabitants and told them they had information that SLA forces had planned to attack them at Kaitkant Hills and to use Magbondo as a launching point. Consequently, a group of RUF forces would now be stationed at Magbondo while the rest of the forces would head for Mile 91. Before leaving, three houses were burnt, six girls below 15 were abducted to be conscripted and one was raped. The headman was deposed and one of the RUF commanding officers was appointed as Town Chief. Two days later, the RUF commander returned with a new group of RUF forces. Shortly after, he went to Rokankrr, south of Magbondo, both to prepare an offensive on Mile 91 and to intercept SLA forces said to be heading there in preparation for an attack on the Kaitkant Hills.

RUF forces attacked Mile 91 between 15 and 28 March, taking property and abducting civilians to carry the load to their Kaitkant base. There are no reports of killings or destruction of property at this time.⁵⁷⁹ After the attack on Mile 91, SLA forces withdrew from the town to an unknown location, leaving the town undefended. It is also likely that the CDUs in Mile 91 and Yonibana were disbanded in March 1995 because they had proved ineffective in increasing security in the area. However, in April 1995, SLA forces were again stationed at Camp Charlie in the outskirts of Mile 91.

Between 13⁵⁸⁰ and 20 March 1995, four military trucks loaded with SLA forces came to Matanka Section (Malal Mara Chiefdom) to dislodge RUF forces from Kaitkant Hills.⁵⁸¹ After a first unsuccessful attempt the RUF forces evacuated the base in the last week of March following heavy bombardments from a helicopter and a Guinean military jet. Those forces scattered in lower Yoni Chiefdom, where they began attacking villages. During these attacks, property was taken and people were captured to carry the loads, but no civilians were killed. RUF forces then moved into the thick forest in lower Yoni Chiefdom, at the boundary with Moyamba District.⁵⁸²

Throughout March and April 1995, the RUF moved west through Tonkolili District, putting pressure on the Western Area.⁵⁸³ On 22 June, around 150 RUF members retreating from the 8 June assault on Port Loko Town (Maforki Chiefdom, Port Loko District) entered Mathoir (Yoni Chiefdom). Here they barricaded a road and ambushed an SLA patrol they heard coming, destroying the SLA vehicles. It is unclear whether they inflicted any casualties on the SLA. They then moved

⁵⁷⁹ At the time of the attack, SLA forces were still deployed in Mile 91.

⁵⁸⁰ AFP, 13 March 1995.

⁵⁸¹ It was stated that SLA forces came with some members of Executive Outcomes, the South African private military company, and that one of them was killed during the attack. At this time, however, Executive Outcomes, was not yet in operation in the country so this is probably a reference to the Ghurkas, who were briefly contracted by the Sierra Leonean Government prior to the arrival of Executive Outcomes.

⁵⁸² During the same period, RUF forces on their way to Freetown in Moyamba District were stopped in Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and moved back to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District), from where they moved northwards to open a new base, called "camp Fol Fol", in an area at the junction between Bumpe, Ribbi, Kongbora Chiefdoms (Moyamba District) and Yoni Chiefdom.

⁵⁸³ See events in 1995 in the Western Area.



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South to Roroks⁵⁸⁴ and then onto Makondu (both Yoni Chiefdom) and finally into the town of Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

In October 1995, RUF forces entered Rokankrr (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), mainly to fetch food but also to accuse the people of having collaborated with pro-Government forces. The RUF forces said that the next time they suspected any collaboration, the civilians would "pay the price". People were required to give them food, as Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom is a substantial rice-producing territory. One man who refused to let RUF forces inside his house to take his property was tied up and beaten to death. Two women were raped, four young men abducted and seven houses burnt down.

RUF forces coming from Yoni Chiefdom in December 1995 entered Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) and surrounded the town. The sounds of heavy gunfire and Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGs) could be heard throughout the town. The RUF commander explained that they had come to find food. Every house in the village was searched and property stolen; some houses were burnt down. RUF forces stayed there for two days, during which time they shot one man dead and raped an unknown number of women. An unknown number of children were abducted for conscription into the RUF. Other civilians were abducted to carry the stolen property.

Two days later, the same RUF group arrived in Rochain Kamandawo (Yoni Chiefdom). RUF members caught four men trying to escape, branding them "Government Spies" before shooting them. At Mananie, the entire village was looted; even the doors and windows were taken from houses. Two women were raped and others were abducted for use for sexual purposes. Children under the age of 15 were abducted and able-bodied men were captured to carry the stolen property. Following this, the RUF forces moved east to their base in the Kangari Hills (Konike Barina Chiefdom), in the south of the District.

On 31 December 1995, RUF forces coming from Mafolatha attacked the village of Matuku 1, four miles east of Mafolatha. Three girls were raped and over 20 young men were abducted. The RUF forces burnt down 8 houses and took the contents of two trailers loaded with assorted goods. After encountering and giving chase to SLA forces based at the nearby Ferry Junction (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), RUF forces returned to Matuku 1. When people came back to the village after the forces had eventually left, they saw the letters "RUF" and other things carved into the walls of the houses.

d) Events in 1996

In January 1996, civil militia known as the Gbethis mobilised in the Mabang area (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) and staged raids on villages in the Mara Section of Malal Mara Chiefdom, taking civilian property.

RUF forces staged a series of raids in the area around Kumrabai Junction⁵⁸⁵ in January 1996. Early in January 1996, RUF forces who, in late December 1995, had been in the Mafolatha area (in the

⁵⁸⁴ Also called Roruks.

⁵⁸⁵ Also called Kumrabai-Mamila, it is located at the crossroads leading to Yele (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom) and to Magburaka.



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extreme south of Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) continued their search for food in the area. The nearby villages of Matuku 2 and Kumrabai Junction were attacked on 5 January 1996. During these attacks, houses were searched for rice, some women were raped, young people were abducted to be conscripted and others were abducted to carry the loads.

On 10 January 1996, the same RUF forces entered Magbonto (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) three miles from Kumrabai Junction, north of the highway leading to Magburaka. The purpose of their visit was twofold: to search for food and to terrorise civilians by asking whether they wanted "peace before elections or elections before peace." The Section Chief of Mabang Section, who was at Magbonto at the time, pleaded with the RUF commander to return the cattle that the forces had taken. The Section Chief was captured and killed at Magbass Sugar Complex (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom). Another man was also killed in the village. Six houses were burnt, six children under the age of 15 were abducted and women were taken to be used for sexual purposes. Before leaving the town, the RUF forces promised that they would come back before the general elections, which were due to be held on 26 February 1996.

These same RUF forces re-entered Magbonto on 23 February 1996. The commander again asked the people whether they were supporting the election process. People answered they wanted peace before elections, fearing the reaction of the RUF forces. While the meeting was going on, a truck loaded with SLA forces entered the town; no fighting took place, which led people to think that the SLA were working in concert with the RUF. RUF forces also looted the town for food; they tortured and shot dead a man who asked how they could provide food when their town had been looted by the RUF on several occasions. Before leaving, RUF forces burnt four houses and abducted two women and eight boys under the age of 15. On leaving the village, RUF forces killed one boy as a warning to anyone who might challenge their authority.

Also in January, a group of RUF forces came to Rokankrr and asked the inhabitants the same question about elections. The RUF commander threatened that they would kill everyone in the town if they voted in the upcoming elections. RUF forces repeated this activity in Marunie (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), eight miles from Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom).

The group that had attacked the Mafolatha area in December 1995 returned to Mafolatha from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom in February 1996, to look for food and for a three-day meeting. Commanders coming from different directions arrived in the town and held a meeting to decide on the action to take if the Government of Sierra Leone decided to go ahead with the elections. People from Mafolatha and the neighbouring villages were warned not to vote and threatened with death if they did. At Matuku 2, over 100 young boys were abducted and boys under the age of 15 were abducted to be conscripted.

Two days before the elections, on 24 February 1996, heavily-armed RUF forces came back to Mafolatha to summon people to support peace before elections. The RUF group then headed for Magburaka, arriving there on 26 February, the day of elections. SLA forces were deployed on the roads leading to the town, but no counter-attack was made. RUF forces composed of about 200 members entered the town in the late afternoon, moved around for the rest of the night, captured



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On or around 19 November 1996, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom (in the north of Kenema District) followed RUF forces to their stronghold called "Booloko".⁵⁹⁶ Booloko Camp was a very large camp that was divided into four different sections labelled "Tenneh Ground", "Combat Camp", "Sullay Ground" and "Command Post." Tenneh and Sullay Grounds were named after a hero or heroine of the RUF. Civilians and non-combatant RUF were not allowed in Combat Camp. Command Post hosted RUF who were planning offensives. Other Kamajors from Kenema District joined the Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom, attacked the camp and killed 100 RUF members, sustaining some minor injuries themselves. A large quantity of weapons and ammunition were captured from the camp; one captured RUF commando was taken to serve as a firearms training instructor.

The peace negotiations, which started in the aftermath of the elections, reached their conclusion on 30 November 1996 with the signing of a Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Violations of this agreement were, however, rapidly reported.⁵⁹⁷

e) Events in 1997

In January 1997, renegade RUF forces went on the rampage, attacking and burning villages during food-finding missions.⁵⁹⁸

In early 1997, a civil militia known as the Kapras was formed in Kafe Simira Chiefdom in the north of the District. Kapras wore brown country clothes called "rook" and were armed with single-barrel guns, cutlasses and sticks. They established and operated checkpoints all over the chiefdom. People in Kafe Simira Chiefdom assisted the Kapras by giving money or food. The chiefdom was quiet during that period, except for one RUF attack, when forces burnt a vehicle near the chiefdom headquarter town of Mabonto and then went to Nenekoro, in the east of the chiefdom, where they burnt down the village and killed over 20 people. Those people were buried in front of their houses, as the civilians who buried them were frightened to go to the cemetery that was in the bush.

Throughout 1997, relations between local militias and SLA forces were tense.⁵⁹⁹ On 7 March, Kamajor militia clashed with the SLA in Matatoka (Tane Chiefdom), killing 12 SLA members.⁶⁰⁰ from the SLA's Rapid Deployment Force. On 23 April 1997, Gbethis intercepted SLA forces who were on their way to Lower Yoni at Yonibana (Yoni Chiefdom). After a battle, the Gbethis were

⁵⁹⁶ Booloko probably refers to the name of the camp the RUF forces had firmly established in the Kangari Hills, despite SLA attempts to dislodge them. It seems that "Booloko" is a generic term and was mentioned with different spellings in other Districts.

⁵⁹⁷ Since the signing of the Peace Agreement, around 15 civilians were killed by RUF forces during food-finding missions in Tane and Yoni Chiefdoms: Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information, 19 November - 16 December 1996.

⁵⁹⁸ AFP, 26 January 1997.

⁵⁹⁹ The kind of relationships the SLA forces had with members of the CDF was a result of the relationship they had with the various CDUs.

⁶⁰⁰ Xinhua, 7 March 1997.



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civilians, including children, raped girls and killed civilians they found hiding in the bush. Before leaving, the RUF forces took property, which they made young boys carry. After the attack and after the RUF forces had left for an unknown direction, only a few SLA forces were found on the ground.

After the election process, RUF activities decreased in the District, except for Malal Mara, Kholifa Mabang and Yoni Chiefdoms. At this time, local hunter societies began to be organised in chiefdoms throughout the District, namely the Gbethis in the south and the Kamajors in the south-east;⁵⁸⁶ the Kapras would emerge in the north-east only in 1997. Following frequent attacks by the RUF and harassment by SLA forces, elders from the Kholifa Mabang, Yoni and Malal Mara Chiefdoms set up a civil militia called the Gbethi Society in February 1996.⁵⁸⁷ Composed of local hunters and youths who were organised to perform defence operations for the security of the chiefdoms, some Gbethis were armed with locally-made shotguns, but most possessed only machetes, cutlasses and other bladed weapons. Gbethies dressed country clothes known as "rook", wore charms and talismans around their necks and had two overall commanders, one representing Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom and one representing Yoni Chiefdom; Malal Mara Chiefdom did not have any commander.

The Gbethis conducted day and night patrols and house-to-house searches for any people who were not inhabitants of a particular locality, who were termed "strangers." Civilians were warned to give notice to the Gbethis of any stranger and if they failed to do so, they would be fined Le 20,000. Gbethis operated checkpoints together with SLA forces at Mile 91. However, in June 1996, a fight broke out between SLA forces and Gbethis, allegedly over property taken from civilians by SLA forces. The Gbethis said that the SLA forces had failed to give them their share. After this, the Gbethis were in charge of Mile 91 while the SLA forces remained at the nearby Camp Charlie SLA base.⁵⁸⁸ Although this arrangement persisted, some Gbethis returning from a patrol along the highway entered a skirmish with SLA forces, during which two Gbethis were killed. Reinforcements for the SLA forces came from Bo Town to Mile 91 and the chiefdom elders organised a meeting with them to try to smooth the relationship between the two forces. However, the meeting was a failure because the commander of the SLA forces accused the Gbethis of laying ambushes for SLA forces, as a result of which the situation became tense, culminating in a fight between the Gbethis and SLA forces. Six Gbethis and their commanders were killed during this encounter and SLA forces also suffered some fatalities. Overpowered and outnumbered by the SLA forces, the Gbethis retreated from Mile 91 to Mabang (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom).

On 9 March, the SLA announced 2 infantry brigades, supported by Nigerian and Guinean artillery units, had staged successful raids on RUF bases in the Kangari Hills. It was reported that over 30 RUF members were killed during the attacks.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸⁶ Kamajors would start to be very active in 1997 in Gbonkolenken and Tane Chiefdoms.

⁵⁸⁷ In June 1994, these chiefdoms established a 1000-strong civil militia called the Civil Defence Unit to provide security for Mile 91 and Yonibana. It appears that chiefdom authorities abandoned this particular initiative in March 1995, following attacks across the chiefdoms by RUF forces.

⁵⁸⁸ Camp Charlie is located in the outskirts of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom).

⁵⁸⁹ AFP, 9 March 1996. This attack did not, however, totally dislodge the RUF forces from this base.



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In the aftermath of the presidential elections, a ceasefire was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in March 1996 and negotiations for the signing of a peace agreement began. Shortly after, however, RUF forces inflicted serious physical violence on civilians in and around Magburaka.⁵⁹⁰ Remnants of RUF forces carried out raids in villages, looking for food, which led civilians to find refuge in an IDP camp; around this period, over 14,000 persons had found refuge at camps in Magburaka and Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom).⁵⁹¹

In mid October, Gbethis entered Rokanrr (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) with the intention to deploy throughout the Section. The commander of the Gbethis told inhabitants of the town that it was their responsibility to feed the Gbethis, as they were fighting for the people of the town. A man was then accused of being an RUF member after pointing out that this request would impose even more hardship on the civilians. He was tied up and beaten, but later released.

In the early evening on or around 20 October 1996, the headquarter town of Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom) was attacked for the second time; the attack lasted for a few hours. In collaboration with Executive Outcomes, SLA forces stationed at Bumbuna repelled the RUF forces.⁵⁹² The RUF forces retreated along their line of advance to Kegbema 1, south of Bumbuna. In Kegbema 1, RUF forces killed the Town Chief and five other people. They also burned down 9 houses. The Italian workers were evacuated to Freetown. Executive Outcomes remained at Bumbuna to secure the Hydro Electricity Project Buildings from RUF attack and provide training for the SLA troops stationed there.⁵⁹³

Civilians from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were asked by SLA officials to leave the chiefdom in November 1996 and settle in a camp in the west end of Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom).⁵⁹⁴ A Kamajor representative from Konike Sanda Chiefdom visited this camp and called the men to join the Kamajor Society. Those who volunteered went with him to be trained. Kamajor members were issued with rules to abide by. For example, female Kamajors should not leave their heads uncovered, should not pound grain with a mortar and pestle after 18.00 and civilians should not sit on mortars.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹⁰ Open sources revealed that four women who refused to have sexual intercourse with RUF members had their vaginas and rectum sewed with fishing line while four men also had their rectum sewed, two men had their mouths clamped with padlock and one woman had her vagina clamped with a padlock: *The Independent* (London), 5 May 1996, quoting Amnesty International.

⁵⁹¹ AFP, 5 July 1996.

⁵⁹² Executive Outcomes was a private military company contracted in 1995 by the Sierra Leonean Government to assist the SLA in repelling the RUF forces, mainly by giving military training to SLA forces. They deployed mainly in Kono District.

⁵⁹³ It is interesting to note that during their stay in the country, Executive Outcomes were hired by mining companies in Kono and Moyamba Districts to provide security in the mining sites.

⁵⁹⁴ See Inter Press Service, 2 January 1997 for more on this IDP camp.

⁵⁹⁵ It is unclear from the records whether these rules were also imposed on the civilian population in areas secured by the Kamajors.



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overpowered and withdrew. SLA forces then broke into houses and shops, from which they took a lot of property, and forced civilians to carry the load to Mile 91 and Camp Charlie.⁶⁰¹

In one incident in early 1997, Kamajors from Kholifa Rowalla, Tane and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms who were looking for RUF forces in the Tane Chiefdom took possession of various items, including guns, they had found in the bushes. This did not please the SLA forces and in May, they attacked Kamajors who were conducting a night patrol along Bo Road. In the same month, SLA forces dressed themselves in Kamajor attire and allegedly burnt the civilian residential camp near Matotoka; as a result of that attack, civilians fled the area.

In the middle of April, following the Abidjan Peace Agreement, around 50 malnourished RUF members who had been based for almost three years in the Kangari Hills surrendered in Magburaka and demobilised.⁶⁰² On 6 May 1997, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom (Kenema District) went back to "Booloko", the RUF base. During this attack, three members of the RUF forces were killed and 30 were captured and brought to Gorama Mende Chiefdom. These captured men were encouraged to give information about the camp; their response was described as "fruitful". On 24 May 1997, the Kamajors went to the RUF defence headquarters in the Kangari Hills. Thirty-eight RUF members were captured, including their commanders, and an unspecified number were killed. The Kamajors took a large number of weapons and ammunition back to Bo along with the captured RUF members. Those captured RUF members were still in Bo when the military coup took place the following day.

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'état and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released over 700 people from the Pademba Road Prison, including their leader, who was formally sworn in on 17 June 1997 as Head of State.⁶⁰³ After the coup, the CDF were asked to disarm by the AFRC forces.⁶⁰⁴ Gbethis from the upper part of Yoni Chiefdom and from Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms acceded to this request, but the Gbethis from the lower part of Yoni Chiefdom refused to surrender. Instead, they joined with Kamajors from the South and attacked Camp Charlie, but were beaten; some of them were killed during the battle. Following this attack on Camp Charlie, the Gbethis were given a deadline to surrender.

Following an order allegedly from the AFRC leader, the RUF commander announced that looting should stop and that any civilians or RUF/AFRC members caught looting would "face the consequences". These consequences became clear when three civilians were killed in the town square of Mile 91 for stealing property belonging to other civilians. In a separate incident, a civilian was also shot dead in the square for stealing a foam mattress belonging to another person.

⁶⁰¹ While open sources (Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information (OCHA) 15 April - 12 May 1997) mentioned Kapras clashing with SLA forces in Mile 91 on April 1997, there is no information in our records about Kapras activities in the chiefdom; only Kamajors and Gbethis are mentioned in this regard.

⁶⁰² Inter Press Service, 16 April 1997.

⁶⁰³ Xinhua, 17 June 1997.

⁶⁰⁴ The AFRC Chairman made an announcement over the radio that CDF members should lay down their arms and register at the nearest police station.



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In May or June, Kamajors from Gbonkolenken and Tane Chiefdoms held a meeting at Yele, a junction town in the far south of Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. They decided to cut off the highway leading into Kono District, thereby preventing food from getting to the RUF in that District. On May 10 Kamajors units moved into to Tane Chiefdom and blocked the highway between Magburaka and Matotoka, at the place where the Pampana River crosses the highway. SLA forces tried to dislodge the Kamajors from their position so that they could reopen the highway, but were unsuccessful. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone eventually persuaded the Kamajors to clear the road. A Kamajor Society was also formed in Konike Barina Chiefdom in 1997.

In July 1997, as the deadline for the Gbethis to surrender expired in Yoni Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces began house-to-house searches or screening patrols for Gbethis, using civilians who were familiar with the surroundings. As a result of this screening process, suspects were molested by the RUF/AFRC forces, publicly flogged with their hands tied behind their backs, forced to do frog jumps⁶¹⁵ or to lie on their backs and look at the sun. In addition, the RUF/AFRC forces passed decrees applicable to both civilians and RUF/AFRC members. Night curfews were imposed and contraveners were fined Le 5,000; those who did not pay the fine were severely flogged. RUF/AFRC forces also used civilians during their food-finding missions and forced civilians to do menial tasks in their homes. In October, RUF/AFRC forces coming from the direction of Bo District brought various items, including Honda motorbikes, cars, bicycles and accessories they had stolen and sold them to civilians at Mile 91. They also established small-scale businesses such as hawking and barrow boys. As they moved freely from Mile 91 to Magburaka, Port Loko and Makeni, they would bring back stolen items to Mile 91 to sell them. They further explained to the population that they were stealing because they were not paid and that in any case, civilians should support them and share their food with them, since they had come to save the civilians. These business transactions were, however, sometimes marred by violence and were not conducted fairly; on more than one occasion, RUF/AFRC members required people to pay for the same goods twice. Stealing in the Mile 91 area was described as being at its peak around this period.

RUF/AFRC units with different responsibilities were put in place, including the Military Police and the Task Force. The Military Police were responsible for investigating matters related to the sale and purchase of items. However, if a civilian and an RUF/AFRC member had a quarrel or a disagreement, only the RUF/AFRC member would be allowed to explain their version of what happened.⁶¹⁶

Sometime after the coup in 1997, RUF/AFRC forces settled in Magburaka. Civilians were harassed, women and girls were raped and children were abducted and forced to join the RUF/AFRC movement. Kamajors coming from the eastern part of the chiefdom attacked the town early in the morning, but were overpowered by the RUF/AFRC forces and retreated in the same direction from which they had come. In the afternoon, a member of the AFRC called together the civilians who

⁶¹⁵ To "frog jump" or to "pump" is done by first holding on to the earlobes with two hands – the left hand holding the right ear lobe and vice versa– after which the person is required to jump up and down continuously on their haunches. This form of punishment was both physically and psychologically painful, because it is a punishment meted out mostly to children and it is considered shameful for an adult to be made to "pump".

⁶¹⁶ See below for the role of the Task Force.



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had fled during the attack. At that time, some women were raped, some civilians were beaten, property was taken and captured Kamajors were executed and thrown into water wells and latrine pits. In the afternoon of the same day, the same AFRC member launched "Operation Pay Yourself", according to which the RUF/AFRC forces were free to take property belonging to civilians.⁶⁰⁷

One event that took place in Malal Mara Chiefdom after RUF forces had established a base at Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) in June 1997 highlights the structures that RUF forces put in place to obtain food. Malal Mara Chiefdom is a strategic position, as it is the starting point of the road that links up with the road from Magburaka to Makeni through Bombali District. RUF forces were sent to Manewa Section, in the north of Malal Mara Chiefdom, to open a Task Force office to raise funds for their base at Makeni. To achieve this, civilians were required to pay taxes. Furthermore, whenever the base at Makeni needed something, this would be communicated to the Task Force units, who would contact their local administrative heads, who in turn would demand contributions from civilians. The collection of money and property was accompanied by harassment in an attempt to get the items quickly. This process lasted until 1999.

Despite the Peace Plan signed between the AFRC leader and the Government of Sierra Leone in Conakry, Guinea on October 1997,⁶⁰⁸ RUF/AFRC violations were still reported in the District and RUF/AFRC forces embarked on upgrading the airstrip at Magburaka into a "fully-fledged airport for the illegal importation of arms and other supplies."⁶⁰⁹

In December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces from Yoni Chiefdom realised that civilians were hiding their properties in the bush. An announcement was made that any civilian caught concealing property would be punished and the property would be taken.

That same month, Kamajors⁶¹⁰ unsuccessfully attacked Mafolatha (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). This attack aimed at dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces from the town, considered as a springboard for Mile 91 and its environs. There were no reported casualties.⁶¹¹

f) Events in 1998

In early 1998, stealing carried out by RUF/AFRC forces continued in the District. In February, retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown en route to Kono District using the Freetown-Kono highway passed by different chiefdoms in the District. On their way to Kono District, they launched the "Operation Pay Yourself", according to which RUF/AFRC forces would take food and other items from civilians to last them through their retreat. In addition, in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from different areas arrived in Mile 91. "Operation Pay Yourself" was also launched there and villages and towns in the chiefdom were looted, mainly for food although there were two

⁶⁰⁷ This kind of operation, namely, massive stealing would be widely carried out in 1998 by RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown and would reach unprecedented levels during that period.

⁶⁰⁸ During this meeting, it was agreed that RUF/AFRC forces would hand over power to the Sierra Leonean President on 22 April 1998.

⁶⁰⁹ Sierra Leone Situation Report (OCHA), 20 December 1997 - 20 January 1998.

⁶¹⁰ They were described as a faction of the CDF speaking Mende.

⁶¹¹ No more information was available on this attack.



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secondary school girls were raped at this time. RUF/AFRC forces, however, avoided the lower part of Yoni Chiefdom since it was a CDF stronghold. While they were advancing to Kono, some RUF/AFRC forces were attacked by Kamajors in Tane Chiefdom. However, the RUF/AFRC forces managed to repel the attack, killing eight Kamajors and wounding many others. Nevertheless, during this time, it appeared to civilians that there was no command structure within the forces and the RUF commander who was familiar to everyone was not around.

RUF/AFRC forces arriving in Magburaka by truck, Honda motorbikes and cars in late February also carried out "Operation Pay Yourself" in the town,⁶¹² which had a lot of traders and many vehicles. In the early evening, some RUF/AFRC members saw a girl in the street and called to her, but she ran away. They followed her to her house. Her father came out and the RUF/AFRC members threatened to kill him if he did not give them his daughter. After begging them, the father told them to do what they had to do, for he had no alternative. One of the RUF/AFRC members then shot him in his left foot, cut off two of his toes and left. In another incident, RUF/AFRC forces met a man in the street, asked him about his money and followed him to his house. When the forces asked him why he did not have any money, he replied that the war had put him "back to square one". The RUF/AFRC forces shot at his house with an RPG, killing the man, who was inside at the time. The family of the dead man reported the case to one of the commanders, who later identified and shot the member who had killed the man. During the night, many girls were raped and some were taken to Kono District. RUF/AFRC forces burnt 50 houses in the town and executed Kamajors they had captured; their bodies were thrown in water wells or latrine pits.

On 5 March, ECOMOG forces entered Magburaka and its environs. Youths were asked to point out any RUF/AFRC member or collaborator and those suspected were detained at Magburaka's Local Prison. As ECOMOG left for Makeni,⁶¹³ RUF/AFRC forces attacked the town before dawn on the following day, 6 March 1998, from the western part of the chiefdom. The RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 25 houses; some civilians were in their houses when they were set on fire and were burnt alive. Many others were killed and many women were raped and some were taken to be used for sexual purposes. Young people were forced to carry the property the RUF/AFRC forces had stolen as they left the town before daybreak towards the south of the chiefdom. ECOMOG then returned to Magburaka and threatened the civilians, accusing them of allowing RUF/AFRC forces to stay in their chiefdom. Property was taken by ECOMOG forces and it is also reported that

⁶¹² From February to June, the number of civilians wounded or mutilated and arriving in Magburaka hospital increased considerably: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (UNOCHA), 1 - 22 May 1998 and 9 June - 6 July 1998.

⁶¹³ Following the intervention in Freetown in February 1998, a new ECOMOG Brigade – 24 Infantry Brigade – was designed for the expansion of its activities in the Provinces. After they had recaptured Lunsar (Port Loko District), ECOMOG forces headed for Makeni, where it was reported ousted RUF/AFRC forces had established their new base: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc, pp 29 and 39. That could explain why ECOMOG forces did not stay in Magburaka that day. Accordingly, these ECOMOG forces did not belong to the same group who deployed in Bo and Mile 91.



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civilians' wives were forced to have sexual relations with some ECOMOG members.⁶¹⁴ At this time, ECOMOG forces also deployed at many checkpoints along the Magburaka–Kono highway.⁶¹⁵

Kamajors⁶¹⁶ launched an attack on RUF positions on 5 March at Magbass village and Magbass Sugar complex, located in Mamuntha Section in the south of Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. The head of the Kamajors held a stick wrapped in black and red cloth.⁶¹⁷ After the RUF forces sustained heavy casualties, their commander ordered his forces to withdraw towards Magburaka.⁶¹⁸ The Kamajors who had defeated the RUF forces began breaking into the factory and houses in the village, taking property and removing the zinc roof of the factory. They arrested 50 civilians who were hiding and asked them why they were supporting the RUF forces. The civilians were neither killed nor beaten, but were forced to carry the stolen property to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. When they arrived in the Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, they were released and returned to Mamuntha Section.

Around 17 March, heavily-armed RUF forces⁶¹⁹ returned to retake their position in the south of Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. At a village called Makorie, they launched the Operation “No Bush Shaking”, which meant they would shoot in the direction of any grass that was moving, on the assumption that people were hiding there. At Makoray, they burnt down four houses and killed three civilians. At Maiekonko, they burnt all 15 houses in the village because they could not find any people there. On the same day, they went to Mayatha, dividing themselves into three groups to attack the village. Some Kamajors were captured, killed and cut into pieces. The next morning, RUF forces called people for prayers but nobody came, as they knew that this was a tactic used by RUF forces to gather civilians and kill them. In the afternoon, the RUF forces left the village, burning down 18 houses, and went back to Magburaka.

ECOMOG forces coming from Bo,⁶²⁰ together with Kamajors from the southern Province, came to Mile 91 in March 1998. By then, the retreating RUF/AFRC forces had already left the town, heading further north. Many civilians fled with the retreating forces, allegedly frightened of being chased and treated as collaborators, since Kamajors considered that civilians in the upper part of Yoni Chiefdom and in Kholifa Mabang and Malal Mara Chiefdoms were all collaborators. Screening processes were organised by ECOMOG and Kamajors for the purposes of identifying collaborators. As a result of this screening process, ECOMOG forces killed six civilians in March. In addition to people, houses were screened and if any of the items found there led ECOMOG and the Kamajors to suspect that the house had in one way or another hosted members of the RUF/AFRC forces, the house was burnt down and the property was confiscated; up to 98 houses were burnt during this process.

⁶¹⁴ No more information was available on this incident.

⁶¹⁵ They notably deployed in Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom) on 6 April: Adeshina, op. cit., p 70.

⁶¹⁶ The Kamajors were equipped with cutlasses, axes and sticks and few of them had AK47s and RPGs.

⁶¹⁷ Red symbolised blood and black symbolised death.

⁶¹⁸ This RUF/AFRC defeat was explained by civilians through the intervention of the mystical power of the Kamajors who were believed to be able to stop the guns of the enemy.

⁶¹⁹ These RUF forces were fully equipped with a lot of RPG, AK47s, G3 and mortar bombs.

⁶²⁰ Those ECOMOG forces had arrived to Bo town from Kenema Town around 20-22 February 1998.



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Kamajors assisted by ECOMOG forces also organised patrols in the villages surrounding Mile 91 to search for “rebel collaborators”. These patrols were accompanied by destruction of property, mostly done by Kamajors. For example, in Yonibana, 45 houses were burnt; 40 houses were burnt in Mawor; and 45 were burnt in Gaindema. ECOMOG forces and Kamajors also allegedly took civilians’ property, which was then conveyed to Bo Town. Following these incidents, Gbethis from lower Yoni Chiefdom decided to confront the Kamajors, but ECOMOG forces managed to contain them and then charged them with ensuring the security of lower Yoni Chiefdom.⁶²¹

In April, some units of the RUF/AFRC forces were still in Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom. In one incident, a suckling woman who had given birth two weeks previously was raped after her husband refused to give his food to some members of the RUF/AFRC forces. Furthermore, the husband was given 36 lashes and was ordered to eat his own excrement. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces burnt down the houses that remained standing in Mafolatha when civilians refused to give them food. On or around 13 April, RUF/AFRC forces⁶²² arrived at Bolyin (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), a village in the Mabang Section that was used as a hideout by civilians. They convened a meeting in the Court Barrie and explained that the purpose of their visit was to ask CDF (Gbethis) deployed in the area to join them to fight the CDF (Kamajors) in Bo District.⁶²³ The CDF refused to join them and the two groups battled for two hours. The CDF eventually overpowered the RUF/AFRC forces, who left the town, taking away food and domestic animals and burning down four houses.

Around this period, Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom), on the highway to Koidu (Kono District), hosted thousands of IDPs fleeing battles between ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC forces in Kono District.⁶²⁴

On 1 June, ECOMOG forces at Mile 91 announced that civilians who were in the bushes could come back in their houses, with priority being given to women. Following this announcement, women arrived at Mile 91 and were taken to the Caritas building, where they were accommodated for the night. During that night, four of them were raped by Kamajors. It is reported that at this time, ECOMOG forces were unable to control the Kamajors, who had their own command structure. Later in June, men were allowed to resettle back at Mile 91 and were thoroughly screened at checkpoints operated by ECOMOG forces and Kamajors. In July 1998, a suspected “rebel” was apprehended by Gbethis and taken to ECOMOG forces at Mile 91, where he was killed.

In June, CDF from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom came to Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom and liberated Mafolatha, Makelleh (Yoni Chiefdom) and the surrounding villages from RUF/AFRC presence. Since then, no further RUF/AFRC attack was sustained in this area.

Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom went to Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom on 5 December and entered Mabom, around 10 miles south of Magburaka. They dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces who

⁶²¹ It should be recalled that tension had existed between the Gbethis and the Kamajors since 1997.

⁶²² Some of those forces were carrying AK47s and RPGs while others were equipped with cutlasses and sticks.

⁶²³ At this time, Kamajors and ECOMOG forces had driven RUF/AFRC forces out of Bo District.

⁶²⁴ Inter Press Service, 8 July 1998.



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were there and, before returning to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, went on rampage, breaking into civilians' houses and abducting some young men and women. They took food, furniture like bed mattresses and building materials, burnt 15 houses and headed for another village called Masoria, where they asked civilians to point out the houses where RUF/AFRC forces used to live. They went in the houses identified by the civilians and searched for arms and ammunition. As they did not know how to operate the weapons they found – mortar bombs and anti-aircraft guns – they burnt them before returning to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, where they set up more checkpoints. People coming from Magburaka and crossing the border to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were often arrested, tied with ropes called "FM"⁶²⁵ or detained in a cage where cattle slept, suspected of being a "rebel" collaborator. People who were found to be collaborators were killed, allegedly in the forest between Tane and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms, near a stream called Nasi.

In late December, an important movement of troops were to be seen in different chiefdoms of the District. One group of armed men and women, around 300 in number, dressed in mixed military uniforms entered Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) in December 1998. They came in a big green military truck with a foreign military plate, which was identified as belonging to ECOMOG forces deployed in Teko Barracks (Bombali District). The troops identified themselves as "Government troops" coming to protect civilians from the advancing "rebels". They then asked the inhabitants to cook for them and civilians realised that these troops were actually RUF/AFRC forces in disguise; most of them were speaking Liberian dialects and Mende.⁶²⁶ After one week, the whole town was controlled with checkpoints and civilians were required to have a pass if they wanted to leave the town. The next day, some of the RUF forces moved towards Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom). During their stay in Mabonto, the RUF forces instituted a Court and the most common crimes prosecuted in that court were rape and stealing. Three RUF/AFRC members were executed for these crimes.⁶²⁷

Kalansogoia Chiefdom was the scene of many ambushes and attacks carried out by RUF/AFRC forces. The Hydro Compound at Bumbuna was under construction and was therefore of interest, because there were lorries, fuel and other similar items. Thus six attacks were led by RUF/AFRC forces on the town. On 14 December, two ECOMOG members on patrol along the Bumbuna-Bendugu (Sambaia Chiefdom) road fell in an ambush staged by RUF/AFRC forces and were killed.

On 21 December 1998, a large number of armed men in dirty uniforms came from Kono District to Tane Chiefdom, telling people they were tired of fighting and they were no longer going to the bush.⁶²⁸ Some of these troops went towards Magburaka and Makeni while others stayed in Tane Chiefdom, following civilians into the bush in search of food or what was called Jar Jar, which means taking things from civilians by force. Small girls were taken as their "wives" and young men were abducted to carry their loads. They sent messages to civilians to come out of the bush as they

⁶²⁵ FM means "frequency modulation", for it was believed that once tied with this rope, which had two sticks on its edges used to tighten the rope around people's limbs, people began to speak.

⁶²⁶ Around this time, it was believed that combatants from Liberia, allegedly supported by the Liberian President, were taking part in the hostilities in Sierra Leone.

⁶²⁷ No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶²⁸ RUF/AFRC forces retook control of Koidu (Kono District headquarter) on 20 December.



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said they were no longer fighting civilians or Kamajors, only ECOMOG forces. Following this, some Kamajors started to surrender. Twenty of them came and as nothing happened, more and more Kamajors came out, up to 80 in number. Those Kamajors who did not surrender went to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. Many civilians went also to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, at this time a Kamajor stronghold, after the armed men had taken half of their property at gunpoint.⁶²⁹

Three days after the attack on Koidu Town, the headquarters of Kono District, hundreds of RUF/AFRC forces reached Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, entering Magburaka Town on 23 December.⁶³⁰ Previously, the RUF Battle Field Commander had been interviewed on the BBC and declared they would enter Freetown by road. While in Magburaka, the RUF/AFRC forces raped and killed people. For example, on 26 December, a boy working in a garage was threatened with death if he could not repair the Honda that some RUF/AFRC members had brought him the night before. As he became more and more distressed, the boy attempted to run away and was shot by the forces. The same forces pushed their Honda and asked another boy to help them. The boy was then left to hide at the corner of a house and, as he thought the fighters had left, he moved along the street. The RUF forces shot in the air and called out to the boy. When he turned around, the RUF forces shot him in the head. The same night, some members of the RUF/AFRC went to Bathmorie, near Magburaka, and attacked a house, thinking they would find girls. As there were none, they took a young boy to lead them to a house where they could find girls. The boy went to a house and told the girls to vacate the place quietly. When he came back to the RUF/AFRC members, he told them there was no girls there. The members went to the house to check what the boy had said and no girls were to be found. They then started hitting the boy on his back with their G3 guns, they then shot at his feet and shot him another time, killing him. At this time, the RUF commander told civilians that the RUF/AFRC forces would attack Freetown and many civilians were abducted for use in the fighting forces.⁶³¹

g) Events in 1999

Around 1 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces entered Kumrabai Junction (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom) from the direction of Magburaka, en route to Mile 91. On their way, some of the RUF/AFRC forces were left at Kumrabai Station, Matuku 1 and Matuku 2. The relationship between the RUF/AFRC forces and the CDF was allegedly cordial and a civilian was appointed as an intermediary between the two groups. Two days later, however, other RUF/AFRC forces coming from Waterloo passed through Kumrabai Junction and headed to Ferry Junction, the crossing point at the boundary between Kholifa Mabang and Gbonkolenken Chiefdoms, asking what was the mileage to the headquarter town of Yele (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom). They started firing at CDF forces, who returned fire. This group of RUF/AFRC then moved to Magburaka.

Following this encounter, about 500 CDF members from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom attacked Robis, Kumrabai Junction and Ferry Junction and took property. They killed three people at Robis, four at

⁶²⁹ No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶³⁰ No battles with ECOMOG forces were reported. It seems that after they came back to the town in March 1998, ECOMOG forces did not stay the whole year, although it could not be ascertained when they left the town. RUF/AFRC forces would hold the town until 2002.

⁶³¹ Makeni (Bombali District) was attacked around 27 December 1998.



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Ferry Junction, and eight at Kumrabai Junction; raped four women; and abducted 15 boys under the age of 15, possibly for recruitment into the fighting forces.⁶³²

On 14 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces who had attacked Magburaka at the end of 1998 entered Mile 91 and overcame the Kamajors and ECOMOG forces, who retreated south in the direction of Bo District. The RUF/AFRC forces appealed to the civilians not to run away, as they were not their focus, which was the ECOMOG and Kamajors forces. For three days, however, a lot of property was taken, before the RUF commander gave the order for it to stop. This attack on Mile 91 is believed to have taken place to cut off the highway that leads to Freetown, which had been invaded on 6 January and was still at least partly still under RUF/AFRC occupation.⁶³³

The RUF/AFRC forces began operating checkpoints at strategic locations around the town and thoroughly screened people coming in to identify any possible CDF member. Civilians coming from Lower Yoni were closely checked, as their area was hosting Gbethis and Kamajors from the Southern Province. Small Boys Units were used to confiscate property from civilians, which was then handed over to their superior officers. RUF/AFRC forces carried out food-finding missions in the surrounding villages and civilians were used to carry the food to Mile 91.

On 28 January 1999, not long after the killing of the two ECOMOG forces during a patrol in late 1998, SLA forces deployed at Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom), establishing a brigade headquarter. On their arrival, the SLA forces dug trenches around the town and laid down landmines, escorting civilians to avoid them stepping on the mines. Bumbuna was a point of passage for RUF/AFRC forces coming from Kono District using the Kayima Road (Koinadugu District). RUF/AFRC forces coming westwards from the direction of Magburaka and Mabonto launched many attacks on Bumbuna; the fiercest one took place on 15 February 1999, between 7:00 pm and 7:00 am. RUF/AFRC forces were unsuccessful in dislodging the SLA and instead occupied all the villages along the border between Kalansogoia and Kafe Simira Chiefdoms,⁶³⁴ chasing civilians in their hideouts for food and cattle and burning down houses in the villages. The aim of these attacks was mainly to capture the SLA arms and ammunition.

The presence of the SLA forces in Bumbuna brought some relief to the population. As the highway leading to Magburaka was under RUF/AFRC control, thereby preventing lorries from bringing food, the only way to secure food was for the civilians of Kalansogoia Chiefdom to go to Kabala (Koinadugu District), which was 76 miles away.⁶³⁵ As a result, civilians were mainly living on the food rations that were airlifted by helicopter from Freetown for the SLA forces. The commander in charge of the SLA forces was allegedly very strict with the forces under his command so that they would treat civilians cordially.

Throughout 1999 and 2000, the whole area surrounding Bumbuna up to Magburaka was under RUF/AFRC control. RUF/AFRC forces operated checkpoints on the Magburaka-Kono highway,

⁶³² No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶³³ See the events for the Western Area, 1999.

⁶³⁴ Kajida, Kabaray, Kasikoro and Yibai were thus occupied at this time.

⁶³⁵ It took civilians three to four days to reach Kabala.



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issuing and asking civilians for travelling documents called “passes”, which cost Le 500 and were valid for 72 hours. No other documents but these passes were accepted as valid travelling documents. People who produced “Government documents”, namely documents issued by State Institutions, were arrested and detained, accused of being one of “Tejan Kabbah’s people”, namely a supporter of the Government.

By January 1999, almost half of the civilians from Tane Chiefdom had fled to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, where the Kamajors were very active. Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, together with those who came from Tane Chiefdom, decided to attack the RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Tane Chiefdom. In March, after some of the RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Tane Chiefdom had crossed the border to Madina (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom) and had killed one Kamajor during a fight, the Kamajors decided to cross the border between the two chiefdoms and attack positions in Tane Chiefdom. Both factions crossed the border many times, attacking each other in Yele and Matotoka. As a result, Tane Chiefdom was seriously damaged as many houses were burnt down. In April 1999 and following an RUF/AFRC attack on Yele that had left 10 houses burnt down, Kamajors went to Matotoka and burnt 50 houses, including the Paramount Chief’s compound. On their way back to Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, they set more houses on fire in Makenikoray (Tane Chiefdom). When they saw flames in Matotoka, RUF/AFRC forces burnt the remaining houses, thinking they were Kamajors’ houses because they had been left standing by the Kamajors.

In March 1999, Kamajors together with Gbethis coming from Lower Yoni went to Mile 91 to attack the RUF/AFRC forces. A fierce battle took place at Yonibana but the CDF had to retreat, as some of them were killed during the attack. Following this attack, RUF/AFRC forces looted houses at Yonibana and forced civilians to carry the load to Mile 91.

Another attack was launched on Mile 91 in the middle of April 1999 by combined forces of Kamajors, Gbethis, ECOMOG and SLA. There was a lot of shooting during what was described as the heaviest attack on Mile 91 since the war started. The RUF/AFRC forces were forced to withdraw to the direction of Magburaka.⁶³⁶ After the attack, the bodies of 10 civilians, including four women, were found in the town. Thirty houses had also been burnt down. In addition, cases of rape were reported, although civilians were unable to ascertain with certainty the identity of the perpetrators.⁶³⁷ This control of Mile 91 enabled ECOMOG and Kamajors forces to reopen the highway to Bo Town, although the portion of the highway between Masiaka (Port Loko District) and Mile 91 was still considered insecure.⁶³⁸

Subsequently, Mile 91 saw an influx of civilians coming from Makeni, Magburaka and other areas in the north that had fallen under the control of RUF/AFRC forces. These displaced people had no choice but to occupy destroyed dwellings, which they tried to fix.

⁶³⁶ In May, serious fighting was reported in the area of Magburaka: IRIN West Africa, 24 May 1999.

⁶³⁷ It could not be ascertained whether those acts were committed by the RUF/AFRC forces or by the combined forces of ECOMOG, Kamajors and SLA.

⁶³⁸ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (UNOCHA), April 1999. Since March 1999, Bo District had been under Kamajor and ECOMOG control.



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Between March and May, following constant pressure from SLA forces and the CDF, a senior RUF commander issued an order to all RUF/AFRC commanders that all the young men in Makeni and Magburaka should be abducted and trained as fighters. The ground commander in Magburaka called his sub commanders to go and capture the young men of the town. Many young men fled in to the bush while this operation, which lasted two weeks, was carried out. On 10 March 1999, about 100 young men were captured and locked in the Train Store of Agriculture in Magburaka. These young men were then sent for training by vehicle to Burkina, which was the code name for Kailahun. After two weeks, the young men who were caught were fined Le 50,000 and, if they could not pay, were given 300 lashes as a punishment for hiding while the "recruitment" was being carried out. One month later, sometime in April 1999, RUF/AFRC forces in Magburaka faced a food shortage and started attacking villages to take their food. During these attacks, young girls were also taken to become the "wives" of the RUF/AFRC forces.

Throughout the year, CDF forces from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom were also very active in Kholifa Mabang and Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdoms. It is reported that a lot of destruction was carried out in the villages, where property was taken, women raped and people accused of being collaborators or sympathisers of the RUF/AFRC forces were tortured. Killings of people suspected of being "rebels" or collaborators were carried out in the CDF base at Mamilla Gbla.

In one incident in March, three members of a group of Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom who were attempting to attack Magburaka Town were shot dead by RUF/AFRC forces, who then sprinkled petrol on the bodies and set fire to them. As they retreated, the other Kamajors shot dead a man they had called out to but who had run into the bush.

In April 1999, following civilians' complaints about the flogging of civilians with up to 200 lashes, the rape of young girls and the killing of civilians, the commander in charge of the RUF/AFRC forces in Manewa Section (Malal Mara Chiefdom) was replaced by another senior RUF/AFRC commander. The new commander extended the RUF/AFRC's activities towards the north to Kiampkakolo Section, to the west to Mara Section and to the south, to Massathelel Section, deploying in the major villages of the sections. A senior AFRC commander imposed that everybody in the villages should register at the military police task force; any civilian that was not registered would be considered to be a spy for the elected Government. Furthermore, civilians were responsible for feeding the troops. Routine checks were carried out in the villages and if any person who was on the registration list were missing, the local authorities appointed by the RUF/AFRC would be beaten and fined. The movement of petty traders coming from other chiefdoms was controlled by the military police, who would search everybody and confiscate anything they wanted; anyone who complained about this was flogged. Some youths from the villages were used to carry items stolen during the looting activities called Jar Jar. Those who were unable to carry the load or who were sick during the journey were shot dead. Some of the youths who were forced to carry the load were cooperative and were promoted to the rank of small unit leaders and later on to local commanders, which enticed many youths in the villages into joining the movement. The use of the youths enabled thus the RUF/AFRC forces to have access to all the hideouts, where they stole food and other domestic items.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

DRAFT FOR REVIEW ONLY: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION



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After a ceasefire was signed in May 1999, the negotiations between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone reached their conclusion in the signing of a Peace Agreement in Lomé, Togo. Some relief was brought to the people of Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom at this time.⁶³⁹

Starting in the middle of the year, after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, RUF/AFRC forces from Magburaka on food-finding missions were attacked by Kamajors from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom. For example, following one food-finding mission where RUF/AFRC forces arrested and beat civilians for failing to give them rice, Kamajors moved from Gbonkolenken Chiefdom and blocked the highway at Pampana Bridge in Tane Chiefdom at the boundary with Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom. It is reported that the matter was referred to the RUF High Command, who ordered that the Kamajors be dislodged using an anti-aircraft machinegun.⁶⁴⁰ The Kamajors could not resist the attack, during which 20 CDF members were killed and most of them run away. The RUF/AFRC forces threw the bodies into the Pampana River. However, they managed to capture two Kamajors, who were stripped naked and had ropes tied to their backs; these ropes were then also tied behind the lorry that was carrying the anti-aircraft machine gun. When they arrived at Magburaka, the two Kamajors were dead, their bodies severely mutilated; the RUF/AFRC forces later burnt their remains.⁶⁴¹

In October 1999, Gbethis attacked villages in Malal Mara Chiefdom, targeting both the RUF/AFRC positions and civilians. Cases of looting, rape and killing of civilians were reported. Young people were forced to carry the stolen property and since it was the harvest season, civilians were taken to their farms to carry out the work of harvesting.⁶⁴²

In early October, tension between RUF/AFRC forces⁶⁴³ escalated and an in-fight arose in Makeni (Bombali District) between RUF forces on one hand and AFRC forces on the other hand. A senior RUF commander came from Magburaka to attack AFRC forces based in Makeni. It seems that the RUF forces were first not able to dislodge the AFRC members and withdrew from Makeni to Magburaka, where they were allegedly attacked the next day from the "Old Town" section of the town. The fighting lasted for two days. Eventually, in late October, RUF forces from Magburaka and backed up with forces coming from Kailahun District dislodged the AFRC forces from Makeni and occupied the town.⁶⁴⁴

⁶³⁹ Although this assertion is not accompanied with details, it gives an idea on the activities in the chiefdom at this stage.

⁶⁴⁰ The person tasked with carrying out this assignment would later become Foday Sankoh's bodyguard.

⁶⁴¹ In October, the situation around Magburaka and Matotoka (Tane Chiefdom) was still insecure, as civilians were forced to give food to the Paramount Chief who in turn gave the food to RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces also went directly to the civilians to take food: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA), 3 - 9 October 1999.

⁶⁴² No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶⁴³ Following the retreat from Freetown in February 1998, the relationship between the RUF and the AFRC forces was often tense, culminating on some occasions in infighting; for more information, see the analyses for Bombali and Kono Districts.

⁶⁴⁴ It is alleged that this infighting was of a personal nature, because the senior RUF commander who originated from Makeni did not tolerate that the AFRC senior commander in charge of Makeni looted his home town.



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On 22 October, the UN Security Council established a 6,000-strong UN peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone in support of the Lomé Peace Agreement. According to the resolution, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) would be deployed throughout the country.⁶⁴⁵ However, the first batch of UN peacekeepers from the Kenyan contingent were denied access to Magburaka by local RUF commanders, although the peacekeepers were carrying letters of authority from the RUF leader.⁶⁴⁶

At some point in 1999, RUF forces came back to settle at Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom) and asked the CDF to come and join them, which some CDF members did. Junior RUF members were sent on food-finding missions; later, however, they asked civilians to feed them before they began looting and using children to work for them, in particular to go on food-finding missions. People reported the matter to senior RUF commanders, who then came to the town and advised the civilians to make a war committee, which they did. Later on, the RUF leader came and declared that the war was over.⁶⁴⁷

In the middle of November, RUF forces reopened to a certain extent the Magburaka-Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom), which at that time was still under their control. Vehicles that had been stolen by RUF members were driven along this highway as commercial transport; the vehicles were generally driven by civilians under the control of RUF members. However, potential passengers were frightened to board these vehicles and continued to use bush paths on foot.

h) Events in 2000

In January, United Nations Military Observers (MILOBs) started patrolling in the Northern Province and in particular in Magburaka.⁶⁴⁸ By the middle of the month, the deployment of UN peacekeepers was near completion.⁶⁴⁹ During this period, it was hoped that the disarmament camp would be open soon in Magburaka so that the disarmament process could properly start.⁶⁵⁰

In mid January 2000, one of the well known RUF commanders was shuttling between Malal Mara Chiefdom, Makeni and Magburaka, which led the people of Malal Mara Chiefdom to think he had other assignments elsewhere. At the end of the month, another group of RUF forces arrived, headed by a different commander. During the same period, more youths joined the Gbethi Society in the chiefdom.

RUF/AFRC forces from Magburaka spent much of January and February in most of the areas in the chiefdom where Kamajors had been, then went through the western part of the chiefdom to attack

⁶⁴⁵ The number of peacekeepers would increase over the subsequent months.

⁶⁴⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA) 6 - 19 December 1999.

⁶⁴⁷ By the end of the year, the RUF leader and the former AFRC Chairman went to the Provinces to engage the disarmament process.

⁶⁴⁸ IRIN West Africa, 6 January 2000.

⁶⁴⁹ IRIN West Africa, 11 January 2000. One Kenyan Battalion was deployed in Magburaka and Makeni.

⁶⁵⁰ On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President had officially launched the start of the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown. The start of the DDR program had been briefly delayed as it was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.



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Mile 91. On their way, they abducted many young men in Magburaka to carry their arms and arrived at Kumrabai Junction, where they met strong resistance from the Kamajors and had to withdraw. On their way back, they passed by Masoko, where they asked civilians to show them where the Kamajors were. Despite one boy telling them there were no Kamajors in the village, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt down 10 houses and killed three civilians whom they suspected of being Kamajors. They then passed by Mayossoh, where they burnt 13 houses, and Robinkie, where they burnt down 11 houses together with the factory.

A Guinean Battalion of United Nations peacekeepers deployed in Mile 91 around March. During the same period, the DDR camp was still under construction in Magburaka.⁶⁵¹ The situation in Tonkolili District, however, was tense and deteriorated rapidly. In April 2000, RUF forces asked the UN peacekeepers to dismantle the reception centre⁶⁵² for combatants in Magburaka.⁶⁵³

Around 2 May 2000, the RUF/AFRC regional commander for the Northern Province came to Magburaka and ordered the ground commander that all the members under his command should take up arms to attack the UN peacekeeping forces in their areas of deployment, which were the Arabic College along the highway and the Water Works Campus.⁶⁵⁴ The regional commander also declared that any RUF member failing to take up arms would be killed immediately. The ground commander for Magburaka mobilised his men and launched a first attack on the UN peacekeepers deployed at Water Works Campus. The fight lasted for three hours and, later, a gunship came to rescue the peacekeepers based at the Arabic College, who were then able to escape towards Mile 91.

However, the situation was more complicated for those based at Water Works Campus as they were surrounded by RUF/AFRC forces. The situation became extremely difficult as they run out of food and water. After an attempt to negotiate with the RUF/AFRC forces through the intermediary of the Paramount Chief had failed, they regrouped in their armoured vehicles and left their camp using the Makeni road through the Rokel River Bridge to Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom),⁶⁵⁵ where SLA forces were deployed.⁶⁵⁶ On their way, one of their armoured cars had an accident and two peacekeepers died. In Magburaka, RUF forces also destroyed the DDR camp.

⁶⁵¹ IRIN West Africa, 17 March 2000.

⁶⁵² The reception centre is the first place where combatants were to go to disarm: they were to register and to give their weapons in there before being orientated in the DDR camp.

⁶⁵³ According to UNAMSIL, the RUF forces on the ground asked for the dismantlement because they had not been informed about this centre by their leader: IRIN West Africa, 26 April 2000.

⁶⁵⁴ These attacks coincided with the final departure from the country of the ECOMOG. BBC Online News Archive 3 May 2001. These attacks against were nation-wide, for similar actions took place at the same time in Bombali, Kambia and Kailahun Districts. Unsuccessful attacks on Mile 91 and Camp Charlie (Yoni Chiefdom) may also have taken place.

⁶⁵⁵ Reports for Mabonto, located on the highway between Magburaka and Bumbuna confirmed that UN peacekeepers passed by the town in armoured vehicles towards Bumbuna.

⁶⁵⁶ Around 10 May, Kenyans UN peacekeepers arrived in Kabala (Koinadugu District). IRIN West Africa 11 May 2000.



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Shortly after the demonstration outside the house of the RUF leader in Freetown in May 2000,⁶⁵⁷ RUF/AFRC forces from Malal Mara Chiefdom crossed the Rokel River and went to Magbondo (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom), where they burnt down eight houses and took food. They moved on the same day to Rokankrr (south of Magbonto), where they took property, burnt houses and told the people they would “pay the price” for the death of their leader, as they thought he was dead following the public demonstration. The CDF who were allegedly there left the town, as they were insufficiently armed to confront the RUF/AFRC forces. The commander ordered his men to go on the rampage: they burnt nine houses, abducted eight women, raped three and took 20 young men for recruitment and to carry the stolen property to the RUF/AFRC base in Malal Mara Chiefdom.⁶⁵⁸

In May 2000, a Government gunship flew over Magburaka and fired on the Central Market, killing five civilians. The gunship went on to fire also on the Adams Hotel, which was the RUF headquarters in the town. However, many civilians were near the hotel and some fatalities were reported. Furthermore, as also happened in Kambia District, the gunship dropped leaflets intended for the RUF/AFRC forces, which explained that this time, the Government forces had come with minor weapons but if they had to come a second time, they would destroy the entire area.⁶⁵⁹ As a result of these leaflets, many people left the area and went to Mile 91, where there was an IDP camp hosting thousands of people. On the way to Mile 91, which is 35 miles from Magburaka, some civilians died from starvation while others were killed by Guinean forces, who considered people coming from Magburaka to be RUF/AFRC members. In the IDP camp, a diarrhoea epidemic started and as a result, children and adults died, before Médecins sans Frontières came into the camp to control the disease.⁶⁶⁰

During that same month, a lot of vehicles and armoured cars came during the night to Makali (Konike Barina Chiefdom) with about 150 Zambian peacekeepers, who had been captured by RUF/AFRC forces in Bombali District. The UN peacekeepers were packed in a storeroom under a two-storey building. Most of the RUF/AFRC forces guarding these peacekeepers appeared to be under the age of 15. After four days, two senior RUF commanders came one night, loaded these Zambians onto a truck and took them away. Civilians were told that they were taken to Burkina, which was a codename for Kailahun.⁶⁶¹

RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the headquarter town of Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) since 1999. Civilians were still harassed, mainly for food, and some basic structures were put in place. Civilians were forced to give away their food and other items and a G5 committee⁶⁶² was established. A system of passes was established and civilians had to pay Le 500 for these passes, which enabled them to cross at checkpoints. Furthermore, mining villages in the chiefdom were asked to contribute

⁶⁵⁷ See the analysis on the Western Area for 2000.

⁶⁵⁸ No more information was available on these incidents.

⁶⁵⁹ The Government dropped such leaflets in various locations across the Northern Province.

⁶⁶⁰ Since fighting resumed in the Northern Province, Mile 91 hosted thousands of IDPs. For example, in early June, 22,000 IDPs had found refuge in Mile 91. This was the greatest concentration of IDPs in the north: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA), 6-10 June 2000.

⁶⁶¹ No further information was available on this incident.

⁶⁶² Members of those G5 committees were appointed by the RUF/AFRC forces.



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200 carat of gold dust every month or to pay the equivalent money if there was no gold dust. Allegedly in May, a senior RUF commander based in Magburaka came to Mabonto to oust one of the commanding officers posted there, who then moved towards Makeni with his forces. On one occasion, one member was killed by firing squad for raping a civilian. During the same period, a Government Jet bombed one house at Mabonto, injuring some civilians.⁶⁶³

Many battles took place at Tonkolili Village, on the boundary between the Kalansogoia and Kafe Simira Chiefdoms. RUF forces killed during those skirmishes with SLA forces from Bumbuna were buried in mass graves in the village. Other attacks were carried out in the area, like Thamsoberic, where some civilians were killed. Some acts directed towards civilians were still reported. For example, one man at Makama, north of Mabonto had his food taken away and his son was killed because he refused to tap palm wine for the RUF/AFRC forces. Every night, houses were searched for food and girls. One man was shot as he pleaded with some members not to cut the stomach of a pregnant woman to find out the sex of the baby.

In June, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Malal Mara Chiefdom came again to Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom, to a village called Marunia. They held a meeting in the village, the purpose of which was to enquire about the deployment of SLA forces, since they wanted to attack the highway. It is reported that those RUF/AFRC forces were furious because their leader had been arrested.⁶⁶⁴ At this time, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt eight houses, raped four women and abducted 40 young men to be used in the fighting forces. While RUF/AFRC forces were taking property in the village, one man refused them entry into his house. The matter was reported to the RUF commander, who ordered his men to kill anybody who would challenge his authority. Before they left the town, RUF/AFRC forces tortured and killed 20 people and mutilated the hands of two others. The 40 young men who had been abducted were forced to carry the stolen property.

The security situation in the Mile 91 area was delicate, for the influx of civilians did not allow the UN peacekeepers to control the area properly. As RUF/AFRC forces were approaching the area in June, the UN decided to strengthen the number of peacekeepers deployed in Mile 91.⁶⁶⁵ On 23 June, a group of heavily-armed RUF/AFRC forces equipped with armoured cars seized from peacekeepers came from Magburaka to Kumrabai Junction, after burning the remaining houses at Robis and Ferry Junction. These forces were planning to attack Mile 91 and at Kumrabai Junction, they killed eight people. The Gbethis passed information about this plan to the UN peacekeepers, who sent a helicopter gunship to Kumrabai Junction. However, they mistakenly bombed a village called Mamanso Kabla, hitting four houses and killing six people. This attack led the RUF/AFRC to move back to Kumrabai Junction, where they killed four people, and then to Mamilla Gba, a CDF base, where they burnt seven houses, killed five people, took property and abducted 10 boys below the age of 15 for recruitment into the fighting forces. They later on moved to Mathinka Bana, near Mamilla Gba, where they killed 18 civilians and dumped the bodies into an old water well. Most of the people who were killed were IDPs from Magburaka and Makeni. The RUF/AFRC forces left

⁶⁶³ No further information was available on these incidents.

⁶⁶⁴ The RUF leader was arrested shortly after the events of 8 May, when his bodyguards opened fire on the crowd that had gathered to demonstrate outside his house.

⁶⁶⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 23 June 2000 and IRIN West Africa. 26 June 2000.



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and crossed the River Rokel, in the north of the chiefdom.⁶⁶⁶ In late June, a convoy of UN peacekeepers were ambushed near Mile 91 by RUF/AFRC forces. One of them died and four others were wounded.⁶⁶⁷

Between June and July, RUF/AFRC forces from Malal Mara Chiefdom tried to find common ground with the Gbethis in the chiefdom in order to avoid any confrontation. After a first attempt in June, both factions agreed in July on the establishment of a system by which each faction should not cross for any reason to the other faction's area. A buffer zone was thus created and the areas of each faction were separated by the Rokel River, although it did not prevent civilians from moving from one area to the other, either to meet relatives or to undertake business activities. It therefore seems that the RUF/AFRC forces concluded this deal with the Gbethis to be able to have total control over the civilians in one area.⁶⁶⁸ Contributions required from civilians continued unabated and new forms of contributions were put in place. Civilians from one village were forced to push a truck loaded with stolen items to another village, where the lorry would be taken over by civilians from the second village. This continued until civilians reached the main road that links Magburaka to Makeni. The RUF commander in Malal Mara Chiefdom also planned to attack CDF in Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom and for this purpose, ordered civilians from Marokie, Manewa and Mamama to construct boats to cross the Rokel River.⁶⁶⁹ Youths were actively trained for this planned attack, while acts of violence against civilians continued. Women were raped, more property was stolen and more dues were levied on the civilians to feed and equip the RUF/AFRC members. This attack was not carried out and in January 2001, a new commander was put in charge of Malal Mara Chiefdom; he did not behave as his predecessor had and neither imposed harassment on civilians nor tolerated it in this forces, who were punished if they behaved this way.

In August, an Indian contingent of UN peacekeepers replaced the Guinean contingent at Mile 91. Around this period, the situation in Yoni Chiefdom as well as in the Magburaka area appeared to be rather calm and little information was reported for the remaining months of 2000. UN peacekeepers encouraged the free movement of basic items like condiments, especially in RUF-controlled areas, for they told the civilians that if they could not obtain those items, the RUF forces may attack them. Sometimes after this deployment, a member of the RUF/AFRC was sent to Mile 91 to inform UNAMSIL that they were ready for peace. The member was intercepted by Gbethis, who brought him to the commander of the UN peacekeepers. A Gbethi was sent to Magburaka to convey a message about peace process.

However, the situation in Bumbuna (Kalansogoia Chiefdom) was alarming at this time, as thousands of civilians reached the SLA-controlled town in early August. Those civilians had fled the RUF/AFRC attacks and the Government bombing in Magburaka and Makeni (Bombali District) in

⁶⁶⁶ During a UNAMSIL press briefing on 28 June, the UNAMSIL Force Commander who had made an air tour in the area disclosed that he did not see any burnt village.

⁶⁶⁷ BBC Online News Archives, 1 July 2000. During this period, the area between Masiaka (Kowa Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Mile 91 was under constant RUF/AFRC threat and attack. Masiaka was attacked on 3 June 2000: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report (OCHA), 26 June - 9 July 2000.

⁶⁶⁸ For civilians, the RUF commander revealed "his true colour" after the agreement with the Gbethis.

⁶⁶⁹ During the rainy season, the main rivers in Sierra Leone cannot be crossed by foot.



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May and June and had lived in the bush before reaching Bumbuna. Over the subsequent months, the humanitarian situation would deteriorate: civilians from surrounding villages that were under RUF control continued to arrive in Bumbuna, where food could only be supplied by air.⁶⁷⁰

The Lomé Peace Agreement was reactivated on 10 November in Abuja, Nigeria, where the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone signed a ceasefire agreement. The main provision of this agreement was the disarmament of the RUF forces and the deployment of UNAMSIL forces in RUF-held areas. On 8 December 2000, a meeting gathering RUF officers,⁶⁷¹ SLA forces, Gbethis, Kamajors and UN peacekeepers was held at Ferry Junction (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). The RUF engaged to reopen all the roads in the RUF-controlled areas, to hand over all the remaining United Nations' equipment seized in May, to allow UNAMSIL deployment in RUF-controlled areas and to allow access to humanitarian assistance.⁶⁷²

In December 2000, the RUF regional commander for the Northern Province came to Mabonto (Kafe Simira Chiefdom) with over 200 armed men and women. At this time, the relation with civilians was bad as 10 cases of the rape of girls aged between 12 and 15 were reported. The RUF senior officer settled this problem and a G5 committee was set up; one of its roles was to collect rice and money for the forces. However, looting was still carried out by both the RUF and CDF forces. Youths were forced to carry the rice to the RUF/AFRC forces' houses while women were forced to pound the rice and to fetch water. The situation in the town continued to get worse as the most basic cooking and food items were becoming scarcer. Civilians were also forced to rehabilitate the road that lead to Mansoberie and Maranda, both of which are located in a mining area.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting to review the ceasefire signed on 10 November 2000 was convened between the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone, UN representatives and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, again in Abuja, Nigeria. On 15 May, the Government and the RUF agreed that accelerated and simultaneous disarmament of the RUF and CDF would be done District by District and that meetings would be held⁶⁷³ for them to decide which districts would follow after this program began in Port Loko and Kambia Districts.⁶⁷⁴

As a sign the peace process was progressing, the different fighting factions organised football matches in July. The first match was played at Magima (Kholifa Mabang Chiefdom). That same month, five RUF members came to Camp Charlie and had a meeting with the UN peacekeepers.⁶⁷⁵ However, a few skirmishes were still reported and on one occasion, on 5 September, RUF forces

⁶⁷⁰ See among others, Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Reports (OCHA) 25 July - 07 August 2000, 28 August - 18 September 2000 and 28 October - 13 November 2000, UNAMSIL press briefing, 4 October 2000.

⁶⁷¹ The records only mention RUF, not AFRC or "juntas". The UNAMSIL delegation comprised six officials and was led by the Force Commander while the RUF delegation comprised 14 members and was led by the RUF interim leader: UNAMSIL press briefing, 8 December 2000.

⁶⁷² *Idem.*

⁶⁷³ Further to this meeting, tripartite meetings of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration would be held every month.

⁶⁷⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 July 2001.

⁶⁷⁵ No more information was available on this meeting. It seems that this forum was organised to discuss the peace process and the disarmament program.



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prevented SLA forces from bringing supplies to Bumbuna. Nevertheless, a supply convoy escorted by UN peacekeepers was able to reach Bumbuna on 26 September and go further to reach Kabala on 3 October.⁶⁷⁶

During the sixth meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 11 October, the parties agreed to have accelerated disarmament in Tonkolili District simultaneously with Pujehun District from 1 to 14 November.⁶⁷⁷ The DDR camp was located at the Mathora Government Girls' Secondary School.⁶⁷⁸ On 13 November, the UNAMSIL Force Commander witnessed the final phase of the disarmament⁶⁷⁹ and 2,911 combatants had disarmed in the District by 20 November.⁶⁸⁰

3. Conclusion

To be drafted

⁶⁷⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 1 - 30 September 2001.

⁶⁷⁷ UNAMSIL press briefing, 12 October 2001.

⁶⁷⁸ UNAMSIL press briefing, 2 November 2001.

⁶⁷⁹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 November 2001.

⁶⁸⁰ Of these, 1,534 were RUF combatants and 1,377 were CDF combatants: UNAMSIL press briefing, 20 November 2001.



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D. Eastern Province

a. Kailahun District

1. Introduction

Kailahun District is one of the three Districts in the Eastern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It has a strategic position due to the fact that it shares borders with the Republics of Liberia on the east and Guinea on the northeast. It is also bordered by Kono District on the northwest and Kenema District on the west. Its headquarter town, Kailahun Town, is located in Luawa Chiefdom, in the north of the District a few miles from the Parrot Beak, the Guinean area that advances into Sierra Leone. This area would be greatly affected by the conflict, originally because it hosted thousands of refugees and later as it became the theatre of RUF cross-border attacks.

There are fourteen chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Dia	Baiwala
Jawie	Daru
Kissi Kama	Dea
Kissi Teng	Kangama
Kissi Tongi	Buedu
Luawa	Kailahun
Malema	Jojoima
Mandu	Mobai
Njaluhun	Segbwema
Peje Bongre	Manowa
Peje West	Bunumbu
Penguia	Sandaru
Upper Bambara	Pendembu
Yawei	Bandajuma

The geographical position of Kailahun District made it a strategic location for the entry of RUF/NPFL forces from Liberia into Sierra Leone. The District occupies about half of the border area between the two countries and is connected with the diamond-rich District of Kono. This made it possible for the forces to access funds easily through the sale of produce, diamonds and gold, with which they procured weapons and other logistics for the forces. It is therefore not surprising that the District was at least partially occupied throughout the whole period of the conflict. Two main roads allow penetration into the District from Liberia: in the north of the District through Kissi Teng Chiefdom and in the centre through Upper Bambara Chiefdom.

Kailahun District, particularly in the north and east, is composed of dense jungle, which affected the fighting in the District. Furthermore, the road that links Kenema Town to Kailahun Town, through the main towns of Segbwema, Daru and Pendembu, is virtually impassable during the peak of the rainy season from July to August. The Moa River, which finds its source in the ocean in Pujehun District, flows in Kailahun District from the southwest to the north. The control of the few bridges



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spanning this river would be of the utmost importance, as is illustrated by the case of Daru (Jawei Chiefdom), where the town is separated from the SLA Moa Barracks by a bridge.

Aside from its mining activities, the wealth of the District comes mainly from the harvest of cash crops like cocoa and coffee. From the beginning of the conflict, the presence of the RUF in the District and their control over those resources would have dramatic economic consequences for the whole country.

The ten or more years of conflict that took place in Sierra Leone first started in the border towns of this District in 1991. The fighting forces coming from Liberia entered through border villages both in Upper Bambara and Kissi Tongi Chiefdoms. Initially, Sierra Leoneans and most of the outside world regarded these attacks not as the start of a conflict as such but more as cross-border raids by the Liberian forces waging war in Liberia. However, these two incursions into Sierra Leone – together with a third one that took place shortly after in Pujehun District – were the starting point of a systematic occurrence of several events leading to a large-scale conflict that spread throughout the country and lasted for over a decade.

The District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases. The first one, which ran from March 1991 to the end of 1993, was characterised by the progression of RUF/NPFL forces into the District and their direct confrontation with SLA forces based mainly at the Moa Barracks in Daru (Jawei Chiefdom). RUF/NPFL forces would follow the same pattern when attacking and entering a village: they would gather the civilians in the Court Barrie and hold a meeting, introducing themselves as “freedom fighters” and deposing and replacing local authorities. Their arrival and stay was accompanied by the infliction of physical and mental violence on the people of the village, the killing of some people, in particular relatives of civilians working for the Government, as well as the abduction of members of the population, including children, for use as forced labour, as fighters, as cooks and as “wives”. RUF/NPFL forces also engaged in widespread theft and property destruction, notably the burning of houses. Some members, mainly belonging to the NPFL, engaged in massive rounds of killing, raping and cannibalism, which led to infighting between the RUF and the NPFL forces. Throughout this first phase, SLA forces engaged the RUF/NPFL forces in their various positions and by the end of 1993 to the beginning of 1994, they had confined the RUF forces to the extreme east of the District. These military victories over the RUF/NPFL forces were accompanied with violence against civilians, in particular against alleged RUF/NPFL members or “collaborators”. Screening centres were established for this purpose.

The second phase of the conflict encompassed 1994 to May 1997 and is characterised by a change in the RUF tactics. By 1994, most of the fighters were belonging to the RUF as the NPFL had withdrawn to Liberia. The RUF engaged in guerrilla warfare, took control of the bush, began to regain control of the areas previously under SLA control and raided villages. In 1996, Kamajors emerged in the District and, together with the SLA, defeated the RUF in some areas of the District. Although the Abidjan Peace Agreement was signed on 30 November 1996, fighting between the RUF on one side and the SLA and Kamajors on the other side resumed in early 1997.

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During the third phase, which ran from May 1997 to the completion of the disarmament process in January 2002, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with the AFRC regime. Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces retreated to Kailahun District, where they established a War Office, the administrative headquarter of the forces. Around this time, more men were initiated into the Kamajor society. ECOMOG forces deployed in the District and engaged the forces on land and by air. Assisted by Kamajors, they obtained victories over RUF/AFRC positions but were unable to take over their main strongholds. RUF/AFRC forces continued attacking villages and ECOMOG positions; following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, disagreement between senior RUF members emerged over the disarmament process. RUF opposition to this process reached its peak in May 2000 with the abduction of UN peacekeepers. Throughout 2000 and early 2001, RUF/AFRC forces were still active in the District and engaged in cross-border raids into Guinea.

It should be borne in mind that unlike other Districts, the information available for Kailahun District was often chaotic and incomplete, especially for the period following 1994, partly due to the massive displacement of the population. Indeed, from the start of the conflict, a lot of inhabitants of this District fled to neighbouring countries (Guinea, Liberia) and did not come back for years, while others, although they stayed in the District, regularly moved from one chiefdom to another, fleeing attacks. The figures of the rate of internally displaced people in the District throughout the conflict was very high; indeed, OCHA reports show that Kailahun District was one of the most affected Districts in terms of internally displaced people (IDP).⁶⁸¹ Furthermore, as Kailahun District was the only District to have always been controlled to varying degrees by RUF/NPFL, RUF and, later, RUF/AFRC forces, people who stayed were forced to live with them for such a long time that single events are often blurred in more general information.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991

On 23 March 1991, the first group of RUF/NPFL forces from Liberia entered through the border town of Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in the central part of Kailahun District and proceeded further south. A second group crossed the border with Liberia on 27 March 1991, entering the border town of Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) in the north-eastern part of the District. These forces opened two distinct entry points into the District and would join up at Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in April.

The forces that launched these two flanks were composed by a majority of National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) members,⁶⁸² a fighting force that had been challenging the Liberian Government since 1989, together with about 230 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members trained in Liberia⁶⁸³ at Camp Namna.⁶⁸⁴ The Sierra Leoneans within the movement who were trained in Liberia were called "Vanguards", as opposed to the new recruits who were called "junior commandos".

⁶⁸¹ OCHA Sierra Leone Encyclopedia: <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/slis>.

⁶⁸² It is estimated that at the time of the first attacks, those NPFL forces were roughly 5,000 in number.

⁶⁸³ In 1989, the NPFL emerged in Liberia under the leadership of Charles Taylor and began an uprising against the Government of the then President Samuel Doe. In 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a peacekeeping force to Liberia and the President, Samuel Doe, was killed by a splinter group of



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Those attacks surprised civilians, who thought this incursion would not last long and was only a cross-border raid from the forces fighting in Liberia who were in search of food. Hundreds of these civilians fled their villages both within the territory of Sierra Leone and outside its borders into Liberia.

The first group attacked the border town of Bomaru (south-east of Upper Bambara Chiefdom), which had little military manpower in terms of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces deployed along the Liberian border. The RUF/NPFL forces⁶⁸⁵ killed eight civilians and three SLA members as they captured the town. The SLA forces were overpowered and left the town, heading for the Moa Barracks⁶⁸⁶ in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), the most important SLA deployment in Kailahun District. On 25 March, the RUF/NPFL forces proceeded further south to attack the towns of Baiwala and Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces entered Baiwala coming from two distinct directions: some forces passed through Seinga, a town located close to the border with Liberia, while others came from Bomaru. They encountered stiff resistance from the SLA forces, but eventually, as had happened at Bomaru, the SLA retreated and the RUF/NPFL forces were able to take control of the town. At Baiwala, the RUF/NPFL forces set some houses on fire, raped young girls⁶⁸⁷ and killed people whom they considered to be important personalities, on the accusation that they were "APC people". Breaking down doors using the butts of guns and then looting the houses was also common, as forces were looking for money and other items they needed, although the forces presented their actions as a way to make sure there was no enemy hiding in the houses. They also wrote the letters "RUF" on the walls of some houses. Following this attack, civilians packed their belongings and headed for Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), as the SLA base appeared to be safer.

At Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom), some civilians who had escaped from Baiwala found a brief respite in the bush, thinking that the forces would only use the main road as their announced goal was to go to Freetown. However, they were discovered by RUF/NPFL forces, brought to the town, put under gunpoint and ordered not to move, or they would be shot. The RUF/NPFL forces gathered some civilians at the Court Barrie and asked them whether there was any of "Momoh's soldiers"⁶⁸⁸ in the town. When the civilians answered that the SLA forces were at Daru, the RUF/NPFL forces stated they would kill all of them if they found any SLA member or heard any weapons being fired. The commander told the civilians that from now on everything in the town belonged to the "RUF Government", dismissed the Town Chief and appointed a Town Commander together with a Town Mother. Civilians in the town were forced to contribute to the "revolutionary effort" by providing

the NPFL. The Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces deployed a battalion near Freetown at the International Airport in Lungi as a rear base for their forces in Liberia.

⁶⁸⁴ For more information on those fighting forces, see section [X].

⁶⁸⁵ These forces were comprised of Liberian mercenaries speaking Liberian languages like Mano, Pele and Gio, while others were Sierra Leoneans, speaking the Mende, Temne and Krio languages. They wore country clothes, carried talismans and other charms and had red bandanas tied around their heads.

⁶⁸⁶ The Moa Barracks are strategically located at the entrance of Daru on the road to Kenema town and to access it from the north-east, one has to cross the Moa River. It would be a RUF/NPFL target throughout 1991 and beyond.

⁶⁸⁷ Their ages could not be ascertained from the records.

⁶⁸⁸ The President of Sierra Leone was at that time J. S. Momoh and accordingly, this term refers to SLA forces.

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the forces with food as well as going in search of food and processing palm oil. When food was not available, RUF/NPFL forces would tie up the appointed Town Commander and beat him. The RUF/NPFL forces also introduced a set of laws, which were explained to the inhabitants by the RUF commander. One of these laws was that any civilian captured by RUF forces should not attempt to leave the area under their control for areas controlled by SLA forces. Civilians were also told to go to the bush and bring back to the town their relatives who were in hiding; the RUF commander stressed that anybody caught in the bush would be considered as an enemy and, accordingly, would be killed.

From these towns located in Dia Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces advanced westwards to the headquarter town of Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom). This town was captured on 11 April as the SLA forces had apparently left the town earlier. The RUF/NPFL forces entered the town with an armoured tank they had captured from the SLA forces. As most of the civilians were indoors, the forces banged on the doors to make people come out of their houses, threatening to kill them or to burn their house. Most civilians, including children, were imprisoned in the town mosque. The Chiefdom Speaker, a regular policeman and a court clerk were killed. The fighting forces introduced themselves as the "Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone" and explained that they had come as "freedom fighters" to free the country from APC oppression. During the time of their stay in the town, they passed a strict rule that no one was allowed to call on the name of God or to pray; anyone caught violating this law would be tortured and killed. Furthermore, all property was declared to be owned by the "Revolution". Some of the RUF/NPFL forces began raping women and young girls. They also took property of the people in the town. During the following days (12 and 13 April), a lot of other civilians were killed. On 13 April 1991, the Paramount Chief of Mandu Chiefdom was brought from Levuma (north of the chiefdom) to Mobai and killed two days later. He was the first Paramount Chief to be killed by the RUF/NPFL forces. The killing of the Chief caused the civilians to lose confidence in the revolution, as the RUF/NPFL presented and called themselves. Similarly to what happened in the other towns, civilians were told to bring their relatives out of the bushes. For example, on 23 April, six people who had left their hiding places in the bush and came back to the town were accused of being spies and were killed. This incident was later reported to the RUF leader when he came to visit his troops in May.

Although the exact dates could not be ascertained, towns located in Jawie Chiefdom were attacked and captured at around the same time between April and June, including Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom), a town close to Daru. In order to counteract any attempt by the SLA forces based in Daru to recapture the town, the RUF/NPFL forces also established a defence base at Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) on the road leading from Daru to the east and the north of the District. Another defensive position was established at Potoru (Jawie Chiefdom), where there is a bypass bush road leading to Benduma. Some of the RUF/NPFL forces settled at Kuiva (Jawie Chiefdom), which is on the main highway to Daru, and at Patama, a small village on the road leading to Daru via Bombohun (Jawie Chiefdom). When they entered Benduma, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the civilians in the centre of the town and forced them to kill their animals and to cook for them. Some civilians who managed to escape the town went to Daru to pass on the information about the attack to the SLA forces. During that time, Guinean troops came to reinforce the SLA forces based at the Moa



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Barracks at Daru.⁶⁸⁹ Shortly after their arrival, those Guinean forces succeeded in repelling the RUF/NPFL forces from Benduma by using mortar bombs, although neither the Guinean forces nor the SLA forces then deployed at Benduma. The repelled RUF/NPFL forces went to Gbiima (Jawie Chiefdom), which was already under their control.

The RUF/NPFL forces entered the chiefdom headquarter of Jojoima (Malema Chiefdom, south of Mandu Chiefdom) on 12 April 1991. Before the attack, Jojoima was overcrowded with civilians fleeing the areas under RUF/NPFL control and chiefs in the town had received letters from the RUF that they would come to the town on 12 April. In the town, the forces met with a rich farmer and asked him for money. The forces then apparently left the town for some days before returning on 19 April 1991. When they came back, they killed the renowned master farmer and his wife together with many other civilians. The forces also stole property, raped young girls aged between 14 and 20, whom they made their "wives" and conscripted children. Young men were forced to carry loads for them, mainly to Liberia, and they would be killed if they failed to do so. From Jojoima, they raided the surrounding villages, forcing civilians to lead them on these raids. At Sembehun village, for example, they stole one diamond dealer's land cruiser.

On 15 April, the RUF/NPFL forces entered Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) from the direction of Bomaru in the south of the chiefdom, firing gunshots as they entered. As they did in the other towns, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters", explained that the town was now under the "RUF Government" and asked the civilians whether there were any SLA forces or police officers in the town. Civilians were subjected to severe harassment, their property was taken and they were beaten, raped and killed. For example, an RUF member shot two boys because they did not obey a command he had given them. Several other killings were done during the two weeks they remained in the town. One civilian was asked to show the direction to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to one young RUF/NPFL member, who then rode a bicycle to Kailahun Town (17 miles north east from Pendembu) to tell the other front who had entered through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and who had reached Kailahun Town to meet the south flank at Pendembu. Shortly after, still in April, RUF/NPFL forces from Kailahun Town came to join the other group at Pendembu.

The second group mentioned at the beginning of this chapter had entered the country in the northernmost part of the District in order to establish a base at Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) on 27 March 1991. They also came from Liberia and killed a first army officer at a customs town called Beidu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom). On the same day, they reached Koindu, a strategic international commercial market centre close to the borders with Liberia and Guinea and located on the highway that leads to Kailahun Town. During this wave of attacks, this group captured all the main towns on the highway. Koindu was renamed "Kuwait" by the forces due to the valuables that it had and for two days they killed people, stole their property and burnt down houses. At this point, civilians began leaving the town and went to Guinea or inland seeking rescue. It is reported that these fighters called themselves "freedom fighters", claiming to be fighting in order to liberate Sierra Leone.

⁶⁸⁹ As early as 1991, foreign troops, namely Guineans and Nigerians, fought alongside the SLA, pursuant to bilateral treaties between their respective states and Sierra Leone.



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On 29 March, some RUF/NPFL forces advanced into Kissi Kama Chiefdom (west of Kissi Teng Chiefdom). At Dia (Kissi Kama Chiefdom), one Fullah⁶⁹⁰ businessman was killed. At Njaah in April, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town firing indiscriminately. They killed one SLA member who had retreated from Koindu, beheaded him and displayed his head on top of a big stone to the civilians they captured in the village. They gathered the civilians, explained they were “freedom fighters” and appointed a Town Commander. Those communications were made with the assistance of an interpreter, as the commander was Liberian.

On 1 April 1991, two trucks loaded with SLA forces headed for Koindu through Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) to launch an attack on the RUF/NPFL forces.⁶⁹¹ The first battle between the two forces took place the same day at Dambo, a town on the main highway close to Koindu, in Kissi Kama Chiefdom (west of Kissi Teng Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces overpowered the SLA forces, who had to retreat to Kangama. Dozens of SLA forces were killed during this battle. They were further dislodged from Kangama after several unsuccessful attempts to repel the RUF/NPFL forces from Koindu. Some of the retreating SLA forces arriving at Kangama created panic among the civilian population as, similarly to what was happening in the southern part of the District, the SLA forces were quickly overpowered and did not put up strong resistance to the invading forces. Some of these SLA forces were reported to take off their uniforms, hide their weapons and flee to Guinea with the thousands of civilians who were on their way. Other SLA forces withdrew to the chiefdom headquarter of Buedu (south of Kissi Teng Chiefdom).

RUF/NPFL forces captured Kangama on 6 April 1991. While in the town, RUF/NPFL forces began inflicting violence on civilians and their property. The house of the Paramount Chief was burnt down and his property taken away. The RUF/NPFL conscripted young boys and girls, whose age is unclear,⁶⁹² who were then trained and given arms and ammunition. Cases of sexual violence were reported and in one instance, an old woman from Liberia who had found refuge in the town was raped by one of the RUF/NPFL commanders; her body was later found in the bush. The first man to be killed in the town was a Fullah businessman. Seven people were also killed by the RUF/NPFL commander allegedly for having close links with SLA forces or because they had once been in the SLA; their bodies were subsequently burnt.

In the evening hours of 10 April 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces armed with sophisticated weapons like Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), AK47, AK58 and other guns launched an attack on Buedu. At this time, SLA forces had withdrawn from Koindu and large numbers of civilians had started to flee to Guinea. The next day, the SLA forces retreated to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) after

⁶⁹⁰ The Fullah are an ethnic group living mainly in the north and east of the country who were targeted, together with civilians originating from Lebanon, by the RUF/NPFL forces, who believed they were the cause of inequality among Sierra Leonean citizens.

⁶⁹¹ Those SLA forces probably came from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) to reinforce SLA forces based at Koindu. However, according to one source, those SLA forces at Koindu were new recruits who were still undergoing training.

⁶⁹² In the Sierra Leone context, the term “young people” could refer to anyone up to their mid to late thirties, but probably does not include people under 15.



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losing three men in the battle. The RUF/NPFL forces shot and killed seven civilians and burnt down public buildings and some private houses.

On 13 April, RUF forces entered the District headquarter, Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), in the north of the District. RUF/NPFL forces on their way to Kailahun Town killed the Town Chief at Sandeya (Luawa Chiefdom). From this date on, Kailahun Town would be nicknamed "Burkina Faso". The RUF/NPFL forces entered the town from the two main roads heading east towards Buedu and Koindu.⁶⁹³ From Kailahun Town, the RUF/NPFL forces spread across Luawa Chiefdom. At Sandeya on 20 April, for example, RUF/NPFL forces told civilians to go to Kailahun Town, where they were lined up and given rice the forces had stolen from shops to take back to their villages. However, one man who had brought rice to his family, who were hiding in the bush, and who came back to ask for more rice was accused of giving rice to hidden SLA forces and was shot dead. Another civilian was also killed that day near the town clinic, accused by the forces of stealing some drugs. Civilians then returned to their various villages but without their youths, as young men and girls, including children, were kept by the forces to be trained at a training base opened in Kailahun Town shortly after the RUF had taken control of the town. Those who tried to escape were killed. Since its inception, the RUF movement was organised and had an internal structure; one RUF commander, occupying the "G5" position, was in charge of opening new training bases as their territory gains progressed and as they moved further inland. It should be noted that this massive opening of training bases did not prevent the establishment of smaller ones, often at the war front by the commander in charge of the area.

During the three months following their entry into Sierra Leone, the RUF/NPFL forces were stealing, raping and abducting people and training those abductees for battle. Many women were abducted to be slaves, their heads shaved so that they could be easily identified and could not run away. Abductees who tried to escape were beheaded by RUF/NPFL forces and their heads were put on sticks at checkpoints as a warning to others.

During the first months of the conflict, most of the commanders were members of the NPFL and therefore spoke a different dialect than that spoken by Sierra Leoneans. Civilians were frightened of these forces and they did not dare to tell them they could not understand what they were being asked, although some people were killed for answering the "wrong way". For example, on 27 April 1991, on the highway that leads to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), two men who had come to Pendembu to buy salt were interrogated at a checkpoint. As they could not understand the Liberian English spoken by the NPFL forces in charge of the checkpoint, they were mistaken for spies. The NPFL commander told the two men to step back six feet from them and shot them with an AK47. Their bodies were then decapitated and their heads put on sticks to frighten other people.

The leader of the RUF came from Liberia to visit his troops at Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Sakeima (Dia Chiefdom) and Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) in late April or early May 1991. He visited his troops at Mobai, where he presented himself to the civilians as the leader of the revolution, claiming that they were fighting to remove the incumbent APC regime from power and

⁶⁹³ No information concerning the fatalities for Kailahun Town was reported.



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stating that he would fight until he reached Freetown. He further promised the civilians that he would bring facilities such as free education and free medical care to the people of Sierra Leone and that equal rights would be given to all Sierra Leoneans. On this occasion, the Public Relations Officer appointed by the RUF/NPFL forces at Mobai explained to the RUF leader that his members were killing people for no good reason, with reference to the six people killed on 23 April. However, although the RUF leader told the civilians that he had not instructed his men to kill civilians, this statement sounded false to the civilians who did not believe in his sincerity.

From Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) SLA forces recaptured Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom), forcing the RUF/NPFL forces to retreat to Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) and its environs where they forcefully conscripted young men and women into their movement. The RUF/NPFL forces established a training base at Baiwala to train young men and women whom they called "junior commandos".⁶⁹⁴ At first, RUF/NPFL forces appealed to the civilians to join them voluntarily, which some did, but as their number was not sufficient, they started arresting young men and women. At Baiwala and Sakiema (Dia Chiefdom) for example, young men and women were lined up and anybody who tried to refuse joining the forces was seriously beaten, some being instructed to roll on the ground while RUF/NPFL forces fired in the air or close to the person on the ground, killing some of them. In the process of recruiting junior commandos, the girls were used as sex slaves and some were trained as junior commandos. This prompted a lot of young men and women to flee into the bush. In several cases the forces opened fire on the civilians in the bush and food and many other items were taken from them.

The RUF/NPFL forces extended their attacks to other villages in Luawa and Kissi Tongi Chiefdoms, crossed the Moa River that divides the District in two and advanced on Peje Bongre, Peje West, Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. At Dawa, a border town in Kissi Tongi Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL killed nine civilians on 15 April. Some of the bodies were cut into pieces and cooked for the forces to eat that day. During the same attack, some houses were burnt down. Dawa became important for the RUF/NPFL forces, as it was located on one of their supply routes. On 17 April, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Kodu Bendu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), firing indiscriminately and killing civilians. Some civilians, including children under 15 years old, were abducted to join the forces.⁶⁹⁵

Between 18 and 27 April, RUF/NPFL forces captured Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), the first chiefdom headquarter encountered after crossing the Moa River. During their attack on the town, they killed some civilians and burnt some houses.⁶⁹⁶ Peje West Chiefdom (west of Peje Bongre Chiefdom, bordered on the west by Malegohun Chiefdom in Kenema District) was also affected during the same period.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁴ One report mentions that this training base was opened in May but this needs to be carefully considered, as there is no exact date for the information preceding the opening of the training base.

⁶⁹⁵ For both of these attacks, reports mentioned that the fighting forces came from Liberia. However, it could not be ascertained with certainty whether this meant that those forces were coming directly from Liberia when they launched those attacks or whether this was a general reference to the RUF/NPFL forces who had originally entered Sierra Leone from Liberia.

⁶⁹⁶ No further details could be obtained on this attack.

⁶⁹⁷ RUF/NPFL forces reached this chiefdom between April and May.



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On 1 May, the G2 commander⁶⁹⁸ in Kailahun Town ordered general looting as his men needed to eat and goats and sheep were taken away. During that process, vehicles were also taken away. Some women were raped, civilians killed, houses burnt and men trying to oppose the RUF/NPFL actions were severely beaten. Shortly afterwards, another RUF commander in charge of the Bandajuma Sinneh area (Luawa Chiefdom) declared that those stealing, raping and killing actions should stop and any commando involved in such actions would be killed in the presence of the civilians. Therefore, on 27 May, one commando who raped two women who had gone in the bush to fetch firewood was taken to Bandajuma and killed by the commander, who expressly stated that this kind of action should stop. However, this incident did not please other RUF/NPFL forces and soon after, another group invaded and burnt down Bandajuma and Sandeya, killing four people.

On 4 May 1991 RUF/NPFL forces entered Tangabu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom), led by a Liberian commander. This commander killed one man in the village as he said that since he started fighting in Liberia, he kills one person per day. By this time, RUF/NPFL forces had already spread to the Kissi Chiefdoms (Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng and Kissi Tongi) and Luawa Chiefdom. The commander gave orders to his forces to rape young girls in the village; old women were forced to pound rice and go fishing. Six of the members raped a 10 year-old girl on 8 July 1991, who later died from her wounds. Around this time, the RUF leader also visited his troops at Buedu, where he outlined to the civilian population the aims and objectives of his revolution. According to him, the main target was to eliminate the APC regime and its followers and, further, to liberate Sierra Leoneans from mental slavery and other acts imposed on them by the APC government. By June 1991, Kissi Teng Chiefdom was already under the control of the RUF/NPFL forces.

The RUF/NPFL also opened a training base at a small village called Bayama, three miles from Tangabu town. The training base was located at the school and young boys were forced to join the training; those who refused were tied up and imprisoned.⁶⁹⁹

In early May, RUF/NPFL forces reached Yawei Chiefdom, in the northeast of the District,⁷⁰⁰ remaining there until the end of the year. From there, they patrolled the surrounding villages, such as Massayema in the south of the chiefdom and Ngeblama in the centre of the chiefdom, west of the chiefdom headquarter of Bandajuma. When they first arrived, most notably at Baraka, they introduced themselves as “freedom fighters” coming to redeem Sierra Leoneans from the tyranny of the APC regime. This statement inspired some civilians who had indeed suffered from the APC regime to welcome the arrival of the forces and some voluntarily joined them; this happened not only in this chiefdom but in many other chiefdoms as well. However, as soon as people heard or witnessed the first killing or other acts of violence committed against the population, most of them withdrew their initial confidence in the RUF movement.

⁶⁹⁸ See section [X] for a description of the hierarchy within the RUF forces.

⁶⁹⁹ It seems that the term “imprisonment” used to report this event refers to the action of locking a civilian up somewhere. No more information could be obtained on this event.

⁷⁰⁰ Yawei Chiefdom is bordered on the north by Gbane Chiefdom (Kono District).



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Thirty RUF/NPFL members entered Woloma (Penguia Chiefdom) in mid May and forced civilians to gather in the Court Barrie, hitting some old men and women in the head with the butts of their guns. They stayed in the town for two days before 20 of them headed for surrounding villages together with some young men and women from Woloma. In the nearby villages, as they could not find young men and women, they beat elderly people, hoping that those people would ask their children to come out of their hiding places, as a result of which two of the elderly people were killed. A week later, they went to Sengema, a small village near Woloma, where the commander killed two boys and drank their blood. The RUF/NPFL forces were leaving Woloma on a daily basis to search for food, money and young people to conscript in the surrounding villages, returning to Woloma in the evening. At Sengema, young men and women were trained for three hours a day on how to use their weapons. In mid June, this group was reinforced by a group of 50 men coming from Kailahun Town. The commander of this new group immediately requested a "black goat", referring to human beings killed and eaten by the RUF/NPFL forces. Two days later, as a punishment for the escape of two civilians, the RUF/NPFL forces killed four people by cutting their throats, drank their blood and cooked and ate parts of their bodies. Among the RUF/NPFL forces, this practice was mostly carried out by the NPFL members. About two weeks later, SLA forces launched a successful attack on the town and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces. However, a large number of well-armed RUF/NPFL forces later returned, overpowered the few SLA who were in the town and recaptured it. The raids in the neighbouring villages started again.⁷⁰¹

One of the main missions given by the NPFL leader to his forces who entered Sierra Leone was to capture and dislodge the SLA forces from the Moa Barracks at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), in order to deprive SLA and Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces based in Sierra Leone of one of their most strategic locations and, consequently, to restrict ECOMOG activity in Liberia.⁷⁰² However, it appears that after the initial attacks on Sierra Leone territory, NPFL forces lost this objective for a while and were more engaged in stealing property and inflicting violence on civilians as is demonstrated by the events described above.

After a first unsuccessful RUF/NPFL attack on Daru Town, the forces that led the attack had to retreat to Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) and SLA forces based at Moa barracks were reinforced by Guinean forces. A lot of food items were stolen during the retreat and brought to RUF/NPFL bases at Mobai and Baiima, where many civilians accused of being government collaborators were killed. SLA forces began launching canon and dragon missiles on RUF/NPFL positions at Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) and beyond, at Baiima. Some of the rockets hit private dwellings and in one incident at Baiima, some civilians were killed and others wounded when a rocket hit their house. In June, the RUF/NPFL forces led by a well-known NPFL commander regrouped their forces from different positions in Mandu and Dia Chiefdom at Baiima (Mandu Chiefdom) from where they launched their attack on the Moa Barracks. This attack was not successful as they were repelled by the SLA and

⁷⁰¹ The exact dates of these events could not be obtained from the records or from open source materials.

⁷⁰² It has to be remembered that at the time of the March attacks, Sierra Leone territory (Lungi Airport) was used by the ECOMOG forces as a base to fight the NPFL forces in Liberia.



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Guinean forces. During this attack, the NPFL commander was killed on the bridge that separates the barracks from the town.⁷⁰³

Following this general attack, the RUF/NPFL forces would launch many more attacks, sometimes using bypass roads such as the one through Malema Village (Jawie Chiefdom) without managing to capture the Moa Barracks. At this time, Mandu Chiefdom (east of Jawie Chiefdoms) and some villages and towns of Jawie Chiefdom such as Kutoma, Bombohun and Benduma were under RUF/NPFL control. Those three villages were used as informants' places to pass on information to the RUF/NPFL strongholds in Gbiima, Moiba and Mandu (Mandu Chiefdom), where the RUF/NPFL had retreated after the unsuccessful attack on the Moa Barracks. The RUF/NPFL forces lost a lot of their members during these continuous attacks and a lot of civilians were killed. In December, at Gbaama, a village close to Moa Barracks, the RUF/NPFL forces killed 62 civilians, who were later buried by SLA forces from the Moa Barracks.

In Macca Kpakpeibu (Yawei Chiefdom)⁷⁰⁴ on 21 July, a group of 110 RUF/NPFL⁷⁰⁵ members entered the town with heavy firing and assembled the 60 inhabitants, including children, in the Court Barrie. Some civilians were told to bury the 20 people the RUF/NPFL had killed so they dug a big pit, put the bodies in it and covered it over. This group made daily patrols of the surrounding villages, capturing civilians who were then sent to Kailahun Town or Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) to be trained or used to work for the forces by carrying loads. On one occasion, those RUF/NPFL forces gathered 800 civilians and sent them to Geima to work in farms. During their stay, they sexually assaulted women, including the elderly. In mid August, some SLA forces from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) came to the village and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from the village, as at the time of this attack, the SLA were 200 in number while the RUF forces were only 30. The SLA did not, however, stay in the village and instead went back to Daru.⁷⁰⁶

During the harvest season, civilians from Senguma (Penguia Chiefdom) were forced to work for RUF/NPFL forces and had to carry the produce of the harvest on their heads to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom). Fifty RUF/NPFL members entered Baraka on 10 May and stayed in the village for some months, raiding the surrounding area in search for food. During their raids, they always took civilians with them to carry the property they would take.

On 10 October, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Levoma (Yawei Chiefdom), gathered the civilians and appointed some to carry the property they had just taken to the chiefdom headquarter of Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom, south-east of Yawei Chiefdom), which was used by the RUF/NPFL as

⁷⁰³ It appeared that this commander was killed by one of his colleagues, another NPFL commander, who at the time was a battalion commander.

⁷⁰⁴ This town is located on the road that links Bandajuma, Yawei Chiefdom headquarter (and further north, Kono District) to Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) in the south of Kailahun District.

⁷⁰⁵ The two forces were dressed differently as the NPFL members were dressed in "Ronko", namely country clothes, while the RUF members were wearing civilian attire with red bandanas tied around their heads. Some of the NPFL members were from Burkina Faso.

⁷⁰⁶ It is possible that this attack took place in August 1992.



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their route to Camp Zogoda⁷⁰⁷ in Geima. One of the civilians who could not carry the load that was allocated to him, as it was too heavy, was severely beaten. Other civilians were told to bury the people the RUF/NPFL forces had killed in the village, among them an old woman, who was killed in her house, as she was unable to run.

For two months between October and December, the RUF/NPFL forces transferred their base from Kailahun Town to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), which was also their headquarters.⁷⁰⁸

Following the retreat after the attack on Moa Barracks in late June, NPFL forces who had established strong positions on the east side of the Moa River embarked on massive looting, raping and killing of civilians, together with acts of cannibalism. These practices were carried out by NPFL forces at the end of 1991, throughout 1992 and part of 1993 and not the RUF forces. Different rounds of practices called 'Tap' were accomplished throughout this period, starting with Tap 20 in late 1991.⁷⁰⁹

RUF vanguards and junior commandos, inferior in number - even if by October 1991, almost 2,000 new recruits had already been trained - were unable to prevent or protest against those NPFL practices. However, in October 1991, the RUF leader welcomed the idea of an RUF commander opening a jungle base unknown to the NPFL forces. This hidden base was opened near a village called Gborworbugao, about 16 miles from Kailahun Town and about 150 new recruits (captured civilians) began to receive training in conventional and guerrilla warfare.

b) Events in 1992

In January 1992, the RUF leader visited his troops at Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom) where he had a meeting with the troops and the civilians. He explained to the civilians the objectives of his movement and later instructed the troops to be always on the offensive. Also in January, a new base was opened at Jborbu Gao (south of Luawa Chiefdom) but was never used.

On 3 January 1992, RUF/NPFL forces based in Tangabu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) killed four men from Luawa Chiefdom who had entered Tangabu without passes; their bodies were burnt and thrown into the bush. They further explained that any civilian found not staying in the area where they lived would be killed. Later, in April, a woman was killed for having more than one lover. At the beginning of June 1992, the first boys who had been trained at this base were sent to the warfront, leading and showing routes to the RUF/NPFL forces and also assisting them in identifying the civilians who used to hold any position within the APC regime. Thus, in this area composed of the three Kissi Chiefdoms, the RUF/NPFL forces had control and no fighting with SLA forces was reported. However, internal fighting arose between forces from the RUF and those

⁷⁰⁷ This means 'land of freedom'.

⁷⁰⁸ Pendembu would remain their headquarter throughout 1992 and part of 1993.

⁷⁰⁹ It should be noted that the information from the records is rather confusing on the identification of those groups as the different groups and the dates of those events are mixed. What is clear, however, is that there was no difference between those different groups with respect to the type of violence they committed against civilians.



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from the NPFL, which marked the start of a split between the two factions, leading to the withdrawal of the NPFL forces from Sierra Leone.

A reinforcement group entered from Liberia in February 1992 through the border town of Batwoma (Luawa Chiefdom), south of Kailahun Town. This group held a meeting with the civilians at Ngebgema (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) at which they informed them about the aims and objectives of their movement. They stated that the town was now under their control and chose a private dwelling to host their office. The commander in charge of this group asked one of the civilians to point out all the APC government personnel such as police officers, SLA members, civil servants and foreigners, including the Lebanese.⁷¹⁰ However, as Ngebgema was a small village, none of those categories of persons were to be found in the village. The movement of civilians was restricted and none of them was allowed to leave the village without a pass signed by the commander.

In early March 1992, the RUF leader visited this group at Ngebgema, the civilians having been gathered at the Court Barrie for the occasion, and he mentioned that about 15,000 men and women had now been trained to fight in Sierra Leone. The RUF leader explained how the APC regime was a corrupt one and how it had toured the country giving privileges to foreigners, especially businessman, rather than to Sierra Leoneans. He made it clear that civilians were no longer under the authority of the APC government but under RUF control, that every civilian had to obey RUF commanders in their controlled areas and that whatever was obtained by his RUF forces at the war front was for them, as they were not paid. He concluded his statement by saying that all young girls and boys had to join the movement for their country. The commander of the group therefore forced young boys and girls to join the RUF to be trained, to serve as carriers or, for the girls, to become "wives".⁷¹¹ It is interesting to note that the RUF appointed teachers to educate the children they had abducted, allegedly as part of their will to be and to behave as a new rulers of Sierra Leone.

In March, an NPFL member coming to fight the SLA troops at Daru entered Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), where he killed a civilian as a human sacrifice for his upcoming battle.⁷¹² At Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), RUF/NPFL forces made another human sacrifice. The forces had captured a large group of civilians from various towns and villages and gathered them in the town. One out of every ten people was killed as a ritual sacrifice and their bodies were thrown into the river.

In an attempt to repel the NPFL forces out of Sierra Leone, some RUF vanguards decided to use the services of the Poro society,⁷¹³ a male secret society at Mende Buima (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), which was full of NPFL forces using it as an assembly area in Kailahun District. The principle of

⁷¹⁰ Despite many living in Sierra Leone for generations, the Lebanese – who make up the majority of businessmen in the country – are more often than not unable to obtain Sierra Leonean citizenship and are therefore referred to and treated as foreigners.

⁷¹¹ The age of those recruits was not specified.

⁷¹² No more details on the circumstances surrounding this killing could be obtained.

⁷¹³ The Poro society and its equivalent for women, the Bondo society, are Mende societies where the initiation process gives social identities to its members. Those societies are based on common beliefs about the living, the dead and the gods.



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this society is that when the poro devil is outside, whether day or night, only the initiated or recognised of the society are allowed outside to take part or join the group in the ceremony. This society therefore would arrest the NPFL forces since they were not members of it. However, a woman went to tell the RUF/NPFL forces about this secret society, which annoyed them and, in retaliation, the NPFL forces killed 100 civilians and burnt 200 houses.

Furthermore, around the same time, the NPFL forces discovered the existence of the hidden RUF base opened late in 1991 and a lot of RUF vanguards and junior commandos were arrested and taken to Camp Namna in Liberia.⁷¹⁴ Some of the top vanguards were jailed for three to four months as a result of this operation. A lot of RUF junior commandos were killed by NPFL forces while others went into hiding in the bush. The ones kept in custody in Liberia were released after the RUF leader intervened on their behalf with the NPFL leader.

In the north of the District, a combined force of SLA and local militia (Donsos from Kono District) attacked RUF/NPFL forces, recapturing towns and villages under RUF/NPFL control, including Sandaru (Penguia Chiefdom).⁷¹⁵ While at Sandaru, the SLA forces destroyed and took property and beat and killed people.⁷¹⁶ The troops also succeeded in driving the RUF/NPFL forces out of the Luawa Chiefdom, except for the town of Geima.

SLA military successes were however reported, including a few successful attacks for at least the first half of 1992. In February, SLA forces attacked and retook towns and villages in Penguia Chiefdom, including Senguma. They stayed in the area for four months, patrolling the area but also inflicting violence on civilians⁷¹⁷ and taking civilians' property, as a result of which some of the civilians went to Guinea. However, RUF/NPFL retook the area as they were advancing further north. SLA and Guinean forces from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) also made some attempts to repel RUF/NPFL forces from Mandu Chiefdom and to capture Mobai, Baiima, Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom) and Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom). Two fronts were launched, one going to Kuiva and the other one moving towards Baiima. However, both groups were defeated and had to retreat back to Daru. The RUF/NPFL position at Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) was also attacked and captured for a short while, although the forces subsequently regrouped and recaptured the town. During their stay, the SLA forces forced the civilians to break down all the houses that were close to the bush and to uproot all the coffee and cocoa plantation. The zinc taken from the houses was used to make fences around swamps. The SLA forces also recaptured other towns in Kissi Teng Chiefdom, such as Tangabu.

By mid 1992 the RUF/NPFL forces in the North had conquered the major towns and established bases. An important base was Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom), which was a strategic town on the way to Kono District. Later on Baraka and Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) were among the RUF/NPFL forces' strongest holds in the North. In particular, Geima was also an important training camp. Even towns

⁷¹⁴ This camp is located in the Lofa County.

⁷¹⁵ Those local hunters were very active in the south-east of Kono District, in particular in Soa and Fiamsa Chiefdoms.

⁷¹⁶ No more information could be obtained on this incident.

⁷¹⁷ No specific incidents were reported for this period.



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like Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom) and Segbwema came under attack, although they were not captured.

One morning in April 1992, RUF/NPFL forces⁷¹⁸ led by a Liberian commander launched an offensive on the chiefdom headquarter of Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom). As they entered the town, people panicked and started fleeing to the bush. The combined forces put some people in a house and set the house on fire. They then assembled the remaining civilians in the Court Barrie and killed one pregnant woman who refused to join them. The forces used the town as a base from where they patrolled the surrounding villages in search of food and other items. During their stay, 10 school-going girls (classes 4 to 6) were raped. Bunumbu at this time was the front line as it also allowed for further advances into Kenema District, particularly into the diamond area located at Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District).

In Malema Chiefdom in the south of the District, SLA forces encouraged the formation of vigilantes, composed of young people who were given basic training, to assist the troops in prosecuting the war in the District. Most of the chiefdoms were contributing funds called "war efforts", as well as willingly giving their brothers and their young people to be trained. The successes of the SLA, however, did not last long. At this time, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) was under constant RUF/NPFL attack. The only areas the SLA forces controlled were Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and parts of Mandu, Jawie and Malema Chiefdoms. Following the overthrow of the President of Sierra Leone by the SLA on 26 April 1992, SLA forces began more intensive attacks on the RUF/NPFL forces, defeating a large number of them. However, at that time, they did not succeed in removing the RUF/NPFL forces completely from the various areas and their actions were more of a sporadic nature, killing and torturing captured RUF/NPFL members. Furthermore, their behaviour towards civilians began to deteriorate as SLA forces on patrol started to take away civilians' property, such as domestic animals and household items.

Civilians coming from areas under the control of RUF/NPFL forces were taken to the Moa Barracks in Daru for screening purposes; a lot of civilians were killed during this process, accused of being "rebels" or "rebel collaborators". As an example, one young man from Yawei Chiefdom was arrested by SLA forces patrolling the chiefdom and was killed in the Moa Barracks. Later on, a committee made up of the elders from the 14 chiefdoms of the District was formed so that they might identify the civilians brought to the barracks and avoid the killing of innocent civilians.

The RUF/NPFL forces continued their persistent attacks on towns and villages in both the northern and central chiefdoms of the District, including the Moa Barracks.

The "Tap 20" group, consisting of the Gio-speaking tribe of Liberia (NPFL) was active in Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng, Penguia and Luawa Chiefdoms. Their local commander gave an order to his troops that all civilians captured should be killed because for him they were "without blood", i.e. less than human. This group frequently engaged in cannibalism in these chiefdoms. In Penguia Chiefdom in May, members of Tap 20 killed and ate people selected due to their larger size.

⁷¹⁸ These forces were dressed in military combat red t-shirts with palm fronds tied around their foreheads.



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Furthermore, they often engaged in sexual assaults against women, who were raped by many men at one time.

In Ngiehun (Luawa Chiefdom), NPFL forces dropped hot melted plastic into people's eyes. Furthermore, one of the "sentences" they carried out was to put human beings in a large cooking pot with red palm oil; this kind of sentence was imposed when, for example, they thought a civilian was not obeying their commands. In Kissi Teng Chiefdom, the members of this group used to kill people and eat their flesh; babies were usually pounded in mortar to provide the type of food they liked. On 30 June 1992, a man was killed in the chiefdom and his body eaten.⁷¹⁹ This caused many civilians to flee to neighbouring Liberia.

The Tap 20 group was replaced by another group of NPFL members called Tap 40 during the last months of 1992. At this time, most of the top ranking NPFL commanders were recalled to Liberia by their leader as they were encountering serious attacks in Liberia from a fighting force called the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). The Tap 40 group also killed many civilians and often cooked and ate their flesh. One such incident happened in the Kissi Kama Chiefdom on 9 October 1992, when two civilians caught escaping were killed, cooked and eaten.⁷²⁰ Another incident of cannibalism was reported about a civilian caught trying to escape from the RUF/NPFL forces in Fobu (Luawa Chiefdom) on 5 October 1992. A man caught crossing the Guinean border was stripped naked and later killed; most of his body parts were cooked and eaten by some NPFL members. Again around this time, some RUF junior commandos were killed and eaten by those NPFL forces. There appeared to be two main reasons for these practices. First, it was simply a way to get food. Second, the forces believed that when they ate human flesh, they obtained the strength of the person they were eating; accordingly, they would first eat young, healthy, good looking men. Eating enemies was also practiced. However, reports mention that persons of any age and any gender were also eaten, including children. Indeed, in some places in the District like Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Mende Buima (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), Kuiva and Baiima (both in Mandu Chiefdom), NPFL forces were living in separate compounds from RUF forces where they practiced cannibalism.

In Nyadahun Bambabu in March-April, the NPFL forces were the only ones living in this town. When they went on patrol, they abducted people to carry stolen goods back to their town. Upon returning to the village they then killed and ate the people they had abducted. When these NPFL forces were withdrawn from Sierra Leone to fight the advancing ULIMO forces in Liberia, the RUF forces sent to this town found a very large cauldron with three legs set up in the town mosque. These pots were usually used to cook food for large numbers of people when it was harvest time. However in this case the cauldron had been used to cook people for the NPFL forces. All around the cauldron on the floor of the mosque were the dismembered skeletal remains, including the skulls, of around 40 to 50 people. Each of these persons had been shot in the head.

⁷¹⁹ The conditions surrounding this killing could not be ascertained.

⁷²⁰ No more details could be obtained on this bit of information.



N O P E A C E W I T H O U T J U S T I C E

In the south of the District, SLA forces were more successful in containing the RUF/NPFL forces, due to the presence of the ULIMO troops⁷²¹ in Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) and the Guinean troops in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). However, on 25 December 1992, RUF/NPFL forces identified by civilians as being the "Tap 20"⁷²² group launched an attack on Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom), coming from the chiefdom headquarter of Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom), the other road going to Segbwema and passing by Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). They entered the town through the hospital, where they beheaded one doctor after he had given them some drinks and money, hoping this would make them leave without killing him. Many drugs were taken away from the hospital and some people were captured. For seven hours, this group battled with SLA and ULIMO forces before being eventually repelled. Shortly after this incident, Guinean forces based at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) came to Segbwema.

Civilians escaping RUF/NPFL attacks in Yawei Chiefdom tried to find refuge in Gbane Chiefdom (Kono District) located to the north of their chiefdom. Some of those fleeing civilians were thoroughly screened by SLA forces at the chiefdom headquarter of Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, Kono District). A young man, accused of being a "rebel collaborator" was doused with petrol by the SLA forces, who then set fire to him and let him burn. Furthermore, some animosity was prevailing between Kailahun civilians, who were mainly Mende, and Kono inhabitants. Furthermore, as the RUF/NPFL forces entered Sierra Leone through Kailahun District, civilians coming from this area were viewed as suspicious and were not welcome.

At Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom), RUF forces established an execution centre for the whole District. At this centre, alleged criminals were killed and buried in mass graves. The centre was maintained throughout the war period.⁷²³ From December until March 1993, an RUF training base was opened at Manowa (Peje Bongre Chiefdom).⁷²⁴

In December 1992, an Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee comprised of representatives from the three Districts of the Eastern Province – Kono, Kenema and Kailahun – and from Freetown was formed in a bid to assist the SLA forces.⁷²⁵ "Well-meaning" Sierra Leoneans were to register for the Committee and to fulfil the work of vigilantes for the SLA.

c) Events in 1993

In early 1993, some RUF forces that were repelled by SLA forces from Pujehun District⁷²⁶ briefly joined the RUF forces in Kailahun District, passing through the Golan Forest at the border between Kenema District and Liberia. Furthermore, as ULIMO forces were active and inflicted serious losses

⁷²¹ This fighting faction, which emerged and fought the NPFL in Liberia, also fought on Sierra Leonean territory, alongside the SLA.

⁷²² It is more likely that this group was actually Tap 40, who replaced the Tap 20 group in late 1992.

⁷²³ No more details could be obtained on this centre.

⁷²⁴ This base would be transferred for one month only in early 1993 to Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, Kono District).

⁷²⁵ BBC, 22 December 1992.

⁷²⁶ In December 1992 and early 1993, RUF forces launched an offensive on Pujehun District but were soon defeated by the SLA forces, assisted by ULIMO and Guinean forces.



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on NPFL forces in Liberia, the supply route for arms and ammunition and other items for the RUF/NPFL forces in Sierra Leone through Vaahun (Liberia) and Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) was cut off, leaving the RUF forces unable to resist the SLA and Guinean forces.

Following the setting up of a Civil Defence Committee in 1992, local hunters began fighting with SLA forces, notably in Jawié Chiefdom. At this time, however, no formal initiation as such was taking place. Rather the “renowned man” who was behind the establishment of the Committee played the role of a catalyst or organiser for the local hunters.

On 18 March 1993, the RUF/NPFL attacked Bandajuma (Yawei Chiefdom) from their base in Baiima. Seventy-eight RUF/NPFL members were killed; eight civilians and four SLA members were wounded. The RUF/NPFL forces were, however, repelled by the SLA forces.

Throughout 1993 and part of 1994,⁷²⁷ an RUF training base was operational at Dia (Kissi Kama Chiefdom). Furthermore, following the retreat from Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) in January 1993, RUF forces established their headquarters at Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom).

In April 1993, some RUF commanders discovered that some RUF members together with civilians from Ngiehun (Luawa Chiefdom) had talks with SLA forces to arrange for the arrest of the RUF leader. When they learnt this, RUF forces went to Ngiehun, surrounded the town and killed an unspecified number of civilians. One of the practices they carried out at this time was to pour boiling palm oil in the ears of the men and in the vaginas of the women so that they would acknowledge the planned plot against their leader. Among the people killed were one prominent businessman and his family, two teachers and two well-known women.⁷²⁸

The SLA forces proceeded to capture Kailahun Town and also captured other towns, such as Baiima, Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom), Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom), probably in April. The RUF/NPFL retreated first to Dia Chiefdom, east of Mandu Chiefdom, but as SLA forces also advanced into Dia Chiefdom and recaptured the headquarter town of Baiwala, RUF/NPFL forces withdrew from the rest of Dia Chiefdom.⁷²⁹ During this retreat, similarly to other Districts, notably Kenema District, retreating RUF forces frightened the civilians by telling them that if they stayed, they would be considered to be “rebel” collaborators by the SLA forces, as a result of which many civilians fled with the RUF forces. Thus, on 6 May 1993, Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) and Bomaru (south of Upper Bambara Chiefdom, a few miles from Baiwala) were captured by SLA forces. Some SLA forces went to Vaahun, a Liberian town eight miles from Bomaru along on the motorable road used by RUF forces to enter Sierra Leone, to exhort the civilians who had found refuge there to resettle in Dia and Mandu Chiefdoms.

⁷²⁷ This base was operational until SLA forces repelled the RUF forces and confined them in Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

⁷²⁸ Although the precise number of fatalities could not be ascertained, it appears that a lot of people were killed during this incident.

⁷²⁹ No figures on the fatalities during these attacks could be obtained.



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SLA screening bases were operational throughout Kailahun District, including in Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom). Civilians who returned from Vaahun were taken to Daru to check whether they were RUF members or collaborators. Following interviews in these screening bases, those people who had been appointed to any position by the RUF/NPFL forces were kept in custody and sometimes killed. In May, the SLA forces succeeded in completely repelling the RUF forces from Jawie Chiefdom.⁷³⁰

In the same wave of counter attacks in which they recaptured Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms, SLA forces proceeded further north and recaptured Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) in May as well as towns in Luawa, Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. SLA forces occupied Ngiehun, a town located on the main road between Pendembu and Kailahun Town, and entered Kailahun Town with heavy firepower in September. From Luawa, they moved on to Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom).⁷³¹ In Penguia Chiefdom, SLA forces encouraged civilians to come out of the bushes and to resettle. Following the SLA capture of these towns, an announcement was made on the radio that all civilians and RUF members in the bush should come out and that RUF members should surrender. SLA force also went on "mopping up" operations in the bush searching for RUF forces; civilians who were discovered were sent to the screening process.

During the same period, the SLA commander gave orders to demolish houses in Mandu Chiefdom. Most houses within the chiefdom were then unroofed, including a hospital building. Civilians were forced to work for the SLA forces, mainly to brush the roads and to cut down foliage around the towns to prevent RUF forces from taking them by surprise.

The same SLA group that had recaptured Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms in April and May launched an attack on RUF/NPFL positions at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) in June 1993. SLA forces entered the town by using the main motorable road from Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom, west of Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) and battled with RUF/NPFL forces before the latter fled the town, retreating back to Liberia and to the border town of Dawa (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom). While retreating, they shot and killed some civilians at Dawa, raped some women and captured youths. Some civilians were also killed during the battle. After the recapture of the town, the commander in charge of the SLA forces exhorted the civilians to tell their children who had been conscripted into the RUF to come out of the bush and settle peacefully in the town. However, one night, the commander ordered that 27 of those RUF members who had come out of the bush be killed and the 27 young men⁷³² were tortured to death by the SLA forces. This incident created panic among the civilians and some of them left Buedu for the neighbouring countries of Liberia and Guinea. The SLA troops further successfully recaptured Koindu⁷³³ (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and pushed the RUF/NPFL forces back into Liberia, while some escaped to Kono District. Thus by 1993, SLA forces, together with ULIMO and Guinean forces had confined the RUF forces to the extreme east of the District, in the north of Kissi Teng Chiefdom.

⁷³⁰ This chiefdom would be free of RUF incursion throughout the following years, until the AFRC coup where RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with AFRC forces.

⁷³¹ No detail could be obtained on those attacks.

⁷³² Their ages could not be ascertained.

⁷³³ This probably took place in November.



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Tap 40 was also active in 1993, notably in Kissi Teng Chiefdom.⁷³⁴ One of their commanders used to kill people by cutting into their flesh until they died, including a refugee from Liberia who failed or refused to bring palm wine for the NPFL commanders. On 21 January 1993, a woman was killed and her body cooked and eaten in Tangabu Town. Members of Tap 40 raped young girls and forced boys to carry their loads from Tangabu to Liberia. In Kangama, a woman in her fifties coming from Liberia in February was raped by many of those NPFL members; she later died in March as a result and her body was thrown into a big pit near Kangama. In April, three men previously appointed as Town Commanders in three different villages were killed for failing to provide food to the commanders. On 3 February at Mano Sewalu (Kissi Kama Chiefdom) there was a fierce battle between RUF and Tap 40, as a result of which many civilians escaped into the bush. Many other civilians were killed together with some of the RUF fighters, their bodies thrown into a pit. In Kissi Teng Chiefdom, a senior RUF officer gave the order to RUF junior commandos to hunt and kill NPFL forces. Accordingly, NPFL forces left Sierra Leone between February and May and, while retreating, burnt down many houses and killed civilians. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in August 1993 an internal fight occurred within the RUF between two of the most senior officers belonging to two different tribes, the Mendes (from the East and South) accusing the Temnes (i.e. the RUF leader's tribe) of destroying their land.⁷³⁵

In a bid to win the support of civilians, the RUF appointed a G5 group consisting of civilians and RUF members, which served as a mediator and settled disputes between civilians and RUF forces.⁷³⁶

After losing much ground to the SLA forces, the RUF/NPFL were cut off from their supplies coming from Liberia. Furthermore, when the NPFL forces withdrew to Liberia, they took with them all their weapons, including those captured from the SLA and Guinean forces in 1991-93. Indeed, all heavy weapons, artillery, war tanks, armoured cars, small arms and vehicles were taken to Liberia. As they could not depend on irregular supplies from Liberia or on the weapons captured from the SLA forces, the RUF forces engaged in trade and barter with Guineans and Sierra Leoneans along the border towns of the two countries, in particular in Luawa Chiefdom, which was a significant black market location. They traded mostly in agricultural products like cocoa, coffee and palm oil but also in valuable items such as tape recorders, gold and diamonds. Even members of the Guinean forces protecting the borders of Guinea were involved in the trade, as well as members of ULIMO forces. However, RUF forces did not deal directly with the Guineans but traded with their own contractors who took commissions. Any property acquired through this border trade was considered to be "Government property", i.e. belonging to the RUF movement. This system enabled RUF forces to procure weapons and other logistics. Thus, while in the bush, RUF forces forced civilians they had captured to process palm oil, cocoa and coffee they would then use to trade for arms and ammunition. Another way of raising funds was through the establishment of a tax in the District, namely requiring each town or village under their control to contribute a certain amount of products, particularly coffee and cacao, depending on the size of the village.

⁷³⁴ It is believed that they entered the chiefdom in November 1992.

⁷³⁵ No more information could be obtained on this event.

⁷³⁶ See section [X] for more information on the hierarchy and organisation of the RUF forces.



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In the latter part of the year, with persistent attacks on SLA positions in the Kissi Teng Chiefdom, the RUF/NPFL forces succeeded in driving them from the chiefdom entirely. In addition, on 1 December 1993, the then Head of State, Capt. Strasser, declared a unilateral ceasefire. Further to this declaration, a lot of SLA forces left their positions thinking the war was over, which allowed RUF forces to redeploy in certain areas, mainly in the south of Kenema District⁷³⁷ and, in 1994, in Kailahun District.

d) Events in 1994

At the end of January and following renewed RUF attacks, notably in Kenema District, the Government of Sierra Leone declared "total war" against the RUF. The Head of State engaged in a massive recruitment of SLA forces and from 3,000 men in 1991, they would reach around 12,000 in 1994.

By 1994, following the successful SLA attacks and territory gains in 1993 and the retreat of the NPFL forces, the RUF now consisted of one and a half brigades composed solely of Sierra Leoneans. These RUF forces realised that they could no longer engage the enemy in face-to-face battle or conventional warfare, due to the strength and superior firepower of SLA and foreign forces. The RUF therefore decided to engage in jungle warfare in 1994 and an Operations order on jungle or guerrilla warfare was drafted and distributed to the front line commanders. Those front line commanders were trained for two weeks in guerrilla tactics and provided with first aid and a basic stock of food supplies plus arms and ammunition before they were sent in various directions into the jungle. The commanders' individual and newly mastered skills were passed onto the squad, platoon, company and battalion levels. During the training phase, they were taught the basics of squad to battalion tactics, namely tactical deployment in diverse terrains, combined arms training, urban warfare skills, ambushes, infiltration techniques, deception operations, advanced reconnaissance and fighting patrolling.

SLA forces were occupying most of the District for the first months of the year and there were some incidents of harassment of the civilian population. In one incident in Penguia Chiefdom in February 1994, an SLA member was arrested and killed on the orders of the SLA commander for having raped a 13 year-old girl. The commander made it clear to the civilians and the SLA forces that this kind of behaviour was not acceptable.

Towards the end of March and the beginning of April 1994, RUF forces started launching massive and successful attacks on SLA positions in the District.⁷³⁸ A group from Liberia attacked the town of Koindu. A second group from Liberia entered the town of Gbolabu in the Upper Bambara Chiefdom. This group conscripted children in and around the township.⁷³⁹ In Geima (Luawa Chiefdom), a large quantity of arms and ammunition were captured from SLA forces.

⁷³⁷ See the factual analysis for Kenema District where massive and successive attacks were launched in the southeast of the District in December 1993.

⁷³⁸ Already in January 1994, RUF forces captured an SLA base, east of Pendembu.

⁷³⁹ No more information was available on these incidents.



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Once the RUF forces took the jungle and rapidly started to gain positions throughout the country,⁷⁴⁰ Kailahun District, in particular the eastern part of the District, became a stronghold and was completely under RUF control. At sometime in 1994, RUF forces captured a large number of arms and ammunition from the SLA forces at Geima (Luawa Chiefdom) and SLA forces withdrew from Luawa Chiefdom. However, throughout 1994, 1995 and 1996, Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms remained under the control of SLA forces.

In May 1994, RUF forces came to the township of Sandaru (Penguia Chiefdom) from the direction of Kono District and dislodged the SLA forces based there. They informed the civilians that all of Sierra Leone was now under their control and that civilians should not hide or they would be chased and killed. They forced young boys and girls they had captured to take illicit drugs, claiming that it was new medicine meant to develop them and make them strong. RUF forces used Sandaru as a base to patrol and raid the villages in the chiefdom and came back regularly to the town with food, stolen property and more captured civilians, so that the number of their forces was greatly increased. Most of the captured women and girls were sexually assaulted, often publicly.

RUF forces were also to be found in the 'Peje' Chiefdoms, namely Peje Bongre and Peje West Chiefdoms. In one incident in August 1994, while patrolling in Peje West Chiefdom the RUF forces discovered a group of civilians in the bush, raped two suckling mothers, whom they subsequently killed. However, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) and Segbwema (Njaluhun Chiefdom), where a camp for displaced persons was opened, remained under SLA control, thereby blocking strategic access to the rest of the country.

The RUF were dislodged briefly from the town of Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) by joint forces of the SLA, regrouping and recapturing the town later in the year.

As RUF forces intensified their ambushes on the Freetown-Kenema highway in late 1994, life became even more difficult for civilians in Kailahun District. They lacked essential items to live and the daily number of deaths of civilians in the District and in the refugee camps in Liberia was high.

Although RUF forces made serious gains in the country, fighting mainly in the bush and laying ambushes, it was perceived in Freetown as a "disintegrated organisation".⁷⁴¹ Furthermore, during the same period, a large number of SLA members were missing without grounds in war affected areas.⁷⁴²

e) Events in 1995, 1996 and 1997

Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) was fiercely attacked and recaptured from SLA forces by RUF forces in January 1995. In February 1995, RUF forces attacked Jojoima (Malema Chiefdom), which had been under SLA control since 1993.⁷⁴³

⁷⁴⁰ By 1995, all the Districts had come under RUF attacks.

⁷⁴¹ AFP, 16 September 1994.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

⁷⁴³ No details on the civilian fatalities – if any – could be obtained. It is only reported that over 20 RUF members were killed during this attack.



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In Penguia Chiefdom, many civilians who were abducted from the surrounding towns and villages were mistreated; women were sexually abused in public by RUF forces. Those who refused to have sexual intercourse with RUF members were killed.⁷⁴⁴

By the end of 1995, RUF forces from nearby Periwahun launched another unsuccessful attack on Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom), where they were repelled by the SLA forces. The SLA forces were successful in repelling RUF forces' attacks on the Mandu and Dia Chiefdoms in 1995. Nevertheless, throughout 1995 and the following years, the RUF would launch attacks on these chiefdoms, occasionally controlling some areas.⁷⁴⁵

At the end of January 1996, prior to the elections to be held at the end of February, the one-week ceasefire declared by the RUF allowed voter registration in the District, particularly in four chiefdoms considered at that time to be unsafe, namely Jawie, Mandu, Malema and Upper Bambara.⁷⁴⁶ Nevertheless, in RUF-controlled areas, civilians were not allowed to vote in the February General elections.⁷⁴⁷

In 1996, the Kamajor society, which had begun initiations in Bonthe District and developed all over the Southern Province, reached Kenema and Kailahun Districts. Similarly to other Districts where local hunters were operational, young energetic men were nominated by the Chiefs and, more often, the elders of the chiefdoms⁷⁴⁸ to be initiated into the society. Dia Chiefdom for example, was asked to send 50 men for initiation. The appointment was done at the section level and each section was at least initially responsible for the welfare of the men they nominated and who came back to their various areas after the initiation. In Dia Chiefdom, the Kamajors worked with the SLA forces. The Kamajors from Jawie Chiefdom, under the leadership of a well-known commander who was also operational in Kenema District, began challenging RUF positions in Njaluahun Chiefdom.

However, around this time, Kamajors began to harass civilians. In Penguia Chiefdom, for example, civilians were forced to contribute to feeding the Kamajors and if they failed to do so, all their property would be taken away and they would be beaten. A man who had just lost his wife and was about to bury her refused to go and fetch wood as requested by some Kamajors, as a result of which they beat him severely. Again in Penguia, a businessman at Palima Village had his property taken by Kamajors and had to hide in the bush for two weeks with his family.

⁷⁴⁴ No details could be obtained on this information, either from the records or from open sources.

⁷⁴⁵ No details could be obtained on this information, either from the records or from open sources.

⁷⁴⁶ SLBS radio, a national Sierra Leone radio station, quoted the elections officer for Kailahun District: BBC, 30 January 1996.

⁷⁴⁷ The RUF-controlled areas were mainly the chiefdoms located in the east of the District, i.e. Kissi Teng, Kissi Tongi, Kissi Kama, Luawa and some parts of Penguia and Yawei Chiefdoms. No more information on what happened prior, during and following the elections could be obtained from either the records or from open source materials. In this respect it is interesting to note that the only serious incidents reported during the elections took place in Bo and Kenema Towns. While not wishing to minimise the intimidation of the voters carried out by the RUF forces prior to the elections, their scale may not have reached the levels sometimes described in the media.

⁷⁴⁸ As the Chiefs had been targeted by the RUF since the start of the war, most of them had fled while others were killed.



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In March 1996, a combined force of SLA and CDF (Kamajors) who came from Baiwala (Dia Chiefdom) attacked a major RUF base in Geima (Luawa Chiefdom), also called "Camp Burkina Faso". They overpowered the RUF forces and killed eight of them; 26 civilians were also killed during the attack. The RUF forces, however, recaptured the town four days later. The Kamajors also attacked another RUF base, established in Kailahun Town at the National Secondary School. The school was completely bombed down and some civilians were killed. Four days after the attack on Geima, RUF forces counter attacked the Kamajors and SLA forces, some of them being killed in the attack. Following this counter attack, SLA forces and Kamajors were repelled.⁷⁴⁹

Around this time, RUF forces started opening schools in the areas under their control, such as at Kangama (Kissi Teng Chiefdom). The school was not only for children but also for the civilians living in the areas under RUF control. The teachers were paid with seven cups of rice and two beer bottles of palm oil every three months.

However, unlike what happened in the South and especially in Pujehun District, following the elections and the start of the negotiations between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone, civilians originating from Kailahun District and living in displaced camps or in neighbouring countries did not return to the District.

The peace negotiations that started in February 1996 reached their conclusion in the signing of a Peace Agreement between the RUF leader and the Sierra Leonean President at Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, on 30 November 1996. A few days before the signing of this agreement, the RUF leader had visited his troops near Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to talk about the peace process.⁷⁵⁰

Despite the signing of the peace agreement, a few incidents between Kamajors and RUF forces took place in the Segbwema area (Njaluahun Chiefdom) in early December, where some fatalities are reported on both sides. Nevertheless, it appeared that those skirmishes initiated by the RUF were motivated by their search for food.

SLA forces were still molesting civilians they suspected of being "rebels" or "rebel collaborators". On one occasion, a civilian from Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom) accused of being a "rebel" was sent to Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), tied up, had pepper put in his nostrils, was hit with a bayonet and kept in a guardroom for six days before being released. He was given a clearance document that would allow him to return to Mobai.

At the beginning of 1997, the RUF forces in the south of the District came under fierce attacks by SLA forces, thus breaking the ceasefire provided in the Abidjan Peace Agreement. Their positions, notably in Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom), were attacked and they had to retreat to their base at Baiima.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁹ No more information could be ascertained on these events.

⁷⁵⁰ See, for example, AFP, 25 November 1996.

⁷⁵¹ Many press releases relate RUF statements in January condemning the Government of Sierra Leone as having "dashed aside" the Abidjan Peace Agreement: see, for example, AFP, 22 January 1997.



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On 21 January 1997, Kamajors who were deployed in most previously RUF-controlled areas in the country proceeded further east in Kailahun District and retook Kailahun Town. Nevertheless, RUF forces managed to keep control in the furthest eastern area of the District in Kissi Teng, Kissi Tongi, Kissi Kama and parts of Luawa Chiefdoms. Buedu (Kissi Tongi) thereby became a headquarter base of the RUF.⁷⁵² On 20 February, Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), now under SLA control, was attacked by RUF forces who were defeated by the SLA, who were reinforced by their colleagues from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom).⁷⁵³ The killings of three RUF members, one SLA member and one civilian were reported.⁷⁵⁴ Also in February, the SLA forces rescued some children, once conscripted by the RUF but then living in the bush unaccompanied and malnourished.⁷⁵⁵

Due to those skirmishes in the District between the SLA, Kamajors and RUF forces, the resettlement program put in place following the Abidjan Peace Agreement was stalled in Kailahun District. The demobilisation process had not even started, as United Nations observers were unable to deploy. Around 10 May, between 20 and 60 civilians were killed during an RUF attack on the border town of Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), highlighting once more the deterioration of the security situation in the District and the country as a whole, as many attacks were reported for the same period in the Northern Districts.⁷⁵⁶

Thus, shortly before the events of 25 May 1997, the RUF forces were mainly controlling the far east of Kailahun District, even if skirmishes with SLA and Kamajors were reported in other parts of the country, in the Kangari Hills (south of Tonkolili District) and in some parts of Moyamba District.

Early 1997, following the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement on 30 November 1996, one of the people the RUF leader had sent to Freetown to represent him during the implementation of the peace process declared himself the interim leader after the RUF leader's arrest in Nigeria.⁷⁵⁷ This declaration was unilateral and did not obtain the support of the RUF forces. During a visit to Kailahun District in April to hold meetings with the RUF forces, this self-proclaimed interim leader, together with other RUF members, was arrested and kept in custody by some of the most senior RUF commanders.

Following the overthrow of the Government on 25 May 1997, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with AFRC forces. In early June, one senior RUF commander moved to Kenema Town with 300 of his men.⁷⁵⁸ Shortly after RUF forces joined the AFRC forces, some of them went to Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) where they looted shops and stole property belonging to civilians

⁷⁵² Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1-31 January 1997. This report was prepared by the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sierra Leone.

⁷⁵³ Pendembu would be attacked again on 6 April and reports mention there were a lot of fatalities but no more details could be obtained.

⁷⁵⁴ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1-28 February 1997. This report was prepared by the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Sierra Leone

⁷⁵⁵ See, for example, AFP, 4 March 1997.

⁷⁵⁶ AFP, 15 May 1997 and Africa News, 26 May 1997.

⁷⁵⁷ Philip Palmer announced his self-proclamation in a press release on 15 March 1997.

⁷⁵⁸ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 02 - 03 June 1997 REG. NO. 97/0218



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and to the ICRC.⁷⁵⁹ However, few incidents were reported in the District for the period covering May 1997-February 1998, when ECOMOG forces ousted the RUF/AFRC from Freetown, as attention was mostly concentrated on Freetown, where 600 RUF members from Kailahun District were believed to have joined the AFRC members.

Further to this overthrow and the merging of RUF forces with AFRC forces, Kamajors from Penguia Chiefdom took the bush or went to Guinea, fearing to be killed by the RUF/AFRC forces who were chasing them.⁷⁶⁰ It should be recalled that shortly after the events of 25 May, the AFRC leader had ordered the members of the CDF to lay down their arms and surrender to the nearest police station to be disbanded, an order most of the Kamajors did not obey.

After May 1997, and throughout 1998 and part of 1999, civilians in Yawei and Penguia Chiefdoms suffered constant harassment by RUF/AFRC forces. During these years, RUF/AFRC forces killed, raped, tortured, amputated limbs and burnt houses down, as a result of which, many of the inhabitants fled to Guinea. At Baraka (Yawei Chiefdom) for example, the RUF/AFRC forces unroofed many houses and took property, which was brought to their various bases. Innocent civilians were accused of hating the forces and killed as a result. Many civilians fled to Liberia and Guinea.⁷⁶¹

A combined force of Guinean forces, SLA and CDF attacked and dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces in the towns of Bunumbu and Manowa.

In September 1997, Kamajors from Jawie Chiefdom successfully repelled RUF/AFRC forces from different areas of the chiefdom. Shortly after, two weeks after the start of their operation in September, the entire chiefdom was under Kamajor control. During these attacks, many RUF/AFRC forces were killed by the Kamajors. However, in December and during an attack they launched on Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), 100 Kamajors were allegedly captured by RUF/AFRC forces⁷⁶² and brought to Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), an RUF/AFRC stronghold.

f) Events in 1998

On 8 February 1998, the President of Liberia reportedly visited RUF/AFRC forces in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) to meet with the field commanders. A meeting was held at the Court Barrie, where he told the forces that produce from the District, particularly cocoa and coffee, must be transported to Liberia immediately to be sold for the procurement of weapons and other logistics for the fighting forces. He also spoke about disarmament and further warned all combatants not to disarm until they heard from him in Liberia. The supply routes for arms and ammunition coming from Liberia ran through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and Foya (Liberia) or Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) and Vaahun (Liberia). When they needed ammunition, RUF forces would send a large vehicle with a top senior commander carrying some diamonds to the Liberian President. On

⁷⁵⁹ It was earlier mentioned that a camp for displaced people was operational in Segbwema.

⁷⁶⁰ It is reported that at the time of the May Coup, the SLA forces numbered 14,000 while the Kamajors were roughly 37,000 in number: AFP, 29 May 1997.

⁷⁶¹ No further details are available on events during this period.

⁷⁶² Xinhua News Agency, 29 December 1997.



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their way back to Sierra Leone, they were escorted by Liberian security officers and had documents similar to clearance papers that would allow them to reach Kailahun District without encountering any problems. From Kailahun District, the arms and ammunition were distributed and dispatched to other places. The construction of an airfield at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) was also begun, made feasible due to the increased numbers of the RUF forces, particularly the civilians they had taken with them when they retreated from Freetown. However, due to persistent air raids conducted by ECOMOG, the construction stopped.

After being pulled out from Freetown, a lot of AFRC members went to Vaahun in Liberia through Bomaru (Upper Bambara Chiefdom) while the majority of the RUF forces took back the bush, which they were used to due to having conducted warfare there from 1994 to 1997, unlike the AFRC forces. When they left Freetown, the retreating forces could not take many things with them, which led to their searching civilians in Kailahun District and taking their property. "Operation Pay Yourself", meaning take what you need from civilians, was declared in the whole country but there is little direct information on its implementation in Kailahun District. Nevertheless, when they came back from Freetown, RUF and AFRC forces engaged in killing, raping and, above all, looting actions, which prompted a lot of civilians and especially those in Upper Bambara Chiefdom to leave their farms and to go to Liberia. However, RUF/AFRC forces captured civilians whom they forced to work, to go in search for food and to dig holes on the main road of the chiefdom to prevent ECOMOG forces from advancing with their armoured tanks.

In Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), the then Chief Security Officer (CSO) of the RUF invited all returnees to a meeting in which he encouraged the CDF to identify themselves so they might broker peaceful co-existence with the RUF/AFRC forces in the township. Seventy-six Kamajors identified themselves to the RUF/AFRC forces in response to the appeal and the CSO told them that they were "brothers" and that they would work together to rebuild Luawa Chiefdom. However, the CSO then ordered his forces to arrest and detain the Kamajors. The CSO set up a court in which the Kamajors appeared, summary investigations were carried out by the RUF commander appointed as chairman of the court and his verdict was that they should all be released and handed over to their family who would sign for them. While this verdict appeared to be accepted, the CSO nevertheless ordered that those Kamajors should be kept in jail and their families authorised to come and visit them. This continued for few days, until two senior RUF commanders and other RUF members arrived in town. One of the senior RUF officers killed ten of the Kamajors and ordered his men to kill the other Kamajors still being held captive. Three days later, the CSO gathered people in the town and stated that those Kamajors were Government spies and had been preparing to launch an attack on the chiefdom. He ordered the burial of the bodies in two holes behind the police station.

Throughout 1998, Bunumbu (south-east of Luawa Chiefdom) was the main training base for RUF/AFRC forces.⁷⁶³ This base was most likely set up in April following the establishment of the War Office at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) as RUF forces needed more manpower.

⁷⁶³ In 1999, after RUF/AFRC forces captured Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District Headquarter), the training base was moved to Yengema (Kono District).



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In March 1998, CDF forces and a Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG from Kenema District came to Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) through Segbwema (Njaluhun Chiefdom),⁷⁶⁴ supported by alpha jets and each fighting faction led by a different commander. One civilian was killed at the centre of the market area by one of the bombs launched from the airplane. On their arrival, the CDF and ECOMOG forces engaged in battle with the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were killed during the crossfire and houses suspected of belonging to RUF/AFRC family members were set on fire by the Kamajors. Throughout their deployment and attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in the District, ECOMOG and CDF forces would use missiles and other long-range artillery, sometimes missing their targets and destroying property and killing civilians. In Kissi Tongi Chiefdom⁷⁶⁵ during the course of the raids, civilians were killed and property destroyed by the bombs dropped by the ECOMOG jets.⁷⁶⁶

In early March, ECOMOG and CDF forces fell into an ambush two miles from Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom) while on their way to recapture Macca Kpakpeibu (Yawei Chiefdom). In this ambush, some of them were seriously injured and the ECOMOG forces lost one armoured car, which was burnt, four machine guns and a truck loaded with arms and ammunition.

The ECOMOG forces assisted the Kamajors' further advances into the District and on 12 May, launched two attacks on Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) and Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom),⁷⁶⁷ killing over 150 RUF/AFRC supporters.⁷⁶⁸ From there, they then proceeded to capture Kailahun Town, although their progress was slowed by the thick forest surrounding the town. Thus, by 20 May 1998, ECOMOG forces would claim to control Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), Segbwema (Njaluhun Chiefdom), Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Mobai (Mandu Chiefdom), Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom), Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) and Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom).⁷⁶⁹ However, those attacks did not free the District from RUF/AFRC presence and throughout 1998, Kailahun District would still be qualified as their stronghold in the media. Due to this intense fighting, thousands of civilians fled the area and found refuge in Liberia (Lofa County) and Guinea (Gueckedou region, Parrot Beak).⁷⁷⁰

⁷⁶⁴ In February 1998, ECOMOG forces deployed in Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District) advanced further in Kenema and Kailahun Districts. On 22 March, two ECOMOG battalions left the Freetown Peninsula to reinforce the contingent already deployed at Daru and to prepare the assault on Kailahun Town: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 10 - 30 March 1998. REG. NO. 98/0031. In the same report, it was also revealed that a lot of "ex-Junta" men surrendered to ECOMOG forces. In this context, "Junta" probably refers only to the members of the AFRC and not to the RUF forces.

⁷⁶⁵ Kissi Tongi Chiefdom would remain under RUF/AFRC control until disarmament started in 2001.

⁷⁶⁶ The date of this (these) bombing(s) could not be ascertained.

⁷⁶⁷ AFP, 12 May 1998.

⁷⁶⁸ No more information could be obtained on these killings.

⁷⁶⁹ AFP, 20 May 1998.

⁷⁷⁰ Between March and June, 237,000 Sierra Leoneans fled the country to Liberia and Guinea and over 50,000 IDPs were living in camps: UN News Archive, 26 June 1998. Since the ECOMOG intervention in February, it was believed that 27,000 IDPs were leaving in the Eastern Province (Kailahun, Kenema and Kono Districts) and 113,000 in the Northern Province while there were no new displacements in the Southern Province. Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 9 June - 6 July 1998. REG. NO. 98/0068.



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After the reinstatement of the President of Sierra Leone in March 1998, more men from the District, many of whom had found refuge in Guinea, were initiated in the Kamajor society. Some from Penguia Chiefdom went to Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) for the initiation. Kamajors from Penguia Chiefdom were successful in repelling the RUF/AFRC forces from some sections of the chiefdom as far as the Moa River (south-east of the chiefdom) but the RUF/AFRC forces regrouped and retook control of some areas previously held by Kamajors, including Sengema, Kumantandu, Sandaru, Lalehun and Bagibu. The RUF/AFRC established themselves in particular in the Nimmi Hills, an area rich in gold mines. Sengema became their base in the chiefdom, as it is located on a hill. Raping, looting and the unroofing of houses was common in 1998 and the commander in charge of the area was ordered by the Battle Field Commander not to have mercy for civilians who did not support them. On one occasion and following a meeting organised at Woroma by the RUF/AFRC commander in the chiefdom, eight men and four women accused of being supporters of the Government of Sierra Leone were killed and burnt by the RUF/AFRC forces, which led civilians once again to flee to Guinea. However, shortly afterwards in June, the commander ordered his men to kill any civilian caught attempting to cross the Moa River or the Menni River to go to Guinea. Some civilians were therefore killed and some of them drowned in the rivers, which were swollen due to the rainy season. Furthermore, another order passed by this commander was for his men to check for tattoos on the men's bodies, as this would be proof of belonging to the Kamajor society. Besides pursuing RUF/AFRC positions, the Kamajors in Penguia Chiefdom chased and killed those they suspected of being "rebel" collaborators.⁷⁷¹ Kamajors from Peje West and Peje Bongre Chiefdoms were also attacking RUF/AFRC forces in their chiefdoms.

The town of Neama (south of Jawie Chiefdom, near the border with Kenema District) was considered a safe place where many civilians from the surrounding chiefdoms were seeking refuge. The town was under the command of the CDF and was an important ECOMOG and CDF base. RUF forces attacked the town and over 300 civilians were killed; it took three days to bury them in mass graves.

When the chairman of the AFRC and his government were driven out of Freetown by the ECOMOG forces, he sought temporarily refuge in Kangama town⁷⁷² (Kissi Teng Chiefdom), four miles from Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), the headquarter of RUF/AFRC. Indeed, Buedu in 1998 became the War Office⁷⁷³ and a very important centre for supply routes, smuggling of produce and diamonds and for training. All these activities became rampant throughout the year and enabled the RUF/AFRC forces to strengthen their positions and strongholds in the entire District. The War Office was the administrative headquarters where all the operational orders were given and throughout 1998 to 2001, all the important meetings for the top ranking commanders took place there. There was only one War Office and the other headquarters were subsidiary to that office. During this time, a lot of civilians were tortured, raped, killed and conscripted into the fighting

⁷⁷¹ No specific incident was recalled on this information.

⁷⁷² He was seen during the same period in Kono District, en route to Kailahun District.

⁷⁷³ Although ECOMOG forces claimed to have recaptured Buedu in 1998, it is clear from the records and other open source materials that the war office was open in Buedu at the latest in April 1998. Accordingly, either ECOMOG forces attacked but did not capture the town or captured the town only for a short period of time.



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forces. Also children under 15 were conscripted,⁷⁷⁴ as the forces were increasing their number not only to resist and fight ECOMOG and CDF forces but also in preparation for the planned attack on Freetown.⁷⁷⁵ On one occasion that probably took place in April, the senior RUF officer in charge of the War Office at Buedu brought back about 100 machine guns from Liberia.

Kailahun Town and the Geima camp became important training bases for the RUF/AFRC.⁷⁷⁶ RUF commanders regularly shuttled between Kono District and the rest of the deployment areas in Kailahun District and were able to procure more weapons from Liberia. Weapons were stored at Foindu (Peje Bongre Chiefdom) with the aim of engaging in simultaneous attacks on Bunumbu, Segbwema and Daru. Mamboma (Peje Bongre Chiefdom) was the identified base for the attacks. Main RUF/AFRC positions in the District included Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom) and Geima (Luawa Chiefdom).

Throughout 1998 and 1999, until peace talks started, the RUF/AFRC launched several unsuccessful attacks on the ECOMOG/CDF forces based at Daru, often surrounding the town. One of these attacks took place on 25 May 1998 but no fatalities were reported. The commander of the Kamajors admonished his men not to loot houses in Daru, but his order was defied as Kamajors engaged in much stealing in the township.⁷⁷⁷ Furthermore, the Kamajors recruited children to be initiated into their society to fight the RUF/AFRC forces still in the east of the District.⁷⁷⁸

Besides their attack on Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) the RUF/AFRC forces assaulted ECOMOG and CDF positions in different places in the District, including Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom) and Benduma (Jawie Chiefdom).

During the second half of the year, ECOMOG successes in the District appeared to have come to a halt and to be hampered by the RUF/AFRC activities. In September, the ECOMOG spokesman stated that they needed at least 2,000 more troops, "real fighters, as well as logistical support" to put an end to the conflict.⁷⁷⁹ However, massive ECOMOG air raids in the District killed a lot of RUF/AFRC members in November in Pendembu, Kuiva and Geima. Furthermore, according to ECOMOG forces, they attacked and killed many RUF/AFRC forces in villages on the border with Liberia in November and December.

⁷⁷⁴ No specific dated incident could be obtained, apart from this information of a general nature.

⁷⁷⁵ It should be recalled that when they were ousted from Freetown in February 1998, the RUF/AFRC stated that they would return.

⁷⁷⁶ It seems that ECOMOG and CDF forces did not succeed in capturing Kailahun Town during their attack in May.

⁷⁷⁷ No more information could be obtained on these events.

⁷⁷⁸ According to a Kamajor field commander quoted in an IPS press release on 29 June 1998, Kamajors "have 3,000 child Kamajors... These kids are very brave on the frontline... children are unadulterated and ... they follow the laws governing the conduct of the militia like abstinence from sex, drugs and looting when in combat... We don't trust adults quite (as) much because many have breached the rules governing our militia group and so they get killed by the enemy."

⁷⁷⁹ See, for example, AFP, 30 September 1998.



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On 30 December 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on the combined forces of ECOMOG and CDF based in Segbwema⁷⁸⁰ (Njaluahun Chiefdom), where they battled for over nine hours, during which a lot of civilians were killed and houses were set on fire by the RUF/AFRC forces. The RUF/AFRC forces captured the town and established a base there. Apparently this was a strategic plan by the RUF/AFRC forces to cut off ECOMOG forces based at Daru and so prevent them from undertaking any counter attack while they were heading for other Districts and the capital.⁷⁸¹ Furthermore, it allowed further advances towards Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District), which would be attacked in early March 1999.

g) Events in 1999

In 1999, the population of Kailahun District was cut off from the reach of Kenema District despite ECOMOG deployment at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom).⁷⁸²

The strategic town of Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom) became a battlefield for the greater part of 1999. On 6 April, CDF troops from Kenema District unsuccessfully attacked the RUF/AFRC positions there, during which one RUF/AFRC member was killed.

Two days before the ceasefire provided for in the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, a massive RUF/AFRC group attacked the Moa Barracks, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), without being able to dislodge the ECOMOG forces who had been based there since March 1998.

On 17 July 1999, CDF forces planned an attack on an RUF/AFRC position at Daru Junction (Jawie Chiefdom). On their way, they fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush and three Kamajors were killed. The CDF forces were, however, successful in capturing Daru Junction, where they made a temporary base. RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on this base on 29 September 1999. They succeeded in dislodging the CDF, who again launched a further attack on Segbwema, but were once again unsuccessful. During their withdrawal, a lot of Kamajors as well as civilians were killed by the RUF/AFRC forces. At this time, Pendembu, Kailahun Town and Buedu were the RUF/AFRC main bases in the District.

In August at the War Office in Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom), a senior RUF commander sent one of his subordinates to Liberia to bring back all the AFRC members to Buedu⁷⁸³ so that an arrangement could be made to launch an attack on ECOMOG positions. While he was there, a woman came from Liberia and informed the commander that she had seen his subordinate at the ECOMOG base in Monrovia. On his return, the subordinate was arrested and tortured at Buedu

⁷⁸⁰ Segbwema is located on a strategic position in Kailahun District, as it allows for further advances inland towards Kenema District. It is almost a compulsory point of passage as there is only one other road to leave Kailahun District through Manowa Junction (Peje West Chiefdom). However, this road leads to Kono District while the Segbwema road leads to Kenema District and accordingly puts Freetown within much closer reach.

⁷⁸¹ This information has to be read in conjunction with what happened in December 1998 in Kono, Bombali, Magburaka and Tonkolili Districts and in Freetown on 6 January 1999.

⁷⁸² It could not be ascertained whether ECOMOG deployed in other towns, although it is known that from Daru, they were launching long-range missiles up to Kissi Tongi Chiefdom.

⁷⁸³ Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, while some AFRC members dispatched in the provinces, others went to Liberia.



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until he explained the purpose of his visit to the ECOMOG base. The subordinate denied having visited the ECOMOG base in Monrovia and he further stated that if anyone had given such information about him it was false. He even went on to say that if that were true he would not have come with over 100 AFRC members to Buedu from Liberia. His defence never convinced his commander, who eventually killed him.

In mid October, RUF forces captured personnel of the World Health Organisation (WHO) who were on a vaccination mission in Segbwema. At that time, even if Segbwema was still a RUF stronghold, no major security threat was perceived, as illustrated in the report of the interagency humanitarian assessment mission that took place in the District between 29 September and 1 October. In this report, it was stated that "relief agencies can now move into [towns assessed by the team in the District] provided that prior information on their itineraries is made available to the Organisation for the Survival of Mankind (OSM) leadership", which was the humanitarian wing of the RUF, based at Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom).⁷⁸⁴

Also in October, the RUF leader went to Buedu (Kissi Tongi Chiefdom) to exhort his troops to disarm, accompanied by members of ECOMOG and the United Nations Observation Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).⁷⁸⁵ This visit was part of a general tour throughout the country. By the end of the month, however, hundreds of RUF members led by one senior RUF commander left the District and went to Makeni (Bombali District), where an internal fight, most likely of a personal nature, took place with the AFRC forces based there.⁷⁸⁶ This event took place almost at the same time as the first UN peacekeepers arrived at Lungi, the international airport, marking the first step of their country-wide deployment.

Immediately after the RUF leader left Buedu, the Battle Field Commander and second in command to the RUF leader based at Buedu convened a meeting in Buedu and Kailahun Town to which he invited all the RUF vanguards, namely those who were trained in Liberia before the start of the conflict in 1991. At those meetings, he openly challenged the orders of the RUF leader and requested his men not to disarm to the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces they had been fighting for almost a decade.⁷⁸⁷ He further claimed that as the Battle Field Commander, he was the only one that could order disarmament and not the RUF leader. He sent the Chief Security Officer and his bodyguard to Liberia to secure more weapons and when this officer came back, he sent him with loyal troops, mostly vanguards, to persuade the RUF members not to disarm. Furthermore, in early December, two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) workers were abducted by RUF forces in the District, in a bid to focus the attention of the international community on the disagreement of RUF forces with the DDR process. The NGO workers were released two weeks later, unharmed.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁴ IRIN West Africa, 15 October 1999.

⁷⁸⁵ The peacekeeping operation was established by UN Resolution 1181 on 13 July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation in the country; the UNOMSIL mission initially had a six-month term, which was extended.

⁷⁸⁶ IRIN West Africa, 29 October 1999.

⁷⁸⁷ He notably gave an interview to the BBC on 30 November 1999.

⁷⁸⁸ IRIN West Africa, 16 December 1999.



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The RUF men sent by the Battle Field Commander went to Pendembu, a brigade headquarter, and to Segbwema, having been requested by the Battle Field Commander to appoint new commanders in these towns that were loyal to him. At Segbwema, following the arrest of one RUF member caught trying to send a message to the RUF leader, the Battle Field Commander gave the order to arrest all the officers loyal to the RUF leader and to destroy two bridges on the way to Kono District. Those orders were never carried out as, in the meanwhile, the RUF leader ordered the arrest of those men sent by the Battle Field Commander. Those men were tied up, tortured and taken to Koakuima, the second brigade headquarter in Kono District. The RUF leader also ordered the arrest of the Battle Field Commander. However, on hearing his men had been arrested and that the RUF leader had given an order for his arrest to another senior RUF officer,⁷⁸⁹ the Battle Field Commander fled to Liberia with his family and 200 RUF members.

On 20 December, the CDF forces launched another attack on Segbwema. They received support from the ECOMOG forces based in Daru who sent their alpha jet to bomb RUF positions. This attack was again unsuccessful, as was another one that took place on 25 December, following which the CDF forces retreated to Kenema District. Two days after this last attack, CDF from Kenema District went to Fola village (Njaluhun Chiefdom) in the hope of attacking the RUF/AFRC position in Segbwema. At Fola, ceremonies were performed to enable the troops to capture Segbwema. The CDF troops fell into an ambush close to Segbwema, where one Kamajor was killed, but they continued nevertheless and launched a fierce attack on Segbwema. During this attack, which was eventually unsuccessful for the Kamajors who went back to Kenema District, a lot of houses were destroyed during the crossfire. The CDF, however, were successful in capturing the town of Pendembu Njegbla (Njaluhun Chiefdom) and made a base there.

In late December 1999 or early January 2000, the first UNAMSIL troops - part of the Ghanaian battalion, also deployed in Bo and Kenema Towns - were sent from Freetown to Daru Barracks.

h) 2000 and 2001

The demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the estimated 45,000 combatants in the country was slower than had been envisaged at the launch of the DDR program on 20 October 1999.⁷⁹⁰ For Kailahun District, where the DDR camp was located at Daru, the RUF leader stated that the slow process was due to the lack of the necessary structures, namely no ceasefire committees and no logistics.⁷⁹¹

In early January, the RUF commander in Makeni mobilised his fighting forces and went to Buedu to attack and arrest the RUF Battle Field Commander. However, the Battle Field Commander was nowhere to be found as he had earlier left for Liberia with his loyal troops, his bodyguards, some civilians and a lot of property, including FM radio broadcasting equipment, radio communication sets, computers, fax machines, arms and ammunition. A large number of civilians were maltreated and killed by the RUF commander who came to Buedu at this time.

⁷⁸⁹ This senior RUF officer was going to be the next Battle Field Commander.

⁷⁹⁰ It should be noted that the start of the DDR program had already been delayed since it was meant to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, i.e. by 18 August 1999.

⁷⁹¹ IRIN West Africa, 31 January 2000.



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In March 2000, the position of the RUF leader towards the DDR program changed, as far from appealing his men to disarm as he had done in late 1999, he stated that he would not order his men to disarm unless the other fighting forces simultaneously disarmed.⁷⁹² However, soon after, 2,000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers from the Indian Battalion known as INDBATT, arrived in Kailahun Town with six unarmed military observers (MILOBS).⁷⁹³ Both RUF members and civilians in the town warmly welcomed this group.⁷⁹⁴ Within a short time, the troops had proved to be very friendly to the people of the township, engaging themselves in various activities.

Some Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in the Parrot Beak area in Guinea returned to Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) where UNAMSIL was deployed. They were registered and screened at the entry points by the CDF, the Kailahun District Development Foundation (KADDF) and an international NGO.⁷⁹⁵

In early April, UNAMSIL personnel engaged in speeding up the disarmament process, together with the RUF leader, a representative of the ex-AFRC leader and other personalities went to Segbwema (Njaluahun Chiefdom).⁷⁹⁶ However, on 3 May 2000, a UN helicopter and its crew were captured by RUF forces in the District. This abduction of UN troops was not isolated, as at the same moment, UNAMSIL personnel were seized at Makeni (Bombali District) and a 23 man-unit was surrounded at Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom).⁷⁹⁷ Although the helicopter and its crew were released shortly after, the rate of UNAMSIL forces' abduction grew, with over 300 estimated abductions by 5 May 2000.

Within Kailahun District, the UNAMSIL troops, including their commanders, were prevented from moving outside their compound in Kailahun Town following an order from the RUF's Chief Security Officer.⁷⁹⁸ All their vehicles and all other property were taken and conveyed to Geima (Luawa Chiefdom). The Chief Security Officer also ordered the arrest of the MILOBS in Geima. All of their property was taken and they were conveyed to the District barracks in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom) and were then brought to the UNAMSIL compound. The RUF Chief Security Officer also stopped the UN helicopter from bringing food and other logistics for the peacekeepers and instructed the Indian commander of the peacekeepers deployed at Daru to bring food for the prisoners by road. The situation of the 224 Indian peacekeepers and 11 MILOBS was similar to their colleagues at Kuiva (Mandu Chiefdom) as none of these groups was allowed free movement and were surrounded by RUF forces. They were supplied with food coming by truck from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom) but on various occasions, the RUF allowed only half of the load to be supplied or none

⁷⁹² IRIN West Africa, 16 March 2000.

⁷⁹³ It took more than one attempt for the UNAMSIL troops to reach the town as in early March they were stopped by RUF forces on their way to the town.

⁷⁹⁴ It was not clear why the RUF forces were happy to see UNAMSIL.

⁷⁹⁵ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 11 – 31 March 2001.

⁷⁹⁶ On 3 April, nearly 22,000 combatants were disarmed, out of the total estimated 45,000 combatants, according to the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR): IRIN West Africa, 11 April 2000.

⁷⁹⁷ IRIN West Africa, 4 May 2000.

⁷⁹⁸ Others peacekeepers were also captured in May in different places across the country, in Kambia, Bombali and Tonkolili Districts.



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at all. On 29 June, the UN troops from Kuiva were released and transferred to Monrovia before being airlifted to Freetown, their arms and ammunition being kept by the RUF forces.

UNAMSIL engaged in diplomatic and political negotiations for the release of its personnel but as those negotiations failed, around 15 July 2000, UNAMSIL helicopters bombarded the RUF position in Kailahun Town. The sound of those bombardments could be heard all over Luawa Chiefdom and beyond. During this aerial attack, the peacekeepers and MILOBS pulled out of Kailahun Town with their weapons, some being airlifted, the majority going on foot to Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), some unarmed but with air protection from helicopters. On their way to Pendembu, they were engaged by RUF forces who also fired at the helicopters. Two members of the UNAMSIL Indian Special Forces team and seven of the released members were injured while the RUF forces suffered heavy fatalities in Pendembu and Kailahun Town. The helicopter gunship afterwards made frequent trips to view the areas in and around Kailahun. Following this rescue events and the resulting fighting, nearly 5,000 civilians from the surrounding area fled to Daru.

Following the rescue of the UNAMSIL personnel, the disarmament process resumed at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom), one of the two operational DDR camps in the country,⁷⁹⁹ but on a lower scale, as RUF activities were still being reported in the District. For example, although they had signed a recent agreement with the CDF forces to allow commercial trucks to use the Kenema-Daru road, in early August RUF forces captured three trucks and three taxis at Segbwema.⁸⁰⁰

Starting in September 2000, RUF forces were seriously engaged in cross-border attacks into Guinea, in the area known as the Parrot Beak in the east and at the border with Kambia District in the north. As a result of those attacks, Sierra Leoneans who had found refuge in Guinea returned to Sierra Leone and to Kailahun District; between February and April 2001, around 12,500 people arrived in Daru on foot.⁸⁰¹ In addition, some Guinean troops set up positions inside the territory of Sierra Leone to protect the Guinean border, notably in Kissi Teng Chiefdom. Furthermore, at this time Kailahun District became widely affected by the renewed hostilities in Liberia.⁸⁰²

As RUF forces still controlled areas in the District, a one-month ceasefire was signed on 10 November, known as Abuja Cease-Fire, thereby reactivating the disarmament process, which had been interrupted following the events of May 2000. Its main provision was the disarmament of the RUF forces and the deployment of UNAMSIL troops in RUF-held areas.⁸⁰³

In mid March 2001, UNAMSIL peacekeepers conducted a patrol to Kailahun Town, the first since the rescue operation the previous year. They left from Daru and on their way to Kailahun Town, passed by the RUF-held towns of Kuiva, Moiba (Mandu Chiefdom) and Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom), where they met with the RUF commanders and "secured their firm

⁷⁹⁹ The other camp was in Lungi (Port Loko District).

⁸⁰⁰ IRIN West Africa, 10 August 2000.

⁸⁰¹ IRIN West Africa, 25 April 2001.

⁸⁰² Since 1998, fighting resumed in Liberia with the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) fighting to overthrow the Liberian Head of State

⁸⁰³ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 14 November - 6 December 2000.

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commitment towards collaboration with UNAMSIL".⁸⁰⁴ At Kailahun Town, they met with the RUF High Command and raised issues concerning the deployment of UNAMSIL personnel, including the freedom of movement of UNAMSIL patrols and the opening of the Daru-Kailahun road. Around 19 April, UNAMSIL troops eventually deployed in some RUF-held areas and dispatched regular patrols to Kailahun Town.⁸⁰⁵

In early 2001, clashes between the CDF and the RUF/AFRC forces persisted along the Yawei Chiefdom bordering Gandorhun Chiefdom (Kono District). At one point in April or May, a group of CDF from Guinea⁸⁰⁶ who had earlier captured towns in the Penguia Chiefdom proceeded to attack Manowa and Bunumbu to cut the RUF/AFRC forces off from Kono District.

A meeting between the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone, UN representatives and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to review the cease-fire signed on 10 November 2000 was convened on 4 May 2001, again in Abuja, Nigeria. The main points of concern related to the acceleration of the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the remaining RUF forces, the release of child combatants and the freedom of movement of persons. Furthermore, during a meeting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 15 May at UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown, both parties agreed to consider the establishment of a DDR camp in Kailahun Town.⁸⁰⁷ During the following weeks, an official disarmament ceremony including the release of children was held in the District. In October 2001, during a meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed on a schedule for the completion of the disarmament process. This accelerated disarmament was to take place in Kailahun District between 15 and 30 November 2001.⁸⁰⁸

Following fresh negotiations with the RUF, 170 peacekeepers from the Pakistani Battalion (PAKBATT II) were deployed in the District on 26 October; shortly after, the main body of 800 men was airlifted to the District.⁸⁰⁹ Both in Kailahun and Kenema Districts, the disarmament, which stalled for three weeks, began in earnest around 10 December. Since the third phase of disarmament started in May 2001, the figures of the disarmament process by mid December were as follows: a total of 37,654 combatants had disarmed, among them 12,546 RUF, 24,699 CDF and 400 Others. In Kailahun, 2,936 combatants had disarmed: 1,994 RUF and 942 CDF.

⁸⁰⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 March 2001.

⁸⁰⁵ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 19 April 2001.

⁸⁰⁶ In late March 2001, Kamajors coming mostly from Kono District who had found refuge in Guinean refugee camps and were armed by the Guinean authorities launched simultaneous attacks in Kono District and in the north of Kailahun District. Accordingly, this action in Kailahun District has to be read in the light of the factual analysis for Kono District during this period.

⁸⁰⁷ UNAMSIL press release, 15 May 2001.

⁸⁰⁸ The schedule for the completion of the disarmament was agreed as follows: Koinadugu and Moyamba Districts by 22 October; Bo and Bombali Districts by 31 October; Western Area between 1-7 November; Pujehun and Tonkolili Districts between 1-15 November; and Kenema District between 15-30 November: IRIN West Africa, 12 October 2001.

⁸⁰⁹ With the deployment in November of Nepalese peacekeepers in Moyamba District, the UNAMSIL mission reached its authorised ceiling of 17,500 troops: IRIN West Africa, 20 November 2001.



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The PAKBATT II contingent sensitised the RUF forces on the urgent need for peace in the country and encouraged them to disarm. The attitude of the peacekeepers made civilians and RUF members become very friendly and cooperative. However, a senior RUF commander sent instructions that the fighters of Luawa Chiefdom, indeed the whole of Kailahun District, should not disarm until the arrival of their leader. This instruction was never obeyed as even the Chief Security Officer did not stop anybody from disarming. Those who disarmed were protected and looked after of by the peacekeepers. The senior RUF commander later visited Kailahun District in early December together with the UNAMSIL force commander and the formal order for disarmament was issued.

The disarmament process successfully continued in the District until early January 2002; on 11 January 2002, senior RUF commanders symbolically turned in their weapons to the Force Commander of UNAMSIL in Kailahun District. The eighth and final tripartite meeting between UNAMSIL, the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone took place on 17 January 2002: "Both groups called for the extension of government authority throughout the country, the reintegration of fighters back into society and they supported the on-going Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme. They appealed for the international community to continue its support to the DDR."⁸¹⁰

3. Conclusion

The first batch of RUF forces, at that time fighting alongside the NPFL, entered the District through the two motorable roads that link the District to Liberia and the last RUF members were disarmed in early January 2002. Kailahun District was the only District where RUF forces, first with the NPFL, then alone and subsequently with the AFRC, established strong positions throughout the war. They were never completely repelled outside the boundaries of the District.

The first major incursion into Sierra Leone was carried out concurrently in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, where the main roads between Liberia and Sierra Leone are located. The headquarters of the RUF/NPFL were established in Kailahun District from the beginning of the conflict and remained in the District throughout the conflict, although defensive headquarters were opened in Makeni and Kono, as the RUF/AFRC controlled these areas, making Kailahun District the RUF stronghold.

During the first years of the conflict, the RUF/NPFL forces directly engaged the SLA forces but never succeeded in dislodging them from their strategic position in Daru. These years were marked by the initial progression of the RUF/NPFL throughout the District, which was later halted by the SLA. Attacks and counter attacks from both sides made it difficult to have a clear picture of who was in control of any given area. However, the main SLA victory took place in late 1993, at which time they confined the RUF forces to the extreme east. This SLA progression led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December 1993.

⁸¹⁰ Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report 1- 31 January 2002.



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This ceasefire was soon violated, when in March 1994, RUF forces, alone this time as the NPFL had earlier withdrawn to Liberia to defend their positions in the Liberian conflict, changed their military tactic to that of guerrilla warfare and began retaking positions from the SLA. Shortly before that, in December 1993, the RUF forces had launched a massive and successful offensive in the south-east of Kenema District and by March 1994, were scattered throughout the Kenema District. In 1994 also, the south-east flank of Pujehun was clearly reopened and RUF forces spread across the District. This new development of the conflict left the three bordering Districts almost under RUF control and allowed further incursions in the rest of the country. The scale of this second wave was acknowledged by the NPRC Chairman himself, who declared "total war against the rebels". By 1995, all the Districts of the country were directly affected by the RUF incursions.

From 1996 onwards, Kamajors emerged and fought the RUF and later the RUF/AFRC forces in the District. Although they retook control of some RUF-held areas, they never succeeded in taking control of the whole District.

Following the merging of the RUF with the AFRC forces, those CDF members, as in other Districts of the country, went underground before challenging the RUF/AFRC positions by late 1997 but particularly in 1998, following the ECOMOG deployment in Daru. As in 1998, Kamajors were in total control of Pujehun District and the Southern Province in general, thereby cutting off one of the supply roads from Liberia, although not the main one, which was through Koindu (Kissi Teng Chiefdom) in the north-east of Kailahun District. This strong grip over the Southern Province and especially over the Freetown-Kenema and Freetown-Pujehun highways blocked the retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown, preventing them to go to Liberia through Pujehun District and forcing them to reach Kailahun District through Kono District.

RUF/AFRC forces had control over certain areas of Kailahun District, mainly in the north-east of the Moa River and continued engaging the Kamajors, who at that time were assisted by ECOMOG forces. Around this time, many RUF/AFRC forces had regrouped in the District before launching their offensive on Koidu (Kono District) in December 1998. As part of this massive operation, which ended in Freetown on 6 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces retook position of Segbwema, a strategic town on the main road to Kenema District thus blocking ECOMOG at Daru.

The period following the invasion of Freetown was mainly characterised by political negotiations and reached its conclusion by the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. Although the RUF leader exhorted his members in the District to disarm, a senior RUF officer, then Battle Field Commander and CDS categorically refused and engaged in actions to put a stop to the disarmament process. RUF forces furthermore engaged in cross border raids in the Parrot Beak in Guinea. This action was not isolated as another Guinean flank was open in Kambia District. The peace process was reactivated in November 2000 but more than one year was necessary to complete the disarmament in the District and to declare the war over in January 2002. Kailahun was amongst the last Districts to be disarmed.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

DRAFT FOR REVIEW ONLY: NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION



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b. Kenema District

1. **Introduction**

Kenema District is one of the three Districts composing the Eastern Province, together with Kailahun and Kono Districts. It is bordered on the north by Tonkolili District and, mainly, by Kono District, on the east by Kailahun District, on the southeast by Liberia, on the south-west by Pujehun and on the west by Bo District. Its headquarter town is Kenema Town in Nongowa Chiefdom, in the centre of the District. Kenema Town is located on the highway that goes to Koidu (Kono District Headquarter) in one direction and to Bo Town (Bo District Headquarter) and further on to Freetown in the other direction. As in the other Districts of the country, control of the highway was of fundamental importance as it is the only way to bring necessary daily items for civilians in the District.

There are 16 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Dama	Giema
Dodo	Dodo
Gaura	Joru
Gorama Mende	Tongi
Kandu Leppeama	Gbando
Koya	Baoma
Langrama	Ya Baima
Lower Bamabara	Panguma
Malegowun	Sembehun
Niawa	Sendumei
Nomo	Faama
Nongowa	Kenema
Simbaru	Boajibu
Small Bo	Blama
Tunkia	Gorahun
Wandor	Faala

The Moa River, which takes its source in the ocean in the south of Pujehun District, flows through the southern parts of Kenema District (Koya and Dama Chiefdoms). The Sewa River, coming from Bonthe and Bo Districts, reaches Kenema District in the central east in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom and continues towards the north, reaching Kono District through Simbaru, Wandor and Gorama Mende Chiefdoms. On its eastern edge, at the border with Liberia, Kenema District is bordered by the Golan Forest.

After Kono District, Kenema District is one of the most important diamond mining areas of the country. The main diamond area, Tongo Field, is to be found in Lower Bambara Chiefdom, but other chiefdoms are also mainly mining areas, such as Kandu Leppeama and Gorama Mende Chiefdoms.



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

Kenema District was affected by the conflict through three discernible phases. During the first phase, which encompassed 1991 to the end of 1993, Kenema District was attacked by RUF/NPFL forces coming from the south and the east. This phase was marked by widespread violations committed primarily by RUF/NPFL forces, but also by SLA forces. Initially, in the south, there was little resistance put up by the SLA, who were also inflicting violence and terror on the population as part of their "screening" of the population for "rebels". However, towards the middle of 1992, the SLA regrouped and mostly drove the RUF/NPFL forces from their positions back towards Liberia. In the east, the fighting and infliction of violence and terror on the population was more intense, in part because there was a greater concentration of SLA forces due to the location of the SLA brigade headquarter in Kenema Town.

The patterns in both incursions were remarkably similar: the RUF/NPFL forces would gather the people of the villages in the Court Barrie and hold a meeting, toppling the existing authorities and setting up new power structures. Their arrival and stay was accompanied by the infliction of physical and mental violence on the people of the village, as well as the abduction of members of the population, including children, for use as workers, as fighters, as cooks and as "wives". RUF/NPFL forces also engaged in widespread theft and property destruction, notably the burning of houses, particularly when the people had fled the village prior to their arrival. Indeed, there was much internal displacement within the District as some people fled their villages ahead of the arrival of RUF/NPFL forces until mid to late 1992, when the combined SLA and ULIMO⁸¹¹ forces began retaking control of the District and driving the RUF/NPFL forces out.

The second phase spanned from the end of 1993 until May 1997 with two concurrent incursions, one from the north and one from the south. This period saw the birth of the Kamajors, who were local hunters initially coming together in informal groups before coming under the wing of the CDF. The "Kamajors" began to fight the RUF, alongside the SLA. During this second phase, a lot of civilians were killed, abducted, forced to carry property and work in the diamonds mines; the number of rapes increased. The RUF also set up a number of camps throughout the District, from where they launched attacks on surrounding chiefdoms. These camps were also the sites where they brought abducted civilians and inflicted physical and mental violence on some and trained others to be fighters, including children. Atrocities were mostly carried out by RUF forces but also by SLA members who were actively engaged in mining activities and, to a lesser extent, the Kamajors.

The third and final phase of the conflict in Kenema District ran from May 1997, the date of the Coup that saw the AFRC seize power, until 2002, when the war officially ended across the country. During this time, there were still many incidents of violence against the population both by the RUF/AFRC forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Kamajors. This violence was most pronounced just after the Coup in May 1997, but continued throughout this phase, tapering off towards 2000 in the north, when disarmament began across the District.

⁸¹¹ This fighting faction, composed mainly of supporters of the late previous Liberian President, Samuel Doe, emerged in May 1991 to fight the NPFL, which was led by Charles Taylor.



NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

2. Factual analysis

a) First Phase: 1991 – end of 1993

The war began in Kenema District as early as 1991, when RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in Tunkia Chiefdom, in the south, from Pujehun District and Liberia, and in the east from Kailahun District, where they entered Malegohun Chiefdom, which shares a boundary with Kailahun District.

Southern incursion

In April 1991, armed men identified as RUF/NPFL fighters (the NPFL, by their Liberian accent) entered Tunkia Chiefdom⁸¹² in the south of the District from Pujehun District through the Golan forest and, to a limited extent, from bordering Liberia. After gathering people at the Court Barrie or in a school field, these forces introduced themselves as the people's "redeemers and liberators" from the APC Government.

Coming from Makpèle Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in April, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter of Gorahun. Some of these forces had leaves tied around their wrist. This is a symbol of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party⁸¹³ (SLPP) and it is reported that this was done to gain the support of the people of Tunkia Chiefdom, since it was common knowledge that Tunkia was an SLPP stronghold. After taking control of the city, the RUF/NPFL appointed new chiefdom authorities and began looting houses. SLA forces from Kenema Town repelled them for a while but they came back shortly afterwards.

RUF/NPFL forces also entered the chiefdom from Liberia, through Tolo, and rapidly advanced into the chiefdom, harassing and molesting the population, inflicting physical violence, looting, killing and raping. When they arrived at Tolo, where RUF/NPFL forces stayed two days before proceeding further, they burnt some houses and killed civilians. At Tigbwema, RUF/NPFL forces burnt houses but did not meet the inhabitants as they had already left the town. At Mano Jeigbla, one man was shot and wounded and two young women were taken as "wives".⁸¹⁴

At this time, SLA troops had recently arrived in Gegbwema, in the north of Tunkia Chiefdom, to brief the local authorities on security issues. However, when the RUF/NPFL forces approached the town and started firing, the SLA left Gegbwema, allowing RUF/NPFL forces to take control of the town without any armed opposition. One of the commanders of the RUF/NPFL forces told the people that they had come to unseat the APC Government. The day after they had arrived, chiefs from Jao (located in the centre of the chiefdom), Kamasu and the surrounding villages came to the town, unaware that the town had fallen into the hands of the RUF/NPFL, because they had previously been called upon for a meeting by the SLA Major. When they arrived, they were arrested by RUF/NPFL forces, undressed and forced to lie on the ground and look at the sky for a long time. These authorities were then told to go back to their towns, escorted by RUF/NPFL forces, and return to Gegbwema with food items.

⁸¹² The chiefdom headquarter is Gorahun, located on the Kenema–Bo Waterside (Pujehun District) road. Gegbwema and Jao are two major towns in the chiefdom.

⁸¹³ At this time, the SLPP was the opposing party to the APC regime.

⁸¹⁴ A term used by RUF/NPFL forces to denote women who they would abduct and force to perform domestic tasks and have sex with them.



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On their arrival in Jao, one group of RUF/NPFL forces settled there due to the large number of cattle in the town. During their stay at Jao, they forced civilians to cook for them and an unknown number of women were forced to have sex with RUF/NPFL personnel. Joru, Gaura Chiefdom headquarters was attacked many times during that period but without success. In June, Guinean forces⁸¹⁵ who were deployed at Joru launched heavy missiles on RUF/NPFL positions in Tunkia Chiefdom. This led RUF/NPFL forces to leave the chiefdom for Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom, Pujehun District), together with some civilians.

After their departure, people started coming back out of the bush to their villages and SLA and ULIMO forces were deployed at Jao and Gegbwema. However, many people were afraid to leave the bush, because the RUF/NPFL had told them that the SLA would kill them if they found them in places previously occupied by RUF/NPFL forces. As a result of their belief that they would be killed by the SLA, some people went to Zimmi with the RUF/NPFL forces.

Furthermore, there was also harassment of civilians by the SLA. In one incident, SLA forces assaulted a civilian from Jao, accusing him of being a "rebel", beating his head with the butt of a gun and threatening to cut his throat. An SLA commander who knew him intervened, saving his life. At that time, Jao was hosting thousands of people who had come from various villages to avoid RUF/NPFL forces. During their stay, SLA forces routinely carried out a practice known as "screening", checking that people coming to the villages were not "rebels". During the rest of the year, there were two other attacks on Gorahun where SLA forces repelled the unidentified assailants.

In July 1991, the chiefdom was attacked again at Gorahun. SLA forces fought RUF/NPFL forces before withdrawing. Subsequently, SLA forces deployed at Jao and Gegbwema also withdrew. Consequently, thousands of civilians left the chiefdom for safer havens such as Kenema Town, where they received information of attacks and the burning of villages in the chiefdom. In September, the SLA mobilised its troops, driving the majority of RUF/NPFL forces from positions in the chiefdom back to the Liberian border. After these last attacks, Tunkia Chiefdom was quiet for two years until hostilities resumed in December 1993.

Eastern incursion

In 1991, Kenema Town was an SLA brigade headquarter and the Major in charge was responsible for arms and ammunition for the war front in Kailahun District.

In May 1991, the war, which had previously been contained in Kailahun District, spilled over into Malegohun Chiefdom (north of the District, sharing a border with Kailahun District). A few days after they had taken control of Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District), RUF/NPFL forces entered Ngiehun (Malegohun Chiefdom). Before their arrival, a lot of people had left, hearing terrific news such as killing of sick people to save them from suffering or killing of the most frightened ones so that they do not create fear in the others. Fighters searched the bushes to bring back civilians to the town. Following the usual pattern of gathering the village in the Court Barrie, a

⁸¹⁵ Guinean and Nigerian forces, deployed in the country under bilateral treaties with Sierra Leone, fought alongside the SLA.



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Town Commander, a Deputy Commander and a clerk were appointed and a committee was set up. Two men were executed and some women were taken to become their "wives".

The Town Commander conscripted manpower, swelling the ranks of the RUF/NPFL forces and enabling them to take control over other sections (the chiefdom has seven sections). After taking Konjo Buema Section, RUF/NPFL forces controlled Konjo Njagore and Konjo Yematanga Sections.

Following a disagreement with the Town Commander,⁸¹⁶ a local RUF commander removed all the people he had previously appointed from power. Four days later, his forces came back to the town to arrest the elders. However, the elders had left and the town was deserted, so the RUF/NPFL forces burn down 19 houses. The RUF/NPFL forces who were in Ngiehun moved to Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District) and intermittently patrolled the three sections in Malegohun Chiefdom that were under their control.

After these first attacks, 1992 saw RUF/NPFL activities expanding mainly in the chiefdoms of Koya, Dama and Niawa in the south of the District. Some activities were also reported in the chiefdoms of Small Bo, Gorama Mende and Lower Bambara, in the east of the District on the boundary with Bo District.

Several civilians were killed in February 1992 during SLA attacks on the headquarters of the three sections of Malegohun Chiefdom under RUF/NPFL control. SLA forces remained there, fighting to repel RUF/NPFL attacks. When SLA forces cleared Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District), Ngiehun became calm and people began to return from the bush.

Gorama Mende Chiefdom is a hilly and forested chiefdom, bordered on the west by Bo District, on the north by Tonkolili District, on the east by Kono District and on the south by Wandor Chiefdom. Its location near Kono District, its forest vegetation and the wealth of its soil, in particular the diamonds, made the chiefdom ripe for bush warfare. However, like Lower Bambara and Small Bo Chiefdoms, Gorama Mende was barely affected during the first phase of the conflict. In February 1992, five armed men coming from the direction Jaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama chiefdom, Kono District) reached Punduru, a large town at the border with Nimiyama Chiefdom. Their mission appeared to be have been to carry a message informing people of the aims and objectives of the RUF/NPFL, as they stated people should not be afraid because they had come to redeem them from the oppressive ruling party. However, when they had entered the village, an old woman who threw verbal insults at the RUF/NPFL forces was shot dead.⁸¹⁷

⁸¹⁶ On hearing that the Town Commander had sent two of his men to remove chairs from the College at Bunumbu for his house, a more senior local commander followed these two men and killed them, entering Ngiehun with his men the following day.

⁸¹⁷ Although no RUF presence was noted in Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District) in early 1992, it is possible that a pocket of RUF members coming from this direction reached Punduru.



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Niawa Chiefdom in the south-west of the District was attacked for the first time in 1992,⁸¹⁸ although the headquarter town of Sendumei was not affected. On 22 April, RUF forces⁸¹⁹ coming from Kandorhun (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District) through Langrama Chiefdom attacked Gandorhun in the south of Niawa Chiefdom. Upon entering the town, they appointed new Town Commanders for Gandorhun and its surrounding area. After going back for couple of days to Potoru (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District), they returned to Gandorhun, from where they launched attacks in villages in the south of the chiefdom and in the north of Langrama Chiefdom.⁸²⁰ All these attacks took place in April. After this first visit in Gandorhun, RUF fighters came back to the town three days later, as they had promised they would.

At Ngolahun Vaama, civilians were killed, some houses were burnt and six girls together with five underage boys were taken away. At Gandorhun, young girls were raped and a ten year-old girl was killed. Her father was also threatened with death if he ever smiled any time they came back to the town. In another place, civilians were killed, some women raped and taken as their wives and few houses were burnt. In all the villages, property was taken. At Ngolahun Vaama, some houses were burnt and two people in two houses were burnt. Hearing that SLA forces were preparing to attack them, some of the RUF/NPFL forces went to Ngolahun Menila, hiding their identity, and were told that inhabitants were waiting for the SLA forces, for whom they had prepared food. Following this, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town, inflicting physical violence on people, breaking doors and taking property. There were few killings at this time, apparently because the commander was mainly looking for the Chief to join their movement. A civilian who had been appointed the Town Commander of Gandorhun was killed during the attack, allegedly for hiding his people (civilians) whenever RUF forces came to the town. It is reported that the new Town Commander was doing what the rebels asked him to do. During his term, many young girls were raped and the stealing of food was commonplace.

Lower Bambara Chiefdom, located in the north of the District at the border with Kono District, comprising seven chiefdoms is well known for cash crops including cocoa, coffee and palm oil and, above all, for Tongo Field, its diamond area. Villages within this area such as Bomi, Gehama, Tokbambu, Tongola, Lalehun and Vandema are devoted to mining activities. Lower Bambara Chiefdom was affected to a limited extent during the first phase of the war and few incidents are reported, one around May 1992 and the other one at the end of the year. During the May attack, fighting forces wearing military uniforms and t-shirts and writing "RUF" on the walls of the houses attacked the diamond-mining town of Weima from Malegohun Chiefdom in the east. Civilians were killed and others were forced to carry loads.

Shortly after the overthrow of the APC Government, Dama Chiefdom authorities made an appeal to the Defence Minister to send SLA forces to the chiefdom. Dama shares a boundary with Jawei

⁸¹⁸ In Niawa Chiefdom, the following villages were assaulted by RUF/NPFL forces: Ngolahun Vaama, Woroma, Kponima, Kerga, Menila and Buwema.

⁸¹⁹ NB: On the identification of the fighters, key persons mention only the term "rebels" and RUF. No mention of NPFL. However, it is said that one of the commander was a Liberian.

⁸²⁰ In Langrama Chiefdom, as well as Yebeima, which is the first village after the border, Wanjama, Menima Langrama and Marker were attacked.



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Chiefdom (Kailahun District). SLA and ULIMO forces were deployed to Konia, on the border with Nongowa Chiefdom and Jawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District), where they established a base. Soon after, Tawahun was attacked by RUF forces, most of them speaking Krio and coming from Jawei Chiefdom. Most of the forces were dressed in civilian attire, with some in military fatigue, as the RUF had begun to use military uniforms in 1992. During this attack, some civilians were killed, one woman's breast was cut off and a family was burnt in their house.

Around May 1992, Sahun and Sherif Jembahun were also attacked. An unknown number of civilians were killed and all the important buildings were burnt down. Also in 1992, a civilian vigilante movement started operating in the chiefdom under the command of the SLA. They were armed with axes, cutlasses and single barrel guns, sent to checkpoints and asked to shout when assailants were approaching.

However, despite the presence of SLA forces in the chiefdom, attacks were still carried out until the early days of 1993, during which RUF forces mutilated civilians, including carving "RUF" on their bodies.⁸²¹

In September 1992, ULIMO forces launched a powerful attack on Gandorhun (Niawa Chiefdom) and retook control of both Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms. Almost two months later, they handed over their base to SLA forces, who were still stationed there when RUF forces attacked the chiefdoms again in March 1994.

During the end of the year, a large number of RUF/NPFL⁸²² forces attacked Konjo (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), but were repelled by SLA forces. A lot of civilians and RUF/NPFL forces were killed during the encounter. RUF/NPFL forces took a lot of property and the people of the nearby villages, such as Njaiagbahun and Venema, fled into the bush for several weeks. By the end of 1992, the population of Small Bo Chiefdom swelled as displaced people fleeing Barri Chiefdom (Pujehun District) sought refuge there.

An Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee, comprised of representatives from Kailahun, Kenema, Kono Districts and Freetown Peninsula was formed in December 1992, aiming at supporting the SLA by gathering "well-meaning" Sierra Leoneans, whose role would be of a vigilante nature.⁸²³ The youths' knowledge of the terrain would be used to lead the SLA.⁸²⁴

In 1992 and 1993, ULIMO forces used Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) as their base to fight RUF forces in other chiefdoms and were living peacefully with the population there. However, in 1992, coming back from Yibeima (Langrama chiefdom), some ULIMO members, to manifest their bravery, displayed severed male genital organs, claiming they were those of "rebels" they had killed. However, it is reported that this claim was later proved to be false and that the people who were

⁸²¹ This statement is general and unique and no more information is available on it.

⁸²² It is specified that some of the assailants were talking with Liberian dialect.

⁸²³ BBC: 22 December 1992.

⁸²⁴ Youths in the context of Sierra Leone could refer to anybody aged over 15 up to their mid to late 30s.



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killed were actually civilians. Although following this event, people of the chiefdom wanted them to leave, they were sent back in mid 1993 by the NPRC Government.

Koya Chiefdom, in the south of the District, was left in the hands of the RUF forces, as no SLA or ULIMO forces were stationed or deployed there. People of the chiefdom felt totally neglected. Koya would later be notorious for hosting one of the main RUF bases, Camp Zogoda, meaning "Land of Freedom."⁸²⁵ Starting in May 1992 until 1994, there were massive violations committed in various villages in Koya Chiefdom, resulting in the death and abduction of hundreds of civilians. RUF forces entered the chiefdom headquarter town of Baoma in May 1992, gathered the population in the Court Barrie and opened fire, killing about two hundred people. Women are reported to have been raped "at will" and the town was set on fire before they left. The forces then proceeded to other villages and towns,⁸²⁶ where they repeated the same course of action: killing dozens of civilians, raping women and looting and burning houses before leaving. They stayed in Nyadehun from June until September and then moved to Pelewama, where they occupied the town until December. In each of these towns, before killing people, they asked civilians to tell them where SLA members were. In January 1993, they crossed the Moa River and occupied Serabu and its surroundings until September 1993 before moving to Kamasu until December.

Because SLA forces had driven almost all the RUF/NPFL forces from most of the District by the end of 1992, 1993 was relatively calm until the end of the year. The last months of 1993 mark the beginning of what can be labelled the second phase of the conflict, with the resumption of RUF/NPFL activities in Tunkia, Nomo and Gaura Chiefdoms.

b) Second Phase: End of 1993 – May 1997

This second phase started in December 1993 when RUF forces entered Nomo Chiefdom, on the border with Liberia. Those forces rapidly spread over the south of the Moa River, which flows from Pujehun District to Kailahun District through Koya and in the west of Dama chiefdom, and expanded their activities further north by crossing the river. Concurrently to this southern incursion, RUF forces entered the north of the District, attacking Lower Bambara Chiefdom.⁸²⁷

Southern incursion

During this phase, Moawama area, made up of Nomo, Gaura, Tunkia and Koya chiefdoms, was the first area to be affected. The majority of villages in these chiefdoms were devastated and most of the civilians moved to Kenema Town and further north.

⁸²⁵ The report does not specify in which of Sierra Leone's languages "Zogoda" has a meaning. Most likely Mende or Temne.

⁸²⁶ Borgboabu, Giema, Maporma, Segbwema, Gorahun, Njaluahun, Bongor and Nyadehun.

⁸²⁷ It could not be ascertained whether the north attack derived from the south one or whether the North and the South constituted two different fronts. As no troops movement from the south-east of the District to the north (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) was recorded, it could be concluded that those two attacks constituted two different flanks. However, if those flanks were autonomous, the north attack would have come from Kailahun District where no movement of troops were recorded and where RUF forces started to gain territories on the SLA around March only, i.e. two months after the attacks on Lower Bambara Chiefdom. Furthermore, it cannot be inferred from the reports whether these forces joined at one point.



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On 1 December 1993, the Head of State unilaterally announced a one-month ceasefire, which allegedly led many SLA forces to leave their positions thinking the war was over. However, towards the end of December 1993, RUF/NPFL forces crossing the Mano River from Liberia attacked Nomo Chiefdom,⁸²⁸ bordered on the east by Liberia. Shortly after their attack on Faama in the west of the chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces proceeded further into the District and had reached Tunkia, Gaura and Dama Chiefdoms by early March 1994. When RUF forces attacked Faama, civilians and SLA forces who were deployed there suffered heavy losses. The SLA forces retreated, leaving a large cache of arms and ammunition in the hands of RUF forces, which would allow the RUF forces to spread all over the District. Doubts were also raised among civilians and some people were suggesting that SLA left this cache of arms on purpose.

On the following days, other towns in Nomo Chiefdom came under attack, including Kpendebu, Madina and Loawoma. During these attacks, civilians were killed and others were forced to carry stolen property, some to the border town of Dambala. At Madina, civilians gathered in the Court Barrie were forbidden to sleep in their houses for three days and were threatened to be killed if they were caught trying to escape. One young trader accused of carrying out reconnaissance for the SLA was shot dead. The town was surrounded and property was taken.

Beleibu (Tunkia Chiefdom) was attacked during the same period on Christmas Day in 1993. Some civilians were killed and half of the village was burnt down. The same day, RUF forces advanced towards Jao (Tunkia Chiefdom). On their way, they found two Kamajors, one at Nomo Tunkia Junction and another one at Kokoru, both of whom were instantly killed. At Jao, inhabitants were gathered and forced to sit on the ground; some were stripped naked, kicked and beaten. After looting Jao, RUF forces moved to Gegbwema where they burnt the military post and some went to Tijoyeima, where they burnt some houses. Before reaching Gegbwema, they stopped at Jewahun where they looted and burnt houses. Nobody was killed, as the inhabitants had left the town before their arrival.

Also in December 1993, Gaura Chiefdom came under attack. The chiefdom headquarter of Joru, where the SLA was stationed, was the setting of many attacks and counter attacks. SLA forces from Joru fought the assailants in the chiefdom and came back to the town with the head of a man, who they claimed was an RUF fighter, hanging on the front on their vehicle. Two other members, both from Burkina Faso and fighting for the NPFL, were captured and placed in custody.⁸²⁹

SLA forces coming from Moa Barracks, Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) recaptured Faama (Nomo Chiefdom) from the RUF, who launched another unsuccessful attack in mid January 1994. Some civilians who had previously returned to Faama were trapped by RUF forces and killed.

At the end of January 1994, the Head of State declared "total war" against the RUF and engaged in a massive recruitment of SLA forces; from 3,000 men in 1991, they reached around 12,000 in 1994.

⁸²⁸ Nomo has only nine villages and its headquarter town is Faama.

⁸²⁹ What happened to them after during and after their custody was not reported.



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The behaviour of SLA forces towards civilians was not acceptable to some of the chiefs and other elders who had stayed in the chiefdom, who were arrested and detained to answer allegations of "collaboration". Some civilians were also regularly beaten up in Faama for allegedly convening a meeting without giving notice to the SLA.

Early 1994, RUF forces regrouped at Kokoru and bypassed Joru to attack Venima (5 miles west of Joru). They were then led by a civilian who took them to other villages, including Gboyama, Madina, Tanima and Verma, where they were hosted by the Town Chief and another local authority. ULIMO forces coming from Joru repelled the RUF forces and brought the two local authorities from Verma back to Joru, where they were stripped naked. The Town Chief allegedly faced a firing squad but he did not die, was tied up and taken into custody. The other local authority was brought to Kenema Town then to Freetown, where he was imprisoned. In April 1994, the villages of Sandaru, Nyandeyama, Mendekelema and Seifula (Gaura Chiefdom) came under RUF attack. The only actions reported concern Sandaru (north of the chiefdom), where RUF forces captured some young men, whose age could not be ascertained, to carry the property they had stolen. When they left Sandaru, RUF forces promised that they would come back at night or the next morning, returning early the following day.

On the walls of the houses at Faama (Nomo Chiefdom) and Madina, RUF forces inscribed the acronym "RUF".

Dama Chiefdom, west of Gaura Chiefdom and where many civilians from Moawama had taken refuge at one time, came under RUF attack in 1994.⁸³⁰ At Torgboru, some civilians were killed by these forces. Gbewubu and Loppa were attacked. At Loppa, an unspecified number of civilians were killed with automatic guns and others were captured. During those attacks, some of these RUF members had their faces painted so they would not be recognised, because some of them were former SLA members. Other villages including Lelema, Konnehla, Kpandebu, Korma and Konia were attacked, mainly for looting purposes and civilians were most often forced to carry the loads. The RUF forces also killed a number of people, inflicted physical violence on the population and engaged in property destruction. At Konnehla, for example, men were captured to carry stolen property and one man who became tired and unable to continue carrying the load was killed. Korma was burnt down and at Kpandebu many people were killed, either shot or beaten to death. Some civilians were told to bury the bodies. At Konia, one pregnant woman was raped and gave birth instantly after. At Mano in June, RUF forces who were dressed in combat uniforms gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie and requested that they stand, placing guns very close to the civilians' ears and then firing, killing one old man. The RUF also forced the people of the village to lie down on the ground and look at the sun. Three civilians were killed when they attempted to run away. As they left the village, RUF forces took away all the cattle and poultry.

According to their inhabitants, Small Bo, Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms form a block such that events occurring throughout this phase in one of these chiefdoms have a link with what happened in another one. RUF forces reached these chiefdoms early 1994 and launched attacks on many villages

⁸³⁰ The months when the reported attacks took place could not be ascertained. Furthermore, although no precise example was reported, it was however stated that the same kind of attacks also happened in 1995.



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throughout the year, which led the population to flee the area for displaced camps in Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District), Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom, Bo District) and Taiama (Kori chiefdom, Moyamba District).

In early March 1994, RUF forces crossed the Moa River in Koya Chiefdom and attacked Jai and Menima (Koya Chiefdom).⁸³¹ From Menima, at the border with Niawa Chiefdom, RUF forces divided into two groups, both going to Niawa chiefdom, the first one heading for Ngandorhun in the south of the chiefdom and the second one going to Bandawor at the border with Koya Chiefdom.

While on their way to Ngandorhun, the first group of RUF forces ambushed and killed a prominent local hunter with sticks and knives. They then moved to Yibeima, in the north of Langrama Chiefdom by the Waanje River. They attacked the town for the first time on 6 March. RUF forces entered Yibeima heavily armed with AK47s, RPGs and grenades and killed three civilians; one person was killed because he was speaking a language that the fighters could not understand. The RUF forces then returned back to Ngandorhun after making a promise to Yibeima inhabitants that they would come back on 8 March, which they did.⁸³²

They then moved to Woyema (Langrama Chiefdom), where they made a base from which they could attack the surrounding villages. Their intention in Woyema appeared to be to capture the Section Chief, but as he was nowhere to be found, six houses were burnt, 10 men and women captured and one civilian, a carpenter, was killed. They also entered Menima (Langrama Chiefdom), where they killed two civilians, raped three women, burnt some houses and captured civilians. They then returned to Woyema and killed one Muslim leader because he was praying day and night for his village not to be attacked. While in Woyema, people were forced to do community work like brushing the area and preparing the rice farms. Window frames and doors were used as cooking wood. From Woyema, RUF forces launched attacks on Small Bo Chiefdom.

The second group that headed for Bandawor, at the border with Koya Chiefdom, used a bush footpath through Nyandehun, where they killed three civilians, raped some women and burnt some houses. Sendumei was attacked on 4 March 1994 early in the morning, when residents heard a heavy exchange of fire with SLA forces. During this attack, civilians were killed and girls were raped. The heavily armed RUF forces entered Bandawor in the afternoon, set the town on fire and gathered civilians under a tree near the main street that leads to Small Bo Chiefdom. A few armed men guarded the gathered civilians while others went into the town, raped, looted and killed nine civilians.

In the forest of Bandawor (Koya Chiefdom), the RUF forces built a camp they named Camp Zogoda. This camp was a strong base, where the RUF leader allegedly stayed in 1994. An airfield was also established between Menima and Jai (both located in Koya Chiefdom). The RUF forces

⁸³¹ The fact that many reports mention this date adds to the confusion concerning Koya chiefdom as according to the report for Koya, RUF forces had crossed the Moa River, before March 1994. Furthermore, the group that came to Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms in March 1994 was different from the one allegedly in Koya Chiefdom.

⁸³² No details were given for this second attack and fatalities – if any – are not specified.



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used this camp to launch attacks on Small Bo Chiefdom and they also laid ambushes on the Bo-Kenema highway, despite vehicles being escorted by SLA vehicles, and on the roads going through rural areas. Many civilians were killed during these attacks, property was taken and vehicles burnt.⁸³³ Serious doubts were raised among the population as to the identity of those assailants.

One of these ambushes, which took place in April 1994 at a hilly position close to Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) called Kwalekpehun, is illustrative of how RUF forces were operating at that time. RUF forces hiding in the bush used RPGs to attack convoys of passenger vehicles that were escorted by SLA forces. The commander ordered the passengers to lie down on the ground and an exchange of fire followed, during which three civilians were killed. When the firing stopped, the civilians boarded and no sooner had the vehicle ascended the hill than firing from the bush resumed. During this second attack, the SLA members left the convoy to get some reinforcements from Joru. Some civilians were killed, some injured and others were captured, pushed out of the vehicle and beaten with the butts of rifles. In the bush where they were taken, they met other civilians. All the passengers were searched for anything valuable or of interest to the forces. Two young men believed to be Fullah traders were shot at a close range. One died instantly and had his stomach cut open. One of the captives was asked to take the names of all the captured civilians who were allocated different jobs like conveying the wounded fighters to Gegbwema, carting the goods looted from the vehicles or taking the armour boxes. Another example occurred in March 1994, when an ambush was laid between Blama and Lungima, a town two and half miles from Blama. A trailer carrying load of rice was looted and the 350 bags of rice taken away. In another incident on 14 March 1994, one driver was killed while driving his vehicle from Bo to Kenema. Stolen property and captured civilians were taken to Camp Zogoda.

Blama, the headquarter town of Small Bo Chiefdom, is located at a strategic crossroad to Kenema Town, Koribondo (Jama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District) and Potoru (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District). On their way to Blama Chiefdom, RUF forces passed by Topanda Ngovokpan, Kpatema and Yawuema. Between March and April, they attacked Blama six times. At this time, SLA forces were deployed at Blama, some ULIMO members were patrolling in villages and civilians from the surrounding villages had deserted their homes to come to Blama, the headquarter town. Vigilante groups⁸³⁴ controlling checkpoints in Small Bo Chiefdom were monitoring the movement of people entering and leaving the chiefdom and reporting persons suspected of being "rebel" collaborators or spies to the head of the vigilante unit, who in turn reported to the SLA Commanding Officer in Blama. On 5 March 1994, a man suspected of being an RUF spy was apprehended at Blama, taken to the Police Station and shot dead in public by a member of the military police. On 6 March, another man was captured in Blama and taken to the Police Station. He denied being a collaborator and declared that RUF forces had planned to attack the town. The man was not killed but left in the cell and the information was passed on to Kenema SLA Brigade Headquarter with a request for reinforcements, but none was sent.

⁸³³ Since June 1994 in particular, the Bo-Kenema highway came under repeated ambushes, putting pressure on Kenema Town: Inter Press Service, 10 August 1994

⁸³⁴ These vigilante groups were equipped with clubs, spears, single barrel guns and slings.



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Despite repeated efforts,⁸³⁵ RUF forces were unable to capture Blama but established a base at Yawuema, from where they raided surrounding villages, leaving civilians caught between RUF activities and SLA activities at Blama. SLA forces were using the Blama men to carry property they had stolen to Kenema Town and were forcing women to marry them. Civilians were also punished for minor reasons, such as failing to carry out work assigned to them by an SLA member. Punishments ranged from beatings to detention in a guardroom for a day or two without food. Curfews were also declared, particularly when the SLA was going on "looting missions", with civilians forced to stay in their houses from 5.00 p.m. until 11.00 a.m. the following morning. Furthermore, life for Small Bo inhabitants was made even more difficult due to the continuous ambushes laid on the Bo-Kenema highway, rendering the highway unusable for trucks and thus depriving them of necessary daily items.

In April 1994, civilians returning to Tunkia Chiefdom assembled mainly in Jao and Gegbwema where ULIMO forces were deployed. It is believed that around 15,000 civilians regrouped at Jao and around 30,000 at Gegbwema at that time. However, ULIMO forces were committing violent acts against civilians, ranging from harassment, such as asking people to go indoors during the day without any reason, to detaining or shooting dead those who ignored their orders. ULIMO forces would also draw up lists of alleged "rebels" for execution, such as seven young men from Mani village who were executed in front of their parents, accused of being "rebels". At Jao, in May, ULIMO forces gathered 15 civilians, explaining they were to be sacrificed for them to win the war and also for the death of one of their colleagues. One civilian was killed at close range, while the remaining 14 people were saved through the intervention of the Section Chief.⁸³⁶ In another incident, ULIMO forces brought inhabitants from Giewahun to Jao, executed four of them and killed three Imams. ULIMO forces based at Gegbwema displayed the same behaviour; for example, 12 young men from Damawuro, branded "rebels" or collaborators, were arrested and executed, as were seven men from Tolobu. During this period, people were living in very poor conditions and lacked food because the only vehicles that could drive on the roads were ULIMO vehicles.

Gaura Chiefdom was also the scene of the death of civilians killed by ULIMO forces. After an attack on Sandaru in 1994 and following the death of a ULIMO commander, another ULIMO commander from Joru decided to take reprisal for this death and bombed the prison, leading to the death of all the inmates. All these inmates were coming from a small village outside Joru. In another incident in May 1994, a ULIMO member was ordered to take an RUF member captured during an attack on Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) and "bath" him, meaning to execute him.

Around July, Tilorma (Tunkia Chiefdom) came under RUF attack at dawn while some people were praying at the mosque. Some people were put in one house that was set on fire. This latest development urged many civilians out of the 45,000 residing at Jao and Gegbwema to leave the chiefdom and to head for Kenema Town. On their way to Kenema at the bank of the Moa River in Dama Chiefdom, civilians heard that the RUF forces were on their back, which urged them to cross

⁸³⁵ RUF forces reportedly attacked Blama six times between March and April.

⁸³⁶ It seems that the reason given by the ULIMO forces was untrue, as it appeared instead to have been a way to obtain palm oil from civilians.



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the bridge. This panicked and disorganised movement of people resulted in the death of many civilians, who drowned in the river.

These attacks on the Moawama area (Nomo, Gaura, Tunkia and Koya Chiefdoms) left the civilians in total disarray. Most of them fled into the bush for safety and the behaviour of the SLA forces, who put up little or no resistance to the RUF forces, increased their doubt as to their loyalty to the Government. It was also believed that some of the SLA forces had completely defected and joined the RUF. This disarray was further enhanced by the fact that when escaping RUF advance, civilians also had to look out for SLA forces who often shot on sight anybody coming from the direction of a place held by RUF forces, as they were suspected of being a "rebel". Indeed, SLA forces from Dama Chiefdom were instructed to kill anybody coming from Tunkia, Nomo or Gaura Chiefdoms as civilians from those chiefdoms were considered to be "rebels" or were believed to have made their children join the RUF forces.

Throughout 1994 and 1995, those chiefdoms were under sporadic raids, mainly for looting purposes carried out by armed men whose identity could not be ascertained with certainty, for people suspected SLA forces to be responsible for some of these raids. Young men and girls continued to be abducted. During these raids, houses were looted and burnt and people killed, although most of the civilians had fled the villages. Intermittent raids carried out by RUF forces took place throughout 1995 on Sandaru, north of Gaura Chiefdom. During these raids, people were taken to carry the stolen property.

In April 1995, ambushes took place on the Kenema-Dama road, mainly to take food from Dama farmers who were bringing their produce for sale in Kenema. In one incident, a young boy who escaped the ambush explained that four of them who attempted to escape had their throat slit as deterrence to others who might plan to escape.

The few people who stayed in the chiefdoms hid in the bushes and built huts called "sorquehun". Armed men believed to be both RUF fighters and SLA forces who were in the chiefdoms were creating havoc, often going into the bush to find the hiding places and to loot them. People were forced to carry out tasks for the RUF forces and some were killed. The death of one Imam at Gondama (Tunkia Chiefdom) shocked people, as he was well known for being "brilliant and brave". At Damawulo (Tunkia Chiefdom), one man who refused to join the RUF movement was killed. At Jeneh, a prominent chiefdom elder was also killed by RUF forces. Even the civilians who had earlier fled the chiefdoms were coming back regularly to get news and to find food. Those who were caught by RUF forces were often killed, alleged to be spies⁸³⁷ for SLA forces.

At Gorahun (Tunkia Chiefdom) where SLA forces were stationed, civilians were harassed and intimidated, obliged to contribute to the feeding of the SLA. Civilians also had to pay the SLA a "landing fee" to be allowed to sell extra food items.

Northern incursion

⁸³⁷ Note that at this stage, it is not possible to explain with certainty what happened in Koya Chiefdom.



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Similarly to what happened in the Moawoma area, RUF fighters attacked all the chiefdoms in the north of Kenema District in early 1994.⁸³⁸

On 30 January 1994, RUF fighters attacked Tongo (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) from Peyama. Throughout this second phase, Peyama was an RUF stronghold whereas Tongo became the SLA base. Following this attack, the RUF forces scattered all over Lower Bambara Chiefdom and launched attacks on Malegohun and Nongowa Chiefdoms, often coming in high numbers. In January 1994, Peyama and Tongo were attacked. Before coming to Peyama, RUF forces had earlier sent a letter to the inhabitants warning them they would attack their village. When the village was attacked, the identity of the assailants was not clear for people as they were wearing military uniforms. However, no doubt remained after the RUF fighters identified themselves by writing inscriptions on the walls.

After Peyama, RUF forces moved on to Tongo, where they were repelled by SLA forces. During that battle, a lot of civilians were killed and property was stolen. The precise identity of the forces responsible was unclear, as both were wearing the same attire. From Tongo, RUF forces went to Lalehun, where they abducted hundreds of adults and children, forcing some to carry loads, and burnt down a lot of houses. In February, RUF forces attacked Ghana and killed almost everybody; later on, they moved to Talamah, where they killed a lot of civilians and burnt few houses. At Talamah, they also wrote on the walls on the houses inscriptions to identify themselves.

Largo (Nongowa Chiefdom, south of Lower Bambara Chiefdom) was attacked early one morning in February 1994 by heavily armed RUF forces. People were killed and houses looted and burnt. It is reported that one of the commanders vowed to kill any living thing he saw in the town. On the same day, Mano Junction, a strategic town and major business centre at the crossroad leading to Kailahun, Tongo and Kenema, was attacked; civilians were killed and massive looting was carried out before some houses were burnt. Villages on the Mano Junction – Kailahun Road, mainly located in the Lower Bambara Chiefdom, were attacked during the same period, including Talia, Bo Ngeiya and Kangama. At Talia, some civilians were killed and at Bo Ngeiya, the Town Chief and other civilians captured by the forces were ordered to lie on the ground and their throats were cut, because they were accused of supporting the Kamajors and Government forces.

RUF forces coming from different directions attacked Panguma, the chiefdom headquarters town in the west of the chiefdom, at the border with Dodo Chiefdom. They captured some civilians and put them in one house, which they set fire to, killing all the people inside. Around 80 civilians were killed during that attack on 12 March 1994, including an Irish priest and a Dutch doctor, together with his wife and daughter. Houses in the town were destroyed and looted as well as the hospital, where drugs worth millions of Leones⁸³⁹ were stolen. Again in March, Talamah was attacked and

⁸³⁸ However, it cannot be ascertained whether the attacks on most of the chiefdoms located in the North of the District were carried out by the group that had attacked Lower Bambara Chiefdom or by the Southern group who had entered Nomo Chiefdom.

⁸³⁹ As a very rough guide, one million leones is approximately equivalent to 500 USD. This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL)



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RUF forces fought the SLA. During the indiscriminate firing by both forces, many civilians were killed. At Kornia Kpindima, in late March, a large number of RUF fighters coming from Foindu and Yombuma killed some civilians, looted and burnt houses and forced many civilians to carry the loads. During a second attack on this town in April 1994, the Town Speaker and his family were captured, molested and tortured; the Town Speaker was later killed at Yombuma.

RUF forces attacked Koi town (Nongowa Chiefdom) early one morning in mid 1994, reportedly to terrorise the inhabitants, whom they accused of supporting the Kamajors. They fired indiscriminately and many civilians were killed and others were wounded. The town was looted and people were forced to carry the stolen property to Peyama.

Jormu Town (in the east of Nongowa chiefdom) was attacked three times in 1994, the first being on 28 March in the early hours of the morning by RUF forces coming from Peyama. During this attack, which resulted in looting and the abduction of many people to carry the loads, civilians suspected there was collaboration between SLA forces based there at that time and RUF forces because both factions were firing into the air, rather than at each other.

Soon after, Combema was attacked and burnt down. Some civilians were killed and a man was seriously wounded in his arm. RUF forces, who sketched a map of Sierra Leone showing areas under their control on the blackboard of the primary school, did not stay long. Before leaving, they took nearly all of the food and other valuable items in the village, forcing people to carry those items to Jormu.

Jormu was attacked for the second time few months later and RUF forces fired indiscriminately at civilians, who were running here and there, dazed and confused, killing dozens. Many houses were burnt and massive looting was carried out, with people of the town being forced to carry the stolen property. As the RUF forces left the town, they painted graffiti and writings on the walls, naming some of their commandos.

SLA forces based in Tongo Field also carried out massive looting and harassed large numbers of civilians suspected of being collaborators. Civilians were also forced to work for the SLA at mining sites and many people were shot at these sites. Girls and women were raped and Chiefs and community leaders were molested and tortured, suspected of being "rebel" collaborators or sympathisers. SLA also sent messages to civilians who had earlier deserted the area to come back to the town. Checkpoints were mounted and were used to take away money and valuable items from civilians intimidated with guns and daggers. This situation remained the same under the authority of successive commanders. Besides these activities, SLA forces also undertook ambushes.⁸⁴⁰

Thus, at that time, civilians were under the pressure of both RUF and SLA forces, even if from time to time there was fighting between the two factions. Relief came in mid 1994 when a group of local hunters from Malegohun Chiefdom (east of Lower Bambara Chiefdom) established bases in Lower

per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003,
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

⁸⁴⁰ This information was related in such general terms and no specific example can be given.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report

9 March 2004

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Bambara Chiefdom. They fought RUF forces but sustained heavy losses. At the beginning, these local hunters worked directly with the SLA forces but were later on disarmed by SLA forces.⁸⁴¹

The third attack on Jormu (Nongowa Chiefdom) took place during the last months of 1994, apparently mainly for the purposes of obtaining food. Civilians were abducted and taken to the nearby village of Saami, where they were forced to harvest the rice fields. Shortly after this third attack, RUF forces searching for "pro-Government", i.e. SLA, forces attacked Vaahun Town. A door-to-door search operation was carried out and people were gathered in the centre of the village. One young man suspected of being a Kamajor was shot in the Court Barrie in front of all the villagers, who were told by the commander to clap for him and laugh.

At Potehun (Nongowa Chiefdom), people were killed and many were taken away to work in the diamond fields. The continuous attacks on Jormu and its environs drove the inhabitants out of their villages. Sanguahun, Nyandeyama, Nekabu, Baoya, Damawulo, Guabu and Ngeyawamie were attacked during the last months of the year but few civilians were to be found. Most of these villages were burnt and RUF forces coming from Saami started looking for people in the bushes to increase the number of workers for the harvest.

Kenema Town was attacked on Christmas Day in 1994. A high number of heavily armed RUF forces⁸⁴² from Camp Zogoda launched the attack from the south-eastern part of the city, known as "Reservation side". The battle lasted for eight days but SLA forces were unable to protect the town, although a financial contribution to help them had been asked and obtained from the inhabitants. During this attack, which lasted several days, many civilians were killed and a lot of young boys and girls were abducted. Among those killed was a prominent lawyer, whose death struck people as far away as Freetown. However, up to now, doubts still remain about the identity of those who killed him.

Throughout 1994 and 1995, villages all over Lower Bambara⁸⁴³ came under persistent attacks. In all the attacks, people were routinely molested, tortured, killed, forced to carry stolen property and forced to join the RUF. Girls and women were raped and many houses were looted and burnt. In December 1994, RUF forces coming from Peyama killed fourteen civilians and two SLA members. People were slaughtered with knives and some of their bodies were put in pots. At Lowoma (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), also in December 1994, some houses were burnt, some civilians taken away and a few others were killed. Those who were killed were thrown into water cells, which became contaminated and caused diseases. During 1995, schools, clinics, mosques and churches throughout the chiefdom were unroofed.

In February 1995, RUF forces attacked the mining town of Kpava (Nongowa Chiefdom), asking whether any Kamajors or SLA forces were in town. Following indiscriminate shooting, around 15 civilians were killed. The town was then looted and some civilians forced to carry the load to Peyama, the main RUF base in Lower Bambara Chiefdom. People who were caught trying to escape

⁸⁴¹ These events happened in 1994 and probably 1995. See above, note 165.

⁸⁴² It is believed they were 400 in number.

⁸⁴³ These villages include Torpombu, Foindu, Kamboma, Komende, Bumpe, Kornia, Sahaha and Jagor.



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faced severe beatings with sticks and car tyres until they died and very young girls were routinely raped.

Government forces based in Lower Bambara Chiefdom ambushed a lorry between Ngiehun and Lalehun in May 1995. During this attack, 14 civilians, mainly businessmen, were killed. Civilians from Lalehun were forced to take the bodies and bury them in a mass grave in Lalehun. The following month, some women of Kenema Town decided to go and plead with RUF forces stationed at Tabulay Junction. On their arrival, RUF forces opened fire and many of the women died on the spot. Others sustained bullet wounds or were taken to the RUF base and raped.

In November 1995, local hunters equipped with short guns, cutlasses and knives coming from Kenema Town attacked RUF positions in Lower Bambara Chiefdom,⁸⁴⁴ repelling RUF forces who, while retreating, burnt down some villages. Civilians who had earlier fled to the bush started to come back to their villages. These local hunters at this time were not undertaking initiation as such and reporting to a man called a prominent Doctor.⁸⁴⁵

Throughout 1995 and 1996, RUF forces were coming sporadically to Nongowa Chiefdom. Fewer incidents are reported, possibly due to the fact that many people were living in the bushes and that many villages were already destroyed. During this period, RUF forces used to bypass Jormu where Kamajors and SLA forces were based, launching raids on villages out of their reach like Kpalu and Konabu.

On Election Day in February 1996, RUF forces singing "RUF says no election" attacked Kenema Town early in the morning. Among the people killed on that day was a final year student at Fourah Bay College. On the same day, the RUF launched systematic attacks on towns and villages in Dama Chiefdom, as they did not want the election to take place. An unspecified number of people were killed on that day. In some instances, the RUF forces attacking villages on that day were dressed in military fatigues. Nevertheless, despite these incidents, the elections went on as planned.⁸⁴⁶

After the 1996 elections, more SLA forces came to Foindu, Kamboma, Largo and Bendu Junction (Lower Bambara Chiefdom). At checkpoints, civilians without a written document called a "pass" were not allowed to continue their journey. They were often molested and detained for long periods of time. In another incident, in June 1996, the SLA forced a lot of civilians to brush the area near Peyama. As Peyama was a RUF base, many civilians fell into an RUF ambush and were killed.

The North-west of the District

⁸⁴⁴ These positions were located at Kornia Kpindima, Foindu, Kamboma, Largo and Kombuy.

⁸⁴⁵ Initiation of Kamajors did not take place in Kenema District before 1996. However, these local hunters, as in other places in the country, were organising themselves to protect their chiefdoms, mainly equipped with bladed weapons and local guns. The registration process will require further clarification.

⁸⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that very few reports mention RUF disturbances on Election Day. Furthermore, besides Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom), the other area affected was Dama Chiefdom, to be found south of Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema Town being located nearby the border with Dama Chiefdom.



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Coming from Lower Bambara Chiefdom through Dodo Chiefdom, RUF forces reached Simbaru Chiefdom in February 1994; Wandor and Kandu Leppeama Chiefdoms were affected shortly after. These chiefdoms will be examined together as it appears that the same RUF commander was in charge of the RUF forces operational in these chiefdoms. As for Gorama Mende Chiefdom, the northernmost chiefdom of the District, it is likely that RUF forces who reached it came from two different directions and the actions of one group may be linked with what happened in Kandu Leppeama, Simbaru and Wandor Chiefdoms (south of Gorama Mende Chiefdom) while the other actions that affected mainly Punduru (north-east of the chiefdom), were directed from Kono District.

In February 1994, an RUF group called "Tay Go" entered Simbaru Chiefdom and rapidly established a camp under the Lomie Hill they called Joe Bush.⁸⁴⁷ Before establishing their camp, RUF forces attacked Goma. They entered the town with sporadic firing while people were fleeing. The RUF forces stayed for three days in the town and abducted some civilians. The civilians who came out of the bush after the attack counted 15 bodies. The houses were unroofed and young men were forced to carry the stolen property, including food, poultry and personal items such as radios, recorders and clothes to a site that became an RUF camp. Before leaving, they set the town on fire, burning down all the approximately 123 houses of the town.

Shortly afterwards, the first group was reinforced by a second group called "Death Squad", which also came from Lower Bambara Chiefdom. On their way to Simbaru Chiefdom, this second group passed by Dodo Chiefdom, east of Simbaru Chiefdom. At Guala (Dodo Chiefdom), they shot and killed nine civilians and burnt 18 people alive. After spending two days in the town, they continued towards Simbaru Chiefdom and reached the Hydro Electricity Power Dam, located in Simbaru Chiefdom at the border with Dodo Chiefdom. They vandalised the dam and killed civilians who stayed with the Security Police who were stationed there. Civilians who went to the dam afterwards counted 16 bodies, including women and children. Eight civilians were also mutilated and four young boys, allegedly below the age of 15, had melted plastic dripped into their eyes while they were being interrogated by the RUF forces.

The RUF used Camp Joe Bush as a training camp and as a permanent base to attack the whole of Simbaru Chiefdom and the surrounding chiefdoms. Civilians who had been captured were taken to the camp, where they were subjected to physical and mental violence. One example of this was called "Gunproof society". During the course of this action, captives were first forced to dig deep pits and to collect over 150 different kinds of leaves from the bush, where they had been escorted for this purpose. Captives were then obliged to lie down in the pit, where they were covered with the sticks and boiled leaves they had collected, which were then set alight for the captives to be smoked. After this, civilians were forced to wash themselves with the water in which the leaves had been boiled. They were then covered with burnt oil on their whole body and forced to sit for hours under the sun. Following this, RUF members shot them to prove they were "gunproof", as a result of which many people died. In addition, people who had been captured and brought to the camp were shot dead and their flesh cooked by women captives.

⁸⁴⁷ Joe Bush was a generic name given to training bases, like "Camp Lion" in other places. Other camps called Camp Joe Bush were to be found at other places in Kenema District.



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From this camp, RUF forces started attacking villages, systematically molesting, torturing, killing, raping and abducting people and looting and burning houses. The scale of these acts was very high. The following incidents describe the actions carried out during this period.

The first village to be attacked from the camp was Lomabu (Simbaru Chiefdom), where RUF forces killed 13 people, set the village on fire and captured some men and women. They then divided into groups to visit the whole chiefdom, coming back after the attacks to their camp with stolen property and captured civilians. Patrol groups undertaking these actions in various villages were given descriptive names such as "Operation No Mercy" and "Operation Fire".

At Borboru, a section headquarter in Simbaru Chiefdom, people fled as the RUF entered the town, firing their weapons. Those people who were caught were either captured or killed; this attack resulted in the death of 27 civilians, including children. The village was massively looted and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property, which included animals, clothes and zinc, back to the camp. The RUF forces remained in Gbangeima for nine weeks, during which time they mutilated civilians, raped women and girls, burnt people alive, skinned people alive and ate the flesh of their victims. Top commanders were given the most beautiful girls and the other women who had been caught were distributed among the junior commandos. Two young girls were buried alive as a sacrifice at the river bank. People were forced to work and cook for them. At the entrance and exit points of the town, they mounted checkpoints at which they displayed human heads. At one point, they started burning furniture instead of gathering wood and moved all the captives to the camp. Before leaving, they set the village on fire, destroying almost all the houses. People who managed to escape from the camp later found the village destroyed and over 40 bodies lying on the ground.

Deima Town (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, south of Simbaru Chiefdom) was attacked many times during this period, as it was a diamond rich area. In March 1994, the RUF group called "Tay Go", wearing combat attire and red berets, attacked Deima, killing 20 civilians on the spot and abducting many young girls. The heavily armed RUF forces attacked and raided many villages in the chiefdom. The RUF group then settled for a while at Bouajabu, from where they attacked other villages. At Bouajabu, 15 people were captured and forced to carry stolen property. At Jenneh, many civilians drowned in a deep stream as they tried to escape an oncoming RUF attack, of which they had been warned by an inhabitant of the village. RUF forces stayed in Jenneh for three days, killing civilians and raping girls. When they entered the town, the RUF forces met a student from Milton Margai College with his aunt. Accusing him of being a SLA member, RUF forces dragged him away, beat him, wrapped him in rice bags and a bed mat and set fire to the mat. His aunt was then taken away and sexually assaulted by more than one member of the RUF. She was taken with them, forced to cook for them and they said that she was now their "Mammy Queen", forcing her to have sex with them. This woman managed to escape later during a fight between the RUF group and SLA forces that took place at Gbando.

Other villages in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom - such as Motorma, Banda and Leppeama - also came under attack in March 1994. Civilians were killed and houses were burnt down. At the headquarter town of Gbando, one young man from Levuma who had been sent by the acting Paramount Chief

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to report on what was happening in the surrounding villages saw members of a fighting force wearing combat uniforms and identifying themselves as RUF forces. Many houses in the town were on fire and bodies were lying in the backyards of some houses, while other inhabitants who were in houses that were on fire were crying.

RUF forces raided other villages in Simbaru Chiefdom before reaching the chiefdom headquarter of Boajibu. During those raids, they vandalised and took everything they came across, including cattle and poultry, and took away civilians to carry what they had just taken. At Tawalun, they looted extensively, including domestic animals, burnt down the village, captured 19 strong young men to carry the load, killed two civilians with machetes and threw three people into a burning house. At Kpetema, where they arrived in the evening hours, they entered the village with heavy fire and captured eight men to carry their load. At Peyeila, a village of 98 family houses, they vandalised the houses and took all the property they found, including household items, cash, money, clothes and cattle. They captured civilians to bring all the items to Camp Joe Bush, set the whole village on fire and mutilated seven civilians, namely three women, a three year old girl and three young men. One woman who was six months' pregnant had her belly cut open to settle an argument the RUF forces were having about the sex of the baby she carried.

On 17 March 1994, the same group launched an attack on Simbaru Chiefdom headquarters, Boajibu, known to be a business centre for the neighbouring chiefdoms and containing the offices of many dealers in diamonds and gold. Before entering the town, they laid ambushes on all the entrances. Seven hundred and sixty-nine civilians were captured and divided into four groups, each of which was to be given a section of the town to burn down. Each day civilians were killed; they were burnt alive, dropped in boiling water, shot or had melted plastic dripped into their eyes. The bodies of their victims were cooked and eaten; this human flesh was called Yanimi. Many people were mutilated and dozens of women and girls were often raped by numerous RUF members. Relief came from SLA forces from Komboya Chiefdom (Bo District) who attacked the town after 17 days of RUF occupation, repelling the RUF forces. SLA forces then returned to their base in Bo District.

RUF forces began a looting spree on 29 March 1994 at Konta (Gorama Mende Chiefdom), a town known for its business transactions.⁸⁴⁸ RUF forces entered the town at dusk with heavy firing and, as civilians had already fled, undertook systematic looting and burning of the houses. Two people were killed: one man, described as insane, who did not leave the town was stabbed to death because RUF forces were suspicious that he did not leave and an old man was burnt alive in a house the RUF forces had set on fire. Those RUF forces then continued their looting spree in the surrounding villages and captured civilians were forced to carry the stolen property on their heads. At Palima, five civilians were killed and 20 houses left in ashes. The RUF forces went back to Konta, where they killed and ate domestic animals.

⁸⁴⁸ The direction the RUF forces came from cannot be ascertained with certainty. As Konta is located at a nodal point on a road coming from the south (Wandor Chiefdom), it is likely that those forces came from Wandor Chiefdom. However, information collected for Wandor Chiefdom does not mention any troops movement late March 1994, only in May, 1994. It could nonetheless be deduced that the troops who passed by (and only bypassed) Wandor Chiefdom in May 1994 are the same as the one who attacked Konta (Gorama Mende Chiefdom) and that one of these two dates is not completely exact.



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Three days later, the RUF forces left for Modema, which is on the road that leads to Tonkolili District, in the north of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. On their way to Modema, RUF forces burnt many houses: five houses at Gbandi, six at Kortuhun, three huts at Fulawahun and 20 at Kenyema. At the Kenyema Bridge, one civilian who was wearing a t-shirt with a NPRC logo was stabbed to death. Another civilian was captured at the bridge and joined the captives. Modema, a periodical market centre located in an area producing coffee and cocoa, was attacked on 1 April 1994. During this attack, all the public buildings were burnt down and one civilian caught trying to flee was killed. Houses were also burnt down in the surrounding villages. The RUF forces left Modema for the road leading to Masingbi (Konike Sanda Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). SLA forces came to Modema late April, unsuccessfully pursued the RUF forces, stayed in the town for some days and looted what was left before leaving.

In April 1994, RUF forces entered the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. At this time, vigilante groups⁸⁴⁹ composed of local hunters and volunteered civilians trained in basic military tactics were active in the chiefdom. Those vigilante groups were to serve as local observers assisting the SLA forces and were sometimes used for reconnaissance (RECE). One of those vigilante groups had its first encounter in April 1994 when, hearing that RUF forces coming from Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District) were near Punduru, they ambushed those RUF forces in Kemuya forest, killing one of them and injuring others. Following this incident, RUF forces entered Kemuya and killed five civilians, including women and children, and burnt 10 houses. On their way back to their base in Nimiyama Chiefdom, those RUF forces went through Ngorgbedehun, on the east bank of the Sewa River, where they raided the houses and burnt down two of them.

On 8 May 1994, SLA forces came back to Modema (Gorama Mende Chiefdom), claiming they had been deployed to protect civilians. They taxed the people of the town and on 9 June they left, allegedly for another military assignment. Three days after they had left, Modema was attacked but the inhabitants could not tell whether the assailants were RUF or SLA forces. During this attack, five people were killed and the armed men located the civilians in their hiding places, beat them and took their property.

The situation prevailing in Simbaru Chiefdom also affected Wandor Chiefdom, north of Simbaru Chiefdom. Beginning in June 1994, small groups of RUF forces were coming from Simbaru Chiefdom, initially at least led by the same commander who had been leading the "Tay, Go" group. Before these regular visits of small groups, hundreds of RUF forces passed by the chiefdom in May 1994, en route to open a new base further north, killing two people as they passed through Gendema. In June 1994, RUF forces coming from Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom) arrested the Town Chief and killed him in a nearby village, on the basis that the inhabitants did not feed them well. His wife was raped and the RUF forces took two young girls away with them as they moved from village to village to take food. In December, on a food-finding mission, they went to Kpangbaru, where they mutilated a man they identified as being a vigilante. While he was still alive, his stomach was slit open and his organs removed and eaten.

⁸⁴⁹ These vigilante groups were equipped with traditional weapons like swords, lances, knives and short guns (local hunters).



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At one point (reports vary between June 1994 and the end of 1995), SLA forces were based at Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom). When they arrived, they asked people to come out of the bushes and those who did not were later forced to come out. Civilians were forced to stay indoors from 5.00 pm until 9.30 am. Every morning, civilians were dispatched to bring food for the SLA forces in the chiefdom, which later extended to neighbouring chiefdoms when food supplies in Simbaru Chiefdom were exhausted. SLA forces were patrolling in Simbaru Chiefdom and the neighbouring chiefdoms, bringing with them civilians used to carry properties they would loot. Civilians were forced to work for SLA forces, mainly to mine diamonds for them; villages were raided to bring manpower for this purpose. Civilians were also forced to do farm work. Orders were given to shoot any civilian caught trying to steal gems. In one incident, civilians fleeing RUF attacks in Kono District and coming to Boajibu were arrested and detained for two days. Three of them were then shot to death and civilians were told to tie their feet together and to "throw them away". Civilians were beaten if they failed to give food to the SLA forces. Orders were passed that civilians had to divide their food in two parts, one part for them and one for their commander. Civilians were harassed for their property and SLA forces were searching for civilians in their "sorquehun". During one of these searches, some SLA members fell into a RUF ambush. In reprisal, SLA forces killed two young civilians accused of being responsible for the death of their colleagues. They cut their throats, slit their stomachs, cut out their organs and cooked them. During all this period, many women and girls were raped and anyone who denied a request from an SLA member was severely beaten. Similar actions continued under successive commanders.

Punduru (in the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom) was attacked in October 1994 by RUF forces on a looting spree. Over 250 men entered the town wearing red headbands, about 50 of them unarmed, one of whom was a Lebanese businessman captured in Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District). The heavy firing frightened civilians and vigilantes, who all fled the town. The RUF forces then started hunting for people and property, raiding the whole town. They killed 10 civilians, mainly people who could not escape, including the elderly and young children. Other civilians they found were not killed but used as manpower to carry the stolen property. However, one man who was told to carry property taken from the pharmacy and who refused was beaten to death with a bladed weapon. Before leaving the town for their base with their captives, the RUF forces set fire to the mosque, the health centre, the primary school and two churches.⁸⁵⁰ However, some of the local hunters managed to encounter the RUF forces at the border with Nimiyama Chiefdom (Kono District). RUF forces, heavily laden with stolen property, were not able to put up strong resistance and fled, leaving most of the stolen property behind and enabling most of the captives to flee.

Another group of RUF forces⁸⁵¹ reached Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom in August 1995⁸⁵² and inflicted a lot of violence on both person and property as the following examples highlight. At Levuma, RUF forces killed civilians, sexually assaulted women, burnt some houses and captured civilians to carry their load. At Jenneh, they killed five civilians and tortured others. The RUF forces

⁸⁵⁰ Punduru would not come under other RUF attack until 1997.

⁸⁵¹ It was not the 'Tay Go' group.

⁸⁵² This event could have taken place in 1994.



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also killed 16 civilians, burnt 45 houses, amputated the limbs of seven civilians, raped four girls and took other women from their husbands at Gbando, the chiefdom headquarter. Deima, a diamond rich town, was attacked not only during this wave of attacks but also many more times throughout the following months as RUF forces, although not based there, sporadically entered the chiefdom on raids.⁸⁵³ Following these attacks, local authorities addressed the Government, expressing their deep need to have some SLA forces stationed in their chiefdom. However, the SLA forces who were sent as a result of this request also began harassing civilians and taking their property.

Due to SLA attacks in 1995, RUF forces mounted serious assaults in Wandor Chiefdom. At Gendema, civilians were assembled and nine of them were locked up in a room after three had been killed. The nine men in the room were taken out one after the other and beaten to death. The RUF forces did not use bullets, both to save ammunition and to avoid alerting SLA forces based at Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom). RUF forces later proceeded to one of their main bases, called "Bokurr", in Valunia chiefdom (Bo District).

Tongi, the headquarter town of Gorama Mende Chiefdom, was overrun by RUF forces in March 1995. Over 500 well-armed RUF forces entered the town, coming from the north of the chiefdom,⁸⁵⁴ gathered people in the Court Barrie and declared that the town was now an "RUF entity". New authorities were appointed, including a Town Commander, a Town Mother and a clerk. The Town Commander was charged with taxing the inhabitants and gathering food for the RUF. Youths were ordered to unroof houses and to use the zinc to build a camp called Joe Bush⁸⁵⁵ in the forest near the town. During the time of the building of the camp, two civilians were beaten to death, as they did not obey the RUF order to unroof and transport some zinc.⁸⁵⁶ Young men and children were captured and trained in the camp on guerrilla warfare throughout 1995 and 1996.⁸⁵⁷

Local hunters in Simbaru Chiefdom decided to organise themselves and provide assistance to SLA forces, mainly by showing them routes within the chiefdom. At this time, proper initiation was not taking place; rather it was an informal gathering of men above 20 years who then presented themselves to the SLA. This movement also took place in Wandor Chiefdom, where a meeting with local hunters from neighbouring chiefdoms was organised.

In October 1995, at Gombu (Wandor Chiefdom), RUF forces killed 17 civilians and razed the village to the ground by setting houses on fire. Women and girls were sexually abused and civilians were taken away, forced to show the RUF forces routes by which they might avoid local hunters. At Falla the next day, one civilian who cheered, thinking those forces coming to the village were SLA forces, was killed and dismembered with a bladed weapon, his body parts scattered all over the

⁸⁵³ These continuous attacks on Deima resulted to the death of a lot of civilians, the number of casualties per attack being however not ascertained.

⁸⁵⁴ The report mentions that they came from the direction of Mondema, north of Tongi (Gorama Mende Chiefdom) and accordingly those RUF forces came either from Tonkolili or from Kono Districts.

⁸⁵⁵ Joe Bush was a generic name given to training bases, like "Camp Lion" in other places. Other camps called Camp Joe Bush were to be found at other places in Kenema District.

⁸⁵⁶ These two civilians could not carry out the task RUF ordered them to do, as they were ill.

⁸⁵⁷ The camp would later on be attacked by Kamajors.



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town. Another man who was requested to cook for them and took the meat for himself was also killed and his stomach cut open. On that same night, Falla was set on fire.

The SLA presence in Simbaru Chiefdom did not prevent RUF forces attacking villages. On 25 December 1995, as RUF forces attacked Boajibu for the second time, SLA forces fled the town. During this attack, the newly initiated Bondo society girls were captured, the few houses left standing after the first burning were burnt and nine men were killed. The entire town was destroyed, including all the buildings except two mosques and a school. The RUF forces did not stay in the town and around one week later, civilians and SLA forces came back to the town. SLA forces went back to patrolling Simbaru Chiefdom and the neighbouring chiefdoms, where they took away what was left after RUF attacks, unroofing houses and removing their doors and windows shutters. They forced civilians to go with them to carry those items back to Boajibu.

In January 1996, RUF forces came back in Wandor Chiefdom and this time engaged people to join them, organising meetings and appointing Towns Commanders. Those who refused to join were considered as enemies. According to one of the RUF commanders, they would not kill anybody if people followed orders. However, shortly after, their behaviour changed and elders were punished; one was strung up inside the Court Barrie and seriously flogged. Those civilians who had to cooperate with RUF forces were later denounced to SLA forces in Simbaru Chiefdom and, everyday, some were punished with lashes while others were fined.

In 1996, both local hunters and SLA forces attacked Camp Joe Bush in Simbaru Chiefdom and destroyed it. The bodies of many civilians were found almost fully decomposed in the deserted camp, most of them victims of the "Gunproof society" practice. From the documents found in the camp, it became clear that this camp was going to be developed as the main RUF base for the eight neighbouring chiefdoms. The interrogation of the captives revealed that RUF forces were coming from different chiefdoms all over the District. They revealed the way they were treated in the camp: they were forced to work all day long without proper food, continuously beaten or molested; women were constantly raped, often raped by multiple attackers and many of them died from those rapes; bodies were not buried but were thrown in the bushes or in streams; any time RUF forces left the camp to attack a village, they forced captives to go with them, forcing them to the frontline, to carry the property they would take; any civilian who was tired and could no longer sustain the weight of the load was either beaten to death or shot; and young boys and girls under 15 were trained to become combatants. Babies who were born in the camp were well treated, as they were viewed as future combatants. When they entered the camp, Kamajors took automatic rifles and machine guns, hiding these weapons from the SLA forces. Following the capture of the camp, RUF forces attacked Boajibu many times, trying to get back the documents they had lost.

Following this successive attack, the Kamajors of Simbaru Chiefdom established five bases in the chiefdom at Fonima, Gbonjeima, Goma, Boajibu and Njagbwema. They routinely led SLA forces on patrol. To buy the cartridges for their single barrel guns, they used to tax male civilians while women were requested to contribute with rice. As Kamajor control in the chiefdom grew stronger, civilians started coming back in the chiefdom.

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The collaboration between the SLA and local hunters did not last long, as SLA forces started molesting and, at times, disarming those local hunters. At Boajibu, the new SLA commander who arrived in April stated that “two captains cannot drive one ship at the same time”, meaning that SLA forces did not need another armed group to defend the country. SLA behaviour towards civilians became worse when the new commander arrived. Incidents of rapes, sexual harassment and forceful marriages became common practice at this time. SLA forces forced civilians to work in mines and to dig up diamonds for them. SLA forces guarding the mining areas were told by their commander to injure or kill any civilian caught trying to steal a gem. That mining activity went on throughout 1996 until early 1997, when SLA forces left the area and the Kamajors arrived. Civilians were also forced to engage in large-scale farming under the surveillance of SLA forces. Civilians worked all day and went back home in the evening without being fed. On one occasion while they were searching for civilians in the bush to take away their property, SLA forces fell into an RUF ambush and one of them was killed. The SLA commander in Boajibu accused two local hunters from Wandor Chiefdom of being responsible for the killing of this SLA member. The two local hunters had to lie down on the street and were killed, having their throats cut with a dagger. The junior SLA members then removed the organs, cut the fleshy parts of the bodies, cooked and ate them.

In December 1996, the SLA commander ordered the Bondo society heads to initiate girls into the society. At first, the heads refused, as they stated that on hearing that the initiation was going to take place, RUF forces would attack them, especially since RUF forces were constantly attacking the chiefdom headquarter of Boajibu. Nevertheless, the SLA commander forced them to perform the initiation on 23 December. In the morning of 25 December, RUF forces attacked Boajibu; the SLA forces fled and left the inhabitants, including the new Bondo initiates, in the hands of RUF forces. The RUF forces caught the new initiates with their superiors, called Soweis, and sexually assaulted the girls who had been initiated only two days previously. Furthermore, they killed nine civilians, including young married women and children. A lot of buildings were also burnt down.

The Kamajors - 1996

In 1996, on hearing that Kamajor societies were being established in Bo and Bonthe Districts, elders and Chiefs in the various chiefdoms of Kenema District started nominating their own men for initiation as Kamajors, which took place in Kenema Town. The first batches of those initiates returned to their chiefdoms in the middle of 1996 and deployed at key entry points to the towns and villages. Most of the men nominated by the elders to join the society were in displaced camps, as was almost all the population of the chiefdoms.

Events in Dama Chiefdom highlight that in 1996, the welfare of the local hunters, now regrouped under the CDF, was transferred to the Government and each chiefdom authority was required to appoint a chief Kamajor to act as chiefdom coordinator for the CDF in the chiefdom. Battalion commanders and commanding officers were also appointed.⁸⁵⁸ The conditions for initiation, as applied at least during the early stage of the Kamajors, were as follows:⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵⁸ For more details on the structure of the CDF, see the chapter on the CDF in the Fighting Forces section of this report.

⁸⁵⁹ These conditions were specifically reported in relation to Simbaru Chiefdom, generally applied across the whole District and, indeed, the whole Kamajor movement.



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- Men must be above 18 years.
- Men must join the Kamajor society voluntary and append their signature.
- Those men must be recommended to the Paramount Chief by a Town Chief or Section Chief.
- Those men must willingly contribute condiments to the Kamajors.

In some chiefdoms, such as Gorama Mende Chiefdom, men who wished to be initiated as CDF members had to pay a fee ranging from Le 15,000 to Le 25,000. Once the money was paid, a date was set and the men who were going to be initiated were to come dressed in a “war ronko”, which is a type of country cloth.

RUF forces were in control of Langrama, Niawa and Small Bo Chiefdoms until 1996 when the first Kamajors coming back from their initiation and started fighting. In June 1996, local authorities from the three chiefdoms decided to form their own society. A Section Chief from Niawa Chiefdom encouraged people living in the displaced camps to be initiated. The first arrangements combined Small Bo, Niawa, Langurama (Kenema District), Wunde (Bo District), Wunde and Barri (Pujehun District) Chiefdoms; this group was known as the Wanjei Defence Committee. However, this initial arrangement did not last as the group as there were complications due to the fact that it was composed of chiefdoms from different Districts. It was therefore decided that the initiation for the Kamajors society should be undertaken at District level. Thus, Small Bo, Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms regrouped and became known as the Upper Wanjei Defence Committee.

After the initiation in Bo, the first group of around 200 Kamajors arrived in Small Bo Chiefdom in October 1996. With weapons provided by SLA forces and together with the SLA forces, the newly initiated Kamajors launched their first attack on RUF positions in a town located four miles west of Blama.⁸⁶⁰ It is reported that SLA forces gave weapons to the Kamajors despite the animosity and distrust between them. During this first attack, the Kamajors did not dislodge the RUF forces but obtained their first automatic rifles (AK47s). Together with the Kamajors from Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District), they successfully attacked an RUF camp at Semabu (Small Bo Chiefdom). Kamajors continued their progression into Small Bo Chiefdom, taking weapons abandoned by the retreating RUF forces.

The Kamajors of the three chiefdoms (Small Bo, Niawa, Langruma Chiefdoms), assisted by Kamajors from Bo District (Wunde and Boama Chiefdoms, sharing the border with Kenema District) and together with SLA and ECOMOG forces, then launched attacks on Niawa Chiefdom. Using two different roads, one coming from Koribondo (Jama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District) and the other from Potoru (Barri Chiefdom, Pujehun District), the combined forces advanced on RUF camps at Kpantena Ngovokpan, Topanda and Bandawor before reaching the main camp in Bandawor forest, called Camp Zogoda. The fighting lasted several days, as a result of which the combined forces were able to dislodge the RUF from the camp. In the camp, the Kamajors found many RUF documents consisting of records of RUF activities, including, *inter alia*, records of the attacks on the Bo-Kenema Highway, how many items were stolen and how many people were

⁸⁶⁰ The name of the place is not specified, only its location.



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captured to carry the load. In the camp, the combined forces found many captured civilians, who related how they were treated during their stay in the camp. For example, abductees who were caught trying to escape were shot dead or had the letters "RUF" inscribed on their body with hot iron. Civilians were forced to work in the camp and were given little or no food. Villages considered by the RUF as "enemy" bases were burnt down and captured civilians were used to carry boxes of ammunition on their heads for long distances. Young boys between eight and eleven were trained in the camp and sent to fight with weapons almost too big for them to carry. Some of those civilians found in the camp were brought to Blama to a camp that hosted them and the captured RUF forces were taken to the SLA Brigade Headquarter in Kenema.⁸⁶¹

After the Kamajors had successfully repelled RUF forces from the three chiefdoms, civilians started to come back from displaced camps and the bush to their villages. The Kamajors who had initially all been based in Small Bo Chiefdom also returned to their various chiefdoms, namely Niawa, Langruma and Small Bo Chiefdoms. From that time, Niawa and Langruma chiefdoms did not encounter any more RUF attacks.

Newly initiated Kamajors were deployed at different locations – Deima, Levuma and Gbando – in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom. While initially they collaborated with the SLA forces, this deteriorated as they openly disagreed with the behaviour of SLA forces towards civilians. Nevertheless, Kamajors' behaviour towards civilians was not exempt from violence either, as civilians accused of being "rebel" collaborators were chased. In one incident, two civilians who had been appointed Town Commanders at Kamboma and Koindu Villages by RUF forces and who had actively collaborated with RUF forces were killed, although it appears that these people were killed by the people of those villages, rather than the Kamajors.

In Wandor Chiefdom, strong men who were nominated by the Chiefs to be initiated in Jima Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District) returned to the chiefdom in September 1996 and successfully repelled RUF forces. Kamajors started patrolling at the borders of the chiefdom and in order to avoid having civilians caught in crossfire during encounters with RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors requested the civilians from surrounding villages to gather at Falla in the centre of the chiefdom. Shortly after they arrived in the chiefdom, Kamajors fought with RUF/AFRC forces who were en route to attack them at Falla⁸⁶² and succeeded in repelling them. After a second attack that took place two days later, Wandor Chiefdom did not sustain any more RUF or RUF/AFRC incursions.

In September 1996, Kamajors coming from Kenema Town repelled RUF forces from different villages in Lower Bambara Chiefdom, including Lowoma, Fowaru and Ngelaima. People who had fled to the bush started to come back to the villages. However, they were soon forced to give food to the Kamajors and those who refused were detained for hours and molested. Kamajors also deposed Chiefs and decided on private matters, punishing and fining people they found guilty. The heads of some RUF members were cut off and displayed in Tongo Field. Kamajors entered Peyama, drove the RUF out and took all the stolen property back to Tongo, where they worked with SLA forces.

⁸⁶¹ The fate of these prisoners is not known.

⁸⁶² The fighting took place near Kamboma.



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In November 1996, Kamajors from Nomo, Gaura and Tunkia Chiefdoms joined forces to dislodge the RUF, launching successful attacks in Nomo Chiefdom. They were first equipped with short guns, sticks, machetes and cutlasses and progressively, were provided with more sophisticated weapons, such as AK47s, taken from opponents during the attacks. Any person suspected of being a "rebel" would be killed, their heads sometimes chopped off. In January 1997, at Dambala (Nomo Chiefdom), three men were shot dead, alleged to be "rebels".

Early that same month, Kamajors came back from their initiation in Gorama Mende Chiefdom and launched their first attack on the headquarter town of Tongi. They successfully repelled the RUF forces from the town and from Camp Joe Bush. After they overran Tongi, Kamajors arrested all civilians who had held positions during the RUF's stay, threatening to kill them. However, due to the intervention of the chiefdom authorities, those people were not killed but instead were forced to pay the following fines: one bag of rice, five gallons of palm oil, two cotton cloths and Le 50,000. Kamajors also repelled RUF forces from other towns in the chiefdom such as Vengema, Modema, Keema, Jouma, Berembah, Benduma and Nyandehun. More Kamajors were sent for initiation to strengthen their forces. Another Camp Joe Bush at Kpetema Teiyeh, in the north of the chiefdom at the border with Tonkolili District, was attacked and Kamajors drove RUF forces out of the camp. Some RUF forces were killed while most of them ran away. Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom were also active outside the boundaries of their chiefdom as they fought RUF forces in Tonkolili District.⁸⁶³

On 3 March 1997, an initiator from Bonthe District was called upon to initiate more Kamajors in Gorama Mende Chiefdom. In the same week, on hearing this information, RUF forces sent a reconnaissance (RECE) to plan an attack on the chiefdom. Kamajors did not wait for the RUF forces to come and on 10 March, attacked their base at Sullay Ground. The captured RUF forces were sent to Bo Town,⁸⁶⁴ under the protection of the chiefdom coordinator of the Kamajors. After this last fight, Gorama Mende Chiefdom was virtually free of RUF presence, the only subsequent sightings being a few RUF forces seen on food finding missions, with no reported fatalities.

In March 1997, following an encounter between SLA forces and the CDF at Tongo (Lower Bamabara Chiefdom), the Kamajors left the town and many civilians were tortured and killed by SLA forces on the grounds that they were Kamajor supporters. Kamajors who were driven out to nearby chiefdoms regrouped and retook Tongo, driving out SLA forces and establishing a permanent base. Retreating SLA forces killed a lot of civilians on their way to Kono District in Konjo and Venema (both villages are located in Lower Bamabara Chiefdom). At Tongo, the Kamajors targeted alleged SLA sympathisers; they tortured and killed many civilians on these grounds. From this base, Kamajors were soon controlling the chiefdom.

When initiations started to take place in Kenema, local hunters from Simbaru Chiefdom went to be initiated. On their return in March 1997, they were told that the SLA forces had left for Kenema Town. From this time on, the Kamajors were in charge of the chiefdom. In Kandu Leppeama

⁸⁶³ See the factual analysis for Tonkolili District.

⁸⁶⁴ At this time, Bo Town was under SLA control.



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Chiefdom, Chiefs recommended strong men to be initiated and when they came back from their initiation, they were divided into different groups to protect the chiefdom.

In March 1997, RUF forces attacked the following villages in Simbaru Chiefdom, setting houses on fire and killing civilians: Nyahu (over 60 dwellings were burnt and six people killed); Mamboma (over 60 houses burnt, four old men killed and two men mutilated); Paniniga (45 houses were burnt and nine people killed); Gawama (over 170 houses, two primary schools and a health centre were set on fire and 17 people were killed); Gereihun (over 250 houses and public buildings were set on fire, 48 people were killed and four people mutilated); Fawana, Garahun, Jagbwema, Gogbebu and Nyeyama.⁸⁶⁵

In May 1997, a week before the Coup, the Kamajors' Chief Initiator conducted over 300 initiations at Falla (Wandor Chiefdom) to strengthen the number of Kamajors. Others travelled to Bo District to be initiated by the Deputy Chief Initiator.

Around the same time, SLA forces attacked the Kamajor base at Kenema, chasing away the Chief Initiator. During this attack, many civilians and Kamajors and few SLA members were killed and several houses, including that of the Chief Initiator, were burnt down as well as numerous homes of Kamajors and Kamajors supporters. On seeking refuge in Konia (Dama Chiefdom), the Chief Initiator was advised by the Paramount Chief to leave, due to its proximity to Kenema Town, so he left for Bo District.

Also before the Coup in May 1997, Kamajors from Nongowa Chiefdom, on hearing that SLA forces in the Dama axis were demanding money from people at the checkpoints they were operating, went there to inquire about the matter. When they arrived, SLA forces open fire on the Kamajors, who were mainly equipped with bladed weapons and some single barrel guns. The Kamajors captured the SLA commander and hacked him to death; other SLA members were given the same treatment.

c) Third Phase: May 1997 – 2002

Following the Coup on 25 May 1997, AFRC forces asked the CDF to surrender their weapons to the nearest police station and to suspend all their activities. CDF members did not follow this request; on the contrary, although they withdrew from the battlefronts, they regrouped themselves in villages and increased their number by undertaking more initiations. During this period, young boys under 15 began joining the society. RUF/AFRC started launching attacks on Kamajor positions and vice versa.

Shortly after the coup, on 30 May 1997, it is reported in general terms that fleeing civilians were mutilated and killed by RUF/AFRC fighters at Baoma (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom). Indeed, across the District, RUF/AFRC forces harassed and intimidated civilians, molesting them, raiding villages and taking food and other property.

⁸⁶⁵ These incidents may have taken place after the Coup of 25 May 1997.



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In the south of the District, RUF/AFRC forces established a camp called "SS Camp" at the boundary between Dama and Nongowa Chiefdoms. From there, they raided all the surrounding villages. Besides looking for food, the main purpose of these raids was to find Kamajors. Many villages were suspected of hosting Kamajors preparing to launch attack on RUF/AFRC positions. RUF/AFRC attacks were also perceived by the population as reprisal to punish the population for failing to support them. Thus, men were stripped naked and RUF/AFRC forces searched for any marks on their bodies indicating they belonged to the Kamajor society, killing those on whose bodies they found such marks. However, not to have any marks did not prevent civilians from being killed, since people were killed on suspicion of being Kamajors or Kamajor collaborators in the absence of such a mark. This practice of undressing men to search for any mark was also carried out in the SS Camp by the Moa River.

Niawa and Langruma Chiefdoms were not attacked by RUF/AFRC forces after the Coup, unlike Small Bo Chiefdom, where SLA forces had been stationed before the Coup.⁸⁶⁶ Shortly after the Coup, the commander in charge of the ex-SLA forces in the chiefdom announced that Kamajors should disarm to them as instructed by the high command in Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces launched an attack on Kamajor positions, from which the Kamajors were controlling part of the Bo-Kenema highway in the chiefdom and in Blama in August 1997. In both locations, the Kamajors were overpowered and fled. During this attack, RUF/AFRC forces burnt houses in Blama. Another battle between the two forces took place in Joyomei, a town six miles south of Blama. The town was burnt down, although the force responsible for this burning remains unknown, with Kamajors blaming the RUF/AFRC and vice versa.

During the RUF/AFRC stay in Kenema Town, girls were raped, houses were looted continuously and civilians were harassed for food and other items. Most commonly, alleged Kamajors or alleged SLPP⁸⁶⁷ or Kamajor supporters were arrested, detained, beaten and/or killed and their houses looted and burnt.⁸⁶⁸ In one incident, a man riding his bicycle on the road to Kenema was brought to the town by RUF/AFRC members and killed in front of the Sierratel Building; his stomach was cut open and his intestines tied across the road as a barricade. Civilians in the town were beaten to death if they were caught listening to the BBC.

In Small Bo Chiefdom, people who were considered to be Kamajor collaborators were severely beaten or killed. RUF/AFRC forces made civilians look for food for them and the pressure on civilians was intensified as RUF/AFRC forces in Small Bo Chiefdom had stopped receiving food and other items from their main base in Kenema. The RUF/AFRC forces believed that civilians were sending information to Kamajors who had gone in the bushes; any food found with civilians was taken away on the grounds that the food would be sent to Kamajors. Furthermore, RUF/AFRC forces used to organise groups of civilians and took them to the bush to look for food. Whatever the quantity of food brought back, it was divided into four parts, one for the forces' High Command,

⁸⁶⁶ Accordingly, the SLA base transformed into an RUF/AFRC base.

⁸⁶⁷ Since February 1996, the SLPP party has been the ruling party of Sierra Leone.

⁸⁶⁸ No details were gathered for this period but this assertion, although general, was common in the information gathered for Nongowa Chiefdom and beyond the boundaries of the chiefdom.



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one for the lower ranks, one for the civilian administration and one for the civilians who had brought the food.

Civilians in the chiefdom engaged in mining activities in villages located in the north of the chiefdom, namely in Yorvuhun, Victoria, Komoli, Limeh and Nyagbe Bo. They received food from businessmen from Kenema Town who encouraged the mining. Because of this food supply and because the movement of civilians towards these villages was perceived as sabotage,⁸⁶⁹ RUF/AFRC forces established a base at Victoria in the north of the chiefdom, mainly to seize the food and non food items they needed from civilians and to monitor the movement of Kamajors in other chiefdoms located further north. However, RUF/AFRC forces soon also engaged in mining activities.

RUF/AFRC forces were making regular visits to Dama Chiefdom to look for CDF members and to request food from civilians. At Gofor in July 1997, they killed three civilians with automatic rifles and at Bandembu, on the same day, civilians suspected of being CDF supporters were killed. Each time they entered villages, RUF/AFRC asked civilians to locate CDF members, threatening to kill them. Houses and property belonging to suspected CDF supporters were looted and burnt down and some alleged Kamajor collaborators were tortured to death. Also in July, RUF/AFRC forces entering Kpandebu through the east killed 25 civilians, mostly men, and inflicted physical violence on others, whom they alleged to be Kamajor supporters. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) attacked Konia, Gboyama and Manor on the same day and killed an unknown number of civilians in those villages. During this wave of attacks, other villages including Sebehun and Kbakah were also raided and 10 civilians were killed.⁸⁷⁰

The Kamajors regrouped and began attacking RUF/AFRC forces, often by laying ambushes. Captured RUF/AFRC members were killed, frequently on the spot. Across Kenema District, civilians suspected of being a member of the RUF/AFRC forces or a member of their family or a collaborator were killed. For example, at Konia (Dama Chiefdom) in August 1997, one man was shot dead and another was beaten for two days, both on the grounds that they were "not on the side of the CDF".

During the second half of the year, RUF/AFRC forces reached Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, where there were some incidents of violence inflicted on civilians. At Deima, they killed civilians for their money and property, tortured some who refused to give them their valuables and raped some girls. At Jenneh also, some people were killed. The acting Paramount Chief residing at Levuma was arrested in November 1997 as he had dismantled the checkpoints some RUF/AFRC forces had made in the town.⁸⁷¹

Throughout the third phase of the conflict, diamond-rich Lower Bambara Chiefdom was the scene of numerous attacks and counter-attacks between RUF/AFRC forces and Kamajors, as a result of

⁸⁶⁹ This movement of civilians was indeed perceived by RUF/AFRC forces as indicating that civilians had received information of imminent attacks from Kamajors and accordingly civilians were considered as fleeing the area.

⁸⁷⁰ It could not be ascertained in which village those 10 civilians were killed.

⁸⁷¹ The acting Paramount Chief subsequently managed to escape into the bush.



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which there were many civilian fatalities. In August 1997, RUF/AFRC forces launched attacks on numerous villages including Torkpombu, Buime, Lachun, Kpandebu, Lowoma, Fowaru, Ngeleima, most of them diamond mining villages or towns. Coming from Kenema Town, these heavily armed forces fired indiscriminately in the villages as they passed by, shouting the following slogan, called Cyburg: "We don't talk, the barrels talk". During these attacks, many civilians were killed and many houses were burnt. As a result of these attacks, the CDF were driven out of the chiefdom. RUF/AFRC engaged in mining activities almost everywhere, digging plantations without the consent of their owners. If the owners resisted these activities, they were seriously beaten. Civilians were forced to work in the mines and many people died at these sites.

In August also, RUF/AFRC forces planned to attack Punduru, a Kamajor base in the north-east of Gorama Mende Chiefdom. On their way to Punduru, they had an encounter with Kamajors at Bandabu and one of their members was killed during the battle. It is believed that this incident outraged the RUF/AFRC forces and on 30 August, around 700 heavily armed⁸⁷² RUF/AFRC members launched a fierce attack on Punduru. During this attack, four Kamajors and 28 civilians were killed.⁸⁷³ RUF/AFRC forces were however repelled and moved to Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom, Kono District) before burning the whole town and capturing some girls and young boys.

The following month, the Kamajors ambushed a military convoy in Lower Bambara Chiefdom and 20 members of the RUF/AFRC forces were killed and arms and ammunition were seized. In September 1997, Kamajors in Nomo Chiefdom launched an attack on RUF/AFRC forces' positions in Tunkia and Gaura Chiefdoms. Two RUF/AFRC members were captured and their heads chopped off. Any person suspected of being a RUF/AFRC member was killed such as those two men from Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) who were shot in their stomachs while entering Nomo.

That same month, CDF members came to the Court Barrie in Konia and asked the Paramount Chief of Dama where he had put the money he received from RUF/AFRC forces. Denying that he had received such money, the Paramount Chief was arrested, tied up with his hammock, taken away and killed in another village. Later, one man who tried to escape was shot on sight by a CDF member. The CDF commander stated that he was the new Paramount Chief.

In October 1997, the mountain village of Basara (Nongowa Chiefdom) came under RUF/AFRC attack, as it was suspected of being a Kamajor stronghold. The village was surrounded in the early hours of the day and forces opened fire on the civilians. Five civilians were killed during the firing and 15 were put in a hut and burnt alive when the hut was set on fire. In November 1997, the same scenario took place in another mountain village called Masao. Over 10 people were shot dead, while 10 others were forced into a house, which was then set on fire.

Kamajors started regrouping in October 1997 in Dodo Chiefdom and in Panguma (Lower Bambara Chiefdom). Jormu Kefabu (Nongowa Chiefdom) became a CDF stronghold and RUF/AFRC forces

⁸⁷² The RUF/AFRC forces were dressed in combat fatigues with red berets and armed with machine guns, an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a Hilux van, RPGs and automatic rifles.

⁸⁷³ It is worth noting that throughout this time, the more the Kamajors attacked the RUF/AFRC forces, the more the RUF/AFRC forces were harassing civilians.



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made several unsuccessful attempts, mainly in the mountain villages, to drive the Kamajors out. In December 1997, the mountain village of Bambawa (Nongowa Chiefdom), which was believed to be a Kamajor training base, was attacked and burnt and one person was killed. Also in December, RUF/AFRC forces encountered Kamajors at Combema and about 40 of them were killed by Kamajors.

In November 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Gorahun (Tunkia Chiefdom), seizing the two roads leading to the town. In this attacks, 55 people were killed at close range. After this attack, the chiefdom did not experience further RUF/AFRC attacks.

The following month, the Kamajor commander on the ground in Nomo Chiefdom received a letter from the Kamajor High Command instructing all Kamajors in all chiefdoms to launch Operation "Black December". The purpose of this operation was to restrict the movement of the RUF/AFRC forces by regaining control of the highways. Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom took part in this operation on the Kono-Makeni highway. During the same month, at Dambala, a suspected "rebel" was decapitated and his blood drunk by a Kamajor.

"Operation Black December"⁸⁷⁴ did not take place in Lower Bambara Chiefdom in December 1997. However, a fierce attack was launched on Tongo Field in January 1998, when Kamajors entered the chiefdom from two fronts, namely the east from Malegohun Chiefdom and the west from Dodo Chiefdom. Although few details were obtained on this operation, it was stated more than once that during this attack, many civilians lost their lives. Furthermore, following this attack, both fighting forces attacked villages believed to be under the control of the other force, killing civilians and burning houses. Hanga (Nongowa Chiefdom) was also attacked in January by RUF/AFRC forces. Twelve members of the same family and other inhabitants were shot dead and more than 10 houses were burnt down. Some people were forced to carry looted items for the RUF/AFRC forces, who also attacked other villages along the road from Mano Junction to Kenema Town, including Ngelehun, Kpanderu and Bambawa.⁸⁷⁵

In January 1998, RUF/AFRC forces based in Joru (Gaura Chiefdom) decided to sweep away the Kamajors deployed along the entire route leading to Bo Waterside, on the Liberian border in Pujehun District.⁸⁷⁶ Before starting their operation, they sent a letter to the Kamajors to inform them on their plans. On their way, they burnt down many villages⁸⁷⁷ and succeeded in driving the Kamajors away. At Jao (Tunkia Chiefdom), over 40 houses were burnt and at Kamasu, 15 houses

⁸⁷⁴ This operation, declared by CDF High Command, was implemented across the country in the areas where Kamajors were active, in a bid to take control of RUF/AFRC positions. As part of this operation, all the highways and roads were blocked, in order to prevent RUF/AFRC forces from attacking civilians. It is believed that this Operation was launched following the AFRC statement that it would not hand over power to the President of Sierra Leone on 22 April 1998, as planned in the Conakry Peace Plan signed on 23 October 1997.

⁸⁷⁵ As for the casualties in those villages, it is merely reported that houses were burnt but it cannot be ascertained whether all the villages had houses burnt.

⁸⁷⁶ This road passes by Tunkia Chiefdom.

⁸⁷⁷ Tilorma, Taninahun, Sokola, Sefula and Damawulo were also burnt down.



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were burnt. At Gegbwema, where they spent the night, they burnt down all the houses except the mosque and the Court Barrie.

Kamajors from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, together with some from Simbaru and Dodo Chiefdoms, planned to launch attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom. However, on 5 January 1998, when they arrived at these positions, RUF/AFRC forces had already left the area. Kamajors from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom then controlled the chiefdom, although there were reports of harassment of the civilian population. At Deima, for example, one Kamajor arrested seven civilians and put them in a wooden box which he then locked because they failed to give him food. The matter was reported to the commander at Levuma, who ordered their release.

In January also, the Paramount Chief of Nomo Chiefdom, together with other prominent people, including a prominent doctor and a businessman, were arrested by RUF/AFRC fighters in Kenema Town. They were arrested at the time of a fierce battle between RUF/AFRC forces in the outskirts of Kenema and were accused of supporting Kamajors. They were beaten with sticks with their hands tied behind their backs. One of them is believed to have died in detention although his body was never found. The mutilated body of another was found with 35 others in a mass grave at the outskirts of the town. Some of those arrested were however released.⁸⁷⁸

At Konjo (Dama Chiefdom) in early 1998, a pregnant woman was raped by member(s) of the RUF/AFRC forces and gave birth shortly after. During the same attack, civilians were punished⁸⁷⁹ or killed, suspected of being SLPP and Kamajor supporters. Some houses were also put down.

When they withdrew from Kenema in January 1998,⁸⁸⁰ over 10 RUF/AFRC members and their families who took the Nomo Chiefdom road to go to Liberia were shot dead by some Kamajors in Nomo Chiefdom while crossing the river that borders Sierra Leone and Guinea in a canoe. Due to the shooting of the canoe, it sank, which resulted in the drowning of a suckling mother and her baby with other people. At Faama (Nomo Chiefdom), Kamajors shot dead an unknown number of "rebel sympathisers".

As Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) was a stronghold of RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors from Dodo and Kandu Leppeama Chiefdoms on the one hand and from Niawa Chiefdom, Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District) and Jiama Bongor Chiefdom (Bo District) on the other hand started operations to dislodge RUF/AFRC forces from Small Bo Chiefdom. On 31 January 1998, Kamajors from Dodo Chiefdom advanced towards Small Bo and on their way, launched a successful attack on RUF/AFRC forces based at Levuma (Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom). Kamajors from Dodo Chiefdom, with those from Kandu Leppeama Chiefdom, advanced on Blama, entering the town on 15 February 1998. However, no RUF/AFRC forces were to be found in the town as they had left earlier.

⁸⁷⁸ Many reports mention that the arrest of those people and the reported killings were carried out under a direct order from a senior member of the RUF general staff.

⁸⁷⁹ The kind of punishment inflicted could not be ascertained.

⁸⁸⁰ Indeed, RUF/AFRC forces stayed in Kenema town throughout 1997 until late January 1998 when, fearing the imminent Kamajor/ECOMOG forces' attack, they pulled out of the town.



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In February 1998, ECOMOG troops based in Liberia entered the District and on 18 February, together with Kamajors, reached Kenema Town. They then deployed at SS Camp, Gofor, Giema and Joru (in Dama and Gaura Chiefdoms). Indeed, after the intervention in Freetown, ECOMOG forces had positions all over the country and were working with the Kamajors. In Malegohun Chiefdom, for example, ECOMOG came to Kamajor positions with arms and ammunitions. In addition, ECOMOG requested the intervention of the Kamajors from Punduru (Gorama Mende Chiefdom) to be an auxiliary force to liberate Kono District, providing them also with small arms and bullets.

Once in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom), Kamajors killed people suspected of being collaborators or tied them with a special rope called FM,⁸⁸¹ beat them and locked them up. Civilians were gathered in the centre of the town for "screening" purposes. Two police officers were killed, while another police officer and his wife received serious cuts on their necks but did not die. Other police officers managed to escape to a nearby village and to the ECOMOG base in Kenema Town. One man, alleged to be the Small Bo CDF chairman who stayed in Blama while RUF/AFRC were occupying the town, was killed for failing to supply ammunition to the Kamajors at one time when they had planned to attack the RUF/AFRC forces in Blama. Because of failing to supply the ammunition, he was considered to be a "saboteur". The entire town was looted by Kamajors, who also established "Kangaroo Courts"⁸⁸² presided over by Commanding Officers.

When they entered Kenema Town, ECOMOG forces and Kamajors with machetes and guns killed many people who they suspected of being "rebels" or "collaborators".⁸⁸³ Some civilians were burnt alive with old tyres for supporting the RUF/AFRC forces. Those killings were a common sight in the streets of Kenema. In many parts of the town, the charred remains of bodies were seen. Many members of the SSD (Special Security Division) were killed and their bodies scattered all over the Kenema Police Barracks, some of which were set on fire by civilians.

Between January and March 1998, as they were fighting and repelling RUF/AFRC forces, Kamajors targeted alleged members of the retreating forces, their families and those who they considered to be collaborators. Those people, who in reality were mainly civilians, were tortured and killed. It is reported that a group of Kamajors called Yamotor based at Talamah and Lalehun were eating the bodies of the retreating forces and civilians accused of collaboration. Houses believed to have been occupied by RUF/AFRC fighters or by alleged collaborators were unroofed.

After the deployment of ECOMOG and Kamajors all over the District, a few RUF/AFRC incursion were still reported but on a lower scale. A CDF Office was established in Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom) for the purpose of issuing passes to monitor the movement of people. Kamajors initially based in Small Bo Chiefdom but coming from the neighbouring Niawa and Langrama Chiefdoms went back to their chiefdoms. In March, civilians started returning to their villages.

⁸⁸¹ This rope has two sticks on its edges; "FM" means "frequency modulation", as it was believed that once tied with this rope, civilians began to talk.

⁸⁸² In reality, these courts were simply place where Kamajors were sitting down and issuing sentences, without following any laws.

⁸⁸³ No further details are available on these incidents.



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However, unlike what happened in most of the chiefdoms, especially in the south of the District, the situation prevailing in Lower Bambara Chiefdom after ECOMOG deployed in the District still consisted of fighting and attacks between RUF/AFRC forces and the CDF, which continued until disarmament started in December 2001.

In the south of Kenema District, RUF/AFRC forces, alleged to come from Joice (Kailahun District) attacked Jewahun (Tunkia Chiefdom) in April 1998, where they burnt down the village before proceeding further to Gegbwema, where they burnt the houses that remained standing. These forces were later repelled by ECOMOG troops. The following month, RUF/AFRC forces believed to come from Malema Chiefdom (Kailahun District) attacked Madina, Kwadima – where three people were killed - and Kpandebu in Nomo Chiefdom. It is interesting to note that these forces had disguised themselves as Kamajors, thus taking the civilians by surprise.

In December 1998, when RUF/AFRC forces had regained control of major towns in the country, Kamajors from Gorama Mende Chiefdom were able to defend and retain control of the chiefdom, to the extent that this chiefdom served as a safe corridor for retreating ECOMOG forces from Kono District.

At the beginning of the following year, fighting again resumed in Kenema District. In January 1999, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces repelled Kamajors from Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), killing many civilians and Kamajors. Towns like Kpandebu, Lalehun, Bumpeh, Semewabu or Njaigbema were under persistent attacks from Kamajors who had in their ranks young boys under 13, who were forced to hold guns and were trained only for short periods of time.

The RUF/AFRC forces abducted many civilians from their villages and forced them to work in mining sites, beating or killing those who refused. Civilians living in these areas were harassed and intimidated at gunpoint by RUF/AFRC members, who constantly stole property and abducted girls and women and used them for sexual purposes. A lot of Kamajor collaborators were killed during this period. Private houses believed to have diamonds under their foundations were dug up, especially in Kpandebu, Torkpombu, Tongola and Bomie.

In early 1999, between January and February, Small Bo Chiefdom saw an influx of people coming from a camp in Kenema Town, following threats of RUF/AFRC attacks on the Town.

In February 1999, an event that took place in Gorama Mende Chiefdom gives an insight on the CDF internal structure. On 9 February, the Kamajor membership of the chiefdom passed a “no confidence” vote on the chiefdom coordinator for his misuse of their rations from the CDF headquarter in Kenema Town. As a result, a new coordinator was appointed. This new coordinator was requested by the Kono authorities to initiate able young men from Kono to help them liberate Kono District.⁸⁸⁴ Five hundred men came to Jagbema for initiation. As they heard about this initiation, well-armed RUF/AFRC forces came early in the morning to Jagbema sometime in March

⁸⁸⁴ At this time indeed, Kono District was under RUF/AFRC control.



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or April, overran the Kamajors base, killed about 20 civilians and burnt down 45 houses, including the house of the CDF coordinator and a school. Twenty-five Kamajors sustained injuries and 10 civilians were taken away as load carriers. The Kamajor coordinator mobilised his men and they went to trace the RUF/AFRC forces, intercepting them at Laboya. During the encounter, 30 members of the RUF/AFRC were killed and the Kamajors liberated all the captured civilians.

At around the same time, heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kenema Town. Some ECOMOG forces, Kamajors and civilians were killed but ECOMOG and Kamajor forces regrouped and repelled them. On their way back to Kailahun District, those RUF/AFRC forces were ambushed by ECOMOG forces at Mano Junction; many of them died in that ambush.

Many incidents relate the destruction of numerous buildings, private and public, in 1999 in Lower Bambara Chiefdom. Ngehun market was burnt down as RUF/AFRC forces entering the town firing with the belief that Kamajors were residing there. The Roman Catholic Primary School was unroofed as were other schools in Tongo. Zinc from these roofs was used to build booths for the forces and furniture was used as firewood for cooking. Most of the buildings of the National Diamond Mining Company quarters were also destroyed.

RUF/AFRC forces during this period were terrorising the population, who saw this period as "chaos". During their stay in Tongo Field, the RUF/AFRC were recruiting young boys between 10 and 12 years of age; these child soldiers were carrying out most of the atrocities and many of them were intimidating their parents. However, by October 1999, the security situation however improved in the Tongo Field area (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) and commercial activities resumed,⁸⁸⁵ with civilians resettling in their villages.⁸⁸⁶

The situation in Koya Chiefdom was still unusual during this period. Due to the total absence of SLA forces throughout the previous years, RUF forces had established firm control of the chiefdom and most of the civilians who had not fled were conscripted into the movement. The first forces to fight RUF/AFRC forces were Kamajors from Pujehun District in 1999. Koya Chiefdom had its own Kamajors only in 2001 after men went to Kenema to be initiated.

On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President officially launched the commencement of the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown.⁸⁸⁷ A DDR camp was opened in Kenema Town to disarm CDF members, while RUF members were to disarm at Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District).⁸⁸⁸ The DDR process started on a low scale and on 4 November, the first day of the program, no CDF member

⁸⁸⁵ IRIN West Africa, 1 January 1999.

⁸⁸⁶ The number of IDPs in the District dropped from 63,319 at the end of October to 47,199 one month later. IRIN West Africa, 14 December 1999.

⁸⁸⁷ The start of the DDR program as it was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.

⁸⁸⁸ During this first phase of disarmament, DDR camps were also opened in Port Loko Town, Bo Town, Moyamba Town, and Daru (Kailahun District), the security situation in Bombali, Koinadugu, and Tonkolili remaining too unsettled.



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turned out. The initial deadline of 15 December set for the completion of the program was not met and as of 23 January 2000, only 13,100 combatants had disarmed out of an estimated 45,000 total combatants.⁸⁸⁹

Nevertheless, after the DDR process began, the situation started to normalise in the District and in early January 2000, the roads linking Kenema Town to Kailahun Town in the east and Kenema Town to Koidu in the north were formally reopened by the RUF.⁸⁹⁰ As part of their country campaign to sensitise members of the fighting factions on disarmament, the RUF leader, the Deputy Defence Minister, the CDF National Coordinator and some members of ECOMOG visited Kenema Town and Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) during the first week of January 2000.⁸⁹¹ In the same month, peacekeepers from the Ghanaian battalion attached to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) were sent to Kenema Town. On 15 March 2000, around 3,500 CDF members arrived at the DDR centre at Kenema; this was surprising, as the RUF did not reciprocate in Kailahun District.⁸⁹²

However, the DDR process did not bring an end to the fighting in the District. On 28 March 2000, RUF forces numbering 3,500 returned to Fomaya (Gorama Mende Chiefdom),⁸⁹³ all dressed in t-shirts with an "RUF" inscription on the back. They set the town on fire and killed over 300 civilians.

Thus by May 2000, RUF forces were still controlling some parts of the District, especially the mining areas and were engaged in mining activities in Tongo Field. In early June 2000, RUF troop movements were recorded in the area, as forces regrouped at Tongo Field, causing tension in the area.⁸⁹⁴ By late July, between 3,000 and 3,500 civilians were reported fleeing the area, probably following the recent clashes between RUF and SLA forces⁸⁹⁵ and the rescue operation to free over 200 UN peacekeepers confined to their compound in Kailahun Town by RUF forces since May 2000 carried out by UNAMSIL troops between Kailahun Town and Pendembu (Upper Bambara Chiefdom, Kailahun District).⁸⁹⁶ In October 2000, around half of the RUF forces based in Tongo Field moved north and engaged in the cross-border attacks on Guinea that intensified in September 2000. A meeting between UNAMSIL personnel and the RUF based in Tongo took place on

⁸⁸⁹ IRIN West Africa, 31 October 1999.

⁸⁹⁰ IRIN West Africa, 5 January 2000.

⁸⁹¹ IRIN West Africa, 10 January 2000.

⁸⁹² IRIN West Africa, 15 March 2000.

⁸⁹³ RUF/AFRC had already attacked this town in 1999.

⁸⁹⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 1 June 2000. Furthermore, this event has to be read in conjunction with what happened in May in other parts of the country, where nearly 300 UN peacekeepers were captured by RUF/AFRC forces, thereby stalling the DDR process. In July, UNAMSIL called the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF to sign a ceasefire: UNAMSIL press briefing, 7 July 2000.

⁸⁹⁵ IRIN West Africa, 20 July 2001. No details could be obtained on the clashes between the RUF and the SLA in the Tongo field area. However, in the Sierra Leone Humanitarian Report 25 July – 07 August, it is reported that gunship attacks on the market place in Tongo killed 14 civilians, although the gunship responsible for this attack was not confirmed. An SLA gunship also targeted RUF forces at Torpombu (Lower Bambara Chiefdom), shelling and killing civilians.

⁸⁹⁶ This rescue operation was designed.



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29 January 2001 at Pangurna (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) to discuss the opening of the road linking Kenema to Tongo,⁸⁹⁷ although it is not clear whether the road was reopened after this meeting.

On 10 November 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed a ceasefire at Abuja, Nigeria, reactivating the disarmament process, which had come to a halt since May 2000 and the capture of UN peacekeepers.⁸⁹⁸ Its main provision was the disarmament of the RUF forces and the deployment of UNAMSIL troops in RUF-held areas. However, it would however take one more year for those provisions to be implemented, as the following events highlight.

At the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, Kamajors mounted checkpoints at Largo, at the border with Nongowa chiefdom, and harassed civilians travelling between Kenema Town and Tongo Field. Money and valuable items were taken away from civilians and alleged collaborators were detained and tied up with ropes.

Although six chiefdoms in the District were still considered to be unsafe for resettlement by the Government of Sierra Leone in March 2001,⁸⁹⁹ about 100 UN peacekeepers from the Zambian battalion made a long range patrol in Tongo (Lower Bambara Chiefdom) on 10 April. These peacekeepers met with the RUF commander of the area, asking for their collaboration to allow UNAMSIL deployment in the area.⁹⁰⁰ However, fighting between Kamajors and RUF forces resumed around 19 April, although fatalities – if any – could not be ascertained. This fighting, which once again prompted hundreds of civilians to flee the area⁹⁰¹ was seen as a step back in the ongoing disarmament process and UN deployment.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting between the RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone, UN representatives and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to review the ceasefire signed on 10 November 2000 was convened, again in Abuja, Nigeria.⁹⁰² The main points of concern were, among others, related to the acceleration of the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the remnants of the RUF forces, the release of child combatants and the freedom of movement of persons. Mention was also made of the violation of the ceasefire that took place the previous month in Tongo and Kono District. According to UNAMSIL investigations the fighting was provoked by movements of the Civil Defence Force (CDF) perceived as being menacing by the RUF forces.

As a proof of their commitment to the ceasefire, which was renewed in May, and to the provisions contained in the ceasefire agreement, RUF forces handed over 131 child combatants to UNAMSIL during a brief ceremony in Tongo on 22 June.⁹⁰³ In mid September, 300 UN peacekeepers from the

⁸⁹⁷ UNAMSIL press briefing, 31 January 2001.

⁸⁹⁸ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 28 October - 13 November 2000.

⁸⁹⁹ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 11 March - 31 March 2001.

⁹⁰⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 10 April 2001.

⁹⁰¹ BBC Online News Archive, 21 April 2001; IRIN West Africa, 23 April 2001.

⁹⁰² Further to this meeting, tripartite meetings of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration would be held every month and one would take place in Kenema Town on 10 August 2001.

⁹⁰³ IRIN West Africa, 25 June 2001.



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Zambian contingent deployed in the area.⁹⁰⁴ This first deployment was strengthened within a week, putting the number of UNAMSIL forces deployed in Tongo field to a battalion.

In October 2001, during a meeting of the Joint committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), comprising of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and RUF, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed on a schedule for the completion of the disarmament process and this accelerated disarmament was to take place in Kenema District between 15 and 30 November.⁹⁰⁵ Since May 2001, 20,284 combatants from the various fighting forces had disarmed.⁹⁰⁶ However, the deadline set in the agreement was not met as RUF forces showed unwillingness to disarm outside Tongo Field,⁹⁰⁷ were unhappy with some issues of a political nature⁹⁰⁸ and due to some logistical problems, which halted the process. Nevertheless, disarmament started early December at a low pace for RUF forces. This process was fostered by the visit on 14 December of the RUF Interim Leader and the Force Commander of the UNAMSIL in Tongo where they urged remaining RUF forces to complete disarmament.⁹⁰⁹

Disarmament was therefore complete early January; in Tongo, it was completed on 5 January, one day after the visit of the Acting Force Commander of the UNAMSIL and the Deputy Chief of Mission.⁹¹⁰ As part of the events that took place in various areas across the country to symbolically mark the end of the DDR process, a ceremony was held in Kenema Town on 21 January 2002 in the presence of the President of Sierra Leone, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Force Commander of UNAMSIL. This ceremony concluded by the burning of weapons.⁹¹¹

3. Conclusion

Although it shares a boundary with Liberia on its eastern edge, Kenema District was mainly affected by RUF/NPFL incursions coming from the neighbouring Districts of Pujehun, Kailahun and Kono during the first phase of the war, which spanned from 1991 to the end of 1993. This period was marked by the incursion of the RUF/NPFL forces in three different flanks (north-west, north-east and, mainly, south-east). As in Pujehun District, those forces were repelled out of the District in the middle of 1991 by the SLA, who were assisted by foreign troops. During the subsequent months of this first phase, RUF/NPFL forces launched only sporadic actions in the District. Youths and local hunters mobilised themselves and, armed with stick, cutlasses and some shotguns, assisted the SLA

⁹⁰⁴ IRIN West Africa, 17 September 2001.

⁹⁰⁵ The schedule for the completion of the disarmament was agreed as follows: Koinadugu and Moyamba Districts: by 22 October; Bo and Bombali Districts: by 31 October; Western Area: between 1-7 November; Pujehun and Tonkolili Districts: between 1-15 November and Kailahun District: between 15-30 November: IRIN West Africa, 12 October 2001.

⁹⁰⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 15 October 2001.

⁹⁰⁷ There was one DDR camp in Kenema District, one in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) and one in Kailahun Town.

⁹⁰⁸ Those issues included the outcome of the National Consultative Conference, the continued detention of their leader and the time taken to complete registration of the RUF as a political party: IRIN West Africa, 7 December 2001.

⁹⁰⁹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 December 2001.

⁹¹⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 7 January 2002.

⁹¹¹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 21 January 2002.



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in defending the boundaries of their chiefdoms, filling the role of vigilantes. Around this time, SLA forces were deeply engaged in repelling the RUF forces from Kailahun District and in late 1993, confined them to the extreme east of Kailahun District, which led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December 1993.

Taking advantage of this ceasefire, RUF forces regrouped and launched a massive operation from Liberia in the south-east of Kenema District, using secondary roads and bush paths. This attack clearly marked the beginning of the second phase and by early 1994, RUF forces were scattered across all the chiefdoms of the District and were engaged in mining activities in the north of the District. Around the same time, RUF forces began regaining territory in Kailahun District and were also spreading through Pujehun District, making all the Districts adjoining Liberia under RUF control. This progression did not stop there, as RUF forces advanced further inland and by 1995, were present in all the Districts of the country. The SLA, whose number increased greatly in 1994, was not able to stop this rapid RUF progression, carried out using bush paths and guerrilla warfare tactics. RUF forces established important training camps in Kenema District and the main camp for the whole Southern Province and, to a limited extent, for the Eastern Province was established in the south-west of the District. From this camp, RUF forces attacked the neighbouring chiefdoms in Kenema and Bo Districts, staged ambushes on the Bo-Kenema highway and brought back hundreds of abducted civilians and stolen properties from these attacks.

These two phases were accompanied by great violence against civilians, carried out mainly by the RUF/NPFL and RUF forces but also by the SLA forces. The first acts of the RUF were to depose and replace local authorities. During their stay, they inflicted physical and mental violence, killed, sexually assaulted and abducted many civilians. Civilians' property was also widely taken away and houses were burnt down. In addition, the SLA forces also harassed civilians for food but above all chased "rebel" collaborators, whom they killed. Starting in 1994, their behaviour towards civilians deteriorated and civilians began to have doubts about their loyalty to the Government and their efficiency to fight the war, as they also engaged in killing, raping and stealing of property, although on a lower scale than the RUF forces.

However, starting in 1996, Kamajors began to fight alongside SLA forces and to occupy areas previously under RUF control, including the main camps of the District. In this regard, the pattern of actions in the District followed the patterns in the Southern Province, where Kamajors started imposing important defeats on the RUF, considerably minimising and reducing the RUF's strength and their control of the area.

However, following the Coup in May 1997 and the merging of the RUF with the AFRC regime, the RUF/AFRC forces began to push the Kamajors to withdraw from their positions. Nevertheless, the CDF regrouped, operating underground, and by September 1997 began defeating the RUF/AFRC, as was happening concurrently in the Districts of the Southern Province. During their stay in the District, RUF/AFRC forces imposed great harms on civilians, inflicting physical and mental violence, killing, raping and abducting, in particular to work in the mining areas. They also systematically stole civilians' property and burnt down many buildings. They also engaged in a

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widespread hunt for Kamajors collaborators, killing anybody they found whom they suspected of being a collaborator or Kamajor member.

In early 1998, following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in January 1998, the Kamajors, assisted by ECOMOG forces deployed in Kenema Town and repelled most of the RUF/AFRC out of the District. Their stay in the District was accompanied by strict controls on the movement of the population through the establishment of checkpoints and the harassment of civilians, which ranged from requests for food and other items to more violent actions, including physical violence and killing, in particular of alleged RUF and "Junta" collaborators.

However, unlike what happened in the Southern Province, the Kamajors were unable to gain control of the whole District, as fighting for the control of the mining area of Tongo Field continued throughout 1998, 1999 and the first part of 2000. In this regard, the pattern of actions in the north of the District was more similar to the way Kailahun District and, in particular, the mining District of Kono were affected, despite the opening of disarmament centres in Kailahun Town and Daru (Kailahun District). Indeed, after the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces clearly concentrated their attacks and offensives on the mining areas of the country and, later, on Guinean territory, giving a new dimension to the Sierra Leonean conflict.

Reactivated in November 2000, the disarmament process required one more year before being declared complete in January 2002. Kenema, and Kailahun Districts, were the two last Districts to be disarmed.

c. Kono District

1. **Introduction**

Kono District is located in the Eastern Province, together with Kailahun and Kenema Districts. It is bordered in the east by the Republic of Guinea and Koinadugu District, which also borders it in the north. In the south-east, the borders of Tonkolili District and Kono District meet for a few miles, with Kenema and Kailahun Districts forming its southern border.

Koidu, a diamond rich town, is Kono District's headquarter town. It is located almost in the centre of the District and is the starting and ending point of Sierra Leone's main highway, which links Koidu to Freetown, passing through Magburaka (headquarter town of Tonkolili District) and Makeni (headquarter town of Bombali District). Two other highways are of importance in the District, as they would allow the penetration of the District by the fighting forces from the southern Districts. One leaves Koidu, passing through Tankoro and Gbane Chiefdom before entering Kailahun District. The other one leaves Koidu, reaching Kenema Town through Nimikoro and Gorama Kono Chiefdoms in Kono District and Lower Bambara Chiefdom, a diamond mining area in Kenema District. An alternative to these two roads to reach the south-east is the road that leaves Koidu and goes through the east of the District.

There are 14 chiefdoms in the District:

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<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Fiama	Jagbwema
Gbane	Gandorhun
Gbane Kandor	Koardu
Gbense	Koidu
Gorama Kono	Kangama
Kamara	Tombodu
Lei	Saiama
Mafindor	Kamiendor
Nimikoro	Jaiama
Nimiyama	Jaiama Sewafe
Sandor	Kayima
Soa	Kainkordu
Tankoro	Baiama
Toli	Kondewakor

Kono District is the most diamond rich District of Sierra Leone and the wealth of its soil meant that the District was the stage of severe fighting and violations against civilians throughout the war, from its inception in 1991 until late 2001. The main mining areas⁹¹² are to be found in the centre and west of the District, in Kamara (Tombodu area), Sandor (in the south of the chiefdom), Nimikoro, Nimiyama, Gbense and Tankoro Chiefdoms.

As in the other Districts of the Eastern Province, Kono District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases. The first one encompassed 1991 to 1993. During these years, RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in the south-east through Kailahun District. Their first incursion in 1991 was limited to the two chiefdoms bordering Kailahun District and was rapidly halted by SLA forces deployed at Gbense, Sandor, Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms, the latter two of which share a border with Guinea. Local hunters known as Donsos began organising themselves in various chiefdoms, supported and encouraged by the local authorities. RUF/NPFL forces made successive attempts to re enter the District in 1992; by mid 1992, they had succeeded in establishing positions in Gbane Soa Chiefdom, from where they moved towards Koidu. By late 1992, Koidu was under RUF/NPFL control. SLA forces, assisted by local hunters coming from Koinadugu District, repelled the RUF/NPFL forces in early January and strengthened their bases in the east of the District. By mid 1993, the District was virtually free of any RUF/NPFL presence. This first phase was characterised by widespread violations committed primarily by RUF/NPFL forces, but also by SLA forces.

The second phase ran from 1994 to 1997. In 1994, RUF forces launched incursions in the south-east of the country and progressively advanced into the District. Koidu was attacked for the second time in April 1995, RUF forces taking advantage of the fact the SLA on the ground was more occupied in mining than in defending the District. This attack on Koidu led many civilians to leave the area, as the RUF forces began to span out in the surrounding chiefdoms. The District was recaptured

⁹¹² Besides diamonds, kimberlite mineral and gold are also mined.



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around May/June by SLA forces, newly trained by Executive Outcomes, the mercenary company in Sierra Leone under contract with the Government. The SLA, local hunters and Executive Outcomes dislodged the RUF forces from most of their positions and subsequent RUF attacks were carried out by remnants RUF members. The presence of Executive Outcomes in the District brought some relief to the population, as it also engaged in disciplining the SLA and prevented SLA members from undertaking illegal mining. During this period, RUF forces raided some villages in the south-east of the country.

As Executive Outcomes prevented the RUF from having access to Kono and, accordingly, to its diamonds, the RUF posed as condition for the signing of a peace agreement that Executive Outcomes leave the country. This condition was included into the text of the Abidjan Peace Agreement signed between the Government and the RUF on 30 November 1996. Two months later, Executive Outcomes pulled out of the District. After the military coup in May 1997, RUF forces came out of the bush and merged with the AFRC regime. Few incidents were reported for this period, as most of the RUF/AFRC activities were concentrated on mining. In fact, mining became more organised under the command of the RUF, who declared all mining areas to be their property. However, harassment of civilians increased and cases of physical violence, killing, rape and abductions were reported.

The third and final phase began in early 1998, following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown and the retreat of RUF/AFRC forces and concluded in August 2001, when the disarmament was declared complete in the District. This period is characterised by a substantial increase of violations committed by RUF/AFRC forces. Repelled from Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces arrived in Koidu in late February/early March and rapidly spread across the whole District. ECOMOG forces assisted by CDF members recaptured Koidu and other main towns on the highway in April 1998, sending RUF/AFRC forces into the bush, from where they continued to carry out "Operation No Living Thing". Hundreds of civilians were wounded, mutilated, killed, raped and abducted as part of this operation between February and May/June. During the second half of the year, the level of violations decreased, as the RUF/AFRC forces were more occupied with building huts to withstand the rainy season. At that time, most of the civilians had fled to Guinea and of those who stayed in the District, a lot of them were abducted to be trained in the training base RUF/AFRC forces had opened in Lei Chiefdom in the east of the District or to be used as workers in the mining areas in the west of the District. In December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces launched a massive operation and recaptured Koidu from ECOMOG forces. Throughout 1999 and 2000 and despite the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, RUF/AFRC forces accelerated their mining activities in the west of the District, where every single parcel of land was mined. A training base known as "Camp Lion" was opened in Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom), where hundreds of abductees from the Northern Province were brought for training. RUF/AFRC forces also continued their operations in the east of the District, in preparation for attacks onto the Guinean territory. Most of the RUF/AFRC raids during this period were carried out to search for food and above all to get more manpower, i.e. to abduct more people. Violations on civilians were still reported, in particular on those who were abducted. During those years, CDF forces launched attacks on RUF/AFRC positions, mainly in Sandor Chiefdom, in the north of the District and in the east, at the border with

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Guinea. These operations would continue until the completion of disarmament and the brokering of a deal to stop the illegal mining activities at the end of 2001.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991

As a result of the attack on Pendembu⁹¹³ (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kailahun District), security personnel and the chiefdom authorities in Gbane Chiefdom, in the south of Kono District, called a meeting in April to discuss preventive measures. It was agreed during this meeting that towns and villages from the chiefdom should provide local hunters, known as Donsos and energetic youths for training, following which 200 men were trained by the Sierra Leone Police and the Special Security Division (SSD) with the support of the Paramount Chief of Gbane. At around this time, people from Kailahun District fleeing from RUF attacks, especially from Yawei Chiefdom, moved to Gbane Chiefdom and settled in the villages around Gandorhun and Koidu Buma towards the south of the chiefdom near the boundary with Kenema District. Before the war began affecting Kono District, SLA forces were deployed in Mafindor Chiefdom, at the border with Guinea. However, shortly after the attack on Gandorhun, they went to Gbane Chiefdom to join the troops posted there. The few forces who stayed in Mafindor Chiefdom were withdrawn in 1992 to Manjama, the SLA base in Soa Chiefdom in the south-east of Kono District.

On 5 June 1991, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces wearing American flag bandanas on their heads and armed with AK47s entered Koidu Buma (Gbane Chiefdom) through Yawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District). Gbane Chiefdom was the main entry point into diamond-rich Kono District, due to the highway that links Koidu with Gandorhun and Bunumbu (Peje West Chiefdom, Kailahun District). At Koidu Buma, they shot and killed a man who was trying to escape and searched houses for any valuable items, including food. Civilians were asked whether there were any Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces in the town⁹¹⁴ and the RUF forces promised they would kill any SLA member they came across.

They did not stay long in Koidu Buma, soon moving onto Gandorhun, their target being the SLA forces. At this time, Gandorhun was, after Koidu Town, the biggest SLA deployment in Kono District. They were led to Gandorhun by a civilian they had recently conscripted, who showed them a bypass route. The RUF forces entered the town around 03.00 a.m. with sporadic firing, armed with AK47s, RPGs, grenades and knives. In Gandorhun, they killed three people (two shot and one burnt to death) and captured others, among them the brother of a prominent Lebanese businessman and his two daughters.⁹¹⁵ A van belonging to a civilian was taken away and used to carry property stolen from the town to Kailahun District. Most of the population fled to other chiefdoms.

A few days later, on 8 June, a combined force of Sierra Leone Police, SLA, SSD and Donsos forces repelled the RUF, who went back to Kailahun District. However, two of these RUF members got

⁹¹³ Pendembu is located on the road that enters Gbane chiefdom from Kailahun District.

⁹¹⁴ The RUF forces who entered the town referred to SLA forces as "Momoh's soldiers", from the name of the then Head of State.

⁹¹⁵ It is not clear from the records whether the two girls were the daughters of the prominent businessman or the daughters of his brother.



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lost in the forest and, after going without food for a few days, went to a farm to ask for food; youths at the farm went to Gandorhun to tell the SLA about the two men. SLA forces then captured the two RUF members and brought them to Koidu, where they were publicly tortured before being killed. Shortly after the attack on Gandorhun, SLA forces were sent from Freetown to Koidu Town and were deployed in the area under attack. RUF forces launched another attack on 9 June, but were repelled by SLA, SSD and Donsos.

During their stay in the chiefdom, those forces (SLA, SSD and Donsos) inflicted violence on civilians they accused of collaborating with RUF forces. In one instance, some people accused of being collaborators had rags and rubber placed around their necks, which were then set on fire, killing those people. This served as a signal for the population that they should not cooperate with the RUF in any way.⁹¹⁶

As early as 1991, local hunters⁹¹⁷ known as Donsos were to be found in Mafindor, Gbane, and Soa Chiefdoms in the south of the District, at the border with Guinea and Kailahun District. Those from Mafindor were often sent to Sukudu, in the south of Soa Chiefdom near the Guinean border. During the second half of 1991, Donsos started organising themselves in Sandor Chiefdom, in the north of Kono District at the boundary with Koinadugu District. In late 1991, some Donsos came to the chiefdom headquarters of Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom) to be trained by SLA forces on guerrilla tactics, military manoeuvres and staging ambushes. At that time, the SLA military headquarters were in Ngaya. As the war intensified at the boundary between Kono and Kailahun Districts, SLA forces together with Donsos or vigilantes were deployed in strategic towns such as Yormandu and Tefeya (Sandor Chiefdom), at the border with Gbense Chiefdom. Yormandu is a strategic town as it is located over the Bafi River and had one of the longest bridges in Kono District. It is worth noting that at this time, only a few SLA forces were deployed with many local hunters, also called vigilantes, more of whom were trained later on. However, at that time, SLA forces continually told civilians that they were neglected by the Government, whose support for the local hunters extended only to the supply of ammunition.

In late 1991, the Paramount Chief of Mafindor Chiefdom and “important”⁹¹⁸ Kono Authorities gathered the population in Kainkordu, the headquarter town of Soa Chiefdom. They asked for the youths and the local hunters, the Donsos, to organise themselves into a Civil Defence Unit (CDU). The youths and local hunters did so and began to organise the security of the town and the chiefdom, mainly by establishing checkpoints in the headquarter town. It is interesting to note that

⁹¹⁶ The date of this event cannot be determined with certainty and may have taken place in 1992.

⁹¹⁷ Different groups of traditional hunters organised themselves throughout Sierra Leone to fight the advancing RUF/NPFL and, later, RUF forces in the country. They were originally equipped solely with bladed weapons and long guns. Those local hunters had different names, according to the tribe to which they belonged: Donsos in Kono District; Tamaboros in Koinadugu District; Kapras in Tonkolili District; Gbethies in Port Loko District and, to a lesser extent, Kambia District; and Kamajors in the Southern and Eastern Province (Moyamba, Bonthe, Bo, Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts). In 1996, those local hunters would be organised under a national structure known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

⁹¹⁸ This delegation consisted of the then Member of Parliament for Kono North East, Soa Chiefdom Paramount Chief, Kono Senior District Officer, All People's Congress (APC) Secretary General, the Overall commander of Tankoro Chiefdom Police Station and others.



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this meeting and the formation of vigilantes and organisation of Donsos was directly encouraged by the State authorities and also took place in other villages and towns in Soa chiefdom. At this early stage of the existence of Donsos, an embryonic administrative structure was established to assist the hunters on the ground. Thus, the 14 chiefdoms of Kono District were taxed (Le 1,000 per house) and the money was sent to the CDU headquarters in Koidu. Donsos and youths then received this money to buy torches and other simple logistical equipment to assist with their function as watchmen. At this time also, the SLA deployed one Battalion at Manjama (Soa Chiefdom), which became a strong base. Youths, Donsos and SLA forces were working together, the youths and Donsos being of a great help to the SLA as they were more familiar with the local terrain.

On hearing of RUF attacks on Sukudu and Konjo (Soa Chiefdom) in December 1991, a convoy of nearly 150 SLA members together with 19 youths went there to retake the towns. However on their arrival, no RUF forces were to be found. In Sukudu, they found five dead civilians with bullet wounds and 27 houses totally burnt.⁹¹⁹ The fact that those youths joined the SLA forces to go and confront RUF forces was rather unusual at that time, as their main function was to operate checkpoints and to undertake patrols. Indeed, when they came back from this mission, their leader forwarded the information to their headquarters in Koidu. On receiving the information, CDU headquarters in Koidu sent two packets of shotgun cartridges. As cross-border raids were reported at the boundary with Kailahun District, the Paramount Chief of Soa exhorted the Donsos and vigilantes to advance towards the border to guard all the routes. The Youths' leader did not favour this, as they lacked weapons, and a meeting was convened in Koidu to decide on what action to take.⁹²⁰ A few days later, other villages at the boundary with Kailahun District, including Maa and Workor, were also attacked, people were killed and houses burnt.⁹²¹ Civilians in these villages reported that the forces who attacked them were speaking Krio, Liberian and other languages; accordingly, they identified those forces as RUF from Sierra Leone, NPFL forces from Liberia and mercenaries from Burkina Faso. At around the same time, some youths based at Levuma (Soa Chiefdom, on the border with Kailahun District) captured a man they alleged to be a RUF collaborator. This man was brought to Manjama, where the SLA commander ordered him to be shot.

b) Events in 1992

In January 1992, RUF forces were to be found in the boundary villages between Yawei Chiefdom (Kailahun District) and Gbane Chiefdom, as well as in Gandorhun and its environs. After the attack on Gandorhun in 1991, the RUF forces had retreated to their base in Kailahun District.⁹²² This was the start of a series of battles between RUF forces and the combined forces of the SLA, SSD and Donsos. At that time, the combined forces killed some people suspected of being "rebel" collaborators, including by putting a tyre around the neck of suspects and setting fire to it.

⁹¹⁹ The reports make no mention of any casualties in Konjo or in any of villages that were attacked on the way.

⁹²⁰ Although there were no details about this meeting, it can be inferred that it was convened at the CDU headquarters. The result of this meeting could be the reinforcement of SLA forces to Manjama and the registration of armed Donsos in early 1992.

⁹²¹ The vigilantes found three dead civilian males in Maa and two burnt houses in Workor.

⁹²² During this time, RUF/NPFL forces had different bases in Kailahun District, the main one being in Kailahun Town (Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District).



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At this time, local hunters from Sandor Chiefdom were sent to the south of the District where the RUF/NPFL forces were advancing. In February 1992, a military base was set up in Mboama (Gbane Chiefdom) and 30 SLA members together with 47 Donsos were deployed there.

A meeting gathering the young men of Nimikoro Chiefdom was summoned by the Chiefdom Speaker and an SLA officer in April 1992 at the chiefdom headquarters of Jaiama. The purpose of this meeting was to organise the young men into vigilante groups that could assist the SLA in defending the chiefdom from RUF/NPFL attacks. A lot of young men volunteered and received some training from the SLA.

A fierce battle took place in May 1992 in Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom), where the RUF forces were repelled from the chiefdom. The fighting continued sporadically and, shortly after, the RUF/NPFL managed to overpower the combined forces and establish their first permanent base in Kono District, which was used to attack the surrounding villages. The RUF/NPFL forces attacked Sidu (Gbane Chiefdom), at the boundary with Tankoro Chiefdom, in May. Donsos from Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom), eight miles from Sidu, informed the SLA forces deployed in Koidu of the advancing RUF/NPFL forces. The SLA therefore deployed in Baiama and Woama (Tankoro Chiefdom), where a battle took place between RUF/NPFL and SLA/Donsos. During these attacks, civilians were killed, property was taken and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property.⁹²³ RUF/NPFL were bypassing the government forces in Woama to attack villages in Tankoro Chiefdom, up to nearby Koidu. During these attacks, captured SLA forces and Donsos were killed, often after physical violence was inflicted on them.⁹²⁴

In October 1992, the RUF/NPFL forces finally drove the SLA forces from their base in Woama and established a second RUF/NPFL base there. This opened access to Koidu for the RUF/NPFL forces, since Woama is located on the Gandorhun-Koidu highway. The attack on Woama created panic among civilians in Koidu, who started to leave the town. SLA forces mounted checkpoints in Koidu to search the fleeing population for arms and suspected "rebels". For example, a prominent Tankoro Chiefdom authority was arrested at one of these checkpoints, suspected of being a "rebel" because he had in his briefcase a traditional dress like the one worn by local hunters. He was publicly tortured and beheaded in the main central area of Koidu.

Advancing RUF/NPFL forces captured an armoured car on 22 October 1992 from the SLA forces at Wordu, three miles south of Koidu. The RUF/NPFL forces burnt the car and a lot of SLA forces were killed. Some of the civilians who were fleeing the RUF/NPFL advance on Koidu drowned in the surrounding rivers, which had swollen following heavy rains. On 23 October 1992, RUF/NPFL forces launched an attack on Koidu from Woama. The following day, SLA forces together with some local hunters launched a counter attack on the town and repelled the RUF/NPFL forces. After this battle, the bodies of many civilians were left lying on the streets of the town, apparently

⁹²³ No more information was available on these events.

⁹²⁴ During that time, it was alleged that SLA forces sometime abandoned their positions at the battlefield to go to Koidu (Gbanse Chiefdom) to meet their relatives or to mine.



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caught in the crossfire as they tried to escape the fighting.⁹²⁵ Houses were burnt and many civilians were abducted by RUF/NPFL forces, among them a foreign worker. In early December, RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town for the second time from the same direction and repelled the SLA forces as far as Yormandu (Sandor Chiefdom).⁹²⁶ The RUF/NPFL forces also repelled the SLA forces deployed at Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom), located on the Kono-Makeni highway, up to Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom), which is near the Sewa River. In Bumpe junction, one civilian, a Limba by tribe, was shot dead by the RUF/NPFL commander who also ordered that the wife of the man be killed.

The fall of Koidu to the RUF/NPFL forces was interpreted against the Kono tribe and especially against the Paramount Chiefs, who became the target of SLA forces. Shortly after the attack on the town, a car arrived in Koidu carrying the wife of the Fiama Paramount Chief, who was in the boot of the car with his hands tied behind his back, his eyes swollen. When they recognised the Paramount Chief, civilians fled the area, fearful of being recognised by the Paramount Chief, which they believed could cause problems for them with SLA forces. The Paramount Chief was then taken to Tekko Barracks in Makeni (Bombali District); his death was subsequently confirmed. The Tombodu SLA forces later released his wife, after she had been raped by an unspecified number of SLA members. Some reports mention that the Paramount Chief was arrested because he failed to cooperate with SLA forces while another mentions that the Paramount Chief might have been arrested on the allegation that he had been found performing some ritual after the successful advance of RUF forces. Other Paramount Chiefs and other authorities from the District were arrested and sent to Pademba Road prison in Freetown on the grounds they had aided and abetted the capture of Kono District by RUF forces.

By the end of 1992, RUF/NPFL forces were therefore controlling a vast area of Kono District, including the main roads leading to Koidu.⁹²⁷ During their stay in Koidu, RUF/NPFL forces patrolled the surrounding villages in search of local hunters or pockets of SLA forces. During these patrols, the RUF/NPFL forces killed civilians, took property and abducted several civilians, taking them to Koidu to work for the RUF/NPFL forces. At Baiama, for example, about 60 men and women, including a prominent Kono authority, were taken away.

In a bid to repel the RUF/NPFL forces out of Koidu, an air campaign was undertaken, with the assistance of Nigerian Alpha Jets.⁹²⁸

When Koidu fell into the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces, most of its inhabitants left the town for Sandor Chiefdom, known to be an agricultural chiefdom full of hunters ready to defend their land. Those people coming to Sandor Chiefdom were searched at checkpoints by the SLA forces and the

⁹²⁵ This was inferred from the belongings found lying next to the bodies and needs to be clarified.

⁹²⁶ It cannot be determined with certainty whether the bodies of civilians were found on the streets after the first or the second attack.

⁹²⁷ It is interesting to note that these attacks on Koidu went virtually unreported in the media.

⁹²⁸ Inter Press Service, 18 December 1992. Since the middle of 1991, foreign troops, including Nigerians and Guineans forces were fighting alongside the SLA, further to bilateral agreements signed between Sierra Leone and Guinea and between Sierra Leone and Nigeria.



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local hunters. During these searches, SLA forces or local hunters took whatever property they desired. Any civilians who resisted were molested and risked being termed as “rebel” collaborators, for which they could be killed. In addition, some civilians were killed for their money;⁹²⁹ SLA forces and local hunters harassed businessmen in particular. At this time, Yormandu town, in the south of Sandor Chiefdom on the boundary with Kamara Chiefdom, was overcrowded with displaced people and many people were not able to sleep in houses, staying instead in the church, the mosque and the Court Barrie. Food, water and medical facilities rapidly became scarce and cholera broke out at Yormandu and Kayima, the chiefdom headquarter located in the north-west of the chiefdom, taking the lives of many people.

Another crowd of civilians left Koidu after it had been recaptured by RUF forces and headed through Nimikoro Chiefdom for Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom in the south of the District). On their way to Kangama, they had to pass through many checkpoints controlled by local hunters. At Moinmadu (Nimikoro Chiefdom), they fell into an RUF/NPFL attack. In the early hours of the morning, a RUF member disguised as an Imam called the people for prayer.⁹³⁰ Shortly after, the people who had gathered in the Mosque were surrounded by RUF/NPFL forces, who fired heavily in the air, capturing those in the mosque and other civilians in the town. Three civilians and a local hunter were killed in front of the Mosque and three men and a woman sustained serious injuries. Some young girls⁹³¹ were publicly raped. Two houses alleged to belong to the Kamajor commander of the area were burnt down. The people who had been captured were gathered in the Court Barrie and those who had food were forced to give it to the RUF/NPFL forces, who also accompanied other civilians to fetch water and food from elsewhere. During this, some civilians managed to escape, which led the commander to punish his forces who had gone to the bush with the civilians by lashing them and locking them in a veranda near the Court Barrie. After three days, the RUF/NPFL forces together with their captives took a bush path towards Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom, south east of Nimikoro Chiefdom), which at that time was one of their strongholds. On their way, local hunters attacked the convoy and successfully overran the RUF/NPFL forces. The civilians who had been with the RUF/NPFL forces were then brought to Tikonko in the north of Gorama Kono Chiefdom.

As Donsos from Sandor Chiefdom needed logistics, food, medicine and ammunition, a mass meeting was summoned at the chiefdom headquarters of Kayima probably in late October to provide assistance to the hunters. At the meeting, it was agreed that each taxpayer should contribute Le 500⁹³² and a few cups of rice every month.

⁹²⁹ This information is reported in general terms and does not specify the exact location of every occurrence.

⁹³⁰ Kono District is predominantly Muslim and according to the Islam, a Muslim is bound to pray five times a day. Each of the five periods for prayers is preceded by a call, known as adhaan. The early morning prayer may be offered any time within two hours after dawn.

⁹³¹ Although the exact age is not reported, it is mentioned that they were under age.

⁹³² This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day; see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.



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In November 1992, hunters from Tefeyah (Sandor Chiefdom) spread the news that a man was killed by uniformed men believed to be “rebels”, who took his money and diamonds. It was, however, later said that these uniformed men were not “rebels” but SLA forces, who did this because they had heard a few days earlier that the man had diamonds. Supporting this theory, it was said that it was highly unlikely that RUF forces would come to a big town like Tefeyah to kill only one person.

A convoy of an unspecified number of armed and unarmed men, women and children – namely RUF/NPFL forces and their captives – coming from the direction of Koidu arrived in Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) in late November. They stayed in the town for only one hour, killing some people, breaking doors, gathering anything that was of interest for them and abducting some civilians before heading through Manjama (Soa Chiefdom) to Sandaru, the RUF/NPFL base in Penguia Chiefdom (Kailahun District). This road, which links Koidu with Kainkordu and Penguia Chiefdom (Kailahun District), was often used by RUF forces in search of food. Also in Soa chiefdom, on 8 December, an RUF commander escorted by some men arrived in the chiefdom headquarter of Kainkordu. On his arrival, he explained that his movement, the RUF, had come to put an end to the APC regime and that it now controlled the whole of Kailahun, Kono and Pujehun Districts, as well as part of Kenema District.⁹³³ He further said that the people from Soa Chiefdom should join the movement and celebrate the presence of their “new government”. He mounted green pieces of material on top of a high pole as a symbol that this was now RUF-controlled territory and appointed men and women as the new authorities of the chiefdom.

The mobilisation of youths and local hunters was reinforced and structured by the creation of Eastern Region Civil Defence Committee, aiming at mobilising “well-meaning Sierra Leoneans” to fight alongside the SLA. This committee was composed of representatives of Kenema, Kailahun and Kono Districts, with some from Freetown.⁹³⁴

c) Events in 1993

In January, SLA forces coming from Freetown were deployed at Sewafe Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom) and merged with another group who had retreated from Koidu. Those SLA forces recaptured Sewafe town and advanced further on the Koidu highway together with local hunters known as Tamaboros from Koinadugu, Guinean forces and ULIMO-K members. They launched different attacks in Nimikoro, Nimiyama and Tankoro Chiefdoms, successfully driving out RUF forces from the areas previously under their control. Koidu was retaken in the same wave of attacks, on 22 January.⁹³⁵ SLA forces from the Moa Barracks in Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) also took control of Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom).

Those combined forces were heavily armed with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, AA guns and AK47s. They made several deployments in the area, including Koidu, and started patrolling villages

⁹³³ The loss of Kono and Kailahun Districts to the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces had a significant impact on the economy, as most of Sierra Leone’s income came from the production of cash crops in Kailahun District and the mining activities in Kono District. Following the capture of Koidu by the RUF/NPFL forces, the National Diamond Mining Co. ceased its operations: Mining Annual Review, 1 July 1993.

⁹³⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 December 1992.

⁹³⁵ No information was obtained on the casualties sustained during those attacks.



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and towns around Koidu in search of “rebels” and “rebel” collaborators, which led to the killing of many civilians accused of being “rebel” collaborators or sympathisers. The commanding officer⁹³⁶ ordered all the civilians living in the areas formerly under RUF/NPFL control to move to Ngor Town, which is located after the Sewa Bridge in Mimiyama Chiefdom, where the first displaced camp was opened for the people of Kono.⁹³⁷ Shortly after, SLA forces engaged in massive looting, as civilians had left their homes.

After the first group of Tamaboros⁹³⁸ arrived in January 1993, a second group came in July. The Donsos also stepped up their presence and were active in Yormandu (Sandor Chiefdom) and Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom) in January, in Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) between March and August and at the border between Soa Chiefdom and Kailahun District and in Kangama (Gorama Kono) in December.

In early 1993, Kono authorities complained to the Government about looting and harassment by SLA forces during the previous month, so the Government sent a new SLA commander to Kono District. Following his arrival, the SLA forces based in Koidu started issuing passes for civilians relocated in the IDP camp who wished to visit their homes to check their belongings. Nigerian forces arrived in Koidu, while some SLA and Guinean forces moved to attack RUF/NPFL positions in Kailahun District. The Nigerian forces encouraged civilians to return and resettle in their villages. SLA and Nigerian troops were based in different strategic towns like Yengema, near the Kono-Makeni highway in Nimikoro Chiefdom; Tombodu, a diamond-rich town in Kamara Chiefdom; and Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom), where they encouraged civilians to mine for diamonds.⁹³⁹ Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) was a commercial centre and was the arrival and departure point for passenger helicopters flying to and from Freetown. Thus, by the end of 1993, most of the civilians who had earlier left the chiefdom came back to Kamara Chiefdom, as it was free of RUF presence.

However, those SLA forces killed an unspecified number of civilians suspecting of being RUF members or sympathisers. Those executions took place at Bendu II, where the bodies were dumped in a mass grave. In separate incident, another group of SLA members, who had replaced those who had arrested the Paramount Chief of Fiama, arrested a civilian and shot him twice without giving reasons. His body was left on the ground and a few civilians buried him afterwards. Also at Tombodu, Tamaboros coming from Koinadugu District to help the SLA forces drive the RUF out of the country undertook massive screening of civilians. As part of this process, in March,⁹⁴⁰ 2,000 civilians were gathered in the Court Barrie to be screened by the Tamaboros, headed by a woman dressed in traditional hunter attire. Some members of the SLA were also gathered at the Court

⁹³⁶ It cannot be inferred from the information collected whether this commanding officer was controlling all the combined forces, or just the SLA forces or the Guinean troops.

⁹³⁷ Around the same period, other camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) were operational in the country, notably in Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District), where thousands of civilians from Pujehun District found refuge.

⁹³⁸ Local hunters from Koinadugu.

⁹³⁹ It cannot however be inferred from the records whether the civilians were mining for the Nigerian and SLA forces or for themselves, with the encouragement of those forces.

⁹⁴⁰ This screening process probably continued in April and May and is also reported in Koinadugu District.



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Barrie. The woman conducted the screening through her mirror, which allegedly allowed her to assess whether a person was a “genuine civilian” or a “rebel”. Those who were identified as “rebels” were either killed or sent to Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. After the screening process, civilians were given a pass that allowed them to move freely in the chiefdom and beyond without fearing of being molested or suspected of being a “rebel”. People commonly gave the nickname “Unmolested” to this pass, which was issued by SLA officers.

Some Kono elites came together and formed an organisation called Koeyor, the primary objective of which was to restore dignity to the people of Kono. Together with the Kono Students Union, they pleaded for the release of the Kono Paramount Chiefs and other authorities who had been detained by the NPRC regime.

RUF forces were active in the eastern chiefdoms in the District during the first half of 1993, which was marked by incidents of killing and the destruction of property. For example, in Sukudu, at the beginning of the year, a prominent farmer had both of his arms chopped off. RUF forces tied a letter around his neck telling the then Head of State, Captain Strasser, that they were “still in control”. In Kundima (Soa Chiefdom), five elderly people were killed in January by RUF forces. Their bodies showed machete wounds and one woman appeared to have had her head smashed on a rock. In February, RUF forces also attacked Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). Returning civilians later discovered 40 houses that had been completely burnt down and 27 bodies, which they buried in a dug out toilet in the southern part of the town. At that time, RUF forces also attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) for the second time, although there were no reported casualties.

SLA harassment of civilians was also reported in Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms. For example, cattle belonging to a civilian was taken and killed for food for the SLA forces. In Koardu (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom), civilians were locked up in the SLA guardroom and beaten if they complained about the behaviour of the SLA forces. Similar acts took place in Dunamaor (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom), where SLA forces entered the village, firing their weapons. As they began to take people’s poultry, one SLA member asked a man to give them his torch as well, which he refused to do. This refusal was not taken well by the SLA forces, who chased the man into the bushes. As he was hiding in the bushes, they took property from his house and assembled all the women and men of the village to punish them in order to find out where the man was hiding.⁹⁴¹ The matter was later settled as the man’s sister gave the SLA forces some money, some cups of rice and a chicken.

In addition, acts of physical violence, torture and killing of suspected “rebel” collaborators also took place. In May 1993, SLA forces were looking for two civilians whom they suspected of being “rebel” collaborators. As the nephew of one of those two wanted men was alleged to be on his way to warn his uncle, SLA forces arrested him in Gbemandufao (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom). His head was shaved with a piece of broken bottle and he was told to eat his hair, which had been mixed with sand. He then was hit with a bayonet before being brought to Koardu, where more violence was inflicted on him. He was then brought to Manjama (Soa Chiefdom) to ascertain whether he was a

⁹⁴¹ The type and duration of punishment they received were not specified.



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“rebel”, where he was eventually killed. Another suspected “rebel” collaborator in Koardu (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) was tied up, made to lie down in the sun and was severely beaten. In Ndanbadu, in September, a man was severely beaten then brought to Koardu, where he was locked in a guardroom because he had asked why the SLA members were taking people’s cattle.

In the meantime, the Donsos were trying to resist to RUF attacks. In June, they deployed alongside the border with Kailahun District. In mid 1993, SLA forces were deployed in Soa Chiefdom and for the rest of the year, the area was almost free of RUF attacks.

Following rumours of an approaching RUF attack on Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom) and its environs in October 1993, a meeting was summoned in the town in early December. The purpose of this meeting was to motivate the youths of the chiefdom to be initiated into the Kamajors society and to take up arms.⁹⁴² After this meeting, between 100 and 200 youths registered to join the society. In mid December, 150 of these youths came back to the town with a gallon of palm oil and 10 cups of rice each for logistic support. They were then taken to a place called Jagbwema Kamba to be initiated into the Kamajors society. The initiator was also the initiator for Gorama Mende and Lower Bambara Chiefdoms (Kenema District). The initiates stayed in the bush for three weeks before returning to Kangama Town in early January 1994.

Following successful SLA attacks on RUF positions in Kailahun District in late 1993, Kono District was declared safe and IDPs from Ngor camp were repatriated to Koidu by the Government with the help of some Non-Governmental Organisations.⁹⁴³

Around the same period, the SLA had recaptured most of the RUF positions in Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, which led the NPRC Chairman to declare a unilateral ceasefire on 1 December 1993. This ceasefire was however largely violated, as RUF forces launched a massive operation in Kenema District in late December.

d) Events in 1994⁹⁴⁴

By the end of January and following the renewal of hostilities in the Eastern Province and in Pujehun District, the NPRC Chairman declared “total war” against the RUF.

In early 1994, returning chiefs created the Kono Council of Paramount Chiefs, chaired by the Paramount Chief of Mafindor Chiefdom, with the consent of the NPRC Commanding Officer Secretariat in Kono.⁹⁴⁵

⁹⁴² No Kamajor initiation had, however yet take place in the country, not even in the Southern Province, from where it originated. Accordingly, this information about the Kamajors may simply mean that youths and local hunters gathered, as they did in Kenema District, but were not initiated by an initiator as such.

⁹⁴³ In September, the NPRC Secretary General announced that the situation in Kono was calm and civilians could go back to their villages without hindrance: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 September 1993.

⁹⁴⁴ It should be noted that the information for 1994, 1995 and to a certain extent 1996 is sometimes confused and inconsistent. The information related in this report for this period was thoroughly crosschecked, notably in correlation with what happened in other places at the same time, but although there can be no doubt on the actual occurrence of the events, the exact date of those events cannot be ascertained with any certainty.



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RUF forces were reported to be in Baiama, in the south of Tankoro Chiefdom, in early 1994, where they burnt houses and raped girls. In March, they reached Levuma, a village of 70 houses south of Tankoro Chiefdom, near the border with Gorama Kono Chiefdom, where 70 people were shot and killed. This action was allegedly undertaken in reprisal for the local hunters attacking RUF positions and for the civilians' lack of support for the RUF movement. The Gorama Kono Kamajors subsequently launched an attack on Levuma and, after retaking control of the town, buried the corpses of the 70 victims in a mass grave in town, since burying them outside the town ran the risk of an encounter with RUF forces. During the RUF counter attack on Foindu (Gorama Kono Chiefdom, at the border with Tankoro Chiefdom), 10 houses were burnt, five people were killed, girls were raped and people were abducted. Others were wounded with cutlasses, including the Section Chief of Tankoro Chiefdom.

By April, the Tamaboros who had helped the SLA repelling the RUF/NPFL forces out of Koidu in January 1993 moved back to the Northern Province, their region of origin, to fight the RUF advance.⁹⁴⁶

In May, more local hunters were gathered in Gorama Kono Chiefdom,⁹⁴⁷ thereby enabling them to retake Foindu from the RUF. Other towns in Gorama Kono were also the site of fighting between Kamajor and RUF forces. As rumours spread about an attack on Kangama, the main Kamajor base for the whole chiefdom, up to 124 more youths were initiated into the Kamajor society. The anticipated attack on Kangama took place in September 1994 and after the Kamajors succeeded in countering the RUF forces, the chiefdom was free from RUF incursions until 1995. In order to ensure security, the Kamajors laid constant ambushes on the four entry points from neighbouring chiefdoms, namely at Nimiyama, Nimikoro, Tankoro and Gbane Chiefdoms.

In 1994, the taking of property was common by all factions, including RUF forces, SLA forces and Donsos, and businessmen were common targets. For example, at Yormandu, on a Friday market day, an SLA member killed a businessman for his money, approximately 4,000 to 5,000 US dollars. At Mansundu, another businessman was killed and his money was taken.

The Donsos were active in Sandor Chiefdom and were sometimes attacked by RUF forces during small-scale operations. In mid 1994, RUF forces entered Yormandu, where they killed one police officer and abducted the Donsos deputy chief's daughter. By the end of the year, 2,000 hunters were registered in Sandor Chiefdom.⁹⁴⁸

⁹⁴⁵ The main aim of the traditional authorities was to defend their District but no more information could be obtained on its precise role. It, however highlights how local authorities organised themselves to defend their land against RUF incursions.

⁹⁴⁶ Inter Press Service, 21 April 1994.

⁹⁴⁷ This gathering of local hunters at that time did not encompass initiation as such. Initiation ceremonies would not be performed in the Eastern Province before 1996.

⁹⁴⁸ The reported information concerning Sandor Chiefdom was confused and did not allow us to expand our analysis on this chiefdom. Although it is likely that the information reported above did take place in 1994, it may have taken place at a different date and no more information was available on these events.



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SLA forces were harsh with civilians they suspected of abiding or collaborating with the RUF, which led to disunity between civilians and the SLA. Civilians were also harassed without being suspected of being a RUF member and, in particular in diamond-rich Kamara Chiefdom, acts of violence and molestation were inflicted on civilians by SLA forces engaged in illegal mining, who used and took civilians' properties and abducted women to be their "wives". The smuggling of diamonds was at its peak during this period. At the same time, some civilian members of the NPRC regime organised themselves in a group called "Convoy" and engaged in mining activities, molesting any authority or landowner who stood in their way.⁹⁴⁹ A lot of small mining companies sprang up in this way.

In addition, SLA forces sometimes disguised themselves as RUF forces and attacked villages. For example, in Yorkordu (Sandor Chiefdom), located near the Bafin River, seven SLA members took property from the village before falling into a hunters' ambush. These attacks suspected to be carried out by SLA members pretending to be RUF forces led to disunity between local hunters and SLA forces and at Bakidu, SLA forces pretending to be RUF and who came to attack towns along the river were drowned by Donsos. Around the same time, between Mansundu and Worko (Sandor Chiefdom), RUF forces killed four SLA members, cut off their heads and displayed them on sticks.

A fierce RUF attack took place during that year in Yatandoe (Fiama Chiefdom).⁹⁵⁰ RUF forces, who were believed to have come from different directions, attacked the town with heavy firepower. During the course of their stay in the town, houses were burnt, people killed and women raped. A specific event was the chopping off of the two arms of one SLA member. Some civilians were abducted and taken to Kailahun. Civilians who sought refuge in the bush were chased by the RUF forces, who shot and killed some of them, looted and set on fire the huts built in the bush, known as "mansion". People from Fiama Chiefdom stayed in the bush until Executive Outcomes came to Kono District in 1995.

SLA forces remained in Mafindor and Gbane Kandor Chiefdoms, which were virtually free of RUF activity. However, SLA harassment of civilians, which was common during previous years, continued throughout 1994. In February, SLA forces requested the civilians from Sangema (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) to come to Koardu to brush the roads. As they did not get the message early enough and accordingly did not show up on time for the work, the civilians were gathered in Sangema and made to sit on the ground. As one of the civilians tried to reach a compromise with the SLA forces, he was hit with a weapon on his head. The SLA forces present in the village also took goats and poultry. The matter was reported to the SLA officer in charge in Manjama, who ordered the arrest of the SLA members involved.⁹⁵¹ Another incident relates the fate of one woman in Marrah (Mafindor Chiefdom) in March, who was beaten and kicked by a member of the SLA, who accused her of having planned to sabotage the NPRC regime.

⁹⁴⁹ These civilians were called the "blue eye boys" and the nature of their relations with the NPRC regime it is not clear from the records. These mining activities were also carried out in 1995.

⁹⁵⁰ The date was not specified for this incident.

⁹⁵¹ The SLA members in question were not arrested.



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From November 1994, SLA forces were no longer based in Mafindor Chiefdom, although they were still patrolling the chiefdom. In Soa Chiefdom, SLA forces were still deployed in Manjama. Also in Soa Chiefdom, a jet bombardment was heard between Kongomadu and Theyor, which was believed to have been ECOMOG forces missing an RUF position.

f) Events in 1995

During this year, SLA forces were occupied with mining activities, leaving the security of the District to the under-equipped Donsos. During the first months of the year, the RUF forces succeeded in capturing major towns, including Koidu, in the wealthy west of the District, before being repelled in May and June by the combined forces of SLA, Executive Outcomes and local hunters.

In early 1995, RUF forces attacked Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom), advancing within a week on Woama (Tankoro Chiefdom) and then on Motema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). In this way, they approached Koidu town, which created panic among the inhabitants. In Motema, six police officers were killed, as well as a prominent Chief. The retreating SLA forces settled in Kamara and Sandor Chiefdoms, harassing civilians and taking their property.

RUF forces took advantage of the fact that SLA forces were more occupied with mining activities than with protecting the District borders. It has been suggested that junior SLA forces embarked on mining because they were suffering in their areas of deployment, as they did not receive much support from the Government and their officers were enriching themselves by mining diamonds. Furthermore, the attack on Motema, which is located on the Koidu-Makeni highway, created an increase in prices and a shortage of essential items in Koidu town, as the highway was no longer accessible.

In late April 1995, RUF forces launched their attack on Koidu. At this time, confusion arose in the mind of civilians about the identity of the fighting forces in control of the town. The RUF forces successfully captured one part of the bridge but the identification of the forces occupying the other part was unclear. Civilians thought that they may either be "loyal soldiers", namely SLA members fighting for the Government, or they may be "sobels".⁹⁵² This attack is referred to as "the second attack", "phase II", or "5:05" by civilians from Koidu. Unlike the first attack, which took place in late 1992, RUF forces used heavy calibre weapons such as mortar bombs, RPGs and LMGs. During the attack, a lot of civilians were killed and RUF forces took property from hundreds of houses and abducted many people, either to work in the mines or to carry their loads. Shortly after, RUF forces took control of the whole town.

After the attack on Koidu, RUF forces fanned out and attacked many more places, which soon fell under their control. During these attacks, people were ill-treated and killed and property was taken or destroyed, including houses. For example, RUF forces who were on their way to Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) cut off a woman's nose. Shortly afterwards, RUF forces attacked Tombodu. After the attack, inhabitants who returned to pack some belongings saw three houses burnt down

⁹⁵² This term refers to either SLA members who joined the RUF movement but who still used their SLA uniforms, so people thought they were fighting for the Government, or SLA members who, although they did not join the RUF as such, were acting as if they were "rebels", adopting the same behaviours.



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and two bodies, although the actual levels of destruction and killing were likely to be much higher. Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom headquarter, in the south of the chiefdom) was attacked and all the houses were burnt down. Some young women and men were abducted and taken to Koidu, which was at this time under RUF control. The abducted men were forced to carry the stolen property. RUF forces also proceeded further north and attacked Yormandu, south of Sandor Chiefdom, following the local hunters up to Bandu, three miles south-east of Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom headquarters).⁹⁵³

The April attack on Koidu led to a massive exodus of the population towards Kamara Chiefdom and towards the villages of Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) and Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). In Jagbwema, fleeing civilians met with armed men in new uniforms, which led them to think they were SLA forces coming to recapture Koidu. However, shortly after their arrival, one of these armed men shot a civilian in the chest for asking them who they were. These armed men took personal effects and money from the civilians and burnt down one prominent businessman's house. While in their hiding place in the bush, fleeing people in Soa Chiefdom heard on the BBC "Focus on Africa" Program that "white men had come to Koidu".⁹⁵⁴ RUF forces used Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) as their base to lead ambushes in the area, during which some civilians were tortured and raped.⁹⁵⁵

During the same period, people suspected of being "rebel collaborators" were arrested and imprisoned by SLA forces. The NPRC regime imprisoned a lot of authorities they accused of collaboration with RUF forces at Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. At this time, further doubts were raised about the identity of the fighting forces carrying out certain actions, because it was reported that some SLA members organised road ambushes, attacking vehicles for their merchandise and specifically targeting businessmen, taking their belongings and, sometimes, killing them.

Between May and June 1995, a combined force of SLA, ULIMO-K and the CDU advanced from Sewa Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom) to recapture Koidu. On their way, they stopped for one week in Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom), waiting for reinforcements from Executive Outcomes.⁹⁵⁶ Executive Outcomes arrived in the same month after having completed their first military encounter in Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and advanced from Bumpe junction to recapture Koidu. RUF forces attacked those forces at Bumpe but were defeated and 17 of them were killed.⁹⁵⁷ By the end of June 1995, Executive Outcomes, together with SLA forces, had removed the RUF forces from Sewa Bridge, Yormandu, Tombodu Chiefdom, Koidu and villages surrounding Koidu.⁹⁵⁸ They

⁹⁵³ The casualties for all these attacks are however not reported.

⁹⁵⁴ This refers to the coming of Executive Outcomes, a mercenary company from South Africa.

⁹⁵⁵ This information was related in general terms and does not specify the precise location of the events nor the exact date.

⁹⁵⁶ The precise dates of the coming of Executive Outcomes in the District could not be inferred from the records. However, it was crosschecked and corroborated with open sources that Koidu was recaptured by these combined forces in June.

⁹⁵⁷ AFP, 28 June 1995.

⁹⁵⁸ Officially, Executive Outcomes had been engaged solely to train the SLA on military tactics but many reports for Kono District recounted that they came to the District to help repelling the RUF forces.



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moved towards Koidu from three different directions, encountering little resistance from RUF forces as they had superior firepower.

Executive Outcomes organised meetings in some chiefdom headquarters, encouraged hunters to organise themselves, gave them military training, especially on how to operate weapons, and supplied them with logistics,⁹⁵⁹ shotguns and eight round automatic rifles, which did not please the SLA forces. Executive Outcomes went on patrol with Donsos, due to their knowledge of the territory, seldom taking SLA members with them. They also encouraged civilians to participate in their own security as watchmen, notably during a general meeting in Koidu that gathered thousands of civilians together. During a meeting at Tombodu, Executive Outcomes demonstrated to the people how they could participate in the security network, using a "Spider Web" diagram. The Kono District Defence Committee⁹⁶⁰ was reorganised and, as the Executive Outcome commander wished to involve the Kono people in the maintenance of security in the District, the Kono Consultative Committee (KCC) was formed. The KCC, besides the Kono District Defence Committee, embraced all facets of the Kono community. The initial meeting of the KCC took place in August, in the presence of 12 Paramount Chiefs,⁹⁶¹ which was followed by regular meetings to discuss security questions.

Donsos, the local hunters, entered Yormandu in July and at this time, Sandor Chiefdom was divided into different zones, each of them placed under the command of a different hunter. Donsos, focused on liberating their chiefdoms, did not rely on SLA forces because of their impression that those SLA forces were quick to run away during RUF attacks.

People began returning to Koidu but due to the scarcity of food, they had to search for food in the surrounding villages. As they did so, they ran into pockets of RUF forces who, when driven out from Koidu, relocated mainly at Potema Camp, Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom) and Bandafarda Camp, near Motema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). During these encounters, a large number of people were abducted and some were killed or mutilated.⁹⁶²

Probably in the middle of August, RUF forces coming from the Tongo route⁹⁶³ attacked Njaiama, headquarter town of Nimikoro Chiefdom and burnt the residence of the Chiefdom Speaker and the Court Barrie. They were repelled by SLA forces, assisted by local hunters. The SLA commander advised the residents of the town to stay indoors whenever there was a RUF attack on the town. One week later, gunshots from the direction of Njala, a very big town a few miles away, were heard in Njaiama. Indeed, RUF forces, dressed in military uniforms, attacked Njala around 28 August. During this attack, over 50 people were killed and several houses burnt down. The RUF forces then moved on to Njaiama, where over 90 people were killed and houses were burnt. During these RUF attacks on Njala and Njaiama, many civilians were wounded and several more went missing, presumably captured by the RUF forces, although some were later discovered dead in the bushes.

⁹⁵⁹ This training took place at District Office Barracks at Koidu and, after their training, the Donsos returned to their chiefdoms.

⁹⁶⁰ See the developments on this point in the year 1994

⁹⁶¹ Kono District has 14 chiefdoms.

⁹⁶² No details could be obtained on this incident.

⁹⁶³ Tongo is located in Lower Bambara Chiefdom (Kenema District). The road leading Tongo to Koidu passes by Gorama Kono Chiefdom, south of Nimikoro Chiefdom.



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SLA forces who had pulled out of the town at the time of the attack regrouped and assisted by local hunters and Executive Outcomes, recaptured the town: A house-to-house search was carried out to bury the dead, who numbered 97 in total, spread over six different locations in the town.⁹⁶⁴

SLA forces came from time to time to Mafindor Chiefdom during the first half of the year, often harassing civilians. For example, one group of SLA forces regularly carried out raids to confiscate civilian property, on one occasion beating the Chief of Sandia village. These actions ceased during the second half of the year, when the rainy season made the roads impassable. In Lei Chiefdom, which is a rich cattle-grazing area, SLA forces killed cattle belonging to civilians and forced the civilians to carry the meat to Koidu; similar events also took place in 1996. For example, in one incident which took place in the chiefdom headquarter of Saiama, some SLA members killed six cows in a pen and required the caretakers of the pen to bring the meat to Koidu. When two of them refused, they were severely beaten by the SLA forces and forced to take the meat to Koidu as previously requested. This incident was reported to the Paramount Chief of Lei, who explained to the owner of the cows that he was not the first to report such matters. As a result, the Paramount Chief had already complained to the Colonel in charge of the SLA in Koidu, who had assured him that he had taken all necessary steps to stop SLA members doing such things. The Colonel had also told the Paramount Chief that he would alert the Military Police around the chiefdom to arrest any SLA member coming to the chiefdom without an official reason.⁹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, similar actions continued even after the complaints of the Paramount Chief and the reassurances from the SLA Colonel.

In Soa Chiefdom, during the months of July to September, RUF forces believed to come from Kailahun District attacked different villages, mainly on a "hit and run" basis, searching for food and targeting villages with master farms. At this time, Donsos were active in Kainkordu and along the border villages, so RUF forces came in small groups and did not undertake sustained attacks. Rather, they would enter a village, take property and leave straightaway, as they were afraid of the Donsos based in some villages. During these raids, people were wounded, killed and forced to carry stolen property. These types of attacks took place in Bongema, Kuandor and Kainkordu. In Kainkordu, for example, one house was burnt and men and women were abducted to carry the property stolen in the village. One of these abductees was later shot dead outside Kainkordu.

In late 1995, Executive Outcomes, SLA and local hunters launched a massive attack on RUF positions at Woama and Baiama (Tankoro Chiefdom), where the RUF forces had their main camp in Potema. Donsos were able to provide Executive Outcomes with information and directions on RUF positions, following which local hunters were deployed at Baiama and SLA forces at Woama. After a last unsuccessful RUF attempt⁹⁶⁶ to attack Koidu where RUF forces bypassed SLA forces at Woama and were stopped at Woardu by Executive Outcomes, those chiefdoms located in the centre and the west of the District became relatively quiet. It is interesting to note that during some

⁹⁶⁴ Some blamed the SLA for these attacks on Njala and Njaiama, as they were frustrated in their mining activities by Executive Outcomes: Inter Press Service, 6 September 1995.

⁹⁶⁵ It cannot, however, be inferred from the reports whether Military Police did arrest any SLA member or took any other kind of action.

⁹⁶⁶ This event took place between late December 1995 and early 1996.



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encounters between Executive Outcomes and the RUF, some of the RUF members who were killed were identified as ex-SLA, through the SLA identity cards found on their bodies.

f) Events in 1996

Executive Outcome mercenaries controlled illicit mining in Kono District, their presence minimising the ill treatment of civilians by SLA forces. They reprimanded undisciplined SLA forces and in one incident, killed 72 SLA members, described as "sobels",⁹⁶⁷ at Kaneya in the outskirts of Koidu. Executive Outcomes patrolled together with Donsos who also continued to man checkpoints. For these reasons, their presence contributed to the stability of the security situation in Kono District and, to an extent, offset the economic consequences for the District of the incessant RUF ambushes on the Kono-Makeni Highway.

Around this time, it was alleged that Executive Outcomes was given a concession on the Tankoro Kimberlite mining site. The mercenary company was brought to the area by Branch Energy Ltd, a British company that secured a mining lease in the area and said it would hire its own security force. It was therefore believed that Executive Outcomes was taking a cut in the mining activities.⁹⁶⁸

At the border with Guinea and Kailahun District, Sandor Chiefdom was mainly protected by the Donsos and not by Executive Outcomes. This chiefdom was free from RUF incursions throughout 1996.

In Lei Chiefdom, SLA harassment of civilians continued, including sexual assault. At one point in 1996, some civilians came to Senehun, located on the highway going to the chiefdom headquarters of Saiama, to mourn the death of the town chief. Some SLA members asked some of them for a goat and as they explained that they had already given their only goat to some other SLA forces the day before, they were told that they should replace the goat with a woman. The civilians explained that there was no unmarried woman in the town. However, the SLA forces came across a young woman who had also come to the village on hearing of the death of the town chief. They took her away and, as she told them she was not married, they threatened the civilians with beatings as they lied to them about there being no unmarried women in the town. The woman was raped by the four SLA members during the night and then released, so the SLA members could avoid being disciplined by their commander. The incident was reported to a senior SLA commander but no action was taken.⁹⁶⁹

In Gbane Chiefdom, RUF forces intimidated voters on Election Day in an effort to prevent them from voting by sporadically firing their weapons. After the elections, some people fled the chiefdom, fearing the warning given by the RUF that they would amputate the hands of those who had voted for the newly-elected President, Alhaji Dr. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.⁹⁷⁰ Furthermore, people in Kono

⁹⁶⁷ See earlier note 42 for an explanation of this term.

⁹⁶⁸ See *The Mining Journal*, 8 March 1996 and *Inter Press Service*, 11 March 1996. Around September 1996, Executive Outcomes would also be contracted by Sieromco, a company mining Bauxite in Moyamba District.

⁹⁶⁹ The month of the occurrence of the incident could not be ascertained.

⁹⁷⁰ By the end of the year, Gbane Chiefdom was a "no-go" area, as the fighting factions were hunting each other across the chiefdom, leading civilians to flee the area.



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heard that in some parts of the country under RUF control, especially in Kailahun District, people's hands were cut off and their mouths padlocked as a punishment for having voted.

After the elections, SLA forces were deployed all around the country in strategic positions, except some parts of Kailahun District. One battalion was deployed in Gbongbokoro (Soa Chiefdom), which is on the Guinean border and is a crossing point to one of Guinea's most prominent market centres called Gueckedou. However, dissent began to ferment within the SLA forces for not being treated by the Government with the respect and the honour they deserved, while hunters (Kamajors and Donsos) were respected by the Government. For example, in August 1996, armed men believed to be SLA forces attacked Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) and killed the treasury clerk, allegedly because the SLA forces held the treasury clerk responsible for bad reports against them being sent from the chiefdom authorities. Compounding their dissatisfaction, the President's address to the nation at the national Stadium in Freetown after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement did not please the SLA forces, especially when he made particular mention of the Kamajors for the very outstanding job they did to put an end to the war.

RUF forces attacked Kangama (Gorama Kono) in October 1996, entering the town with heavy firing. They killed one woman and shot two other people in their hips, who were later taken for treatment to Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District). The RUF forces took all the property they could find in the town and abducted two boys to carry the load for them to their base, allegedly at Peyama (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District). One Friday in the same month, a meeting was summoned at the Court Barrie as information reached Kangama authorities about the Kamajor initiation that was taking place in Kenema District.⁷⁷¹ It was agreed that young men should be initiated to protect the chiefdom and a message was conveyed to the Paramount Chief of Gorama Kono Chiefdom, who was at that time in Koidu, to put in place modalities for the initiation. His chiefdom speaker made the shuttle between Koidu and Kangama to organise the initiation. Money was borrowed from a produce buying agent in Koidu for the initiation and 30 energetic men were selected by the elders. The 30 young newly initiated Kamajors were then provided with single and double barrel guns and deployed in different part of the town.

Also in October 1996, RUF forces attacked Bamba (Soa Chiefdom) and burnt down 32 houses. They then headed to Sukudu, south of Soa Chiefdom, where they captured people, including children, and forced them to carry heavy loads to an unknown location. SLA forces based at Yigbeda (Soa Chiefdom) advanced to Sukudu and some of their members deployed there. Two weeks later, still in October, RUF forces attacked the town of Kongonani, six miles from Sukudu, where they killed civilians, including men, women and children, before being repelled by SLA forces, who had come from Sukudu on hearing the sounds of gunfire. Before retreating, RUF forces abducted some civilians and brought them to Kailahun District. Stolen property was also transported to Liberia by boat, crossing the river bordering Sierra Leone and Liberia. While a meeting was in progress in Sukudu with SLA forces and local authorities in December, RUF forces again attacked Sukudu and killed the Section Chief of Sawa Fiama Section. SLA forces retreated to Yigbeda but later, still in December, they came back to Sukudu and warned civilians that they were

⁷⁷¹ This information backs up the previous assertions that no Kamajor initiations as such took place in Gorama Kono Chiefdom in late 1993 and early 1994.



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planting mini-landmines along the road RUF forces were using to attack Soa Chiefdom, which caused the death of some of the RUF forces and allegedly led to the ceasing of attacks on villages in the chiefdom.

The Abidjan Peace Accord, signed on 30 November 1996, stated that the war was ended with immediate effect. It required that Executive Outcomes leave the country by early 1997, which they did,⁹⁷² and also required the disarmament of the fighting forces.⁹⁷³ However, Kono people made a very strong appeal to the Government not to stop their contract with Executive Outcomes, as they ensured security for Kono District.

In the aftermath of the Abidjan Accord, the then Vice President conducted a confidence building tour in the provinces to disband the CDF. In late December,⁹⁷⁴ the Vice President of Sierra Leone visited Kono District and held a meeting in Koidu with Kono stakeholders, where he officially disbanded the CDF and required the Donsos to lay down their arms and return to their farming activities, as the Government had entered into a ceasefire agreement with the RUF. Any Donsos who failed to disarm would be detained. Many people who attended the meeting left the hall before the closure of the meeting to show their disapproval with the Vice President's statement. On the evening of that same day, the Deputy Defence Minister came to Koidu and organised a meeting at the Donsos office to encourage the Donsos to stay intact as RUF forces could not be trusted, including giving money as his own contribution for the Christmas celebration. Nevertheless, the Vice President's visit had, to all intents and purposes, paralysed further Donsos' activities.

g) Events in 1997⁹⁷⁵

In March 1997 in Gorama Kono Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked Kangama, a CDF stronghold located at the border with Tankoro Chiefdom, but were repelled. The RUF apparently wanted to capture Kangama as a transit point to block the Kamajors in Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District),⁹⁷⁶ who had strong links with the Kamajors in Kangama.

In May 1997, news of the Coup reached Kono on its very first day through the BBC's "Focus on Africa" Program. After the Coup, the RUF came out of the bush, often looking malnourished, and together with AFRC mainly spent the year taking people's property, in particular making constant demands for livestock. Furthermore, shortly after the Coup, the individual plot system was

⁹⁷² AFP, 30 January 1997.

⁹⁷³ Article 12 of the Agreement stated that the Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops (i.e., the Nigerians and the Guineans) no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier. Article 12 also stated that Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn within five weeks of the deployment of the NMG: Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information Report No.11, 19 November - 16 December 1996.

⁹⁷⁴ This visit could have taken place early January 1997.

⁹⁷⁵ Little information was reported for 1997, as most of the RUF/AFRC activities were concentrated in Freetown and RUF activities now together with AFRC resumed progressively and were mainly focused on the mining areas.

⁹⁷⁶ It has to be remembered that the control of Tongo Field was of the utmost importance for RUF forces as it is the most important diamond area in Kenema District.



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abandoned and all mining areas were declared to belong to the RUF/AFRC forces, who appointed "Mines Monitoring Officials" to supervise their mining activities.⁹⁷⁷

Throughout 1997, RUF/AFRC forces undertook patrols in various places across the District. For example, Gbane Kandor Chiefdom was under the constant patrols of AFRC members. RUF/AFRC forces regularly patrolled Soa Chiefdom, except Kainkordu, which was a Kamajor stronghold.

RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints in Koidu town⁹⁷⁸ and also conducted raids at mining sites, beating and killing civilians and seizing gravel from civilians, looking for diamonds.⁹⁷⁹ The SLPP Secretariat was occupied by the RUF/AFRC forces and used as their own administrative secretariat. A few weeks after the establishment of this secretariat, some RUF/AFRC forces arrested a man, brought him to the secretariat and shot him dead, accusing him of being a Kamajor because he was wearing country clothes, the traditional attire of the Kamajors. A member of the RUF/AFRC forces cut off both his hands. In Kamara Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces also established checkpoints at the entry and exit points of Tombodu. They confiscated any items of value or of interest to them from people passing through the checkpoints. Also at this time, alleged CDF collaborators were executed.⁹⁸⁰

In Fiama chiefdom, RUF/AFRC harassment of civilians was initially minimal, as they only took food and only miners were harassed by RUF/AFRC forces for their diamond-containing gravel. However, shortly after, civilians were arrested and forced to wash the gravel for the combined forces. Furthermore, RUF/AFRC started visiting towns and villages where they took away food and people's personal effects, including jewellery and money. In June, RUF/AFRC forces from Yegeda attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom). No wounding or fatalities were reported, but property including livestock, food items, clothes and medicine were taken. One month later, RUF/AFRC forces came back to Jagbwema from Koidu with two jeeps, opened fire and took items of the same nature as the previous month.

RUF/AFRC forces harassed authorities throughout the District, because they were suspected of being sympathisers with the Kabbah Government. For example, when news reached the RUF/AFRC forces in Koidu that a Paramount Chief had encouraged the reactivation of the CDF in his chiefdom, some forces were sent to capture him. He was not there, but his compound was looted and the Town Chief and one other young man were arrested, beaten and taken to Manjama, the RUF/AFRC military base in Soa Chiefdom. After this, panicked civilians fled to Guinea. In November and December, property was taken from the remaining civilians on a full-scale basis. The taking of property by RUF/AFRC forces took place in other areas, including Gbane and Gbane

⁹⁷⁷ See below in 1998 for details on the mining operations.

⁹⁷⁸ Koidu town had previously been under the control of SLA forces and Executive Outcomes. However, by early 1997, Executive Outcomes had left and when the Coup happened, SLA positions turned into AFRC positions, which were then reinforced by RUF forces.

⁹⁷⁹ This information was related in general terms and no further details were available.

⁹⁸⁰ This information was related in general terms and no further details were available.



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
Kandor Chiefdoms, where Koardu Town (Gbane Kandor Chiefdom) was visited many times, mainly for livestock.

RUF/AFRC forces came again to Kangama (Gorama Kono Chiefdom) in June, taking advantage of the fact that the Kamajors had deserted their checkpoints during the night. Many civilians were captured, massive looting was carried out, houses were set on fire and civilians were forced to carry the stolen property to the RUF/AFRC base in Senehun (Tankoro Chiefdom). In August, the CDF launched a successful offensive on the RUF base in Senehun, as a result of which Gorama Kono Chiefdom was free of attacks for the rest of the year.

In Lei Chiefdom, two civilians accused of sabotage in Kombayende were shot to death on the orders of a member of the RUF/AFRC. In the same town, a woman was beaten with a bayonet and killed by a member of the AFRC for refusing to give him palm oil. There were also two separate incidences of rape in Lei Chiefdom, one in October when a woman was raped by three RUF/AFRC members in Kenema and one in December, when four members of the RUF/AFRC went to Senehun, requested a house in which to sleep and raped a woman.

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h) Events in February - June 1998



Legend:

ECOMOG deployment

→ RUF/AFRC forces deployment

From January to February, violence against civilians and attacks on civilian property were rampant. An AFRC member shot and killed a young boy near the Koidu Central Mosque after the boy had helped him push his motorbike up the hill. Two days before ECOMOG drove the RUF/AFRC forces out of Freetown, a group of RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Branch Energy Lodge and Warehouse in Koidu and stole items valued at over hundreds of millions of Leones. On 12 February, "Operation pay yourself" was launched, according to which looting and confiscation of property were encouraged and almost all the shops in Koidu were looted. This operation lasted for a couple of days. Shortly after, the RUF/AFRC forces decided to undertake another looting operation, which they named "Operation House to House Search". In reaction to these operations, the youths mobilised and attacked the RUF/AFRC forces, succeeding in capturing some weapons. In addition, civilians launched their own operation, "Burn soldiers", where RUF/AFRC forces were chased in their hideouts and rubber tyres were placed around their necks and set on fire. All of these successive operations took place before retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown arrived in Kono District.

CDF members from Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom) and Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) came to help maintain the security of Koidu and its environs. Youths surrendered the weapons they had captured from the RUF/AFRC forces to the CDF. ECOMOG forces were expected to arrive on 21 February, through the Yengema heliport. In Koidu, suspected collaborators of the RUF/AFRC forces were summarily executed by the CDF.



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However, on 21 February, an RUF/AFRC convoy of 150 vehicles, which had been repelled from Freetown and had regrouped in Makeni, launched an attack on Koidu Town, entering the town along the Makeni-Magburaka highway. Using light artillery as opposed to the poor logistics available to the Kamajors, the RUF/AFRC forces overpowered them during the day. The Kamajors had no choice but to retreat, mainly to Manjama and Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom). Accordingly, Koidu Town and its environs fell under the total control of the RUF/AFRC forces. The burning of the town began. Abduction, rape and looting were rampant in Koidu and in all the surrounding villages. As a result of this, civilians fled the town and its environs, leaving Koidu and Woardu almost like ghost towns.⁹⁸¹

When they pulled out of Freetown, the RUF indicated that it was again in charge of the operations. RUF forces began issuing orders to AFRC members and to arrest and kill those who refused to carry out the orders. In the Provinces, the AFRC forces were outnumbered and some of them surrendered to ECOMOG forces. A senior RUF officer, probably RUF Battle Group Commander at that time, was renown for killing many AFRC members when RUF/AFRC forces were in Koidu. On one occasion, he ordered 15 AFRC members to go and destroy a bridge on the highway. As one of them refused to go for he was unarmed, he was shot and killed by this senior officer.

The capture of Koidu town was the prelude to RUF/AFRC forces spreading all over the District. No chiefdom was left untouched after February and the violence intensified after the news that President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah had been restored to power on 10 March 1998, especially when Operation "Kill all living things" was declared. The scale of violations committed was in particular very high between February and May/June, reaching unprecedented levels. What happened during this period (February –May/June) will be outlined below according to the different areas in which things were happening, rather than chronologically, due to the high level of activity in all areas of the District, although it should be borne in mind that these events happened concurrently.

West (Kamara, Gbense, Nimiya, Nimikoro and Tankoro Chiefdoms)

Villages in Gbense Chiefdom were attacked and in late February, many civilians fled the town of Yardu, to the north of Koidu, where a well-known Reverend was killed.

On 17 March, over 30 RUF/AFRC forces discovered some people in their hiding place near Kuandor (Kamara Chiefdom). The commander, a Liberian, asked the people to cook for them. Afterwards, he decided to go to another area but two of his men asked him if they could take with them the girls who were among the civilians. The commander apparently gave permission, as the two girls, aged 13 and 14, were taken away by these forces. On 21 March, the National Chairman of the SLPP who was considered as a father for the whole District, relocated to a hiding place outside Wordu village a few miles from Koidu. He was later discovered, stripped, beaten and

⁹⁸¹ It is not totally clear when RUF/AFRC entered Koidu, as the attack may have taken place in early March 1998 (Chicago Tribune, 17 March 1998). Furthermore, information from Koinadugu District tends to suggest that RUF/AFRC forces reached Koidu from Koinadugu District. The poor conditions of the road network in Koinadugu District, compared to the good quality of the highway, which leads Makeni (Bombali District) to Koidu, through Magburaka (Tonkolili District), however suggest that the bulk of the RUF/AFRC forces reached Koidu from Makeni.



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... tied up before being shot dead by six men belonging to the RUF/AFRC forces. A young girl who was under his guardianship was raped and taken to be the "wife" of their commander. Before leaving, the six men took one boy to carry the property they had just stolen. In Wordu, four young girls in their teens were captured by six RUF/AFRC men. After being ordered to cook, both the girls and some young men were severely beaten.

CDF members continued to confront RUF/AFRC forces and around 23 March, claimed to have recaptured Njaiama Sewafe and the Sewa Bridge (Nimiyama Chiefdom). In addition, they claimed to have rescued hundreds of civilians caught behind RUF/AFRC lines.⁹⁸²

Killings, indiscriminate amputations, the gorging out of eyes, the dropping of burning plastic into the eyes and the disembowelling of pregnant women were common practice in Koidu at that time. In April, six civilians were captured by RUF/AFRC forces in Yardu village (Gbense Chiefdom) and were frog-marched to Koidu Town. One of the commanders shot one of the captives six times in the legs. As the captive could not walk any more, the commander ordered his men to execute him. When they reached Koidu Town, they met a group of ULIMO members⁹⁸³ who demanded that the captured men be divided and one group be assigned to them (ULIMO). After a confrontation between the RUF/AFRC forces and the ULIMO forces, the captured men were finally taken to the RUF commander's residence. One of the captured men was suspected of being a Donsos and was severely beaten, had his hands braced and was locked up with other civilians in a toilet being used as a cell. All of the men were subsequently released.

In April, the rate of killing, rape and mutilation increased as the RUF/AFRC forces had launched "Operation No Living Thing". Kamara Chiefdom, a diamond-rich area northwest of Koidu, was particularly affected at this time.

AFRC/RUF forces were in the bush in Kamara and Tankoro Chiefdoms and the high number of reports for this area reveal the intensity of the violence inflicted on civilians. There were many instances of killing, acts of rape, amputation and burning of houses. One RUF commander was notorious for the amputation of several hands and legs. He ordered the abduction of a large number of people in a mining area, two to three miles away from Tombodu, and ordered the amputations according to description called 'long sleeve' or 'short sleeve'. In another encounter, the same commander and his men conducted an intense raid, during which they all raped one woman and lacerated her vagina. Other incidents include shooting civilians during raids or patrols. Another RUF commander in the area conducted a raid, which resulted in the abduction of several men, women and children, who were locked a house, which was then set on fire.

⁹⁸² BBC Online News Archive, 23 March 1998.

⁹⁸³ Although ULIMO forces were officially disbanded in 1997, following the presidential elections in Liberia, it was alleged and stated by the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone that members of ULIMO-K were fighting alongside the RUF/AFRC forces: AFP, 21 April 1998. Some of these members would be arrested by ECOMOG forces and detained at the Pademba Road Prison in Freetown: Inter Press Service, 29 April 1998.



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At Yardu (Gbense Chiefdom) in early April, the RUF/AFRC commander ordered that three people be killed. Among those killed was an ex-worker at the Koidu Electricity House. Civilians were ordered to bury the bodies on 10 April 1998.

As news arrived that ECOMOG troops were advancing in the District and were based near Koidu, at Koakuima, two convoys of civilians, including men, women and children, moved from Yardu to Motema town, eight miles south of Koidu Town on 22 and 24 April, arriving safely at their destination.

During this period, RUF/AFRC forces were continuously running from village to village, killing, raping and amputating people and burning villages, so that most of the civilians fled for the bush. One resident of Kuandor, who was returning to the town with some other people, ran into seven members of the RUF/AFRC forces, five of them carrying AK47s and two armed with cutlasses; one of them identified himself as trained fighter from Burkina Faso. The civilians were taken to Kuandor village and were asked to give the RUF/AFRC forces money and rice, which they did not have. The forces stripped one man to his underwear, laid him flat on the ground and beat him with a cutlass, which left marks on his back. They then poured some palm wine on his head and body, tied him up firmly and planned to take him out of the town later to kill him. Another civilian who was captured started crying and was hit hard on the head with a cutlass. One of the forces came back to the civilian who was tied up and told him since the civilians did not know his name, he would write it on his back with a razor blade, but was stopped from doing so by another member of the forces. All the RUF members and the civilians then moved on and RUF forces abducted more people in the nearby village. One of the RUF members suggested that they should leave the civilians behind, meaning they should be killed. However, the commander of the group allowed the two men from Kuandor to return to their town.⁹⁸⁴

In another incident that took place in April, 11 RUF/AFRC forces carrying guns and cutlasses captured three boys⁹⁸⁵ who were going to Peyima (Kamara Chiefdom) to get salt and other items to bring back to their relatives, who were living in huts (also known as mansions) in the bush. The boys were forced to take the RUF/AFRC members to the mansions. The members covered the three boys with palm leaves, set fire to them and told the three boys to show them where all the property was kept, or they would stay in the fire until they were completely burnt. The boys showed them where the belongings were and the RUF/AFRC forces left the place taking with them the items they found. Before they left, they beat the three boys.

Also in April, in the village of Gbaima (Kamara Chiefdom), a group of RUF/AFRC members went to a farm near the village and asked the farmer to give them rice and palm oil. As the farmer only had rice to give, the RUF/AFRC members pierced his feet, passed a rope through the hole thus created and tied him up firmly. They then set fire to the palm fruits and threw the farmer into the fire. The man died nine days later. Violence was also inflicted on the other five inhabitants of the farm when the RUF/AFRC forces set fire to an empty five-gallon container and dropped the melting rubber on the five people until the container had burnt completely.

⁹⁸⁴ What happened to the remaining abductees was not specified.

⁹⁸⁵ The age of the three boys could not be ascertained from the records.



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During the same month, two civilians who left Gbaima to go to Tombodu to check the condition of their houses ran into seven RUF/AFRC members, who tied their hands and told them to show them the way where they came from. As they approached Gbaima, the armed men opened fire on the civilians they met in the village, killing one old man, whose stomach was cut open and whose intestines were tied on a stick. Another boy whose age was not specified was also cut with a bladed weapon. The RUF/AFRC forces then conducted a house-to-house search and the two civilians they had previously arrested were ordered to gather all the food items they had taken. Before leaving for Tombodu, the RUF/AFRC forces set all the houses of the village on fire. On their way to Tombodu, the seven RUF/AFRC forces and two abducted civilians passed by the village of Wordu, where one of the armed men went to a house where a blind man was living. When he came back to his colleagues, he told them he had "finished" the man. Two boys they met on their way to Tombodu were also forced to join them. When they arrived at Tombodu, the civilians saw a body with its stomach cut open lying on the street that led the RUF/AFRC forces' headquarters. When they arrived at the headquarters, which was full of a variety of types of weapons including rifles, light artillery and bladed weapons, the commander ordered his men to tie the civilians (who were by then 14 in number), and lay them on the ground, one person on top of another. A mattress was then put on top of them and lit. One of the civilians, who kicked the mattress away as it started to burn him, was hit severely with a machete by the commander. The commander also accused him of being one of the youths who had burnt RUF/AFRC forces in February and hit his right hand with a machete, although it was not chopped off. When they saw this, the other civilians tried to escape and started running but were killed when the commander ordered his men to shoot them.

During this period, RUF/AFRC forces would burn part of the town of Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) each time an ECOMOG jet plane flew overhead. On one occasion, over 50 civilians, men, women and children were locked up in a house at Yusufuya Road and the house was set on fire. Cells in the headquarters were used to detain civilians, men and women, some of whom were later killed. The commander used a mined out crater near the lorry park in Tombodu to dump bodies of the people killed in the town.

In another incident, a man from Gbondu village (upper part of Kamara Chiefdom) was captured by some RUF/AFRC forces, who forced him to carry their load to a village in Sandor Chiefdom. Once the load was carried, the civilian was told to go back to his town. As he was returning, he met with another group of RUF/AFRC forces who cut off one of his hands. The man reached Gbondu and shortly after, the population decided to leave the village to go to Koakuima, where ECOMOG was stationed.

Around this period, a District Emergency Task Force was created by civilians who had returned to their villages. This Task Force was mandated to assess the destruction of their villages and to help the local population. Each chiefdom was represented in the Task Force.⁹⁸⁶

⁹⁸⁶ AFP, 16 and 17 June 1998.



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ECOMOG had arrived in Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) in early April 1998.⁹⁸⁷ While their arrival was characterised by tensions with members of the CDF from Kono District, since ECOMOG came with some members of the CDF from Punduru (Gorama Mende Chiefdom, in the north of Kenema District), the advancing ECOMOG troops were welcomed. While in Njaiama Sewafe, the ECOMOG Commander-in-Chief paid them a visit and gave the order to advance on Koidu Town. Thus, a combined troop of ECOMOG and Donsos moved to Koidu on 12 April on foot through the jungle, encountering an RUF/AFRC attack at Yigbeda, during which many ECOMOG members were killed. Nevertheless, they continued their journey and within one day, captured Yengema, Motema and Small Lebanon⁹⁸⁸ (all located on the highway), after having battled for a few hours with some RUF/AFRC forces. The 5th Battalion was then deployed at Motema. The ECOMOG and CDF forces launched their first attack on Koidu Town but were repelled by RUF/AFRC forces and went back to Small Lebanon. However, ECOMOG and CDF forces launched a second attack and were able to overpower the RUF/AFRC forces, who fled the town.⁹⁸⁹ ECOMOG forces also deployed at Koakuima where, as mentioned earlier, many civilians from the surrounding chiefdoms had come to find refuge, as the ECOMOG presence appeared to represent greater safety.⁹⁹⁰

RUF/AFRC forces continued to stage ambushes and around 14 April, three buses carrying ECOMOG reinforcements and CDF members fell in one of those ambushes near Yigbeda (Nimikoro Chiefdom). Some ECOMOG members were killed, others wounded and two BBC reporters were killed while trying to find refuge in the bush. The buses were later met by some of the ECOMOG forces of the 24th Brigade infantry en route to Makeni and from there to Freetown to brief the Task Force Commander. Those ECOMOG forces loaded their dead and the wounded colleagues onto the truck and continued their journey to Makeni. Shortly after, they fell in another RUF/AFRC ambush but managed to escape the ambush without any fatalities and made their way to Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom).⁹⁹¹

⁹⁸⁷ Following the intervention in Freetown, further inland operations were carried out by the specially designed 24th ECOMOG Brigade Infantry: Brig. Gen. R. A. Adeshina: *The Reversed Victory: Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc., p 29. Members of this brigade deployed in the country and after capturing Makeni in March 1998, they proceeded further North to Kono District and arrived in Njaiama Sewafe around 11 April, where they met their colleagues already deployed since early April. It appears that the first batch of ECOMOG forces who deployed in Njaiama Sewafe waited for troops from the 24th Brigade Infantry before advancing further to Koidu.

⁹⁸⁸ Small Lebanon is a town south of Koidu.

⁹⁸⁹ It is not totally clear whether ECOMOG forces launched one or two attacks on Koidu before capturing it. In any case, these actions were carried out within a short period of time. RUF/AFRC forces, before retreating from the town, inflicting heavy casualties on civilians, killing some and burning houses. It was alleged that around 2,000 civilians were held hostages by the RUF/AFRC forces, in readiness for the expected ECOMOG attack. Inter Press Service, 16 April 1998.

⁹⁹⁰ However, unlike the people who had escaped Gbense Chiefdom for Koakuima, those who had found refuge in Sandor Chiefdom and the CDF, who had also decided to move to Koakuima, fell into the hands of RUF/AFRC forces in Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom) and a lot of them were killed while others had their limbs amputated.

⁹⁹¹ Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 62-3; see also Associated Press Worldstream, 18 April 1998.



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CDF forces equipped with arms and ammunition given to them by ECOMOG troops stationed at Njaiama Sewafe attacked Yardu (Gbense Chiefdom) in April and overcame the RUF/AFRC forces. Many RUF/AFRC members were killed during that attack, while two died by drowning into the river. In late April, ECOMOG forces in the District received reinforcements, who deployed along the Njaiama Sewafe-Koidu highway, where they faced some ambushes staged by some RUF/AFRC forces. Assisted by an air campaign, they cleared the highway and reopened it in early May.⁹⁹²

A Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG was also sent to Torgbambu, an important town in Gorama Kono Chiefdom.⁹⁹³ They came with heavy artillery including Alpha Jets, tanks, mortar bombs and helicopter gunships; shortly after their deployment at Torgbambu, they attacked RUF/AFRC positions and deployed in Jaiama and Bumpe (Nimikoro Chiefdom) together with members of the CDF. The ECOMOG forces encouraged people to come out of their hiding places, so civilians started to come back to the headquarter town of Jaiama.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG positions at Jaiama (Nimikoro chiefdom), where they were repelled, and at Motema, where they were also repelled, but not before they had killed 24 civilians in a house situated near the national Petroleum Station at the Motema Junction along the main Freetown highway.⁹⁹⁴ Those 24 civilians were later buried in one mass grave by the house of a retired senior superintendent of the Sierra Leone Police. Several attempts were also made by the combined RUF/AFRC forces to attack ECOMOG forces based at Koakuima but they all failed.

On 10 June, two days after the announcement over the radio of the death of the Nigerian President, RUF/AFRC forces made an attempt to attack Koidu, at that time under ECOMOG control. Although this attempt continued until the end of the month, the RUF/AFRC forces did not succeed in recapturing the town.⁹⁹⁵

North-west (Sandor Chiefdom)

After taking Koidu in late February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces arrived in Sandor Chiefdom and organised themselves into different groups, namely food finding groups and mining groups. A lot of stolen property came to Sandor from Koidu, as Sandor Chiefdom was a commercial centre. In this chiefdom, they were based in Yormandu, Tefeya and Kayima, from where they controlled various chiefdoms in Koinadugu District.

AFRC/RUF forces were engaged in large-scale mining in the south of Sandor Chiefdom, in towns including Yormandu, Tefeya, Bakidu, Woidala and Bendu. The RUF/AFRC forces needed people to

⁹⁹² Former members of the AFRC regime who had surrendered were part of this deployment, re-trained and incorporated by ECOMOG: Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 66-7. This deployment of former AFRC members frightened the population, who suspected they may still be loyal to the ousted AFRC leader: AFP, 16 June 1998.

⁹⁹³ It seems that this contingent of ECOMOG came from Kenema while the other one who deployed in towns alongside the highway that leads to Koidu came from Freetown. It is likely that those deployments took place at the same time.

⁹⁹⁴ The attack on Jaiama took place shortly after ECOMOG deployed whereas the one on Motema must have taken place weeks later.

⁹⁹⁵ Adeshina, *op cit*, pp 89-93.



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work in the mines and to find food, so a lot of civilians were abducted for these purposes. Many people who were captured were divided into groups, namely tripping, extraction and washing, and forced to work in the mines all day long. Mining workers were flogged, killed or burnt to death. Sick or tired workers were either killed or driven away after a severe beating or flogging. Mining workers caught stealing diamonds were burnt to death using a five-gallon container for carrying petrol or palm wine or oil. Physical violence, mutilation and killing were rampant. At Tefeya and Sandeya for example, RUF/AFRC forces killed civilians and amputated the ears and hands of others.⁹⁹⁶ Promotion was given to RUF/AFRC members according to the results of their missions. As an example, when members, often child soldiers, were asked to burn houses and they burnt more than they had been told to, they were given rank promotion.

All over the chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces began killing people in the bush, mainly for food as their stores began to run out in April. "Where is the salt, where is the Maggi, where is the pepper" were common questions asked of civilians, who would be killed if they were unable to provide the RUF/AFRC forces with those items. For example, in Kayima area at a place called Nakor, six people were killed for refusing to give food and other items. During the same period, in Kayima area, 13 people were put in a farm, which was then set on fire.⁹⁹⁷

In April, an internal dispute arose between RUF/AFRC forces at Yormandu and some went to Tegbadu, three miles east of Yormandu.⁹⁹⁸

As they needed civilians to undertake various activities, the RUF/AFRC forces devised different ways to bring civilians out of the bushes. On one occasion, RUF/AFRC forces sent the message to the bush, in particular nearby Yiffin (Koinadugu District) where civilians from Sandor Chiefdom had fled earlier, that a former NPRC Defence Minister and son of Kayima had come to Kayima and had called people to come out of the bushes.⁹⁹⁹ On another occasion in May, one civilian leaving the bush around Masundu and heading for Guinea with his family fell into a RUF/AFRC ambush. The RUF/AFRC forces took them back to Masundu and the commander told him that if he would bring people out of the bushes, he would be appointed Town Chief or Town Commander. This man persuaded some other people to come out of the bushes and they started to brush the town and to repair damaged houses. A civilian was appointed at the G5 position. RUF/AFRC forces would then come regularly to the town to ask for food. Civilians were not killed but were forced to produce the requested items and to work for the RUF/AFRC forces. To refuse to work would lead to flogging. It appeared that Masundu was one of the first towns to be rebuilt in Sandor Chiefdom. This situation continued throughout 1998 and 1999 until Donsos came to fight the RUF/AFRC forces.¹⁰⁰⁰

⁹⁹⁶ AFP, 17 April 1998.

⁹⁹⁷ The precise location of this event was not specified in the records.

⁹⁹⁸ No further information on the reason of the dispute but also stated in general terms, it illustrates, as other similar incidents in Kono District and in other Districts that following the retreat from Freetown, internal fight appeared inside the combined RUF/AFRC forces.

⁹⁹⁹ This information revealed to be false but anyway, did not have the expected results.

¹⁰⁰⁰ When they came to Masundu, probably in 2000, the hunters called together some civilians and molested a lot of them, accusing them of having collaborated with the RUF/AFRC forces.



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However, this collaboration was not mirrored in other areas of the chiefdom, where women were raped and taken as RUF/AFRC “wives”. Young girls were raped in front of their parents and were subsequently captured to carry loads. In April, one man was killed after he begged for mercy for his daughter, who was being raped in front of him.¹⁰⁰¹

At Yormandu, the burning of five-gallon containers to drip the melted plastic onto civilians was rampant. People were flogged up to 200, 300 and even 400 lashes all over their body, mainly when they refused to work, or said they were tired, or were caught stealing minor things. However, people caught stealing diamonds had a separate treatment and were burnt to death using a five-gallon container. In one specific incident that took place at Yormandu, one man who stole a diamond, called “Government property”, was stripped naked and had melted rubber dropped on his body until he died.

As a result of these atrocities, civilians fled in large numbers to Yiffin (Koinadugu District), which saw a massive influx of people starting in late April. Indeed, throughout 1998, civilians were going on and off in the bush, to Guinea and to Koinadugu District.

Members of the CDF, together with a large number of SLA forces,¹⁰⁰² equipped with arms and ammunition provided through the ECOMOG helicopter fought RUF/AFRC forces in Sandor Chiefdom. As a result, sometime in June, RUF/AFRC forces retreated to Koinadugu District. Other groups of hunters under the command of different commanders were active in the north and north-east of the chiefdom. RUF/AFRC forces, however, regularly attacked those SLA and CDF forces, often by using ambushes. In fact, ambushes were widely practiced by RUF/AFRC forces, particularly after SLA forces together with CDF members attacked them. In mid 1998, a group of between 30 to 35 civilians fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush three miles south of Kayima. Eighteen of them were beaten to death at the Yormandu Kayima and Tefeya Junction, as it was said that RUF/AFRC forces did not want to alert SLA forces by using their guns. The remaining civilians were taken to Baudu, the first town after Kayima on the road to Yormandu, where six of them were killed. The remaining people were taken away and their fate remains unknown.

Gbane Chiefdom

In Gbane Chiefdom, RUF/AFRC forces forced civilians to work for them, mining diamond and gold and harvesting cash crops like coffee and cocoa, which the RUF/AFRC forces were using to get arms and ammunitions.¹⁰⁰³ By the end of March, the chiefdom was virtually empty, as people fled the villages to go to the bush and to Guinea.

South-east (Fiama, Soa, Gbane Kandor and Mafindor Chiefdoms)

When RUF/AFRC forces dislodged CDF forces from Koidu in February 1998, these CDF forces retreated mainly to Kainkordu and Manjama in Soa Chiefdom. Shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces

¹⁰⁰¹ No detail on the location of this incident could be obtained from the records.

¹⁰⁰² The report mentions that the SLA forces were composed of 846 men.

¹⁰⁰³ The records talk about the cash crops being swapped for arms and ammunitions without giving details as to where this exchange was taking place, whether it was taking place at the Guinean border.



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launched attacks on Fiama and Soa Chiefdoms, in particular in those areas where the CDF forces were concentrated. Indeed, in Soa Chiefdom, Donsos had six bases¹⁰⁰⁴ in the chiefdom, their headquarters being in Kainkordu.

On 11 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the headquarter town of Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces, coming from Koidu in military and civilian jeeps, entered the town firing indiscriminately. More than 70 houses were burnt and the town was massively looted. During the night, the RUF/AFRC forces abducted three people, including the Town Chief, who were all later killed; on 12 March 1998, the same group also killed the Town Chief of Gbetema. On 24 March 1998, RUF/AFRC forces coming from Jagbwema attacked Yeanoh, shooting and killing many people.

When they heard that the Kamajors and Donsos were in Soa Chiefdom, at Gbanmandu, north of the chiefdom headquarter of Kainkordu, the RUF/AFRC forces moved to Soa Chiefdom. On their way to Kainkordu, this group of RUF/AFRC forces fought with another group of RUF/AFRC forces, each of them thinking they were fighting with CDF forces. A number of the forces were killed during that encounter, but later, both groups¹⁰⁰⁵ joined forces to advance on Kainkordu. In Kainkordu, the RUF/AFRC forces fought with the CDF forces and both fighting factions suffered heavy fatalities, with no reported civilian fatalities. The RUF/AFRC forces then headed for Manjama, two miles from Kainkordu, where many civilians were killed. Those two attacks on Kainkordu and Manjama created panic among the civilians and a lot of them decided to flee for Guinea. This panic was intensified by the rumour that the route through Kainkordu was being used by some RUF/AFRC forces going to Liberia¹⁰⁰⁶ through Kailahun.

The same RUF/AFRC forces then proceeded further east towards Gbane Kandor Chiefdom and, on 27 March, launched simultaneous attacks on Bendu, Gbangbandor, Dugbor, Gbaidu, Dunamoo and Koardu (all in Gbane Kandor Chiefdom). During this wave of attacks, several civilians, including men, women and children, were abducted, women were sexually abused and many houses were looted and burnt down. In Gbangbandor, for example, one woman was sexually assaulted and beaten to death. These attacks made the civilians leave the chiefdom for Guinea. However, in order to find food, civilians returned from time to time to the chiefdom and an unspecified number of civilians were abducted or killed. Donsos from Mafindor Chiefdom to the east of Gbane Kandor Chiefdom regrouped to try to stop the RUF/AFRC advance and agreed that the three sections of the chiefdom should each contribute one cow that would be sold in Guinea in order to buy ammunition there.¹⁰⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰⁴ The Donsos had 100 men deployed at Kainkordu, 25 at Kuandor, 25 at Fuero, 25 at Sukudu, 50 at Manjama and 15 at Medu.

¹⁰⁰⁵ While one group was coming from Koidu Town (and then Jagbwema in Fiama Chiefdom), the other group came from Pendembu, Kailahun District.

¹⁰⁰⁶ It is reported that the rumour also said that Johnny Paul Koroma was among those forces. Other reports mention that as early as February, RUF/AFRC forces passed through Soa to reach Kailahun. Furthermore, this information has to be read in conjunction with the developments of Lei Chiefdom, where it was reported that Johnny Paul Koroma arrived in March and then left the Chiefdom, leaving behind him some troops.

¹⁰⁰⁷ It is not specified who these Donsos bought their cartridges from in Guinea.



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RUF/AFRC forces continued further east and on 18 May 1998 attacked villages on the road leading to the headquarter town of Kamiendor (Mafindor Chiefdom). The RUF/AFRC forces burnt many houses at Densenbadu, Fandu, Gbenkoro, Kamiendor Kormadu, Sandia and Gbendema, where the CDF base was also burnt down. At Fandu and Gbendema, an unspecified number of civilians were abducted. Following these attacks, the RUF/AFRC forces returned towards Koidu and the dislodged Donsos from Soa and Mafindor Chiefdoms went to Guinea.

Lei Chiefdom (east of the District, at the border with Guinea)

In February 1998, a convoy of RUF/AFRC forces with 18 vehicles and three trucks full of arms and ammunition arrived in Lei Chiefdom, in the east of Kono District. The RUF/AFRC forces attacked towns including Yarawadu, Wanjama, Senehun and Kenema before some of the senior commanders departed, leaving the bulk of the forces stationed at Konbayendeh, in the centre of the chiefdom on the road that leads to the headquarter town of Saima. At Senehun, located in the same section as Kissitown, RUF/AFRC forces killed four civilians coming out of the bush, including two children. One of the adults was killed with a bayonet.

While in Konbayendeh, the RUF/AFRC forces started raiding surrounding villages, indiscriminately killing and mutilating people and burning houses, as a result of which people left their villages to go to the bush. However, the RUF/AFRC forces also started chasing the civilians in the bush. In one incident that took place in a bush around Kissitown, over 20 members of the RUF/AFRC, all in military uniforms, found around 70 civilians in their hiding place, gathered them all and started killing them, shooting some and mutilating others with machetes. Realising that those RUF/AFRC forces were going to kill them all, the remaining nine civilians decided to run away. The RUF/AFRC forces opened fire, killing five. Before leaving, the RUF/AFRC forces took 11 girls with them.

In Kissitown, RUF/AFRC forces established a training camp for abducted civilians, called "Superman Camp". Civilians were trained, given weapons and sent out to different parts of the chiefdom and the District. Some senior members of the RUF/AFRC forces had once earlier warned their forces in Lei Chiefdom not to kill civilians but once they are captured, to bring them to the camp for them to be trained so that the number of their forces would increase, in anticipation of their planned attack on Freetown. On one occasion, 30 civilians who were abducted and trained for one week in the camp were sent to Boroma town, north of Kombayende, with 15 "old" RUF/AFRC forces, for it was reported that civilians were in this area. One young boy who was hiding in a garden threw a grenade at the RUF/AFRC forces who had come to the town. However, the young boy was captured and cut into seven different pieces; 13 other people were also killed. On their way back to the camp, the RUF/AFRC forces captured 100 civilians who were on their way to Guinea. Eighty of them were sent to Koidu for mining, some who tried to escape were killed and two women were amputated when they refused to have sexual intercourse with two of the RUF/AFRC members.

In March, inhabitants of Kenema, a town located in the east of the chiefdom, shouted "welcome back to Sierra Leone", referring to the news of the restoration to power of the President, when they saw a plane flying over their town. A few hours later, they saw civilians coming in the village with



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bundles on their heads, which led them to go in the bush. Shortly after, they heard gunshots from different directions in the village and saw the whole village being set on fire by RUF/AFRC forces. Other villages on the highway that leads to Siama, the headquarter town, were also set on fire. At Kombayende, five people were killed and two were amputated. On the same day, the RUF/AFRC forces proceeded further north to Kundundu in the north of the chiefdom, where eight people were shot dead and two had their legs amputated with an axe. Among the eight people who died, one had his tongue cut out with a knife. Another man was hit to death with a bayonet.

On 10 March, RUF/AFRC forces came back to Senehun, set fire to the houses that had not been burnt earlier and captured six people, one of them suspected of being a Kamajor commander. Three of those captives were killed with an AK47, one was beaten to death while another one had a blue rope tied around his neck and was dragged along the ground until he died. The sixth captive, who was suspected of being a Kamajor commander, was told by the RUF/AFRC commander that he was not yet dead because they did not know yet the kind of punishment they would give him. From Senehun, they went to Kenema, where they shot dead seven people before entering the town and captured a young man who tried to hide in a garden. One of the RUF/AFRC members was asked by the others to take a big stone and to smash the hands of the young captured man. Before leaving for another village called Samie, they burnt the remaining houses.¹⁰⁰⁸ At Samie, a man was shot three times in the head with an AK47 because he could not give the RUF/AFRC forces the location of the hiding place for the people of the village. The RUF/AFRC forces also poured petrol they found in the village on two thatch houses and set them on fire. The fire spread to other thatch houses and, eventually, 11 of them burnt down. As it was getting dark, the RUF/AFRC forces, together with the last captive they had, went back to Kombayende.¹⁰⁰⁹

After President Kabbah's restoration to power in March 1998, two points for killing people called "commaflag" were established in Kombayende, a commercial town. One of these points was located at the centre of the town and the other one on Mambo Bridge, the last bridge leading to Kissitown in the west. On one occasion,¹⁰¹⁰ the RUF/AFRC force commander who had established the commaflag system sent some members to arrest civilians in and around the town to check whether they were supporters of Tejan Kabbah Government. Thirty-one people were brought to the commaflag site. The commander addressed the captured people and told them that Lei Chiefdom was criticising their action, the proof being that people had fled to the bush. The commander called on one of his members, who had recently been promoted to Captain because he "knew how to kill people", to kill those who had been brought to the commaflag site. On that day, 10 of the captured people were shot before the operation was halted because it was getting dark. The remaining people were locked up in a room and brought back to the site the next morning. One of the captured men was given an AK47 and told to fire at one of the other captives. He did so and after one shot, the man died. Then, the commander gave the gun to another captive, but he needed three shots to kill another of the captives, so the commander told him that he had "failed the exam" and shot him.

¹⁰⁰⁸ It is highly likely that this event is related to the one described above when RUF/AFRC forces came to Kenema after people welcomed back the President.

¹⁰⁰⁹ On the way back, an unidentified fighting faction opened fire on them, which allowed the captive to escape.

¹⁰¹⁰ Although the date was not specified, it can be inferred from the record that this event happened between March and June.



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This operation continued until only eight of the captives had survived by “passing the test”. They were then recognised as Junta II¹⁰¹¹ and were forced to kill people at the commaflag points. In another killing that took place at a commaflag point, three out of eight people who had been abducted and sent to the Superman Camp at Kissitown for training were arrested as they were trying to escape. The abductees were brought to Kombayende and killed at the Mambo Bridge commaflag, after which their bodies were thrown under the bridge.

When the commander in charge of Kombayende sent some of his men in search of food, those RUF/AFRC forces found nine people themselves were looking for food for their families. As the nine people did not answer the question of the commander of the group who asked them where he could find other civilians, the commander took the G3 rifle that was on his back and fired at two of the civilians, breaking their legs. As the people still refused to say anything, the commander killed the two wounded civilians. As the remaining seven civilians still refused to reveal where other people could be found, the commander amputated their hands with a rusty cutlass that the RUF/AFRC forces had found in the village. The RUF/AFRC forces then went to Soama, a few miles from the chiefdom headquarter of Siama, where they killed one man who refused to join them.

Rumours of imminent attacks in Guinea were rampant. However, no attack within the Guinean territory was reported for 1998 (nor 1999). It appeared that RUF/AFRC forces would have launched attacks on the Guinean territory earlier had they been larger in number, which they were unable to achieve since most of the civilians had already fled to refugee camps in Guinea.

On 8 April, RUF/AFRC forces moved from Kundundu and headed for Koidu Town. On their way, they passed by Kenema, where they hit an old man on his neck and his back with a bladed weapon for failing to take them to any civilian hiding places, as a result of which he died.¹⁰¹² Two other people were shot and killed at Kenema on that day. Before leaving for Koidu, the RUF/AFRC forces looted the village.

In April, seven men captured by RUF/AFRC forces in military uniforms in Sandor Chiefdom were taken to the Njai stream that separates Sandor and Lei Chiefdoms. Six of the men were tied with a blue plastic rope and were shot in the head. A heavy stone was then tied to each of them and they were thrown into the stream. The seventh person was not killed; the commander of the RUF/AFRC forces declared that he was not going to kill this person, because he was a Christian, as the commander himself was. Rather, the commander ordered one of his men to mutilate the man's 10 fingers, as a result of which his left hand was broken.

RUF/AFRC forces returned to Kundundu towards the end of the month in search of food and civilians. Some of the people they found in the bush were killed while others were taken away for manpower. On 1 May, in the bush around Kenema, RUF/AFRC forces captured civilians, killing

¹⁰¹¹ Junta II refers to these people who were enrolled in the RUF/AFRC forces following the retreat from Freetown.

¹⁰¹² This incident is reported in another record to have taken place when RUF/AFRC reached Lei in February. As this information could not be reconciled, it has to be assumed that this event took place between February and April.



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two men with a bayonet, one of them being the Town Regent Chief. Those who were captured were told to form two lines, one for men and one for women and children. The commander told his men to choose a woman each for the night, himself selecting a girl who was 14 years old. Three women who refused to go with the armed men were stripped naked and sexually abused with gun barrels before being killed. RUF/AFRC forces settled temporarily in Kundundu.

At Faakor in the south of the chiefdom during the same period, RUF/AFRC forces beat to death a blacksmith allegedly because he was a Kamajor, because they had found two empty cartridge shells in his forge. Twenty-one people were also killed that day, one of them being beaten unconscious and burnt to ashes.

RUF/AFRC forces attacked Gbonkongbor a few miles from the Guinean border in the northeast of the chiefdom with heavy firing in May, during which eight civilians were killed and many people fled. The RUF/AFRC forces then sent young men to bring back the cattle and ordered six women to cook for them. After eating, they left the village with the six women and able-bodied men. On 8 June, another village near the Guinean border was attacked. Some civilians, including men and women, were captured while others were put in a house and burnt.

i) Events in the second half of 1998

Between June and the end of the year, very few incidents are reported.¹⁰¹³ At this time, most of the people of Kono District had fled to Guinea¹⁰¹⁴ or into the bush and a lot of them were forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces in the mining areas.

In September 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom) and its environs. They raided the town and other villages, including civilian hiding places. Many civilians, including women and children, were killed and abducted during those attacks and Jagbwema was set on fire. As heavy bombardment could be heard, it was assumed that RPGs were used during those attacks, although it has since been revealed that RUF/AFRC forces had a tactic to produce sounds which are similar to those made by RPGs.¹⁰¹⁵ The Donsos went moved to that area to fight the RUF/AFRC forces and after firing few gunshots to test the strength of the Donsos, the RUF/AFRC forces intensified the shooting. As a result of the heavy shelling from both parties, 32 houses were burnt down.

Around the end of October, RUF/AFRC forces attacked and killed civilians at Tomboðu (Kamara Chiefdom) before being engaged by ECOMOG and CDF forces, which left 83 RUF/AFRC

¹⁰¹³ This period corresponds to the rainy season, during which heavy rains often paralyse movement. In Sierra Leone, the rainy season runs mostly from May to August.

¹⁰¹⁴ By April, around 90,000 civilians had crossed the border to Guinea since the start of the ECOMOG offensive against the RUF/AFRC in Kono and Kailahun Districts: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16 - 30 April 1998.

¹⁰¹⁵ RUF/AFRC forces used empty five-gallon containers, with their lids on, which they hit with a stick to emulate the sound of RPG fire.



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members dead. This attack on Tombodu took place in the aftermath of the passing of a death sentence on the RUF leader for treason.¹⁰¹⁶

On 5 November, RUF/AFRC forces reached Hindimi (Lei Chiefdom), where they found 62 people who had returned from Guinea to harvest their crops. The civilians were separated by gender and told to give the RUF/AFRC forces the produce of the harvest. As they were reluctant, the two first people of the line were shot and killed, which prompted the civilians to give them the 216 bags of rice they had harvested. Women were forced to cook for the RUF/AFRC forces. The following day, the RUF/AFRC forces left the village together with captives who were forced to carry the bags of rice; those bags they were unable to take, as there were not sufficient people to carry them, were burnt. When they arrived in Kombayende, the men were separated from the women; this was the last time they saw each other. The men were later taken to Koidu for mining. After mining during the day, they were locked in a container at night.

On 20 December 1998, a fierce attack was launched on Koidu by RUF/AFRC forces, who were able to dislodge the ECOMOG forces based there. This attack came from the bush and was planned from different directions. Prior to this attack, RUF/AFRC forces had regrouped in Buedu (Kailahun District), which was an RUF stronghold throughout the war, and moved with three to four battalions to Kono. RUF/AFRC forces were already in Kono District and another group of RUF/AFRC forces were deployed at Njaiama Sewafe (Nimiyama Chiefdom) to set an ambush for the retreating ECOMOG forces. Four days prior to this attack, RUF/AFRC forces had attacked Small Lebanon and dislodged ECOMOG forces; ECOMOG troops based at Koakuima, Motema and Bumpe were also dislodged. In Koidu and Koakuima, RUF/AFRC forces killed many ECOMOG and CDF forces, as well as civilians.¹⁰¹⁷ At Koakuima, the retreating ECOMOG forces left behind them a lot of arms and ammunition, which were captured by the RUF/AFRC forces. Retreating ECOMOG forces fell in the ambush staged by RUF/AFRC forces at Njaiama Sewafe and suffered heavy casualties.

RUF/AFRC forces then attacked the last ECOMOG battalion in the District, namely the 197th Battalion redeployed in Njaiama (Nimikoro Chiefdom).¹⁰¹⁸ After a fierce battle, ECOMOG repelled the RUF/AFRC forces and asked for reinforcements from Bo. However, the ECOMOG commander was instead advised to withdraw his troops from Njaiama. On 30 December, the ECOMOG commander left Nimikoro Chiefdom with CDF members and thousands of civilians, as ECOMOG did not want to leave the civilians in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces. They took the road to Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District) in the south of Kono District. On their way, they fell into two ambushes laid by RUF/AFRC forces. After the first ambush,

¹⁰¹⁶ AFP, 26 October 1998.

¹⁰¹⁷ It cannot be inferred from the reports whether these forces were killed within the course of the battle or after being captured.

¹⁰¹⁸ Prior to this wave of attacks, this battalion was deployed at Njala and Wanjama (Nimikoro Chiefdom). When the ECOMOG position at Bumpe fell into the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces, the decision was taken to establish a blocking position at Njaiama, on the highway that leaves Bumpe to the south of the District: Adeshina, *op cit*, p 128.



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ECOMOG forces led the convoy, which allowed the RUF/AFRC forces to abduct hundreds of civilians from the rear end of the convoy during the second ambush.

Prior to this attack on Koidu, a number of troop movements were noted in the surrounding areas in Sandor Chiefdom and in Koinadugu District. In fact, in late November, RUF/AFRC forces retook control of Sandor Chiefdom and civilians at Yiffin (Koinadugu District) observed many ECOMOG forces retreating from Kono District.

At Yormandu, some RUF/AFRC forces told the civilians that were their captives that they would continue the fight until Freetown and that they got the necessary logistics, arms and ammunition from Kailahun District. Indeed, this attack on Koidu was the catalyst for the RUF/AFRC forces to proceed further south, capturing more towns in the District and the country¹⁰¹⁹ and to enter Freetown on 6 January 1999,¹⁰²⁰ using civilians from Gbane to carry their arms and ammunition.

Following the attack on Koidu, civilians and hunters decided to leave Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom) for Yiffin and Alikalia (Koinadugu District). However, they fell into an RUF/AFRC ambush on 28 December and a lot of them were captured. Over 170 of those captured were taken to Yiffin. One of the captured hunters was given a letter that requested the hunters to come out of the bush and join the RUF/AFRC forces. He was also told that if he did not convince the hunters to join them, he would be killed. The man saved his life by explaining that he only knew people in Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom). Some of the RUF/AFRC forces together with their captives thus headed for Kayima and on their way, four of the captives were killed for their belongings at Gbenekoro.¹⁰²¹

i) Events in 1999

On 1 January 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces that had killed four captives at Gbenekoro proceeded towards Kayima (Sandor Chiefdom), together with their remaining captives. On their way, the captives saw the body of somebody they knew and they learnt he was killed because he answered rudely to the RUF/AFRC forces. The captives were told to take orders from a child commander and were reminded that their lives were of no value for them. When they arrived at the RUF/AFRC forces' commander's compound, they saw one Fullah¹⁰²² man being killed for refusing to give up his sheep. They were introduced to the RUF/AFRC commander as his "slaves and servants" and were forced to do petty jobs, mainly going on food finding missions for the commander. A man was appointed to the G5 position, to look after the civilians' affairs/interests. A Formation Assembly was set up where every morning, civilians were told to pray and announcements for the rest of the day were made. The establishment of these G5 committees not only took place in Kono, but also in other Districts, as a means of rationalising the use of civilians by making them participate in administrative matters. Civilians appointed to such positions could hardly refuse the appointment,

¹⁰¹⁹ See the general overview and the analysis for Kailahun, Tonkolili, Bombali and Port Loko Districts and the Western Area.

¹⁰²⁰ See the factual analysis for Tonkolili, Makeni and Port Loko District and the Western Area.

¹⁰²¹ It could not be ascertained whether this place is to be found in Koinadugu or in Kono District.

¹⁰²² The Fullah are a tribe to be found in the north of the country and in Guinea. They would be particular targets of the RUF and, later, the RUF/AFRC during the war, as they were often healthy, earning money by raising and selling cattle.



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because a refusal would soon be followed by a severe flogging. In Sandor Chiefdom, civilians were required to follow rules imposed on them by the RUF/AFRC forces, which included no raping, no taking of civilian's property and no stealing ("Jar Jar").¹⁰²³

However, the establishment of such committees and the rationalisation of the use of civilians did not stop the harassment and violence continued to be committed against civilians. At Kayima, for example, sometime after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, civilians presented complaints to the top commander in charge at Koakuima. When they came from this meeting, they were threatened and were punished with flogging and being forced to go on food finding missions. The commander at Koakuima sent some RUF/AFRC members to investigate the matter, although the results and consequences of this investigation are unknown. Furthermore, five civilians were killed and burnt to ashes in a bush near Neakor, west of Kayima. Following this incident and a complaint made by a relative of one of the civilians killed, the commander at Kayima recalled that no one should kill civilian and if such a crime was committed, it should be reported to the G5.

On 10 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Punduru, a CDF stronghold in Nimiyama Chiefdom that was overcrowded with civilians. During this attack, both civilians and CDF were killed and their property was damaged.

From February 1999, hunters came in and out of Sandor Chiefdom from Guinea and made their permanent base in Fanema, near the border with Guinea, progressing towards the north of the chiefdom and retaking some areas from the RUF/AFRC forces. They were obtaining coffee and cocoa from the population in support for their activities, selling these items to the Guineans to buy ammunition or food. In one incident, RUF/AFRC forces came to Fanema looking for a famous hunter. They took all his belongings and brought his relatives back to Kayima, where they were molested, beaten and tied up before being released.

The abduction rate increased as people were used as diamond miners and were conscripted into the RUF/AFRC forces. At this time, Koakuima was the base for the RUF/AFRC 2nd Brigade and hosted the main office for the mining operations; it was also was the base for the Overall Mining Commander, who was assisted by a Deputy Mining Commander. Mining officers were appointed at the various mining sites. Every week, mining officers were to bring the diamonds collected at the sites to the Deputy Commander, who crosschecked them before handing them over to the Overall Mining Commander. However, diamonds over 5 carats were to be brought to the Overall Mining Commander at Koakuima as soon as they were discovered, without waiting for the weekly shipment. Every week, the diamonds were sent from Koakuima to Kailahun, from where they were sent to Liberia. Some private mining, mainly carried out for diamond dealers, was authorised by the Overall Mining Commander at the cost of Le 5,000 per week. However, diamonds over 5 carats were to be given to the Overall Mining Commander, as they were considered to be the property of the RUF.¹⁰²⁴

¹⁰²³ More details are required from the records on the G5 committees.

¹⁰²⁴ These diamonds were considered as "government property" as the RUF was considering itself as a government.



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At this time, the District was divided into operational areas under the command of a commanding officer. The training base established in Bunumbu (Luawa Chiefdom, Kailahun District) since 1998 and known as "Camp Lion" was transferred around January to Yengema (Nimikoto Chiefdom), as the centre of RUF/AFRC actions had moved to the north-west. On one occasion, six abductees, six adults and one child of a Small Boys Unit (SBU) escaped from the training base and tried to reach Koinadugu District but were caught and brought back to the base. The RUF Senior Officer in Charge of the Brigade Headquarters in Koakuima ordered these escapees to be killed. The six adults were shot and killed while the fate of the child soldier remains unknown. Hundreds of abductees from the Northern Province were sent to Yengema but as their number increased and as food supplies were not sufficient, the base was moved for three months to Gbendembu (Bombali District) before coming back to Yengema. Recruits were organised into platoons and young children as young as 10 were conscripted into Small Boy Units (SBUs).

A lot of beating, killing and rapes took place at the camp during the time of its operation. One practice carried out in the camp was called Halaka.¹⁰²⁵ A big circle, the size of a tennis court, was drawn on the ground with a smaller inner circle. The area between the two circles was full of obstacles such as barbed wires, drums and blocks. Recruits were to enter in this area and to find the exit located far from the entry, while the instructors located in the inner circle were beating them with sticks. Many civilians died from this practice.

In Lei Chiefdom, the rate of violations committed in 1998 continued and was very high after January 1999. Civilians were abducted to be trained as combatants, especially for the purpose of the upcoming attacks on Guinea. The commander in charge of Kombayende regularly sent his men to capture civilians to be trained as Junta II. A team went to Kissitown, where Superman Camp was located, but as they could not find anybody in the town, they went to the bush. There, they eventually found 160 people, who they brought to Kissitown for scrutiny.

Following those continuous developments, CDF members mobilised themselves; some of them were sent back to Guinea to bring back shotguns and they attacked the RUF/AFRC forces at Kissitown. After a three-hour battle, 15 civilians had lost their lives and the RUF/AFRC forces left the town with the civilians they had earlier abducted. Strengthened by this success, the CDF established a base at Gborgborma and successfully attacked the RUF/AFRC forces at Samie,¹⁰²⁶ where the RUF/AFRC forces fled the town leaving behind them most of their weapons. A few days after the CDF attack on Samie, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the chiefdom headquarter of Saiama, where they killed almost all the civilians they found in the town. After this attack on Saiama, the RUF/AFRC forces headed back for their base at Kombayende. On their way, they passed through a village called Kutima, where they found three bodies. As they continued their journey, they met three women who told them that men in military fatigues had attacked Kutima. The three women were then taken with the group, who used them as a shield anytime they entered a town. At Bomboro, some RUF/AFRC forces found one young woman with her baby. As she was caught trying to escape, they accused her of being a supporter of the President. They told her to throw her baby in a thatch house they had set on fire, warning her that she would be thrown in the fire as well

¹⁰²⁵ This term allegedly comes from Libya.

¹⁰²⁶ This village could also be Soama.



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if she did not do what they asked her to do. After she had thrown her baby into the burning house and she was asked to join the RUF/AFRC forces, she tried to escape and was shot in the head. The RUF/AFRC forces also attacked the CDF base at Gborgborma and dislodged the CDF members who went back to Guinea.

Teams put together to search for civilians, also called "Safari team" by the RUF, continued to be sent. On one occasion, a team came back with only 15 civilians. Three of them were women and were allocated to the RUF/AFRC forces who did not have any woman. Among the 12 other captives, three who tried to escape were brought to the commaflog located on the Mamba Bridge and were shot, their bodies thrown under the bridge. In another incident and after orders coming from Koidu told commanders in the different posts to conscript more civilians for planned attacks on Guinea, 152 civilians were captured in the bush and taken to Kombayende for scrutiny before being sent to Superman Camp. The able men and women were sent to Kissitown while the old people were brought to the commaflog in the centre of the town, at Baoya Road. All 21 of them were killed by the member of the RUF/AFRC who had been promoted to Captain because he knew how to kill. Their bodies were thrown in a very big hole previously dug by RUF/AFRC forces for this purpose. This was a common scenario, which was repeated many times.

In March 1999, an internal fight arose between RUF/AFRC forces as a group coming from Koidu entered Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom) with heavy firing. The members stationed in Kombayende fired in return. Sixteen civilians died during that fighting and 22 were seriously injured.¹¹²⁷ Around this period, the identification of combatants was difficult but it is alleged that some AFRC members were integrated within the RUF movement and were briefed on the ideology of the movement. The senior officer in charge of the Brigade headquarters in Koakuima, who was also the Overall Mining Commander, was one of the most senior RUF members; most of the senior AFRC commanders were deployed in the Northern Province, in Kabala (Koinadugu District) and Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).¹¹²⁸

On different occasions, civilians with amputated limbs arrived in refugee camps in Guinea and explained they had been attacked by RUF/AFRC forces in Lei Chiefdom. For example, one civilian had his left hand amputated when he was in Gbordu, a village nine miles from Siama. RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village and killed five people. The man who had his limb chopped off was accused of being a Kamajor and after he was amputated, he was given a message by the RUF/AFRC commander to deliver to the Kamajors and civilians living in Guinea that they should expect the coming of RUF/AFRC forces soon. On another occasion, one man was mutilated at Gborgborma;

¹¹²⁷ It could not be ascertained what happened after this incident between the two RUF/AFRC groups.

¹¹²⁸ Furthermore, unlike for Port Loko DDR, where ex-AFRC members disarmed as such, the DDR centre opened in Kono District received RUF and CDF members but no ex-AFRC members, which tend to reinforce our assumption that AFRC members who were in Kono District after the invasion of Freetown were incorporated within the RUF. However, as the distinction between the forces was difficult for civilians, we would continue referring to RUF/AFRC forces in the subsequent developments. Relations between RUF and AFRC forces were not totally sour, for in 1999, an AFRC member was appointed as personal bodyguard to the RUF leader when he was released from Prison.



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the RUF/AFRC forces who had amputated his limb told him that whoever was captured in this village would be treated as a Kamajor because the village used to be a Kamajor base.

Sometime before the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord, RUF/AFRC forces attacked a number of towns and villages in Kamara Chiefdom, including Sukudu and Peyima, killing many civilians and burning many houses. Over 200 civilians, including men, women and children, were abducted and the strongest men were used for mining. There was a food shortage at that time and what little food was available was taken by the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were relying mainly on roots (gari) and boiled bananas to survive. Several civilians, particularly those working in the mines, died from starvation. The same working conditions described earlier in 1998 prevailed and the same kind of corporal punishments were applied. Among others, one practice, which caused the death of 10 men in Tombodu (Tankoro Chiefdom), was called "hanging solar on the civilians", which meant beating someone to death. Civilians caught trying to smuggle or steal diamonds were tortured or killed. It is believed that hundreds of men, women and children were killed during this period.

RUF/AFRC were occupying Fiama Chiefdom, setting ambushes for Donsos and civilians. Towns in Fiama Chiefdom, including Sandekor, Koakor, Waima, Njardu, Darkadu and Gbematambadu, were attacked and burnt down during 1999. Sometimes, the burning of different villages took place on the same day and at other times, RUF/AFRC forces decided to burn a certain number of houses per day. Rice barns were also set on fire after being looted.

RUF/AFRC forces were in control of Gbane Kandor and Mafindor Chiefdoms, which were virtually empty, as civilians had fled to the bush or to Guinea. However, people who fled came back to their chiefdoms from time to time in search of food. Attacks on villages are reported occasionally. For example, in April, as civilians were moving regularly between the bush around Sindadu, in the northeast of Gbane Kandor Chiefdom, and Guinea for food, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the village and shot the hands of one civilian. In May, while searching food, RUF/AFRC forces from Mafindor Chiefdom shot a hunter who was captured in his house at Dengenyma. The hunter was caught by surprise in his house, his shotgun leaning on the wall.

During that period, Donsos forces reorganised in Guinea and launched an attack on the RUF/AFRC forces at Kamiendor (Mafindor Chiefdom). Both sides suffered fatalities, but the loss of men did not prevent the CDF from continuing to launch attacks, as a result of which they recaptured different villages in Gbane Kandor Chiefdom. Donsos freed some civilians that had been held captive by the RUF/AFRC forces and sent them to Guinea.

Following these attacks and the significant gains the Donsos were making, RUF/AFRC forces called for peace talks, which took place in July¹⁰²⁹ at Manjama (Soa Chiefdom). Over 3,000 civilians also attended the meeting. This meeting led to a ceasefire agreement, with the fighting factions agreeing that both civilians and combatants should move freely and that Manjama should serve as a buffer zone. For the purposes of freedom of movement, passes were issued to the civilians by the fighting forces. In August 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces even asked that joint security forces be formed to

¹⁰²⁹ This first meeting may have taken place in August, as reports mention both July and August for the date of this meeting.



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patrol the border area. It has been suggested that this system gave the RUF/AFRC forces the opportunity to bring their looted property to Manjama and to exchange it for other necessary items brought from Guinea by the Donsos. However in September, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Donsos positions, retaking all the areas the Donsos had held for the previous few months. The RUF/AFRC forces expanded their attacks beyond the borders of Sierra Leone, launching one attack at Gueckedou, one of the busiest commercial centres in Guinea.

After the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, the rate of violations decreased, even if molestation and other violations were still committed by RUF/AFRC forces, fearing that they would no longer be able to use civilians to carry out their mining activities and food finding operations. After July, it is reported that civilians were appointed to a G5 committee to look after civilian affairs in Kamara Chiefdom.¹⁰³⁰

The fighting with the RUF/AFRC forces in Sandor Chiefdom continued until the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord in July 1999. However, the cessation of hostilities was only temporary and fighting resumed in 2000.

During the second half of the year, a mining area was opened by the RUF under the directive of the Overall Mining Commander near the bridge between Tombodu and Bundu II (Kamara Chiefdom). Many civilians were captured from across the whole District and forced to work in the mines. The captured civilians were working with barely any food or water and people were beaten or killed if they complained of hunger or thirst. On one occasion, three young men who defied instructions were killed, allegedly on the order of the Overall Mining Commander. On another occasion, 50 men were brought from Kainkordu (Soa Chiefdom) to mine and it is believed that almost all of them died during the course of the mining.¹⁰³¹ Even foundations of houses were broken for the purposes of mining for diamonds.

In Sandor Chiefdom, different RUF/AFRC camps, known as Joe Bush, were operating and many violations were committed at those camps. At Tegbadu, four miles north of Yormandu where RUF/AFRC forces were still engaged mining, there was a "killing field". Nearby Taberna, on the Kayima Tefeyah highway, a camp also called "P.C. Ground" was infamous for the sexual violence inflicted on civilians. Many girls were raped and kept in the camp for sexual purposes. These women and girls were often sexually assaulted by more than one RUF/AFRC member at a time while some were taken and assigned to only one man.

On 20 October 1999, the Sierra Leone President officially launched the started of the Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown.¹⁰³²

¹⁰³⁰ Clarification is required from the records on the dates.

¹⁰³¹ It is believed that 95% of them died.

¹⁰³² The start of the DDR program was originally planned to take place within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999.



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In November 1999, near Jagbwema (Fiama chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces, who already had over 130 abducted civilians with them, captured an unspecified number of people. Those abductees were told to fetch water, firewood and food; one of them was given the responsibility to settle minor disputes among civilians. After three weeks, all the abductees were taken to Kailahun District, passing through Gandorhun (Gbane Chiefdom). Most of the journey was undertaken at night and civilians were not allowed to rest on their own volition. In Kailahun, there were over 1,000 members of the RUF/AFRC forces and a lot of abductees. Some of them were required to farm for the RUF/AFRC forces while others became teachers.

In December 1999, hunters who had found refuge in Guinea tried another time to repel the RUF/AFRC forces from Lei Chiefdom. With the support of local authorities also living in the refugee camps, they crossed the river that separates Sierra Leone and Guinea on 18 December, launched different attacks on RUF/AFRC positions and at Kombayende, they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the RUF/AFRC side and to chase out the remaining forces. However, eight days later, RUF/AFRC forces came back and this time, the CDF members were not able to withstand the heavy firing and had to retreat to Guinea. The CDF members who were captured were either killed or mutilated and given letters promising that they (RUF/AFRC forces) would chase them into Guinea.

k) Events in 2000 to 2001

Throughout 2000 and the large part of 2001, mining activities were carried out in Koidu Town and in Plant No. 11, a mining area located between Koidu Town and Tombodu (Kamara Chiefdom). In Koidu Town, a place called Kaisambo was mined for the Overall Mining Commander. An unspecified number of houses in Koidu town had their foundations broken so that they could be mined. At Plant No. 11, more than 500 people were abducted and forced to mine and push caterpillars whenever they broke down.

On 14 January, the RUF leader, the Deputy Defence Minister and the ECOMOG Force Commander visited Koidu, as part of a country tour aiming at sensitising the combatants on the DDR process.¹⁰³³ Military Observers began conducting regular patrol missions in the District, although UN peacekeepers had not yet been able to deploy in the District.¹⁰³⁴ However, the situation in the country worsened and United Nations peacekeepers captured in Makeni in early May 2000 were brought to Plant No. 11 (Kamara Chiefdom).¹⁰³⁵

It was widely believed that the control by the Government of Kono District would mark the end of the conflict¹⁰³⁶ and talks were initiated between the President of Sierra Leone and the RUF to end

¹⁰³³ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 5 - 16 January 2000.

¹⁰³⁴ IRIN West Africa, 12 April 2000. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 1270 approving the deployment of 6,000 armed peacekeepers alongside the 260 unarmed military observers. Their number would increase over the subsequent months.

¹⁰³⁵ This group of UN peacekeepers was composed of 208 Zambians: IRIN West Africa, 8 May 2000. Around the same period, peacekeepers were also abducted in Kailahun District.

¹⁰³⁶ In early June, the Deputy Defence Minister called for an offensive military operation in the District: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 1-2 June 2000.



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the conflict, which faced a new development in May with the abduction of the UN peacekeepers, as mentioned, and the arrest and detention of the RUF leader in Freetown.¹⁰³⁷

Inhabitants of the District, however, began again crossing the Melie River, which separates the District from Guinea, fleeing RUF harassment.¹⁰³⁸ Around the same period, RUF/AFRC forces began attacking the Guinean territory from different fronts.¹⁰³⁹

The peace talks, which started in late May 2000 in order to reactivate the Lomé Peace Agreement found a conclusion in Abuja on 10 November with the signing of a ceasefire between the Government and the RUF forces. UNAMSIL was given the mission to monitor this ceasefire.¹⁰⁴⁰ However, in December 2000, civilians who had found refuge in a Guinean camp near the border with Lei Chiefdom saw thousands of civilians with bundles on their heads, who explained them that they had been attacked by “rebels” during their sleep.¹⁰⁴¹ The following day, another group of refugees within the territory of Guinea confirmed that the “rebels” had come to Guinea. The next morning, trucks full of RUF/AFRC forces dressed in military uniforms arrived at the place where all these refugees were at this time and announced through a microphone that they had not come to kill them but to take them back to Sierra Leone. Their commander told the civilians that they wanted peace and as a proof of their commitment to the peace process, they have come to take Sierra Leoneans back to Sierra Leone. Over 20,000 refugees were thus taken back to Sierra Leone while the RUF forces continued their attacks in Guinea. The trip to Lei Chiefdom lasted roughly 10 days and when they arrived at Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom), the civilians were allocated to different towns within the chiefdom.

At Kundundu, the returnees were forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces and were told to plant cannabis seeds. A woman accused of performing witchcraft was stripped naked and shot six times. In another incident that took place at Yawandor, 22 miles from the headquarter town of Saiama, following the killing of two RUF/AFRC members and the wife of another member by civilians, 17 civilians were killed on the order of the commander based at Kombayende, so that the RUF/AFRC forces based at Yawandor could restore their authority. At Kombayende, the commander in charge was the same person who had established the commaflags in 1998.

During this time, RUF/AFRC forces continued to commit acts of violence against civilians. On one occasion, four RUF members raped a 42-year-old woman until she died. When the civilians took the matter to the commander in charge, he replied to them that the RUF never made complaints about the men they had lost during the war so the civilians should not complain. Two days after that

¹⁰³⁷ The RUF leader was arrested in Freetown in May, after his bodyguards had shot and killed civilians gathered for a demonstration in front of his house in Freetown on 8 May 2000.

¹⁰³⁸ IRIN West Africa, 23 August 2000.

¹⁰³⁹ Attacks on the Guinean territory were also launched from Kambia and Kailahun Districts.

¹⁰⁴⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 27 November 2000. Paragraph 4 of this Ceasefire Agreement stated “both parties agree that UNAMSIL shall have full liberty to deploy its troops and other personnel throughout Sierra Leone including the diamond-producing areas in the discharge of its responsibilities, when UNAMSIL is satisfied that the ceasefire is observed by all the parties.”

¹⁰⁴¹ In addition, during this period, the training base at Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom) was still open.



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incident, a suckling mother was raped and her child was taken away from her. A man accused of stealing was stripped naked and the commander ordered some of his men to set fire to an empty five gallon container and to drip the burning rubber onto the man. The man died three days later. Furthermore, some civilians were taken and sent to Koidu for mining.

In January 2001,¹⁰⁴² fighting between RUF/AFRC forces and hunters intensified in the upper part of Sandor Chiefdom. However, UN personnel and commanders together with the Paramount Chief of Sandor arrived in Kayima by helicopter to exhort both factions to disarm. The RUF/AFRC forces who spoke with those authorities responded positively and stated they were ready to disarm.¹⁰⁴³ However, about one month after this visit, fighting intensified north of Kayima¹⁰⁴⁴ and as they were retreating south, RUF/AFRC forces burnt the remaining houses in the villages. After a battle at Yaryah, three miles north of Kayima, the RUF/AFRC forces decided to leave the chiefdom and headed for Koidu.

In Fiama Chiefdom, in March 2001, one man on his way to Jegbwema met civilians who told him that 50 men had been abducted and used to work for the RUF/AFRC forces at Jegbwema. Women were used to cook and for sexual purposes, as a result of which some of them became pregnant and had children. Sometimes, the captured civilians were beaten at night and put in containers used as cells by the RUF/AFRC forces. One man brought from the Guinean border was suspected of being a Kamajor and was beaten for three days by RUF/AFRC forces at Jagbwema before he died on the fourth day. At Gbekor, a man met more than 12 young girls below the age of 18 who were with the RUF/AFRC forces as their "wives". As he was wondering whether these girls were with the RUF/AFRC forces for their stolen property and money, he discovered that most of them had been abducted and were afraid to go back to their parents for fear of being called "rebels" or being maltreated.

Three days after they had arrived in Kombayende, 150 men who had just come back were taken by the commander to go to Guinea with some RUF members to carry the stolen property they had in Guinea. Shortly after, the Guinean Minister of Defence and some senior military officers came to the border with Sierra Leone to find members of the Kamajors to help Guinea repel the RUF beyond the Guinean border. The Kamajors told the Guinean authorities that they could not fight without the approval of the Sierra Leone Government, as they were under the control of the Sierra Leone Government. Two weeks later, the Guinean authorities came back, told the Kamajors that they had communicated with the Sierra Leone authorities, who approved their request. Kamajors were then equipped with arms and ammunition from the Guinean authorities.

Following this, on 23 March 2001, a group of 200 Donsos and Kamajors who had regrouped and were fully armed¹⁰⁴⁵ launched simultaneous attacks on RUF/AFRC positions in Kono District

¹⁰⁴² Although this event was described as taking place in 2000, it probably took place in 2001.

¹⁰⁴³ This visit probably took place during the second half of 2000.

¹⁰⁴⁴ The CDF members fighting were those coming from the north of the Chiefdom.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Reports mention that these CDF forces had heavy artillery like tanks and that a ferry was built across the Meli River that separates Mafiendor Chiefdom and Guinea to facilitate the movement of the CDF.



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through three different flanks: Gbangbokoro¹⁰⁴⁶ in Soa Chiefdom (Kamajors/Donsos), Kamiendor in Mafindor Chiefdom (Donsos) and Kailahun District (Kamajors). Communication sets allowed the three groups to launch attacks simultaneously and to communicate any developments.

The group that headed to Kamiendor drove out the RUF/AFRC forces before separating into two groups, one going to Kombayende and the other using the Kondewakoro flank and working in concert. These two sub groups regrouped later on in Fiama Chiefdom. From Kamiendor, the group heading to Kombayende dislodged RUF/AFRC forces from Sindudu, which is located on the border between Gbane Kandor and Mafiendor Chiefdoms. As the commander in charge of the RUF forces in Kombayende noticed the advance of the CDF, he sent for reinforcements to Koidu, which was still under RUF/AFRC control. The reinforcement was composed of senior RUF commanders, who moved to Kombayende armed with anti-aircraft machine guns, RPGs, automatic rifles and other weapons seized from the UN peacekeepers. When they entered the town, the CDF forces opened fire and killed 32 of them. After a fierce battle, the RUF/AFRC retreated back to Koidu, as most of their senior commanders had been killed. The CDF chased them up to Jagbwema (Niama Chiefdom), where a battle took place. The RUF/AFRC then retreated to Maiyor, which is on the highway linking Jagbwema to Koidu.

In late April, the Acting Force Commander of UNAMSIL made a visit to Koidu to assess the situation on the ground, following RUF complaints about attacks carried out by CDF members backed up by Guineans.¹⁰⁴⁷ The CDF prepared themselves to go to Koidu, but in the meanwhile,¹⁰⁴⁸ in May, trucks full of UN peacekeepers came to the CDF deployment to advise them not to make any further assault on RUF/AFRC positions and to observe the cease-fire.¹⁰⁴⁹ The CDF told the peacekeepers that they would only observe the cease-fire after they had seen their Paramount Chiefs. About one week later, Paramount Chiefs and senior UN officials came by helicopter to meet the CDF and the Paramount Chiefs told the CDF that they did not want the Government to accuse the people of Kono of destroying the peace process. This meeting caused the CDF to desist from launching any more attacks and to stay in Maiyor until disarmament¹⁰⁵⁰ took place.

On 4 May 2001, a meeting was convened between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone¹⁰⁵¹ to review the ceasefire signed in Abuja in November 2000 and which was violated, mainly in Kono

¹⁰⁴⁶ Gbangbokoro is on the border with Guinea.

¹⁰⁴⁷ UNAMSIL press briefing, 26 April 2001.

¹⁰⁴⁸ It is alleged that a member of the RUF General Staff went to Makeni to find the UN Bangladeshi contingent to ask them to come to Kono to resolve the situation.

¹⁰⁴⁹ UN peacekeepers from Tonkolili and Kailahun Districts carried out two-day patrol missions in early May prior to the establishment of a permanent patrol presence patrol in Koidu in late May: UNAMSIL press briefings, 6 May 2001, 11 May 2001 and 22 May 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁰ The other CDF group that entered Kono District through Soa Chiefdom met this group at Jagbwema.

¹⁰⁵¹ This meeting was the second meeting of the Committee of Six of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, the United Nations, the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front: UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 May 2001.



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District.¹⁰⁵² Further to this meeting, it was decided to introduce phases of disarmament, in order to accelerate its process.

Also in May, UNAMSIL Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander visited the RUF forces at Koidu and the CDF members at Kombayende (Lei Chiefdom) and Jagbwema (Fiama Chiefdom), to witness the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement, signed by the RUF and the CDF on 15 May.¹⁰⁵³ This cessation of hostilities and the start of the DDR program made the atmosphere extremely tense and many officials made visits in the District to ensure the process ran smoothly.¹⁰⁵⁴

During the second meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR held at Magburaka on 2 June, the parties agreed to conduct the DDR process simultaneously in Bonthe and Kono Districts in July 2001, leaving time for the DDR facilities to be built in Yengema (Nimikoro Chiefdom). The estimated numbers of combatants to be disarmed were 1,500 combatants for the CDF and 2,500 for the RUF.¹⁰⁵⁵

Disarmament started on 1 July at a very slow pace and was intermittently halted. Different reasons were put forward to explain the stalling of the process, including the suspicion of both the CDF and the RUF forces against each other, the UN travel ban on the RUF's Political and Peace Council Chairman and, above all, tensions resulting from the mining activities.¹⁰⁵⁶ To speed up the disarmament process, UN Officials met directly with the commanders of both fighting factions on the ground, rather than with the political leaders¹⁰⁵⁷ and during the third meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 17 July, the parties agreed that the checkpoints established by the RUF and CDF forces be dismantled and a moratorium on mining activities be implemented.¹⁰⁵⁸ Nevertheless, skirmishes between RUF and CDF were still reported for June and July.¹⁰⁵⁹ By the end of July, two companies of the UN Bangladeshi contingent were deployed at Koidu and 500 Pakistani UN peacekeepers were based at Yengema.¹⁰⁶⁰

The initial target date of 28 July for the completion of the disarmament process was not met and the process was extended, as pockets of RUF forces were still not disarmed in the District. By 17 August, the disarmament for Kono District was complete and the figures of the combatants who

¹⁰⁵² Further to the meeting in May 2001, those parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR.

¹⁰⁵³ UNAMSIL press briefings, 17 May 2001, 24 May 2001

¹⁰⁵⁴ On 25 and 26 May 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, accompanied by the UNAMSIL Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander and a Government delegation, including the Deputy Defence Minister met with representatives of the CDF and RUF in Koidu: UNAMSIL press briefing, 28 May 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 5 June 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁶ UNAMSIL press briefing, 6 July 2001 and 13 July 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁷ IRIN West Africa, 12 July 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁸ IRIN West Africa, 20 July 2001; UNAMSIL press briefing, 20 July 2001.

¹⁰⁵⁹ IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2001.

¹⁰⁶⁰ UNAMSIL press briefing, 24 July 2001.



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had gone through the process were higher than originally expected, mainly for RUF members came from Koinadugu District to Kono District to disarm.¹⁰⁶¹

The completion of the disarmament in Kono District brought relief to the whole country, as it meant the war was really over. As a mark of the importance of this achievement for the country, the Sierra Leonean President, the Nigerian President and the Chairman of the ECOWAS went to Kono on 3 September, to witness the official end of the disarmament process.¹⁰⁶²

RUF forces, however, continued to mine in the Koidu area, including indiscriminate mining carried out in the centre of the township. Some incidents of violence against civilians are reported during that period.¹⁰⁶³ In one incident, one civilian went back to Koidu from Freetown to assess the level of destruction of his property. As he reached his house, he met 20 people busy mining the soil underneath his house. When he asked them to stop, one commander at the site told his boys to arrest him and tie him up. He ordered four of his men to hang four solars on the man as he had interrupted the mining activities, which means that four people will beat the person. On another occasion, the Overall Mining Commander ordered civilians to be arrested, so that they could wash gravel at mining areas. One of these civilians was accused of stealing a diamond and when a young RUF member reported that the man had swallowed the diamond, the Overall Mining Commander ordered his men to hang ten solars on the man. After the beating, the man admitted he had taken a diamond but had swallowed it. The Overall Mining Commander ordered his men to kill the man and get the diamond out of the stomach. However, nothing was found in the stomach of the dead man, which made the Overall Mining Commander say that the boy who made the report let him kill a man for no just cause. As a result, the Overall Mining Commander shot the young member three times in the chest, killing him.

This situation of continuous mining activities angered the residents of Koidu. They reported the matter to UNAMSIL, who explained that it would be solved in due time. Nevertheless, on 18 December 2001, residents from Koidu took slings and machetes to fight the RUF/AFRC forces. A lot of the residents then left the District for other Districts (Bombali and Tonkolili) as they believed some of the RUF/AFRC forces would never give up the privileges they got from the mining areas, namely control on the mineral wealth and taxes levied on traders. Following this mass exodus of the population, a meeting took place¹⁰⁶⁴ in Makeni at the headquarters of the UN Nigerian contingent with leaders of the RUF forces and a delegation from Kono authorities. On 27 December, an important delegation composed of Northern Paramount Chiefs, the UNAMSIL Acting Force Commander, officers of the Sierra Leone Police and other people arrived in Koidu and summoned a

¹⁰⁶¹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. As of 31 August 2001, 5,634 combatants had disarmed in the District, 3,623 being RUF members and 2,011 CDF members: UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001 and Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 09 - 31 August 2001.

¹⁰⁶² IRIN West Africa, 3 September 2001.

¹⁰⁶³ In its Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 09 - 31 August 2001, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), based on information from Sierra Leone Web reports, reported on the ongoing use of child labour by the RUF for mining activities.

¹⁰⁶⁴ It is alleged that this meeting took place to clear the rumour that the incident of the previous day was carried out on tribal lines on the pretext that Temnes, Limbas and Mendes were being killed in Kono.



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meeting of stakeholders at the UNAMSIL headquarters. An agreement to put an end to the RUF mining activities in the District was signed and apparently implemented.

3. Conclusion

As with the two other Districts of the Eastern Province, Kono District was affected by the conflict since 1991 until the disarmament was declared complete in 2001. This 11-year conflict transformed the face of the District, which suffered heavily in terms of casualties, displacement of population and destruction of dwellings.

The District was first attacked in 1991 by RUF/NPFL forces coming from Kailahun District but those attacks were limited to the south-east, at the border with Kailahun District. During the following year, RUF/NPFL intensified their incursions into the District and progressively expanded their positions to attack Koidu, the headquarter town, by the end of 1992. SLA forces repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from Koidu at the beginning of 1993 and continued their "mopping up" operations throughout the year. By the middle of the year, they had dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from their main positions in the District. Around the same period, SLA forces had confined the RUF/NPFL forces to the extreme east of Kailahun District, which led Sierra Leoneans to think the war was over and the NPRC Chairman to unilaterally declare a ceasefire.

In late December, however, RUF forces launched a massive operation in the south of Kenema District. This operation clearly marked a new phase of the conflict, during which RUF forces spread across the whole country, using guerrilla warfare tactics. RUF forces re-entered Kono District in 1994 and gradually gained territory on SLA forces, whose number had considerably increased over 1994 but whose actions aimed at repelling the RUF forces had proved wholly ineffective. By April 1995, RUF forces captured Koidu Town for the second time, inflicting high casualties on civilians and destroying and vandalising the town. From Koidu, RUF forces spanned out mainly in the diamond areas around Koidu. Their progression in the District and their mining activities were stalled around May/June by the SLA assisted by CDF forces and, above all, by Executive Outcomes, the South African mercenary company in Sierra Leone under contract with the Government. The RUF forces were rapidly driven out of their positions and throughout the rest of the year and 1996, were mainly confined to the south-east of the District, while Executive Outcomes controlled most of the remainder of the District.

Following the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes by the end of January 1997, the Kono population was left in the hands of the RUF forces, in particular following their merging with the AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces, although mainly concentrated around Koidu, patrolled the chiefdoms, harassing civilians for food items and abducting civilians who were then forced to work at the mine sites for the RUF/AFRC forces. As the harassment and physical violence against civilians increased, youths and CDF members fought the RUF/AFRC forces in Koidu and recaptured the town early 1998.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces retreated into the Provinces and reached Kono District in late February 1998. They rapidly retook Kono and spread across the whole District, carrying out the "Operation No Living Thing". The rate of physical violence, mutilation, rape, killing, abductions for conscription, use as forced labour or for sexual purpose and



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the destruction of property reached unprecedented levels. This period, running from February to May/June, was characterised as the “reign of terror”. Although RUF/AFRC forces were also deployed across the Northern Province, where they carried out the same actions, Kono District suffered the most from this “Operation No Living Thing”, as RUF/AFRC forces clearly concentrated their operations on the main mining area. ECOMOG operations continued in the Provinces and by April 1998, ECOMOG forces had reached Kono District and recaptured the towns previously under RUF/AFRC control. RUF/AFRC forces continued their actions from the bush and abducted more civilians to conscript and train them in the new camp they had opened in the east of the District or to use them in the mining sites.

Violence began decreasing by June 1998. Around this period, hundreds of thousands of civilians had fled the District and RUF/AFRC forces were mainly engaged in large-scale mining operations. In late December, however, the RUF/AFRC regrouped and launched a massive operation on Koidu and other main towns in the west of the District, dislodging the ECOMOG forces from all their positions. The capture of Kono was the first step of a wider action, which reached its conclusion in the invasion of Freetown in January 1999.

Following the invasion of Freetown in January 1999, negotiations started between the Sierra Leonean President and the RUF leader in order to put an end to the conflict: A ceasefire was signed in May and a Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. This agreement did not end the conflict, as RUF/AFRC expanded their positions in the Northern Province and continued to be present in Kono District. RUF/AFRC forces pursued their mining activities in the District and violence was still inflicted on civilians. Local hunters in the north and the east of the District increased their attacks on RUF/AFRC forces but were often defeated. From 1999, however, the conflict got a new face, as it appeared RUF/AFRC forces planned to launch attacks onto the Guinean territory.

The number of civilians abducted and trained, in particular in “superman camp” in the east of the District clearly indicated that RUF/AFRC forces were preparing attacks onto the Guinean territory. Attacks on Guinea were launched in May 2000 and reached their peak in September. These attacks onto the Guinean territory were not isolated, for Guinea was also attacked from Kailahun and Kambia Districts.

In 2001, the CDF, backed up by Guinean authorities, engaged and defeated the RUF forces in the east of the country. They were halted in their progression through the intervention of Kono authorities and UN officials, in a bid to enforce the ceasefire renewed in Abuja. The disarmament process began shortly afterwards, an agreement to end illegal mining was reached and the war was officially over in the District by the end of 2001.



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E. Southern Province

a. Bo District

1. Introduction

Bo District is one of the four Districts composing the Southern Province together with Pujehun, Bonthe and Moyamba Districts. Its headquarter town, Bo Town, lies in its centre in Kakua Chiefdom. It is strategically located at a nodal crossroad, from which roads extend into the District in four directions.

Bordered on the east by Kenema District and in the south by Pujehun District, almost all the incursions would come from this direction following an east-west pattern. Its northern chiefdom, Valunia, shares a boundary with the central District of Tonkolili. Moyamba District on the north and Bonthe District on the south constitute its western edge.

There are 15 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Badjia	Ngelehun
Bagbe	Ngarlu
Bagbo	Jimi
Baoma	Baoma
Bumpeh	Bumpeh
Gbo	Gbo
Jiama Bongor	Telu
Kakua	Bo
Komboya	Njala
Lugbu	Sumbuya
Niawa Lenga	Nengbema
Selenga	Dambala
Tikonko	Tikonko
Valunia	Mongere
Wunde	Gboyama

Two roads leading to Bo Town allow its penetration from Pujehun Town, the principal road passing by Wunde Chiefdom and the secondary road passing by Bagbo Chiefdom. It was the secondary road that would find favour with the RUF/NPFL forces, who entered the District from Pujehun District in 1991. The main road in the District is the highway that links Freetown with Kenema Town. This feature would influence the conduct of the conflict, as it would be the setting of many ambushes and checkpoints. The relatively large number of roads accessible by vehicle would allow further RUF advances inland towards the Districts of Moyamba and Bonthe, even if the headquarter town, Bo Town on the Freetown-Kenema highway, would not be captured by RUF forces.

The Sewa River that flows from the south-west to the east, following one-third of the border with Kenema District, divides the District in two and would be the natural separation between the chiefdoms affected by the conflict during its first years.

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As Bo Town is the second largest city in Sierra Leone, trading and business are among the main activities of the District, as well as mining, particularly diamond mining in Jiama Bongor, Baoma, Tikonko and Lugbu Chiefdoms and cash crops such as rice, cocoa, coffee and palm oil. The mining production has however to be considered in the context of the whole country and in this regard, the production of the District comes rather far behind Kono District and the North of Kenema District.

The absence of external borders would make the District a safer haven for the inhabitants of Pujehun District, at least during the first years of the conflict, and different camps, often made of bush sticks and mud and hosting thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from other Districts, would be built in Bo District. Gondama (in the south of Kakua Chiefdom), at the junction between different chiefdoms, would host such a camp and would be severely affected during the conflict. Koribondo would be a strategic town during the conflict, due to its location at a crossroad between two strategic roads, the first running west-east and linking Bonthe District to Kenema District and the second running south-north and linking Pujehun District to Bo Town.

The main ethnic group is the Mende, renowned, among other things, for the importance of the traditional hunters in the society. Accordingly, the initiation of Kamajors, which had started in the Southern District of Bonthe, soon spread throughout Bo District, which would become a Kamajor stronghold.

Three different phases of the conflict can be clearly identified in Bo District. The first phase encompassed 1991 to 1993 and was characterised by the spreading of the RUF/NPFL forces from Pujehun District. However, only a few chiefdoms closest to Pujehun District were affected at this time, namely Bagbo, Lugbu, Jiama Bongor and Tikonko Chiefdoms. RUF/NPFL forces followed the same pattern when entering a village: they would gather people in the centre of the village, introduce themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem them from the APC regime; some members would stay in the villages while others would proceed further. Physical violence, killing, abductions, the taking of property - especially food - and the burning of houses were reported from the very first incursion. Starting in June 1991, the SLA forces based in Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and assisted by foreign troops contained these first attacks, repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from the District and patrolled in the areas previously under RUF/NPFL control, chasing "rebel" collaborators and encouraging the formation of vigilante groups. RUF/NPFL forces would later make sporadic raids in the District but did not settle in the District during this first stage.

The second phase spanned from 1994 to 1995, during which time the RUF had spread throughout the entire District. This phase saw the beginning of the organisation of youths and local hunters fighting alongside the SLA, although no formal initiations took place at this time. By the middle of 1995, SLA forces had retaken control of a large area south of Bo Town, although RUF forces still made repeated incursions and attacks, mainly in the chiefdoms on the east bank of the Sewa River and along the border with Kenema District. During this second phase, a lot of civilians were maltreated, killed, raped and abducted, a lot of houses were burnt, especially along the Kenema border, and property was taken away. These incidents were carried out mostly by RUF forces but by

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SLA forces as well. During this stage, the Freetown-Bo-Kenema highway was the setting of many ambushes, though the precise identity of the faction responsible could not always be ascertained.

The final phase ran from late 1995 to the end of the war, during which time the Kamajors were formally initiated and spread across the District. Although they initially fought alongside the SLA, their collaboration soon deteriorated and was almost nonexistent by the time of the Coup in May 1997. Fighting between those forces were reported and some SLA forces were suspected of collaborating with the RUF. The Kamajors nonetheless gained control of almost all the previous RUF strongholds in the District and during the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were only based in Koribondo and Bo Town. Following the ECOMOG deployment in the District in late February-early March 1998, no further RUF/AFRC incursion were reported, the District remaining under the Kamajors control who however harassed civilians, chasing, inflicting physical violence and killing people they suspected of being "Junta" and RUF collaborators.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Phase I: 1991 – 1993

RUF/NPFL forces entered the District in April 1991 through Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) in the south-west of Bo District. These forces arrived first in Bagbo Chiefdom, where they scattered throughout April, May and June. They reached Lugbu Chiefdom in June, where they stayed for some months before being repelled by SLA forces.

On or around 24 April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from the RUF base in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) known as "Kuwait" arrived in the headquarter town of Jimi (in the east of Bagbo Chiefdom), 42 miles south-west of Bo. The RUF/NPFL forces fired their weapons¹⁰⁶⁵ and gathered the people of the town for a meeting in the Court Barrie. At this meeting, they identified themselves as fighters from Liberia, trained in Burkina Faso and fighting for their leader to liberate the people of Sierra Leone. The RUF/NPFL forces gave the people of the village palm fronds as symbols of the revolution¹⁰⁶⁶ and warned them that if they ran, they would be deemed an "enemy" and shot. They took all the Paramount Chief's belongings, including his car, claiming he was an "APC chief". While there are no reported fatalities, they abducted the Paramount Chief's staff and recruited some 82 people, including young children.¹⁰⁶⁷

The RUF/NPFL forces remained in Jimi for approximately one week, after which the forces split into three groups. One group remained in Jimi and the second group headed north west towards Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom). On the way, at Mani Junction (Bagbo Chiefdom), this group split into two, with one group continuing on their way to Sumbuya and another group heading south for Bum Chiefdom in Bonthe District. The third group headed north-east in a push towards Niagorihun, passing successively through Limba and Levuma. Niagorihun occupies the strategic position of

¹⁰⁶⁵ The RUF/NPFL forces were armed with mortar bombs, AK47 rifles, Berettas, LMG, GPMG and grenades.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Palm fronds and leaves were considered to be a symbol of the SLPP (Sierra Leone People' Party), the opponent to the then APC regime of J.S. Momoh. Reports from Kenema also mentioned RUF/NPFL forces coming to the District with palm leaves round their wrists.

¹⁰⁶⁷ No mention is made of what happened to the staff of the Chief nor whether they were included in the 82 people abducted at this time.



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junction town on the road leading to Sumbuya, the commercial centre and headquarter town of Lugbu Chiefdom, and the road coming from Jimi, from where movement between the north-east to the south-west could be controlled.

The second group, who went to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom), stopped at Mani Junction in Momajoe on the way, where they encamped all the civilians at Lavekee compound and conscripted 85 boys and girls. In their address to the people, they made it clear that nobody should run in their presence or they would be classed as an "enemy" and would be shot on sight. Furthermore, the RUF/NPFL stated that they came more for the Fullahs and the Lebanese, who - according to them - contributed to the suffering of the masses.¹⁰⁶⁸ Thus, one Fullah businessman was tied to a stick and people were told to guard him until their return, under threat of indiscriminate killing in the area if anyone let him go.

Before leaving, they warned the population to have livestock ready for them when they passed through on their way back. They then split into two groups and left, one group going towards Bonthe District and the other continuing on their way to Sumbuya. Near Sumbuya, one young man was shot because he started running away when he saw the forces coming. One Lebanese businessman was killed at the wharf, another one was shot dead for refusing to open his store and four Lebanese people were abducted. The RUF/NPFL commander ordered his forces to take property from the town, including hundreds of bags of rice, many bags of onions, sugar and other items, including vehicles. All the property was taken back to Jimi by the young boys and girls who had been abducted when they had first arrived, some of whom were taken for training.

On their way back, the RUF/NPFL forces stopped in Momajoe and brought the man who had been tied up since they left before the assembled town, at which time the commander of the RUF/NPFL forces shot and killed him. They forced some of the townspeople to bury the body, which had started to cause panic among the inhabitants. While in Momajoe, the group that had gone to Bonthe District returned with property, including motorbikes, they had taken from the rice mill at Torma (Bum Chiefdom). They then left Momajoe and went back to Jimi with the property they had taken from Sumbuya and from Torma, some of which was then taken to the RUF base called "Kuwait" in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District).

The third group, who were heading north-east, continued along the road to Limba, passing through Manjama on the way, where they burnt down a number of houses. On their arrival in Limba, the RUF/NPFL forces gathered the people of the town for a meeting, in which they introduced themselves as trained Liberian mercenaries who had come to put down the APC regime. After this brief meeting, they continued on to Levuma, north of Limba, and later to Niagorihun Gateway, 7 miles north of Jimi, the meeting point of the main road to Sahn Malen and Sumbuya Lugbu Chiefdoms.

On 12 May 1991, SLA and the United Liberation Movement for Liberia (ULIMO) forces stationed in Koribondo (in the south of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) were deployed to Niagorihun to prevent the

¹⁰⁶⁸ The Fullah are one of the ethnic groups from Sierra Leone and were a particular target, as its members were known to be wealthy businessmen.



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RUF/NPFL forces from taking control of the town, which was successful. The RUF/NPFL forces made approximately four other attempts to take the town, returning each time to Jimi and passing through Limba on the way to Niagorihun, but each time they were repelled by the combined SLA and ULIMO forces. During the successive battles, both sides suffered heavy fatalities, including one of the RUF/NPFL commanders,¹⁰⁶⁹ and houses were burnt down as a result of the shelling.¹⁰⁷⁰ After their final attempt, they went back to Jimi and went on raiding missions in different towns in the chiefdom, taking what food they could find.

As a result of these battles, SLA and ULIMO forces based in Niagorihun began to move down the road towards Jimi, first taking control of Levuma and then moving on to Limba, where they established a base. The SLA and ULIMO forces, who were under SLA command, held a town meeting in the Court Barrie at which they established a curfew, set restrictions on people's movements and seized all the weapons in the town. During the following month, the SLA and ULIMO forces remained in Limba, from where they undertook covert reconnaissance missions to establish the extent of the RUF/NPFL strength in Jimi. They also went on food finding missions in nearby towns, which resulted in some skirmishes between SLA/ULIMO forces and RUF/NPFL forces.

On or around 16 June 1991, SLA and ULIMO forces launched a successful offensive with up to 250 troops to retake control of Jimi. During the battle in Jimi, the SLA and ULIMO forces killed six civilians who they believed to be "rebel" collaborators. RUF/NPFL forces coming from the direction of Pujehun District attempted several times to recapture Jimi but were unsuccessful. During these attempts, at least one house was burnt down as a result of the shelling, but no fatalities are reported. After they had recaptured Jimi, SLA forces maltreated civilians and hunted RUF collaborators. A number of people were killed because they were suspected of being "rebel" collaborators or because they came from "rebel-held" villages, although no investigations appear to have been held. Civilians who dealt with or hosted any RUF/NPFL forces, whether willingly or unwillingly, were tied up, beaten, made to look at the sun and, in some instances, killed.

In late June 1991, SLA forces launched a counter-attack to take control of Mano (Bagbo Chiefdom), which resulted in half of the town being occupied by the SLA forces and the other half of the town being occupied by the RUF/NPFL forces, although the exact dividing lines are not clear. Civilians in the town became the victims of both sides as each of the fighting factions accused them of aiding and abetting the other faction. Thus the SLA forces killed one boy, beat up the Town Chief and burnt down up to 45 houses. In return, the RUF/NPFL forces burnt down the remaining houses, killed 15 people and mutilated others.¹⁰⁷¹ Around this time, RUF/NPFL forces also attacked Sonehun Gola and Mano, west of Jimi on the way to Momajoe/Mani Junction. In Sonehun Golan, RUF/NPFL forces killed 10 people and in Mano, they killed two people and burnt down four houses.

¹⁰⁶⁹ It is reported that there were no civilian fatalities at this time.

¹⁰⁷⁰ It appears that the houses were not deliberately targeted, but were burnt down as an indirect result of the shelling.

¹⁰⁷¹ The records report that the people who were mutilated were "taken to Matru Jong or Bo for treatment", although it is not clear what this means.



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At the same time, SLA forces passed through Momajoe on the way to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom), where they remained for around two weeks, trying to assess the extent of territory controlled by the RUF/NPFL. At the beginning of July 1991, SLA forces regained control of Momajoe/Mani Junction, and were also established in Kasseh and Sumbuya. Sumbuya was an economic and trading centre and people were moving south of Sumbuya to buy food and other items, bringing them back to Sumbuya to trade. However, the SLA commander was uncomfortable with this movement of people, so people coming to Sumbuya from the south were considered to be “enemies” and were molested or put in cells for some days. This may in part be due to an incident that occurred on or around 10 July 1991: a military truck had an accident, which resulted in one SLA member falling off the truck and accidentally discharging his weapon. This led his companions to think they were under attack and they fired in the direction the shooting had come from, accidentally killing the soldier on the ground. The soldiers then fired at the vehicle to make their commander believe they had fallen into an ambush. Based on this report, the commander declared the zone north of Momajoe an “enemy zone” and ordered preparations for a full-scale invasion, including the order to shoot anybody they saw on sight. The following day, the invasion occurred from Golawoma to Tawamahehu, during which a lot of civilians were wounded, some of whom died in the bush due to lack of medical care.

One week later, the SLA commander required young men¹⁰⁷² in the surroundings of Momajoe¹⁰⁷³ to register for a vigilante group. After registration, they formed vigilante groups in the various towns and were assigned tasks by the SLA, including building huts, hunting and general cleaning tasks. Punishments for coming late or failing to do assigned duties included frog jump,¹⁰⁷⁴ rolling, being forced to lie down and look at the sun and imprisonment for a number of days.

In mid July 1991, SLA forces required civilians to lead them to Golapo Junction¹⁰⁷⁵ following a RUF/NPFL incursion in Kasseh, south of Momajoe, from Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District), during which two people were killed. They met stiff resistance from the RUF/NPFL forces and one of the SLA soldiers was killed. However, all the civilians escaped safely, as a result of which the SLA commander imposed more stringent rules on how to deal with civilians. Civilians who had any connection with RUF/NPFL forces, including mothers of people abducted by the RUF, were all classed as “rebels” and were treated accordingly. For example, in Mogbon, five miles east of Momajoe, two women were killed by gunshot wound to the vagina because they cooked food for their children who had returned from the RUF/NPFL base and failed to surrender to the SLA. One

¹⁰⁷² The ages of these people are not clear; they are variously described as “young men” and “youths”, which in the Sierra Leone context could be anywhere up to mid to late thirties, but probably does not include people under 14.

¹⁰⁷³ The towns are reported as being Momajoe, Golawoma, Mowei, Mossamgbahuò, Nyahgorihun (all north of Mamojoe); Temgbeleh, Largo, Maniwa, Mani, Bo, Tissana, Yegelleh, Fala (all south Momajoe); and Mojemai Kpongbalia and Golapo, east of Momajoe.

¹⁰⁷⁴ To “frog jump” or to “pump” is done by first holding on to the earlobes with two hands – the left hand holding the right ear lobe and vice versa – after which the person is required to jump up and down continuously on their haunches. This form of punishment was both physically and psychologically painful, because it is a punishment meted out mostly to children and it is considered shameful for an adult to be made to “pump”.

¹⁰⁷⁵ While not explicitly stated, it appears that the civilians were used to guide the SLA forces through the area rather than provide them with any sort of protection.



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man was killed because he said that the RUF/NPFL were planning to attack Momajoe. Two boys who came to Momajoe from Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) to buy salt were suspected of being “rebel” collaborators and were forced to chew their own penises before they were shot and killed. It is estimated that during this period, up to 48 people were killed by SLA forces because they arrived in Momajoe from a direction in which RUF/NPFL forces were believed to have bases.

The District remained under the control of the SLA/ULIMO forces, who engaged the RUF/NPFL forces from all flanks, pushing them north-easterly from Sumbuya and south from Jimi through Pujehun District back into Liberia. At this time, the main SLA base was still in Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and others had been established in Jimi, Sumbuya and Momajoe. Initially, SLA forces provided food and medicine to the civilian population, which led to good relations between them. Over time, however, civilians were forced to build camps for the SLA, were molested and flogged in public for failing to carry out the cleaning exercise and young girls were sexually harassed. A court structure was set up by the SLA and civilians were heavily fined for breaches, although it is not clear what law (if any) was applied in these courts. In November 1991, SLA forces started using civilians to mine diamonds in Niagorihun, where unidentified armed men killed 20 civilians.¹⁰⁷⁶ These events led to confusion within the population and to distrust of the SLA. At that time, civilians began to suspect that SLA soldiers were disguising themselves as RUF fighters and attacking villages.

During this time, from late 1991 to the end of 1992, the RUF/NPFL made sporadic incursions in Jimi and Limba (Bagbo Chiefdom) from Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District). They burnt seven houses in Limba and took away all the cattle in the town. One man was killed by his son in law, a member of the RUF, and his head was displayed along the road leading to Jimi. In addition, they launched some attacks in the area around Mano, in which some people were killed. However, RUF/NPFL forces did not manage to make any significant advances into Bo District and did not retake control of any territory.¹⁰⁷⁷

Foreign troops¹⁰⁷⁸ were based in Gondama (south of Kakua Chiefdom, at the border with Tikonko and Jiama Bongor Chiefdoms) and in early 1993, an influx of civilians from Pujehun District fleeing RUF forces came to Gondama through Koribondo on the advice of SLA forces in the District. Gondama would remain safe until November 1994, when RUF forces launched a major attack on the town.

In April 1993, RUF forces entered Sembehun, a mining area in Tikonko Chiefdom. The RUF forces were not wearing combat uniforms and many people did not realise they were RUF until they begin firing their weapons. The RUF forces went through houses looking for gold and diamonds and took many goods from the market place, including clothes and shoes. They then abducted a number of people to carry the stolen property, although they were not detained and were returned to Sembehun the same evening.

¹⁰⁷⁶ No further information is available on this attack or who the attackers were.

¹⁰⁷⁷ No news was made available on these attacks in the chiefdom (Bagbo) and people soon forgot about them.

¹⁰⁷⁸ These troops were either Guinean or Nigerian troops, posted in Sierra Leone in furtherance to bilateral treaties with Sierra Leone.



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In 1993, RUF forces embarked on road ambushes in Bagbo Chiefdom around Jimi, during which SLA forces and civilians suffered heavy casualties. In December 1993, during a meeting called by the SLA commander in Jimi to discuss the situation with chiefdom authorities, news broke out that a commercial vehicle had been attacked at Basaleh junction in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) between Jimmi Bagbo and Sahn Malen Chiefdoms.

B) Phase II: Late 1993 to 1995

From February 1994, the Freetown – Bo – Kenema highway was constantly ambushed by RUF and SLA forces, cutting off food supplies for towns like Bo and Kenema whose population was swollen by thousands of civilians seeking refuge. Convoy of trucks¹⁰⁷⁹ leaving Freetown were often ambushed.

Towards the end of 1993, RUF/NPFL forces regrouped in Malen Chiefdom (Pujehun District) and started launching heavy attacks on Bagbo Chiefdom, starting in Jimi. In addition, in October 1993, Koribondo was attacked and many civilians moved to Bo Town. As a result of this attack, the Director of the Gondama camp initiated a self-defence program, selecting youths as vigilantes to run checkpoints both day and night. By late 1993 or early 1994,¹⁰⁸⁰ SLA forces were to a large extent dislodged from Jimi, Sumbuya and Momajoe and re-established themselves in Koribondo. This SLA withdrawal gave room to the RUF/NPFL forces to go through Bagbo Chiefdom into Bonthe District, where they also pushed out the SLA forces present in Bum Chiefdom and gained access to Mattru Jong and from there the Sierra Rutile mining areas.

Most likely in early 1994,¹⁰⁸¹ upon receiving news that the war was approaching his chiefdom, the Regent Chief of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom decided that all the towns and villages of his chiefdom should mobilise their youths to guard their villages against the assailants. The old hunters were asked to give their guns to the youths and the youths and local hunters were trained, after permission was granted from the Resident Minister of Bo. Youths and local hunters from Boama and Bagbe Chiefdoms also organised themselves in a similar fashion. By June 1994, the training was complete and 2,800 men composed of youths and local hunters were issued with arms and ammunition.¹⁰⁸²

The RUF forces attacked Koribondo in March 1994, as a result of which troops on both sides were killed and one civilian was caught in the crossfire. At the time of the attack, the SLA had been sent to the town. Following the attack, a troop of Guinean soldiers came as reinforcements for the SLA forces.

¹⁰⁷⁹ These convoys could be very big, comprising up to 70 vehicles.

¹⁰⁸⁰ This information has to be read in conjunction with the attacks that started in December 1993 in Kenema District.

¹⁰⁸¹ No date is given for this meeting, but training took place in April 1994 as a result of this meeting, so it is likely these events took place in early 1994.

¹⁰⁸² This gathering of youths did not entail, at this time, the process of initiation within the Kamajor society. This initiation would begin in Bo District in 1995.



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In the early months of 1994, villages in different chiefdoms along the border with Kenema District were attacked by a small number of RUF forces, mainly for food finding purposes. For example, RUF forces entered Komboya Chiefdom in the north of Bo District by crossing the Sewa River from Kenema District. They arrived in a small village near the town of Gumahun, where the Trade Fair was situated. The RUF forces then entered Gumahun, apparently with the main intention of obtaining food, as they only took food items, palm oil, cattle and money. Before leaving, on the same night they entered, the RUF forces also burnt down three dwelling houses. SLA forces were stationed at that time at Njala (Komboya Chiefdom), but the RUF made their incursions before there was time to deploy those forces and, in addition, it is reported that the SLA forces there were themselves harassing civilians and taking away their food and property.

In 1994, most of the road ambushes were carried out by SLA forces, especially between Niagorihun and Grima (Tikonko Chiefdom), during which civilians were killed and their property stolen. These forces were referred to as "sobels", meaning members of the SLA who had joined forces with the RUF. The loss of confidence in the SLA, which had begun towards the end of 1991, thus continued to grow stronger in 1994. People relate that wherever SLA forces deployed to protect a town or a village, that town or village would be attacked by RUF forces shortly after their arrival.¹⁰⁸³ In April 1994, inhabitants of Lugbu Chiefdom who no longer felt safe moved to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom). Thus, the population of Bo Town swelled in 1994 and food became scarce.¹⁰⁸⁴

At some time in 1993,¹⁰⁸⁵ vigilante groups were established in Wunde Chiefdom (south-east of the District, at the border with Pujehun District), led by the former Regent Chief. In April 1994, RUF forces attacked Juhun (Wunde Chiefdom) twice and each time, people were killed, some houses were burnt and people were forced to carry the stolen property to Zimmi, near the border with Liberia in Pujehun District. Local hunters from Jiama Bongor Chiefdom sent to the border between Wunde and Jiama Bongor Chiefdoms fought with RUF forces. Four civilians are reported to have been killed in that fight and two houses were burnt down.

Many villages were attacked in 1994 in Wunde Chiefdom, property was taken, houses burnt, people killed and women raped. For example, in early 1994, RUF forces attacked Kambawana, a section headquarter town with 58 dwelling houses, causing many of the inhabitants to flee into the nearby bush. RUF forces set fire to the town, completely destroying 30 houses and damaging the remaining buildings, including by shooting at them. RUF forces killed or abducted most of the people who had remained in the village, including young children, and raped the women.¹⁰⁸⁶

In Boama Chiefdom, the youths and local hunters were mobilised in 1994 and established as a Territorial Defence Force (TDF) under the command of the chiefdom authorities in the town of

¹⁰⁸³ Cross reference to Bombali District, where people said the same thing.

¹⁰⁸⁴ It appeared that its population doubled in 1994, rising sharply from 450,000 inhabitants to roughly one million.

¹⁰⁸⁵ No month is given for the formation of the vigilante groups.

¹⁰⁸⁶ The bodies were left on the ground for some time, as a person who visited the village some time after this attack saw a number of skeletons lying on the streets. It is not clear when or where these skeletal remains were finally buried.



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Gerihun. The TDF was divided into two groups, one of which was sent to Jomu village and the other of which was sent to Kpatbu, both of which are on the border with Jaima Bongor Chiefdom. These towns were considered strategic points in the defence of Boama Chiefdom from the RUF forces fighting in Jaima Bongor Chiefdom.

Nevertheless, in May 1994, RUF forces coming from Kenema District, most likely from their base of Camp Zogoda,¹⁰⁸⁷ continuously attacked villages behind the Sewa River in Boama Chiefdom. In all these attacks, civilians were killed, women raped, houses burnt, property stolen and people abducted, including underage children. For example, in Tugbedu, two civilians were killed and four houses were burnt; in Sandia, one pregnant woman was killed; and in Kpatobu, three young men were killed, five houses burnt and a lot of property taken. In Keigbai village, one civilian was killed, women raped, three houses burnt down, property was taken and over 200 people abducted. Also in May 1994, RUF forces coming from the direction of Mile 30 on the old Koribondo-Blama (Small Bo Chiefdom, Kenema District) highway attacked Gordi (Jaima Bongor Chiefdom), burnt five buildings, including the school, and took sheep and goats away with them. No fatalities were reported at this time.

On hearing that the chiefdom headquarter of Telu (Jaima Bongor Chiefdom) had come under heavy attack in June 1994, local hunters and youths from Gbaama mobilised themselves and went to Telu. On their arrival in Telu, they discovered the 70 bodies of local hunters and youths in front of the Regent Chief's residence, which was damaged.¹⁰⁸⁸ Twenty civilians were found dead from bullet wounds. The survivors of the attack on Telu, including the Regent Chief, fled to Bo, Gerihun and other places for safety.

Similarly to the other chiefdoms at the border with Kenema District, RUF forces first entered Badjia Chiefdom in mid 1994 mainly to find food. However, these food-finding missions were also accompanied by the burning of houses and huts and the killing of civilians. In Pendebu, one old man was shot dead and one hut was set on fire. Each time they came to find food, the RUF forces were very small in number.

In August 1994, the Town Chief of Geima¹⁰⁸⁹ (Jaima Bongor Chiefdom) arrived in Koribondo with two youths whose hands had been cut off. He reported that RUF forces had attacked Geima, dumped 40 civilians in wells, killed nine men, three children and eight women, burnt down 30 houses and forced people to carry their stolen property to Zimmi, which is on the border with Liberia in Pujehun District.

That same month, RUF forces again attacked Jimi and over 20 civilians were killed and up to 50 were abducted, allegedly being taken away to "Kuwait", the RUF base in Pujehun District. Another attack took place in September, during which an SLA officer was killed. After this incident, the SLA

¹⁰⁸⁷ Camp Zogoda was located in Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District) and was operational throughout 1994-95 before being overrun by SLA and Kamajors in 1996. For further information, see Kenema District.

¹⁰⁸⁸ It is not clear how the Regent Chief's house was damaged or how the local hunters were killed.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Geima is on the Koribondo-Sumbuya Highway, the main route from Kenema District to Bonthe District through Bo District.



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intensified their search for RUF collaborators and many civilians were killed by SLA forces on this basis, including the Town Chief. During this period, up to 190 houses in Jimi were burnt down, with the exception of the Primary and Secondary Schools; civilians were killed; and many young people were abducted. Cases of rapes are mentioned and it is reported that three girls were raped on the road between Jimi and Kanga, west of Jimi. Houses were looted and people were injured with machetes in Mano; there are also reports of amputations at this time.

At the same time, the RUF forces began attacking the towns that had been left by the SLA, particularly in Niagorehun, Sumbuya, Towamaheahun and Lower and Upper Saama in the west of Lugbu Chiefdom on the road between Sumbuya and Niagorehun. During these attacks, many civilians were killed and raped and houses were burnt down. In Sumbuya, over 100 houses were burnt, including the residence of the Paramount Chief, and over 150 houses were burnt in Niagorehun.

In September 1994, RUF forces attacked Momajoe and its environs (Bagbo Chiefdom), meeting little resistance from the SLA forces based at Mani Junction. During this attack, one boy and one local hunter, who had been pointing his gun at the RUF forces, were killed in separate incidents. Property was taken away from people and around 20 young men were forced to carry that property to RUF bases in Malen Chiefdom.

Njala (Komboya Chiefdom in the north of Bo District), which is a hub for the flow of produce such as palm oil, rice, groundnuts, kola nuts, coffee and cacao during marketing seasons, was attacked in September 1994.¹⁰⁹⁰ Five civilians were killed and houses were looted and then burnt down. The RUF forces attacking the town came from the east, most likely along the road from Kenema District through Gumahun and Naigolehun. The RUF forces left the town the same day as they had arrived.¹⁰⁹¹

Also in September¹⁰⁹² 1994, a large number of RUF forces, most of them dressed in plain clothes with red headbands and commanders in uniforms with steel helmets, entered the chiefdom headquarter town of Ngelehun (Badjia Chiefdom),¹⁰⁹³ firing heavily. Although no deaths were reported, many women and children were abducted and forced to carry stolen property. RUF forces came back later and abducted many more people. In Badjia Chiefdom, few people were killed but thousands were abducted and forced to join the RUF movement, whereupon many people fled to Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom). Progressively, the villages and towns of Badjia Chiefdom became

¹⁰⁹⁰ Njala is at the foot of a steep mountain on top of which there was rumoured to be a RUF establishment called Bokurr, which was a large training camp and the sometime residence of the RUF leader. Sounds of helicopters were heard over the mountain every two days during 1995, although the duration when the helicopters were flying was unspecified

¹⁰⁹¹ Indeed, at the same period, RUF forces had reached Wandor Chiefdom (Kenema District) that lies at the east of Komboya Chiefdom.

¹⁰⁹² Reports mention two different dates for this attack, September and December. Although open sources could not confirm the date, it is likely that this attack took place in the aftermath of the one at Njala (Komboya Chiefdom) in September.

¹⁰⁹³ The land of Badjia and Komboya Chiefdoms was rich in food and the place was ideal as it is a hilly area, far from the main road.



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empty, as RUF forces made various incursions and attacks throughout the chiefdom and people sought refuge in larger towns like Kenema or Bo or in the bush.

The chiefdom headquarter of Ngarlu (Bagbe Chiefdom) was also attacked by RUF forces,¹⁰⁹⁴ using a method worth describing in more detail. The RUF assailants gathered the inhabitants in the Court Barrie and asked the Town Chief to send messages around the farms calling all the people to come at once. People were forced to sit on the floor with their legs stretched out in front of them. The RUF members explained to the people that those among them who were in uniforms with helmets on were Burkina Faso fighters while those in other clothes and red headbands were RUF members. Under heavy guard, some of them took young women and girls into a house and raped them. As these rapes were going on, the old people were separated from the youths and other RUF members searched the houses. After collecting items from the houses, they set the town on fire. One hundred and fifty youths were told to carry the things they had collected from the houses for the RUF forces. As it was time for the third Muslim prayer, they fired shots above the heads of the gathered civilians, dropped young babies and trampled on them and hit screaming children on their heads. Many young people, including children and teenagers, were abducted during this attack, most likely for recruitment purposes although their fate remains unknown. People who had escaped to the bush and returned the following morning discovered burnt houses, property missing and 25 bodies in the town and others in the nearby bushes, including adults, children and babies, whose heads had been crushed. Ten of the bodies were buried in one grave in the centre of the town, three in another one and four in a third grave.

Valunia, the northernmost chiefdom in Bo District, was first touched by the conflict in late 1994. In October, November and December, RUF forces and SLA forces were present for the first time in the three biggest towns. In early October 1994, SLA forces came by truck to the town of Baomahun, towards the north in the centre of the chiefdom, from Tekoh Barracks in Makeni (Bombali District). The SLA forces explained to the population that they had come to search for RUF forces based in Kangari Hills¹⁰⁹⁵ in Tonkolili District, from where they believed RUF forces would make an attack on Valunia Chiefdom. However on their return, very few soldiers were to be seen on the trucks. At around that time, foreigners who were operating the gold mines left the town, allegedly poisoning the food and drink in their quarters as they believed the SLA forces would be back to steal their property. Later in October 1994, SLA forces attacked Baomahun, taking a lot of property from the gold mining quarters and the town in general. The SLA forces spent some time in the quarters, drinking what was left by the expatriates who had fled earlier. Trucks loaded with food and other items were brought to Tekoh Barracks. A few days later, information reached the civilians that SLA soldiers were found dead in the forest and that wives and children of those SLA members at Tekoh Barracks were also dead, as a result of the poison the expatriates put in their food and drinks before leaving.

¹⁰⁹⁴ This event was described as happening in June 1994 but also as taking place after Njala (Komboya Chiefdom) and Ngelehun (Badjia Chiefdom) had been attacked, which took place probably in September. Accordingly, this attack was probably carried out around September.

¹⁰⁹⁵ The Kangari Hills are to be found mainly in Tonkolili District but also lie in Valunia Chiefdom. The RUF base, however, was located in Tonkolili District.



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Due to the persistent attacks on Bagbe Chiefdom, up to 600 villagers came and settled in Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom), which also hosted displaced people from Komboya and Badjia Chiefdoms after the attacks on the headquarters towns of Njala and Ngelehun respectively. Following this influx of civilians, UNHCR established a displaced camp in Gerihun, under the protection of SLA forces and Special Security Division Police.

In November 1994, RUF forces coming from Camp Zogoda¹⁰⁹⁶ in Kenema District attacked Gerihun twice. Both times, they were repelled but promised that they would not be satisfied until Gerihun was captured. In June 1995, the RUF forces returned in large numbers, attacking the town on three sides and retaking control of both the town and the IDP camp. Over 100 displaced people were killed in the camp either by shooting or by being drowned in the Beibei River. Property was taken from booths, namely huts made from bushsticks and covered with greenery for shelter, which were then set on fire. At that time, the SLA forces asked the fleeing civilians to come to their base for protection as they had sent someone to Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom) to ask for reinforcements, although it is not clear whether reinforcements were on the way.

While up to 1,000 civilians went to the base, the whole town including the military base was soon taken over.¹⁰⁹⁷ The SLA forces withdrew to an unknown destination and more people were killed, some as a result of RPG firing by RUF forces as they entered the town. Every house in the town was searched and looted. Over 200 civilians were told to carry the stolen property to the RUF base at Camp Zogoda in Kenema District. Before leaving the town, the RUF forces set the IDP camp on fire. Among those people who had to carry the property, few came back and the rest have not been seen since. Shortly after the RUF forces left, SLA forces returned with reinforcements, firing indiscriminately. After they arrived, they made the population bury the people who had been killed by the RUF forces when they had attacked the town.

During the same period, women and children who had left Bagbe, Komboya and Badjia Chiefdoms were killed on their way to Kenema District. When they had stopped at the chiefdom headquarter of Boajibu (Simbaru Chiefdom, Kenema District) and sought shelter in a large house, RUF forces set the house on fire.¹⁰⁹⁸

Monghere (Valunia Chiefdom), south-west of Baomahun at the junction between the road from Moamahun and the road from Bare in the north-west of the chiefdom, was attacked in November 1994. RUF forces believed to come from their base in Bokurr raided the town. They took people's property, in particular domesticated animals such as goats and sheep, before burning down nearly all the houses in the town. They abducted some people, forcing them to carry the stolen property. These people later escaped. While there were no reported fatalities, a number of people suffered gunshot wounds.

¹⁰⁹⁶ The camp was mentioned on the ID card found on a dead RUF member.

¹⁰⁹⁷ One key person said that an RUF member advised them to move from the SLA base to a safer place because the SLA forces were "fooling" people and were fighting together with the RUF.

¹⁰⁹⁸ No further information could be obtained on this event, which was not mentioned in relation to Kenema District.



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In December 1994, RUF forces attacked the town of Mandu, towards the south of Valunia Chiefdom along the road from Monghere. RUF forces set fire to all the houses in the town, took property, including food and valuables, and forced civilians to carry the property they had taken. The civilians were later released after the RUF forces had reached villages allegedly near their bases. SLA forces based at Grima junction,¹⁰⁹⁹ north of Mandu along the road to Monhere, arrived in the town after the RUF forces had left the town and some of them also took property belonging to civilians, although others assisted in putting out the fires in the town.

Another example of the attacks on Wunde Chiefdom in 1994 is the assault on Niagorehun in the south of the chiefdom, which was attacked by RUF forces in December 1994. Windows and doors of the houses were broken, houses ransacked and people forced to carry their property; people who refused were shot on the spot. Young girls were raped and young boys, most of them below 10 years old, were abducted. Many civilians were killed, such as one pregnant woman who refused to have sex with one of the fighters.

Later, towards the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995, RUF forces came back to Bagbe Chiefdom, this time arriving from the south. Given the location of Ngarlu at a junction, RUF forces planned to establish a base there. They drove the people out of the chiefdom by burning the main towns like Madina, Gibina, Blama, Kpetewoma, Kpakoh and Mano. Prominent people were also killed, including a schoolteacher of Blama who refused to be a teacher for their forces. Some people went into hiding and others went to Bo Town or Kenema Town (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District). Their arrival in Bo corresponded with the initiation of Kamajors starting in 1995.

Benduma (in the south of Bagbe Chiefdom) was overcrowded with civilians fleeing from the Sewa River, where RUF forces were settled; from the headquarter town of Ngarlu; and from Komboya Chiefdom. Villages in the area were surrounded by RUF forces and attacks were always imminent. In December 1994, five people were instantly shot dead by RUF forces arriving in Benduma. During the same visit, they raped women, stole property and forced young men to carry that property to the RUF base in Ngallu. Benduma was of interest as it was rich in food and animals. Benduma was also the largest town in the chiefdom, where the Paramount Chief lived.

However, the most striking wave of attacks that affected Bo District as a whole is the one that took place in December 1994 with the attack on the Gondama IDP camp, followed by attacks on the main towns in the centre of the District during the Christmas week.

In December 1994, RUF forces attacked Gondama camp, south of Kakua Chiefdom.¹¹⁰⁰ The attack on Gondama Camp, where thousands of people from Pujehun and Bo Districts had found refuge,

¹⁰⁹⁹ Note that while the records refer to it as "Grima junction" and "Grima town", the UNHCR maps have it named "Geima".

¹¹⁰⁰ It has to be noted that there is little information for Kakua, Tikonko and Bumpe Chiefdoms from 1993 to 1995, as almost all the civilians at that time were living either in the bushes or in displaced camps, such as Gondama camp. For example, the only information about Kakua Chiefdom, during this time, besides the December 1994 attacks, is that in July 1995, SLA forces and local hunters launched successful attacks on RUF forces in Kakua Chiefdom, resulting in the death of many RUF fighters.



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was a shock for the population. At the time of the attack, on 24 December 1994, only a few ECOMOG troops were posted at Gondama,¹¹⁰¹ where an estimated 80,000 people had sought refuge. Between 200 and 400 civilians were killed, either by drowning in the Sewa River or as a result of bullet wounds. ECOMOG troops repelled the RUF forces about one week later and the camp was transferred temporarily to Bo Town. During this time, both RUF and SLA forces raided the camp, taking property that had been left behind. In January 1995, the camp was declared safe¹¹⁰² and people were asked to come back, which they did. Nevertheless, throughout 1995 the situation was difficult, as RUF forces had blocked the main highway between Bo and Freetown, thereby cutting off a main route for the supply of food. People died on a daily basis from malnutrition and cholera broke out; some relief was provided when the route was reopened in October 1995.

After their attack on Gondama, RUF forces then moved on to make their first attack on Tikonko Town (Tikonko Chiefdom) on 25 December 1994, arriving at around 3.00 pm, killing many civilians and burning and looting many houses. At the same time, other villages in the chiefdom were also attacked. At Sengema riverside, one young man was killed and another was shot in the leg. Civilians fled in large number to Mattru on the Rail (Tikonko Chiefdom),¹¹⁰³ intensifying the panic in the town.

On 26 December 1994, RUF forces attacked Mattru on the Rail (Tikonko Chiefdom) in the afternoon, mutilating civilians' arms and legs. The RUF then opened sporadic gunfire on the civilians, killing many people, looting their property and burning down their houses. They also abducted civilian youths who they conscripted into the RUF forces. In the morning before this attack, 40 fully armed men wearing military uniforms entered the town, claiming to be Government forces coming to protect Mattru on the Rail. However, when RUF forces who identified themselves to the civilians as such attacked the town, these Government forces were nowhere to be found.

Bo Town was attacked on 27 December 1994 for the first time by RUF forces passing through the New London quarter. Prior to this attack, fleeing civilians from Mattru on the Rail and Tikonko Town had told residents of Bo Town that the RUF were bent on attacking Bo Town. The authorities of the town organised youths to erect checkpoints, which were controlled by these youths as a precautionary move in the event of an RUF attack. Thus, the youths who had mobilised themselves repelled the RUF forces out of the town. Few civilians were killed, few houses burnt and few youths abducted during this attack.

Bumpeh Town (Bumpeh Chiefdom), in the far west of Bo District, was attacked three times between December 1994 and June 1995. RUF forces coming from the north of Bumpeh attacked the town for the first time in December 1994, probably during the same wave of attacks against Bo Town, Tikonko Town and Mattru on the Rail. During this attack, few houses were burnt and some property was taken. Some girls were raped and people were abducted. The Regent Chief from

¹¹⁰¹ It appears that on 22 December, the ECOMOG troops were ordered to go to Bo to provide security for a carnival that was planned, leaving only 11 soldiers in the camp.

¹¹⁰² It is not clear who declared the camp to be safe, but ECOMOG continued to provide protection at the camp, so it is possible it was ECOMOG.

¹¹⁰³ As opposed to Mattru on the Jong, which is in Bonthe District.



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Mattru Jong tried to hide from the RUF forces in the Tabal River, but accidentally drowned. As had happened in Mattru on the Rail prior to the RUF attack, forces claimed to be SLA forces had come to the town, asserting they were waiting for reinforcements following the previous attacks on Tikonko, Mattru on the Rail and Bo Town. However, when the RUF forces entered the town, those forces were nowhere to be found.

The attack on these major towns in the District was perceived by the population as an indication that the RUF were now a strong force not only in the eastern and northern parts of the country but also in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone.¹¹⁰⁴

Gbo, Selenga and Niawa Lenga Chiefdoms, north of Kakua Chiefdom, were not affected by the war before 1995, following the wave of attacks on Gondama, Bo and Tikonko Town in December 1994.

In January 1995, RUF forces reached Gbo Chiefdom through Bumpeh Chiefdom. The first village they attacked was Nagbana, on 3 January, killing people, raping women and taking away cattle. On hearing that they were approaching the headquarter town of Baiama, the Paramount Chief reported the threat to the SLA's Bo Brigade Headquarter. However, no action was taken by the SLA to prevent the attack on Baiama, which took place on 4 January 1995. People were gathered in the Court Barrie, beaten and kicked by the RUF forces. Six people were killed, houses looted, cattle taken and over 20 houses were burnt. On the same day, Mokeilendeh was also attacked. Confusion arose in the mind of the civilians since uniformed men came to Baiama on 6 January 1995 telling people they were Government forces but, shortly after, left the town. People did not know to which government they were belonging, particularly because the RUF was now calling itself a "Government".

RUF forces attacked Baiama a second time on 8 January 1995, killed people, burnt some houses and abducted some people who were released shortly after. After the attack, SLA forces came from Bo to Baiama, after the Paramount Chief made another appeal to the SLA Brigade Commander. However, these SLA forces, who did not stay long, took all the cattle of the town.

The headquarter town of Dambala (Selenga Chiefdom), about 12 miles north of Bo Town, was also attacked in January 1995 by RUF forces coming from the direction of Negbenah, which is four miles east of Dambala. This time as well, SLA forces who were based in the town were nowhere to be found at the time of the attack. During the attack, RUF forces killed approximately three people and burnt down up to 110 houses.

In January 1995, RUF forces attacked the SLA forces based in Grima (Valunia Chiefdom) and overpowered them. Attacks on SLA positions were frequent, including on their bases in Mandu and Monghere (Valunia Chiefdom). Throughout 1995, civilians hiding in the bush were tracked down either by RUF or SLA forces. RUF forces were raiding villages and hunting civilians in the bush, mainly for food. Civilians were maltreated as RUF forces beat them, dripped melted plastic on them, raped women and, frequently, young girls, and forced people to have sexual intercourse with

¹¹⁰⁴ Also during the Christmas week, Kenema Town and Magburaka (Tonkolili District headquarter) were attacked.



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members of their own family. Young people were taken away and some people were killed, such as one man who was killed so the RUF forces could take his animals. Another incident concerns a young farmer who had his fingers cut off when the RUF forces discovered he had set traps to get meat.

Negbema, 16 miles from Bo Town in Niawa Lenga Chiefdom, which adjoins Selenga Chiefdom to the north-east, was also attacked in January 1995. At the time of the attack, no SLA forces or local militia were based in the town. RUF forces, as they identified themselves to the civilians,¹¹⁰⁵ burnt down houses and abducted young boys. Another attack took place later during the year, probably in May 1995, during which the RUF forces burnt down more houses, killed some people and abducted some young girls. In August 1995, SLA forces came to protect the town. However, according to civilians, they were more thieves than liberators as they were taking away all the food from civilians.

The SLA forces took property from civilians in Valunia Chiefdom, including food items and livestock, claiming it was on orders. They also forced civilians to work for them, including requiring drivers to carry items for them. Anyone who refused would be punished, often by being verbally abused or beaten. The only secondary school, in Koyeima, was completely vandalised; the furniture, steel windows and doors were removed and, for the most part, taken to Bo Town, either to be sold or to be used by the SLA forces based there. In addition, checkpoints were set up in the town and operated both by SLA soldiers and by civilians. People were stopped at checkpoints and faced being "booked", i.e. fined, for failure to carry the correct identity cards, among other things.

Momajoe and its environs (Bagbo Chiefdom) were again attacked in January 1995 but no mention is made of casualties at this time. RUF forces deposed all the chiefs and elected new ones, although it is not clear how these elections took place. The area was divided into two operational zones, with one command post at Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom) and another post in Momajoe (Bagbo Chiefdom). Soon after their arrival, RUF forces made civilians work for them, in particular to carry property taken from one town to another town and to carry wounded RUF members back to their bases. In addition, RUF forces threw civilians out of their houses so that the forces could occupy them and forced civilians to feed them. Salt was the most expensive condiment, for which people were killed. No civilian was allowed to eat proper food, which led to the death of children from malnutrition. Any civilian refusing to obey orders from the RUF forces was killed and it is suggested that rapes also occurred around this time.¹¹⁰⁶ RUF forces remained in control of Momajoe and its environs for around 9 months, up to the end of 1995.

In 1995, "loyal"¹¹⁰⁷ SLA forces began attempting to dislodge RUF forces from Bagbo Chiefdom but harassed civilians, taking away all the property that was hidden in the bush.

¹¹⁰⁵ It is reported that the commander of the RUF forces who identified them to the civilians was approximately 15 years old.

¹¹⁰⁶ Key persons talk about marital homes being "broken up".

¹¹⁰⁷ At this time, the key persons speak of "loyal SLA forces", who were believed to be loyal to the Government and "sobels", who were SLA forces believed to be in collusion with the RUF.



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In February 1995, Njala (Komboya Chiefdom) was attacked for the second time by RUF forces using a bypass route through Kundorma and Pelewahun rather than the route through Gumahun and Naiagolehun. SLA forces were based in Njala but were overpowered. Some civilians were killed and others were forced to carry property that was taken from the town. Those who were abducted travelled to Kpelewama (Valunia Chiefdom), where the RUF had a settlement and then moved to Kpetema, which is located near their main base, Bokurr, in Valunia Chiefdom. On their way to the base, civilians who were unable to keep up were shot dead and some women were raped. In Kpelewama, the RUF forces opened fire, killing one woman and her child before cutting her head off. After they arrived in Kpetema, all the remaining civilians were released, allegedly because RUF forces did not authorise civilians to come to their base.

During the RUF attack on Njala, the commander in charge of the SLA forces was killed by one of his subordinates, allegedly because he was a "loyal" SLA member. After the death of this commander, SLA forces relocated to Mendewa, three miles outside of Njala. From there, they occasionally returned to Njala, stealing property from the people of Njala and surrounding areas. In one incident, SLA forces came to Njala with a truck, opened fire as they entered and loaded their truck with food and non-food items. The SLA forces were at this time using the word "clearing" to refer to the taking of property in the town.

Since the SLA forces had completely left Njala, the RUF forces used this road to travel from the East to the West up to Gbaama and back. On their way, they were harassing civilians, taking food and forcing them to carry it for the RUF forces to their base at Bokurr, on top of the mountain near Njala.

Thus, starting in 1994 up to 1995, the whole of Komboya Chiefdom was affected by both RUF and SLA activities. Civilians living in the bushes in sorkoihun¹¹⁰⁸ were chased by RUF forces for food. Civilians were also killed for various reasons during this period, including for failing to show the RUF forces where other civilians were hiding. In other incidents, a man was amputated between Bauya and Tibor, seven houses were burnt down in Tibor and four civilians were killed at Talla II.¹¹⁰⁹

In 1995, RUF forces coming mainly from Bumpah and Lugbu Chiefdoms were attacking villages and sorkoihun in Tikonko Chiefdom. Property was taken, houses burnt, civilians killed and young people abducted. At Wotebehun, north of Baoma in the south-west of Tikonko Chiefdom, three men and two women were shot and killed, sheep belonging to a chief were taken away and some houses were burnt. At Yegensa, one man was killed and his body tied to a tree. At Buewama, people were killed and houses and a mosque were burnt. At Kassama, two and a half miles from Baoma, RUF forces killed two people, which the SLA forces based there made no attempt to stop. In June 1995 at Baoma, which is on the Sewa River in the south-west of Tikonko chiefdom, RUF forces entered the town from the direction of Kassama (to the north of Baoma) and stayed there for two days. RUF forces threw some people into the Sewa River, where some drowned, and killed many others.

¹¹⁰⁸ This refers to hiding places in the bushes, also spelled "sorquehun".

¹¹⁰⁹ No further details are available on any of these incidents.



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The same scenario was repeated in many places in 1995, including Buewama, Kassama, Sembahun Tabema, Benehun, Shengema and Mano Bembehteh, which are all in the south of the chiefdom, and Dodo, Faikundor, Foidu, Samie Tabaima, which are all around Tikonko Town. In all of these attacks, many young men and women were abducted, including people who were underage. Civilians identified the assailants as RUF forces, dressed in jeans and t-shirts and some having red pieces of cloth tied around their heads.

From March to June 1995, SLA forces were deployed in Dodo (Tikonko Chiefdom). However, these forces harassed civilians, molested them, took their property and killed alleged “rebel” collaborators. On one occasion, they cut off the head of a suspected collaborator, put it on a stick and went to every house asking for some money as a sign of appreciation for their job. Tikonko Town itself was attacked for the second time in June 1995 but civilians had already fled the town. Dodo was also attacked by RUF forces in June 1995. People were shot and killed, among them the Town Chief’s son, and some were seriously wounded with knives. All of Dodo, except the mosque and a few houses, was burnt.

The second attack on Bumpeh Town (Bumpeh Chiefdom) took place between March and April 1995, with the third one occurring in June. The March attack on Bumpeh was part of a massive RUF operation in the chiefdom allegedly in retaliation for the killing of RUF members by SLA forces in the Sierra Rutile Mining area in nearby Moyamba District. The attacks on different villages in the chiefdom left over 100 civilians dead within a few days.¹¹¹⁰ During the third attack on Bumpeh Town, many people were abducted, at which time civilians were told that the RUF needed more people to be trained. In addition, a lot of people were killed, more people were tortured, some had their hands amputated and young girls and women were raped. Some people were burnt alive in a house.¹¹¹¹

Starting in July 1995, SLA forces regained control over the area and the surrounding chiefdom of Tikonko during a massive “mopping up” operation.¹¹¹² During their operation in Bumpeh Town in early July 1995, SLA forces claimed to have killed a lot of RUF members but no other source of information could confirm the fatalities. However, it is clear¹¹¹³ that from July 1995, SLA forces retook control of a large area south of Bo Town, inflicting serious defeats on the RUF for the first time since the start of the second phase of the conflict.¹¹¹⁴

However, SLA control over an area never guaranteed the absence of RUF attacks, which were often carried out by pockets of forces disseminated in various areas. For example, Yengema was attacked

¹¹¹⁰ AFP, 26 April 1995.

¹¹¹¹ The precise figures of the casualties could not be obtained.

¹¹¹² It was not, however, totally clear when those SLA forces first arrived in the town as there are suggestions that some SLA members were already deployed at the time of the third attack.

¹¹¹³ Amnesty International Report, “Sierra Leone – Human Rights abuses in a war against civilians – 13 September 1995”.

¹¹¹⁴ This military victory has to be read in conjunction with the recent military training the SLA received from the Executive Outcomes, the South African mercenary company contracted by the Sierra Leonean Government. Similar “mopping up” operations were carried out in Moyamba District and, shortly after, in Bonthe District.



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in September and 60 civilians were put in five houses that were set on fire; in addition, RUF forces killed a lot of civilians at Serabu. However, after these last attacks, Bumpéh Town and the entire chiefdom were free from an RUF presence. That same month, SLA forces who had gone to repel RUF forces in other town in the chiefdom, namely Kpakema and Serabel, returned with seven captured RUF members.¹¹¹⁵ These RUF members were paraded in Bo Town before they were killed and burnt in front of the NPRC Secretariat, which was witnessed by a large crowd. The bridge in Bumpéh Town divided the town in two distinct living areas, one being for the civilians and the other one for the SLA forces. Shortly after, the SLA commander exhorted civilians to come out of the bushes.

In July 1995, RUF forces coming from Simbaru Chiefdom (Kenema District) launched attacks on Badjia, Bagbe and Komboya Chiefdoms, where over 40 towns and villages were destroyed and, in total, 50 civilians were killed. The armed men who carried out the attacks were dressed in full military uniforms.

The following month, panic broke out in Gondama IDP camp (Kakua Chiefdom) as people feared another RUF attack was taking place. People were running around the camp and during the confusion, ECOMOG forces fired a heavy weapon, which resulted in the death of eight civilians. ULIMO soldiers came as reinforcements from Bo Town and on their way to Gondama, arrested two boys who they believed were former RUF members. The two boys were killed immediately, one of them having his genital organ cut off before being killed and the other one being beaten and tied up. Both were thrown into the Sewa River.

A second attack on Dambala (Selenga Chiefdom) took place in August 1995 but unlike the first one, SLA forces fought the RUF forces and repelled them. Up to 30 people, identified as "strangers" passing through the village on their way to Bo, were killed during this attack, possibly by SLA forces at checkpoints, and were buried in a mass grave. Another attack took place in the nearby village of Joru, four miles from Dambala, but this time, RUF forces did not use their weapons. Rather, they hit people on their heads with stones until they died, claiming they were doing it to save their ammunition. RUF forces also burnt down up to 20 houses during this attack.

By the middle of 1995, the situation in Bo District was divided in two: while SLA forces had retaken control of a large area in the west of the District, minimising RUF activities in that area, the large eastern area was still severely affected by RUF incursions carried out mainly from other Districts.

c) Phase III: Late 1995 to 1997 and beyond¹¹¹⁶

The initiation of Kamajors began in mid to late 1995; rapidly, all the chiefdoms had their own Kamajors. They were initially armed with single barrel guns, sticks and spears.¹¹¹⁷ Furthermore,

¹¹¹⁵ It seems that the SLA forces recaptured those towns.

¹¹¹⁶ Little information was available on events in 1998 to 2001, because the District was under Kamajor control and no further RUF/AFRC attacks were reported.

¹¹¹⁷ It should be noted that compared to other Districts in the South, the records reveal little information on CDF activities, in particular on atrocities they may have committed. It is unclear whether this meant that fewer violations



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except in Bagbo and Lugbu Chiefdoms and a camp in Valunia Chiefdom, it should be noted that RUF forces did not have bases in Bo District where, unlike other Districts in the south, they were entering sporadically from other Districts.

In mid to late 1995, the idea of initiation came up in Bumpeh Chiefdom¹¹¹⁸ and people were sent to Bo Town for that purpose. After their initiation, Kamajors went back to Bumpeh Chiefdom, in the far west of Bo District, where they worked for some time hand-in-hand with SLA forces based in Bumpeh Town. While sent by the SLA commander to get some food in Nyayahun, north of Bumpeh Town, Kamajors came under fire. The identity of the men attacking the Kamajors proved to be SLA forces who had started developing a camp called "Bulkoh" with RUF forces near Nyayahun. Kamajors examining the bodies found the ID card, boots and uniform of an SLA commander who had sent them. On their return to Bumpeh, the SLA commander denied that the armed men were his men, which led the Kamajors to decide to join with more Kamajors to attack the camp.

During the second half of 1995, at the time the Kamajor initiation ceremonies were introduced in the District, towns and villages in Tikonko Chiefdom sent men to be initiated.¹¹¹⁹ During the first round of initiations in 1995, only people above 15 were initiated, but this changed later, although no date is specified. Tikonko Chiefdom soon came under the control of the Kamajors.

In late 1995, as the RUF forces were spreading throughout Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, the elders of the chiefdom sought the Regent Chief's permission to initiate people into the Kamajor society. After permission and full support was granted by the Regent Chief, one person was sent to the village of Tihun (Bonthe District) to contact the Kamajor's High Priest Initiator. On arriving in the headquarters of Tellu, the High Priest Initiator requested that the Gondama – Tellu road be brushed for security, to prevent any RUF incursion. However, one young man who had returned to his village to look for food had his left hand cut off when he came across some RUF forces at Nagbena, two miles from Tellu.

In late 1995, RUF forces left Njala Town (Komboya Chiefdom) for their main base on the mountain near Njala. Knowing that there were no SLA forces stationed in Njala at that time, RUF forces regularly used the road to travel from the east end through Gumahu and Korkortie to the west end at Gbaama and back.

As Kamajor operations were spreading in Bonthe and Pujehun Districts, dislodged RUF forces from those Districts joined their companions in Bagbo Chiefdom, primarily in Momajoe, Sumbuya and Kissahoi, 4 miles from Momajoe. In December 1995 in Kissahoi, RUF forces brought with them over 300 civilians, who had been forced to carry property for the RUF. The regrouped forces launched a massive attack on civilians in December and over 700 civilians were captured in different villages, including Momajoe, Maniwa, Mani-Bo and Tissana. All those abductees were taken to

were committed or whether violations were committed and we lack information, as people are reluctant to talk on this.

¹¹¹⁸ The initiation ceremonies started in Bonthe District.

¹¹¹⁹ No more details could be obtained on the place where this initiation took place.



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Madoko (Bagbo Chiefdom) before being divided into groups and taken to different locations in Bo and Pujehun Districts, depending on their origin. The fate of these people is as yet unknown.

Events in 1996

After 1995, most of the population had fled Bagbe Chiefdom, which is north-east of Bo Town. There were instances of RUF incursions, such as one in early 1996, when RUF forces attacked Benduma (Bagbe Chiefdom), one of the largest towns in the chiefdom where the Paramount Chief resides. The young RUF forces, who were described as “uncontrollable”, started firing indiscriminately, killing a member of their own forces, whose body they cut into pieces and ate, while some drank the blood.

As in other chiefdoms, Valunia Chiefdom had its own Kamajors initiated in Bo Town by the Deputy Initiator sometime before 1996.¹¹²⁰ When they returned to their chiefdom in 1996, the Kamajors successfully repelled RUF forces from their Camp Kokahun, which was near the towns of Sengina and Yamandu, close to the border with Moyamba District. The Kamajors seized arms and ammunition, including machine guns, and freed some civilians who were being held captive at the base. At that time, SLA forces were removed from the chiefdom allegedly because of controversy surrounding the fact that their attire and weapons were similar to those of the RUF forces.

In early 1996, young men of Komboya Chiefdom were initiated in Bo-Messima and came back to settle in Njala. They successfully repelled the RUF forces from the chiefdom.¹¹²¹ At this time, the hunting of alleged RUF collaborators began and those suspected were seriously beaten, tied up and forced to sit under the sun. Anybody who had stayed in the towns during RUF attacks was suspected of being a collaborator. One person, who the RUF forces had appointed Town Commander, was undressed, tied up and severely beaten before being released. Freedom of movement was restricted and passes were required from civilians before they were allowed to move from one place to another. Any civilian failing to show such a pass at checkpoints could be suspected of being a “rebel” or a “rebel” collaborator and be treated accordingly.

Kamajors from Bonthe District entered Bagbo Chiefdom through Fola, south of Momajoe, in early 1996, where they established their first base. In order to repel RUF forces still based in Momajoe, it was decided that every town should nominate four “gallant” men to be initiated. Those men, numbering up to 200 from the entire chiefdom, were taken to Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom (Bonthe District), where the Kamajor’s High Priest Initiator initiated them in February 1996.

However, RUF forces were still active in the area and in April 1996, they launched attacks on a number of towns in the environs of Momajoe that the Kamajors were unable to withstand. A number of civilians were killed and others were wounded during these attacks. In a separate incident, RUF forces killed three men accused of collaboration with Kamajors in Momajoe and displayed their heads at checkpoints. Civilians continued to suffer from the RUF presence in this area by

¹¹²⁰ No further information is available on the exact dates.

¹¹²¹ There is little information available on how the Kamajors managed to fight off the RUF forces, including information relating to the number of battles, casualties, damage to property and so on.



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having their property taken away, being denied food, being thrown out of their houses and married women were not allowed to sleep with their husbands.

Later, but probably still in April 1996, the newly initiated Kamajors took control of Momajoe and its environs.¹¹²² As a result of this, RUF forces moved to Bendu (Malen Chiefdom, Pujehun District), taking a large number of civilians with them. It appears that these civilians were later rescued sometime in April 1996 by Kamajors from Pujehun District and taken to a town near Momajoe.

The Kamajors brought a large amount of stolen property they had found during their attack in Bendu with them to Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom). Probably as a result of this, RUF forces attacked Sumbuya for the third time towards the end of April 1996. It was during this attack that Sumbuya was destroyed and many houses were burnt down.

The last attacks by RUF forces on Bagbo Chiefdom took place in May 1996, in the area surrounding Momajoe, during which houses were burnt down and two people were killed in Yegelleh. After this, the Kamajors controlled Lugbu Chiefdom, in particular the Sumbuya axis, from where the roads lead up to Bumpenh Chiefdom, to Jiama Bongor Chiefdom and on to Kenema District and down through Bagbo Chiefdom to Pujehun District.

After the attack on Gerihun in 1995 in Baoma Chiefdom, adjoining Badija and Bagbe Chiefdoms to the south, RUF forces were still occupying some villages across the Sewa River from Gerihun. In some of these villages, people had to live with those forces, working for them and women were forcefully taken. As a result of this, in April 1996, 200 men were initiated into the CDF. However, their relationship with SLA forces still based in Gerihun was not friendly and problems began to arise between the two forces.¹¹²³

In April 1996, a group of well-armed people coming from the direction of Kori Chiefdom (Moyamba District) arrived in Baiama (Gbo Chiefdom). These men, whose identity is unknown, introduced themselves as SLA forces, but left the town in the evening to an unknown destination. After this, the Paramount Chief called a meeting to ask the townspeople to provide young men for initiation into the Kamajor society, which they did. A couple of weeks later, in late April 1996, the senior officer in charge of the SLA Brigade in Bo came to Baiama with 90 men, of whom 20 remained in the town and the other 70 went out on patrol. In early May 1996, unidentified uniformed men attacked Baiama and a number of houses were set on fire. The Kamajors stationed in Baiama believed the attack was perpetrated by SLA forces so there was no SLA presence in town until later in the month, when another SLA battalion was established in Baiama and began working together with the Kamajors.

Probably in early 1996,¹¹²⁴ the Kamajors from Bumpenh Chiefdom attacked the RUF/SLA¹¹²⁵ camp called "Bulkoh". They killed up to 200 men, presumed to be both SLA and RUF forces. Some men

¹¹²² No further information is available.

¹¹²³ No further information is available.

¹¹²⁴ The exact date is unclear and could not be confirmed by open sources.

¹¹²⁵ As mentioned earlier, this camp was reportedly composed of both RUF and SLA forces.



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were shot on the ground and others were hiding in the trees, where they were shot, fell into the Tarba River and drowned. The female commander was killed, her body cut into pieces by the Kamajors and cooked in a large pot for the whole day. This was apparently done for retaliatory or revenge purposes and the woman was not subsequently eaten. Following this, Kamajors leaving the area of Bumpah for Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom) were often caught by SLA forces and killed.

Following the attack on "Bulkoh" camp, Kamajors from Bumpah Chiefdom moved from Bumpah to Tikonko, where they established their base. Following an attack by the SLA forces, they went back to Bumpah. On their way back to Bumpah, they discovered villages that had been looted and burnt by SLA and RUF forces. In these villages, bodies were found with plastic in their eyes and some people had been amputated. At Serabu, for example, up to 300 buildings were burnt, including the hospital, and the convent and the Archbishop's compound appeared to have been looted.

The main Kamajor base in Valunia Chiefdom at that time was in Mandu, which is on the road leading from Tonkolili District south towards Selenga Chiefdom. After they successfully repelled the RUF forces from Kokahun, the Kamajor commander decided to initiate more men. To do so, he asked the seven Section Chiefs to give as many men as they could. It was at this stage that young boys, described as school-going boys under the age of 18, were also initiated. As their number increased, they planned to attack Bokurr, the main RUF base in the chiefdom. It is reported that they undertook this operation together with SLA forces. The Kamajors came back with a quantity of arms and ammunition and some property previously stolen by RUF forces. After this attack, RUF forces attacked the Kamajors in all the sections of the chiefdom; anytime there was any threat in one of the sections, Kamajors from the other sections would come to provide support.

On or around 20 June 1996 at Tellu (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom), the High Priest Initiator initiated up to 800 local hunters and youths into the Kamajor society. After the initiation, the new initiates were asked to return to their towns and villages to work for the protection of their towns and villages and for the chiefdom as a whole.

In July 1996, armed men attacked Tellu in large numbers, some dressed in complete military uniform and fully armed, while some were carrying two rifles, one in their hands and the other one slung across their backs. Some Kamajors were killed, as was the Fullah headman of Jiama Bongor Chiefdom. The Kamajor initiation site and some houses were burnt. Some Kamajors went to meet the advancing "rebels" - as described by civilians - and fought them near Gordie. The armed men were overpowered and the Kamajors came back with three heads, weapons and military uniforms. From what was found on the bodies, it appeared that most of them were military officers from the SLA Battalion deployed in Koribondo. The CDF National Coordinator was reported to have come to Gbaama the day after and to have left with some weapons and the military uniforms.

Thus, by the end of 1996, the whole District except Bo and Koribondo, which were controlled by SLA forces, was under CDF control. Clashes occurred many times between Kamajors and SLA forces at Koribondo and Bo Town. For example, towards the end of October 1996, fighting



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between those two forces took place in Bo Town and lasted several hours, leaving members of both sides and civilians dead.¹¹²⁶

Events in 1997

RUF forces launched subsequent attacks in Selenga Chiefdom in 1997 but each time, the Kamajors were successful in repelling those forces, with little killing of civilians or destruction of civilian property or houses.

In 1997, the Paramount Chief of Komboya Chiefdom, who had played an important role in bringing peace between the Kamajors and SLA forces in Bo, was invited together with some Kamajors to the Headquarter at Reservation Quarters, Bo Town. On his arrival, SLA forces opened fire, killing the Paramount Chief, some Kamajors and some civilians.

Kamajors controlled Bagbo and Lugbu Chiefdoms until the arrival of United Nations peacekeepers, during which time the Kamajors established a court system and assumed the mantle of authority from chiefs. At the same time, they were harassing the civilian population for food and suspected “rebel” collaborators were chased and killed. In addition, around this time,¹¹²⁷ the Commanders told the people in Limba (Bagbo Chiefdom) that the CDF National Coordinator had told them that every town under Kamajor control should contribute three stones of diamond not less than three carats each to buy weapons.

In Lugbu Chiefdom, about 85% of the male were initiated, some of them becoming initiates to avoid harassment. It is worth noting that after the Kamajors had taken control of an area, some people were initiated without the intention that they would become a fighter, in which case the initiation period was shorter. The general perception of the population and people who were initiated in this manner was that becoming a member was a protective measure, since people who were not members of the Kamajors could be suspected of being a “rebel” collaborator.

By 1997, Kamajors cleared Bagbe Chiefdom of an RUF presence and it appears that the AFRC regime did not affect Bagbe Chiefdom. In Badjia¹¹²⁸ and Boama Chiefdoms, the attitude of the Kamajors is described as having changed to become arrogant and disrespectful towards civilians.

¹¹²⁶ AFP, 31 October 1996. According to the Sierra Leone Bi-Monthly Information Report No.9, “the fighting in Bo town on 30 October, 1996 erupted following the acrimonious break-up of a meeting between the Kamajors and the military at Brigade Headquarters, the purpose of which was to enable the Kamajors and the military to resolve their differences over Talama”, a village west of Bo. Two days earlier, “[...] it was reported that Kamajors in Talama village tried to prevent members of the military from looting zinc roofing sheets from Njala University College, 7 miles outside Talama. In response, the military in Talama detained the Kamajors involved at the local barracks. On hearing this news other Kamajors in the area decided to converge on the barracks with a view to resolving the situation. En route, these Kamajors were ambushed by soldiers using RPG launchers and suffered casualties [...]”

¹¹²⁷ This date is not clear.

¹¹²⁸ RUF forces left Badjia Chiefdom, in the north-east of Bo District, in 1996, which then remained under the control of patrolling Kamajors. No further details are available as to under what circumstances the RUF forces departed or any acts committed by the Kamajors in the chiefdom at this time.



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The Kamajors deposed the Chiefs, established their own courts and required people to give them food and money and to work in the Kamajors' farms.¹¹²⁹

Once the Kamajors obtained control of Valunia Chiefdom, they operated checkpoints, where they issued travelling passes for Le 500 per day per traveller, described by the Kamajors as a war effort for their sustenance. Anybody wanting to move within this area had to purchase and, when required, produce such a pass. People who were suspected of being a member of the SLA were subject to interrogation, in some cases brief, and were punished and sometimes killed. Non-initiated civilians were required to provide them with food, which led many young adults to join the society. The Kamajors also took property from people passing through checkpoints. In one instance, one car that was seized was handed over to the Deputy Initiator, who was residing in Kongombahun in Niawa Langa village after she had fled Bo Town.

As mentioned, most of the Chiefs were deposed and the Kamajors took over their responsibilities. Civilians disobeying their orders or complaining about their authority would be punished. People were put in cages called a "kuliehun", which was so small that it would not reach the height of a person's knee. A common punishment inflicted was the use of FM rope, namely a nylon rope tied on two edges of a small stick around a person's hands and tightened.¹¹³⁰ Thus, in December 2000, while in Bo, a man who declared on the radio that the nomination of the new Regent Chief for Wunde was not endorsed by the population was arrested by Kamajors, severely beaten for six days and threatened to be killed before being released following pressure from a human rights activist. Other opponents to this nomination were also arrested and taken to CDF headquarters in Bo, although no further information is available on what happened to them.

Fighting between the Kamajors and SLA forces began spreading from Libi Junction in Malen Chiefdom to Bathurst, south of Koribondo, in April-May 1997. In one incident, SLA soldiers were captured, although no further information is available on what happened to them after their capture.

During the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were mainly concentrated in Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom) and Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) and on the highway between Bo and Koribondo. During this period, Kamajors attacked Koribondo on several occasions¹¹³¹ and RUF/AFRC forces were driven out during the beginning of 1998.

Shortly after the Coup in May 1997, the Kamajors drove the AFRC out of Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom) and back to Bo Town. However, in June 1997, when Gerihun was attacked by RUF/AFRC forces, the Kamajors were unable to defend the town as they ran out of ammunition and up to six civilians were killed, including the Paramount Chief. Many houses were burnt down, including that of the former Vice President of Sierra Leone.

¹¹²⁹ In addition, they tied people up and sometimes killed them, although no further details are available.

¹¹³⁰ This rope was called "FM", meaning "frequency modulation", because once tied with this rope, civilians spoke or confessed.

¹¹³¹ During an attack that took place in June, eight civilians were killed. However, it could not be ascertained how those civilians were killed: <http://www.focus-on-sierra-leone.co.uk>.



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In June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked ECOMOG troops based at Gondama twice. The first time, the combined forces were not able to challenge the heavy firepower of the ECOMOG forces. However, some refugees were killed, some by drowning in the river. During the second attack, running out of ammunition, ECOMOG forces found refuge at the Mil Camp at Gbaama. As RUF/AFRC forces were controlling all the access roads to Gbaama, the welfare of these ECOMOG members were at stake, so 11 days after the attack, the local Kamajor commander took the decision to rescue them using a helicopter. The sounds of helicopter and jet fighters were heard flying towards Gbaama and Kamajors arriving by helicopter landed on the field of the Roman Catholic School. It took them several trips to rescue all the ECOMOG forces and by the end, the school was completely damaged, apparently by the constant landing and taking off of the helicopter. In November 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the township of Mamboma, to the north of Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom along the road from Telu, but were driven out by Kamajors coming from Gbaama.

RUF/AFRC forces based at Koribondo¹¹³² (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom) patrolled the area and attacked Kamajor positions, killing both civilians and Kamajors. In June 1997, they attacked Bendu (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom), a Kamajor base, again killing both Kamajors and civilians and burning some houses.¹¹³³ The practice of looting by RUF/AFRC forces was also widespread at this time. As the RUF/AFRC attacks intensified, the Kamajors of Gbaama, Tikonko and Lugbu Chiefdoms attacked the RUF/AFRC base at Koribondo but were unsuccessful.

After May 1997, the Kamajors of Gbo Chiefdom started hunting what they called "Junta collaborators" and killed some people, although it was more common for them just to punish people they suspected of having any contact with the AFRC forces, for example by tying people up and making them stay out under the sun. The Kamajors also took food from civilians. It was useless to report these incidents, in particular the taking of food, to the CDF commander, who would reply by saying that his men were in the right, because they came to protect people.¹¹³⁴

A major incident took place in Tikonko Town (Tikonko Chiefdom) at this time. On 10 June 1997, the Kamajor's Chiefdom Ground Commander received a letter from the High Priest Initiator with the order to gather all Kamajors in Tikonko Chiefdom at Tikonko Town for the purpose of participating in an attack on RUF/AFRC positions at Bo Town. Approximately 200 or 300 Kamajors came from all directions of the chiefdom and two days later, more arrived. During their short stay, civilians were forced to feed them. These Kamajors engaged in stopping any RUF/AFRC movement southwards by blocking successfully the Bo-Matru Jong (Bonthe District) road.¹¹³⁵

¹¹³² For the most part, from 1991 to 1997, the SLA had a base at Koribondo and controlled the town. When the Coup took place in May 1997, SLA forces became members of the AFRC and so, in general, former SLA bases became RUF/AFRC bases.

¹¹³³ One report states that while eight Kamajors, 11 adult civilians and one child were killed, after this attack 16 bodies dressed in military uniform were found.

¹¹³⁴ It is not clear who had control of the town at this point. While it appears that the Kamajors were in control, it is also said that at this time the CDF had been disbanded and the Kamajors were operating secretly.

¹¹³⁵ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 22 July - 4 August 1997. It is, however, not clear when the Kamajors attacked the town, as the reports make no mention of this (these) attack(s). However, according to the Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 23 August - 01 September 1997, fighting continued between



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At this time, RUF/AFRC forces began to disguise themselves as Kamajors and attack towns in Tikonko Chiefdom. People were able to identify them as RUF/AFRC forces because they had RPGs, AK47s and grenades, whereas the Kamajors were armed with single barrel guns, cutlasses, sticks and knives. One incident took place on 25 June 1997, with some men dressed in full Kamajor attire came from the direction of Bo, riding Honda motorbikes. This was confusing to the people of Tikonko, because Kamajors never rode motorbikes and, at the same time, rumours were going round that RUF/AFRC forces were heading for Tikonko Town. Shortly after the arrival of these men, the sound of RPG fire was heard in the town. RUF/AFRC forces entered the town, taking property and killing people. All those who were trapped in their houses were killed, including 11 people in one house near the market and a woman who was disembowelled. One of the Kamajors based in Tikonko Town was beaten and tortured before being killed. Many Kamajors died in the forest along Lembema Road, north of Tikonko Town. A similar incident occurred in January 1998, when RUF/AFRC forces coming from Bo went to Towama, between Bo and Tikonko towns, saying it was a Kamajor base. Four civilians were killed, up to 25 houses were burnt and property was taken away. The RUF/AFRC forces went back to Bo and stayed there until ECOMOG forces arrived.

After reports had reached the CDF National Coordinator that the Kamajor commander who had rescued the ECOMOG troops at Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom) was harassing, maiming, ill-treating and killing civilians, this commander was replaced by another one, who became commander for Jiama Bongor, Bagbe, Lugbu and Tikonko Chiefdoms. In the weeks that followed (July 1997), there was relative peace, although the Kamajors began to steal property.

RUF/AFRC forces again bombarded the ECOMOG position at Gondama on 11 October 1997; ECOMOG responded by bombing RUF/AFRC positions, using Nigerian warplanes.¹¹³⁶

In December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Kamajors at Baiama (Gbo Chiefdom). A few days later, one man and one woman who were suspected of being relatives of an AFRC member were killed at Baiama Junction and their bodies remained lying there until they decomposed.

Operation "Black December" was declared in December 1997 by the CDF High Command in a bid to take control of RUF/AFRC positions and was implemented in Boama Chiefdom. As part of this operation, all the highways and roads leading to the villages were blocked, in order to prevent RUF/AFRC forces from attacking civilians. Due to this operation, Kamajors became increasingly dependant on civilians to obtain food and medication, as the supply routes were blocked. Nevertheless, the operation also successfully prevented RUF/AFRC movement and enabled the CDF to counter-attack the RUF/AFRC forces in Gerihun.

Events in 1998

Kamajors and RUF/AFRC forces in the south of Bo Town, which may suggest that fighting already took place previously. Furthermore, it is clear that whatever battle may have taken place in the area between the RUF/AFRC and the Kamajors, the RUF/AFRC forces were still in control of the town.

¹¹³⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1 - 13 October 1997.



N O P E A C E W I T H O U T J U S T I C E

In February 1998, fighting took place between Kamajors and RUF/AFRC forces all over the Southern Province, which led to the withdrawal of the combined forces. By early 1998, the Kamajors had regained control of Boama Chiefdom until the arrival of ECOMOG forces around 20-22 February 1998.¹¹³⁷

That same month, two boys came to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom), their hands covered in blood. They told the people of Koribondo that Kamajors had shot their hands and that they were coming to attack Koribondo; indeed, the Kamajors did attack the town on 13 February. During this attack, two AFRC soldiers and two Kamajors died. Soon after, the AFRC forces withdrew from Koribondo, following the ousting of their government from Freetown in February 1998. The attitude of the Kamajors panicked people, who decided to move to Bo Town, where houses identified as occupied by Koribondo people were harassed. This situation lasted until ECOMOG arrived in Bo Town in February or early March 1998.¹¹³⁸

Around 16-17 February, there was a major battle between RUF/AFRC and ECOMOG forces in Bo Town;¹¹³⁹ hundreds of people fled the town. The town was set on fire, massively looted and bodies were left lying on the streets. RUF/AFRC forces looted three commercial banks, destroyed the telecommunications network and damaged the Bo-Kenema power facility serving the Eastern Province.¹¹⁴⁰ Shortly after, around 20 February, ECOMOG troops based at Kenema deployed in the north and east of the town, areas previously held by Kamajors and then in the town itself, where Kamajors had been fighting RUF/AFRC forces.¹¹⁴¹ After RUF/AFRC forces had left the town, youths were searching for RUF/AFRC members and their "collaborators", including people who were suspected of being Temne.¹¹⁴² Those suspects who were caught were killed, some hacked to death and others had tyres put around their neck, which were then set on fire.¹¹⁴³ Furthermore, a committee created for processing stolen property "discovered a large dockside area that had been used to take such goods out of the country".¹¹⁴⁴

¹¹³⁷ Key persons recognise that some atrocities were committed by Kamajors but tried to justify them, saying that anyway, there was no law or order and that these Kamajors were not trained for war as soldiers but took arms to defend democracy. They continued by stating that since most of them were not educated, you could not expect them to observe rules and regulations governing "warriors".

¹¹³⁸ It is not clear from the records when ECOMOG arrived in Bo Town. However, ECOMOG movements in the rest of the country, in particular in Port Loko, Moyamba and Tonkolili Districts, as well as their arrival date in Kenema District suggests that ECOMOG troops had to be in Bo Town by the very beginning of March at the latest. Some contingents of ECOMOG forces were however already deployed in the District at Gondama (it has to be remembered that the Gondama Camp since 1993 was placed under the protection of Nigerian troops).

¹¹³⁹ Open sources revealed that on 16 February, over 10,000 well-armed Kamajors entered the town from three different directions and "several junta soldiers and their sympathisers were killed or tried on the spot and handed over to anti-junta youths for execution [...]": AAP, 17 February 1998.

¹¹⁴⁰ AFP, 24 February 1998.

¹¹⁴¹ AFP, 24 February 1998; BBC Online News Archive, 25 February 1998.

¹¹⁴² The RUF leader was a Temne by tribe whereas the Kamajors were Mende.

¹¹⁴³ No more information could be obtained on this event.

¹¹⁴⁴ AFP, 24 February 1998.



N O P E A C E W I T H O U T J U S T I C E

On their way out of Bo Town, civilians were thoroughly searched at Kamajor checkpoints. At one checkpoint on the way to Manguama, which lies north-east of Bo Town, some civilians were stripped naked, tied up and forced to sit on the ground, suspected of being “Junta” collaborators. These people were later killed. In another incident on 17 February, civilians coming in a truck were asked to show their passes at a checkpoint at Baiama junction (Gbo Chiefdom). Those who could not produce them were put into a cell made up of sticks and were beaten.

Kamajor harassment of the civilian population, including physical violence, looting and the burning of houses, continued throughout 1998. In one instance in Baiama (Gbo Chiefdom), a woman suspected of being an AFRC member’s wife was killed and her body was displayed at the checkpoint. In the villages where they had found refuge, people were harassed by Kamajors for food.

Around June 1998, a large number of Kamajors attacked Koribondo, looting and burning over 70 houses. Shortly after the town was set ablaze, the CDF National Coordinator came to Koribondo and held a meeting at the village square, at which people of the town were present. During this meeting, he allegedly thanked the Kamajors but reprimanded them from not having followed his instructions completely, as he had told the Kamajors not to spare any building except the church, hospital, mosque and the village square. It appears that this attack was partly done in retaliation for Koribondo people hosting SLA and RUF/AFRC forces. Following this incident, some ECOMOG troops arrived in Koribondo to investigate the matter and the Kamajor commander together with 20 of his forces were arrested and taken to Bo.¹¹⁴⁵

Kamajors went to the south of Kakua Chiefdom to villages including Baoma, Segbwema, Adala and Berehun. On three separate occasions in December 1998, they took people’s possessions, including cars, clothes and other valuable items, as well as any food they could find, including livestock. In addition, Kamajors targeted people suspected of being collaborators with both SLA and AFRC soldiers. One example is from the end of 1998, when the Kamajors drew up a list of the 25 “most wanted” people, who were suspected of having hosted soldiers in their houses. A letter was sent to Sembehun that Kamajors would attack the town to kill those 25 most wanted people and on the day they stated, a large group of Kamajors¹¹⁴⁶ came to Sembehun. Although nobody was killed, as the 25 people were nowhere to be found, a lot of houses were burnt down. A short while later, the CDF commander based at Koribondo, who had control over Sembehun and who led the search in December, required the 25 people to come to Koribondo and pay Le 50,000 each, or they would be killed. The people did as they were told and then were allowed to leave.

Following the RUF/AFRC invasion of Freetown in January 1999, negotiations started between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. A ceasefire was signed in May and a peace accord supposed to mark the end of the conflict and known as the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed on 7 July in the Togolese capital. An important part of the accord was that the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process was to start within six weeks of its entry into force. This process, somehow delayed, was formally launched by the President of Sierra Leone on 20

¹¹⁴⁵ It is not clear from the records what happened to these Kamajors after they were taken to Bo.

¹¹⁴⁶ Records relate that “thousands” of Kamajors came to Sembehun on this day.



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October 1999 during a ceremony at Wilberforce Barracks, Freetown and began properly on 4 November. However, despite the calls of the RUF leader and ex-AFRC leader to their troops to disarm,¹¹⁴⁷ disarmament was implemented at a very slow pace, thus hindering the deployment of humanitarian aid in the country. The delay of the process was mainly due to the resumed fighting in the Northern Province and in Kono District.¹¹⁴⁸ In the meanwhile, the first UN peacekeepers arrived in the country and, in January, troops from the Ghanaian contingent arrived in Bo District.¹¹⁴⁹

In a bid to foster and enhance the DDR process, sites for new DDR camps were identified around 10 March 2000, one being located at Gondama (Kakua Chiefdom).¹¹⁵⁰ However, the disarmament process was stalled in May 2000, following the capture by RUF forces of over 300 UN peacekeepers in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The process would be given a new start in November 2000 when the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed a new ceasefire agreement in Abuja, Nigeria.¹¹⁵¹

On 31 January 2001, a CDF meeting was convened at the CDF District Headquarters in Bo Town in the presence of the UNAMSIL military observers (MILOBs) team for Bo, the resident Minister, the Deputy Defence Minister, the CDF District Administrator and the NCDDR (National Commission for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) representative. At this meeting, the problems caused by the CDF in the District were discussed, including the recent attack on the NCDDR office, the reorganisation of the CDF and CDF interference in police matters. During a separate meeting convened by the Deputy Defence Minister, the reorganisation of the CDF in the District was discussed, rather than its disbanding.¹¹⁵²

By 31 March 2001, the 14 chiefdoms of the District were declared safe for resettlement, thereby making the entire Southern Province safe, unlike the North, where humanitarian activities were not possible in three-quarters of the Province, and in the East, where the whole of Kono and Kailahun Districts (except Daru) and six chiefdoms in Kenema District were still considered unsafe.¹¹⁵³

¹¹⁴⁷ On 10 January, the RUF leader, the ex-AFRC leader and the Deputy Minister of Defence and CDF National Coordinator stopped in Bo Town, as part of sensitisation trip on the disarmament campaign, aimed at exhorting combatants, namely ex-AFRC, RUF and CDF, to disarm: IRIN West Africa, 10 January 2000.

¹¹⁴⁸ In November 1999, only 1,500 combatants had disarmed out of the estimated total of 45,000 combatants: IRIN West Africa, 17 November 1999.

¹¹⁴⁹ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), adopted on 22 October 1999. Six thousand peacekeepers were sent into the country and their number would increase over the coming months, following the security developments in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

¹¹⁵⁰ The initial camps were located at Port Loko North, Port Loko South, Kenema Town and Daru (Kailahun District): IRIN West Africa, 17 March 2000.

¹¹⁵¹ The security situation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces prevailing in 2000 urged the Government of Sierra Leone to negotiate a ceasefire with the RUF in November 2000. On 4 May 2001, those parties would meet again in Abuja, Nigeria to review the ceasefire. Further to the meeting in May 2001, those parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings as the Joint Committee on DDR. The final meeting took place in January 2002 when disarmament was declared complete and the war over.

¹¹⁵² UNAMSIL press briefing, 31 January 2001.

¹¹⁵³ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 11 – 31 March 2001.



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Following the meeting in Abuja in May 2001, disarmament was carried out at different dates across the country. It was scheduled to start in Bo District by the end of September 2001¹¹⁵⁴ but was briefly delayed. However, during a symbolic disarmament ceremony in Gerihun (Boama Chiefdom) on 20 October 2001, over 80 CDF members disarmed in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Sierra Leone and were transported to the DDR camp at Gondama, where the SRSG addressed the now ex-combatants.¹¹⁵⁵

At the conclusion of the seventh tripartite meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), comprising representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and the RUF held in Freetown on 8 November 2001, it was communicated that disarmament would be complete in Bo District on 10 November 2001.¹¹⁵⁶

3. Conclusion

The pattern of the conflict in Bo District followed to a large extent the one of the three other southern Districts. The RUF/NPFL incursion in Pujehun District in 1991 expanded in the bordering chiefdoms of Bo District. Successful SLA counter-attacks in 1991 and 1992 limited the RUF/NPFL attacks to a lower scale, mainly carried out by “pockets” of RUF/NPFL members for food finding purposes. The situation was similar in Bonthe and Pujehun Districts and would continue until the second phase of the conflict began in 1994.

As in the rest of the Southern Province, the conflict reached its peak in Bo District in 1994 and 1995, as RUF forces spread across the whole District. Their strong grip over the District would allow RUF forces to advance further inland towards the north-west (Moyamba District) and the south-west (Bonthe District), where most of the attacks in 1995 originated from Bo District through Moyamba District, unlike in 1991 when Bonthe District was affected by RUF /NPFL forces coming from Pujehun District. During this period, SLA forces were wholly unable to contain the RUF advance into the District and in the Southern Province as a whole, although (or because) their numbers increased greatly in 1994.

This RUF progression and stay in the whole Southern Province and in Bo District in particular was gradually stopped by the initiative of the Kamajors who started fighting alongside the SLA in 1996. The collaboration between those two forces however deteriorated rapidly and fighting between them reached its climax in early 1997. At this time, the Kamajors and the SLA were controlling distinct and separate areas of the District.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown and its deployment in different towns in the Provinces in 1998, the Southern Province became free of RUF/AFRC attacks and instead came under the total control of the Kamajors. Bo District was not affected by the retreating RUF/AFRC

¹¹⁵⁴ IRIN West Africa, 13 August 2001; UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. For example, in early August 2001, the Joint Committee on DDR declared disarmament complete for Port Loko and Kambia Districts.

¹¹⁵⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 23 October 2001.

¹¹⁵⁶ UNAMSIL press briefing, 09 November 2001. However, the target date of 30 November 2001 for the completion of the process in the whole country was not met and the disarmament was declared complete in January 2002.



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forces from Freetown, as they regrouped and concentrated on the main mining areas (Kono District and north of Kenema District) and those areas in which CDF members did not have established and constant control, mostly in the Northern Province.

Throughout the conflict, widespread violations were committed primarily by RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces, but also by SLA forces and Kamajors, especially once they firmly established their control and authority over the District. Those violations were directed against civilians and their property and included stealing and destruction of property, physical violence, sexual assault, killing and abduction for use as fighters, workers or "wives". Only a few cases of mutilation were reported for the District, as most of these incidents took place during a specific RUF/AFRC operation called "Operation No Living Thing" in the first months of 1998 and following the retreat from Freetown. Furthermore, while it hosted thousands of IDPs from other Districts, mainly Pujehun District, Bo District suffered less internal displacement of its own population.

b. Bonthe District

1. Introduction

Bonthe District is located in the south-west of the Southern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It is the only District in the Southern Province that shares boundaries with the other three Districts in the Province, namely Moyamba and Bo Districts in the north and Pujehun District in the south and east. Bonthe District is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean in the west.

Although located on Sherbro Island,¹¹⁵⁷ its headquarter, Bonthe Town, is not part of the two chiefdoms of the island (Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms). Rather, it is part of another administrative structure, the Sherbro Rural District.

There are 11 chiefdoms in the District, two of which are located on Sherbro Island:

Chiefdom	Headquarter
Bendu Cha	Bendu
Bum	Madina
Dema	Tissana
Imperi	Gbangbama
Jong	Matru
Kpanda Kemo	Matuo
Kwamwbai Krim	Tei
Nongoba Bullom	Gbap
Sittia	Yonni
Sogbini	Tihun
Yawbeko	Talia

¹¹⁵⁷ This island is commonly known as "Bonthe Island".



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The presence of the water, whether it is the ocean, the rivers or the swamp, is the most striking natural feature of the District. The nine chiefdoms of the mainland are separated by the ocean from the two chiefdoms located on Sherbro Island. The south of the District, especially Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom is an area made up of swampland.

The two main rivers of the District, the Sewa River and the Jong River, both of them taking their source directly in the ocean, would affect the deployment of the forces throughout the conflict. They would be a substitute way of communications, especially in the south of the District where the road network is rather poor. The highway that links Bo Town to Matru (Jong Chiefdom), via Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District) and Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom would allow rapid penetration into the north of the District from Bo District. From this highway, secondary roads extend into the neighbouring chiefdoms of Sogbini and Imperi.

The main economic activities include fishing, rice growing and palm plantations but the greatest revenue is generated by the rutile mining in the north of the District, particularly in Imperi Chiefdom. The north of the District and the south of Moyamba District, which advances into Bonthe District, are indeed renowned for the importance of their mining activities, which procured vital economic resources for the Government.

The ten years of conflict in Sierra Leone started in Bonthe District as early as April 1991, due to the fact that the District shares a border with Pujehun District, which was one of the entry points of the RUF/NPFL forces into Sierra Leone in March 1991. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces entered the border chiefdom of Kwamebai Krim in May. This was the start of a long series of hostilities and atrocities committed against the civilians in the District, which lasted until the completion of disarmament in the District in mid 2001.

From this first incursion, Bonthe District was affected by the conflict through three discernable phases, the first one running from 1991 until the end of 1994. During the first attack in May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces settled in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom for a short while before moving westwards to the neighbouring chiefdom of Nongoba Bullom. When entering a village, they would always proceed in the same manner: they gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie, introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem Sierra Leoneans from the corrupt APC regime and deposed and replaced local authorities. Defeated by the SLA forces some months later, they withdrew from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom to their base in the south-west of Pujehun District. At the time of this first incursion, SLA forces were deployed mainly in Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) but by the end of 1991, more bases in the east of the District were set up. RUF/NPFL forces occupied Bum Chiefdom for six months before being repelled by the SLA. Although RUF/NPFL attacks were still reported during the subsequent years of this first phase, they never succeeded in going further than the three chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim, Bum and Nongoba Bullom. In 1994, RUF forces coming from Pujehun District re-entered the District and succeeded in controlling some areas in those three chiefdoms.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

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Each of the RUF/NPFL and, later, RUF incursions was marked by violence against civilians; indeed, from the very beginning of the conflict in the District, there were incidents of physical violence against civilians, who were also killed, raped and abducted for the purposes of using them as fighters or workers. Government authorities in particular were targeted. Those forces also stole civilians' property, mainly food and domestic animals, and destroyed houses and other buildings. The SLA forces also imposed harm on civilians in general and on "collaborators" in particular, killing those suspected of having collaborated with the RUF/NPFL and RUF during their stay in their villages. Civilians were also harassed for their food and other property. As the conflict continued, SLA violence heightened, with cases of killing, rape and use of civilians for forced labour being reported. By the close of this first phase, rumours of imminent RUF attacks in the other chiefdoms of the District were rampant.

The second phase encompassed 1995 to February 1998 and is characterised by the spreading of the conflict across the District. By February 1995, RUF forces controlled all of the northern chiefdoms of the District and proceeded southwards and westwards in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attack Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island. Training bases were opened across those chiefdoms under RUF control. This phase was marked by a clear increase in violence against civilians, as RUF forces settled in those areas. Physical violence, killings, rapes and the abductions of civilians, mainly to be trained as fighters and to work for the forces continued to be carried out on a scale much larger than during the first phase. Also during this period, a massive killing, which was scarcely reported in the media, took place in late 1995.

By the end of the year, the RUF were dislodged from most of their strongholds by SLA forces assisted by foreign troops and Kamajors, who had earlier emerged in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and subsequently developed in the other chiefdoms. During the subsequent years until the Coup in May 1997, Kamajors entrenched their control of the District, although some skirmishes with RUF forces were still reported. The Kamajors' initial collaboration with the SLA did not last long as tension and fighting erupted between the two factions.

Following the 25 May 1997 Coup, the RUF/AFRC were concentrated in Bonthe Town, from where the Kamajors had pulled out but maintained a covert presence around the town, allowing them to retake control of the town the day after the RUF/AFRC retreat in 1998. Civilians rapidly suffered at the hands of the Kamajors, who increased their demands on civilians, chased RUF collaborators and started regulating people's everyday life. The Chiefs, whose actions had been paralysed during the RUF stay, were again deposed and had no authority over their chiefdoms, as the Kamajors set up their own administrative structures and appointed their own Town Chiefs. Civilians were constantly harassed for food and other items; this harassment included physical violence and killing, mainly of alleged collaborators.

The last phase ran from February 1998 to the completion of disarmament in late 2001. During this time, the Kamajors were in total control of the District, as no more RUF or AFRC forces were operating in the District. The brief return of RUF/AFRC forces to Bonthe Town following the invasion of Freetown did not much change the situation of the District, let alone Bonthe Town. The Kamajors continued to impose and affirm their authority in every aspect of life, deciding over



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administrative and private matters, chasing “rebel” and “Junta” collaborators and intensifying their havoc on civilians. This would continue until the completion of disarmament and the deployment of UN peacekeepers throughout the District in late 2001.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991

In early April 1991, traders coming from Bo Waterside (Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District) reported to inhabitants of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom that unknown gunmen had crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia.¹¹⁵⁸ Soon after, on 9 May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from Gbandapi (Panga Kabone, Pujehun District)¹¹⁵⁹ arrived by canoes to Tei (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) in the south of Bonthe District, while civilians were conducting a ceremonial rite. These forces were allegedly led by some civilians from the chiefdom who had earlier gone to Gbandapi to bring them to Tei in search of the Paramount Chief.¹¹⁶⁰

On their arrival in Tei, one member of the RUF/NPFL forces shot a person in the leg, not knowing he was the Paramount Chief for whom they were searching. The Paramount Chief fled to the bush to hide from the forces. The RUF/NPFL forces asked civilians where they could find the Paramount Chief and when civilians revealed he was the man previously shot in the leg, the RUF/NPFL forces became more aggressive and beat people. The Paramount Chief was found behind his house, had his hands tied behind his back and was brought at the front of his house, where his property was taken away¹¹⁶¹ in his presence. He was then taken into his house and shot many times before the house was set on fire. His head was cut off and allegedly brought to Gbandapi. The RUF/NPFL forces appointed a man to be Town Commander of Tei and asked him to take care of the town in their absence.

In the same month, the combined forces entered Topain (north of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). There, they identified themselves as RUF fighting along side the NPFL from Liberia, who were mainly Burkinabes and Liberians. They assembled all the men and elderly people in the centre of the town and made them sit in the sun, on the accusation that they knew where the SLA forces and the staff of the Paramount Chief were. Property was taken, including household items and livestock. People were abducted and forced to carry the loads.

The RUF/NPFL forces then headed for the town of Borleh, which is four miles from Topain. In that village a man was slaughtered and mutilated in his house. They went further south to Mass

¹¹⁵⁸ Bo Waterside is the crossing point between Liberia and Sierra Leone and, by April, the RUF/NPFL had spread across Pujehun District.

¹¹⁵⁹ Gbandapi is located on the bank of Malemie River, which joins the Wanjei River that flows to Bonthe District. It is renowned for hosting weekly trade fares where slat is predominantly sold. The RUF/NPFL forces were based there for a while.

¹¹⁶⁰ Reports recount that a disgruntled man who had an argument with the Paramount Chief over a land issue went to Gbandapi to relate his fate to the RUF/NPFL forces. This has to be read in conjunction with the fact that the RUF/NPFL forces had been targeting Paramount Chiefs since they entered the territory of Sierra Leone, as the Chiefs represented the APC Government in the chiefdoms.

¹¹⁶¹ The property taken away included clothing, money earmarked for the mechanical cultivation of the rice the following year, two single barrel guns, rice and other personnel belongings.



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Kpanguma, where they carried out similar actions as they had done in Topain, to where they returned in the evening of the same day. Topain was at that time selected to be a training centre as it was on a flat land and reasonably close to their base at Gbandapi (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, Pujehun District). The young men of the town were taken aside and encouraged to join the RUF/NPFL forces since they claimed to be fighting against corruption and for the liberation of the people of Sierra Leone. The young men were then assigned to operate checkpoints established at the entrance of the town.

From Topain, the forces went on daily stealing and killing sprees in the neighbouring villages. Young and elderly people were forced to carry loads from neighbouring villages to Topain and onwards to Gbandapi. A load meant to be carried by three people was often given to one person to carry.

On one Sunday in May, RUF/NPFL forces attacked Kale (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom), a town approximately 10 miles to the west of Topain. A lot of property was taken, including food items and livestock. The former Regent Chief was captured and seriously flogged before he was taken to Topain, where he was finally killed. His head was cut off and put at the main junction in the village for everybody to see.¹¹⁶² This killing was reported to the RUF High Command in Gbandapi, which led to the withdrawal of the troops based at Topain and to the court martial of the commander who had ordered the killing of the former Regent Chief. This commander was killed and replaced by another commander.¹¹⁶³ The forces continued stealing and killing in the surrounding villages and attacked the town of Benduma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom), three miles from Topain. The Chiefdom Speaker was captured there together with his three sons and some of his relatives. The RUF/NPFL forces took all of his property, then forced him and his sons to carry it for them to Gbandapi, where one of the sons and a relative were later killed.

Later in May 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces left Topain for Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island to launch an attack on the SLA forces based there. They gathered their forces from all their minor bases in and around Topain, abducted young men and elderly people to carry stolen property for them and took away all the canoes they could find from the surrounding villages. They continued to take property in the villages they passed on their way. There are reports of clashes between them and SLA forces along the way. A few days later, a heavy battle took place in the area surrounding Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) between the RUF/NPFL forces and the SLA forces.¹¹⁶⁴ Most of the RUF/NPFL forces retreated to their base at Gbandapi while others were killed and the SLA forces at Bonthe Town also started to advance to Topain.

From their base at Gbandapi, the RUF/NPFL forces came at intervals to attack neighbouring towns and villages in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom but this time, they did not follow the previous pattern of introducing themselves as "freedom fighters". Rather, their attacks were allegedly carried out for

¹¹⁶² It is further revealed that to make it more fearful, a cigarette was placed into the mouth of the dismembered head. This killing led many civilians to flee to the bush.

¹¹⁶³ To a certain extent, the RUF adopted the internal structure and organisation of the Sierra Leone Army.

¹¹⁶⁴ However, attacks actually taking place on Sherbro Island were not reported. It is accordingly more likely that this battle took place somewhere between Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and Bendu Cha Chiefdom, on the western edge of the mainland. No further information is available on this event.



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reasons of reprisal, as they accused the civilians of supporting the SLA forces. Furthermore, they were poorly dressed and some were barefoot. For example, on 14 May 1991, RUF/NPFL forces entered Topain at 6.00am and fired continuously to scare people away. Civilians ran into the bush, leaving the RUF/NPFL forces free to take whatever property they could find. They also raped five young women, some under the age of 12. A three-month-old suckling mother was raped by many assailants.

Another attack was made on the town just one week later. This time not many people were found and the forces had to search for them in their hiding places in the bush. RUF/NPFL forces inflicted physical violence on the civilians and took away nearly all of their property, which consisted mainly of food items. Those civilians found hiding were severely beaten and their property was taken from them; some were brought into the town and forced to catch the remaining livestock for the forces. A woman was beaten with sticks until her skull cracked.¹¹⁶⁵ Another was seriously beaten all over her body on the accusation of having committed adultery with the fighting forces. Others had hot melted plastic dripped in their eyes. Two houses, two kitchens and the Court Barrie were burnt by the troops on that day before they left for neighbouring villages. They returned in the evening from the direction they had come, bringing a lot of young men and boys below the ages of 12 and 15.

As their base in Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) was too far to enable them to fight the RUF/NPFL concentrated in the south-east of the District, the SLA made a base south of Topain at Massa Kpanguma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). One hundred and fifty of them came to the chiefdom between June and July 1991, all in full military uniform and armed with new weapons including AK47s, RPGs, LMGs, mortar guns and grenades. From there, they went to Topain to open another base. Arriving in Topain, they gathered the young men¹¹⁶⁶ of the town and told them they must help the SLA forces in ensuring the security of the town, mainly by operating checkpoints.

At this time, the SLA forces had already begun to harass civilians; for example, anyone who refused to operate a checkpoint was severely beaten and/or arrested and put in detention. Women were sometimes raped by some SLA members while their husbands were kept in detention. Other civilians from neighbouring villages were captured and brought to Topain to work as labourers. Their wives and children were taken away to unknown places and nobody knows what happened to them. The situation was similar at Massa Kpanguma, where civilians were forced to feed the SLA forces even although these forces already had their own supplies of food.¹¹⁶⁷

After a month staying in Topain, the SLA forces commanded the civilians to arm themselves with sticks, cutlasses or any other potential weapon to be ready to fight the RUF/NPFL forces who were threatening to attack the town. An ambush was laid at Bandakor, a village close to Topain, but the RUF/NPFL forces did not come at that time.

¹¹⁶⁵ This woman reportedly had significant and permanent mental health problems following this attack.

¹¹⁶⁶ No further information is available about how young these people were.

¹¹⁶⁷ Every town or village was to contribute 24 dozen fish, a bag of rice, five litres of palm oil and Le 25,000 on a monthly basis.



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Between June and July 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces attacked the town of Sohlon (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom, which adjoins Kwamebai-Krim Chiefdom to the west). Dressed in country clothes with red bandanas tied around their heads, the forces came together with some of the inhabitants of the town and some people from Pujehun District, all speaking the Mende dialect.¹¹⁶⁸ Those civilians had allegedly joined the forces willingly and were leading them and indicating the places where they could find SLA forces, Lebanese businessman and Government authorities or their relatives. On their arrival, the RUF/NPFL forces summoned a meeting of all the people of the town and instructed the Section Chief to detain everyone until they came back from Yelewa (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). Two days after the attack of Sohlon, Yelewa was also attacked. The forces held a meeting with the civilians in the town and killed one prosperous businessman and native hunter after he was asked to produce his gun. His body was left in the open to rot, as the RUF/NPFL forces prevented people from burying it.

At around this time, the eight SLA members who had come to Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) from Bonthe Town asked civilians to help them construct an elevation at the jetty on which they could put their anti-aircraft gun. However, the SLA forces soon realised that the RUF/NPFL forces would overpower them and went back to Bonthe Town to obtain reinforcements from the SLA naval branch. Most of the RUF/NPFL forces left Yelewa after two days by boat, taking a lot of civilians with them, allegedly for use as protection against attack. Along the route for the headquarter town of Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) on the north bank of the river,¹¹⁶⁹ the RUF/NPFL forces reached the junction on the Sewa River at Yele, which has routes going both to Bonthe and Gbap. On their arrival, they were attacked by the SLA reinforcements coming from Bonthe, who killed many of the RUF/NPFL forces. Civilians who were travelling with the RUF/NPFL forces had to dive and swim underwater to the other side, where they hid themselves until the battle was over. The SLA forces then went back to Gbap and from there to Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island).

The remaining RUF/NPFL forces (about eight of them) who were not part of the crossing went to Daama (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) where they took civilians' property, mostly clothes, food items and a box of tobacco, and forced a woman to cook for them. The troops then went to Mecca (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), where they abducted two men to bring the stolen property across the river to Yele before letting them go and telling them to go back to Mecca. The forces then withdrew from the chiefdom and retreated to Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom.

Some civilians and SLA forces who were left at Bandakor (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) were attacked in November 1991 by RUF/NPFL forces coming from the Gbandapi route. The SLA forces were forced to retreat to Topain before going on to their base at Mass Kpanguma. After two days, they returned to Topain and launched a counter-attack that successfully repelled the RUF/NPFL forces from Bandakor. More civilians were brought from neighbouring villages to Massa Kpanguma and used as labourers by the SLA forces. However, RUF/NPFL forces attacked

¹¹⁶⁸ Those RUF/NPFL forces probably came directly from Pujehun District, using the Wanjei River, which flows almost parallel to the Ocean.

¹¹⁶⁹ The natural features of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom are very unique, as the Sewa River separates the mainland on the north from the south edge, composed of a long strip of swamps and bordered by the Atlantic Ocean.



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Massa Kpanguma two weeks later, killing a lot of civilians. Defeated, the SLA forces pulled out of the town¹¹⁷⁰ and when the SLA forces based at Topain heard of this attack, they also left the area. The surviving civilians fled to the bush but the RUF/NPFL forces did not settle in the town, destroying houses and taking livestock as they left the village. The day after the battle at Massa Kpanguma, the SLA forces who had pulled out passed by Korankor (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom); at a nearby village they tried to stop all the civilians at a checkpoint but as the fleeing population grew, they let them go.

Civilians at Mano (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), at the border with Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, abandoned the town and boarded a patrol boat together with the SLA forces to safer areas. No sooner had they left than the RUF/NPFL forces entered the towns of Korankor and Mano. Civilians who had fled Korankor described discovering bodies when they returned to the village, mostly the elderly and children who could not find their way in the bush. They also found a lot of dwellings burnt, including the mosque, the Bondo society house and the Court Barrie. Civilians were also abducted to carry the stolen property.¹¹⁷¹ This incident forced civilians to abandon the town for the bush where they made makeshift camps. Food and medicine were difficult to get while in the bush, which led to many deaths, especially of children.

SLA forces who later entered the towns of Mano and Korankor after the RUF/NPFL attacks took civilian property, such as building materials and household utensils. The forces then burnt down the remaining two houses in Korankor when leaving the town. After this incident, SLA troops went from town to town identifying civilians they alleged to be “enemy collaborators”, who they executed in public without any trial.¹¹⁷²

In November 1991, approximately 25 armed men entered the town of Kanga Oil Mill (Bum Chiefdom), at the border with Bo District (Bagbo Chiefdom). Civilians suspected those armed forces, who were carrying talisman and other charms, were NPFL forces, because they were all speaking in Liberian dialect. They were proved right as the men introduced themselves as NPFL forces who had come to liberate the people of Sierra Leone from the then APC government. The civilians cheered them and the night passed without incident, the forces leaving the next morning for Madina. On their way to Madina, they came across a commercial vehicle and took it to continue their journey. As in Kanga Oil Mill, their arrival in town passed without incident and they left to go back to Bo District. However, at some point on their way, they killed a Lebanese businessman, drank his blood and threw his body into a river.¹¹⁷³

¹¹⁷⁰ This battle at Massa Kpanguma was also reported as taking place in July 1991. As this information could not be reconciled with the attack on Bandakor, which allegedly took place in November, it has to be considered that all these actions were carried out in the same period of time, between broadly July and November 1991.

¹¹⁷¹ It is reported that the RUF/NPFL forces went back to the direction of Soro Gbema Chiefdom (Pujehun District). This action, although carried out by an important number of RUF/NPFL forces that forced SLA to escape, was probably not part of a wider movement to advance into the District, as at this time, the SLA forces had repelled most of the RUF/NPFL forces out of Bo and Pujehun Districts.

¹¹⁷² Although one report mentioned that at this time, RUF/NPFL forces were based in Topain, it seems that RUF/NPFL forces were no longer settled in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and launched their attacks from Pujehun District.

¹¹⁷³ The exact location of this incident could not be ascertained.



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One month later, NPFL forces together with RUF forces again entered Bum Chiefdom in Madina, where they abducted the Paramount Chief and took her to an unknown destination.¹¹⁷⁴ They recruited a large number of the town's inhabitants, including young boys and girls, into the fighting forces, which swelled from 50 to about 200. During their stay in Madina, they forced civilians to carry loads, raped young girls and women in the town and flogged elderly men and women. Town Commanders and secretaries were appointed in villages and towns in the chiefdom to carry out directives from the RUF/NPFL forces, disregarding any other authority in the chiefdom.

RUF/NPFL forces, around 45 in number, also reached Kanga Oil Mill, firing randomly while entering the town. Civilians were gathered at the Court Barrie and detained there while the forces took away property and food items. They introduced themselves as "freedom fighters" who had come to liberate the people of Sierra Leone from the APC misrule. They carried with them sophisticated weapons, large quantity of arms and ammunition. During their first night, they raped young girls, most of whom were between 12 and 13. During their stay in the town,¹¹⁷⁵ RUF/NPFL forces deposed all the chiefdom authorities, appointed Town Commanders and Town Mothers and passed laws for the civilians, saying they had come to settle in the area.¹¹⁷⁶ While no incidents of mutilation, killing or destruction of property were reported, the RUF/NPFL forces forced civilians to work for them, raped women and girls, beat people and inflicted punishments such as frog jump¹¹⁷⁷ and rolling on the ground. Youths were encouraged to join the RUF/NPFL forces. Old as well as young people were forced to carry loads for the forces. After they ate all the livestock of the village, they taxed civilians to supply them with fish or meat in turns. It was later observed that the forces came into the town in batches of 25 every two months. At this time, one commander was very notorious in trafficking civilians and training them to be fighters for the forces, often shooting those who tried to resist, and for taking civilians' property away.

Sometime in December 1991, SLA forces made a base in Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), from where they went on routine checking missions in the surrounding villages.

b) Events in 1992

Between January and February 1992, SLA forces entered Sohlon (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), where they took civilians' livestock. The matter was reported to their High Command at Gbap, who warned them against such acts, as it did not present a good image of the SLA. These actions stopped for three months, during which time civilians hid all their livestock. However, on or around 15 May

¹¹⁷⁴ She would be released in 1993 in Pujehun District.

¹¹⁷⁵ This group stayed six months in the village before being dislodged by SLA forces in July 1992.

¹¹⁷⁶ Some of these laws were as follows: everyone's personal property is meant for everybody; no civilian should steal or would be killed and every civilian was to deposit his money to the RUF/NPFL forces or face arrest for carrying illegal property.

¹¹⁷⁷ To "frog jump" or to "pump" is done by first holding on to the earlobes with two hands – the left hand holding the right ear lobe and vice versa – after which the person is required to jump up and down continuously on their haunches. This form of punishment was both physically and psychologically painful, because it is a punishment meted out mostly to children and it is considered shameful for an adult to be made to "pump".



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1992, the livestock was stolen from these hiding places with the help of one of the inhabitants of the town, who was a vigilante at the time.

Around August 1992, the town of Gbap was attacked by RUF/NPFL forces who successfully dislodged the SLA forces from the town. The SLA forces retreated temporarily to an island, labelling it "F.M".¹¹⁷⁸ Civilians staying at Sohlon, a few miles away from Gbap, moved to the neighbouring town of Nyandehun, four miles from Sohlon, which became a "safe haven" for many civilians in the chiefdom. Realising that their villages were not affected by the RUF/NPFL forces and that the living conditions in the camp at Nyandehun were deteriorating, civilians decided to resettle in their houses.

In the middle of the year,¹¹⁷⁹ on hearing the rumours that SLA forces were close to Bum Chiefdom, RUF/NPFL forces left the chiefdom and made their way to Pujehun District.¹¹⁸⁰ The SLA forces did in fact enter the chiefdom later and made a base at Madina.¹¹⁸¹ After a few days, all the Town Commanders and their secretaries were gathered and interrogated by the forces on how they were helping the RUF/NPFL forces. Those people that the SLA forces considered had taken active part in aiding the RUF/NPFL were killed, while those they considered having taken lesser part were detained for a certain number of days and given manual jobs to do before they were released. Apart from the Town Commanders and their secretaries other civilians who were considered collaborator of the enemy forces were also killed. A boy of 18 was tied to a stick head downwards and fire set under him. He was then tortured to death by the heat of the fire. Sometimes civilians from other villages like Tarsor and Kassie (both of Bum Chiefdom) were alleged to be "rebel" collaborators, because they came from areas where RUF forces were known to be, and were killed by firing squad without proper investigations. In addition, civilians were forced to harvest the oil palm and process it for the SLA forces. Plantains, fish, bananas and other commodities were either seized or bought cheaply from civilians; indeed, the SLA appeared to be more interested in trading these items than in ensuring the security of the chiefdom or the District.

The SLA forces also settled at Moyia, which gave some respite to the people at first. However, not long after, the SLA forces gathered together all the Town Commanders, their secretaries and all other alleged collaborators. An unspecified number of them were killed on the basis that they had encouraged the RUF/NPFL forces to stay in the town and were helping them in their activities. Some people were forced to dig their own graves and lie down in them. They were then shot at afterwards and left there; some people were buried while they were still alive. Harassment of civilians, stealing of property and killing was taking place on a daily basis. People were grossly intimidated as the SLA forces frequently fired their weapons and made people frog jump. In addition, the SLA forces made the people work for them, processing the palm oil fruits, fishing and engaging in many other activities.

¹¹⁷⁸ The RUF/NPFL forces did not however stay in the town but it could not be ascertained when the SLA forces came back to Gbap.

¹¹⁷⁹ This may have occurred either in July or in October/November.

¹¹⁸⁰ No more information could be obtained on this movement of forces.

¹¹⁸¹ As the RUF/NPFL forces had already left the chiefdom, no confrontation was reported. The SLA forces would have control over the chiefdom for two years, until the middle of 1994 when RUF forces came back.



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In November, one Saturday afternoon, most of the SLA forces the civilians had seen the year before at Massa Kpanguma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) entered Topain and took away civilians' property in a manner described as "much like the RUF/NPFL forces". Women were raped and livestock was taken away the same day. They came back the next day and spent a night in the town, during which they fired their guns to frighten people out of the town. However, the inhabitants stood their ground and the SLA forces soon left the way they had come.

c) Events in 1993

In June 1993, another SLA officer was sent to command the SLA forces deployed at Madina (Bum Chiefdom). They occupied the house of a civilian who later demanded payment of rent for the period. The troops not only refused to pay but also imprisoned one of the civilians after severely beating him up, accusing him of having been a "rebel" collaborator. The villagers were then forced to build more huts for the troops deployed in the town. Those who refused or tried to escape were caught and severely flogged.

In around July 1993, some SLA forces came to their base at Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) in order to expand their number in the area. They dispatched some troops at Yele (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) and at Massa Kpanguma (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom); in August, others were sent at Sohlon (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), on the other the bank of the river.¹¹⁸² Young men were asked to be vigilantes at various locations in Gbap Town. The fishermen were required to put the Sierra Leonean flag on their fishing boat, to allow the SLA to monitor and control the movement of boats on the river. At this time, the SLA only required civilians to provide fish for the troops and there were no reported incidents of physical violence or ill-treatment. At one time, when the civilians could not give them fish, the SLA took some livestock away from the people of the town and prepared it as food for the forces. However, this stopped when civilians told the forces that they would complain to their commanding officer.

In October 1993, SLA forces from Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) visited Tissana (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) on a security tour. The troops harassed the civilians by forcing them to contribute money for their feeding. Those who failed to pay were beaten up and a teacher who incited the people not to pay was imprisoned. SLA forces also took away some property of the civilians, including fish and livestock. Civilians were detained at a Court Barrie while the SLA forces searched their homes and took away what they found.

Also in October 1993, a small group of armed men travelled along the Wanjei River and stopped in Baoma Section, west of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. They were all dressed in country clothes and had masks covering their faces. One of them who was speaking Liberian dialect told the civilians they were from Burkina Faso. They took away some food items and alcohol they found in the town and forced civilians to carry this load to a crossing point, where they were released. Burkinabe

¹¹⁸² This deployment was probably done to allow SLA to have control over the river, which leads to the ocean in the west, thus preventing the RUF forces not only from making incursions in the chiefdom but also from advancing towards Bonthe Town.



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mercenaries also entered Mecca (Bendu Cha Chiefdom, west of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom),¹¹⁸³ where they took the property of civilians and forced elderly people to carry loads for them. A man who had never drunk any alcohol before was forced to drink wine to excess by one of the forces. It appeared that those armed men had come from Pujehun District and were on a raiding tour of villages in Nongoba Bullom and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms. At one point, SLA forces from Bonthe Town were informed about those armed men and laid an ambush in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom, where many of the armed men were killed and some captured. A civilian was arrested and taken to Bonthe Town together with the captured forces for interrogation; they were all killed in Bonthe Town.¹¹⁸⁴

d) Events in 1994

Throughout 1994, RUF activities were mainly reported in the eastern chiefdoms of Bonthe District, in Kwamebai Krim, Bum and Nongoba Bullom Chiefdoms.¹¹⁸⁵

In the first week of May 1994, SLA forces based at Bonthe Town (Sherbro Island) entered Mina village and ambushed some RUF forces on their day patrol. The SLA forces attacked the first loaded boat of the RUF troops heading for the town in the early morning hours. Forty-seven of them were killed, including five women, and 12 were seriously wounded. On their way back to their base the RUF forces entered Mano (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) and captured a girl of 11 years old, whom they raped. They further went to Topain where they established a base. When the SLA forces realised that the RUF forces had left Mass Kpanguma, they immediately re-established a base there. They later attacked and dislodged the RUF forces at Topain, occupying that town as well.

Pelewahun was attacked by the RUF forces on 14 May 1994 and several people were killed in the town, including elderly people and children as young as seven, some of them being hacked to death. People who remained in the town had absolutely nothing to survive on as the forces took all the property in the town. After a month, in June 1994, Mass Kpanguma was attacked. At the time of the attack, the town was full of displaced people from the neighbouring chiefdoms of Pujehun District. The attack did not appear to be a surprise to the SLA forces based there, as some of them had already left the town the previous day with their relations.¹¹⁸⁶ During the attack, the remaining SLA forces were overpowered and some were killed. Immediately afterwards, civilians in the

¹¹⁸³ Although it is not specified when in 1993 those mercenaries reached Bendu Cha Chiefdom, we can infer from the information collected in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom that they reached Bendu Cha Chiefdom around the same time.

¹¹⁸⁴ It cannot be ascertained whether those arrested men went through any kind of process before being killed.

¹¹⁸⁵ In 1993, most of the NPFL forces had been recalled by their leader to fight in Liberia as the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), a fighting faction that emerged in May 1991, started to defeat them in various areas in Liberia. Thus, the troops that entered Sierra Leone in 1994 were mostly composed of RUF forces whose number had considerably increased from the 250 men at the beginning of the conflict, due to the conscription that had been carried out.

¹¹⁸⁶ The day before the attack, SLA forces based at Massa Kpanguma came to Tei and told civilians they were going to Bonthe Town to get their salaries. They however told their relatives to pack quickly things they could lay hand on and to leave Tei for a safer area. It can however not be inferred from this information that the SLA acted in concert with the RUF forces during the attack. It rather seems that, having heard about the incoming attack, the SLA deserted the area.



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neighbouring villages fled their houses and went into hiding in the bush, sometimes in neighbouring chiefdoms like Bum Chiefdom.¹¹⁸⁷ This control over strategic towns in Kwamebai Krim District would allow the RUF to continue its advance in the District.¹¹⁸⁸

On 17 July 1994, the RUF forces made a move to recapture Bum Chiefdom from the SLA forces,¹¹⁸⁹ following the Sewa River and arriving from Tormabum, on the main road to Madina. Four truckloads of SLA forces together with their families and some vigilantes retreated from the chiefdom without putting up any resistance to the RUF/NPFL forces, because the SLA forces were far outnumbered. As a result, by August 1994, the RUF forces had taken control of the entire chiefdom and settled in almost all the villages, making Madina their administrative town. The forces had limited number of Liberians among them at this time and were mainly Sierra Leoneans who came through Tormabum along the Sewa River. Their behaviour towards civilians was different from the previous years, as it was reported they were violently hostile to every civilian they came across, killing unspecified numbers whenever they entered a town. At this period, the RUF forces were dressed in such a way¹¹⁹⁰ that suggests they had been living in the bush for quite some time.

RUF forces attacked the town of Kanga Oil Mill (Bum Chiefdom) during the night to recapture it from the SLA forces based there.¹¹⁹¹ They met no resistance from the SLA forces, as they killed a lot of civilians even before they entered the town. Houses were burnt and many people killed in the town. In the first two weeks after they recaptured the town there was indiscriminate killing of civilians because they regarded everyone to be the "enemy". Civilians were forced to abandon the town for camps in the bush. They were later hunted and brought back into the town by the forces; those who refused to come were killed in the bush. This forced the civilians to return to the town, particularly following an incident where RUF forces killed two people in the bush to underscore their threats. Furthermore, it is worth noting that most of the RUF members were inhabitants of the chiefdom, who had earlier been abducted by the RUF forces. Raping and killing of civilians was an everyday occurrence. More young men and women were conscripted and people were forced to carry loads for the forces.

After two months in Madina, during which time they went on patrol missions, the RUF forces entered the village of Mami, a fairly large village situated six miles south of Madina. The RUF forces were engaged in a house-to-house search in the village when they saw some military uniforms in one

¹¹⁸⁷ It however seems that the RUF did not settle in the area for a long time as in December 1994, civilians who had fled their villages went back and did not encounter any RUF activity.

¹¹⁸⁸ The control over Mass Kpanguma would give access to the Wanjei River, which merges with the Sewa River in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom.

¹¹⁸⁹ Early in 1994, RUF forces dislodged the SLA forces that had been in Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District) for two years, thus allowing the RUF to attack Bum Chiefdom, knowing the SLA would not be reinforced by those who used to be based at Momajoe (Bagbo Chiefdom, Bo District), a few miles from Madina Town. Bum Chiefdom adjoins the southern part of Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District).

¹¹⁹⁰ These forces were roughly dressed in jeans and t-shirts, with slippers on their feet and very few military boots, although their attire improved as they stole more clothes from civilians.

¹¹⁹¹ Although the report mentions that the town was attacked in December 1994, it is clear that it took place shortly after Madina town was attacked and prior to the incident in Mami (see below) took place. Accordingly, it probably took place earlier than December.



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of the houses. The inhabitants were all gathered to explain why military uniforms should be found in the village. The chief and his wife were first called upon to explain; when they failed to do so they were both shot dead. A woman in the front row was then picked to explain and when she could not, she was told to undress. Her son was called upon and told to do the same. He was then told to have sex with his mother in the presence of everybody. Shocked and panicked, he could not do it and they were both shot dead. Another woman was picked from the crowd and shot in the head. Although the troops were only three in number, the people were so terrified that they were unable to escape. Four more people were killed that day, making a total of eight. Four girls were raped on the same day and 17 more were abducted. Property was taken and removed from the village on the same day.

In a small village called Tarsor (Bum Chiefdom) located near a stream, the decomposed bodies of two RUF child combatants who had earlier gone missing were found on the seashore. Around 30 people who were found in the village were quickly gathered and asked to explain by the RUF forces. No one knew anything about the death of the boys and could not explain anything to the satisfaction of the RUF forces. Six people were immediately shot and killed and the other people were tied up and made to lie in the sun. Rubber was melted and dropped in their eyes. This was done to both young and old, including babies. Fifteen houses were burnt in the town and the farmhouses were destroyed, at which time seven more people were killed. At Bisoa, at the boundary with Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, RUF forces burnt six houses at night and killed 18 people on the grounds they were harbouring SLA forces.¹¹⁹²

Madina was made a training base for the abducted young men and boys; drugs were allegedly given to them during the course of the training that took place at the school compound, during which young girls were also trained as fighters. Although not all of them were given weapons after the training, these new recruits were used to attack SLA positions in Pujehun and Bo Districts. RUF forces also had a training base at Torma, where conscripted civilians were sent for training. The training was carried out in two phases. Training to fight was done during the first phase and then trainees were drugged during the second phase. Most of the boys that were trained in this way were below 15 years of age and they were usually sent on looting patrols called "mission" for their commander.

During their stay in Bum Chiefdom in 1994, the RUF did not face any counter-attack by government troops. This firm control over Bum Chiefdom would only be the prelude for further incursions into the District in early 1995 from Bo District.

In November and December 1994, six months after the SLA established a navy base in Bonthe Town, those navy forces patrolled the waters in Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms on the pretext that they were chasing away illegal foreign trawlers, despite the fact they never met any trawlers during their patrols. Their visits were sometime announced to the Chiefs in advance, who consequently taxed the civilians to contribute money for the feeding of the SLA members. On one occasion, the SLA forces called the people and local authorities at Tissana (Dema Chiefdom) to a meeting at which they

¹¹⁹² It was however revealed that this village did not host SLA forces.



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demanding that they should be supported financially so they could protect the lives and properties of the civilians. Women were required to give Le 1,000 and men had to give Le 1,500. One civilian, who incited the others not to give this money, on the grounds that the SLA was already paid, was arrested and put in a cell. This meeting concluded with a token by the Paramount Chief of Le 500,000;¹¹⁹³ once the SLA forces had sufficient money and food, they released the civilian who had earlier been detained.

Around this time, rumours of impending RUF attacks were spreading across almost the entire District and in late December, a Catholic priest of St. Ambrose Parish who was travelling from Rutile (Imperi Chiefdom) to Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) ran into armed RUF men. He was flogged by them and given a letter for the people of Mattru together with the sum of Le 6,000. On his arrival in Mattru, he informed the Chiefs and other civilians what had happened and gave them the letter. Most people abandoned the town for bigger towns like Bo and Freetown on account of this while others went to villages like Blama, Kabati, Wongifor, Bisao and Nyandehun all in the neighbouring chiefdoms. Furthermore, three RUF members who disguised themselves as State Security Division (SSD) officers were arrested at a dance organised by the people of Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) on 25 December 1994. They later confessed that they were RUF spies.

c) Events in 1995

On 19 January 1995, RUF forces attacked the Sierra Rutile Company in the north of Imperi Chiefdom.¹¹⁹⁴ In the morning, three groups of RUF forces¹¹⁹⁵ passed in succession by Moriba, heading to the plant-mining site where they were to gather. With them, they had abductees from the Sieromco Bauxite Mining Company in Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District), which they had attacked the day before.¹¹⁹⁶ They did not shoot while they were going to the mining site but took with them a large number of people of all ages and both sexes. The whole population was in panic but the RUF told them that they were not here for them but for the SLA forces so that they should join their movement, which some civilians did. They arrested all the junior staff at Kpanguma, 100 yards from the mining site. When they arrived at the senior staff quarters at Mobimbi, they started shooting and arrested some of the staff, including foreign workers. Soon after, they were in control of the mining site, where they fired their weapons for some time and took almost all the property

¹¹⁹³ As a very rough guide, five hundred thousands Leones is approximately equivalent to 250 USD. This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

¹¹⁹⁴ The Sierra Rutile was the world second largest producer of rutile, used in paints; before the war, the rutile extracted from this site represented 50% of Sierra Leone's total exports and 3,000 people were employed at the mining sites: AFP, 11 March 1997. At the time of this attack, the mine was in the middle of a major expansion program: Africa Review World of Information, 1 September 1995.

¹¹⁹⁵ Numbering 40, 80 and nearly 100 men in the respective groups, the RUF forces were equipped with AK47 and RPGs.

¹¹⁹⁶ This Swiss-owned mine was the world's largest producer of bauxite. These mining areas in Moyamba and Bonthe Districts were the two most important economical sectors after Kailahun and Kono Districts had fallen in 1992 and 1993, thereby depriving the Government of significant resources coming from the mining of diamond and the cultivation of cash crops like coffee and cacao.



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from the area, including vehicles, money, fuel, engines, medicines, food, livestock and other items taken from the company itself. RUF forces started giving food to civilians, which once more convinced civilians to join them.

At the time of the attack, foreign troops¹¹⁹⁷ and SLA forces were deployed in the area; members of the SSD (Special Security Division) were in charge of the security of the company. SLA and foreign troops made attempts to dislodge the RUF forces and finally succeeded on 30 January, at which time the RUF retreated to areas not far from the mining site. Doubts were raised among the civilians on the role played by the SSD and especially its commander in the overrun of the mining site by the RUF.¹¹⁹⁸

At the end of January 1995, RUF forces attacked and captured Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) without much resistance, as it seems the SLA had already pulled out of the town. While the bulk of these forces most likely came from Imperi Chiefdom, it is possible that some of these forces came from Lugbu Chiefdom (Bo District)¹¹⁹⁹ through Gbonge, stopping at the crossroad between the main road going west to Mattru and a southern one going to the chiefdom headquarter of Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom), at which time they decided to attack Mattru. When they entered the town, the RUF forces did not kill people or destroy property, informing civilians that they were only against the NPRC government and the government soldiers.¹²⁰⁰ As they settled in the town, they put in place structures to administer the town and the chiefdom, including the appointment of Town Commanders and Town Mothers. They also appointed adjunct clerks who, in charge of the control of movement in the chiefdom, were responsible for issuing passes allowing civilians to go from one area to another. They encouraged civilians to join them by giving them food, medicine, clothes and other items. However, this behaviour was not to last long and soon they began to act in a manner contrary to their words.

During the first weeks of their stay in the town,¹²⁰¹ they lived on the food and other items they had taken away from the Sierra Rutile but as they run out of those items, they forced civilians to work for them, notably by repairing and maintaining the ferry on the Jong River that allowed RUF forces to use the direct road to Sierra Rutile, where they had a lot of stolen property stored. Vehicles from civilians were used for this purpose. Civilians were also required to undertake other tasks; everyday, the young men each had to bring a bag of cassava and women had to bring vegetables, water and wood, as well as cook the food. Failure to carry out these tasks brought punishments, like being beaten or tied up and laid under the sun; the most severe punishment was death, for example if a civilian refused to give vegetables from his or her garden or if a civilian was caught hiding in the bush, like one woman who was shot at Luawa, near Mattru, in April. People were also brought from other towns and villages and killed for similar reasons at the RUF headquarter in Mattru. Youths,

¹¹⁹⁷ The records mention ECOMOG but this refers to either Nigerian or Guinean troops.

¹¹⁹⁸ The commander would have carried arms and ammunitions for the RUF at the mining site, once the RUF had overrun it and would have gone in surrounding villages

¹¹⁹⁹ Lugbu Chiefdom adjoins Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom on the east. Its headquarter town, Sumbuya, is on the main road that leads to Mattru (Jong Chiefdom). Since 1994, Lugbu Chiefdom had been under RUF control.

¹²⁰⁰ Mattru was the hometown of the Vice Chairman of the NPRC and two Government Ministers.

¹²⁰¹ RUF forces would occupy the town for eight months before being dislodged by the SLA in October.



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mostly between the ages of eight and seventeen, were also brought from the surrounding towns and villages to be conscripted.

Two bases were established in the chiefdom, one at Mattru and the other at Gambia Oil Mill. The RUF forces stole the supply of medicine and other items at the government hospital in Mattru and turned the hospital into a training base. The base at Gambia Oil Mill, nine mile from Mattru, was called "Camp Lion"¹²⁰² and hosted the more mature and top ranking members. To build the camp, the RUF forces unroofed houses in the surrounding villages. The new recruits who were trained in Mattru were presented to the commander at Camp Lion for approval to be sent at the war front.

The RUF forces also burnt down many houses in the town, including the entire compound of the Paramount Chief as well as houses that were allegedly empty. Occupied houses were also burnt and in one incident, two civilians who went back to their burnt house to gather some of the things that had not been destroyed were stopped by the RUF forces; one was killed and the other mutilated. Throughout the chiefdom, civilians' property, including furniture, clothing and money, was taken away, which led civilians to hide some of their belongings. When the RUF forces discovered that civilians were hiding property, they would take a member of the family, who would be forced at gunpoint to show them the hiding place. As at that time condiments and tobacco were only to be found in areas under SLA control, any civilian found with those items would be killed. Radios were also not allowed, to prevent civilians from hearing independent news about the war. During the time of their stay, both young and old women, including girls as young as 10, were sexually assaulted, sometimes in public and by more than one RUF member. People who escaped in to the bush were later hunted down and brought back into the town; some people were killed in the bush and their property taken.

RUF forces settled in many areas in the chiefdom, such as in Blama, south-east of Mattru, and Biawo, north-east of Mattru. When they settled in these villages, they carried out the same actions as previously described, including forcing civilians to work, to go hunting and to carry the load and conscripting children. In addition, they deposed existing authorities and installed their own structures, including the appointment of Town Commanders and Town Mothers, and established the "pass" system. At Blama, the Town Commander was sent to Camp Zogoda to be trained.¹²⁰³

On 3 February 1995, a very large number of RUF forces entered the headquarter town of Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom). Over 1,000 people were in Tihun at the time the RUF forces entered it, at which time they gathered all the civilians they met in the town, including the Town Chief. Gathering the inhabitants at the Court Barrie, the RUF forces asked the civilians who identified themselves as members of the Bio family (relations of the then NPRC Deputy Head of State, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio) to step forward. Many civilians did step forward, even if they did not belong to the family, thinking that the RUF forces were doing this to protect them; however, everyone who

¹²⁰² This was a generic name for training bases and other Camp Lions existed in the country, notably in Makeni (Bombali District).

¹²⁰³ This Camp Zogoda, although it is a generic name, probably refers to the important camp located in Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District).



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stepped forward was then killed.¹²⁰⁴ Other civilians were killed on that day, including two girls and an elderly woman. Over 34 houses were also burnt down in the town, a large amount of property was taken and a lot of people were captured.

The following day, the captured civilians, including the Town Chief, three white foreigners taken from the Sieromco Company in Mokañji (Moyamba District) and hundreds of others captured from Matru, were marshalled towards the town of Senjehun (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom), near the Sewa River.¹²⁰⁵ They stopped at a junction near Senjehun, where the abductees, who were carrying stolen property for the RUF forces, were divided into five groups. The Town Chief was told that the troops were heading for their base at Camp Zogoda in Kenema District (Koya Chiefdom), where the RUF leader used to stay. These forces further explained that they had captured some elderly men, as the RUF wanted elderly people advise the parliamentarians they would have once they seized power in the House of Parliament. Some civilians, headed by the Town Chief of Tihun, were then told to go back to Tihun under an RUF escort while the others proceeded to Senjehun carrying the stolen property, crossed the Sewa River at Borleh and headed for Madina (Bum Chiefdom), from where the RUF said the civilians from Madina would continue the journey to Camp Zogoda.

Soon after this attack, SLA troops were sent to secure the town of Tihun. On 11 February 1995, the RUF attacked the town but faced stiff resistance from the SLA forces based there. Several other unsuccessful attempts were made by the RUF to recapture the town between 11 and 18 February, when the SLA forces were dislodged from the town by a strong and fierce attack. A lot of civilians were killed; young men, women and girls were abducted; and several houses were burnt. Children got lost in the battle and a lot of property was taken and carried away by the RUF forces, who left the town on the same day of the attack.¹²⁰⁶ They went to neighbouring villages like Moyorgbo, Gerehun, Bauya Junction and Karleh, where they took away and destroyed civilian property and abducted several people. In each village or town they visited, they deposed the traditional chiefs and appointed Town Commanders, Town Mothers and clerks, who assumed administrative responsibilities and the running of the towns and villages. As in other places, a system of "passes" was established and civilians caught travelling without their pass were severely beaten.

When they entered Bauya Junction, RUF forces wrote "RUF" on the doors of civilian houses before leaving for the nearby village of Semabu, two miles from Bauya Junction. People in Bauya fled into the bush as soon as the RUF forces left the town. That same night, the RUF forces returned from Semabu, together with a large number of young men who carried property the RUF forces had taken from the people of Semabu. Some of the RUF forces then took the property to "Camp Charlie",¹²⁰⁷ returning four days later. They asked the civilians to return to the towns and stop

¹²⁰⁴ It is estimated that around 300 people were killed during this incident.

¹²⁰⁵ Information from Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom confirms that this chiefdom was used as a transit chiefdom for RUF forces, who did not settle there but used it to transport their stolen property, including televisions, bags of rice, corrugated iron sheets and food items, across the Sewa River and through Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District) to Camp Zogoda in Kenema District.

¹²⁰⁶ Although it is not certain whether RUF forces came back to the town, it is clear that SLA forces did not launch any counter-attack the following months.

¹²⁰⁷ There was one famous "Camp Charlie" near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).



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sleeping in camps in the bush. They also imposed laws on civilians preventing them from travelling to Bo Town (Bo District) without permits; people caught travelling without the permit would be killed. Indeed, movement from one place to the other could only be done with a “pass”. The forces elected administrative leaders in the town and surrounding villages. Often, people accused of coming from Bo by the RUF forces were shot dead without questioning. People were also killed if they were found with tobacco or food items like fish and any manufactured goods, as this was considered to be proof that they had gone to areas controlled by SLA forces, which were the only areas such items were available.

This continued for up to three months, when the RUF forces introduced another system known as “Man Power”, by which civilians were forced to carry loads for distances of about 50 miles. At that time, wives of civilians forcefully became the “wives” of the RUF forces and the husbands were to thank them whenever they had intercourse with their wives. Civilians were also forced to have sexual intercourse with their relatives in public and those who refused to do so were killed.

Also in February 1995, RUF forces entered the headquarter town of Matuo (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom), killed two civilians and burnt down 16 buildings including the Court Barrie. At Senjehun, a town used as a crossing point on the Sewa River, the forces terrorised the civilians by killing several people, burning down several houses and destroying the boats they found at the waterside in the town, on the grounds that civilians were using the village as an escape way to Bo District and other places.¹²¹⁸

During that month,¹²¹⁹ SLA forces based in Bonthe Town regularly patrolled the sea route in the north-west of Bonthe District between Dema Chiefdom and Gbangbatoke (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District). Civilians were banned from going to sea for fishing in this area, as the SLA feared that RUF forces might attack them and use their boats to continue their advance in the District. Civilians however continued to travel to Gbangbatoke, at night and SLA forces started to chase them and once captured, took away their fish and sometimes killed the faulting civilians.

On 25 February, the RUF made a successful counter-attack at the rutile mining site (Imperi Chiefdom), dislodging the SLA forces based there. During their stay, their behaviour was not as friendly as during their first stay. On the contrary, they told civilians that because civilians in the area had taken the side of the Government when the RUF was dislodged on 30 January, they would not spare any soul in the area. On that day in Imperi Chiefdom, in villages such as Mogwemo, Kpanguma and Moriba, the RUF forces ransacked villages, indiscriminately killed civilians, forced civilians into houses and set fire to them, destroyed and burnt houses, raped women and girls, conscripted young people into their movement and forced civilians to work for them. As in other places, any civilian caught with condiments or tobacco would be accused of going to areas under SLA control, where those items could be found, and would be killed.

¹²¹⁸The same forces also entered Lawana (Bumpch Chiefdom, Bo District) where they burnt down five houses and stole a lot of civilian property. They also killed four old people who were unable to escape from the attack. The town was attacked because of rumours that diamond mining was going on and a big diamond had been found there.

¹²¹⁹ It is likely that this was a practice that was carried out for a number of months around February 1995.



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Following the recapture of the mining area, RUF forces scattered throughout almost the entire chiefdom, taking control of the area for over eight months before being dislodged by SLA forces in November. For example, RUF forces entered Gbangbama on 20 February 1995, where they stole a lot of property, killed two people and captured many others. One week later, on 27 February 1995, the forces attacked the nearby village of Foinda. They took a lot of property, killed one civilian and abducted many others, who were forced to carry the stolen property to Mobimbi, which was previously the headquarter of the senior staff of the Sierra Rutile Company and became the RUF headquarters when they re-captured the town. Another example is Gaidema, which was attacked on 1 March 1995. RUF forces invaded the village in the north of the District with heavy gunfire. They remarked that civilians were ungrateful to them, as they had laid down their lives to fight against the dictatorship government of the NPRC, which had earlier toppled the APC government. They described the NPRC government as selfish, not transparent and unaccountable. The RUF forces attacked the village from its landlocked side, leaving the direction to the river open; accordingly, people fled from the continuous gunfire into the river where some, who were unable to swim, drowned while others were shot. In the village, RUF forces captured civilians, killed some and conscripted others. These forces also took a lot of property, which they then transported to their headquarters.

These continuous attacks on the villages in the chiefdom led the majority of the population to leave Imperi Chiefdom and to find refuge in more secure areas like Bonthe Town on Sherbro Island. Their control of the chiefdoms in the north of the District, where the strategic roads spreading through the rest of the District originate, allowed RUF forces to proceed further southwards to Yawbeko, Nongoba Bullom and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms. In these chiefdoms, most of the civilians were already living in camps in the bush, after they heard about the attacks in the north of the District. Furthermore, it is believed that the attack on the mining company, which led hundred of civilians jobless, resulted in increased favourable public opinion for the expansion of the Kamajors in the chiefdom.

The situation for Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom was, however, slightly different as it seems that the first RUF attack in the chiefdom, which took place in February 1995, originated from Pujehun District.¹²¹⁰ Civilians ran into the bush leaving behind children and elderly people who were unable to run. Those forces, dressed in military attire,¹²¹¹ identified themselves as RUF forces based at Sulima (Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District). Young girls who were caught were raped in front of their parents, including a 10-year-old girl, who was severely traumatised and remained ill for a long time. A lot of civilians were appointed as labourers to carry property as far as Dama, some 11 miles from Topain, where they were released and ordered to return back to Dama. People abandoned the town and stayed in the bush, where life rapidly became unbearable. Several visits were made to the town by the RUF forces in the following days but no one was found in the town so they stopped going there.

¹²¹⁰ Although RUF forces were reported to be in the chiefdom in 1994, it seems that an important attack was carried out on the chiefdom from Pujehun District.

¹²¹¹ Starting in 1992, RUF forces acquired uniforms from the SLA, often taken after a battle. Some of those uniforms also came with SLA members who deserted their ranks to join the RUF.



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Most of their activities were then carried out at Bandakor, from where they raided the neighbouring villages. Tei was also attacked in February, at a time when most of the people had gone to their farms or fishing, leaving the youngest and eldest in the town. The RUF forces burnt down the whole town, including the school, the UBC church and the Town Barrie and took away property such as fishing nets, canoes, seed rice, livestock and poultry. Five civilians were killed, among them an 85 year-old man, and some young people were abducted and forced to carry the load.

During one of their raids on the villages, three young men at Kale resisted the attack and killed two of the RUF forces. Civilians in the neighbouring towns and chiefdoms were informed and they immediately formed civilian-fighting groups or local militia to defend themselves, since the SLA forces was no longer able to contain the RUF advance. This group was composed of Kamajors, a Mende word for hunters. Civilians started contributing to the support of this civil force, donating single barrel guns and money for the purchase of cartridges. Other weapons like knives, spears and machetes were made by blacksmiths in the chiefdoms as part of their contributions.¹²¹² The main place for initiation was at Kaileh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) but, as the group expanded, it was further divided into sections with its headquarter base at Kale, south of Topain.

On 21 March 1995, around 120 RUF members coming from Jong Chiefdom, dressed in new combat attire with red cloth tied around their necks, entered the town of Baoma (north-east of Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) as they had heard SLA forces were in the area. The RUF forces made civilians they met in the town lead them to the farmhouses, where they took civilians' property, including food items and livestock, and captured a lot of civilians to be trained as fighters. They then went north-east to the town of Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) with all the stolen property. The attack was reported to the SLA forces based at Gbap, south-west of Baoma. They came to the town two days afterwards, took the remaining food items and livestock and returned to Gbap. On hearing about SLA troop movements, a large number of RUF forces came back to the town on 27 March 1995. One man who was asked whether he had informed the SLA about the first attack was tied up and stripped naked, as was another man. The first man was hit with a bladed weapon on his neck until he died while the second one had his genital organ cut off before being hacked to death. On the same day, RUF forces went looting in the surrounding villages, burnt down houses and came back to Baoma with captives carrying their load before leaving the town for Gambia (Jong Chiefdom).

Two members of the RUF re-entered Baoma about a week later, on 5 April 1995. They encouraged an old man they found in the village to call all the civilians who were hiding in the bush to return to the town, as there was no other person in the town, but nobody responded to the old man's appeal. A few days later, the RUF forces raided the camps of the civilians in the bush and burnt down several huts and destroyed other property. They threatened to kill all those who failed to return to the town, as a result of which civilians returned to the town a few days later. Town Commanders were appointed and arrangements were made for the support of the forces while they were in the town. However the Town Commanders were fearful for their lives, having heard that SLA forces

¹²¹² The support of the force was voluntary at the beginning but as time went on it became compulsory and also included provision of food and other essential materials for the Kamajors.



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killed civilians appointed as Town Commanders and those who stayed with the RUF on the grounds that they were collaborators, so they advised the civilians to escape back into the bush.

The RUF forces continued to harass civilians in the neighbouring towns and villages. Also in April, the RUF forces dislodged the SLA from Gbap, where civilians had already fled the town. The retreating SLA forces went to Bonthe Town before coming to the chiefdom between May and June and settle at Yele, south west of Gbap. From Yele, the SLA exhorted the civilians to leave the Baoma area, as they were going to launch an offensive on the RUF. The SLA did not however succeed in dislodging the RUF forces who themselves launched a counter-attack on SLA position at Yele five days later. During this counter-attack, RUF forces killed a large number of civilians and a few SLA forces. The few remaining SLA forces left for Bonthe Town and the RUF went back to Baoma, burning down some houses before leaving.

Around April, RUF forces attacked and settled in many villages in Yawbeko Chiefdom, in the centre of the District, including the chiefdom headquarter of Talia.¹²¹³ The pattern they followed in the villages they entered was similar to what they had done so far in the north of the District. Local authorities were particularly targeted, deposed and replaced by Town Commanders and Town Mothers. Some of the local authorities were also molested and killed.

RUF forces coming from Jong Chiefdom reached Bendu Cha Chiefdom in May 1995.¹²¹⁴ Their arrival was accompanied by severe brutality towards civilians and instances of killing, often with bladed weapons, raping, burning of houses, stealing of civilians' property and abduction of civilians were commonplace. For example, in May 1995, RUF forces reached Tigbe from Jong Chiefdom and shoot and killed two fleeing civilians. The forces cut off the dead men's genital organs, which they placed in the mouths of the bodies and left the mutilated corpses on the road. They then burnt down 10 houses before proceeding to another village, Tisama, where they beat a man with sticks almost to the point of death. Also in May, some RUF forces on their way to Malama passed by Molamdeh. They burnt a house in which a sick woman was lying in bed, allegedly because she did not give them water as they had asked. Once in Malama, they took a lot of property, including food items, which they forced captured civilians to carry to their base at Baoma (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). They also killed a petty trader who refused to give them money.

Fighting between the RUF on one hand and SLA forces assisted with Kamajors on the other hand continued in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom. On 25 May 1995, RUF forces located the hidden camp at Taifa, where civilians from Tei had found refuge, and attacked it. The SLA and the Kamajors fought the RUF forces and a big battle took place at Tamgbassi, two miles from Taifa. About 50 RUF forces were killed while 10 SLA members and two Kamajors died.

Another heavy battle took place at Bombokor (Kwamebai Krim chiefdom) on 7 June 1995 as a result of which the RUF forces were dislodged; about 25 of them killed while five were captured alive. There were no civilian fatalities reported to have been committed by the SLA, as their

¹²¹³ The date of their arrival in Talia could not be determined with precision. More details will be added for Yawbeko Chiefdom.

¹²¹⁴ Bendu Cha Chiefdom is a small chiefdom on the western edge of mainland Bonthe.



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commander¹²¹⁵ ordered his forces not to shoot civilians. The SLA commander also returned the stolen property left behind by the retreating RUF forces to the civilians.¹²¹⁶ On their way back to their base after the defeat at Bombokor, the RUF forces, apparently in retaliation, raped, beat and killed civilians with bladed weapons, including young children. Nevertheless, the RUF forces were driven entirely from the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom. As such there was great influx of civilians from the other chiefdoms into Kwamebai Krim, which caused a lot of hunger, starvation and disease, as there were not enough food and medicine.

However, RUF forces maintained control over chiefdoms in the centre of the District and continued their actions against civilians. For example, sometime in June 1995, RUF forces entered the village of Ghaloh (Bendu Cha Chiefdom), captured civilians, flogged some and later killed some of them. They also entered Bormimahun village but found no one in the town. They burnt down all the houses and traced the footprints of people to the camp in which they were hiding, where they killed some civilians and abducted the rest. As they were about to leave, they set fire to seven houses in the town. Kanga village was also raided and eight houses were burnt down and several civilians were abducted, including a 15-year old girl together with other women. The following month, civilians made another camp between the boundary of Jong and Bendu Cha Chiefdoms in the northwest of Bendu Cha Chiefdom.¹²¹⁷ At some point during the month, this camp came under the attack of the RUF forces at about 6.00pm. A baby boy was hit with bladed weapons by the RUF forces. Several people were captured and girls were raped and abducted.

Again in Bendu Cha Chiefdom, on 30 August 1995, RUF troops coming from Baiama (Jong Chiefdom) attacked Momaya, where they abducted civilians, including one man whom they recruited into their fighting force and some young girls, who they made their wives. The RUF forces then headed to Bawoma and Kpetema (both in Jong Chiefdom). On their way they killed two civilians. On or around 15 September, the Muslim festival day of Eid al Adha, RUF forces attacked civilians who had moved out of their camps to observe prayers around Mindohun village. Civilians were captured in the mosques and abducted; two men were killed, allegedly because they did not properly carry out a task the RUF forces had asked them. On their way out, they encountered a young man of about 30, who they suspected of being an SLA member, so they tied him to a stick, poured petrol over him and set him on fire.

As RUF forces were progressing and affirming their control of the District, except Sherbro Island, and the SLA were increasingly unable to defend the District, rumours about the Kamajors began to reach Bonthe Town. This consisted of information about the development of Kamajors, armed

¹²¹⁵ This SLA officer who used to be based in the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom favoured the idea of these local militia fighting alongside the SLA to bring the war to a speedy conclusion in the District.

¹²¹⁶ However, this action of the commander made his men dissatisfied and they became disgruntled. Shortly after, the SLA forces were over powered by the RUF during an encounter in the west of the Chiefdom; it was said the SLA forces could not face this battle, mainly due to the loss of morale following the episode of looting at Bombokor. Those RUF forces required that the commander identify himself and one junior SLA member pointed out the commander, who was then killed by the RUF forces.

¹²¹⁷ Civilians were leaving the camp during the day to go farming or fishing and were coming back after their activities.



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with cutlasses and knives and rumoured to have mystical powers, who were coming together to restore peace in their villages in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom. At this time, Bonthe Town was full of displaced people and the local authorities decided to send around 300 youths to the area where initiations were being performed.¹²¹⁸ Once initiated, the Kamajors went back to various areas in the District, engaging the RUF forces and, initially, working hand in hand with the SLA.

On their return from their initiation, a group of Kamajors engaged the RUF forces based at Baoma (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) with heavy firing between September and October 1995. About 22 members of the RUF were killed and several of them and their wives were captured. They were taken to the Kamajor base at Karleh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). Following the attack, the RUF completely left Baoma but one week later they regrouped and launched a counter-attack. They succeeded in dislodging the Kamajors and burnt down the remaining houses in the town. On 5 November 1995, Kamajors also launched a fierce counter-attack on the RUF forces at Baoma. They finally succeeded in ousting them out of Baoma and Gbap and entirely chased them out of the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. This was the final battle between the RUF forces and the Kamajors in the chiefdom. Civilians returned to resettle in the various towns and villages in the chiefdom and also in the neighbouring Yawbeko Chiefdom.

In late October, rumours of imminent SLA attacks¹²¹⁹ and sounds of heavy gun firing coming from the Bo road led some of the RUF forces based at Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) to leave the town for Senehun, in the south-west, and Gbonge (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom),¹²²⁰ although those based at Camp Lion refused either to leave or to release the civilians. On 25 October, a group of SLA Forces known as "Special Task Force" and composed mainly of ULIMO forces entered Mattru with heavy gunfire. They were accompanied by two jets, which were clearing the way for them before they entered the town. The RUF forces who had stayed in Mattru deserted their base as soon as the members of the Task Force arrived in the town, after killing many civilians who were with them. The following day, the Task Force attacked the RUF at Camp Lion in the north of Mattru Town. A lot of civilians including men, women and children were killed during that attack and the survivors were all brought into Mattru Town. Civilians in neighbouring villages were also requested by the Task Force to come and live in Mattru Town. While bringing civilians from the villages to Mattru, the Task Force faced pockets of resistance from the RUF but continued to defeat the RUF forces who, while retreating, imposed great havoc on the population, burning down houses wherever they were dislodged and killing many civilians. For example, in Kale Kowama, RUF forces retreating from Blama came across a family (parents and two small children) and killed the two parents.

¹²¹⁸ The local authorities asked the representatives of the chiefdoms, who had found refuge in Bonthe Town, to present a number of their young men.

¹²¹⁹ Starting in August, SLA forces, who had just received military training from the South African mercenaries company Executive Outcomes, who were contracted by the Government of Sierra Leone, engaged in "mopping up" operations in the Southern Province, dislodging the RUF forces from various strongholds in Bumpah Chiefdom (Bo District) and the mining area around Mokañji (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

¹²²⁰ At this time, Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, in the south of the District started to have successful confrontation with RUF forces and went as far as Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom). This strong grip on the south east of the District probably explains why the RUF forces did not move south, using the Sewa River and Wanjei River, that flow in Nongoba Bullom and Kwamebai Krim Chiefdoms but rather retreated to Gbonge, a hilly area in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom.



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Civilians brought to the town undertook a massive brushing and cleaning of the town and surrounding villages but soon, started to lack food and other necessary items.

In one of their patrol to bring civilians to Mattru, members of the Task Force went to Njahun and Senjehun (Sogbini Chiefdom). On hearing this, the RUF forces at Bauya (Sogbini Chiefdom) gathered the civilians and told them to wait for a while and all the civilians would go to Mattru. More civilians, some from neighbouring chiefdoms, came to Bauya, either brought by the RUF forces or arriving of their own free will, hoping to find a safer haven in Mattru. Therefore, thousands of people were gathered at Bauya when the RUF forces divided them in two queues, one for men and one for women. The civilians were told to sing a song and the RUF forces started to take one person after the other and killed them either with a gun or a bladed weapon. When they realised what was happening, the civilians started to flee to the bush. RUF forces fired on the fleeing crowd, killing hundreds of people. The RUF forces also ambushed the town to catch and kill escaping civilians.¹²²¹ The surviving civilians went back to their camps in the bush, where RUF forces chased them, killing everyone they found, including young children. At Licono for example, they gathered the civilians they found in the Court Barrie, hacked some of them into pieces, opened the stomach of one pregnant woman and threw the foetus in the fire. Some civilians found refuge at Bahoi, on the Sewa River east of Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom, and were rescued by Kamajors from Senjehun who came and took them to their base. Around 200 RUF forces attacked the Kamajor base at Senjehun but were defeated by the Kamajors stationed there, who were assisted with civilians equipped with sticks. After this attack, the RUF forces went to the Gbonge hills from where they raided villages in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom, burning houses, taking away property, killing and abducting civilians. Senjehun did not however sustain any further RUF attacks.

In November, SLA forces dislodged the RUF forces from Imperi Chiefdom and settled in the mining area, at Kpanguma and Mobimbi.¹²²²

Around October/November, Kamajors repelled the RUF from Yawbeko Chiefdom. To strengthen their positions, the Kamajors established more training bases in other chiefdoms than Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, so that they could spread over wider areas of operation. Many young men and boys, some aged below 15, enlisted to be trained, calling themselves "Black December". One such base was at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). Another base was at Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) where young men and boys initiated were called "Avondo".

On 13 November, Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom entered the village of Kpankpa (Bum Chiefdom) and killed 19 civilians on the allegation that they were accommodating the RUF forces in the village. The bodies were dragged into the river flowing by the village. The Kamajors who carried out this action were around 15 in number, only two of them had shotguns and all the others had cutlasses. After this incident, the Kamajors went back to their base at Karleh Wanjama (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom) before returning in the same month to attack RUF positions in Bum Chiefdom.

¹²²¹ This event resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians. In 1998, over 1,000 human skulls were discovered at Bauya Junction: AFP, 10 March 1998.

¹²²² No information on fighting with RUF forces was recorded. Those SLA forces would be joined by some ULIMO-K forces for a short while in January 1996.



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The RUF forces' position at Mami was attacked and they were dislodged from the town. They regrouped at Madina, where they faced a serious confrontation with the Kamajors. The RUF forces were again dislodged from their Madina base but burnt down 25 houses and killed several civilians before leaving the town. Eighteen RUF members were killed during the encounter. The RUF left towards the north and went in the direction of Sumbuya (Lugbu Chiefdom, Bo District).¹²²³ As they were retreating, the RUF forces killed civilians they came across, abducted a large number of people and took with them all the young girls they found. In December, RUF forces launched hit and run attacks on the chiefdom from Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District), north-east of Bum Chiefdom, but following their retreat from Madina they no longer settled in Bum Chiefdom, where more and more young men were initiated within the Kamajors society.

At a general meeting held in Mattru on 27 and 29 November 1995, civilians who had formerly served the RUF forces in various ways were identified and condemned to death. Some were later freed after investigations proved that they were innocent. At around this time, some of the Task Force members engaged in cannibalism, cooking and eating the bodies of RUF members they had captured and killed. In one incident, one child member of the RUF and known by the civilians for making "unruly" statements about the government forces was arrested by the civilians, who brought him to the Task Force members. Those shot him, removed the organs and left the body, asking civilians to dump it in the river.

As food was lacking, civilians living in Mattru were authorised by the SLA to go back to their villages in December with an SLA escort. The civilians were divided into groups depending on the area they were from and taken to their villages in order of the directions of the compass, with a group from the north going out one day, a group from the east when the first group returned and so on.

Towards the end of the year, the RUF were still to be found in Bendu Cha Chiefdom. In an incident that took place around October or November, RUF forces came to Gordana, approaching it from the river side. Two civilians who had earlier been captured in the chiefdom were with these forces. They were mainly interested by food products and told civilians that the war was not over and that the rumours that they did not have any more ammunition were not true. Before leaving, they forced civilians to carry the property they had taken to the south of Jong Chiefdom.

f) Events in 1996

In January 1996, civilians continued to resettle in Jong Chiefdom and engaged in commercial transactions with SLA members from the navy branch and coming from Bonthe Town.¹²²⁴ This period is referred to by civilians as "being calm".

¹²²³ Information gathered for Bo District reveals that in December 1995, RUF forces arrived in Bagbo Chiefdom from Bonthe District, repelled by Kamajors.

¹²²⁴ The SLA forces were bringing condiments, tobacco, clothes and radios that the civilians in the chiefdom could buy or exchange for gari, cassava or palm oil.



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Since RUF forces had been repelled from the boundaries of the chiefdom in 1995, the inhabitants of Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom did not sustain any more RUF attacks. After the February elections, however, the Kamajors started subjecting civilians to physical violence, sometimes killing people, and stealing people's property. For example, the Kamajors erected a detention cage made of thorns at every checkpoint in the chiefdom, which they used to punish people who did not have proper papers or for other reasons. Civilians were targeted for a variety reasons and were often ill treated.¹²²⁵

Many civilians, particularly adult males, sought initiation into the Kamajor society not because they wanted to go to the war front but to protect themselves and their families from mistreatment by the Kamajors. One specific example of this occurred at the beginning of 1997 in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom. A civilian who was selling tobacco in the chiefdom came across Kamajors at Torma Gbangbahun, who took his tobacco. As he wanted to talk, they threatened to beat him. On his return to Sohlon, some Kamajors he knew advised him to be initiated, because it would stop this kind of harassment. Accordingly, the man went to Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom) for initiation.

The Kamajor presence expanded across the whole District, gaining control over areas previously under RUF control. They started settling in the various chiefdoms and putting in place local structures. The collaboration with the SLA rapidly became problematic as tension, amounting sometimes to fighting, erupted between the two forces. Indeed, most of the activities reported for the year concern the Kamajors and the SLA, as the RUF forces were gradually being repelled from their positions across the whole District. While RUF forces were still present in some areas, they were more likely to be acting in small groups and looking for food rather than in large numbers and on the offensive. For example, RUF forces were coming from time to time to Bendu Cha Chiefdom, chasing civilians in their camps in the bush, especially in the coastal area of Tisagbe, where they burnt down houses and took away a lot of property.

In January 1996, Kamajors joined the SLA forces based at the mining site in Imperi Chiefdom. The ground commander for the Kamajors kept his men within the rules of the Kamajors and punished the few Kamajors who harassed civilians. On one occasion, for example, he ordered the arrest of one Kamajor who had seized a whole lorry of gari from a civilian. The Kamajor was put in a culvert pipe for sometime and had to pay a fine.

Kamajors also settled in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom), which became an initiation centre where the High Priest and Chief Initiator performed initiations. A big camp was built behind the health centre, where the ceremonies were performed. Before being initiated, Kamajors had to bring money for initiation fees (Le 10,000) and other items like oil, old country clothes and razor blades. In Tihun, Kamajors and civilians together gathered the remains of civilians killed by the RUF forces and buried them in a grave dug in a graveyard.¹²²⁶

¹²²⁵ No further details are available on this information.

¹²²⁶ It is not clear when the RUF was dislodged from Tihun and whether the SLA carried out this operation alone or in conjunction with the Kamajors. On 20 November 1995, the Government claimed the SLA had retaken control over the town but this information could not be confirmed by independent sources: Xinhua News Agency, 20 November 1995.



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In January 1996, Kamajors based in the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom held a meeting with the civilians at Baoma, where they appointed a chief or PRO they referred to as "AG" (Action Group). At the meeting, several laws were made regarding how the civilians were to behave, requiring them to observe the practices of the Kamajors, of whom there were 33 based in the town. The Kamajors took over all civil authorities in the town and surrounding villages, taking on the responsibility for judging all cases and settling disputes. Several restrictions were put on the civilians, who were forbidden to pound anything in a mortar¹²²⁷ and to hit a Kamajor with a broom. Contravention of these laws would lead to loss of life and the fine of demolition of the offender's dwelling house. The civilians were also tasked with feeding the Kamajors. In or around March, a woman violated one of the laws by pounding in a mortar and, as the Kamajors were chasing her in order to catch and kill her, she ran to the AG for rescue. The AG pleaded with the Kamajors, who demolished part of the woman's house as a fine. A civilian was also imprisoned on allegations that he was a rebel collaborator. On 7 August 1996, some Kamajors from Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) sent by the High Priest Initiator, took a lot of food items from the civilians at Baoma, which was also an initiation centre for the Kamajor society in the chiefdom. In a separate incident, civilians were molested and beaten when one of the initiators fell from his motorbike after hitting a stick that was lying across the road. The people of Motefoe village, where this incident happened, were brought to Baoma, where they were punished. The commander ordered the people to pay for the parts that were damaged on the motorbike. The people who had been brought to Baoma, together with the authorities of Baoma, paid the money.

SLA forces based in Bonthe Town and equipped with two gunboats (101 and 201) were working together with the Kamajors, entering the mainland to chase RUF forces. At this time, a lot of civilians labelled as RUF collaborators were brought from the mainland to Bonthe Town by both the SLA and the Kamajors, were killed and buried along the seaside, on the road opposite the military naval base. On one occasion, a man from Gbap (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom) accused of being a collaborator, as he cooked for the RUF, was brought to Bonthe town and killed. In a separate incident, a man from Bendu (Bendu Cha Chiefdom) was also brought to Bonthe Town, accused of being an RUF collaborator and was killed.

On 15 February, Executive Outcomes reached the District and deployed at the rutile mining site (Imperi Chiefdom). They held meetings with the civilians, SLA and Kamajors on strategies to protect the chiefdom. These three forces had different bases in the area and Executive Outcomes worked together with the Kamajors but not with the SLA, whose behaviour towards civilians was "not cordial". Indeed, the SLA engaged in taking away civilians' property and in chasing RUF collaborators. In one incident, the Town Chief of Mogwemo was killed without much questioning, accused of being an RUF collaborator.

Some SLA troops came to Jong Chiefdom from Bo road, as a support body for the Task Force in February 1996. The SLA forces occupied places captured by the Task Force from the RUF forces but, after staying in the chiefdom for a while, started to take civilian property, including zinc and

¹²²⁷ This particular law did not fit in the pattern of civilians' life, where pounding was the basis of food preparation, be it pepper, cassava leaves or rice.



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palm oil, and began to beat up civilians who refused to work for them. In the meanwhile, Kamajors had deployed at Gambia,¹²²⁸ east of the chiefdom, equipped with cutlasses, knives, shotguns, sticks and FM ropes.¹²²⁹ In the town, they appointed a chief (AG). Information gathered from Jong Chiefdom reveals the general laws the Kamajors had to abide by. For example, newly initiates could not have relations with women, could not lie on beds, could not bath and could not eat nut oil during the two weeks following their initiation. Kamajors were also not allowed to sit on mortar, to eat unscaled food or to stand at doorposts. It was believed that any Kamajors breaking those laws was no longer protected and would be killed by enemies during battles. To strengthen the force of the Kamajors in the chiefdom, more initiation began to take place at Gambia.

In a bid to control the chiefdoms where they were deployed, Kamajors established checkpoints and issued passes to civilians, thus regulating the movements of the population. In Bum Chiefdom, civilians coming to any village without such a pass were beaten, made to lie on the floor or forced to beat the back of their fingers on concreted floor, a practice referred to as "typing". They also appointed civilians as Town Chiefs (AG) and GS clerk,¹²³⁰ to deal with administrative issues. At this time, the Kamajors' attitude towards civilians started to become hostile, as the villages were taxed in order to feed the Kamajors and, above all, summary executions of alleged RUF collaborators were carried out. On 27 January, Kamajors from Bum Chiefdom attacked Torma, killed some civilians, took away some property and vandalised the quarters and offices of the swamp rice project.

Sometime in 1996,¹²³¹ Kamajors from Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom attacked RUF forces who had retreated from Matru and re-established in the Gbonge Hills (Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom). Sixty-eight civilians were rescued from the RUF, although 23 died in the crossfire. Seventeen RUF forces were killed and the Kamajors recovered the property the RUF had previously taken away.¹²³²

On 26 April, a serious fight broke between the Kamajors and the SLA forces based at Mabaka (Imperi Chiefdom), which resulted in some SLA members being killed.¹²³³ Following this encounter, the SLA withdrew from Mabaka and went to their main headquarter at Mobimbi. Sometime in 1996, reports of actions carried out by "lawless" SLA forces reached the military headquarter in Freetown and those forces were removed from the mining site and brought by helicopter to Camp Charlie, an SLA base near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili Chiefdom). Those forces who escaped this evacuation were believed to have gone to the Mokbanji area (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District).

A few months after the 1996 general elections,¹²³⁴ a conflict arose between the SLA and Kamajors in Kpanda Kemo Chiefdom. The SLA forces fell in a Kamajor ambush at the village of Kebawana, where one of the SLA members was killed. In revenge, the SLA forces killed seven Kamajors at

¹²²⁸ It was allegedly a lack of ammunition that prevented Kamajors from attacking the RUF stronghold in Matru in 1995.

¹²²⁹ This rope, one foot long with small sticks at its edge, was used to tie people at the ankle by their backs. "FM" means "frequency modulation", because when somebody was tied with such a rope, he would talk and reveal a lot.

¹²³⁰ Those GS clerks fulfilled the same kind of tasks as the clerks appointed by the RUF.

¹²³¹ This attack probably took place early 1996, before May.

¹²³² This attack may have been carried out by Kamajors deployed in different chiefdoms.

¹²³³ This was however not the only conflict between Kamajors and the SLA in Imperi Chiefdom.

¹²³⁴ The exact date of this event could not be ascertained.



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Kebawana and displayed their bodies on the Mattru-Bo highway. Two days later, the Kamajors regrouped and attacked the SLA forces. However, the SLA forces defeated them, killing 40 Kamajors and burying them in a mass grave in Mattru. The two groups continued to live as enemies for another month until an SLA officer came and settled the conflict.

Local authorities were among the people harassed by the Kamajors. In March 1996, the Paramount Chief of Sittia Chiefdom went into hiding, opposed to the Kamajors deployment in his chiefdom and their behaviour towards civilians. This did not go down well with the Kamajors who chased them, severely beating one of his relatives to know about his hiding place. The Kamajors eventually found him, seriously beat him, went to another relative of the Paramount Chief who had hosted him and fined her Le 300,000, which she subsequently did not have to pay due to a reverend's intervention. However, the Paramount Chief was so severely beaten that he was transported for medical treatment to Freetown, where he allegedly died.

Sometime in May 1996, the Kamajors continued to harass civilians, particularly businesswomen and other civilians who often went in search of food in Sittia Chiefdom on Sherbro Island. Some of the civilians were punished by being forced to carry loads for the Kamajors or were beaten and sometimes killed. People deserted the towns and villages to go into hiding in camps. However, the Kamajors followed them to the camps and forcefully brought them back to the towns. In the same month, the Kamajors attacked the village of Mobayeh (Sittia Chiefdom), where civilians were hiding. They burnt down the whole village and killed three people, namely one old woman who had given notice to the inhabitants of the village of the Kamajors coming was tied up and left to burn in one of the houses; a pregnant woman, whose womb was slit open; and that woman's four year-old daughter.

In June 1996, the Kamajor ground commander of Sogbini Chiefdom ordered the killing of four people on the grounds that they were enemy collaborators, who were arrested at night, taken to Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom) and killed.

In September 1996, Kamajors, who were mainly from Imperi Chiefdom in the north of Bonthe District, arrested 28 civilians and killed many of them in Sittia Chiefdom. There were cases reported of human flesh being cooked and eaten by the Kamajors. SLA forces were given notice about these civilians held captive by the Kamajors and went to attack them and free the captives. In retaliation, Kamajors laid an ambush for the SLA at Mbockie (Sittia Chiefdom). During the attack, some civilians who ran to the river and could not swim across it were drowned, while others were burnt in their houses by the fire sparked by fragments of RPGs. Two members of the SLA were also killed by the Kamajors. Over 50 Kamajors attacked the town and overpowered the 10 SLA soldiers who were based there. A large amount of stolen property was loaded into boats and carried away to Gbangbatoke (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District) by the Kamajors.

By the end of the year, the main Kamajor base was at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). After the 25 May events, it would be called "Base Zero".



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g) Events in 1997

By 1997, the Kamajors together with the SLA forces had succeeded in removing the RUF forces from most of their strongholds in the District. This notwithstanding, there were several clashes between the Kamajors and the SLA forces. The Kamajors also wrecked a lot of havoc on the civilians, as the SLA and RUF had done previously and continued to do.

SLA forces continued to mistreat civilians in the few areas in the District where they were deployed. A group of SLA forces from the navy branch posted at York Island used to take food and other non food items away from civilians. Civilians accused of committing crimes like killing or raping were punished by the SLA forces without many investigations into the truth of these accusations. The main punishment was to tie the suspect up, hang them upside down from the roof of a house and beat them. The most senior SLA member in command used to mete out this type of punishment. Cases of sexual violence against women by SLA members were also reported, including harassing civilians in order to take their wives. In one incident, some SLA members locked a woman in one room of her house and assaulted her sexually. As they heard her husband was coming home, they went outside the house and fired in the air to make people flee the area. Those SLA forces however withdrew from York Island and went to Bonthe Town as reinforcements following the Coup in May 1997.¹²³⁵

In March 1997, a combined force of Kamajors and SLA from Bonthe Town launched a fierce attack on the RUF position at Bendu, the headquarter town in the west of Bendu Cha Chiefdom. The combined forces had about 20 to 25 wounded, who were taken to Bonthe Town for medical treatment.¹²³⁶ The RUF forces continued to occupy the town and sent several messages to the SLA forces and the Kamajors in Bonthe Town threatening to attack them and the town. Nevertheless, despite this collaboration, fighting between the two factions continued. In one incident, an SLA member who had come to an area under Kamajor control was killed at Foinda–Madina (Imperi Chiefdom).

In May 1997, the military overthrew the Government and put in place a military regime called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This brought a total change in the attitude of the SLA forces based in Bonthe Town and its environs, who then joined the AFRC government. Civilians were continuously harassed, property was taken and a large number of people were killed on the allegation that they were Kamajors. The RUF forces, then referred to as “Peoples Army”, joined the AFRC forces and the combined forces continued to attack and mistreat civilians in the Town.¹²³⁷ The Kamajors in Bonthe Town moved out of Bonthe Town, which is part of the Sherbro Urban District, to Sittia Chiefdom and to Bendu (Bendu Cha Chiefdom), where they regrouped to attack the AFRC forces now in Bonthe Town. Furthermore, Kamajors had been deployed since 1996 in all the villages along the river from Mattru down to York Island, three nautical miles to Bonthe Town. Accordingly, the RUF/AFRC forces were surrounded by Kamajors.¹²³⁸

¹²³⁵ They would however come from time to time to patrol the island.

¹²³⁶ Casualty figures for the RUF forces could not be ascertained.

¹²³⁷ This would be the only time RUF managed to get a grip on Bonthe Town.

¹²³⁸ The Kamajors were however not deployed in York Island.



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Following threats of attack by the Kamajors on Bonthe Town, the AFRC forces mounted checkpoints at various locations in the town around July/August. Civilian movement was restricted and all boats and other vessels were grounded. Fishing nets and boats were seized from the civilians by the RUF/AFRC forces. Civilians were beaten, molested and deprived of their daily food. The AFRC commanders often sent their forces to attack villages occupied by Kamajors and to kill civilians. Sometimes civilians, suspected of being Kamajor collaborators, were arrested and brought to Bonthe Town, where they were imprisoned; those who could not be identified were shot and buried by the seaside opposite the naval base.

People were evicted from their homes to accommodate the RUF forces when they began to arrive in Bonthe Town in May 1997 and were harassed. At this time, the actions carried out by the RUF/AFRC members were masterminded by the AFRC forces, because the RUF forces, who mostly came from outside the District, did not know the area.

The Kamajors occupied SLA and RUF positions in Bendu Cha Chiefdom soon after the overthrow of the Government in May 1997. By July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces were shooting at civilian locations in the area. People in villages like Momaya were under serious attacks and during one attack, a 15-year old girl was killed. People abandoned their villages in the area for camps in the bush. Those attacks carried out by RUF/AFRC forces also prompted many young people in the chiefdom to join the Kamajor society, in Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom and at Talia (Yawbeke Chiefdom). Reports however mention that as their number grew larger, they became out of control and created more havoc on civilians.¹²³⁹ In November 1997, two young boys from Bonthe Town coming to Bendu to bring their relatives to Bonthe Town were arrested at the wharf by the Kamajors posted at Bendu checkpoint. When they admitted they were coming from Bonthe Town, they were accused of being "junta" collaborators and were killed with cutlasses.

Kamajor harassment and violence against civilians was reported in almost all the chiefdoms where they were deployed. In Bum Chiefdom, they targeted businessmen, especially if they were Fullah or Temne by tribe, and killed them.¹²⁴⁰ In one instance, one man from Moyia who was coming back from Bo District with food items was intercepted by Kamajors at Moyia who took away his food, locked him up in a guard room and subjected him to punishment, as a result of which he died. Punishments included starvation or tying the elbows behind the back and projecting the chest forward. The harassment of civilians increased when an embargo was imposed on Sierra Leone. At the checkpoints they mounted, Kamajors from Bum Chiefdom used to take whatever property the civilians had. If they resisted, civilians were beaten and put in a 2' x 2' cage made of thorns. In Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Kamajors were forcing civilians to work for them and were also taking away their property. They would load vehicles with the property they had stolen and take it to Talia (Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom). On another occasion, a group of Kamajors in Matru amputated the

¹²³⁹ Around this period, it was suggested that there was "[...] a clear difference between newly-recruited Kamajors, who have access to automatic weapons and apparently operate outside the authority of chiefdom representatives, and the traditional Kamajors who are carefully screened and respect traditional chiefdom structures": Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 29 October – 18 November 1997. REG. NO. 97/0390.

¹²⁴⁰ It has to be remembered that the Kamajors were Mendes.



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ears of one civilian. He was also severely wounded on the arm and later died of the wound. Another Kamajor killed two civilians at the Keiga checkpoint (Imperi Chiefdom).

The situation for the civilians in Bonthe Town worsened when RUF/AFRC forces imposed an economic embargo on the civilians in Bonthe Township. No one was allowed to leave Bonthe Town for Freetown and those who attempted were beaten and molested. Civilians therefore found themselves caught between the Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC forces, with the RUF/AFRC forces threatening them for being relations of Kamajors and the Kamajors threatening them for being "rebel" collaborators. This situation became unbearable by August 1997, so the elders of Bonthe organised a peace deal between the Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC forces. The peace was initiated after the peacemakers met with the Kamajor High Priest and Chief Initiator who was based at Talia (Yawbeko Chiefdom). Their trip to Talia was, however, accompanied by many obstacles, most of them being the Kamajors checkpoints all along the road to Mattru. Those civilian peacemakers were severely molested at a checkpoint at Momaya (Bendu Cha Chiefdom), where Kamajors opened fired into the air.¹²⁴¹ They were also molested by Kamajors on their arrival at Talia. Nevertheless, they met the High Priest and Chief Initiator, who gave them a message for the RUF/AFRC based at Bonthe Town. In that message, the Chief Initiator asked those forces to stop killing civilians and Kamajors and, in return, he promised he would try to stop his men from launching attacks on Bonthe Town. The peacemakers went back to Bonthe, escorted by some Kamajors responsible for the security of the High Priest, and the RUF/AFRC agreed to the peace plan.

However, the AFRC forces soon undermined the peace deal several times by attacking the positions of the Kamajors. For example, a few days after the return of the peacemakers from the negotiations, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Kamajor position at Gbangbatoke (Banta Chiefdom, Moyamba District). They were defeated and two members of the RUF/AFRC forces were killed. In September 1997, the RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Kamajors at Pembihun, north of Bonthe Town. The RUF/AFRC forces were again defeated and the Kamajors killed a lot of their number, including a very top RUF member. Soon after, the RUF/AFRC made another attack on Kamajor location in Bamaba, west of Bonthe Town, and were again defeated by the Kamajors. The RUF/AFRC forces continued to harass the civilians and killed people they suspected of being Kamajor collaborators in Bonthe Town. Dema Chiefdom, east of Sittia Chiefdom, was also affected by these attacks, as in December 1997, AFRC members went to Moyema by sea, over powered the few Kamajors posted there, looted some houses and a store and burnt down some houses before leaving.¹²⁴² The AFRC members left for Bonthe Town but one of them proceeded to the village of Mokutu (Dema Chiefdom) and killed a youth, who allegedly tried to be "defiant". This AFRC member was later arrested on his way to Tissana and killed by Kamajors.

In the middle of 1997, newly initiated Kamajors settled at Mokossie (Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom), where they convened a meeting with the civilians to explain the new laws civilians would have to obey. These laws included no whistling in the town, no sitting on motorbikes by women, no trousers for women and no use of mortars at night. The penalty for the breach of one of these laws was the

¹²⁴¹ This checkpoint was called "the gate of hell".

¹²⁴² During the period of 1997 to 1999, Dema Chiefdom administration was entirely in the hands of the Kamajors, who presided over cases and served as chiefdom police sub chiefs and as Paramount Chief.



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destruction of the civilian's house. The Kamajors decided on cases and tied people with a FM rope for various reasons.

Around 10 and 11 September 1997, the AFRC commanders ordered that all the important personalities in Bonthe Town be arrested, in particular those who initiated the peace talks, alleging they did not negotiate in the interests of the AFRC. The arrested people were, however, released in the evening. On 15 September, the Kamajors launched an attack on Bonthe Town, which was unsuccessful, as the RUF/AFRC forces had a large amount of weapons in the town. Several Kamajors and a lot of civilians were killed during the battle, which lasted for four hours. The dead Kamajors were buried in a mass grave dug by the RUF/AFRC forces. After the battle, the RUF/AFRC forces conducted a house-to-house search in Bonthe Town, looking for Kamajors. Civilians were advised not to host any Kamajor and to report any case of a civilian harbouring a Kamajor. Information of imminent Kamajor attacks on the town continued to arrive in Bonthe Town, through the businessmen travelling back and forth to Sittia Chiefdom. This led many RUF/AFRC forces to leave the town on gunboats for Freetown, taking with them a lot of property they had previously stolen. Few civilians were authorised to board the RUF/AFRC gunships on that occasions but on subsequent trips and during a transfer to the boat, the sea car they boarded capsized and many civilians drowned in the ocean.

The RUF/AFRC forces who stayed in the town continued to take property and kill civilians in and around Bonthe Town. On 14 October, they arrested the SLPP secretary for Bonthe District, accusing him of being among the Kamajors who launched the attack on the town on 14 September. He was detained for three days, during which time physical violence was inflicted on him; the RUF/AFRC forces also burnt down his house. On 18 October, he was brought to the United Methodist Church, where he was mutilated and had his head cut off.¹²⁴³ The RUF/AFRC forces then dismembered the body, put his head on a stick and paraded across the town, asking civilians to give them money for the good work they did.¹²⁴⁴ Four days later, the civilians asked the RUF/AFRC members for authorisation to bury what was left of his body.¹²⁴⁵

h) Events in 1998

In January, Kamajors went to York Island and stole a lot of property from civilians' houses, without killing anybody. They took their load and went back to Bendu Cha Chiefdom.

On 14 February 1998 the AFRC forces departed from Bonthe Town for Freetown.¹²⁴⁶ The Kamajors replaced them the next day, on 15 February. Two groups of Kamajors heavily armed with

¹²⁴³ It was reported that his organs were cooked and eaten at the naval base.

¹²⁴⁴ It is reported that the officers in charge of the town did not take any action, which led civilians to think that they actually masterminded every action carried out by the junior staff.

¹²⁴⁵ Those responsible for this action would be court marshalled in September 1998 and the mother of the man killed testified she was forced to eat her son's heart by the men who had killed him: AFP, 16 September 1998.

¹²⁴⁶ In late March, over 500 decomposed bodies were discovered in two shallow graves on Sherbro Island. It was believed that these bodies were hurriedly buried by the RUF/AFRC forces before they pulled out of Bonthe Town. It is not clear whether those people had been killed by the RUF/AFRC forces just before they retreated or throughout their stay in the town: AFP, 1 April 1998.



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AK47s, RPGs and LMGs under different commanders, one numbering about 30 members and the other of unknown size, entered Bonthe Town on that day. A meeting was held with the civilians in the township, where some people were killed, mostly on the grounds that they were identified as “rebel” or “junta” collaborators. One of the civilians killed was a tailor who had made the “Kamajors uniforms” the RUF/AFRC forces sometimes used to attack the Kamajors by surprise. In another instance, Kamajors arrested a man who used to live in York Island but was now hiding in Bonthe Town. He was put in prison where two civilians and two policemen were already detained. He was severely beaten by a young Kamajor around 13 years old, following the order of a commander; a few minutes later, five Kamajors entered the cell and told them they would be killed because they were collaborators. They were then taken to the Kamajors High Command, where they were tied up and beaten. It was only due to the intervention of a parish priest that their lives were spared. Instead, they were allowed to pay a fine, which – because the original punishment had been death – was set at Le 200,000, although the first civilian was allowed to leave on payment of Le 54,000.

More Kamajors from the mainland chiefdoms arrived in Bonthe Town, where they looted houses and public offices before going back to the chiefdom from which they had come. Businessmen and traders were continuously harassed by Kamajors who took all their property from them; sometimes, people were killed. Checkpoints were established at various locations at the entry points of the town through which civilians coming from the mainland or from Sherbro Island had to pass. In one instance, Kamajors went to Mania, a trading place for civilians. On their way, they met some civilians going to the nearby village of Ndainga to trade. Those civilians were flogged and one was wounded with a dagger on his back. The Kamajors took most of the items the civilians were about to trade and left for Jimi. On their way, they saw a canoe going towards Ndainga. They took away all the traders’ property and took control of the speedboat with the traders still inside, leaving their canoe out at sea. The civilians were disembarked on a piece of land and the Kamajors continued on their way to Jimi, where they set one house on fire.

The Kamajors continued to harass civilians, killing people alleged to be “junta” or “rebel” collaborators and stealing property. They were totally dependant on civilians for their food and starting taxing civilians, as a contribution to their feeding and to the purchase of ammunition. This made life for the civilians very difficult in the township and surrounding villages. The Kamajors burnt down villages like Gbogboma, Puokie and many others in the Sittia Chiefdom and killed people who occupied positions of respect in the community.

Throughout the remainder of the year and those following, Kamajors victimised civilians in towns and villages across the District. They deposed or ignored all the chiefdom authorities and themselves acted in those positions, including as chiefs and policemen. They added to the suffering of the civilians with their prohibition laws to protect their powers and their mistreatment of civilians, applicable only to the Kamajors. Civilians were required to obey a set of different laws, which included no stealing, no fighting and no travelling from one village to another without a pass, each with different penalties depending on their gravity. Furthermore, the Kamajors asserted that their authority was supreme and that the Town Commander called AG had the right to intercede between civilians and Kamajors.



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While the Kamajor initiation was going on at Gambia (Jong Chiefdom) in 1998, one Kamajor commander raped a suckling mother at the market place in Goba town. He also threatened to kill the husband of the woman. On 27 March 1998, a one-year old boy was deliberately killed at Mowagor village near Mattru by a Kamajor commander.

i) 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002¹²⁴⁷

The Kamajors were not respectful to each other let alone to the civilians in the District, including instances of riots and fighting between different groups of Kamajors in the District. The High Priest would send his own men out on looting missions, but they would often encounter troubles with other groups of Kamajors in other chiefdoms. The Kamajor structure appeared blurred or non-existent to the civilians at this time: acts of violence against civilians and their property throughout the country led people to think that there was no more structural organisation, aside from the District Coordinator and High Priest.

In January 1999, a group of Kamajors from Sittia Chiefdom entered the island town of Timbima (Dema Chiefdom) and required the civilians to pay the sum of Le 1,000.00 and a quantity of fish for their feeding. Defaulters were tied up and made to lie down and look at the sun. Another group of Kamajors from Dema Chiefdom went to attack this first group,¹²⁴⁸ but could not find them in the town. This second group therefore required the civilians to pay for the cost of fuel used to visit the village. From September 1999 to the end of 2000, the administration of all of Dema Chiefdom was in the hands of the Kamajors, with the chiefdom ground commander assuming the responsibility and position of the Paramount Chief. They also made themselves into sub chiefs down to headmen and made additional laws, including prohibiting civilians from eating certain food, like bananas. Civilians were forced to obey their instructions and defaulters were always given severe beatings. Housewives were punished together with their husbands. The Kamajors continued these practices throughout the years of 1999, 2000, 2001 and the early part of 2002, when disarmament begun in the District, although on a lower scale.

Following the Freetown invasion by the RUF/AFRC in January 1999 and their subsequent defeat by ECOMOG and others, RUF/AFRC forces retreated hastily into the country and some arrived in Bonthe Town. While in the town, they raided villages in Sittia and Dema Chiefdoms, took property and burnt houses. Four months later, Kamajors from Dema Chiefdom agreed to regroup with those of Sittia Chiefdom to attack Bonthe Town. Civilians were requested to provide them with the items they needed, like food and cartridges. During a meeting with elders at the chiefdom headquarter of Tissana (Dema Chiefdom), the Kamajors were told that civilians could not gather the money to buy the ammunition, which did not please them. They molested the Paramount Chief and some began going around to collect money from civilians while others were chasing cattle. From Tissana, they moved to an island called Nyagai, where they found a man they accused of having been an attendant

¹²⁴⁷ It is mentioned that Executive Outcome were based in the Moyamba District, and intermittently went into Bonthe District to give moral support to the Kamajors. However, Executive Outcomes left the country early 1997, therefore this information may refer to other forces.

¹²⁴⁸ This second group of Kamajors were from Dema Chiefdom and were ordered by their commander to drive the Kamajors from Sittia Chiefdom back to their chiefdom.



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for the RUF/AFRC in Bonthe Town during previous years. The Kamajors amputated the man bit by bit, starting with his ears, before removing his eyes and internal organs and finally dumping him in the river. The people for whom the man was working for were obliged to pay a fine for having harboured and kept a collaborator. The Kamajors then launched their attack on Bonthe Town but were unsuccessful¹²⁴⁹ and about one month later, those Kamajors, now over 500 in number, launched a second attack on the town. In the meanwhile, the RUF/AFRC forces had started pulling out of the town, having learnt of this attack.¹²⁵⁰

On 24 May 1999, the deputy task force commander of Bonthe District led a troop of Kamajors and attacked Mattru Police station at midday. Two police officers were killed. On 8 July 1999, the same commander led a group of Kamajors at night to launch a strong attack on Kortumahun village (Yawbeko Chiefdom). A pregnant woman was shot in the leg during the attack and later taken to Bo Government Hospital.

In Sogbini Chiefdom, the Kamajors had no regard for the Paramount Chief. They defied his authority and claimed that they were only accountable to the CDF National Coordinator. Civilians were physically and sexually harassed. Children below the age of fifteen were abducted and some were forcefully conscripted and initiated into the Kamajor society. More and more youths joined the society to protect their relations and families from the continuous harassment and havoc wreaked by the Kamajors. In the town of Semabu (Sogbini Chiefdom) a notorious Kamajor killed civilians, took property and burnt down civilian houses. Fear of the Kamajor atrocities forced civilians to go back into the bush camps for safety, abandoning their property behind them. The Kamajors took all of that property that had been abandoned, sometimes visiting the bush camps to steal property and harass civilians.

Following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program (DDR) was formally launched on 20 October 1999 by the President of Sierra Leone during a ceremony in Freetown. Very few combatants out of the estimated 45,000 combatants, however, laid down their arms at this time.¹²⁵¹

The DDR process was halted in 2000, due to the insecurity in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and the abductions of UN peacekeepers in May 2000. To reactivate this process, a ceasefire was signed in Abuja, Nigeria on 10 November 2000, which again had to be re-activated for the second time on 4 May 2001.¹²⁵²

¹²⁴⁹ Some Kamajors and few RUF/AFRC members were killed but civilian fatalities could not be ascertained.

¹²⁵⁰ It could not be ascertained whether there had been any fighting at all between the RUF/AFRC forces and the Kamajors.

¹²⁵¹ In November 1999, only 1,500 combatants had disarmed out of the total 45,000 estimated combatants: IRIN West Africa, 17 November 1999.

¹²⁵² The security situation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces prevailing in 2000 urged the Government of Sierra Leone to negotiate a ceasefire with the RUF in November 2000. On 4 May 2001, the parties would meet again in Abuja, Nigeria to review the ceasefire. Further to the meeting in May 2001, they parties would hold monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR. The final meeting took place in January 2002 when disarmament was declared complete and the war over.



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Following a meeting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF held at the UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown, the parties agreed on the need to accelerate and complete the disarmament process, which included the opening of a DDR centre in Bonthe District.¹²⁵³ The second meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR took place in Magburaka (Tonkolili District) on 2 June 2001 and the parties agreed on an accelerated disarmament process meant to take place simultaneously in Kono and Bonthe Districts in June 2001,¹²⁵⁴ although the disarmament camp was not yet set up.¹²⁵⁵

Disarmament finally began on 2 July 2001¹²⁵⁶ although at a slow pace, as only nine CDF members turned in their weapons on the first day of the opening of the DDR centres. In fact, CDF members from the mainland expressed their wish to disarm in Mattru (Jong Chiefdom) and not in Moyamba District, as was planned.¹²⁵⁷ Therefore, following a meeting attended by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNAMSIL's Force Commander and Deputy Force Commander, the CDF coordinator and other officials and a member of the NCDDR, the parties agreed to establish another DDR camp in Mattru.¹²⁵⁸ This camp was opened around 13 July and from this time, the disarmament process began to accelerate in the District: as of 27 July, 813 CDF members had disarmed in the two DDR camps in Bonthe District. On this date, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General visited the two centres to assess the disarmament progress and to stress the importance of having this process complete by the end of July.¹²⁵⁹

During a meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR, the parties formerly declared disarmament in Bonthe District complete in September.¹²⁶⁰ UN peacekeepers of the Nepalese contingent deployed in the District in late 2001.¹²⁶¹

3. Conclusion

Sharing a border with Pujehun District, Bonthe District was affected by the RUF/NPFL incursion into Sierra Leone as early as 1991. The effect of the conflict, however, differed slightly from the experience in Pujehun District. Until 1995 in Bonthe District, the conflict had only spread into the three chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim, Bum and Nongoba Bullom, while in 1991, although only for a few months, RUF/NPFL forces had spread across the whole Pujehun District. After a first short stay in Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom in 1991, RUF/NPFL forces would visit the District sporadically,

¹²⁵³ In addition to the existing DDR camps in Port Loko, Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru, the parties also agreed on the urgent need to open new DDR camps in the country, in the Northern Province (Lunsar, Makeni, Kamakwie, Masingbi and Alikalia), the Eastern Province (Koidu and Kailahun) and the Southern Province (Pujehun and Bonthe): UNAMSIL press release, 15 May 2001.

¹²⁵⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 5 June 2001.

¹²⁵⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 8 June 2001. The acceleration of the disarmament was meant to take place District by District.

¹²⁵⁶ UNAMSIL press briefing, 3 July 2001.

¹²⁵⁷ Kamajors wanted a fast-track disarmament to be able to return rapidly to their farming activities.

¹²⁵⁸ UNAMSIL press briefing, 6 July 2001.

¹²⁵⁹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 27 July 2001.

¹²⁶⁰ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 30 September 2001. Disarmament would only be declared complete for the whole country in January 2002.

¹²⁶¹ UNAMSIL press briefing, 16 November 2001.



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often in small numbers, but would not establish a real presence there, except in Bum Chiefdom for six months in late 1991/1992.

The natural features of the District, particularly the swamp areas and rivers in the south, could explain the containment of the conflict to the three aforementioned chiefdoms during its early stage. This is reinforced by the fact that the major incursion penetrating the District in 1995 was carried out from the north of the District, where the road network is the more developed.

By 1995, the conflict had taken a new turn, as RUF forces spread across the whole country. The attacks on the east and south of Moyamba District and the north of Bonthe District in January 1995 was in fact preceded by a massive RUF operation in Bo District, where RUF forces launched attacks on camps and headquarter towns in the centre of the District all within a couple of days towards the end of December 1994. RUF forces then proceeded directly to Moyamba District and then to Bonthe District.

RUF forces attacked and thus paralysed the economically vital mining area, which spreads across the north of Bonthe District and the south of Moyamba District. This new development was dramatic for the Government of Sierra Leone, as the income from mining activities and the selling of cash crops produce had already dropped considerably following the previous occupation of Kono and Kailahun Districts. RUF forces spread across the mainland District, failing however to reach Sherbro Island.

Their progression and the violations they committed were hampered by the intervention of a special military unit in late 1995 and the continuous development and successes of the Kamajors. By the end of 1996, the RUF forces were dislodged from their positions across the District and the subsequent actions they carried out was the fruit of small pockets of RUF remnants.

Unlike Pujehun, Bo, Kenema and Kailahun Districts, after the overthrow of the Government and the establishment of the AFRC regime, the Kamajors did not withdraw from their positions and go underground, as the RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in Bonthe Town and not in the rest of the District. Furthermore, most of the RUF forces who joined the AFRC members in the Bonthe Town did not originate from the District but came from Kailahun District.

From February 1998 and following the withdrawal of the RUF/AFRC forces from Bonthe Town, the pattern of actions in Bonthe District was similar to how the conflict affected the other Southern Districts of Pujehun, Moyamba and Bo. Free of RUF/AFRC presence, Kamajors actions, originally aiming at defend their chiefdoms against RUF attacks and violence, became oppressive for the civilians, as Kamajors affirmed their control not only of the security of District but also of the local administration, substituting themselves for the local authorities, and of the civilians living in Bonthe District.

After 1998, the conflict concentrated in the Northern Province and areas of the Eastern Province, where the CDF members were not able to put up a firm and continuous resistance to the RUF/AFRC advances and where the main mining areas were located.

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Violations committed by Kamajors during this period were fewer reported than the violence carried out by the RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces. This is probably mainly due to the fact that key people mostly reported violence when carried out during an attack; from 1998 onwards, the Kamajors were in total control of the District, so the day-to-day violations were most of the time not reported, blurred in the memories of the key persons.

As RUF forces did not settle in the District for a long period and the intensity of fighting was generally lower than in the rest of the country, Bonthe District was one of the least affected Districts in term of destruction of property, displacement of people¹²⁶² and violence against civilians.

c. Moyamba District

1. **Introduction**

Moyamba District is one of the four Districts in the Southern Province of the Republic of Sierra Leone. It is bounded by Bo District in the east; Tonkolili and Port Loko Districts in the north; Bonthe District in the South; and the Western Area in the west. The headquarter town, Moyamba Town, is located in Kaiyamba Chiefdom, in the centre of the District.

There are 14 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarter</u>
Bagruwa	Sembehun
Banta	Gbangbantoke
Banta Mokele	Mokele
Bumpeh	Rotifunk
Dasse	Mano
Fakunya	Gandohun
Kagboro	Shenge
Kaiyamba	Moyamba
Kori	Taiama
Kamajei	Senahun
Kongbora	Bauya
Kowa	Njama
Ribbi	Bradford
Timdel	Bomotoke

Having borders with both the Southern and the Northern Province, Moyamba District would be affected by the development of the conflict in those two Provinces, both of which were used to launch attacks on its borders, primarily from the south.

¹²⁶² Although there was no massive displacement of population between towns inside the District and outside the District, civilians often took the bush, leaving in bush camps called "sorkoihun".



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Two strategic roads pass through the District. The main highway leaving Freetown for the Provinces separates into two roads at Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). The first road goes from the west to the north towards Magburaka (Tonkolili District) and Koidu (Kono District), while the second one reaches Bo and Kenema through Moyamba District. This second road reaches Moyamba District in the east, and runs in the District from the extreme north-east of Fakunya Chiefdom and its headquarter town, Moyamba Junction, Taiama (Kori Chiefdom), and Senehun (Kamajei Chiefdom) before arriving in Bo District in Gbo Chiefdom. From Moyamba Junction (at the border with Tonkolili District), a road leaves to the south-west to reach Moyamba Town. Accordingly, controlling Moyamba Junction would allow access to the north-west to Tonkolili District, to the south-west to Moyamba Town and to the south-east to Bo Town. When circumstances make using this highway impracticable, an alternate route to reach Bo from Freetown runs through Moyamba Town. It leaves the Western Area through Songo and goes south-east to Moyamba District, passing by the headquarter towns of five chiefdoms, before ultimately reaching Bo District through Bumpeh Chiefdom. The control of this road would be of a critical importance, as it makes Freetown reachable from Moyamba District.

Its main economic activities, besides salt production on the coast, are rutile and bauxite mining. The mining area is located in the south of the District, in Banta Chiefdom, and in the north of Bonthe District (Imperi Chiefdom). The headquarters of the bauxite company are in Mokañji (Banta Chiefdom), while the headquarters of the rutile company is in Imperi Chiefdom (Bonthe District). Those mining activities were of vital importance for the Sierra Leone Government, as mineral resources made up the bulk of its exports before the war.

Njala University College (south of Kori Chiefdom), by the Taia River that flows south-north in the east of the District, is part of the University of Sierra Leone and is the only University Campus in the Provinces.

The way the conflict affected the District can be divided into three distinct stages. The first stage was from 1991 to 1994, the period before the RUF forces entered the District. During this time, SLA forces were deployed in the District but harassed civilians, including taking away their property. Cases of rapes and killing were reported and the chasing of collaborators increased by the end of 1994 as rumours of imminent RUF attacks grew stronger.

The second stage ran from 1994 to 1998 and saw the progression and settlement of RUF forces in the District and the development of the Kamajor society. In early 1995, RUF forces made an incursion in the District and, shortly after, began to make their way towards Freetown. As this advance was stopped by SLA forces, the RUF forces settled in the District, progressively reaching all the chiefdoms and establishing a strong base in the north. The chiefdoms in the south of the District were less affected and most of the actions were concentrated in the north of the District. Civilians began organising themselves into Civil Defence Units (CDUs) and by early 1996, the first Kamajors deployed in the District and engaged RUF forces. They however also fought SLA forces who were asked by the civilians to leave in 1996. The following year was described as the peak of



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Kamajor activities in the District. RUF forces were still active in the north of the District but had been repelled from the south and centre.

During the AFRC regime, RUF/AFRC forces were only deployed in limited areas of the District and were strongly resisted by the CDF. This second phase was characterised by violence inflicted on civilians mainly by RUF forces but also by SLA forces and Kamajors. RUF forces, once stopped on their progression to Freetown, mainly carried out hit and run attacks, entering villages, taking away property and burning houses but also killing civilians, raping girls and capturing civilians to carry their loads, usually to their main base. They also killed number of civilians on the grounds they were Kamajor collaborators. During this period, the behaviour of the Kamajors towards civilians began changing, as they intensified their fight against the RUF and, later, RUF/AFRC forces and started gaining control over different areas. Civilians were initially requested to provide them with food and other basic items but soon, Kamajors began harassing civilians and taking their property. Kamajors did not recognise the authority and power of local authorities and other Government personnel, as they only had respect for those who had been initiated and they soon extended administrative authority over civilians in the areas they occupied. Their control of an area included physical violence against civilians in general, including sexual violence against women. Alleged RUF or AFRC collaborators were killed without first undertaking an investigation. The Kamajors made certain laws for the civilians and those who broke those laws were subject to various punishments, including imprisonment in a small cage made of sticks and thorns.

The third and final stage ran from 1998 to 2001 when disarmament was complete in the District. Following the retreat from Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces pulled out of the entire District, which was therefore in total control of the District. Only few and limited attacks were carried out in the north of the District by RUF/AFRC forces based in Tonkolili District. This period was however marred with a lot of atrocities, and most of the CDF actions described in 1997 also happened in 1998. Alleged RUF or RUF/AFRC collaborators were killed and traders and businessmen were particularly targeted for their belongings. Fighting between two factions of the CDF erupted in the District in 1998 and 1999.

However, by the end of 1998 CDF activities against civilians started to decrease and, gradually, civilians became free from attacks and harassment. People returned to their various towns and villages and started resettling. This continued until the disarmament of the CDF in the entire District by 2001.

2. Factual analysis

a) Events in 1991 – 1994

Sierra Leone Army (SLA) forces were deployed across the country in the District's headquarter towns and other sensitive areas soon after the coup d'état in 1992, with the aim of securing the country from the National Patriotic Front (NPFL) and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces, which had entered Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991. Around this time, new SLA units emerged, such as Tiger Battalion, Scorpion Battalion and SLA Rangers. In Moyamba District in 1992,¹²⁶³ some

¹²⁶³ The date is not clear from the record, but this was probably sometime in 1992.



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SLA members deployed in Fakunya Chiefdom in the central north of the District, which shares a boundary with Tonkolili District. They deployed in two sensitive areas of the chiefdom, namely Moyamba Junction, 102 miles from Freetown on the Freetown-Bo highway, 22 miles to Moyamba and Njagbahun Junction, on the Moyamba Junction-Moyamba road, 8 miles from Moyamba Junction and 14 miles from Moyamba town.¹²⁶⁴

At this time, the District was free of an RUF/NPFL presence, as those forces were confined to the south-east and north-east of the country. However, the war had already begun to affect civilians, who were harassed by SLA forces, mainly for their food and domestic animals. Food was often stolen at the checkpoints mounted by the SLA, but also when SLA forces would leave their checkpoints and visit towns and villages in the chiefdoms for the purposes of finding food. In addition, cases of physical violence, killings and rapes were reported. At the checkpoints, SLA forces took some women and girls away and sexually assaulted them. The forces also took aside civilians suspected of being "rebels", inflicting physical violence on them and sometimes killing them when they could not be identified by relatives or other civilians.¹²⁶⁵

By the end of January 1994, the then Head of State declared "total war" against the RUF forces and launched a massive recruitment process, more than doubling the ranks of the SLA.¹²⁶⁶ In addition, in April 1994, an SLA captain visited Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom),¹²⁶⁷ in the north-east of the District, where he held a meeting with the people of the town. During that meeting, he instructed the people of the town to give their young men to be trained as vigilantes to help the SLA fight the RUF forces and to further protect their chiefdoms in the Districts. The trained youths formed a Civil Defence Unit (CDU).¹²⁶⁸ The people of the town were instructed to provide the CDU with food and logistics but as elders were reluctant to tax an already poor population, the Chiefs decided to tax themselves to support the youths. The CDU kept guard at certain locations in Rotifunk and the surrounding villages. Other units were formed in other chiefdoms in the District. Additional security was provided for the workers at the mining company¹²⁶⁹ in Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) by SSD (State Security Division) forces, who arrived on 4 July 1994.¹²⁷⁰

However, towards the end of 1994, the actions of the SLA against civilians continued to increase. For example, SLA forces who introduced themselves as SLA members went by military truck to the town of Rotawa (north of Fakunya Chiefdom) on 14 October 1994. Those men were dressed in full

¹²⁶⁴ Whoever controlled these junctions would have open access to Moyamba Town (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), south-east of Fakunya Chiefdom.

¹²⁶⁵ No more detail was available on this information, nor the precise year of its occurrence.

¹²⁶⁶ In late 1993, RUF forces launched a massive operation in the south of Kenema District and rapidly spread across the District. By the end of 1994, they were all over Kenema, Pujehun and Bo Districts and continued their inland progression.

¹²⁶⁷ There is also a Bumpeh Chiefdom in Bo District.

¹²⁶⁸ A CDU was the most developed form of organisation the civilians put in place for the defence of their chiefdoms. This was the step prior to the initiation and development of the Kamajors.

¹²⁶⁹ Sierra Leone Ore and Metal Co. (Sieromco), a Swiss-owned mining company based in the southern area of Mokanji was the only bauxite producer in the country and was mining deposits within 4 km of the washing plant at Gondama, in the centre of the Chiefdom: *The Mining Journal*, 29 May 1994.

¹²⁷⁰ The year is uncertain, as the SSD may have deployed in July 1993.



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military uniforms. They took civilian property, mainly food items and livestock, and proceeded to Falaba and Gbotima, in the north of Fakunya Chiefdom, where they carried out the same action. Another group of SLA forces, allegedly coming from Mofokoya (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), five miles to the north of Rotawa, entered Rotawa on 16 December 1994. They entered the compound of an elder, once a Regent Chief, and took her 16-year daughter whom they began to beat up. When the girl's father and one of his guests pleaded for her release, the SLA killed them; the father was beaten with stick and the guest was shot and killed. On their way back to Tonkolili District, they came across a woman whom they raped before giving her Le 1,000. They further told her they were SLA forces from Camp Charlie at Mile 91.¹²⁷¹ Also, the town of Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom) was raided on 11 December by the SLA forces, who took a lot of property from civilians living there.

On 14 November 1994 the SLA forces came to Mano (Dasse Chiefdom), situated on a highway leading Fakunya Chiefdom to Dasse Chiefdom, through Kori Chiefdom southwards into Bo District. They were fully dressed in military uniforms and armed with RPG and automatic rifles. The SLA forces established a base in the town and erected checkpoints in the town at roads leading out towards Taiama to the north, Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) to the south and Bumpeh Chiefdom (Bo District) to the south.¹²⁷² Soon afterwards the SLA forces started harassing civilians in the town, taking money from people at the checkpoints, and even went to other towns and villages in the chiefdom. Civilians were beaten and their property was taken. Following the attack on Bo Town in late December 1994, the SLA imposed a curfew from 6.00pm to 7.30am and started suspecting civilians of being "rebels" or "rebel" collaborators; several people were beaten, imprisoned in the guardroom and even killed.¹²⁷³

By the end of 1994, news about possible attacks by the RUF forces began to be heard in the District. There were rumours that the RUF forces were fast advancing to attack the mining town of Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) and make a base there. Around 28 December 1994, SLA forces coming from Freetown were airlifted to Mokanji as reinforcements for the SSD.

Civilians were very much disturbed by the presence of the SLA forces in the District as those forces were treating them roughly and although RUF forces had not yet reached the District, civilians began to mistrust the SLA.

b) Events in 1995

On 11 January 1995, SLA forces entered Njama (Kowa Chiefdom, in the east of Moyamba District) and their commander introduced them to the Paramount Chief as troops sent from the SLA Brigade headquarter at Bo Town to secure the chiefdom, as RUF forces were on their way to the chiefdom. The SLA forces erected checkpoints in the town but departed the town on the following day, led by civilians taken to lead the way, en route to attack RUF forces that were based at Momajoe (Bagbo

¹²⁷¹ Reports for Tonkolili, however, do not make mention of SLA troops based at Mile 91 around this time.

¹²⁷² Around this time, RUF forces had spread across Bo District and were approaching Bumpeh Chiefdom, which adjoins Dasse Chiefdom to its west.

¹²⁷³ Massive attacks were carried out during the Christmas week in Bo District. RUF forces first attacked an IDP camp before attacking Bo Town and major cities in its environs.



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Chiefdom, south of Bo District). However, they returned to Njama later the following day, overrun by the RUF forces at Momajoe; that evening, Njama was attacked by RUF forces.

This first RUF attack into Moyamba District was the prelude of a massive operation, at the end of which RUF forces attacked and spread across most of the District. There was, however, some confusion at the time of the attack on Njama, as the SLA present in the town appeared to put up no resistance to the RUF forces and some of them were seen outside the town, rubbing black and blue materials on their faces and putting on masks. RUF forces entered the headquarter town, shooting randomly and shouting at civilians to fight them with sticks and cutlasses.¹²⁷⁴ As they started to set houses on fire, civilians ran away from their houses. One hundred and six houses were burnt down that day and the houses that were not burnt were looted and the shops vandalised. RUF forces molested and beat civilians, raped seven girls, whose age could not be ascertained, and killed 10 civilians, including the Chiefdom Speaker and the Paramount Chief's son and younger brother. The RUF forces spent the night in town before departed the next day, early in the morning of 14 January, with some civilians whom they had abducted to carry the load. They arrived at Mokoya (Kowa Chiefdom), where they took property from the village. No casualties were reported, as all the civilians had deserted the village before they arrived. On the same day, an SLA gunship coming from the direction of Bo shot at Njama for two hours.

On 15 January 1995, RUF forces battled with SLA coming from Mano (Dasse Chiefdom) on their way to Njama. This battle took place at Pelewahun (Kamajei Chiefdom) some six miles to the north-east of Mano. The RUF forces overpowered the SLA, which forced them to retreat hastily to Mano. Before this battle, RUF forces had attacked some villages in the extreme south-east of Kori Chiefdom, west of Kamajei Chiefdom. RUF forces attacked Njala, including the University campus, and Mosongo, where they burnt 12 houses and killed some civilians. It appeared that RUF forces then separated,¹²⁷⁵ with one group advancing north to Kamajei Chiefdom and one going south-westward to Dasse Chiefdom.

In Kamajei Chiefdom, RUF forces attacked villages in the south of the chiefdom, including Buma and Ngiyehun. At Buma, two civilians were killed and others abducted and taken to Njala (Kori Chiefdom). Although the RUF forces did not attack Senehun, the headquarter town, most of the civilians left the town and went to live in the bush or, for those who had money, to Bo Town. RUF forces established a base at Pelewahun Kenneh, where they would stay for 11 months and from where they would launch attacks on Kori and Kamajei Chiefdoms. For example, Pelewahun¹²⁷⁶ was attacked on 18 February, by RUF forces dressed in military uniforms, underneath which some of them had attire adorned with the RUF initials.

The RUF group that had advanced in the direction of Dasse Chiefdom pursued the SLA forces to Mano, where they discovered that the SLA had fled the town. The RUF forces captured eight civilians and introduced themselves as "freedom fighters", coming to redeem the Sierra Leoneans

¹²⁷⁴ This referred to the attack on Bo Town in late December, during which RUF forces were repelled by civilians equipped with sticks and cutlasses. See Bo District for further information.

¹²⁷⁵ It is not clear whether they divided before or after the battle at Pelewahun.

¹²⁷⁶ There are two Pelewahuns in the south of Kamajei Chiefdom.



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from the APC regime. The RUF forces spent six hours in the town but did not inflict harm on the civilians. They then attempted to take the Mokanji road but were ambushed by the SLA on the bridge over the Taia River. Sixteen RUF members were killed and two civilians, who had attempted to escape, drowned in the river. The RUF left the area and spent the night at Benduma.

SLA forces and civilians who were in hiding returned to Mano and the SLA continued to harass civilians. People were killed on the suspicion that they were “rebels” or “rebel” collaborators. More checkpoints were established throughout the town and youths were asked to work as vigilantes, which included running the checkpoints but also doing menial work for the SLA like fetching water or cooking. When an attack was imminent, those youths were given weapons to fight.

From Benduma, the RUF forces proceeded to the south to attack Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom), the location of the Sieromco Company, a Swiss-owned company that specialised in the mining of bauxite. Prior to this attack, some SLA forces who were stationed in Mokanji had left the town for Njama (Kowa Chiefdom) to fight the RUF but were repelled at Pelewahun on 15 January and came back to the town.¹²⁷⁷ On 17 January, 30 SLA members, allegedly from Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District), were airlifted as reinforcement to Mokanji.¹²⁷⁸

On 18 January 1995, the RUF forces from Banduma passed by Kabiama (Banta Chiefdom), where they abducted a diamond dealer, his wife and other civilians and continued to Mokanji, three miles from Kabiama.¹²⁷⁹ In Mokanji, no houses were burnt, but several civilians, both locals and foreigners, were abducted, including the personnel manager of the Sieromco company and civilians were killed, including the Government representative to the mining companies, a retired Inspector of Police, a worker from the company, a Fullah man and two SLA members. SLA forces deployed at the Sierra Rutile Company (Imperi Chiefdom, Bonthé District) came to the town, in order to consolidate the SLA forces at Mokanji and thus to protect the security of the other mining company. However, the RUF did not stay long in Mokanji and by the end of the afternoon had left the town and proceeded further south to Tongor (Banta Chiefdom) where they took a lot of civilian property. From there, they moved to Imperi Chiefdom (Bonthé District), the location of the Sierra Rutile Company, which would be attacked on 19 January 1995. Military strategists in Freetown suspected that the RUF forces would use the Sierra Rutile area as a base to access the sea through the port of Nitti (Banta Chiefdom), where major shipments of mineral products from both Sieromco and Sierra Rutile companies were exported by sea to Europe.¹²⁸⁰

¹²⁷⁷ It is likely that they regrouped with the SLA forces who were deployed at Mano (Dasse).

¹²⁷⁸ A strong SLA military base was located at Daru, called Moa Barracks. This base had been attacked many times during the first years of the conflict by RUF/NPFL forces but SLA forces always repelled them, which led civilians in Mokanji to say that those SLA forces “knew how to fight”. It is also alleged that this reinforcement was not too much encouraged, as the SLA forces already stationed in the town were poorly dressed in half combat, were carrying cutlasses and half of them were wearing bathroom slippers.

¹²⁷⁹ During the attack on Mokanji, it appeared that the RUF were “all over the town”, as gunshots were heard from everywhere. This may suggest two things: either RUF forces were already in the town before the attack, disguised in SLA uniforms, or some SLA forces left their ranks and joined the RUF.

¹²⁸⁰ Xinhua News Agency, 24 January 1995.



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More SLA members were again airlifted to Mokanji to reinforce the forces already in the area. Supported by Nigerian Alpha Jets, they fought the RUF forces who had not gone to Bonthe District and who were allegedly still in the Mokanji Hills area.¹²⁸¹ The workers of the mining company and their families were evacuated to Freetown. SLA forces based in Mokanji, however, began to harass civilians and to chase them out of their villages to steal their property, forcing them to live in the bush. For example, around 13 February, the SLA forces went to a bush camp in order to take civilians and to make them work for them. During their escape, a woman and her four children drowned in the Taia River. They also killed civilians they accused of being “rebel” collaborators.

For two months, the RUF forces concentrated on Bonthe District¹²⁸² and to a limited extent on the south of Moyamba District. In February, RUF forces entered Mokele, the headquarter town of Banta Mokele Chiefdom. They burnt down the Paramount Chief's compound and four other houses and stayed in the town for two weeks before leaving. During the time of their stay, the civilians had fled to the bush. The RUF forces were also scattered in villages throughout Banta Chiefdom, including Yebanna and Mogbomo Junction in the south of the chiefdom, and asked civilians whether any SLA forces had visited their villages at any time. In late February, RUF forces coming from the rutile area (Imperi Chiefdom, Bonthe District) launched an unsuccessful attack on Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom). Until August, RUF forces would make other unsuccessful attempts to dislodge the SLA forces and to take control over the mining company.

In March 1995, a massive RUF operation was launched in Moyamba District. The pattern of the RUF actions clearly demonstrated that their goal was Freetown and that they initially did not intend to settle in Moyamba District, which they used more as a transit towards the capital. RUF forces simultaneously attacked Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom) and Moyamba Town, following the same pattern in each attack.¹²⁸³ The group that attacked Moyamba Town would then follow the Moyamba-Freetown road, attacking the major roads on its way, before being halted in Ribbi Chiefdom, in the north-west of the District.

Prior to the attack on Moyamba Town, RUF forces attacked the town of Mokele (Banta Mokele Chiefdom). On their arrival in the town, the commander informed the civilians that they were peace-loving citizens fighting to liberate the people of Sierra Leone, which was why they were called “freedom fighters.” However, no sooner had the meeting ended than the harassment of civilians began. The forces stole civilians' property and took away all the young men and women including girls between 13 and 16 years old. They looted the township and forced the young men and women to carry the loads. Another group of RUF forces entered the town of Mosekie (Banta Mokele Chiefdom) where they had a meeting with the civilians. At the meeting people were ordered to cook for the them, after which the town was looted and the property was carried for them by young men captured in the village. Some houses were burnt but no one was killed. Around the same time, the RUF forces also entered Mokepie village (Banta Mokele Chiefdom), where they introduced

¹²⁸¹ AFP, 25 January 1995.

¹²⁸² By February 1995, all the chiefdoms in the north of Bonthe District had been attacked by RUF forces.

¹²⁸³ It is probable that the RUF group who attacked Moyamba Junction, to the north of the District came from Tonkolili District, and the one who attacked Moyamba Town came from Bonthe District.



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themselves as “freedom fighters” and took property from civilians. They burnt down some houses in the town and abducted youths, for the purposes of recruiting them into their fighting force.¹²⁸⁴

These RUF forces, dressed in military uniforms, reached Moyamba Town (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), close to the centre of Moyamba District, on 14 March 1995. At the time of the attacks, members of the CDU were deployed in the town but had to withdraw, as they could not withstand the heavy firepower of the RUF forces; the SLA forces, similarly overpowered, also had to retreat. Twenty-five civilians were killed in the town and several young girls and women raped. The RUF forces also burnt down 23 houses, including the Moyamba Police station and took away a lot of property from civilians and shops. Captured civilians were forced to carry property taken by the RUF forces, who also captured some children to be conscripted into the fighting forces. The RUF forces spent only one night in the town and continued their way on the Moyamba-Freetown road, passing by Yoyema (Kaiyamba Chiefdom).

Another group of armed men entered the town on 17 March 1995 and set up base in the compound of the Moyamba Boys Secondary School. They introduced themselves as SLA forces and encouraged civilians to come back to the town; civilians were convinced that these were SLA forces, as they were wearing military uniforms. Furthermore, the commander introduced himself as a famous SLA officer. However, three days later, those men began breaking into houses, shops and Government buildings and taking everything they could lay their hands on. They stayed in the town for one more month, during which they harassed civilians for their domestic animals and created more havoc, killing, raping and abducting civilians. They only left the town on hearing the rumour that SLA forces were on their way to the town. Civilians then identified those armed men as RUF forces.¹²⁸⁵

At Yoyema (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), which they reached on 15 March, RUF forces also beat civilians, killing some, took away all the domestic animals and left the same day, continuing their journey westwards. Five days later, another group of armed men claiming to be SLA forces reached Yoyema and, as they did in Moyamba Town, persuaded people to resettle in the town; for one week, the town was calm. However, pandemonium broke out not long after, including the massive stealing of property throughout the town, and those forces were then identified by civilians as RUF forces. These forces also left on hearing that SLA forces were approaching Moyamba Town.

The next chiefdom to the west was Kongbora and Bauya, the chiefdom headquarter town, is located on the main road. RUF forces who had left Yoyema on 15 March attacked villages on the road but by-passed Bauya. They entered Morkorewo (Kongbora Chiefdom) on 16 March and burnt down the first house of the village. They killed some people, among them two elderly people, and abducted others. Those captured civilians were to carry their property while young boys, some of whom had weapons, were to fetch water. One old man who was captured at Yoyema the day before and who

¹²⁸⁴ Although this action was reported to have taken place on 19 March, it is likely that it took place before the attack on Moyamba Town on 14 March, as it is located in the south of the District and RUF forces reached Moyamba Town from Bonthe District, which is further south.

¹²⁸⁵ It is however not clear whether those armed men were RUF forces or ex-SLA forces deserting their positions and acting like the RUF. Civilians however recounted that they were RUF forces in disguise.



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told them he was tired to carry the load was killed. The RUF forces stole property from the old part of the village and stayed for three days, during which time they killed some civilians and took all the livestock. These RUF forces were accompanied by men and women fulfilling different missions, some of them being engineers, cooks, first aid men, load carriers or road map directors.

The headquarter town of Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom), which is also located on the main road, was attacked in the afternoon of 18 March 1995. Civilians were abducted and killed; people coming to the town one week later found a lot of bodies in the centre of the town, some already beginning to decompose. Many houses were burnt, mostly on City Road, and property was taken. The day before this attack, armed men introducing themselves as SLA forces had come to the town. However, on the day of the attack, those armed men took red pieces of cloth out of their pockets and tied them around their heads. This made civilians understand that those armed men were not SLA forces coming to protect them as they pretended but RUF forces.¹²⁸⁶ Before leaving the town, the forces wrote on some of the houses: "RUF heading for the city Freetown – we will be back soon".

RUF forces then attacked the headquarter town of Bradford (Ribbi Chiefdom), to the north-west of Rotifunk. All the civilians in the town ran into the bush while the forces burnt down many houses, killed 13 civilians and took a lot of property. They were however repelled by SLA forces who had come from Freetown on three trucks the day before. During the fighting, one RUF member and two SLA members were killed. Although they had defeated the RUF, the SLA forces did not stay in the town.

After the attack on Bradford and their encounter with SLA forces, RUF forces came back to Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom). They established a camp, known as "Camp Fol Fol",¹²⁸⁷ located in a strategic position on a hilly hideout at the border with four chiefdoms, Bumpeh, Ribbi and Kongbora Chiefdoms (Moyamba District) and Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District). From this camp, they went on to attack villages, notably the villages surrounding Rotifunk, where they killed civilians and took property. At Berembu, a woman was killed and in Makombrabai the RUF forces killed three people, one woman and two men. At Mokebbi, five miles from Rotifunk, no one was killed but several people were captured and property was taken. Old men and women were forced to carry the stolen property, including mattresses, rice, palm oil, gari and cattle, while young boys and girls were taken to the RUF base for training and recruitment. One young boy who attempted to run in order not to be abducted was shot and killed by an RUF member. When they reached Levuma, in the north-west of Kongbora Chiefdom, near their base, RUF forces released the carriers, as they did not want them to know the location of their base. A guard place or second camp was established at Motokoh, two and a half miles from Camp Fol Fol, where civilians abducted to carry loads from the villages were released and told to return to their villages. RUF forces also made several visits to Rotifunk town, which was completely deserted by civilians for some weeks. All these attacks led many civilians to find refuge in the centre of the chiefdom, notably in Bumpeh, a village virtually only accessible by the Bumpeh River, which originates in the ocean.

¹²⁸⁶ The red headband was characteristic of the RUF forces who had worn it since the beginning of the conflict. This red headband distinguished them from the NPFL forces during the early stages of the conflict.

¹²⁸⁷ This camp was reported spelled in two different ways, the alternative one being "Camp Fall Fall".



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More than 200 RUF members, armed with AK47s, RPGs and a Anti Aircraft gun mounted on a lorry, attacked Bauya (Kongbora Chiefdom) sometime in March.¹²⁸⁸ Several buildings were burnt, including the Chief's house, the Secondary School, the Court Barrie and the market. More than 30 people were killed and a lot of property was taken. From Bauya, they attacked the surrounding villages. Besides Camp Fol Fol, a secondary training base was opened at Levurna (north-west of Kongbora Chiefdom). The area soon became deserted, as the RUF forces were settled and in control of the area.

In the other wave of attacks occurring concurrently with the attacks on Moyamba Town, Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom) was attacked on 14 March 1995, probably by RUF forces coming from Tonkolili District.¹²⁸⁹ Early in the afternoon, armed men with full military uniforms entered the town with sporadic shooting; giving no excuse for the shooting, they left the town towards Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District), where they claimed they came from.¹²⁹⁰ Late in the evening, those armed men came back and attacked the town again. At the time of the attack, the SLA forces posted there were nowhere to be found. The RUF forces burnt down nine houses and captured several people. These forces then went south, attacked Waterloo in the evening and proceeded on to Njagbahun Junction, where SLA forces were based. Although no fatalities are reported, RUF forces succeeding in capturing a lot of newly supplied arms and ammunition from the SLA. From Njagbahun, they headed back in the direction of Waterloo and, on their way, attacked Kpetema Fanday at midnight. Property was taken and several people were captured in the town.¹²⁹¹ On 15 March, civilians who had been abducted from Moyamba Junction and surrounding villages were forced to carry the stolen property to an RUF camp called "Borkor One" near Lumleblu village.¹²⁹²

In about mid April 1995, the RUF forces attacked Motobong (Bumpeh Chiefdom), 16 miles from Rotifunk. As they opened fire while entering the village, civilians ran into the bush. The RUF forces shot two cows and took away other domestic animals to Moshibara Junction, where they entered the town, killed one woman and wounded another civilian. They then advanced to Moshemoi, capturing many civilians without resistance or the need for gunfire during the night. They asked a girl to show them the direction of the Paramount Chief's farm and, as they realised she gave them the wrong direction on purpose, they raped her. They then gave her Le 10,000, telling her that they would come back for her, and left for their base at Camp Fol Fol.

The SLA forces who had earlier prompted RUF forces, disguised as SLA members, to leave Moyamba Town in late March/early April, arrived in Moyamba Town on or around 20 April 1995. The SLA forces defended the town from several more attacks by the RUF forces, who never

¹²⁸⁸ Although it took place in March, this attack may have taken place before the establishment of Camp Fol Fol. It is also possible that some of the RUF forces had settled in villages in Kongbora Chiefdom, while the bulk of the RUF forces were heading to Rotifunk (Bumpe Chiefdom). Accordingly, the exact date of these events could not be ascertained. They took place either before or after the Rotifunk and Bradford attacks.

¹²⁸⁹ Around the same period, RUF forces attacked Mile 91, a strategic town on the highway to Freetown, in Tonkolili District.

¹²⁹⁰ At this time, SLA forces were deployed in Mile 91 in Tonkolili District.

¹²⁹¹ No further information was available on this event.

¹²⁹² Although the location of this camp could not be ascertained, it was probably a secondary camp.



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succeeded in retaking the town. Their stay in the town was described as “peaceful” and no acts of violence against civilians were reported.

Probably coming from Camp Fol Fol, RUF forces came to Rotifunk (Ribbi Chiefdom) around 14 June 1995, although at that time, most of the people were living in the bush. On their way to Rotifunk, they came across a civilian at Mokaikono, whom they asked to lead them to the other civilians in the bush. As he did not want to disclose their location, he was hit with a bladed weapon and left for dead in the bush. The man however survived and after two days, managed to go back to his camp.

Sometime between June and July, Mokanji (Banta Chiefdom) was attacked for the fourth time by RUF forces probably coming from Bonthe District. They were repelled by SLA forces and 28 of them were killed. No SLA member or civilian was killed but SLA forces were actively engaged in stealing and vandalising the Sieromco Company.¹²⁹³

During August 1995, the upper part of Bumpeh Chiefdom was under the control of the RUF forces. Villages in Bumpeh Chiefdom including Berembu, Topkumbu, Mosenesse, Kpamgbaya, Komrabai and Yenkissa were attacked. The RUF forces burnt a house at Tokpumbu and took the property of a civilian at Kpamgbaya. In that town, they also forced a man who was a Muslim and had never drunk wine in his life to drink alcohol; as his wife came out of the bush crying, she was shot and killed and acid was sprinkled on her body. The town of Mokebbi was attacked for the second time by the RUF forces and they proceeded to Mogbindi. Finding nobody in the town, they burnt all the houses there.

At that time, however, RUF forces were launching those attacks by group of 20 to 30 men, of whom only four to five had guns. It thus appeared that the progression force of the RUF as evidenced by their attacks on Moyamba Junction, Moyamba Town and the main towns on the highway had come to a halt during this period, and RUF forces were more engaged in looting.

In October 1995, another wave of attacks were carried out in Fakunya Chiefdom, by RUF forces coming from their main base at Camp Fol Fol. On 9 October 1995, they passed through the towns of Rotawa, Falaba Gbotima and arrived at Sembahun Kortuwabu, where they set up a temporary base. Many civilians were captured in the town on their arrival. The commander informed the people of the town that they were RUF forces and that both the town and all its surrounding villages were under their control. The RUF forces attacked neighbouring towns and villages and various items were stolen, including food products such as rice, groundnut, pepper and palm oil as well as personal effects, including tape recorders, radios, clocks, clothing and cameras. In those villages, some women were raped. On 10 October 1995, the RUF forces attacked the town of Kpangbama. After they entered the town, the RUF commander ordered the forces not to shoot, so they did not shoot. Over 100 people were captured, including women, including suckling mothers, and children. The captured civilians were forced to carry property stolen from the town to Sembahun Kortuwabu,

¹²⁹³ RUF forces carried out a fifth and last attack on Mokanji in August but were, once more, repelled by SLA forces.



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escorted by one RUF group, while another group left intending to attack Njagbahun Junction but instead went back to Sembehun Kortuwabu, as they did not find any SLA forces at the Junction.

Other attacks were launched in the surrounding villages of Ngandorhun, Kwellu, and Falaba. The attacks were successful and a lot of property was taken. Again, captured civilians were forced to carry the stolen property to Sembehun. SLA forces who had come from Moyamba Town staged an ambush for the RUF forces but, as they could not withstand the firepower of the RUF, they went back to Moyamba Town. Some captured civilians managed to escape during the crossfire. In retaliation for the attack, RUF forces burnt down Kpangbama, accusing civilians of having warned the SLA they were there. Over 100 goats from the surrounding villages were killed and smoked, for later consumption at Camp Fol Fol. During their six-day stay in Sembehun Kortuwabu, RUF forces raped women and many girls, sometimes aged below 11, and killed three civilians who attempted to escape.

On 14 October, the RUF commander sent a message to Camp Fol Fol for the High Command to send more men, both captured civilians and RUF members, to collect the looted items, as he, and his troops, together with the civilians captured in the area were heading for Njala University (south-east of Kori Chiefdom). The commander told the civilians that this university would not function until the RUF took over government.¹²⁹⁴ RUF forces entered the town of Mokorewa (Fakunya Chiefdom) on 15 October 1995 and took property, mainly personnel items like tape recorders, radios and clothing, from several houses. Two civilians were killed and several more were captured. They told the civilians they came from Sembehun Kortuwabu and were heading for Njala University. Just over a week later, on 24 October, the forces visited the town again and attacked surrounding villages, stealing property, raping and sexually harassing women and young girls. They stayed at Mokorewa for four days, during which time they abducted many civilians, the majority of whom were children. Civilians were forced to carry stolen property for the RUF forces.¹²⁹⁵

A subsequent attack was launched on Sembehun Kortuwabu and its environs around 2 December 1995. A large number of the RUF members were children between the ages of 12 and 15 years, who had been captured in schools in Lunsar, Port Loko Town (Port Loko District) or Kambia. Civilians were captured and maltreated by the RUF forces in an attempt to learn where the civilians were keeping their food and sexual violence was rampant.¹²⁹⁶ From December to March 1997, it appeared that the civilians in Fakunya Chiefdom suffered greatly, as both RUF and SLA forces raided their villages and camps in the bush, mainly to steal food and other property; some of the civilians were beaten and some women were raped.

On 15 December 1995, RUF forces coming from Camp Fol Fol reached the north of Kagboro Chiefdom, to the south of Bumpah Chiefdom. At this time, an influx of people had arrived in Shenge, the headquarter town located by the ocean, south of Kagboro Creek. The RUF forces came

¹²⁹⁴ Njala University was attacked by RUF forces on 27 December 1995. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 December 1995.

¹²⁹⁵ This attack on Mokorewa may have been carried out a few days earlier, before the RUF forces sent their message to Camp Fol Fol.

¹²⁹⁶ No more details were available on this information.



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mainly for the purposes of finding food and, as they had done earlier in the beginning of 1995, introduced themselves as SLA forces. They entered Morkandor, where they took away domestic animals before continuing their journey to nearby villages, including Bandasuma and Mokana. In all these villages, they abducted civilians to carry the loads, mainly consisting of domestic animals, to their base at Camp Fol Fol. Civilians were warned by the RUF commander that they would be killed if they could not continue the journey. When they arrived near the base, those civilians were released and told to go back to their villages.

Following these attacks, a CDU comprised of civilians with cutlasses, swords and a few shotguns was formed in Kagboro Chiefdom. In addition, the attacks on Bumpah Chiefdom led the elders to hold a meeting in Moyeamoh in December, at which they sought to find means by which they could repel the RUF forces. One Section Chief asked all the civilians with hunting rifles to surrender them to the Chiefs. Only nine guns could be gathered and 29 youths gave themselves up for training and to form a CDU.¹²⁹⁷

On 28 December 1995, RUF forces attacked Senehun, the headquarter town of Kamajei Chiefdom, where they killed 28 civilians, burnt houses and took property, mainly money and other valuables. As a result of the attack, most of the civilians left the town and went to camps in Bo and Freetown.

c) Events in 1996

Kamajors from Bonthe District came to Moyamba District to assist the CDUs in the defence of their chiefdoms. At that time also, members of the CDUs and other young men progressively became initiated into the Kamajor society. They initially went to Bonthe District before initiation ceremonies began to be performed in Moyamba District. In February, the first Kamajors of Kagboro Chiefdom came back to the chiefdom from their initiation.

In early 1996, members of the newly formed CDU of Bumpah Chiefdom had their first encounter with RUF forces between Moyah and Mogbainchain (Bumpah Chiefdom). They staged an ambush, killing two RUF members, capturing one and taking two AK47s.¹²⁹⁸ Soon after, a few Kamajors from Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District) came to the chiefdom and started patrolling in the area, looking out for RUF members. They went to Moyah, where they joined the members of the CDU. In February, both the Kamajors and the members of the CDU went to attack Motokoh, the guard place or secondary camp near Camp Fol Fol. As they took the RUF forces by surprise, they succeeded in dislodging them. They killed some RUF members, took some arms and ammunition, destroyed the base and went back to Moyah. The relations between the Kamajors and the members of the CDU, however, began to deteriorate and they started to quarrel over the Kamajors behaviour. Their main complaints were that the Kamajors wanted the CDU to be their juniors, because the Kamajors had mystical powers; they were harassing civilians, beating them up whenever they did something wrong; and they were taxing civilians and treating the Chiefs and elders without respect.

Initiation ceremonies began to take place at Taninehun (Kongbora Chiefdom) in early 1996 at first only for men recommended by the Section Chiefs. Prior to this, in 1995, a few men had left the

¹²⁹⁷ Those men were not initiated Kamajors.

¹²⁹⁸ It could not be ascertained what happened to the captured RUF member.



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Chiefdom to be initiated as Kamajors and had come back to the chiefdom, chasing the RUF who were sporadically raiding small villages, taking away property, abducting young boys and girls and killing some people.¹²⁹⁹ As more and more men were initiated, the Kamajors established checkpoints across the chiefdom, notably three in Bauya, the chiefdom headquarter town. An administration for the Kamajors was set up in the chiefdom with the following positions: Supreme Leader and Initiator, Deputy Initiator and Battalion Commander, Deputy Battalion Commander, Chiefdom Ground Commander and Commanders. Kamajors, equipped with hunting guns, swords, spears, knives and other bladed weapons did not initially attack identified RUF positions but began by staging ambushes, capturing small groups of RUF forces on food finding missions. They killed a lot of RUF members and took their arms and ammunition. As their number grew, the Kamajors began organising their deployment in strategic areas of the chiefdom.

Before the elections scheduled for 26 February, RUF forces entered Moyoka (Fakunya Chiefdom), and killed with bladed weapons eight civilians attending a church service. They then headed for Moyolo and on their way, killed a man and left the body in the bush. On approaching Moyolo, some entered the bush and encircled the town while others in military uniforms and Kamajors attire entered the town, telling people they had come to talk about the initiation process. Youths came from their different locations and the RUF forces disguised in SLA members and Kamajors¹³⁰⁰ ordered them to assemble at the Court Barrie. The civilians were told to undress and were kept locked in houses. Some 18 civilians were then taken out of the houses, were set on fire and died. As this was going on, three women were raped by many RUF members and were then mutilated, one being forced to sit in a solution of caustic soda and another had her breast cut off with a knife. The third woman was sexually assaulted with a stick, as a result of which she died. Five more civilians including two children aged 12 and 15 were taken out of their houses and, after they were told by the RUF forces to identify which was their predominant hand, this hand was cut off.

The RUF forces left the next morning and one day later, SLA forces from Njagbahun came to the town. They told civilians who were burying their relatives that they had come to assess the damage caused by the RUF forces. However, they took civilians' property, including domestic animals, rice, groundnut and clothing. Three days later, SLA forces came back to the nearby villages of Mobayngahun, Salima, Bembeh, Mopotey, Njala Gofor, Gbeworbu, Potehun and Batama, where they took property, forced civilians to carry the load to their base at Njagbahun and sexually harassed women.

After the February elections, RUF forces came back to Rotifunk (Bumpah Chiefdom) and burnt down more houses, but by this time most of the civilians had deserted the town. RUF forces were described as being "totally out of control", as each time they went to a village, they burnt down houses, took away property and killed anybody that they came across.

The north-east of Kamajei Chiefdom was attacked by RUF forces coming from Valunia Chiefdom (Bo District), to the east of Kamajei Chiefdom. They established a base in Yelina Section in March

¹²⁹⁹ It could not be ascertained where they went for the initiation ceremony.

¹³⁰⁰ It is also suggested that those RUF forces introduced themselves as officers of the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC), coming to educate the people of the town about the electoral system.



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1996 and abducted some young boys and girls to carry loads and to show them the various routes and passages through the chiefdom. In the same month, Kamajors arrived in the chiefdom to protect Gondama.¹³⁰¹ The Kamajors attacked the RUF forces in Yelina section and rescued many civilians, who they then brought to Gondama. However, Gondama was attacked shortly after, with over 30 people being killed by the RUF forces, and the Kamajors left the town. Most of the people killed were civilians recently brought to Gondama by the Kamajors and, accordingly, did not know any escape routes. During this attack, the RUF forces did not burn any houses but took away property, mainly livestock.

In late March/early April 1996, RUF forces attacked the town of Mokainsay (Kagboro Chiefdom), in the south of the District. At first, the Kamajors put up a stiff resistance but they were soon forced to withdraw, as they ran out of ammunition. The RUF burnt some buildings, including a mosque. They left the town and two days later, killed an old man in his hammock and burnt houses at Mojana, in the east of the chiefdom. The RUF forces then retreated to their base at Camp Fol Fol.

Bagruwa Chiefdom, also in the south of the District, was attacked by RUF forces for the first time around April 1996. RUF forces coming from the north of Bonthe District through Banta Chiefdom arrived in the south of Bagruwa Chiefdom.¹³⁰² At this time, the Paramount Chief hired Kamajors from Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District) to defend the chiefdom. RUF forces were dislodged in a fierce battle at Mogboi. The battle lasted for several hours and a large number of RUF forces were killed. At Matru Bangay, one Kamajor killed a civilian on the allegation that he was an RUF collaborator.

In late May, RUF forces came back to Kagboro Chiefdom and attacked Mokobo (north-east of the chiefdom) for the second time, with the intention to establish a base there. They stayed in the town for two days, stealing civilians' property in the town and in the surrounding villages and forcing civilians to carry the load. These attacks led civilians to desert the town and go to live in the bush. The RUF forces then divided into four groups and scattered throughout the chiefdom, including at Tissana, Morkandor, Bandajuma, Mokana, Suen and Mohiteh, where they harassed civilians, stole their property and forced them to carry the load. They also made a rapid incursion into Timdel Chiefdom, east of Kagboro Chiefdom.

RUF forces attacked Sembehun, the headquarter town of Bagruwa Chiefdom, around 3 June. They broke into all the houses, took away property and captured four boys and four girls who cooked for the RUF forces at their temporary base at Kongonani.¹³⁰³ They then left the area, heading in the direction of Bonthe District. On their way, they stopped at Mokassie, where they released some civilians they had abducted but killed one man because he refused to go with them. Another man was killed for the same reason at Jondu. Following the attack on the town, CDUs were formed in Sembehun and young people, equipped with sticks, machetes and shotguns, established checkpoints.

¹³⁰¹ This is a different Gondama Town from the one in Bo District, which hosted an IDP camp.

¹³⁰² At the time of this attack, RUF force had already been dislodged from their positions in the north of Bonthe District and had scattered throughout the bush.

¹³⁰³ It is not clear whether those children were released after doing the cooking.



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Around May or June 1996, a new wave of attacks were carried out in Fakunya Chiefdom and its environs by RUF forces using Falaba Gbotima village as their base. They raped women and took property in more than 30 villages in the area, capturing several civilians who were forced to transport their loads to Falaba Gbotima. Around the same period, Kamajors who went to be initiated came to Kwellu together with some Kamajors from Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District) and began engaging the RUF forces, who were continuing their attacks on the small villages of the area. Between June and July, Kamajors based at Kwellu heard that RUF forces were going on looting sprees in Kpangama, Gbengbedu and Mayendu. Four Kamajors met the RUF forces at Nyandehun and engaged them in battle, which left some civilians and some RUF forces, including their commander, dead. The following day, 45 RUF members came to Nyandehun to find their commander, as they could not believe four Kamajors had defeated them and killed their commander. They found the body of their commander displayed at the centre of the village and in retaliation, burnt the village. On their return to Falaba Gbotima, they captured a civilian whom they then mutilated and killed. While still alive, his genital organ was cut off and forcibly put in his mouth. His stomach was then slit open and his intestines tied across a stick by the side of the road. At the time of these attacks, the SLA forces were still based at Njagbahun, four miles from Nyandehun, but did not make any move. They would later comment on this by saying that the area was "divided" and as the RUF forces had not come to their area, there was no need for them to go and attack the RUF forces.

As Kamajors continued to attack RUF positions in Yelina Section (Kamajei Chiefdom), RUF forces launched a second attack on Gondama (Kamajei Chiefdom) around 28 June 1996. No casualties were reported, as most of the civilians were by then living in the bush, but the RUF forces burnt down the town. This attack was the last ones in the area, as the Kamajors started patrolling around Gondama. In the neighbouring chiefdom of Kori, Kamajors deployed at Wayima (north-east of the chiefdom), where they mistreated civilians and passers-by, notably by imprisoning them in cages made of thorns. On one occasion, they severely beat the Village Chief of Ketumah, near Wayima, on the grounds that he had made a statement against Kamajors. On another occasion, those Kamajors from Wayima killed three brothers who had travelled from Markoli to Ketumah to meet their mother, accusing them of being RUF members. When their father came to enquire about what had happened to them, he was hit with a bladed weapon and killed.

Around June, the Paramount Chief of Bagruwa Chiefdom sent 70 young men to be initiated at Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District). Prior to this development in the chiefdom, some members of the SSD had been sent to the headquarter town of Sembahun to protect the town from RUF attacks. However, those SSD members soon began to harass civilians, moving from village to village and taking away civilians' property, including domestic animals. On one occasion, they killed one young man at Gbangbatoke Junction. This harassment prompted the Paramount Chief to request the presence of Kamajors in the Chiefdom and to report the matter to the Paramount Chief of Kaiyamba Chiefdom. While the Kamajors did come back to Bagruwa Chiefdom, they also soon began harassing civilians.



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On 13 July 1996, RUF forces entered Waterloo Town (Fakunya chiefdom) for the second time, from the direction of Rogboya (Fakunya Chiefdom). One of the RUF forces, described as a young boy, killed a civilian. On their arrival in the town, an old deaf man was in his garden, working with a machete, and as he did not drop his machete when told to do so by the RUF forces, a child soldier shot and killed him. During this attack on Waterloo, RUF forces burnt down 23 houses and attacked nearby villages, including Kondiama, Tombay Gbahama and Togbie. In those villages, a lot of property was taken away and civilians were abducted to carry the stolen property to the RUF base at "Camp Fol Fol".

Between June and August, RUF forces battled with Kamajors in Nyaogihun (Kagboro Chiefdom). Four members of the CDF were killed, including their commander. The RUF forces beheaded two of the bodies, cut their stomachs open and displayed their intestines across the road at a checkpoint. The RUF forces then burnt the village before crossing over to neighbouring villages in Timdel Chiefdom where they took property, mainly cattle, and harassed civilians. At this time, Timdel Chiefdom had no Kamajors, as it had never been attacked by RUF forces and the Paramount Chief paid for Kamajors to come from other chiefdoms, requesting subscriptions from the civilians to pay for their services.

As this harassment on Timdel Chiefdom grew, Kamajors from Kagboro Chiefdom went to Bumpah Chiefdom to obtain reinforcements. They agreed with the Kamajors from Bumpah that each would send reinforcements to the other chiefdom when it was under attack. Kamajors from the two chiefdoms went to Timdel Chiefdom and staged an ambush near Mokobo (Kagboro Chiefdom), killing many RUF forces. The remaining RUF forces fled the area but promised they would come back. More men from Kagboro Chiefdom were initiated, in Banta Chiefdom and in Kangahun (Kaiyamba Chiefdom) and deployed in different sections of the chiefdom in or around October. Men from Timdel Chiefdom were sent for initiation in Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District). No further RUF attacks took place in Timdel Chiefdom and the Kamajors established a base at Mosanda.

Around August, armed men claiming to be SLA forces arrived in Yoyema Town (Kayima Chiefdom), soon followed by another group composed only of women. Despite their claims, civilians understood that they were actually RUF forces, because the initials "RUF" were written on the weapons carried by the women. The RUF forces sent a message to the SLA commander in Moyamba Town. The SLA forces went to Yoyema and after a fierce battle, repelled the RUF forces out of the town.¹³⁰⁴ The SLA commander left some troops in the town and went back to Moyamba Town. The SLA forces left in Yoyema took away civilian's property and left for Moyamba Town three days later. RUF forces came back to Yoyema and stayed for five days, during which they maltreated and killed some civilians, raped some women and abducted about 20 children for conscription.

¹³⁰⁴ This event could, however have taken place in June, as around this period, Moyamba Town was under RUF siege and SLA forces thought the RUF were provoking them to violate the ceasefire, signed earlier that year following the elections: AFP, 7 June 1996.



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Around the same time, SLA forces were asked to leave Moyamba Town by the people. It seems that following all the reports of SLA harassment across the District, the Paramount Chief of Kaiyamba asked the Government to withdraw the SLA forces, which he did. After the departure of the SLA forces, the people of the town decided to initiate themselves as Kamajors so that they could defend themselves, since they did not want any SLA forces in the town. The men in the town made it clear that the Kamajor society was only open to people who were Mende by tribe and taxed every household to pay a contribution of Le 1,000. Whoever did not pay the contribution was tied with a FM rope.¹³⁰⁵

However, the Kamajors engaged in continuous harassment of civilians, including taking property, forcing women into marriage and sexually harassing them. The Kamajors also killed two SSD officers in Moyamba Town, taking their guns and uniforms. Those Kamajors went to Yoyema after the RUF departure from the town. They told civilians to call those who were hiding in the bush and "screened" them, looking for RUF members and collaborators. As in Moyamba Town, they taxed each household as a contribution to their feeding before leaving the town.¹³⁰⁶

A large number of RUF forces returned to Kagboro Chiefdom in November. Having seen this large group, Kamajors from Mokobo asked for more reinforcements from the other sections. In the meanwhile, two Kamajors who had advanced on the RUF forces were killed. Their bodies were beheaded and their intestines were tied on two sticks across the road to act as a checkpoint. At Nyayagoihun, the RUF forces killed two pregnant women and three children, who were hiding under a bed, and burnt the houses of the village.¹³⁰⁷ Around the same period, RUF forces made another incursion in Bagruwa Chiefdom. They killed one man at Moseinongor and burnt three houses at Ngayebu. They also encountered SLA forces from Moyamba Town who were patrolling the area and some fatalities on both sides were reported. As they approached Gbangbatoke Junction, they burnt two commercial vehicles going to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom) but the passengers managed to escape by running into the bush. The RUF forces then left the area and went back up north.

At around this time, the Kamajors began increasing their numbers and, consequently, began putting in place structures for better coordination amongst themselves. Kamajors from Kagboro, Timdel and Bagruwa Chiefdom organised themselves and appointed one man as the Chief Kamajor for the region. Men from Banta Mokele Chiefdom were sent for initiation to Tihun (Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District). Around the same period, Kamajors from Bonthe District arrived at Mano, the headquarter town of Dasse Chiefdom. However, as time went on, Kamajors started harassing civilians and summary executions of alleged collaborators took place at the Kamajor base at Mosanda. On one occasion, a man was brought to Mosanda from Sembehun (Bagruwa Chiefdom), was beaten and put in a cage made of thorns for one full day before being released.

¹³⁰⁵ This rope had two sticks on its edges. "FM" means "frequency modulation", for it was believed that once tied with such a rope, anyone would talk.

¹³⁰⁶ No more information was available on these events.

¹³⁰⁷ Although it seems that the RUF forces were repelled from the chiefdom, there is no further report on fighting with Kamajors in the chiefdom. In the south of Bumpé Chiefdom (north of Kagboro Chiefdom), RUF forces battled for two days with Kamajors before being chased away.



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By the end of the year, probably around November, the Kamajors from Kongbora Chiefdom launched their first attack on RUF positions at Levuma, north-west of the chiefdom. The Kamajors shot down a helicopter and succeeded in dislodging the RUF forces from their positions. A large cache of arms, ammunition and weapons that the Kamajors did not have so far – in particular AK47s and RPGs – was captured. Following this successful attack, Kamajors launched an offensive on Camp Fol Fol, the main RUF base in the area. The battle went on for two days and the RUF forces were eventually dislodged.¹³⁰⁸ Kamajors came back from this battle with a lot of arms and ammunition and other property, including televisions and fridges. These victories led more and more men to be initiated into the society, fighting the RUF stationed in the north-west of the chiefdom. Kamajors brought back a lot of RUF members and people they suspected of being RUF members or collaborators and killed them; civilians recounted that they regularly heard that a “rebel” had been captured and that they knew he was going to be “washed”, meaning killed.

In December 1996, RUF forces entered Bengé (Bumpeh Chiefdom) where they killed a civilian who refused to have sex with his mother. They proceeded to other villages like Mobainda and Nyadahun (Bumpeh Chiefdom) where they took a lot of property from civilians.

In late 1996 and probably after the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, civilians refused to allow deployment of SLA forces in the District. By 1996, the population of Moyamba had developed a complete distrust of SLA forces, since the RUF forces who came to the District were wearing military uniforms and the SLA forces deployed in the District, mainly in Kaiyamba, Fakunya and Banta Chiefdoms, were harassing civilians.

d) Events in 1997

At the beginning of the year, resettlement of displaced persons, which had began in late 1997, continued as the Government declared the Southern Province safe for resettlement.¹³⁰⁹ Nevertheless, the year continued to be marked by violence against civilians and between all the different fighting factions.

On 3 January 1997, SLA forces based at Taiama (Kori Chiefdom), together with SLA forces from Bo Town, attacked Kamajors at Taiama. Prior to this event, tension between the SLA and Kamajors deployed at Taiama had built up to the extent that both forces were controlling different checkpoints in the town. In late December, one SLA member destroyed a Kamajor checkpoint in the town; civilians were killed during the subsequent attack in January. SLA forces then headed to

¹³⁰⁸ The RUF spokesman stated that the constant attacks on their main bases in the District from the air and the land around 9 and 11 November were undermining the peace process. Furthermore, conflicting information was reported about the crash of a helicopter in the Rotifunk area. According to the RUF, this was an SLA helicopter bringing reinforcements to strategic sites in preparation for a ground assault while it carried out aerial bombardment on RUF bases. The RUF claimed to have brought it down with an Anti-Aircraft weapon. However, military sources spoke about a helicopter bringing relief supplies, which had to undertake an emergency landing after developing engine trouble and was then set on fire by the Kamajors: AFP, 13 November 1996.

¹³⁰⁹ This resettlement went on in various areas in the south and at the same period, thousands of IDPs left the camps in Bo District and returned to Pujehun District.



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Njala, south of Kori Chiefdom. On their way to Njala, those SLA forces stopped by Mokonde, where they ransacked the hospital. At Njala University, they went to a “customers store”, broke into it and took everything they could carry away with them.

In January, villages in the Kovella Section (Fakunya Chiefdom) were tasked with sending men for initiation at Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom). On 30 January, Kamajors battled with the SLA troops based at Njagbahun for two hours before dislodging the SLA from the town, killing some SLA members during the battle. This battle was the last of a series of fights between the two fighting factions in the chiefdom.

On 26 January, Kamajors attacked the SLA forces based in Mokañji (Banta Chiefdom), allegedly because those forces had been stealing property. The Kamajors were defeated by the SLA forces and three SLA members, a lot of Kamajors, including the son of the High Priest and Chief Initiator, and some civilians were killed. Three days later, the SLA forces were transferred to Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District),¹³¹⁰ leaving the way open for the Kamajors to settle in the town and erect checkpoints. Soon, they began harassing and ill-treating civilians; any person found having a link with a member of the SLA member was targeted and killed. Kamajors also cleared out what was left in the Sieromco Company during an operation they named “Operation clear all”.¹³¹¹ Some months later in the south of the District, at Gbessebu (Kamajei Chiefdom), SLA forces killed a Kamajor while they were going to Pelewahun (Kamajei Chiefdom).

In February 1997, tired and hungry RUF forces entered Kawama (Kori Chiefdom) on a food finding mission. They asked civilians to cook for them and took away civilians’ property. They also took with them five strong men to carry the load and three young girls between the ages of 15 to 18 years; since that time, their fate remains unknown.

Since they had taken control of Moyamba Town, in around August 1996, Kamajors had been mistreating the civilians in the town. Indeed, for the inhabitants of Moyamba Town, the only difference between the Kamajors and RUF forces was that the Kamajors were in the towns, while RUF forces were in the bush. In February 1997, Kamajors from Moyamba Town went to Korgbotuma, where they beat the Village Chief for two days and forced him to swallow stones, as a result of which he died. The villagers were then taxed Le 400 as a contribution to the Kamajors, who burnt the houses of those who did not pay. Kamajors also stole most of the remaining property in the town, including zinc from the houses and zinc recently provided by an International NGO. Civilians were forced to give money and rice every two weeks and whoever did not do so was killed.

Sometime between January and May 1997, RUF forces attacked Manø (Dasse Chiefdom) but were repelled by Kamajors from Bonthe District who had deployed in the chiefdom in late 1996. This attack prompted the chiefdom elders to initiate their own Kamajors and civilians were asked to contribute a small amount of money for the initiation ceremonies. A Kamajor administration was

¹³¹⁰ Around this time, SLA forces were deployed at Mile 91, where fighting with the CDF was also reported.

¹³¹¹ Later during the year, in November, the Sieromco Director contracted Executive Outcomes to protect a team sent to evaluate the damage at Mokañji: Africa Energy & Mining, 11 September 1996. Executive Outcomes was a mercenary company hired by the Government of Sierra Leone in 1995.



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put in place in the chiefdom and the following positions were established and filled: Chiefdom Ground Commander, Deputy Chiefdom Ground Commander, Section Commanders, Patrol Commander and Welfare Officers (AG). The Welfare Officers were generally civilians appointed by Kamajors to act as a liaison between the civilians and the Kamajors.

Shortly after the Coup on 25 May, which saw the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrow the government and seize power, RUF forces from Bumpah Chiefdom left their camp and went to Freetown to join the AFRC regime.¹³¹² However, they later returned to Rotifunk, the headquarter town, and took away the zinc from the remaining houses. RUF forces brought the zinc to Waterloo (Western Area),¹³¹³ where they met their business partners. All the Kamajors from the chiefdom assembled at Mokkebi, ready to attack RUF/AFRC forces if they came back, which they did two days later and were attacked by the Kamajors.¹³¹⁴

After the Coup, the AFRC forces made an announcement over the radio that Kamajors should lay down their arms and surrender to the nearest Police Station, which the Kamajors in Moyamba District did not do. RUF/AFRC forces established checkpoints from Rotifunk (Bumpah Chiefdom) to Mabang (Ribbi Chiefdom, at the boundary with Port Loko District) and on the highway, as they knew there were Kamajors in Bumpah Chiefdom. Nevertheless, the Kamajors continued their attacks, and after few months, they had succeeded pushing the RUF/AFRC forces beyond the Mabang Bridge, thus controlling Ribbi, Bumpah, Kongbora and Kayima Chiefdoms.

From May 1997 until January 1998, the RUF/AFRC forces killed a number of civilians travelling on the Taiama (Kori chiefdom) to Bo (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) highway, during which time they also took a lot of property from the travellers. Men were particular targets, as the RUF/AFRC forces alleged that any man in Kamajei and Kori Chiefdoms was either a Kamajor or a Kamajor supporter. Kamajors from Kamajei Chiefdom, together with some Kamajors from Mongere (Valunia Chiefdom), also ambushed vehicles they claimed to belong to AFRC members. The stolen property was taken to Gondama (Kamajei Chiefdom) and to Mongere. Civilians in this area were therefore caught between the two fighting factions.

On 5 June 1997, RUF forces from Kailahun District and en route to Freetown to join the AFRC regime raided the town of Senehun (Kamajei Chiefdom). They took a lot of property from the civilians, as a result of which civilians fled the town. On 7 June, RUF/AFRC forces entered Moyamba Town, although it had been under Kamajor control since August 1996, when Kamajors forced the SLA forces out of town. RUF/AFRC forces killed 12 civilians and took away property, leaving the same day and promising they would come back.

Around 16 June, RUF/AFRC forces entered Yoyema (Kaiyamba Chiefdom), where RUF forces had been repelled around August 1996. They told civilians they had come to thank them for voting for

¹³¹² It is not clear whether an attack on the camp took place in 1996 and, if it took place, whether the RUF forces went back to the camp afterwards.

¹³¹³ There are two Waterloo Towns in Sierra Leone, one in the Western Area and one in the north of Fakunya Chiefdom.

¹³¹⁴ The outcome of this battle and any casualties could not be ascertained.



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the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). They burnt down many houses in the town and killed a tremendous number of civilians.

Since the Kamajors had been in control of Kagboro, Timdel and Bagruwa Chiefdoms, in the south of the District, since late 1996, there was a shift in their organisation. At this time, the Kamajors were identified in two different categories: the "old" and the "new"; it was believed that most of the havoc on civilians was created by the new Kamajors, most of whom had been initiated after the RUF forces made their last attack on the chiefdoms. Thus at this time both old and new Kamajors from Kagboro reorganised themselves and, having taken control over an area, began to harass not only civilians but also their own colleagues. For example, starting in June, a base commander from Sembehun (Bagruwa Chiefdom) used to visit Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom). On these occasions he and his men would loot the town and harass the inhabitants. On one occasion he killed two civilians visiting Shenge and left their bodies near a bridge at Sembehun. One of these civilians was a trader, carrying US dollars to the value of Le 11,000,000, which was taken away by this Kamajor commander. During these raids, this Kamajor commander also threatened some Kamajors from Kagboro Chiefdom at gunpoint. On another occasion, Kamajors based at Mossanda (Timdel Chiefdom) went to Mokobo in Kagboro Chiefdom where they took some cattle away.

Kamajors at Shenge and elsewhere also made cages constructed with different kinds of thorns, where suspected "rebel" collaborators and civilians or Kamajors who violated their laws were imprisoned. Civilians were flogged with sticks and forcefully pushed into the cages, the floors of which were also lined with broken bottles. The CDF forces also had another form of punishment for civilians known as "FM": a thin nylon rope was tied on two short equal sticks and then wrapped either on the two wrists or above the elbows. It was continually rolled until the nylon was squeezed into the body, injuring veins and muscles as the circulation of blood stopped in the affected areas. When the person was released, usually either their hands were broken or very swollen, which often led to partial deformity. These forms of punishment (FM and cages) were found in almost all the chiefdoms in the District where CDF were based. For example, at Mano Junction (Kagboro Chiefdom), two members of a church were accused of preaching against the Kamajors and were put in the cage into which hot ashes were poured; Kamajors referred to this as "a jet is bombing".

CDF members in other chiefdoms continued their harassment of civilians, inflicting sexual, physical and mental violence. In fact, this period was described by some civilians as the peak of the CDF activities in the District, with Kamajors being described as "having spoiled their mandate". People who defied the Kamajors' authority were often killed. For example, at Banta Chiefdom, three youths who went to purchase gari at Gbangbatoke were arrested for not paying due respect to the CDF command. Two of them were killed and the third was severely beaten before being released. This harassment led to an incident in Gbangbatoke in September, during which civilians threw stones at Kamajors and told them they would take care of their defence themselves.¹³¹⁵ At Dodo Bridge (Bagruwa Chiefdom), summary executions were carried out. Checkpoints were established and travel cards issued to civilians. A civilian without such a card was considered to be an RUF member and was dealt with accordingly.

¹³¹⁵ AFP, 26 September 1997.



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In Banta Mokele Chiefdom, Kamajors also passed laws civilians had to abide by, presided over cases and acted as Chiefs. The Kamajors' behaviours in Kamajei Chiefdom (north-west of the District) also began to change after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement and they were described as being the "chiefs". They decided cases and punished people they found guilty: Town Chiefs and Section Chiefs were molested by young Kamajors, civilians were maltreated and sometimes, were put the cages made of sticks and thorns. In other cases, women were beaten publicly, particularly when they refused to marry a Kamajor.

In Dasse and Kowa Chiefdoms, civilians recounted that the checkpoints, originally set up by the Kamajors to search for RUF members and weapons, were now used to harass civilians and drivers, asking them for money and taking their property. Cages made of thorns were built at these checkpoints and were used as prisons or guardrooms. On one occasion, a student coming from Bo had his shoes and his money taken away at Mano (Dasse Chiefdom). As he wanted to talk, he was a hit with a rifle one Kamajor was carrying.

RUF/AFRC activity in the second half of the year continued with numerous attacks on different towns and villages. During the night of 25 June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Mokonde, south of Kori Chiefdom near Njala University. As it was dark, it was difficult for people to see where they were going when they tried to escape and many drowned in the Taia River. Others were shot and killed by the RUF/AFRC forces. RUF/AFRC forces went to Njala College and stole a lot of property. Before leaving, they captured some civilians to carry the load; one of them was later shot and killed when he said he was too tired to carry the load. RUF/AFRC launched subsequent attacks on Mokonde and its environs throughout the year, almost without exception on a hit and run basis.

In the north of the Chiefdom, at the boundary with Yoni Chiefdom (Tonkolili District), RUF/AFRC forces entered Negeleboiya at night sometime in July. They gathered the civilians who did not manage to escape at the Court Barrie and began calling people's names. Those who were called had to lie down and then the RUF forces then cut their throats; 40 men were killed that night in this way.

On 28 June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom) and villages on the road leading to Moyamba Town. Houses were burnt at Kpangbama and Ngandorhun while civilians were killed between Kpetema Junction and Waterloo. Sometime the next month, a large number of RUF/AFRC forces went from Moyamba Junction to Moyamba Town (Kayima Chiefdom). They captured 11 commercial vehicles at Moyamba Junction and mounted an anti-aircraft gun on one of the vehicles, which they used to fire at towns and villages they passed on their way to Moyamba Town. They burnt down several houses at Kpangbama and Ngandorhun (Fakunya Chiefdom). Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom) was fiercely attacked, as it was an important initiation centre. Despite stiff resistance from the CDF, between four to eight civilians and one CDF member were killed during the battle and eight houses were burnt down. The RUF forces reached Moyamba Town around mid to late July and dislodged the CDF forces after a stiff battle.



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Moyamba District in a whole and Moyamba Town in particular, was a target for the AFRC when it came into power in May 1997 due to the earlier rejection of SLA forces by civilians in the District. During their short stay of eight days in Moyamba Town, the RUF/AFRC forces killed almost all the young men they found; women, children and even livestock were also killed. They hunted people who had fled into the bush and killed them. Section Chiefs and elders were targeted and killed, including one prominent Section Chief. His death terrified all the chiefdom elders as well as the young men, as a result of which many young men volunteered to join the Kamajor society to defend their chiefdoms.

After eight days in the town, RUF forces returned to Moyamba Junction with all the property they had taken. The RUF/AFRC settled in Moyamba Junction, which led to the harassment of civilians, who by then were mostly living in the bush. One group of RUF/AFRC members was everyday going to the bush to take away civilians' property. During this period, women and girls were constantly sexually harassed.

Two days after the RUF/AFRC forces had left, Kamajors returned to Moyamba Town, sending messages to people in the bush telling them to come back to town. Civilians were screened for RUF members or collaborators when they came out of the bush and every household was taxed Le 2,000 to contribute to the feeding of the Kamajors. The Kamajors conducted a house-to-house search and took away any property that had not been burnt or stolen by the RUF/AFRC forces. The Government agricultural office was also looted. As many civilians left the town and found refuge in the nearby village of Korgbotuma, the Kamajors went there and threatened to kill civilians who would not come back to the town. On their way back, two civilians were shot and killed by Kamajors.

Kamajors imposed their authority on everybody. They used a building on Coromboya Road as their secretariat and established laws and decrees. Chiefs were prevented from exercising their powers and were molested, beaten or tied up. Kamajors exercised all the powers normally vested in different official bodies and fulfilled the tasks of chiefs, judges and policemen. They set up tribunals and presided over cases. Civilians were continuously harassed, for all the non-initiates were treated with disrespect. Wealthy civilians were targeted and all their money and valuables were taken away, often at checkpoints. On one occasion, four Kamajors killed a trader and burnt down his compound. In another incident, a civilian was killed at a checkpoint for Le 500. Women were sexually harassed and forcefully became the "wives" of Kamajors. RUF/AFRC members, if captured, were killed. Kamajors also killed civilians, on the allegation that they were collaborators. The way they qualified the collaboration was so wide that relatives of RUF/AFRC forces were killed, even if they had nothing to do with their relatives in the RUF/AFRC: having the same name as an RUF or AFRC member was sufficient to be "washed", i.e. killed. On one occasion, an employee of the District Office was accused of being a "Junta" collaborator and beheaded at Sembehun Road.

Kwellu (Fakunya Chiefdom) became the centre of administration in the chiefdom and cases were directed to the CDF leaders based in the town. The head of the CDF initiation process and his assistants presided over all cases. RUF members captured at the war front were brought to the town and were killed. On one occasion, a civilian alleged to be a "rebel" collaborator was arrested at



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Falaba Gbotima and was hit with a knife and severely beaten before he was taken to Kwellu, where he died. Other civilians were killed on the same grounds, including one man from Madina and one man and his son from Monyanga. Cages made of thorns were built, where civilians and Kamajors who did not respect the laws the Kamajors had established were imprisoned. The local authorities, including Paramount Chiefs, Section Chiefs and Town Chiefs who did not want to be initiated no longer had any control or power.

On 10 December 1997, the CDF launched a successful attack on the RUF/AFRC forces at Moyamba Junction (Fakunya Chiefdom). Five RUF/AFRC forces were killed and the town was captured by the CDF. This attack was the first of series of battles for the control of Moyamba Junction, where RUF/AFRC forces were based and Waterloo, where Kamajors were based. Ultimately, Kamajors would keep the control of Waterloo and would also dislodge the RUF/AFRC from Moyamba Junction.¹³¹⁶

The RUF/AFRC forces launched a counter-attack on 16 December, reinforced by RUF/AFRC forces from Bo and Camp Charlie.¹³¹⁷ A helicopter gunship was also brought by the RUF/AFRC forces, which they used to overpower the CDF, leaving one of them dead. The RUF/AFRC forces captured two other CDF and killed them. Nevertheless, the CDF captured a lot of weapons from the RUF/AFRC forces. On 25 December 1997, the CDF again attacked Moyamba Junction and captured the town. However, on 27 December the RUF/AFRC forces launched a counter-attack and recaptured the town, killing one member of the CDF. On 31 December, the Kamajors finally chased the RUF/AFRC forces out of Moyamba Junction, forcing them to leave a lot of arms and ammunition behind.

Once the Kamajors consolidated their control over the whole Fakunya Chiefdom (they already had control over Kwellu), they increased their pressure and harassment of civilians, establishing laws that civilians had to abide by. Those laws, among others, prevented civilians to pound food in mortars at night and forbade them from giving the Kamajors bananas or any food containing banana. As in Kwellu, cages of 2 ½ feet high and 3 ½ feet wide and made of thorns were built and used as prisons. The punishments for not obeying the laws were varied and ranged from being fined to receiving lashes, being imprisoned in the cage and going "round the kabba"¹³¹⁸ seven times, asking for forgiveness, during which the Kamajors would encircle the violator and give them lashes while they went around seven times.

The last major attack on the town of Njala (Kori Chiefdom) was on 23 December 1997, while Kamajors were carrying out the operation "Black December". RUF/AFRC forces burnt houses from Mokande to the College and occupied Njala for seven days. They killed civilians and captured

¹³¹⁶ In December, an increase in Kamajor activities was reported, despite the declaration of a ceasefire on 22 October as part of the Conakry Peace Plan: Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 19 November - 2 December 1997.

¹³¹⁷ This camp was located in the outskirts of Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).

¹³¹⁸ The kabba is a cube-shaped building in Mecca, which Muslims believe was built by Abraham for the worship of Allah. When going on Hajj, namely the journey to Mecca, pilgrims begin by going seven times around the kabba.



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and raped a lot of young girls and women in the town. Surrounding villages like Pujehun and Bambuibu (both in Kori Chiefdom) were also attacked at this time. The RUF/AFRC forces then went south along the main road to Mano (Dasse Chiefdom), chasing civilians who had found refuge in the bush. The “sorquehun”, bush camps, were ransacked and property was taken away. On the walls of some houses, the forces wrote the names of some of their commanders in blood.

In December 1997, the CDF high command announced over the radio the commencement of the “Black December Operations”, namely that no vehicle should travel to Freetown. This operation was designed to cut off the AFRC forces in Freetown from the rest of the country. The CDF in the District stopped all vehicles and boats from travelling to Freetown and severely punished those who did not obey the announcement. For example, a defaulting vehicle, which did not stop as requested was fired on at Bengeh (Bumpeh Chiefdom), killing two people.

e) Events in 1998 to 2001

After they were driven out of Freetown during the first week of February 1998, RUF/AFRC forces left Moyamba District, although little information was recounted on this departure, except the following incident. RUF/AFRC forces attacked Korgbotuma (Kaiyamba Chiefdom) from four different points and battled with the CDF in the town, defeating the CDF and capturing the town. The RUF/AFRC commanders informed the civilians that their mission was to carry out “Operation no living thing” in the town and its environs.¹³¹⁹ The forces stayed in the town for eight days, during which they killed a lot of civilians, took property and burnt down houses in the town. Two days after their departure the CDF took over the town and ordered all the people in the bush to return to the town even when they had no where to sleep since almost all the houses were burnt.

In early 1998, Kamajors from Bo District came to Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom) and told the Kamajors from Bumpeh Chiefdom that they had received instructions from the CDF High Command to reinforce those already deployed at Rotifunk, in order to prevent the RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown using the Mabang Bridge (Ribbi Chiefdom, at the border with Port Loko District). Those Kamajors soon took control of the township and the Kamajors from Bumpeh Chiefdom went under cover, for they had less arms and ammunition than the recently arrived reinforcements. One month after they had arrived, the elders of the chiefdom met at Moyamba Town to find a way to move out the Kamajors from Bo District. It was agreed that more men should be initiated, so an initiator was brought to perform initiation ceremonies at Bellentin. Within two weeks, he had initiated over 400 men and one woman. Those new initiates, equipped only with bladed weapons, drove out the Kamajors from Bo. Nevertheless, the new Kamajors established checkpoints on the highway and took money from drivers at those checkpoints. Drivers who did not want to pay would be beaten or their vehicle damaged. On one occasion, one driver who could not give Le 10,000 as requested had two of his tyres shot out.

ECOMOG forces deployed in various areas of the District in February 1998 and ensured the security of the District, notably by setting up checkpoints that they operated together with

¹³¹⁹ “Operation No Living Thing” was the name of the operation carried out by the RUF/AFRC forces retreating from Freetown, during which atrocities committed against civilians reached unprecedented levels. It was mostly carried out in the Northern Province and in Kono District.



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Kamajors. In Kamajei Chiefdom, for example, they set up checkpoints at the headquarter town of Senehun and at Lonponga. However, Kamajors who assisted the ECOMOG forces at those checkpoints were still mistreating civilians. Vehicles suspected of carrying RUF or AFRC members or goods without proper documents were detained at those checkpoints and passengers were forced to remain there and sleep on the ground. Women who openly opposed the activities carried out at those checkpoints were stripped naked and forced to lie on the ground. The situation worsened when the ECOMOG forces left the checkpoints in the hand of the Kamajors,¹³²⁰ who would only dismantle those checkpoints in November 2001.

Immediately after the RUF/AFRC forces were pushed out of power in early 1998, an internal fight occurred between different factions of the CDF. Kamajors operating in the Southern Province accused the Gbethies, who were active in the Northern Province, of supporting AFRC members in their fight against Kamajors. A group of Gbethies from neighbouring chiefdoms in Tonkolili District attacked the Kamajors base at Gondama and Fogbo (Kori Chiefdom). Nobody was killed during the attack but houses were burnt by the retreating Gbethies. Five days later, the Kamajors launched a counter-attack on the Gbethies at Pateful (Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, Tonkolili District). The situation was finally resolved through the intervention of the elders.

On 29 March, a letter issued by the CDF headquarter was circulated to all Kamajors in the District, ordering that since the Sierra Leonean President had now been reinstated, the Kamajors should let the Chiefs assuming their functions and stop presiding over issues. However, Kamajors from the chiefdoms in the south of the District, Kagboro, Timdel, Bagruwa, Banta and Banta Mokele Chiefdoms continued to affirm their authority and to maltreat civilians and authorities. CDF in Moyamba Town (Kaiyamba Chiefdom) also continued to rule as chiefs and to control the live of civilians, as they had done in 1997. For example, around 5 March 1998, a young woman moved from Foyah to Matta Gelema in Banta Chiefdom to sell cassava leaves. At a checkpoint on her way, she was asked by a Kamajor to show him her pass. The woman told the Kamajors that her father was a Town Chief and that they did not know about this system of pass. Kamajors replied by saying that Kamajors were now the chiefs and authorities and that they were not respected by the civilians, who treated them with over-familiarity. They took her cassava bag away and detained her for two hours before she was freed. Her father, the Town Chief, reported the matter to the Ground Commander to no avail, as the Ground Commander told him he had no time for reports, for he knew his men were doing a good job.

In Kagboro Chiefdom, by 1998, the CDF had established checkpoints along the road going through the middle of the chiefdom at Yoyema, Gondama Junction, Talia and Tawovahun. Vehicles were checked for guns and “rebels” or “rebel” suspects. Anyone caught as a “rebel” or “junta” soldier or who was suspected to be such by the Kamajors was immediately carried away and “washed”, a term the CDF used for killing. People were killed at the checkpoints very often, sometimes for money or other property. In other places where the CDF had checkpoints, people who were not from that chiefdom were often singled out to be victims.

¹³²⁰ It could not be ascertained when ECOMOG forces exactly came in the District, nor when they left Kamajei Chiefdom.



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The CDF frequently beat women and one commander in particular travelled around the chiefdom harassing young men and women and molesting the elderly. From Bauma to Blama and from Mamboma to Senehun, this commander was well known for this type of behaviour. On one occasion, he ordered his boys to torture a civilian whose daughter was alleged to have been in love with an RUF/AFRC member. In another incident in Mokebay Section, Kamajors killed a lady who had come from Bumpe to buy fish. They removed her body parts for rituals, as they allegedly believed that the ritual murder would prevent their "evil deeds" from been exposed. Several other civilians were killed afterwards. Other civilians killed included one man from Yorgborfore, one from Mbawoma, one from Metiba and one from Bumpetoke. A Kamajor cut off the ear of a woman from Bonthe District with a cutlass and chewed it. The woman latter suffered severe pain from the ear. Another Kamajor declared one day that any civilian not abiding by their laws would be killed and eaten raw. In Timdel Chiefdom, at Morkandor, one civilian was beaten with orange sticks covered in thorns, as he failed to be his contribution for the feeding of the Kamajors. He was then asked to contribute with three bushels of husk rice or would be killed. The deputy Town Chief of Morkandor was severely beaten because he refused to act as a town crier.

In April or May, a schoolteacher riding his bike between Mokonde (Kori Chiefdom) and Pelewahun (south of Kamajei Chiefdom) was caught by Kamajors who had established a checkpoint at Pelewahun. The man was dragged in the bush, had his stomach cut open and his intestines removed. The Kamajors then set the body on fire, taking his bicycle and his two months salary he had just received. This killing was carried out because one of the Kamajors wanted to take his revenge on this schoolteacher, the new partner of his ex-girlfriend. Police officers from Taiama (Kori Chiefdom) investigated the matter and the four Kamajors who killed the schoolteacher were arrested, put in prison and tried in the High Court in Bo. Following this arrest, the other Kamajors left Pelewahun.

In 1999, some incursions were carried out in the District by RUF/AFRC forces based in Tonkolili District. Those attacks were, however, limited to villages in Fakunya Chiefdom, along the border with the Northern Province. Sometime in March 1999, RUF/AFRC forces based in Tonkolili District launched a series of attacks on villages on the Fakunya/Yoni boundary, mainly for searching for food and other items. One serious attack was made at Mataradegba, one mile from Rogboya, by the RUF forces from Mile 91 in late March 1999. It was a silent attack and they entered the town without discharging their weapons. Sixteen people were locked in a house, which was then set on fire and set ablaze. The RUF forces also shot and killed another five people. They then went to Rogboya, where they met with stiff resistance from the CDF forces in the town. On their retreat, they fell in a CDF ambush; six of the RUF forces were killed and a lot of their arms and ammunition captured. On 18 April 1999, the RUF forces launched another attack on Rogboya and succeeded in capturing the town. They were, however, soon repelled from the town by CDF from other towns nearby. On their way back to Tonkolili District, they had a battle with some Kamajors, which left over 40 RUF/AFRC members dead. This was to be the last battle between the CDF and RUF forces in Fakunya Chiefdom.

During the same period, some RUF/AFRC forces coming from their base at Okra Hills (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) crossed into the north of Ribbi Chiefdom, mainly chasing civilians in



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the camps they had built in the bush.¹³²¹ They took away the rice and burnt a farmhouse near Makabie before heading for Makabie, where they abducted one man. This man was told to deliver the message to the inhabitants of Makabie that they would come back again to the village, as one of their boxes of cigarettes had been stolen. They further added that anyone they caught would be either mutilated or killed, depending on their will. When they came back to the village, they took some property away, burnt the houses and abducted one man, who they later killed.

The inhabitants of Ribbi Chiefdom, north-west of the District at the border with Port Loko District, were in total disarray at this time because of one group of CDF, who were opposed to the Gbethies from Port Loko District and who were inflicting a lot of violence on civilians in the chiefdom. On 24 March 1999, Kamajors and Avondos came to Bradford,¹³²² the headquarter town of Ribbi Chiefdom and began to shoot indistinctly.¹³²³ One civilian was caught escaping and was accused by the Kamajors of being a “rebel”. Those Kamajors and Avondos told the civilians they had come to Ribbi because they knew they had been RUF/AFRC forces in the chiefdom. Some civilians were killed, accused by the CDF members of selling food to RUF/AFRC members. Throughout May and April, the two groups deployed in the town and went to the surrounding villages, killing civilians and burning houses. For example, they went to Rogbonkol, burnt 10 houses and killed 20 people; at Mothankey, they killed one woman and took away her two children and all her property. They also crossed the Ribbi River and went to Bathpon (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District). On their return to Bradford, the Kamajors and Avondos met a deaf woman in her garden and asked her what she was doing there. The woman told them that since they were “soldiers” – because they were wearing military uniforms – they should not disturb her. The CDF members told the woman they were going to kill her, as they said she was inhabited with devil spirits. The Avondo commander¹³²⁴ ordered his men to kill her, so she was shot and killed.

The CDF members then moved to Makabie, where they established a checkpoint on the highway leading to Freetown. Any civilian caught speaking Temne was accused of being a Gbethie collaborator, who were their targets at this time. Anybody thus accused was forced to lead them to the place where he was living and all his property was taken away. The inhabitants of Makabie were gathered, accused of being “rebels” and threatened with death; they were not, however, killed and the Town Chief was forced to pay Le 15,000 instead. Civilians were told that they could not go anywhere without the permission of the CDF members and that as long as they remained in the town, the civilians were responsible for their feeding. It was alleged that the main purpose of the CDF members was to steal their property and that the allegation of collaboration was a pretext. Some CDF members then left the town and went to Rosint Loko, where they abducted civilians, subsequently releasing all but one. The captured civilian who was not released was killed, as he failed to lead the Kamajors to the Gbethies. He was hit with a bladed weapon on his face and as he was

¹³²¹ Okra Hills was the base of the West Side Boys, a fighting faction that emerged from the RUF/AFRC forces in late 1998: see the analysis for Port Loko District for more information.

¹³²² It is not clear where those CDF members came from. It seems that the Avondos came from Taima (Kori Chiefdom) while the group of Kamajors came from Kongbora and Bumpeh Chiefdoms.

¹³²³ It seems that there were no Kamajors operating in Ribbi Chiefdom before this incident.

¹³²⁴ Both the Avondos and the Kamajors had their own commanders, although they carried most of these actions together.



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wiping away the blood, the Kamajor commander told him not to waste his blood as he was thirsty and wanted to drink it. The man was then shot and killed; he was later buried by civilians from Makabie. A report on this incident was made to the ECOMOG forces deployed at Songo (Western Area). ECOMOG forces arrested the CDF members but released them shortly after.¹³²⁵

The CDF members returned to Ribbi Chiefdom and resettled first at Mo Lamina and then at Mo Goba, from where they raided the surrounding villages, harassing civilians for their property. One truck belonging to the International Labour Organisation was stolen in Moyamba village (Ribbi Chiefdom) and used by the CDF members to carry the property they were stealing. At Massampa, for example, they entered the town shooting their guns and killing one student. They looted the town and burnt five houses. At Sueu, they shot the Chiefdom Speaker, stripped him, tied him up and took him to Bumpeh Chiefdom, where they allegedly had their main base. At Rotifunk (Bumpeh Chiefdom), one of the commanders wore the fingers of the late Chiefdom Speaker on a necklace around his neck. The CDF members went back to Moyamba village (Ribbi Chiefdom), burnt 19 houses and captured two traders, whom they later killed. Other incidents included another attack on Bradford, where they took a significant sum of money from traders and another attack on Sueu, where they killed one woman and took away her property. CDF members also went to Mabang, after the RUF/AFRC forces had left the bridge,¹³²⁶ and killed a lot of civilians and harassed anybody using the bridge.¹³²⁷

The Kamajors stayed in Bradford for a while, forcing civilians to bring them food and money and to work for them, harvesting palm nuts. These actions continued until the Government announced that all the fighting factions had to stop hostilities.¹³²⁸

By May 1999, some commercial vehicles used the alternative highway from Freetown to Bo, through Moyamba, without encountering any attack, although the highway was not yet reopened for traffic.¹³²⁹

Probably in 1999 or 2000, Kamajors from Bumpeh Chiefdom battled with Kamajors from Kagboro Chiefdom, for one lady trader from Bumpeh Chiefdom had been beaten and her money taken away by Kamajors at Ribbi (Kagboro Chiefdom). The Kamajors from the two chiefdoms were later reconciled through the intervention of the Paramount Chief of Bumpeh Chiefdom and elders of Kagboro Chiefdom.

Following the Freetown invasion in January 1999, a peace accord marking the end of the conflict and known as the Lomé Peace Agreement was signed on 7 July in the Togolese capital. Pursuant to this accord, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process was formally launched by the President of Sierra Leone on 20 October 1999 during a ceremony at Wilberforce

¹³²⁵ No more details were available on this arrest.

¹³²⁶ RUF/AFRC forces were in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District), on the other side of the bridge.

¹³²⁷ No further information was available on this incident.

¹³²⁸ A ceasefire was signed in May 1999. No more information was available on what exactly happened in the chiefdom following this announcement.

¹³²⁹ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1 - 17 May 1999.



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Barracks, Freetown and began properly on 4 November 1999.¹³³⁰ Five demobilisation centres were opened at Lungi (Port Loko District), Port Loko South, Port Loko North, Kenema and Daru (Kailahun District). In early 2000, UN peacekeepers from the Guinean contingent were deployed at Moyamba Town.¹³³¹

On 10 March 2000, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) identified two more sites, one of which was at Levuma (north of Kongbora Chiefdom).¹³³² However, disarmament started at a slow pace and was halted temporarily in May 2000, as fighting were still going on in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and peacekeepers were abducted by RUF/AFRC forces. Although Moyamba District was not directly concerned by these events, it seems clear that the CDF members would not disarm as long as the other fighting factions were still carrying out armed operations. The DDR process would be given a new start in November 2000 when the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed a ceasefire in Abuja, Nigeria on 10 November 2000. On 4 May 2001, those parties would meet again in Abuja, Nigeria to review the cease-fire. Further to this meeting, those parties held monthly tripartite meetings under the Joint Committee on DDR and decided on an accelerated schedule for the completion of the disarmament process. During the fourth meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR in Kenema on 10 August 2001, it was agreed that the next stage of disarmament was to take place simultaneously in Moyamba and Koinadugu District, between 15 and 30 August.¹³³³ However, disarmament was not complete by 31 August, mainly for logistics reasons.

In a symbolic disarmament ceremony in the town of Moyamba on 20 October 2001, CDF combatants and their senior commanders handed over more than 50 weapons to UN peacekeepers, in the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra Leone.¹³³⁴ At the end of the seventh meeting of the Joint Committee on DDR on 9 November, disarmament was declared complete in Moyamba District.¹³³⁵ On 30 November 2001, a Nepalese Battalion of peacekeepers was deployed in Moyamba Town and Rotifunk (Bumpah Chiefdom), at which time the war officially came to an end in Moyamba District.¹³³⁶

3. Conclusion

Moyamba District was the last District of the Southern Province to be attacked by RUF forces. The first incursion into the District was launched in early January 1995, at a time when NPFL forces, originally fighting alongside the RUF from 1991, had long since withdrawn to Liberia. This first wave of attacks was carried out from Bo District and in the aftermath of a series of attacks on major

¹³³⁰ The launch of the DDR process was delayed as it was meant to start within six weeks of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

¹³³¹ IRIN West Africa, 12 April 2000. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 1270 approving the deployment of 6,000 armed peacekeepers alongside the 260 unarmed military observers. Their number would increase over the subsequent months.

¹³³² IRIN West Africa, 17 March 2000.

¹³³³ UNAMSIL press briefing, 14 August 2001. At that time, the disarmament was complete in Port Loko and Kambia Districts. As of that date, 1,500 CDF members had disarmed in Moyamba District.

¹³³⁴ UNAMSIL press briefing, 23 October 2001.

¹³³⁵ UNAMSIL press briefing, 9 November 2001.

¹³³⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 06 - 30 November 2001.



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towns in Bo District. Attacks on Moyamba District were subsequently carried out by RUF forces who settled in the District but also from the neighbouring Districts of Bonthe and Bo in the Southern Province and Tonkolili in the Northern Province.

The spreading of RUF forces into Moyamba District was one of the latest developments of a new phase of the conflict, which started in late December 1993 in the south of Kenema District. From this date on, RUF forces took to the bush and adopted guerrilla warfare tactics, progressing to Districts so far unaffected and by 1995, had established positions in all the Districts.

In March 1995, it was clear that the ultimate goal of the RUF forces who attacked Moyamba District was to reach Freetown. To this end, they progressed through the District using the highway that leads to Songo in the Western Area, systematically attacking the major towns located on this highway. It was only when their progression to Freetown was stopped that they settled in the District and established a strong base in the north.

As in the other Districts of the Southern Province, Kamajors progressively halted the actions of the RUF forces from the beginning of 1996. The initiation of youths and local hunters, members or not of the CDUs, started in early 1996 and developed throughout the year. Bonthe District played an active role in the development of Kamajors throughout Moyamba District, as many men from Moyamba District went to Bonthe District for initiation also because Kamajors from Bonthe District went to Moyamba District to fight the RUF forces.

The chiefdoms in the south of the District were under Kamajor control earlier than the chiefdoms in the north. By late 1996, Kamajors had taken control of the southern chiefdoms and no more RUF attack was reported in those areas. This was probably also due to the fact that around this period, Kamajors had already dislodged RUF forces from Bonthe District. The situation for the chiefdoms in the north of the District was far different. Although their main base, Camp Fol Fol was destroyed in late 1996 by Kamajors, the RUF forces and, shortly after, RUF/AFRC forces were present in many of the chiefdoms in the north, wreaking a lot of havoc on civilians. At this time, both Port Loko and Tonkolili Districts, which adjoin Moyamba District to the north, were also infiltrated by RUF and RUF/AFRC forces.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in early 1998, the actions of the RUF/AFRC forces were concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Free from RUF/AFRC incursions, the Kamajors affirmed their control of the security of Moyamba District and expanded this control to civilians and local authorities. In this regard, the pattern of actions in Moyamba District at this time would converge with what happened in the other Districts of the Southern Province.

d. Pujehun District

1. **Introduction**

Pujehun District, with its headquarter of Pujehun Town, is one of the four Districts of the Southern Province, the other three being Bonthe, Bo and Moyamba Districts. It is bordered on the east by

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Liberia, on the northeast by Kenema District (Eastern Province), on the northwest by Bo District and on the west by Bonthe District. At its southern edge is the Atlantic Ocean.

There are 12 chiefdoms in the District:

<u>Chiefdom</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Barri	Potoru
Gallinas Peri	Blama
Kpaka	Massam
Makpele	Zimmi
Malen	Sahn
Mano Sakrim	Gbonjema
Panga Kabonde	Pujehun
Panga Krim	Gobaru
Peje	Futa
Soro Gbema	Fairo
Sowa	Bandajuma
Yekomo Kpukumu Krim	Karlu

The main rivers flowing through the District would prove to be of strategic importance during the conflict. The Mano River that flows on the eastern edge of Makpele and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms constitutes the natural border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The entry point to the District is located in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, at the Mano River Union Bridge, Bo Waterside, which was a joint venture between Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Control of the bridge would be of great importance for the RUF/NPFL and later on for the RUF forces, as it allows easy penetration into the District and the transport of supplies from Liberia. Accordingly, throughout the conflict, the RUF forces would mainly be based in the east of the District. The Moa River originates from the ocean between Gallinas Peri and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms, following more or less the border between those two chiefdoms through Barri Chiefdom before reaching Kenema and Kailahun Districts, thereby isolating Soro Gbema and Makpele Chiefdoms from the rest of the District. Other rivers located in the south of the District and of lesser strategic importance would be used by the fighting factions, mainly the RUF forces, to move within the District.

Crossing the Mano River Union Bridge, there is only one motorable road linking Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom headquarters) to Sulima in the south (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) and to Zimmi in the north (Makpele Chiefdom Headquarters). Furthermore, this road to Zimmi is the only way to reach Pujehun Town, other than by using bush paths. From Zimmi, it continues westwards to Potoru (Barri Chiefdom headquarters), Futa (Peje Chiefdom headquarters) and Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom Headquarters). Bandajuma is located on the main road that links Pujehun and Bo Districts, starting in Pujehun Town and leading to Koribondo and Bo Town (Bo District). From Potoru, an alternative road passing by Gallinas Peri and Kpaka, the two central chiefdoms, goes to Pujehun Town.



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The small number of roads providing access to other Districts is an important factor in how the RUF/NPFL forces would attack surrounding Districts. To go to Kenema District in the north-east, there are only two alternative roads, through Makpele Chiefdom or through Peje Chiefdom. Two roads also allow the penetration of Bo District, the main one being a highway passing through Panga Kabone and Sowa Chiefdoms, while the second one leaves Pujehun Town to pass through Malen Chiefdom in the west. There are no motorable roads linking Pujehun District with Bonthe District in the south-east; accordingly, this District would not be affected during the first years of the war, as access was achieved only later through Bo District.

The main economic activities of the District consist of mining, fishing and cash crops, notably coffee and cocoa plantations. In some chiefdoms, primarily in Makpele Chiefdom, the main economic activity is diamond mining.

Pujehun District, at the border with Liberia was concerned by the conflict as early as March 1991 when Revolutionary United Front (RUF)/ National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) forces crossed the border at the Mano River Union Bridge into Soro Gbema Chiefdom. From this first incursion, the conflict would affect the District through three discernable phases.

The first phase, which ran from 1991 to 1993, was first marked by the first incursion in 1991, where almost all the chiefdoms and major towns, including Pujehun Town, were attacked by RUF/NPFL forces within one month. This first incursion was characterised by widespread violations committed by RUF/NPFL forces. Those forces would follow the same pattern upon entry to a village: they would gather the civilians, identify themselves as "freedom fighters" coming to redeem Sierra Leone from the corrupted All People's Congress (APC) regime and depose and replace the local authorities, setting up basic administrative structures. Their arrival and stay in a place was accompanied by the infliction of physical and mental violence on the people of the village, as well as the abduction of members of the population, including children, for use as forced labour, as soldiers, as cooks and as "wives". RUF/NPFL forces also engaged in widespread theft and property destruction, notably the burning of houses. However, from July to September 1991, SLA forces, assisted by foreign troops, dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from most of their positions, pushing them back to the Liberian border. This SLA offensive and control of the District was nonetheless soon accompanied by violence inflicted on civilians, in particular those labelled as collaborators with the RUF/NPFL. Attacks, probably carried out by remnants of RUF/NPFL forces, were however still recorded at the end of 1991 and in 1992. At the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993, RUF forces launched a powerful attack from Liberia, established a stronghold in Soro Gbema Chiefdom and started spreading across the District. This second incursion was, however, less successful than the first one as they were soon defeated in most areas by SLA forces. While in control, SLA forces continued to inflict great havoc on civilians, killing a lot of alleged collaborators, chasing civilians for their property, destroying some property and engaging in mining activities in the east of the District.

The second phase spanned from 1994 to May 1997, during which time the RUF forces succeeded in spreading throughout the country, shifting their tactics away from direct confrontation with the SLA to bush warfare, during which they mainly staged ambushes. At this time, thousands of civilians had fled the District for a refuge camp in Bo District. Starting in 1996, newly initiated Kamajors, initially

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operating in collaboration with SLA forces, engaged the RUF forces and by 1997 had succeeded in taking control of most of the RUF positions across the country, which led thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to resettle in the District. However, their control was also accompanied by harassment of civilians, including constant requests for food and the taking of property. Physical violence was also inflicted, in particular on those they identified as being RUF collaborators.

The third phase of the conflict started in May 1997, when a military regime – the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) – seized power in the capital and concluded at the end of 2001, when the disarmament process was complete for Pujehun District. Shortly after the Coup, RUF forces who had been living in the bush for some months joined the AFRC and Kamajors in the District went underground. During their stay in the District, the RUF/AFRC forces imposed great harms on civilians in general and on alleged Kamajors collaborator in particular, including physical violence, killing, rape, abduction for use as forced labour, soldiers 'or "wives" and stealing and destruction of property. Starting in October, Kamajors regrouped and intensified their fighting against those combined forces, gaining more and more ground; by March 1998, following ECOMOG deployment in the District, the RUF/AFRC forces were repelled from the District. From this date onwards, the District remained under control of the Kamajors, who imposed their authority in all aspects of life, restricted the movement of the population by establishing checkpoints, replaced the local authorities and themselves administered the District, increased their violence against all civilians and engaged in mining activities. This would continue until the completion of disarmament at the end of 2001.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1991

On 28 March 1991, RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Mano River Union Bridge¹³³⁷ at Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), 7 miles from Fairo. They then headed for Malema, where they seized weapons from the SSD store, before heading for Fairo. From Soro Gbema Chiefdom, the RUF/NPFL forces would then head for Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, in the east of the District), passing by Makpele, Barri, Peje, Sowa, Kpaka and Gallinas Peri Chiefdoms, leaving behind some forces to settle in each of those areas. A few days after the RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Mano River Union Bridge, the RUF and NPFL leaders paid them a brief visit at Bo Waterside, allegedly to check that the forces had crossed the river and to receive food items and furniture taken from the Police Barracks at Jendema.¹³³⁸

At the time of this incursion, SLA forces were deployed in the District, chiefly in Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) and Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom).

¹³³⁷ The control of the Mano River Union Bridge, a joint venture between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, would be of great importance as it allows penetration of the territory of Sierra Leone from Liberia.

¹³³⁸ During the first weeks of the conflict, many reports mention the visit of the RUF leader to Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, although it appeared that he spent more time in Kailahun District than in Pujehun District, while the NPFL leader is only mentioned as being present at Bo waterside.



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At Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), a short battle took place with some SLA forces and SSD members who were posted there.¹³³⁹ The house of the Paramount Chief, occupied at the time by SLA forces, was burnt down and the first killings of civilians and taking of their property was recorded at this time. Gunshots were heard in the town until night fell. The following morning, the civilians were gathered in the Court Barrie and addressed by the RUF/NPFL forces, who told them they should not be afraid, as they had come to redeem the civilians from the APC regime. However, a few days later, the RUF/NPFL forces killed one civilian who refused to give them food at Jendema. At Sulima, in the south of the chiefdom, they also killed one civilian, allegedly because he questioned them about the previous killing. Following this incursion, civilians from Wai, a town located on the main Fairo-Sulima road in the chiefdom, fled the town; some went to Liberia, first hiding their property, as they had heard from fleeing civilians that the RUF/NPFL forces were stealing food and any other items that took their interest. However, those who fled Sierra Leone did not find a safer haven in Liberia, where a civil war was raging; while in Liberia, the people who had fled the war in Sierra Leone were harassed by NPFL forces, who took their property and sexually assaulted their daughters and wives.¹³⁴⁰

After they took control of Malema and Fairo (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), two training camps were opened in those towns to train conscripts on how to use weapons. The RUF/NPFL forces first went from village to village to get people to join their movement, but when they realised that few young people were joining them, they forced villages as a whole to contribute and to give some of their inhabitants for training, threatening them with the destruction of the village if they refused. In this way, the RUF/NPFL forces recruited many young boys and girls and whoever refused to join or tried to hide during training was killed on the spot. Furthermore, those newly conscripted members were told to point out houses where young people had not volunteered to join, after which the RUF/NPFL forces looted and then burnt them. This situation led many families to give one of their family members to join the movement. RUF/NPFL forces also chased people who were hiding in farm huts in the bushes, raiding them at night, stealing their food and other valuable items and capturing young boys and girls. While the boys were conscripted into the fighting forces, the girls were used for sexual purposes. On one occasion, in the area of Malema, a five-months pregnant women was raped by five RUF/NPFL members and, as a result, had a miscarriage. In another incident, also in the Malema area, one girl was raped during a night raid. That same night, the commander of that RUF/NPFL forces told the people that the RUF leader had told them in Liberia that all the Sierra Leonean women were their wives and all the property they could find was also theirs.

The RUF/NPFL forces nominated a former candidate in the 1982 elections to be the chairman of their war council in the chiefdom. Following the 1982 general elections, a fight had erupted between

¹³³⁹ The SLA forces were only 10, together with five SSD members, and had little ammunition, mainly only to defend themselves.

¹³⁴⁰ Since 1989, the NPFL had been waging war against the then President, Samuel Doe, who would be killed by a splinter group of the NPFL in 1990. Also in 1990, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent some Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces to assist the Liberian Government to end the war. As part of this mission, ECOMOG based some forces at Lungi, Sierra Leone's international airport to the north of Freetown.



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the partisans of the two political groups contesting the elections and many civilians were killed and much property destroyed. The nomination of the war council chairman for the chiefdom recalled these events in 1982 for the civilians of Soro Gbema, as the newly appointed chairman was the candidate in the 1982 election who had not been elected to represent the Pujehun east constituency in Parliament.¹³⁴¹ Some supporters of the man who was elected chairman and leader of the Ndorgbowusui group, saw this nomination to the war council as an opportunity to take revenge for atrocities committed against their families almost 20 years ago. For this reason, they voluntarily nominated some of their children to join the RUF/NPFL forces. Thus, civilians who were not members of the Ndorgbowusui group were particularly targeted during the RUF/NPFL presence in the chiefdom in 1991.

In late March 1991, civilians fleeing the RUF/NPFL advance in Soro Gbema Chiefdom crossed the Moa River that flows on its west edge and took refuge in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, at Gbanahun, returning to their chiefdom a week later.

Zimmi,¹³⁴² the headquarter town of Makpele Chiefdom, and the surrounding villages are diamond-rich area. On 3 April, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town and established a base there that became their main one for the District. During their stay in the chiefdom, up to December 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces attacked many villages, where they followed the same actions upon taking control of the different villages. The RUF/NPFL forces would enter the town and gather the inhabitants at the Court Barrie, where they would introduce themselves as the Revolutionary United Front, their purpose being to remove the APC Government from power and liberate Sierra Leone. At this meeting, or soon after, they would depose the Town Chief and replace him or her with their own Town Commander, who was sometimes appointed from the civilian population. While in the town, the RUF/NPFL forces would destroy property; take food and other items; force civilians to work for them, such as by cooking and fetching water; tie civilians up; kill people; and abduct people, both adults and children. The following incidents are examples of the attacks carried out and the violence inflicted on civilians in the chiefdom, most of them taking place in April.

Between April and December, Gbaa was burnt three times, virtually all the property in the town was taken and some people were killed. On 9 April, the RUF leader visited the town, gathered hundreds of civilians for a meeting and stated that RUF were peacemakers, coming to free people from slavery. Zimmi became a main base in the District and beyond, in the south-east, and the RUF leader had a lodge reserved for him there. At Palima, on 25 April, RUF/NPFL forces fired on a car full of police officers being driven into the town, as a result of which the driver and one police officer were killed. Cattle and poultry were also taken from Palima and brought to Zimmi. In the same month, RUF/NPFL forces, nine in number, attacked Vaama Kortu and entered the town accompanied by gunfire. The sheep and goats of the village were taken away. During the same attack, two women were raped and three boys (two aged 18 and one aged 15) were taken away; their

¹³⁴¹ It is accordingly not a coincidence if the RUF/NPFL nominated somebody who opposed at one time to the APC regime representative.

¹³⁴² Zimmi is a strategic town for many reasons because, aside from its location in a diamond mining area, it is the first major town to be reached when crossing the border from Liberia and it allows further inland advances in the east of Kenema District.



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fate still remains unknown. At Sembehun, a group of 15 RUF/NPFL forces took property from houses, including furniture and other belongings, and forced inhabitants to carry the loads to the RUF base in Zimmi. Those who did not obey the order were beaten, tied up, forced to roll and look at the sun and eventually carried the load at gunpoint. Goats and sheep were taken away, as well as two sewing machines and a bailing machine belonging to a diamond dealer, carpentry tools and blacksmith's equipment. Fifteen houses were burnt down at this time.

At Njabaama, also in April 1991, a woman was raped in the presence of her husband and another woman was taken to be the "wife" of one of the RUF/NPFL forces coming from Liberia. That same day, the village was burnt down in retaliation for the inhabitants not welcoming the RUF/NPFL forces. Household property, furniture and money were taken. On 22 April, a group of seven RUF/NPFL forces entered the village of Gbahama and appointed a 24 year-old man as the Town Commander. This newly appointed Town Commander, who was unable to refuse this appointment, was told to mobilise the civilians to operate checkpoints. Women were told to cook for the RUF/NPFL and eight people were forced to carry a load comprised mainly of coconuts to Zimmi. This continued until June, by which time most of the civilians had managed to leave the town and found refuge in Liberia. At Gbeakor, 27 RUF/NPFL members entered the town, instantly killing seven people. The Town Chief was deposed and a new Town Commander was appointed. Before leaving, the forces took with them all the cattle and poultry they could find.

At Ngombu, in June 1991, 70 houses were burnt and 42 kitchens and 15 toilets were destroyed by a group of 30 RUF/NPFL members. Diamond mining towns were also visited, such as Gbahama in April 1991, where property was taken and civilians were used to carry the loads. In this town and others, such as Baguihun, the RUF/NPFL forces engaged in mining activities and stole everything that was in the offices of the mining company. Daar-es-Salaam, a town north of Zimmi on the bank of the Mano River, was at this time hosting a camp for thousands of refugees from the Liberian war. In April, the camp was attacked and all the property belonging to various NGOs and UNHCR was taken; fleeing civilians died, drowning in the Moa River.¹³⁴³ It appeared that the RUF/NPFL forces had registered in large numbers as refugees in the camp, so that they would have easier access. Daar-es-Salaam became a training camp, known as the second Camp Zogoda.¹³⁴⁴ Wonde, another border town hosting a refugee camp, was also visited in April 1991; the RUF leader came to the camp and asked civilians to join the RUF. It appeared that only few of them did in fact join and a lot of refugees left the camp, leaving their few belongings in the hands of the RUF/NPFL forces. Due to these constant attacks, many civilians left the chiefdom, the majority of them going to Liberia.

On their way to Pujehun Town, in early April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces¹³⁴⁵ coming from Zimmi passed by Moala (Barri Chiefdom), located on the west bank of the Moa River. After Moala, they

¹³⁴³ No more information could be obtained on this event, either from the records or open source materials.

¹³⁴⁴ Zogoda, meaning "land of freedom" is a generic name given to training bases, like "Camp Lion" in other places. Other camps called Camp Zogoda were to be found at different times in Kenema and Kailahun Districts. This camp in Pujehun District was called "second Camp Zogoda", because the first one was established in Kailahun District.

¹³⁴⁵ These forces were armed with berretta guns, AK47s, single barrel rifles, RPGs and machetes and were dressed in military attire or with headbands with "RUF" written on it.



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headed for Potoru (Barri Chiefdom headquarter), which is at a junction on the main road to Pujehun Town (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom) from Kenema District.¹³⁴⁶ In both towns, they introduced themselves as “freedom fighters” coming to save people from the corrupt APC regime. On arrival, they searched for SLA forces and gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie. While some of the forces were addressing the inhabitants, telling them they were not going to steal anything or take their women as wives, others were parading in the towns, entering houses in search of food and money. Local authorities were deposed and new Town Commanders were appointed. At Moala, three people were killed with berretta guns, allegedly because they were reconnaissance/spies, since they run from the RUF/NPFL forces. During one night, some women were taken from their husbands. At Potoru, a Fullah man was killed for refusing to give them his sheep. Ten other civilians were also killed, accused of being reconnaissance and, for two of them, for refusing to hand over their bags; at least one man was shot in the head with an AK47 and two were beaten to death with a bladed weapon. Checkpoints were mounted where cards called “pass” were issued, which allowed civilians to move through the chiefdom. During their stay in the town, women and underage girls were sexually assaulted. All this violence led many people to leave the town for Sowa Chiefdom and Bo District.

From Potoru, some of the RUF/NPFL forces (a group of 25 to 30 men) went to Waima, four miles from Potoru. After calling the inhabitants for a meeting, they undertook a house-to-house search, removing the people they found and shooting some of them. Those forces were speaking a number of different languages, but the majority language was Liberian. Before leaving the town, they abducted girls under 15 years-old and then headed for other villages in the chiefdom, including Kotumahun and Dendegahun, where the same kind of attacks took place.

From Barri Chiefdom, some RUF/NPFL forces went to Peje and Sowa Chiefdoms, relatively small chiefdoms located to the west of Barri Chiefdom,¹³⁴⁷ while others probably went to Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) through Gallinas Peri and Kpaka Chiefdoms.¹³⁴⁸ At Futa (Peje Chiefdom), on or around 17 April 1991, around 100 RUF/NPFL members gathered the civilians in the Court Barrie; those who refused were severely beaten with sticks and gun butts and some were killed. This first group of RUF/NPFL forces were joined the next day by another group,¹³⁴⁹ who merged before dividing into two groups: while one went to Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom, west of Peje Chiefdom), the other group went back to Potoru, allegedly to join other RUF/NPFL forces before their attack on Pujehun Town.

¹³⁴⁶ Potoru is the necessary entry point for Kenema District from the south-west, whereas Zimmi allowed penetration from the south-east.

¹³⁴⁷ Two main roads leave Potoru, one going to Peje and Sowa Chiefdoms and beyond to Wunde Chiefdom (Bo District) while the other one links Potoru to Pujehun (Panga Kabone Chiefdom), through Gallinas Peri and Kpaka Chiefdoms.

¹³⁴⁸ Information gathered concerning Kpaka Chiefdom tends to demonstrate that RUF/NPFL forces used this chiefdom as a transit point, using the main highway from Potoru to reach Pujehun Town. Accordingly, RUF/NPFL forces must have passed through Gallinas Peri Chiefdom where the highway lies in the north, although no information was recorded on this.

¹³⁴⁹ It could not be ascertained where this second group came from.



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The RUF/NPFL forces then proceeded to Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom), where SLA troops were posted. Those SLA forces advised civilians to go indoors while RUF/NPFL forces were approaching. However, after a one-hour battle, RUF/NPFL forces entered the town, forced the inhabitants at gunpoint to gather at the Court Barrie, paraded in the town and killed some civilians who attempted to escape or who refused to go to the Court Barrie. Some civilians accused of being SLA members who would go and call their colleagues were killed, while others were beheaded. It appeared that the RUF/NPFL forces then left the town¹³⁵⁰ and SLA forces arrived in the town, but RUF/NPFL forces returned with a mounted anti aircraft gun while the inhabitants were busy burying their dead. The SLA and the RUF/NPFL fought all day, with some casualties being reported on both sides. The SLA forces were unable to repel the RUF/NPFL forces and ordered the civilians to leave the town and to go to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District¹³⁵¹) for safety. One week later, the SLA forces, reinforced by ULIMO, were eventually able to dislodge the RUF/NPFL forces from the town.

Repelled from Bandajuma, RUF forces concentrated on Futa (Peje Chiefdom) and Potoru (Barri Chiefdom), where they trained people who had joined willingly as well as those conscripted by force. They remained scattered in those two chiefdoms until the major SLA attack in August 1991. Some of the RUF/NPFL forces who had been repelled from Bandajuma went to Jeoma (Sowa Chiefdom). Civilians from the upper part of the village were gathered together and the men were forced to go into the veranda of the first house on the road from Bandajuma and Pujehun Town, while the women and children were put in a school compound. The RUF/NPFL forces shot at the men gathered in the veranda and 26 of them died; two managed to escape to the bush after pretending to be dead beneath the corpses.¹³⁵²

In mid April 1991, a RUF/NPFL group, different from the one that took control of the aforementioned chiefdoms, entered Gbanahun (Gallinas Peri), two miles east of Bumpeh. This group was coming directly from Soro Gbema Chiefdom (located to the east of Gallinas Peri Chiefdom¹³⁵³) and came mainly for the purposes of finding food, as they did not stay in the village nor did they go to Bumpeh, which is a bigger town. At Gbanahun, nevertheless, they appointed a Town Commander who was asked to provide food for them. After eating, the RUF/NPFL forces looted the shops of the village and forced young people to go with them to their base to carry the stolen property, which included domestic animals. Fullah people were targeted and two men were severely tortured. On their way back to their base in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, they passed by Bomi (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), where they shot dead one man they accused of being a SLA member and again abducted young people to carry the property they had stolen. Those young boys from the two villages were then conscripted and when they came back to the chiefdom, they returned as members of the RUF/NPFL forces.

¹³⁵⁰ The RUF/NPFL forces apparently left the town when they heard the noise of a truck coming to the town, thinking it could be SLA reinforcements. The truck however did not pass by Bandajuma.

¹³⁵¹ At this time, SLA forces were deployed at Koribondo, their main base in Bo District.

¹³⁵² No details could be obtained on what happened to the women and the children.

¹³⁵³ The Moa River is more or less the natural border between those two chiefdoms.



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On their way to Pujehun Town on 17 April 1991, RUF/NPFL forces coming from Sowa Chiefdom passed by Koranko (Kpaka Chiefdom), reaching the headquarter town of Massam the following day. At Koranko, this RUF/NPFL group composed of 10 men dressed in black t-shirts and military trousers entered the town firing indiscriminately; they gathered the people and told them they should obey their laws forbidding raping and telling lies, which were punishable by death. The RUF/NPFL forces appointed a Town Commander and a secretary. Poultry from the village was taken and cooked for the forces. The next day, five of the RUF/NPFL members, followed by reinforcements from Potoru (Barri Chiefdom), went to Massam and, as in other villages, followed the procedure of holding a meeting in the Court Barrie, introducing themselves, appointing Town Commanders and so on. They slept in the town, mounting checkpoints to ensure their security. One man who was accused of being an APC sympathiser had his property taken away. One teenage girl was taken away to be a "wife"; her whereabouts remain unknown.

RUF/NPFL forces advanced further towards Pujehun Town, only a few miles from Massam, and laid an ambush between Massam and Yonni (Kpaka Chiefdom, at the border with Panga Kabone Chiefdom), killing one SLA member¹³⁵⁴ who was riding his bicycle to Massam to check about the rumour of an attack on the town. A reinforcement group of RUF/NPFL forces came from Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) to Yonni and headed for Pujehun Town, which they captured between 19 and 20 April 1991. By then, following the death of the SLA member in the ambush between Massam and Yonni, the few SLA members stationed at Pujehun Town had left the town. A Ministry of Social Welfare employee on his way home in the centre of Pujehun failed to stop when requested to do so by RUF/NPFL forces, so they followed him to his house. There, they asked for the keys of his motorbike and, when he refused, one of the RUF/NPFL members shot and killed him with an AK47 then took the key from his pocket. Other civilians were killed for trivial reasons, such as one man, killed because he was allegedly an APC sympathiser, although he was killed before he had time to answer the question whether he was or not. On another occasion, RUF/NPFL forces killed a petty trader who had refused to give them his motorbike. The petty trader's shop was also looted, together with other shops in the town that were broken into and looted.

Checkpoints were established to prevent civilians from escaping and the RUF/NPFL forces undertook the familiar gathering and address. Other meetings would be held during the time of their stay in the town, including one that took place four days after their arrival. At that meeting, the RUF/NPFL forces declared that the premises of a bank were now used to be as a "task force" office, revealing they were taking direct orders from the Head Office at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and requesting elders and other literates to work for them on administrative matters. One week later, as the elders complained about the starvation of the civilians, a system of "pass" was put in place, allowing civilians to move within the area under RUF/NPFL control.

Also in April, prior to the capture of Pujehun Town, Gallinas Peri Chiefdom was again visited by small groups of RUF/NPFL forces coming from the south of Barri Chiefdom. On their arrival in Bumpeh, they pointed guns at civilians, threatened to kill them if they did not join them and beat some of them, returning on the same day to Barri Chiefdom. As with the first incursion from Soro

¹³⁵⁴ At this time very few SLA forces – 10 in number – were based at Pujehun Town.



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Gbema Chiefdom, the elders decided to report the matter to the few SLA forces posted at Pujehun town, but no action was taken. RUF/NPFL forces came back to Bumpenh and Gbanahun, having learnt that the matter had been reported to SLA forces at Pujehun Town. At Konia (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), one person suspected of having a link with the SLA forces was killed by the RUF/NPFL commander. Near Fonikoh, a man on his bicycle was killed after having refused to stop. Three people were killed at Blama Massaquoi and on his way back to Moala (Barri Chiefdom) with his men, the commander killed two more people at Fonima for running away when they saw the forces approaching.

From Pujehun Town, some RUF/NPFL forces boarded a car and a motorbike headed towards Gbandapi, a trade fair centre, passing through Najay. Gbandapi, in the south of Panga Kabonde Chiefdom, is located on the bank of Malemie River, which joins the Wanjei River flowing to Bonthe District. In all the villages along the road to Gbandapi that they visited, RUF/NPFL forces gathered the inhabitants, asked for weapons and enquired about the presence of SLA forces. They also established checkpoints, appointed a Town Commander, who was to send a daily report to the area commander,¹³⁵⁵ and told the civilians to bring food including rice, poultry, goats and sheep to Pujehun Town.¹³⁵⁶ Punishments for failing to bring food included beating with sticks and gun butts and the order to roll on the ground or swim in dirty water in a gutter.

The RUF/NPFL forces followed the Malemie River with speedboats to attack Benganie, which is the largest town in Mano Sakrim Chiefdom, albeit not the headquarter town. A meeting was summoned, checkpoints mounted, travelling passes issued, a Town Commander appointed and a green flag raised, meaning that the chiefdom was under RUF/NPFL control. The commander who mounted the green flag that day made it clear to the civilians that no other commander had the right to occupy the town and its environs without his consent, which would lead to internal fighting in May.¹³⁵⁷ Since it is located by the ocean, Benganie inhabitants were regularly asked to provide salt - a valuable and expensive commodity at this time - to forces stationed at Gbandapi and to those coming from time to time by boat.

Again in April, the RUF/NPFL forces from Pujehun Town proceeded further west to Malen Chiefdom, which shares boundaries with Bonthe District on the south-west and Bo District on the north-west. Before their arrival, people from the chiefdom had already fled to Bagbo Chiefdom (Bo District), upon hearing of the attack on Pujehun Town. The RUF/NPFL forces arrived in the chiefdom headquarter of Sahn on 24 April, when they summoned a meeting at the Court Barrie, asking for the Paramount Chief. When he arrived, the RUF/NPFL forces¹³⁵⁸ told the Paramount Chief that he should join them and exhort his people to do the same, while other RUF/NPFL members were looting property in the village and establishing checkpoints. An 11-year-old RUF/NPFL member called "child soldier" handcuffed the Paramount Chief. The first civilian to be

¹³⁵⁵ This information was reported specifically for Najay town, but is illustrative of general practice at this time.

¹³⁵⁶ The civilians would carry the food on their heads to the next village, where new people would take the load to the next village until it reached Pujehun Town.

¹³⁵⁷ See below for more details on this infighting.

¹³⁵⁸ The commander of these forces was speaking a Liberian Creole, which led people to identify him as a NPFL member.



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killed in this chiefdom was a man riding his motorbike from Jimmi (Bagbo Chiefdom, Bo District) to Taninahun (Malen Chiefdom) who did not stop and accordingly was considered to be a member of the SLA or SSD. The RUF/NPFL forces then departed for Pujehun Town, taking with them the motorbike of the man they had killed.

At this time, a place in Gadorhun (Malen Chiefdom) known as Kuwait, due to the valuable items that could be found in the town, was used to launch attacks on Bagbo Chiefdom in Bo District.

On 18 May, following the announcement over the BBC that the Paramount Chief from Malen Chiefdom had fled with his family between 9 and 10 May,¹³⁵⁹ RUF/NPFL forces came back to the chiefdom from Pujehun Town. Those RUF/NPFL forces coming in two trucks and armed with AK47s, bladed weapons and sticks, went straight to Taninahun in the north of the chiefdom, where they shot and killed the Town Chief with an AK47. They then went to Sahn, where they tied up prominent elderly people with bush ropes, forced six elderly women to sit on the floor in the Court Barrie, shot and killed some civilians, including women and children, raped one woman and took her away, together with her son. Fifteen houses were burnt, including the Paramount Chief's compound. At Fonikor, near Sahn, nine civilians were killed with AK47s by RUF/NPFL forces looking for the Paramount Chief's mother. From that day until July 1991, the RUF/NPFL forces remained in control of the chiefdom.

During their stay at Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom), RUF/NPFL forces forced young men to manage checkpoints for them while others were used to carry their loads, as the forces were expanding their control to surrounding villages, like Manjama, Nyayahun and Bendu, stealing food and domestic animals. In May, a training base was opened at Gobaru, two miles from Massam, where a lot of school-going children were conscripted. A herbalist and fortune teller performed rituals during the training that were believed to make members invulnerable.¹³⁶⁰

In May, an RUF/NPFL commander together with some of his forces arrived at Benganie and started stealing property. On hearing this news, the RUF/NPFL commander who had earlier warned civilians that no other commander should come to the town without his consent sent some troops, who captured the commander and the other members who carried out the looting. The captured commander tried to escape but was re-captured and brought back to Benganie, where he was publicly disgraced, tied up and seriously beaten. The other boys were taken to Gbandapi (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) for further interrogation, but their fate remains unknown. In late May, a similar incident took place and two commanders who had been stationed at Benganie were punished¹³⁶¹ by the same commander as the previous time for sabotaging the administration he had set up in the village. In early June, another commander with his troops came to Benganie and, stating he was a

¹³⁵⁹ The Paramount Chief allegedly fled through Bum Chiefdom (Bonthe District) to give information about what was happening in Pujehun District to the authorities in Bo Town.

¹³⁶⁰ It is reported that the belief in the powers of this person attracted many school children and other youths who decided to join the movement.

¹³⁶¹ The two commanders were requested to fight bodily as enemies and as one was much younger, this one was then beaten by the commander. The two men were then undressed, ordered to dig two holes, which were filled with pepper, and ordered to put their genital organs in the holes.



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good dancer, ordered the civilians to dance. Everybody was obliged to attend the dance, except the elderly, all doors had to stay open and the dance itself was organised so that the men were to lead the dance, followed by drummers and then by women at the end together with the RUF/NPFL forces. One man who defied the order and went to bed was severely beaten and tortured. When the dance started, the men at the front realised that the women at the back were being raped by the RUF/NPFL forces. This dance continued for four nights until the RUF/NPFL forces left the town.

By late June, SLA forces, together with United Liberation Movement for Liberia¹³⁶² (ULIMO) forces, recaptured Dandabu (Panga Kabone Chiefdom), on the highway linking Pujehun Town and Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom) and then Bo Town (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District). As this town was the first one to be recaptured in the chiefdoms located to the west of the Moa River and as this town is on the road that goes to Bandajuma, it is highly likely that the SLA forces, reinforced with ULIMO forces, who recaptured those chiefdoms came from Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom). Within two months, the SLA and ULIMO forces were able to dislodge the RUF/NPFL forces from all the chiefdoms located on the west bank of the Moa River.

On or around 14 July 1991, combined SLA and ULIMO forces successfully repelled RUF/NPFL forces from Pujehun Town and its environs, in particular Gobaru, Yonni and Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom). The RUF/NPFL forces withdrew to Bumpah (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom). Following this attack on Pujehun Town, a curfew from 4:00pm to 6:00am was imposed in the south of Panga Kabone Chiefdom in the villages along the road leading to Gbandapi. Inhabitants from Najay saw a truck loaded with RUF/NPFL forces passing by their village without stopping. Two days later, SLA forces boarded a jeep and pursued the RUF/NPFL forces into Gbandapi, returning to Pujehun Town the same day. The retreating RUF/NPFL forces then passed by Benganie (Mano Sakrim Chiefdom), where one civilian had his slippers and tape recorder stolen. The next day, another batch of disgruntled and hungry RUF/NPFL forces previously based at Yonni (Kpaka Chiefdom) arrived in Benganie, requested civilians to cook for them, looted the houses and forced young men to carry the loads. One day, probably in August, youths from the chiefdom went to Pujehun Town to tell the SLA and ULIMO forces they had learnt that an RUF/NPFL commander who was hiding in the bush with his wife and daughter had recently asked a civilian for accommodation. ULIMO forces arrived in the chiefdom in search of the commander and killed the civilian who had hosted him. In late August, ULIMO forces tied up young people accused of being RUF/NPFL collaborators, as a result of which two of the young people died.

SLA and ULIMO forces successfully attacked RUF/NPFL forces at Gobaru (Kpaka Chiefdom, near Pujehun Town) on 14 July 1991. Some retreating RUF/NPFL forces passed by Largo (Kpaka Chiefdom) and one of them forced a woman to have sexual intercourse with him, threatening to kill all the other women of the house if she refused. While at Gobaru, the SLA and ULIMO forces requested the civilians to come to the town, for screening and registration purposes. However, molestation of civilians was at its highest peak during this time, as young people were undressed and beaten with gun butts; the screening test was so stringent, a lot of young men were killed accused of

¹³⁶² This fighting faction, composed mainly of supporters of the late previous Liberian President, Samuel Doe, emerged in May 1991 to fight the NPFL.



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being RUF member without much investigation.¹³⁶³ Women and girls were also alleged to be the wives of the RUF/NPFL forces. Night searches for RUF/NPFL members were also instituted. In one incident, during such a search, a man who hid under his bed after SLA forces had knocked on his door was killed, on the allegation that he was a “rebel”. In early August, as the number of civilians coming to the town was increasing and as a lot of people had already been killed during the screening process, SLA forces required civilians to assist in the screening process and established an action group composed of three SLA member and six civilians. As food coming from an international NGO was provided at Gobaru, Yonni and Massam, SLA forces mounted checkpoints at Massam to enhance security, particularly because RUF/NPFL forces were still present in the District, on the east side of the Moa River (Soro Gbema and Makpele Chiefdoms). At those checkpoints, young people were screened and on one occasion, on 21 August, one man was killed as documents were found in his bag demonstrating he was a secretary for the RUF/NPFL forces. Civilians were also required to operate checkpoints for the SLA forces, especially at night. As the SLA commander was replaced sometime between September and November, the situation changed slightly as civilians were no longer required to operate checkpoints and those suspected of belonging to the RUF/NPFL were thoroughly investigated.

On 18 July, four days after the recapture of Pujehun Town, 28 members of the SLA and ULIMO forces drove the few remaining RUF/NPFL forces out of Malen Chiefdom, with ULIMO forces killing one RUF member at Sahn. However, 47 men and children were also killed by ULIMO and SLA forces. Most of them were shot with AK47s and one man was killed with a knife, accused of having been trained by RUF/NPFL forces when they took control of the chiefdom after the Paramount Chief had left. Twenty members of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) were then deployed in the chiefdom.

Repelled from Pujehun Town in July 1991, RUF/NPFL forces resettled in Bumpeh (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom). A checkpoint was established at Koni Junction, ¼ mile west of Bumpeh, and civilians from the surrounding villages were forced to operate it. During their one-month stay, RUF/NPFL forces harassed and beat civilians and raped girls. For example, civilians who refused to take their turn at a checkpoint were given 100 lashes each. The rate of killing increased at this time and there are reports of a practice whereby RUF/NPFL forces made people form a line and killed the 10th person in the line. A camp was opened to train young boys and girls who had been conscripted. It is reported that over 100 civilians were killed during the RUF/NPFL stay for not collaborating with them. Among those people killed were one woman who had come to buy palm oil and was accused of being a spy for SLA forces and a man who was killed because he was coming from an area behind the front line and accordingly was considered to be an SLA collaborator.

Those RUF/NPFL forces were reinforced in late July by two groups crossing the Moa River, both of whom killed civilians on their way to Bumpeh. At Gbanahun, the first group shot and killed six civilians who had previously quarrelled with an RUF/NPFL child soldier. The other group that crossed the Moa River near Saama killed one man who failed to offer them his cassava leaves.

¹³⁶³ It is however reported that the ULIMO were more abrupt in screening and killing young men than SLA forces.



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On 3 August, RUF/NPFL forces resisted an attack from combined SLA/ULIMO forces who, after a fierce battle,¹³⁶⁴ went back to Pujehun Town, from where they had come. After this battle, the RUF/NPFL resettled in Saama, south of Bumpeh, where they frequently mistreated civilians at their newly-established checkpoints. These forces often sought out women and girls who were still virgins and raped them and civilians' valuable items and food were stolen. In one incident, all the inhabitants were told to undress, form two lines - one for men and one for women - and dance until nightfall. Women were later raped and those who refused to have sexual intercourse were killed. At this time, the forces were under the command of NPFL commanders. However, by the end of August 1991, combined SLA and ULIMO forces successfully dislodged the RUF/NPFL forces from the chiefdom, which was declared a "rebel- free area".

Until August, it is unclear who was in real control of Potoru (Barri Chiefdom), whether it was the RUF/NPFL forces or the SLA forces who, throughout April and May, claimed to have retaken the town from the RUF/NPFL forces.¹³⁶⁵ However, the only attack that is reported by civilians, possibly because it was the major one, took place in August in Potoru and other places in Barri Chiefdom; this freed the chiefdoms from any RUF/NPFL presence. Accordingly, although they may have been exchanges of control of the town and skirmishes between SLA forces and RUF/NPFL forces from April to August, because this period is characterised by the RUF/NPFL periodically crossing the Liberian border and both SLA and RUF/NPFL forces launching sporadic attacks on the other fighting faction, two periods can clearly be identified for Peje and Barri Chiefdoms: from April to August/September, when RUF/NPFL were present in the chiefdoms and from August/September, when SLA forces took control of the chiefdoms.

During the SLA attack on Potoru (Barri Chiefdom) in August, during which SLA forces were armed with anti aircraft guns, RPGs, hand mortars and AK47s, about 30 civilians and 42 to 45 RUF/NPFL members were killed and about 15 houses were burnt. From Potoru, RUF/NPFL forces were pursued to Moala, on the bank of the Moa River, where RUF/NPFL forces managed to cross the river towards Makpele Chiefdom, together with a number of civilians.¹³⁶⁶ SLA forces also went to Peje Chiefdom to dislodge the remaining pockets of RUF/NPFL forces, taking those forces they captured to Potoru.¹³⁶⁷ SLA forces began to patrol Barri and Peje Chiefdoms, sometimes falling into ambushes laid by the few RUF/NPFL small groups who had not been dislodged.

Under SLA control, any person suspected of being a "rebel" or a "rebel collaborator" was maltreated and some were killed. Youths from different chiefdoms, accused of being RUF/NPFL members, were brought to Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom), where they were killed. The Paramount Chief of Barri Chiefdom was arrested, stripped, beaten, thrown into a military truck and taken to the

¹³⁶⁴ Both fighting forces had the same kind of weapons, including AK47s, AK58s, RPGs, hand grenades and "local" guns.

¹³⁶⁵ See, for example, BBC, 19 April 1991; there were also additional reports on this in April.

¹³⁶⁶ It is reported that the RUF/NPFL forces convinced civilians to go with them in Liberia so that they would not be killed by the SLA forces. This statement may also refer to what happened in other places such as Kailahun District where retreating RUF/NPFL forces succeeded in taking with them a large number of civilians by telling them they would be considered as RUF/NPFL collaborators by the SLA forces who would accordingly kill them.

¹³⁶⁷ It was not disclosed what happened to those captured RUF/NPFL members.



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military base at Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom). At the base, he was accused of having harboured RUF/NPFL forces in his compound; his fate remains unknown. By the end of 1991, civilians who had fled to the bush and to the nearby District of Bo had resettled and resumed farming activities in Barri, Sowa and Peje Chiefdoms.

In September 1991, people staying at Bo Waterside were requested by the retreating RUF/NPFL forces to go onto the Mano River Union Bridge, which led to over 2,000 people gathering there. The civilians were forced to stay on the bridge for two days and nights, without access to food. Some children died and youths were killed when, authorised to leave the bridge, they headed for Sierra Leonean territory.¹³⁶⁸ It is believed that it was following this RUF/NPFL forces attempt to contain advance of the SLA and Guinean forces that those SLA and Guinean forces¹³⁶⁹ retook control of the bridge, thus cutting off the supply route for the remaining pockets of RUF/NPFL forces in the District. During their stay in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, SLA and ULIMO forces killed any suspected RUF collaborator, although they could escape death once arrested if their family gave money and/or women to the SLA forces. Valuable items were also taken from civilians during this period and transported to Freetown.

Activities resumed on 3 September 1991 in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, when RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Moa River and came to Bopon, 15 miles south of Bumpah, as they saw that there was no SLA deployment along the Moa River. In Bopon, they killed one prominent man, cut off his head and displayed it at the Gondema checkpoint in Soro Gbema Chiefdom. Three miles from Bopon village, they killed the 15 inhabitants of a farmhouse, including a pregnant woman whose stomach was split open and the foetus removed. After that killing in the farm, SLA soldiers took control of the whole chiefdom and reinforcements were sent to the various crossing points along the Moa River. No RUF/NPFL incursion was felt for the rest of the year, until April 1992.

In late 1991, as fighting on the east bank of the Moa River was taking place, SLA forces based on the west side appealed to the Paramount Chiefs of Kpaka, Panga Krim and Panga Kabonde Chiefdoms to give them young men to help them maintaining the security of the chiefdoms.

b) Events in 1992 –1995

The number of incidents for 1992 to 1994 drops considerably when compared to 1991,¹³⁷⁰ which is instructive of how Pujehun District was affected by the war. By 1992, SLA forces together with ULIMO forces had driven most of the RUF forces out of the District. The RUF, together with NPFL forces, nevertheless came back to the District from the Liberian border in late December 1992, when they established their stronghold in Soro Gbema chiefdom.

¹³⁶⁸ It is not clear from the records who killed those civilians, whether it was SLA or RUF/NPFL forces, and open source information does not clarify the matter. Accordingly, to say that the RUF/NPFL forces used the civilians to protect themselves from the SLA forces is an inference gleaned from the records, although it was not expressly stated.

¹³⁶⁹ According to the Agence France Presse, the bridge was retaken on 6 September 1991: 06 September 1991.

¹³⁷⁰ Thus, the number of records for 1992 represents 1/5th of the records for 1991, 1993 – 1/6th and 1994 and 1995 together 1/10th.



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Therefore most of the fighting as such was concentrated in the east, at the Liberian border, which may account for the fewer number of incidents during this time period. In addition, in 1993, most of the residents of the District were advised to go to Gondama camp, which may also explain the scarcity of the incidents of this period. However, beginning in 1992, there were increasing incidents of violations committed by SLA forces.

Events in 1992

Although SLA forces claimed to have recaptured Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) in August 1991,¹³⁷¹ it appears that Makpele Chiefdom came under SLA control only in January 1992, when SLA forces took over Daar-es-Salaam, the easternmost point of Pujehun District on the border with Liberia, and many other towns in the chiefdom. RUF/NPFL bases became SLA bases; Zimmi camp and Baquima were now under their control. SLA forces were also based at Gofor in the south of the chiefdom along the road that goes to Soro Gbema Chiefdom, where they brought poultry and other domestic animals they had found in the villages they had visited.

However, SLA forces began to harass and mistreat civilians from the beginning of 1992. Sexual assaults are reported, such as a woman from Joporwahun who was raped by an SLA member while she was at Zimmi. SLA forces chased civilians for their food, restricted their movement and forced them to work for them, including by hunting or fishing. SLA forces also engaged in mining and at Gbojibu, which became one of their mining villages, they set 13 houses on fire as they did not want to have civilians in their midst. This drove civilians to regional towns like Kenema or Bo or to Liberia.

In January 1992, following the appeal of the SLA commander to the Paramount Chiefs of Kpaka, Panga Krim and Panga Kabone Chiefdoms, youths¹³⁷² from all these chiefdoms, some of them being local hunters, gathered in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) to receive summary training and some ammunition for their barrel guns. Shortly after, they were sent to Bumpeh (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), located a few miles from the Moa River. SLA forces used underage children to carry arms and ammunition to the warfront. Furthermore, not only did the SLA forces take money and food items from the population in what they called the "war effort", they also took other property, including drums of palm oil, furniture and other household items. These items were believed to be transported to Freetown by SLA trucks and other trucks they had seized from civilians.

The killing of alleged collaborators was ongoing; the standard SLA practice was to tie up alleged RUF collaborators and to throw them off the Yonni Bridge (Kpaka Chiefdom) or to execute suspects at the Makibi Bridge in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom). For example, SLA forces beheaded a man in the Sambo section, allegedly because he had given meat to the RUF forces.

In 1992, SLA forces were well established in Panga Krim Chiefdom, which forced the RUF forces into hiding. However the presence of the SLA forces was heavily felt by the civilians, as the SLA

¹³⁷¹ AFP, 19 August 1991.

¹³⁷² The term 'youths' in Sierra Leone could refer to anybody aged up to their mid to late 30s, although it probably does not include anyone under 14.



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forces ill-treated the civilian population. For example, civilians who had previously been appointed to any position by the RUF, which they could not refuse or they would be killed, or who had been forced to join the RUF were punished by the SLA forces. Common punishments included amputations of the hands and ears, the plucking out of eyes, putting people in a bag and then setting the bag on fire, taking them to the river and drowning them and shooting and killing them.

In May 1992, RUF/NPFL forces crossed the Moa River and launched a series of attacks on different towns in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom. By the end of the month, civilians reported that the chiefdom was under their control. However, it appeared that in 1992, most of the RUF/NPFL forces had been chased out of the District and only pockets of forces were still active, mainly laying ambushes. Indeed, following the successful attacks on RUF/NPFL positions by the SLA and ULIMO forces in 1991 and the SLA control over Makpele Chiefdom in January 1992, the major RUF attacks in the District took place in December 1992 and 1993. Accordingly, those attacks on Gallinas Peri could be considered not as highlighting a massive operation for the control of the chiefdom but rather as sporadic actions carried out by isolated pockets of RUF forces. Thus in May, apparently taking advantage of the disorganisation of the SLA forces,¹³⁷³ RUF forces attacked Kakayama, where they battled for two days with SLA forces. An SLA truck with human and logistical reinforcements fell into an ambush, but there were no fatalities. The SLA forces then retreated to their other base at Saama, which - overpopulated with civilians fleeing the previous fighting - was later attacked on 3 May 1992. Some civilians were killed in the crossfire and others were captured by the RUF forces. The Town Chief of a nearby village was captured and later killed by the RUF forces, who left his body at one end of the town. Within the same month, another RUF group attacked another SLA position at Njala.

Kpaka Chiefdom was fairly quiet during this period, with only two incidents reported. Probably before the overthrow of the Government of J.S. Momoh on 29 April, RUF forces who had crossed the Moa River attacked many villages, including Gedeyama, Saama Peri, Kpetema and Mamboma, looting, killing and abducting civilians.¹³⁷⁴ Similarly to what happened in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, these actions were probably raids from some isolated groups of RUF forces. In June, unidentified armed men attacked Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom) in the early hours of the day but were repelled by some SLA forces who claimed that they fought armed men they could not identify.¹³⁷⁵

In October 1992, SLA forces counter attacked and retook some positions in Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, although Saama remained an RUF base. SLA forces based at Bumpeh encouraged civilians to come back and resettle. Some civilians were killed, mainly for the purposes of taking their property. For example, one Fullah businessman was killed by an SLA member who took away his belongings, namely a gold wristwatch, a gold chain, some money and a bicycle. The SLA member who carried out this killing was arrested by the SLA commander to whom the killing was reported and sent to Freetown. In November, the youths gathered at Bumpeh to help the SLA forces repel the RUF forces from their chiefdom. Those youths, who brought single barrel guns and various

¹³⁷³ Although SLA forces were based at Bumpeh, Kakayama and Saama, the command position on the SLA forces was just changing hands at this time.

¹³⁷⁴ No details could be obtained on these incidents.

¹³⁷⁵ Fatalities - if any - were not reported.



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bladed weapons, were dispatched by the SLA commander in two groups, one heading to Saama where the RUF forces were based. On their way to Saama, they fell into an RUF ambush, during which some of them were killed while others were captured by the RUF forces.¹³⁷⁶

RUF forces regrouped and returned in December 1992 to capture Soro Gbema Chiefdom, which became their stronghold. This attack led to a massive exodus of civilians crossing the Moa River. Towards the end of December 1992, inhabitants of Barri Chiefdom saw a large number of civilians from Soro Gbema Chiefdom crossing the Moa River and passing by their chiefdom. Those civilians, disclosing that an attack had taken place in Soro Gbema Chiefdom where many civilians were killed and houses were burnt, did not settle in Barri Chiefdom but continued their journey to find a safer haven. Civilians from Potoru heard three days later that the RUF forces were also in Makpele Chiefdom.¹³⁷⁷

Events in 1993

In January 1993, RUF forces crossed the Moa River and launched attacks on all the chiefdoms located on the west bank of the river. Thus, they attacked Saaquehun village (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom), 12 miles north of Bumpeh, where they killed 12 people, burnt many houses and abducted many civilians.

On 13 January 1993, well-armed RUF forces attacked Potoru in Barri chiefdom,¹³⁷⁸ shelling the town. Over 30 people were killed, some having their throats cut with bayonets. The forces used Potoru to attack other villages in the chiefdom, such as Waima and Kundowahun, and to make raids on Peje and Sowa Chiefdoms. In Peje Chiefdom, villages like Bumpeh and Quiva came under attack and civilians described this wave of attack as a "full-scale offensive", "a fearful battle, worse than ever". Over 100 civilians were killed and 30 houses burnt in Bumpeh, most of which were populated with civilians. During these attacks, young girls were raped and a lot of civilians were abducted. Indeed, throughout their stay in these areas,¹³⁷⁹ the RUF forces raped women, including rapes by many men of girls under 15, killed people for not supporting them and abducted people on a daily basis, including young boys who were abducted for the purposes of recruitment. As a result, civilians left the chiefdoms and went to Gondama camp.

Also in January 1993, an unspecified number of RUF forces¹³⁸⁰ attacked Massam (Kpaka Chiefdom) and on the same day, moved on to Yonni (Kpaka Chiefdom) and to Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom). Since this attack took place on the day of the weekly trade fare at Gbandapi (south of Panga Kabone Chiefdom), most of the women were not in Pujehun Town and the surrounding villages, which led to the abduction of many children. The SLA forces based at Pujehun Town left the town and the RUF forces occupied the town.

¹³⁷⁶ It could not be ascertained where the second group went.

¹³⁷⁷ No more information could be gathered on these attacks.

¹³⁷⁸ Some of those forces were speaking in Liberian language.

¹³⁷⁹ As for Sowa Chiefdom, conflicting information concerning Bandajuma where the SLA was stationed did not allow us to ascertain what happened in this town.

¹³⁸⁰ It is reported that some of them had their faces masked for fear of recognition.



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Civilians from the chiefdoms where these attacks took place were advised by the SLA forces to go to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District), a major SLA base in Bo District. At Koribondo, an international NGO provided assistance to the displaced people who were advised by the SLA commander to go to Gondama, at the border between Kakua and Tikonko Chiefdoms (Bo District), where the Pujehun District Development Association had secured a land to build a camp. By March, registration started in the camp for proper food supply and each household was to build a booth before they could be registered. By the end of April, civilians from all the chiefdoms of Pujehun District were to be found in the camp.¹³⁸¹ Again, in February 1993, the SLA forces exhorted the civilians from Gallinas Peri Chiefdom to go to Koribondo (Jiama Bongor Chiefdom, Bo District) for their own safety. When they arrived at Koribondo, the civilians were advised by the SLA base at Koribondo to go to Gondama.

However on 28 January, coming from the direction of Dandabu (north of Panga Kabone Chiefdom), SLA forces recaptured Pujehun Town, which by that time had been under the control of the RUF for two weeks. In March 1993, the SLA recaptured Blama Massaquoi (Gallinas Peri Chiefdom) and rescued over 260 civilians who were being held captives by the RUF forces after a fierce battle in Tongie. In late March, RUF forces retook Pujehun Town overnight, armed with heavy machine guns but SLA forces successfully counter attacked four days later on 30 March.¹³⁸² In early June 1993, other unsuccessful attacks were launched on Pujehun Town, allegedly by hungry RUF members, which did not challenge SLA control over the area.¹³⁸³

Civilians began having doubts about the SLA forces; starting in 1993, there appeared to be "much understanding" between the RUF forces and the SLA forces. Indeed, civilians found that any time there was a RUF attack on a village or settlement, the SLA forces based in Pujehun Town would not go there until they heard the RUF had left the area. On their arrival, they would take away the any property left by the RUF forces and bring it to Pujehun Town, sometimes by truck and sometimes by forcing civilians to carry the load. Civilians also understood that during attacks on SLA bases, the forces stationed there would only shoot in the air and then run away, leaving their arms and ammunition behind them. Civilians further noticed that those kind of incidents happened especially after SLA forces had received deliveries of arms and ammunition and food rations. Civilians who dared to question the behaviour of the SLA forces and their efficiency in repelling RUF attacks were killed.

In May 1993, SLA forces, SSD members and ULIMO forces launched a successful attack on Potoru (Barri Chiefdom). After a three-day battle, the RUF forces were repelled from the town and had spread throughout the chiefdom. During this attack, some civilians were killed. After they recaptured Potoru, ULIMO and, to a lesser extent, SLA forces killed up to 70 civilians whom they suspected of being "rebels" or "rebel collaborators" and burnt the houses of many people they

¹³⁸¹ This camp was made up of makeshift mud and thatch huts without sewage or proper ventilation. Living conditions would start becoming catastrophic and the death toll would soon be very high, between 50 and 80 deaths per month: BBC, 16 September 1993.

¹³⁸² AFP 26 March 1993 and BBC 1 April 1993.

¹³⁸³ BBC, 3 June 1993 and 5 June 1993.



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suspected of hiding suspected “rebels” or “rebel collaborators”. Furthermore, civilians were used to carry supplies for the SLA and, accordingly, some of them were killed during ambushes laid by RUF forces. From May 1993 to 1994, SLA positions in these chiefdoms came under persistent attacks.

Those in the RUF High Command in Soro Gbema Chiefdom were members of the late Ndorgbowusui Group. However, others who were not members of this group volunteered to be recruited for the RUF, which led to dissention among the RUF ranks. When orders were given, they refused to follow them or, if they were forced to carry them out, it was not in the best interest of the commanders. The rivalries between these two RUF groups, each of them giving allegiance either to Solomon Demby or to Hon. Mannah Kpaka, led to much destruction of property and killing of civilians in Soro Gbema chiefdom. For example, one group carried out the massive destruction and burning of Malema and Fairo, the two major towns in the chiefdom, while the other group burnt down Wai and surrounding villages. In any village where either group felt there were supporters of the other group, they would wage war on those communities. Furthermore, as the Demby supporters were known for being wealthy, constant ambushes were staged along the main roads of the chiefdom.¹³⁸⁴

The population of Makpele Chiefdom suffered continuous looting and property destruction by the SLA forces, who had begun to engage in mining activities that would continue until after the 1996 elections. For example, at Palima in 1993, the roofs were taken from the Court Barrie, the mosque and other houses. By early 1993, most of the civilians had fled to camps (including the Gondama camp in Bo District, which was opened in January 1993), to larger towns such as Kenema and to Liberia. The SLA forced those who remained to mine for diamonds, bring the SLA forces food and give them money for food.

Thus, by August 1993, RUF forces were entrapped in Pujehun District by SLA and ULIMO forces whose main bases were in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) and Gofor (Makpele Chiefdom). The remaining RUF forces controlled only a region of marshland and tropical forest on the Atlantic coast,¹³⁸⁵ where they staged ambushes. On 28 August, some RUF forces laid an ambush at Golahun, nine miles south of Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone or Kpaka Chiefdom), and opened fire on ICRC personnel. Two ICRC nurses were killed and a third one, together with the two Gambian drivers, was wounded.¹³⁸⁶

Events in 1994

At the end of January and following the renewed RUF attacks, notably in Kenema District, the Government of Sierra Leone declared “total war” against the RUF.

Despite the SLA presence in Zimmi, RUF forces attacked Palima (Makpele Chiefdom, 1.5 miles from Zimmi) in April 1994, by passing the SLA forces. Thirty-two people were abducted and

¹³⁸⁴ None of those events could be specifically dated and happened sometime between 1993 and 1995 when the Government of Sierra Leone sent a delegation to the Mano River Union Bridge.

¹³⁸⁵ AFP, 16 September 1993

¹³⁸⁶ AFP 28 August 1993 and 29 August 1993.



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brought to their stronghold in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, where they stayed over two years, being trained as RUF member or used to work for the RUF forces, mainly as fishermen.

In 1994, RUF forces were occupying most of the villages in Barri Chiefdom, looting, raping, killing and abducting. These forces began spreading to Kenema District.¹³⁸⁷ However at that time, most of the population of these chiefdoms had fled to the bush or to Gondama camp.

Events in 1995

At the beginning of the year, the Sierra Leonean Government sent a delegation to the Mano River Union Bridge (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) to negotiate a cease-fire with the RUF. This was the second round of talks between RUF forces and the NPRC regime, the first one taking place in December 1994.¹³⁸⁸ For one of these meetings, the delegation composed of Government representatives and prominent people was airlifted to the crossing point at Bo Waterside from Monrovia and crossed the bridge towards the Sierra Leonean side, at Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) without seeing any RUF forces. RUF forces appeared shortly after and abducted them, threatening to kill them. It is believed that those people remained in the hands of the RUF forces until 1998 when the District was cleared of any RUF presence.

In 1995, SLA forces were still in control of Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and harassment of civilians continued. In one incident, 25 people from Palima were undressed and taken to Zimmi, where they were forced to push a truck loaded with SLA forces.¹³⁸⁹ Palima (Makpele Chiefdom) was again attacked by RUF forces in October 1995 but this time, the forces came from Tunkia Chiefdom in Kenema District. Two people were killed and some houses looted.¹³⁹⁰ Thus, civilians from Makpele Chiefdom were caught between RUF attacks and SLA harassment. All the houses and other facilities (including kitchens and toilets that had been built by UNHCR) at Palima were destroyed by both the RUF forces and the SLA forces, although more destruction was done by the SLA forces.

Notwithstanding the relatively scarce information related to this period, it appears that Pujehun District together with the Mekanji Hills (Moyamba District) and the north of Bonthe District had become a stronghold of the RUF.¹³⁹¹

c) Events in 1996 – 1998 and beyond

These years are marked by the progressive initiation of Kamajors in the District. As with other Districts in the south, from the time of their initiation until the May 1997 Coup, the Kamajors together with SLA forces were successful in containing and repelling RUF forces from their

¹³⁸⁷ More detail is needed on these incidents.

¹³⁸⁸ This second round of talks failed as the RUF turned down NPRC's offer of peace: Communiqué Inter Press Service, 3 January 1995 and 11 January 1995. In April, the NPRC Chairman proposed an immediate cease-fire and negotiations to the RUF, which was rejected by the RUF. Amnesty International Report 1996.

¹³⁸⁹ No more details could be obtained on this incident.

¹³⁹⁰ Although no more details could be obtained on this incident, it has to be borne in mind that Palima is 1½ miles from Zimmi and accordingly, the reported attacks on Palima, could reveal an attempt of the RUF forces to overrun the SLA forces based at Zimmi.

¹³⁹¹ BBC, 20 February 1995.



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positions. Shortly after the Coup on 25 May, the Kamajors went underground and reassembled; from the end of 1997, they were successfully engaged in driving the RUF/AFRC forces out of the District.

CDF initiations began in late 1995 or early 1996 in Gondama camp in Bo District. It is reported that the catalyst for the commencement of initiations was the attacks on Gondama Camp and the heavy casualties suffered there. In early 1996, the first CDF members moved to Pujehun District to reinforce the SLA forces stationed there. All chiefdoms represented in the camp were to appoint a certain number of men from their chiefdom as Kamajors, in proportion to their size and population. The initiation rite was performed in Bo Town. All the adults in the camp had to contribute Le 500¹³⁹² or the equivalent in bulgur for the initiation to take place. In the early stages, the new initiates, equipped mainly with bladed weapons and single barrel guns, were under the command of the chiefdom authorities but they soon came under the command of a National Coordinator, with District Coordinators.¹³⁹³

Following the general elections in February 1996, people started leaving the camps and the bush to resettle in their villages. Displaced people who had found refuge in Bo District and refugees from Liberia began to be repatriated in the District. However, in May, Kamajors found over 100 civilians dead in Bendu (north of Malen Chiefdom), mainly aged over 50 years old. The RUF forces who killed those civilians also captured teenagers from the town and took them to Camp Libya in Soro Gbema Chiefdom.¹³⁹⁴ In late August 1996, AFP reported that tens of thousands of people left Gondama Camp as the "rebel war dies down"¹³⁹⁵ and it was believed that people had returned to 10 out of the 12 chiefdoms of the District. Makpele and Soro Gbema Chiefdoms, at the Liberian border, were the two chiefdoms where resettlement remained impossible for security reasons. Those people who resettled in the District nevertheless still received food distribution in Bo District until this distribution began also in Pujehun District later in the year.

During the period leading up to May 1997, the Kamajors, together with SLA forces, repelled RUF forces in many areas, allowing for relative tranquillity and continuing resettlement. People tried to engage in farming activities, being supplied with seeds and basic agricultural equipments by NGOs and UN Agencies. However, this collaboration between SLA forces and the Kamajors soon started to deteriorate. In Barri Chiefdom for example, quarrels over the dismounting of checkpoints arose and checkpoints mounted by SLA forces were destroyed by Kamajors. This led the SLA forces to leave the chiefdom, which was then under Kamajor control only until the May 1997 Coup.

In Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, the first attack the Kamajors launched against the RUF was in Blama Massaquoi and they continued fighting until the chiefdom was declared a "rebel free area" around

¹³⁹² This should be placed in the context of Sierra Leone's position at the bottom of the Human Development Index: between 1991 and 2000, 57% of the population lived on less than 1 USD (2,000 SLL) per day and 74.5% lived on less than 2 USD (4,000 SLL) per day: see UNDP Human Development Report 2003, http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_SLE.html, last visited on 30 December 2003.

¹³⁹³ See section [X] for a more detailed explanation of the formation of the Civil Defence Forces.

¹³⁹⁴ Xinhua News Agency and AFP: 9 May 1996.

¹³⁹⁵ AFP, 22 August 1996.



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November 1996. Thus, from November 1996 until May 1997, the chiefdom was under Kamajor control. Kamajors from Soro Gbema Chiefdom passing through Gallinas Peri Chiefdom reached their chiefdom sometime between August and October 1996. In Barri Chiefdom, the Kamajors first joined the SLA forces based at Potoru, the chiefdom headquarters, while RUF forces were scattered mainly in the north of the chiefdom, between Vaama and Baiama. Following attacks on RUF camps, Kamajors obtained arms and ammunition that were more sophisticated than the ones they had so far.

However, the Kamajors in Makpele Chiefdom, in particular the 23 Kamajors based at Manjama, engaged in massive mining activities, the junior members undertaking mining for the most senior ones. Mining equipment was taken away from civilians, who were forced to feed the Kamajors, go hunting and fetch wood and water. No respect was paid to the chiefdom authorities and the Regent Paramount Chief had no control over the Kamajors. The movement of civilians was restricted and harassment of civilians was frequent; their houses were searched, property was confiscated and farms were harvested by the Kamajors for their own purposes. Civilians from this village went into hiding, as they could no longer withstand this situation. At Vaama in 1996, Kamajors argued with SLA forces, allegedly because both groups wanted to have access to the resources of the villages, namely food, money and women. The two groups fought, the Kamajors being equipped with single barrels guns and the SLA with automatic rifles and RPGs, as a result of which the Kamajors left town. SLA forces from Zimmi visited Ngombu, close to Zimmi, as they heard Kamajors had gathered there to fight them. As they arrived in the town, they started shooting, thus preventing people from giving explanations, as a result of which seven civilians were killed. Before leaving, those SLA forces took some furniture for Zimmi.

Kamajors based at Madina (Makpele Chiefdom) also engaged in the same behaviour towards civilians, who were forced to contribute to the Kamajor's activities by providing money, bulgur, rice and palm oil. Toobu (three miles from Zimmi) was also visited by Kamajors and in April 1997, they took away bicycles, bailing machines, a power saw, Le 1,000,000 and other property.¹³⁹⁶ Civilians made a report to the head Kamajor at Zimmi but no action was taken. Until the May Coup, more initiations took place for youth of the chiefdom and almost all the villages suffered similar kinds of harassment.

In late December 1996 following the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement, more than 8,000 people who had been captured two years earlier by RUF forces were released in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, allegedly on the directive of RUF High Command.¹³⁹⁷ During this period, it appeared that RUF forces were ordered by their High Command to regroup and encamp at Camp Libya, located in a dense rainforest on the Moa River, which was practically their only remaining stronghold in the District after the Mano River Union Bridge and Sulima (both in Soro Gbema Chiefdom) had been recaptured.

In Soro Gbema Chiefdom, before the May Coup in late 1996 or early 1997, Kamajors drove many RUF forces out of the chiefdom. At Felo Mano and other places in the chiefdom, the Kamajors

¹³⁹⁶ Those Kamajors "dressed carefully" and "behaved like RUF or SLA forces".

¹³⁹⁷ BBC, 28 December 1996.



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discovered arms stores and an airstrip was also found at Felo Mano. This information was transmitted to the Sierra Leone Government through the SLA and SLP based at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) and the arms and ammunition were airlifted to Freetown in 1997.¹³⁹⁸ The Kamajors fought to retake the whole chiefdom up to Jendema, at the Liberian border. Many RUF forces fleeing to Liberia were caught and killed on the Mano River Union Bridge, which has been described as the “Kamajor slaughter site”, where many RUF members were tied up and thrown alive in the Mano River.

After the Coup in May 1997 and the merging of the RUF with AFRC forces, the CDF were defeated in many areas and went into hiding. They operated from underground, refusing to obey the AFRC leader’s general order to lay down their arms and to report to the nearest police station. Instead, initiations continued took place; in Sowa Chiefdom, for example, 150 young men were initiated.¹³⁹⁹

From May 1997 until they were repelled from the District in 1998, the combined RUF/AFRC forces imposed great harms on civilian population in general and on suspected Kamajors or Kamajors collaborators/sympathisers in particular. For example, three days after the overthrow of the Government, AFRC forces burnt down compounds belonging to Kamajor commanders in Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom). Other houses were looted, including those of two Limba people. In Sowa Chiefdom, AFRC forces accused civilians of being Kamajors, killing many of them. The RUF/AFRC forces went on patrols in Sowa Chiefdom and established themselves in the chiefdom headquarters of Bandajuma. RUF/AFRC forces then commenced patrols in Bandajuma, as they knew the chiefdom was initiating Kamajors, attempting to prevent the Kamajors from establishing themselves in the chiefdom headquarter. The Bo-Pujehun Highway, which passes through Sowa Chiefdom, was constantly patrolled at night and houses along the highway were set on fire. Youths who were found during these patrols were killed by the combined forces, who accused them of being Kamajors. These constant patrols led civilians once more to flee their villages to go in their settlements in the bush, called “sorquehun”.

Women were sexually abused and in Pujehun Town, one woman died as a result. The practice of padlocking the private parts of women is also reported.¹⁴⁰⁰ In Gallinas Peri Chiefdom, in December 1997, RUF/AFRC forces coming from their main base in Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom) entered Blama Massaquoi, fully armed with automatic rifles and an anti-aircraft weapon mounted on vehicle. They burnt down the house of the CDF commander using an RPG, as a result of which other houses nearby were also burnt. The RUF/AFRC forces took supplies from returnees to the

¹³⁹⁸ According to the records, ECOMOG from Freetown and Kenema would have come to the site of these discoveries and air lifted the ammunition to Freetown. However, no ECOMOG forces as such were to be found in these towns. The key person probably referred to foreign troops such as Guinean or Nigerian who have been fighting with SLA for a long time. Furthermore, the reference to Kenema should probably understood as Kenema District and not Kenema Town, as no presence of such foreign forces was reported for Kenema Town.

¹³⁹⁹ According to the OCHA report for 16-21 July 1997, in many parts of Pujehun District, “local military commanders have good relations with Kamajors and do not support AFRC” but from the information collected from key people, this could not be confirmed.

¹⁴⁰⁰ This information was related in such general terms and no more details could be obtained.



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chiefdom, mainly seed rice and other seeds, and continued to steal property throughout the chiefdom, in particular at Saahn Massaquoi, before returning to Pujehun Town.

Whenever they lost men at the battlefield, RUF/AFRC forces killed a number of civilians similar to the number of men they had lost. For example, in late 1997, in Gofor (Makpele Chiefdom), RUF/AFRC forces placed 20 people in a house and set fire to it. The reason advanced for this was that these people were coming from a place where the Kamajors had previously ambushed and killed RUF/AFRC forces.

The Kamajors regrouped their forces and more initiations took place, initiating often children below the age of 15.¹⁴⁰¹ Starting late 1997, Kamajors attacked RUF/AFRC forces' positions. In October 1997, RUF/AFRC forces in a four-truck convoy fell into an ambush near Fairo in Soro Gbema Chiefdom. Kamajors killed those caught in the ambush, together with the civilians who were travelling with them, because the Kamajors considered them to be collaborators. According to those Kamajors, those civilians used to lead the RUF/AFRC forces and show them the Kamajor hiding places. Between late 1997 and March 1998, many villages were burnt down in Soro Gbema Chiefdom by both Kamajors and RUF/AFRC forces to prevent the other fighting faction from settling there.

ECOMOG forces based in Liberia were carrying weapons sent by the CDF National Coordinator through the Mano River Union Bridge to the CDF District Coordinator, who in turn distributed the items to the Kamajors in the District. ECOMOG was also supplying the Kamajors with medicine and the wounded forces were transported to Tieni in Liberia by helicopter, where there was a base at that time.¹⁴⁰² Whenever arms and ammunition were seized at battlefronts, they were taken to the District Coordinator, who reallocated them as required.¹⁴⁰³

In November 1997, the Kamajors repelled most of the combined forces from Sowa Chiefdom. While fleeing, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt 30 houses in Bandajuma and set many villages along the Bandajuma-Koribondo (Bo District) highway on fire. Nevertheless, the Kamajors took control of the area and people came out of the bush where they had been hiding.

¹⁴⁰¹ According to the Sierra Leone Humanitarian Report for 29 October-18 November 1997, "[...] insecurity in Bo, Pujehun and Bonthe districts has also increased due to clashes between the military and the Kamajors. It seems that there is a clear difference between newly-recruited Kamajors, who have access to automatic weapons and apparently operate outside the authority of chiefdom representatives, and the traditional Kamajors who are carefully screened and respect traditional chiefdom structures. Aid Agencies operating in the Southern province are being increasingly harassed by some groups of Kamajors and are currently being prevented from accessing areas to the South of Bandejuma on the Bo-Pujehun highway. This is a source of concern as there are known pockets of malnutrition in parts of Bonthe and Pujehun districts." Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 29 Oct - 18 Nov 1997. REG. NO. 97/0390.

¹⁴⁰² Indeed, it seems that Kamajors had a base on the Liberian territory.

¹⁴⁰³ It is alleged that some of these weapons were sold for money by the CDF District coordinator and were thus kept out of circulation to the Kamajors. Furthermore, some weapons would have been given to civilians who were not Kamajors for them to benefit from the disarmament program. This information was also revealed during the TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) hearings in Pujehun Town in June 2003.



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On 20 to 22 December 1997, Kamajors from Gbandapi (south of Panga Kabone Chiefdom) moved to Pujehun Town in a bid to recapture the town from the RUF/AFRC forces. During this first attempt, the Kamajors were repelled and sustained heavy casualties. A few days later, on 27 December, RUF/AFRC forces from Pujehun Town went down to Gbandapi, burning houses and looting food items on their way; 23 houses were burnt down at Najay. This counter-attack would mark the first step of a series of reprisals against civilians by the Kamajors. On 8 January 1998, three Kamajors came to Najay, where they fired many shots, burnt down one house and arrested two men gathered for the morning prayer at the Mosque whom they accused of collaborating with the RUF/AFRC forces, taking them to Bonthe District.¹⁴⁰⁴ Other Kamajors later returned to the town, stripped naked six civilians and beat them, on the same grounds. On 15 February, Kamajors killed the Chief Imam of the District and the Section Chief at Bayama (Panga Krim Chiefdom) by tying a rope around his neck and stabbing him many times before shooting him. These events prompted inhabitants from Najay to leave the village for fear of further reprisals but Kamajors found them in their hiding places and took away all their belongings, including food, domestic animals and money. As they were unable to stay any longer in the bush and as many surrounding villages refused to host them, these civilians went to Bassaleh, east of Najay.

Over 20 fierce and repeated battles took place between 28 May 1997 and late February 1998 to establish and maintain control of Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), which was a stronghold of the RUF/AFRC forces in the District. During the two first attacks¹⁴⁰⁵ launched by Kamajors coming from the direction of Gofor, civilians were killed. As the fighting intensified between Kamajors and the RUF/AFRC in June, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) sheltered over 1,000 civilians.¹⁴⁰⁶ In early July, Kamajors regrouped and launched a third attack, coming from the main road of the chiefdom, like the previous attack. This attack was unsuccessful although no casualties were reported. However, the RUF/AFRC forces burnt down houses of Kamajor supporters, which made them flee the town, leaving their belongings in the hands of the RUF/AFRC forces. During the fourth attack in early August, many civilians, RUF/AFRC members and Kamajors were wounded. Some of the wounded died in the bushes and the decomposing bodies were later discovered by civilians. While they took control, the Kamajors would control the town only for a very short period of time.¹⁴⁰⁷

Inhabitants from Palima, half a mile from Zimmi on the road to Kenema District, deserted the town following the fourth attack and went to the bush for three weeks. They were discovered by the RUF/AFRC forces, who took the produce from the harvests to Zimmi. During the subsequent battles from September to December, houses were burnt down and civilians from Zimmi and the surrounding villages suffered heavy casualties; four Chiefs and 14 counsellors were killed, accused of being supporters of the Sierra Leone President. During this period, civilians also died from

¹⁴⁰⁴ What happened to those civilians was not specified.

¹⁴⁰⁵ During the second battle on 17 June, the key person recounts that he had the impression that when it came time for the battle, the Kamajors did not have central command.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Sierra Leone Humanitarian Report 24-30 June 1997.

¹⁴⁰⁷ According to Africa News, 25 August 1997, ICRC had to withdraw from its office at Zimmi.



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starvation while others drowned in Mahoi River, trying to seek refuge in other areas.¹⁴⁰⁸ On 6 January 1998, another Kamajor attack left a lot of civilians dead.¹⁴⁰⁹

Also in January, Kamajors went to Vaama (east of Zimmi) where they stole all the household property they could find and took some money from civilians. Before leaving, they set some buildings on fire and took away one civilian.¹⁴¹⁰ Starting on 23 January, there was another attack described as a 'no retreat battle' that lasted for four days. At the end of the battle, during which both fighting factions used RPGs, there was a great deal of property destruction and a large number of bodies, both civilians and members of the fighting forces, were left on the streets. Following this, the Kamajors went back to Gofor. During the battle that took place on 1 February, the Kamajors were again unsuccessful in dislodging the RUF/AFRC forces from the town. Thirteen RUF/AFRC forces were caught by Kamajors and killed opposite the R.C. School on the Zimmi Fairo Road. Three of their "wives" taken by the Kamajors to Gofor, where they were used as sex slaves before being killed.

The final battle in Zimmi, which took place on 17 February, saw the Kamajors being assisted by ECOMOG forces and some SLA forces. Those combined forces blocked all the roads leading to the town and battled for three days with the RUF/AFRC forces who had not fled the town, which some had on hearing that Freetown was no longer under their control. Over 1,500 civilians used by the RUF/AFRC forces as sex slaves or as workers to do petty jobs like brushing the town, bringing food or water were freed by the Kamajors, who then made Zimmi their base. From Zimmi, Kamajors raided surrounding villages, taking property including household items and bicycles. They also harassed civilians in these villages because for the Kamajors, any civilians near Zimmi were RUF/AFRC collaborators.

After the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998, the District rapidly became free of RUF and AFRC forces as the Kamajors took control of it. In Kpaka Chiefdom, for example, as they were cut off from Koribondo which used to be a stronghold in Bo District (Jama Bongor Chiefdom),¹⁴¹¹ the remaining RUF/AFRC forces left the chiefdom in March.¹⁴¹² In early 1998, Kamajors from Sowa Chiefdom battled with RUF/AFRC forces at Jeoma and successfully repelled them. From this time on, civilians were forced to feed the Kamajors, the burden of which increased when Kamajors opened a new initiation base at Foindu. In Panga Kabone Chiefdom, Kamajors attacked the remaining RUF/AFRC stronghold in the District three times before eventually driving them out in March 1998, when the RUF/AFRC forces were cut off from their headquarters in Koribondo.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Also in September, the fight for the control of Tongo Field (Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District) intensified.
¹⁴⁰⁹ Hundreds of fatalities are mentioned, but this figure could not be confirmed. Also in January, serious fighting took place at Tongo Field.
¹⁴¹⁰ Those Kamajors were described as acting like the "junta" i.e. the RUF/AFRC forces.
¹⁴¹¹ Following the coup in May 1997, the SLA base at Koribondo had become a stronghold of the RUF/AFRC forces as part of the general "transfer" of SLA bases and property to the AFRC.
¹⁴¹² No information was obtained for Kpaka Chiefdom after the departure of the RUF/AFRC forces. Kamajor harassment of civilians is reported in the same general terms as for the other chiefdoms, without relating any precise event.



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During this period, Kamajors looted Pujehun Town (Panga Kabone Chiefdom), Yonni and Gobaru (Kpaka Chiefdom). However, after 1998, it is reported that Kpaka Chiefdom was relatively quiet as was Mano Sakrim Chiefdom, which did not suffer much from the Kamajors after May 1997, because they were fighting RUF/AFRC forces in other parts of the District.¹⁴¹³

Kamajors controlled the District by conducting patrols and mounted checkpoints, imposing the pass system in search of arms and ammunition and alleged “enemies”. In Barri Chiefdom for example, up to 1999, Kamajors issued passes to travellers for a fee of Le 500, as a way to control the movement of people and to search for their enemies. This pass was only valid for a limited period of time and had to be renewed at the expiration of that period.¹⁴¹⁴ Kamajors from Potoru explained to civilians that only Kamajors could travel without such a pass.¹⁴¹⁵ Civilians were requested to show their pass that proved they were civilians and not RUF/AFRC members at any Kamajors checkpoints they passed through. Those checkpoints were also used to request money from drivers and passengers and to search passengers’ bags. For example, from Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) to Jendema (Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Liberian border), eight checkpoints were mounted and four were established between Zimmi and the border with Tunkia Chiefdom (Kenema District).

The Kamajors systematically ill-treated civilians across the District, mainly as a reprisal for their suspected collaboration with the RUF and RUF/AFRC forces. The District Coordinator used to go from chiefdom to chiefdom to visit the Kamajors on the ground; such visits were witnessed, for example, in Barri Chiefdom. In particular, relatives of RUF/AFRC forces were humiliated, punished and killed. The Mano River was used to drown alleged collaborators; Jijama and Jembe (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) were two towns where this practice was carried out. Traditional leaders were deposed and their power seized, some of them being molested. Prominent people were killed, such as the Assistant District Officer, who was mistaken for an AFRC lieutenant, and the Chief Imam of Soro Gbema Chiefdom. Looting was also frequently carried out and on one occasion, when this was being done and civilians were being chased into the bush, the Kamajors stated that when the RUF/AFRC forces took away their property, they never grumbled or did anything, but now they were complaining when the Kamajors were taking their property. Houses, compounds and communities termed “unfriendly” were burnt down, as happened, for example, in Nanjay (Panga Kabone Chiefdom). The killing of civilians for whatever reason was mostly carried out along the Liberian border.

¹⁴¹³ It appeared that in 1997, Mano Sakrim Chiefdom did not sustain much the presence of the RUF/AFRC forces, who were concentrated in other areas in the District.

¹⁴¹⁴ On one occasion, Kamajors told civilians that the pass would be valid only for four days. This is however not a fixed limit as information from other Districts notes that the passes issued could be valid for other periods of time.

¹⁴¹⁵ It is interesting to note that this system of pass together with the harassment suffered at checkpoints led some civilians to be initiated within the Kamajors society. This type of initiation was however different from the one the fighters to be had to go through, it was among other things much quicker. Furthermore, this type of initiation was mostly carried out once Kamajors were in control of the District and not previously while they were fighting RUF/AFRC forces.



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The houses of relatives of RUF and AFRC members were broken into, damaged and burnt down. It was common practice to send alleged collaborators to "wash" in the river, which was a euphemism for drowning, or to put them in cages where they were tied with FM ropes, which are nylon ropes wrapped around two short sticks and which often lead to loss of circulation to the hands. For example, in Sowa Chiefdom, during the Operation called "Black December" carried out in December 1997, two civilians who pleaded with the Kamajors authorities to let some vehicles come in were arrested and tied with FM ropes. Another example is a woman from Bandajuma (Sowa Chiefdom) who was killed and her head displayed on a sharp stick, as she was suspected of being a collaborator with the AFRC. Thirty people were killed in Bomborhun (Soro Gbema Chiefdom) for failing to report to the Kamajors that RUF/AFRC forces had crossed the Mano River.

Women were sexually abused and some of them had their heads shaved. In addition, women were also forcibly married to Kamajors, unable to refuse or they would be killed. This information was given in general terms for Soro Gbema Chiefdom but could most likely be extended to the other chiefdoms under CDF control. It is interesting to note that this was rather controversial among the Kamajors as they believed that once covered with their traditional attire and protection, they could not be approached by any woman or they would no longer be protected. Accordingly, this was used as an argument to deny the assertion that some of them had committed sexual offences against women.

The Kamajors established laws, both for Kamajors and civilians, and anyone caught breaking these laws was punished, including by public flogging, being locked in a guardroom and, for the Kamajors, being required to give up their weapons. Such incidents happened, for example, at Potoru, the CDF headquarter in Barri Chiefdom. Offices were established in the villages and Kamajors intervened in domestic affairs. They would settle cases of debts and other disputes, including marital affairs. Civilians reported cases to them and not to the Government authorities, who had no power or control over the chiefdoms at this time. Fines were levied on those civilians found guilty and other type of punishments were carried out, such as putting people in pens of two feet high and five feet long, built with palm stalks and sharp pointed materials.

One former Kamajor relates how children between the ages of 10 and 15 were initiated when the fight for Zimmi intensified towards the beginning of 1998. Those children were sent to enemy zones and battlefronts to act as spies and some became fighters. Others were also used to mine diamonds for the leaders. Kamajors also embarked on forceful conscription of men. When things started to become difficult for the Kamajors, they asked civilians to contribute with food and money to the movement. The food was for the forces and the money was used to pay initiators and to buy weapons. Civilians were also used to carry arms and ammunition, food and property stolen by the Kamajors. Those who refused to carry out these orders were arrested, beaten, put in cages, tied up or fined. Children were used to transport gravel from the mining areas to washing sites. RUF/AFRC forces captured alive during battle by the Kamajors were either initiated into the



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Kamajors or killed, depending on the situation. Other punishments were applied to these captured enemies such as imprisoning them, stripping them, tying them up and putting them in cages.¹⁴¹⁶

Kamajors also engaged in mining in different chiefdoms such as Soro Gbema, Makpele, Gallinas Peri and Malen and it is reported that the District Coordinator was allocating forces for mining. It was said that these diamonds were given to ECOMOG to get ammunition, but doubt was raised over the destination of the gems as the District Coordinator was suspected of keeping diamonds for his own use. In 1998, at Famina (Soro Gbema Chiefdom), a group of five civilians caught by the Kamajors mining diamonds without their permission were killed.¹⁴¹⁷

In September 1998, at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom), Kamajors seized seven big trucks loaded with rice, sugar and other items coming from Liberia and en route to Kenema District. The trucks were parked opposite the police station, the SLP being unable to do anything. The passengers abandoned their loads and continued their journey to Kenema.

On one occasion, in October 1998, the killing at Zimmi (Makpele Chiefdom) of a man from Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District) accused of being a "rebel" led to a fight between Kamajors from Koya Chiefdom (Kenema District) and those from Makpele Chiefdom. The dispute was resolved through the intervention of the two CDF chiefdoms coordinators. Other incidents of friction between Kamajors were reported and in November 1998, some young men from Gallinas Peri Chiefdom decided to form their own society, allegedly with the assistance of the son of the Kamajor's High Priest. This decision to form a separate group of Kamajors concluded rapidly as, following the initiation, three of the young men who were to queue to test their bullet proof ability were killed and many others wounded when the initiator fired at them. The matter was reported to the police but no action was taken.

In mid October 1998, serious clashes occurred between CDF assisted by ECOMOG forces and some RUF/AFRC members accompanied by Liberian armed men at the Mano River in the south of Soro Gbema Chiefdom. According to the CDF Coordinator for Pujehun District and ECOMOG forces, those armed men were members of the Liberian Army, which was denied by the Liberian President. To avoid further incursions, the Kamajors created a buffer zone at the Liberian border by strengthening their forces in the border villages.¹⁴¹⁸

Discussions on the disarmament process began in December 1999, when the CDF National Coordinator together with the District Coordinator convened a meeting for Kamajors at Potoru (Barri Chiefdom). By April 2000, UNAMSIL forces were deployed in Zimmi and Joru and shortly after, at Pujehun Town, following ECOMOG withdrawal from the country. Possibly as a result of this, Pujehun District also became a transit area for refugees coming back from Liberia and

¹⁴¹⁶ This was apparently done on the advice of civilians, which may refer to the fact that some civilians were appointed in the administration of the CDF in the Districts.

¹⁴¹⁷ No further information is available on this incident.

¹⁴¹⁸ This incident was related by AFP, 04 November 1998, and comes from Kamajors source; it was neither confirmed nor denied by independent sources.



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originating from other Districts in Sierra Leone. A DDR camp was opened at Pujehun Town¹⁴¹⁹ in May 2001 and in October, following a meeting of the Joint Committee on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), comprised of the Government of Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL and representatives of the RUF, it was agreed that the remainder of the DDR process should be accelerated between 1 and 14 November.¹⁴²⁰

At the end of 2001, SLA forces deployed alongside the Liberian border in Pujehun and Kenema Districts following intensified fighting of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)¹⁴²¹ forces in the west of Liberia.¹⁴²²

Aside from this, there is almost no information available from the end of 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001, as the District was under the control of Kamajors and ECOMOG forces and, later on, UNAMSIL troops. It appears that civilians were able to resettle in their villages and were mostly engaged in farming activities.¹⁴²³

3. Conclusion

Pujehun District was an entry point to Sierra Leone for RUF/NPFL forces as early as 1991 and all the RUF incursions in the District were carried out following an east-west pattern, RUF forces first settling into the two chiefdoms bordering Liberia, namely Soro Gbema and Makpele before proceeding further west by crossing the Moa River. Accordingly, those two chiefdoms were the most affected, particularly because Makpele Chiefdom is the main mining area of the District.

The first major incursion in the District, carried out by RUF/NPFL forces was done in concert with a northern flank in Kailahun District; the RUF/NPFL forces rapidly scattered throughout the chiefdoms of both Districts. From the very start of the conflict, the headquarters of the RUF forces was, however, established in Kailahun District. Three motorable entry points into Sierra Leone were thus clearly identified, two in Kailahun District and one in Pujehun District.

The RUF/NPFL forces were repelled from Pujehun District in the middle of 1991, while some chiefdoms in Kailahun District remained under RUF/NPFL control. At that time, Pujehun District came under SLA control, with the RUF/NPFL forces being limited to launching sporadic actions in the District.

¹⁴¹⁹ Following a meeting between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF at UNAMSIL headquarters, Freetown, it was agreed between the parties that DDR camps should be opened as a matter of urgency in Lunsar, Makeni, Kamakwie, Masingbi, Koidu, Kailahun, Alikalia, Pujehun and Bonthe, in addition to the existing ones in Port Loko, Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Daru: UNAMSIL press release, 15 May 2001.

¹⁴²⁰ IRIN West Africa, 12 October 2001. Furthermore, disarmament for the whole country was scheduled to be complete by 30 November 2001. During this disarmament period in November 2001, over 2,000 CDF members demobilised: UNAMSIL Press Briefing, 20 November 2001

¹⁴²¹ The LURD was a fighting faction engaged in the Liberian conflict and challenging the authority of the Liberian Government. This group had been fighting the Liberian Government since 1998.

¹⁴²² Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 31 December 2001.

¹⁴²³ The situation was radically different for the Districts of the Northern Province and for Kono District where RUF/AFRC activities were still ongoing, with high fatalities among the civilian population.



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In late 1993 and in 1994, RUF forces launched a second massive incursion from the Liberian border and spread across Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts, before continuing further westwards, establishing positions in the whole country by 1995. As such, Pujehun District was for the second time under RUF control, although for a longer period this time. This RUF presence in the District led thousands of civilians to flee the District and go to IDPs camps in Bo District, encouraged by an SLA that was being gradually defeated in the District. Accordingly, Pujehun District was one of the most affected Districts in terms of displacement of population and of destruction of property.

From late 1995 and especially after February 1998 and the intervention in Freetown, the pattern of the conflict in Pujehun District differed from Kailahun District and was more similar to the other Districts of the Southern Province. This was due to the initiation and deployment of Kamajors, who were able to retake most of the RUF positions in the District, unlike Kailahun District, which was never completely under Kamajor control.

Following the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998 and its deployment in the District, the RUF/AFRC who had stayed in the District during the AFRC regime pulled out and the retreating RUF/AFRC forces from Freetown did not settle at all in the District. Free from further RUF/AFRC incursions, the District was thus left under Kamajor control, as with the other Districts of the Southern Province, which deprived the RUF/AFRC forces of one of their main supply roads from Liberia. From 1998 until the completion of the DDR process, RUF/AFRC attacks were concentrated in the main mining areas of the District and in the areas where CDF members did not have constant and complete control, namely the Northern Province, Kono District, Kailahun District and the north of Kenema District.

Throughout the conflict, widespread violations were committed in the District, primarily by RUF/NPFL, RUF and RUF/AFRC forces, but also by SLA forces and Kamajors, especially once they firmly established their control and authority over the District. Those violations were directed against civilians and their property and included stealing and destruction of property, physical violence, sexual assault, killing and abduction for use as fighters, workers or "wives". Both the RUF forces and the Kamajors forces deposed and replaced local authorities and put in place basic systems of administration. Only a few cases of mutilation were however reported for the District, as most of the cases reported took place during a specific RUF/AFRC operation called "Operation No Living Thing" in the first months of 1998 and following the retreat of Freetown.



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F. Western Area

1. Introduction

The Western Area is located in the far central west of Sierra Leone and adjoins Port Loko and Moyamba Districts on its eastern side; its western side is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean. Roughly two-thirds of the Western Area is a mountainous peninsula, along the north of which is located Freetown, the capital city of Sierra Leone. Freetown has been a major international port for merchant and military shipping for the best part of 150 years.

Unlike the rest of the country, the Western Area is not composed of chiefdoms, but is divided into four Rural Districts (RD) and a metropolitan area known as Greater Freetown:¹⁴²⁴

Western Area	Main Settlements
Koya Rural District	Newton, Songo
Waterloo Rural District	Fogbo, Hastings, Kossoh Town, Newton, Tombo, Waterloo
Greater Freetown	Freetown and suburban areas
York Rural District	Goderich, Lakka, York
Mountain Rural District	Regent

Koya RD is in the far east of the Western Area and is bordered to the north by Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District). Across the River Ribbi, which delimits the southern boundary of Koya RD, lies Ribbi Chiefdom (Moyamba District). The main motorable crossing point over the River Ribbi is located at Mabang, connecting the towns of Moyamba, Rotifunk and Bradford (all Moyamba District) to Songo, in the far east of Koya RD. This Moyamba route rejoins the main highway at Tiama Junction, giving travellers access to all major locations in the Southern Province. The RUF would use this route to enter the Western Area in 1995.

From Songo, moving inland, the main hard-surface arterial route from provincial Sierra Leone passes through the north of Koya RD and its main town, Newton. From Newton, the villages of Bath Comp and Fogbo are accessible by a road running south. Fogbo is a main transit point for goods and people westward across the swamp areas of the Calmont Creek and eastward to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom, Moyamba District) and to other locations up the Ribbi River. A large number of small settlements can be reached from the Newton-Fogbo road. Moving east from Newton, the main arterial route leads to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and on to all other major towns in Sierra Leone. Control of the stretch of road between Newton and Masiaka was a major strategic aim of all factions in the conflict.

Moving westward from Newton, the main highway leads to the town of Waterloo, and the Waterloo RD. The area between Newton and Waterloo is flat, highly fertile agricultural land. There is a large

¹⁴²⁴ Along with the SUDC area of Sherbro Island (Bonthe District), the Western Area is administered directly by the Government of Sierra Leone without the traditional structures found throughout Sierra Leone. This is a result of the early British administration, which did not extend its control over the provincial areas of Sierra Leone until the late 1800s, at which time it exercised authority mainly through the traditional structures already in place: see General Overview.



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palm oil plantation at Banga Farm, also on the main highway. Waterloo is on the foothills of the mountainous Western Area Peninsula. It has a number of suburban areas, including Lumpa, Kossoh and Bassu Town to the south and Cole Town to the north. The Prince Alfred Road Bridge, over which the main highway runs, is a key point in the town. The harbour settlement of Pa-Loko is located directly north of Waterloo.

The main highway into Freetown runs through Devil Hole, Rokel and Hastings. On the flat area north of Hastings town and running down to the Sierra Leone Estuary is a hard-surface airfield. The Sierra Leone Police Training School is also located at Hastings. On the Kossoh Town–Hasting axis, a number of different routes into Freetown converge. The main highway continues into the east of Greater Freetown through Wellington and Kissy. From Kossoh Town, two routes lead into Freetown. The first leads through Mountain Rural District from Grafton to Regent. This winding, cliff edge road is made of broken asphalt. At Regent, the road splits again allowing access to Freetown's civic centre through Mount Aureol and to Freetown's west end through Hill Station. The alternative route from Kossoh Town leads through Allen Town to Calaba Town, where it runs parallel to the main highway. This road is also of extremely poor quality and passes through the busy and densely populated areas of Wellington, Low Cost and Portee.

Another road leaves Waterloo and runs south around the Western Area Peninsula into west Freetown. The road passes through the SLA's Benguema Training Centre,¹⁴²⁵ through to the harbour town of Tombo, which marks the southern-most point of Waterloo Rural District. The peninsular road loops around along the coast through to York, Sussex and Goderich in the York RD. From Goderich, the road passes straight into the Lumley and Juba Hill areas of west Freetown. The peninsular road is of extremely poor quality and takes around three hours to get from Freetown to Waterloo in a regular vehicle. The main highway route, through Hastings, takes only 20 minutes.

In 1991, the conflict that was taking hold in other areas of Sierra Leone had little impact on the Western Area except for troop movements to other areas of the country and the establishment of checkpoints – at which there were incidents of harassment of civilians and stealing of their property by the SLA – and defensive deployments in strategic areas, particularly in Waterloo. Following the coup in 1992, which saw the NPRC take power, harassment of civilians and stealing of their property by the SLA increased as more checkpoints were established. This also marked the beginning of Cleaning Day, according to which on the last Saturday of every month, people had to stay home during the morning hours and clean their houses: those caught on the streets would be punished by the SLA. However, these incidents were relatively few and there would continue to be little impact on the Western Area throughout 1992 to 1994.

Starting in 1995, the RUF began to extend their presence westward, at one point cutting off the main highway linking Freetown with the rest of the country and occupying much of Koya RD. There were a number of battles between the RUF on the one hand and the SLA and foreign forces on the other hand, with the SLA establishing more checkpoints in sensitive areas. Throughout 1995 there was an increase in violations committed against civilians, including killing, raping, abduction

¹⁴²⁵ The Benguema Training Centre was subsequently renamed the "Armed Forces Training Centre".



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and looting primarily committed by the RUF, with some violations by the SLA and the Nigerian forces. Elections were held in early 1996, the run up to which was marred by incidents of violence including the first amputations (of thumbs) in the Western Area by SLA, who believed there should be peace before elections. There was little fighting in the Western Area in 1996, with SLA, Guinean and Nigerian forces deployed in strategic areas and the SLA continuing to operate checkpoints along major routes. Civilians were routinely harassed at these checkpoints and were punished for failing to produce identity cards, including being beaten, primarily by the SLA and the Nigerian forces. Towards the end of 1996, peace talks between the RUF and the Government resulted in the Abidjan Peace Agreement on 30 November 1996.

Nevertheless, the conflict only began to have a major impact on the Western Area on the magnitude experienced in the rest of the country in 1997. In May of that year, the AFRC launched a coup, as a result of which the elected government fled to Guinea. Soon after taking power, the AFRC invited the RUF to join them and a large number of RUF forces joined the AFRC forces already in Freetown and the rest of the Western Area. This period saw a massive increase in violations against civilians, with RUF/AFRC forces in particular targeting students, representatives of civil society and journalists, especially after the commencement of broadcasting by the clandestine pro-government radio station, FM98.1 Radio Democracy. Civilians were beaten, raped, killed and arrested and detained without being charged, sometimes for up to a number of weeks. Despite the formation of an anti-looting squad by the AFRC, which saw the return of some stolen property to civilians, looting was widespread; civilians were searched and their property, most commonly food, was taken at checkpoints and in their houses. Civilians were also detained and forced to work for the RUF/AFRC forces, primarily undertaking domestic work such as cooking and cleaning. There was a large build up of foreign forces at this time and fighting between the RUF/AFRC and these forces would lead to massive internal population displacement as civilians fled the fighting. In the latter half of the year, first ECOWAS and then the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone, including a travel ban on members of the RUF/AFRC.

Despite a ceasefire signed at the end of 1997, fighting continued with numerous violations of both the spirit and letter of the ceasefire. The instability in the city and the country at large prompted a military intervention by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces, reinforced by CDF and "loyal" SLA members, in February 1998, as a result of which the RUF/AFRC forces were driven from Freetown and the majority of the Western Area. The ECOMOG intervention continued to roll back the RUF/AFRC from every major town in Sierra Leone during March and April 1998. The Government returned from Guinea and sanctions were lifted, except those banning the import of weapons. For the most part, order was restored in the Western Area, although there were incidents of harassment of civilians, including the torture and killing of suspected RUF/AFRC members and collaborators by ECOMOG forces and the CDF. The middle of the year saw the commencement of a wave of treason trials against civilians and military personnel for their involvement in the coup in May 1997. The majority of those being tried were convicted, with death sentences and terms of imprisonment being imposed. Some of the military personnel, who had been court martialled, were executed in October while those who had been tried in civilian courts appealed their sentences and were still in detention awaiting the outcome of their appeals when the invasion of Freetown occurred on 6 January 1999.

Draft Conflict Mapping Report
9 March 2004

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Towards the end of 1998, RUF forces had begun attacking towns in the west of the Western Area, including the strategic town of Waterloo, which led to renewed fighting in these areas. This would be the prelude to the major attack on Freetown by the RUF/AFRC on 6 January 1999. Thousands of RUF/AFRC forces converged on Freetown, occupying various locations, killing and amputating hundreds of civilians, taking their property and burning their houses. ECOMOG forces with assistance from the CDF managed to repel the RUF/AFRC forces and by the end of January had regained control of the city, although the destruction wreaked on the city and the loss of human life during the brief RUF/AFRC stay would be tremendous. In the coming weeks, ECOMOG extended its control to the areas surrounding Freetown and in April, peace talks began in Togo that would lead to the Lomé Peace Agreement, signed on 7 July 1999. That Agreement included a power-sharing arrangement for the elected Government and the RUF as well as a blanket pardon and amnesty for all combatants for all acts committed in pursuit of their objectives. From the time the AFRC and RUF leaders returned to Freetown in October 1999 until May 2000, the Western Area was mostly quiet.

In 2000, UNAMSIL began deploying across Sierra Leone and implementing the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program agreed to during the Lomé peace talks. On 8 May, there was a large demonstration outside the house of the RUF leader, which resulted in the deaths of some of the protestors and the capture and detention of the RUF leader, accused of violating the spirit and letter of the Lomé Agreement. From then, UNAMSIL deployment continued in the Western Area, which remained quiet until the war was officially declared over in January 2002.

2. Factual Analysis

a) Events in 1991

At the beginning of 1991, around 2,000 members of the SLA were sent to the southern border of Sierra Leone with Liberia to prevent the incursion of forces from the Liberian war into Sierra Leone. These would be reinforced by three truckloads of SLA forces dispatched from Freetown on 25 March 1991 and 1 April 1991.¹⁴²⁶

In early 1991, the conflict broke out in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone. The Government of Sierra Leone requested the assistance of Guinean and Nigerian troops to prevent RUF forces from entering Freetown and other large towns. Responding to this request, checkpoints were established between Waterloo and Tombo (both Waterloo RD) along the road running from the north to the south in the middle of the Western Area towards the border with Port Loko and Moyamba Districts. Waterloo is of strategic military importance, due to its location on the highway leading from Freetown to the rest of the country and its proximity to Freetown.

The Nigerian forces operated the checkpoint at Madina, whilst the others at Tombo and Russell (Waterloo RD) were operated by the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). SLA forces stationed at these checkpoints required people who were unable to produce their identity cards to pay them money. If

¹⁴²⁶ Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 25 March 1991 and UPI, 2 April 1991.



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civilians did not have money, SLA forces would punish them. For example, some were forced to clean up a particular area and others were forced to lie down on the ground and stare at the sun.

Following news of the first incursions, the Government of Sierra Leone – in 1991, the All Party Congress (APC) – was quick to mobilise political support for the war effort. The then President received gifts of food from representatives of the Fullah and Indian communities and entertained a gesture of solidarity from the Sierra Leone Judiciary.¹⁴²⁷

In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone made requests for assistance to various foreign governments, including those of the US¹⁴²⁸ and the UK. Officials from both governments publicly stated they were considering how to assist.¹⁴²⁹ The US provided a variety of direct assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone. First, the US Government flew in an undisclosed amount of light weapons and ammunition.¹⁴³⁰ A further shipment of materials was reported as scheduled to arrive by US Air Force cargo plane by 9 August 1991. Also in August 1991, a 15-member US Army mobile training team commenced a program of training in communications, medical care, equipment maintenance and setting-up effective command structures for non-commissioned SLA officers at the SLA's Benguema Training Centre. In September 1991, the US Government also agreed to provide \$500,000 to the Government of Sierra Leone to support the continuing involvement of the SLA in ECOMOG, then operating in Liberia. Freetown was one of the key logistic points for the 7,000-strong ECOMOG peacekeeping force stationed in Liberia.

On 13 April, the Governments of Guinea and Nigeria sent 700¹⁴³¹ military personnel and accompanying hardware to Sierra Leone.¹⁴³² The Nigerian forces arrived on 16 April 1991,¹⁴³³ at which time the Government of Sierra Leone cut air, sea and land transport links with Liberia, restricting incoming flights to Freetown to humanitarian and military traffic.¹⁴³⁴ Following the visit of delegation of Nigerian military officials to Freetown, a further 500 Nigerian forces arrived on or around 29 April 1991¹⁴³⁵ and were posted to strategic locations in the Freetown area including Lungi International Airport¹⁴³⁶ (Kaffu Bullon Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and the power station.

In May 1991 a camp for Liberian refugees was established near Waterloo town (Waterloo RD). On 6 May 1991, around 3,000 Liberian refugees were repatriated to Liberia from Freetown aboard the Nigerian vessel, the *River Adada*. Over the weekend of 4-5 May, the same ship had ferried an undisclosed number of Nigerian soldiers from Lagos.¹⁴³⁷

¹⁴²⁷ BBC, 15 April 1991.

¹⁴²⁸ UPI, 9 April 1991.

¹⁴²⁹ Independent, 7 May 1991.

¹⁴³⁰ AFP, 8 August 1991.

¹⁴³¹ Number initially undisclosed, reported as 700 by Xinhua on 29 April 1991.

¹⁴³² Xinhua, 13 April 1991.

¹⁴³³ AP 16 April 1991.

¹⁴³⁴ AP, 16 April 1991.

¹⁴³⁵ These forces were under the command of the field commander of ECOMOG in Liberia: Xinhua, 28 May 1991.

¹⁴³⁶ A short distance away (7 minutes by helicopter) from Freetown, north over the Sierra Leone River.

¹⁴³⁷ AFP, 6 May 1991.



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b) Events in 1992 - 1994

In mid-April 1992, a group of low-ranking members of the SLA Tiger Unit, armed with an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a military truck, moved from Kailahun District to Freetown. They bypassed the SLA base at Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and used the Moyamba-Rotifunk-Mabang (Moyamba) route to Freetown through Songo town (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District), south-west of the Western Area. These forces continued along the main highway and when they arrived in Freetown, other SLA forces stationed at the Benguema Training Centre were made aware of this unusual military movement.

On 29 April, the Kailahun group of SLA members overthrew the APC Government and established a military junta known as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Led by 25 year-old Captain Valentine Strasser, the NPRC suspended the Constitution of Sierra Leone and imposed a State of Emergency. An SLA Major from the Benguema Training Centre was arrested and detained in Pademba Road prison when he tried to persuade those leading the coup to reverse their actions. The ousted President fled to the Republic of Guinea, where he was later granted asylum, as 50 SLA troops acting for the NPRC stormed the presidential offices at State House, in the centre of Freetown. Lungi International Airport was temporarily closed to air traffic and international telex and telephone lines were reportedly disabled.¹⁴³⁸

The US Government airlifted 300 expatriates out of Sierra Leone and issued a warning advising against travel to Sierra Leone. The French Government sent a frigate into Sierra Leonean waters to assist with further evacuation of expatriates should the situation in Sierra Leone deteriorate.

On 30 April 1992, the NPRC leader made a broadcast over national radio on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service citing corruption and incompetent governance as the reasons for the coup.¹⁴³⁹ Later in the day, around 700 students marched through Freetown in support of the NPRC coup.¹⁴⁴⁰ In Freetown on 5 May 1992, students and trade unionists staged a much larger march in support of the NPRC.¹⁴⁴¹

A number of foreign Governments, including Nigeria, Japan and Ghana, were quick to recognise the NPRC as the Government of Sierra Leone. Cooperation between Nigerian troops and the SLA against the RUF continued.

Following the NPRC coup, SLA forces in Waterloo (Waterloo RD) and surrounding areas broke into shops and residences on the Calmont Road, stealing civilian property and loading it onto military trucks. SLA forces attacked villages in the Koya RD near the boundary with Port Loko and Moyamba Districts. In these villages, which included Mafonikay, Nyamgba Town and Newton, SLA forces killed an unknown number of civilians, stole property and inflicted violence on many people.

¹⁴³⁸ AFP 30 April 1992.

¹⁴³⁹ BBC, 2 May 1992, transcribing SLBS, 30 April 1992.

¹⁴⁴⁰ BBC, 30 April 1992.

¹⁴⁴¹ AFP, 5 May 1992.



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SLA forces attacked the Waterloo Oil Palm Plantation and other farms in the Waterloo and Koya RDs, taking agricultural machinery, household furniture and other high value items.

During 1992, the SLA arrested an unknown number of people in Lumpa, near Waterloo Town. On a beach near Sussex village, along the peninsular road, the then Inspector General of Police and up to 12 other people were summarily executed on the suspicion of plotting a coup. It is alleged that their bodies were buried in a mass grave in that location.

During 1992, the NPRC declared that the last Saturday of every month would be National Cleaning Day. Between 06.00 and 10.00 only those on official business were excused the task of cleaning their compounds, residences and commercial properties.¹⁴⁴² A variety of punishments were meted out to civilians who did not adhere to these rules. Civilians were beaten with belts, made to roll around on the floor, thrown into the gutter effluent and forced to quick-march 500 metres carrying a heavy rock on their heads. A common SLA punishment was termed Frog Jump, or "pumping". Civilians were made to perform squat jumps, crossing their arms one over the other and holding their earlobes between thumb and forefinger. This exhausting punishment could last for hours. Another gruelling SLA punishment was "making civilians fly"; civilians were forced to lie down on their backs with their legs held straight into the air, their arms outstretched across the ground.

Shortly after the coup, the SLA mounted five military checkpoints along a 15km stretch of the peninsula road running from Tombo to Waterloo Town (both Waterloo RD). SLA forces operating checkpoints continued to extort money from travellers.

In late December 1992, a special military tribunal created by the NPRC condemned to death an unknown number of people for their alleged involvement in a coup attempt in November 1992. The British Government condemned the executions¹⁴⁴³ and briefly suspended all economic aid to Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁴⁴ Between 9 and 16 January 1993, the NPRC declared a week of national repentance and prayers for those who had been executed.¹⁴⁴⁵

On 18 March, NPRC security agencies arrested 7 civilians and 4 UK expatriates accused of plotting a coup. On 8 April, concerned with rumours of RUF movement towards the Western Area and a growing smuggling network, the NPRC banned movement of heavy vehicles on public roads between 19.30 and 07.00 every night. In Freetown, the ban stretched from 22.00 until dawn.

The Western Area was mostly quiet for the remainder of 1993 and throughout 1994.

¹⁴⁴² Cleaning Saturday is still observed in Freetown to date.

¹⁴⁴³ AFP, 4 January 1993

¹⁴⁴⁴ AFP, 5 January 1993

¹⁴⁴⁵ Interpress, 7 January 1993



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c) Events in 1995

In January 1995, the NPRC contracted Ghurka Security Guards,¹⁴⁴⁶ a private military company, to run a training program for the SLA and provide security at Camp Charlie, a key SLA base near Mile 91 (Yoni Chiefdom, Tonkolili District).

In March 1995, the RUF extended their reach further west, with RUF movement through Moyamba District towards the towns of Songo and Mile 38 (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) putting pressure on the Western Area. In late April, RUF forces targeted locations on the high quality, asphalt highway leading through Waterloo (Waterloo RD) to Freetown. RUF forces gained a foothold in the bush areas of the southern half of Koya RD and managed to create a frontline spanning Joe Town (Koya RD) to Pa-Loko (Waterloo RD). This had the effect of temporarily cutting off the main highway, or at least making it too dangerous for civilian traffic. Nevertheless, RUF forces were unable to penetrate or bypass Waterloo. RUF attacks on locations on the unsealed, southern route around the Peninsula to Freetown were also unsuccessful.

In February 1995, representatives of the NPRC Government held a meeting at the Waterloo Community Centre, requesting that the local community provide auxiliary support to the SLA in preventing the infiltration of RUF forces into the Western Area. Guinean forces moved from Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) to Bassa Town (Waterloo RD), less than a kilometre from Waterloo Town (Waterloo RD), establishing checkpoints and numerous mortar positions facing towards Newton (Koya RD). The Bassa Town Primary School was used as an ammunitions dump for the Guinean contingent. SLA forces armed with light weapons were based at nearby Lumpa (Waterloo RD), in addition to a heavily armed SLA Tiger Unit in the grounds of the Peninsular Secondary School in Waterloo. To prevent the RUF moving from Pa-Loko through Cole Town into Waterloo, SLA forces were also deployed at the Prince Alfred Road Bridge.

Between 21 and 30 March 1995, the SLA established checkpoints along the north-south Newton-Fogbo road at Newton-Fogbo Junction, Magbathi and Bath-Comp (all in Koya RD, on the border with Port Loko and Moyamba Districts). Fogbo (Koya RD) is near the mouth of the River Ribbi and is a trading centre for fish and salt. It is also a transit point for inland traffic along the river and to points further along Sierra Leone's coast, with a large wharf to handle the inland river traffic. Before 10 April, an unknown number of heavily armed SLA forces deployed on foot to Fogbo Wharf, escorted by a military helicopter. The SLA forces were equipped with a mobile anti-aircraft gun and numerous RPGs. They established a command point in the house of the then Town Chief and confiscated village livestock to use as food.

Newton is an agricultural centre on flat, fertile land between Songo (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) and Waterloo (Waterloo RD). The SLA forces stationed at Newton-Fogbo Junction patrolled the area between Newton (Koya RD) and Songo, mainly on a circular route running anti-

¹⁴⁴⁶ For background information see Cillers, J & Mason, P (eds), *Peace, Profit and Plunder: The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies*, pp 129-33: <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Books/PeaceProfitPlunder/Chap7.pdf> [Link alive: 7 January 2004].



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clockwise from Newton, through Makoibundo, Mabange, Garahun, Kwama¹⁴⁴⁷ and Mile 6 (all Koya RD).

Between 8 and 11 April, RUF forces attacked villages in a triangular area sketched out by Songo to the east, Waterloo to the west and Fogbo to the south, establishing a base at Mashewureh (Koya RD), about 2 km north-west of Fogbo. There, they captured fleeing civilians, raped women and destroyed houses. RUF forces attacked and captured a number of villages adjacent to Songo, including Mokobech, Maferkalay and Mathonteh (all Koya RD). RUF forces attacked the village of Kwama to the north of the main Masiaka-Waterloo highway, killing 7 civilians and burning down an unknown number of houses. Shortly after this attack, SLA forces engaged a 58-strong RUF group on the main highway at Brima Junction (Koya RD).

RUF forces attacked Newton (Koya RD) on 9 April, moving from the villages of Ragberfi and Magbafti to the south and Makoibundu and Garahun to the east, but were repelled by SLA forces stationed in Newton. On 11 April, RUF forces attacked Fogbo, where they raped a young mother, abducted an unknown number of civilians and stole civilians' livestock. The SLA forces deployed at Fogbo offered limited resistance; the RUF established a base and operated out from Fogbo and nearby Mashewureh.

Between 15 April and 20 April 1995, RUF forces advanced on Waterloo (Waterloo RD), moving through Nyamba Town¹⁴⁴⁸ and Joe Town (both Koya RD). They advanced to Pa-Loko, 10 km north of Waterloo, and to the Banga Farm palm oil plantation halfway between Newton and Waterloo. Between 21 and 22 April, RUF forces at Banga Farm came under heavy air attack from an Alfa Jet,¹⁴⁴⁹ which killed an unknown number of RUF members and civilians. On 21 April, RUF forces attacked Lumpa with RPG and AK-47s, but retreated to Pa-Loko following heavy mortar and other artillery fire by Guinean forces. During the RUF attack on Lumpa, civilians fleeing from Lumpa, Waterloo and surrounding areas were stopped by Nigerian forces operating a checkpoint at Rokel, about 4 km north-west of Waterloo on the main highway. At the checkpoint, Nigerian troops beat an unknown number of people with sticks and gun butts; saying "Let your brothers kill you", they turned the people back towards the Waterloo area, which was then under attack.

Over the weekend of 29-30 April, combined SLA and Guinean forces engaged the RUF in Pa-Loko and Joe Town, forcing their retreat by 3 May;¹⁴⁵⁰ shortly after, the corpses of RUF members could be seen floating in the Waterloo Creek. Between 3 and 7 May 1995, the NPRC Government contracted a South African based private military company called Executive Outcomes to replace the Ghurka Security Service.

In addition, around 600 demobilised Liberian militia, formerly from ULIMO-K, were concentrated in the area around Allen Town (Greater Freetown, Western Area), on the outskirts for Freetown's

¹⁴⁴⁷ Also spelled Quama.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Also called Yamba Town.

¹⁴⁴⁹ It is unclear whether the Alfa Jet was SLA or Nigerian.

¹⁴⁵⁰ AFP, 1 May 1995, 3 May 1995.



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East end.¹⁴⁵¹ RUF forces retreating from Pa-Loko moved towards Newton, ambushing civilian traffic on the Waterloo-Newton stretch of highway. A joint Executive Outcomes and ULIMO-K “Special Task Force” cleared this road of RUF activity.¹⁴⁵²

Nigerian forces were stationed at Madina, along the peninsula road between Waterloo and Tombo (both Waterloo RD). On or around 2 May, an unknown number of RUF forces attacked Kerry Town (Waterloo RD), a village on the peninsula road. Civilians fled 2 km northwards from Kerry Town to Macdonald (Waterloo RD). Although no direct contact was made between SLA-aligned forces and the RUF, Guinean and SLA forces bombarded the area.¹⁴⁵³

The beach village of Tombo, which had a large wharf, had increased in significance as a trading and passenger transit point following the RUF attacks on Waterloo and the main inland highway as well as the strengthened RUF control of Fogbo jetty and the northern chiefdoms of Moyamba District. At this time, the SLA and SSD were seeking out suspected RUF members and collaborators with increasing vigour, often beating and killing those they found. After 2 May, residents of Kerry Town captured a suspected RUF member and took him to the SLA base at nearby Tombo. Following interrogation by the SLA commanding officer, SLA forces took the man onto the beach, shot him and cut off his head and genitals. Residents of Tombo and SLA members danced the severed head around the village. After failing to set fire to the corpse using petrol, two members of the SLA tied weights to it and dumped it out at sea. Also after 2 May, unknown perpetrators captured and killed two suspected members of the RUF by placing burning car tyres around their necks.

On 15 December in Tombo, an SSD Sergeant shot dead two teenage boys and severely injured one other. The boys were on a boat, the pilot of which had refused to pay the Le500 levied on all boats entering or exiting the wharf.

d) Events in 1996

In early January, Strasser accepted offers from both the Organisation of African Unity and the Government of Burkina Faso to mediate between the NPRC and the RUF. Soon after, Julius Maada-Bio, the then Deputy Head of State, overthrew Strasser, claiming that he was planning to cancel the elections planned for 26 February 1996. Maada-Bio continued a policy of dialogue with the RUF. A nighttime curfew was imposed in Freetown from 16 to 23 January. On 24 January, the NPRC and the RUF announced a ceasefire, which was quickly followed by a 2,000-strong civilian peace march through Freetown.¹⁴⁵⁴

Doubts about the durability of the NPRC-RUF ceasefire, concerns about voter registration and whether the National Electoral Commission would be sufficiently well-resourced prompted calls for the postponement of the Presidential and Parliamentary elections scheduled for 26-28 February. Nevertheless, on 9 February, 5,000 protestors marched through Freetown in support of non-

¹⁴⁵¹ AP Worldstream, 11 May 1995.

¹⁴⁵² It is not clear whether Executive Outcomes participated directly in hostilities.

¹⁴⁵³ Event reported by AFP, 2 May 1995

¹⁴⁵⁴ Xinhua, 24 and 26 January 1996.



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postponement. A day later, grenades were thrown into the house of the Electoral Commission Chief, who was an advocate for non-postponement.

The Electoral Commission organised a national consultative conference at Freetown's Bintumani Conference Centre on the theme "Peace Before Elections or Elections Before Peace?". On 12 February, the majority of delegates participating in the conference voted in favour of non-postponement, while all 14 delegates from the RUF voted for postponement. On the same day, 43 Paramount Chiefs from the Northern Province adopted an 8-point declaration also supporting postponement pending substantive peace talks between the NPRC and the RUF. The SLA were generally in support of "Peace Before Elections" while the majority of the civilian population supported "Elections Before Peace."

Between 23 and 25 February, NPRC and RUF delegations commenced peace talks in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, chaired by the Ivory Coast's Foreign Minister. The talks were adjourned in the late hours of 25 February, the eve of elections, with RUF delegates still calling for their postponement.

Polling in the elections began at 07.00 on 26 February. A curfew was imposed overnight into the second day of polling. Shortly before the polling centres closed, at around 19.00, machine gun fire was reported on Pademba Road and at the Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown. News sources report that a 40-strong military unit dressed in blue uniforms assaulted the home of Maada Bio using RPGs and heavy machine guns.¹⁴⁵⁵ A polling station supervisor was shot dead while returning to his home. Also on 26 February, the National Reconciliation Commission was inaugurated. Polling continued on 27 February. The results of the Presidential election were inconclusive and a run-off election was planned for 15 March, despite RUF declarations on 1 March in Abidjan that they would not accept the results.

During and after the elections at Wilberforce Barracks and other military barracks, people's thumbs were held out by SLA forces and beaten because they voted. Heavy gunfire broke out near Kabasa Lodge to discourage the voting and have it cancelled, which was unsuccessful. The run-off election on 17 March, in which Alhaji Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected President of the Republic of Sierra Leone,¹⁴⁵⁶ saw the cutting off of thumbs, marking the first amputations in the Western Area.

Meanwhile, Nigerian forces established a checkpoint at Jui Junction (Waterloo RD) in March 1996, since their commander was residing at the SSD quarters in the Jui SSD Barracks. At the same time, SLA forces established checkpoints between Waterloo and Freetown. Guinean forces established a base between Lumpa and Waterloo as a back up for SLA checkpoints mounted around that area. As in other places, both Nigerian ECOMOG and SLA forces harassed people passing through these checkpoints, inflicting punishment where people were unable to produce identity cards. Punishments included forcing civilians to clean up the checkpoint area and beating them with wooden sticks.

¹⁴⁵⁵ AFP, 28 January 1996.

¹⁴⁵⁶ President Kabbah was sworn in on 29 March 1996.



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Peace talks continued in Abidjan. On 23 April, President Kabbah met with the RUF leader, continuing the peace negotiations commenced by the NPRC in late February 1996. Three joint working groups were established to draft the text of a peace agreement, hammer out details for encampment and disarmament and to work out the demobilisation process. On 15 May, talks yielded agreement on a ceasefire although by 19 May, the RUF leader was already calling for fresh elections during a visit to the Republic of Guinea. News reports indicate that removal from Sierra Leone of the South African private military company, Executive Outcomes,¹⁴⁵⁷ was an RUF precondition for a peace agreement.¹⁴⁵⁸

On 3 July, around 20 senior SLA officers from the disbanded NPRC regime were removed from their positions in the SLA. On 10 July, the Sierra Leone Parliament re-activated portions of the Constitution that had been suspended by the NPRC in 1992. On 9 September, Government security agencies uncovered a coup plot against the SLPP government and arrested at least six SLA soldiers.

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF leadership signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. This provided for the immediate and total cessation of hostilities and the creation of a Committee for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP). Demobilisation of RUF and other militia would commence upon the identification of suitable sites and SLA units not required for the maintenance of general security would be returned to barracks. The CCP would examine options for restructuring the SLA and the SLP would be strengthened to ensure realistic police primacy. An international, neutral monitoring group would be deployed in the country and Executive Outcomes would withdraw within five weeks of the arrival of that group. By 30 May 1997, all other foreign troops would be removed from the country, consistent with the treaty obligations of Sierra Leone. The RUF would become a legitimate political movement and a blanket amnesty was granted to all RUF members in respect of actions taken in pursuance of the objectives of the RUF up until 30 November 1996. Provision was made to guarantee the civil rights of the RUF and for the creation of an independent National Commission on Human Rights to monitor and investigate alleged abuses.¹⁴⁵⁹

e) Events in 1997

On 1 January, the Government commissioned into service a gunboat donated by the Chinese Government to combat poaching in Sierra Leone's territorial waters. The boat was able to carry around 200 security personnel and had been donated as part of a \$20 million aid package agreed to by China in 1995.¹⁴⁶⁰ On 6 January, six SLA soldiers were sentenced to 10 years in jail for piracy,

¹⁴⁵⁷ The NPRC had contracted Executive Outcomes on or around 7 May 1995 following the extension of RUF military operations into the Western Area.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Before 11 September, Executive Outcomes was reportedly contracted by Sierra Leone Ore and Mining Co (Sieromco) to secure bauxite mined in Moyamba: Africa Energy & Mining, 11 September 1996. The removal of Executive Outcomes from the country became a specific term of the Abidjan Peace Accord, signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 30 November 1996.

¹⁴⁵⁹ For the full text of the Abidjan Peace Accords, see http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_10301996.html.

¹⁴⁶⁰ AFP, 2 January 1997 and Xinhua 1 January 1997.

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having raided a Spanish fishing vessel in 1996, attempting to abscond with \$200,000 of fishing equipment.¹⁴⁶¹

On 30 January, Executive Outcomes completed a withdrawal that began with the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord, removing around 300 personnel and heavy weaponry from Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁶² Around a month later, Sierra Leone and Nigeria signed a new Status of Forces Agreement, redefining the legal status of Nigeria's forces in Sierra Leone and expanding Nigeria's training role from solely the SLA to other parts of the Sierra Leone armed forces.

In mid-March, there was a leadership struggle within the RUF, sparked by the arrest of the RUF leader in Nigeria on firearms charges. On 11 March, the Government of Nigeria confirmed the presence of the RUF leader in Nigeria, although they denied that he was under house arrest.¹⁴⁶³ They reversed this position a few days later, admitting that they had arrested him for the illegal possession of a firearm and detained him in a federal government guesthouse in Lagos.¹⁴⁶⁴ Spokespersons for the RUF leader insisted variously that he was in Nigeria on private business and also that he was discussing the Sierra Leone peace process with the Nigerian Government.¹⁴⁶⁵ Some days later, a senior RUF member declared himself to be the new interim leader, which was soon followed by the RUF taking into custody a number of its senior membership and the Sierra Leone Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea on 31 March¹⁴⁶⁶ and the issuance of a public statement that the RUF leadership had not been changed in any way.¹⁴⁶⁷

On 7 April, 130 troops from Burkina Faso joined ECOMOG in Liberia. On 17 April, the UK agreed to train two battalions of SLA soldiers.¹⁴⁶⁸ On 28 April, it was announced that all civil militia groups in Sierra Leone were to be put under the command of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force, reportedly to make them more effective and to facilitate their rapid demobilisation.¹⁴⁶⁹

On 25 May 1997, elements of the SLA staged a coup d'état and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC released over 700 inmates from Pademba Road Prison, including their leader, who was formally sworn in as Head of State on 17 June 1997.¹⁴⁷⁰ The AFRC immediately suspended the Constitution of Sierra Leone. President Kabbah escaped to the Republic of Guinea by helicopter.

The AFRC moved quickly to draw close to its popular personalities, political and civil society groups and organised labour groups. However, this failed to stave off a month-long strike staged by the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. Additionally, 50 members of the 80-seat Parliament met despite the

¹⁴⁶¹ AFP, 6 January 1997.

¹⁴⁶² AFP, 4 February 1997.

¹⁴⁶³ Xinhua, 11 March 1997.

¹⁴⁶⁴ He was later transferred to the Sheraton in Abuja.

¹⁴⁶⁵ AFP, 18 March 1997.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Including RUF delegates to the CCP, see AFP, 31 March 1997.

¹⁴⁶⁷ AFP, 31 March 1997.

¹⁴⁶⁸ APF, 17 April 1997.

¹⁴⁶⁹ AFP, 28 April 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Xinhua, 17 June 1997,



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suspension of Parliament, condemning the AFRC's action and demanded the immediate restoration of democratic order.

Immediately after the coup, the AFRC invited the RUF to share power. On 28 May, the RUF leader appeared on SLBS Radio, encouraging RUF solidarity with the AFRC. Part of his statement is worth quoting: "You will always get instructions from me through [the AFRC leader]. They are our brothers. Let no one fool you. You have to work with them to put the situation under control, especially in the western area. As you [sic] the field commander, instruct your other Commander ... to stand by for any reinforcement needed by [the AFRC leader] for any eventualities. We have to defend our sovereignty. You are to act on these orders immediately."¹⁴⁷¹ On 30 May, the RUF declared their support for the AFRC on SLBS television and radio and on 1 June, the AFRC declared the RUF leader to be the Vice President of Sierra Leone.

In anticipation of a Nigerian led military intervention, the AFRC was quick to secure strategic locations around Freetown. This included Hastings, which was adjacent to the pre-coup Nigerian base at Kossoh Town¹⁴⁷² and near an airfield. Accordingly, around 200 AFRC members entered Hastings and took over the Hastings Police Station on 26 May 1997. In the wake of the coup, there was a large build up of predominantly RUF forces in the Hastings area. Hastings, Waterloo and the SLA's Benguema Training Centre were concentration points for RUF combatants entering the Western Area. RUF forces entering the Western Area camped in public building in Waterloo (Waterloo RD), because the town residents refused to lodge them. In Waterloo, RUF forces occupied the Commercial Secondary School, the REC Secondary School and the SDA Primary School.

On 29 May, a further 500 RUF members arrived in Hastings, bringing the total to around 2,000, taking over the expansive Police Training School complex and the Kelly's Rural Vocational and Agricultural Secondary School. That same day, the leadership of this RUF group met with the Hastings village authorities and complained that they had not offered the RUF/AFRC their support. On 30 May, RUF forces set up five large checkpoints throughout Hastings, each operated by around 20 people. Civilians trying to leave the settlement had to pass through each checkpoint, where they were searched for food. The RUF forces also conducted house-to-house searches confiscating prepared foods from civilians and held an unknown number of civilians at the Police Training School, forcing them to collect wood and fresh water for the RUF commanders.

There were a number of random shootings and extensive looting in the Freetown metropolitan area around this time. For example, a large number of armed robberies were committed in Freetown on 25 May. The National Treasury building was completely gutted, most foreign exchange bureaus were looted and the Central Bank was damaged by fire as AFRC forces unsuccessfully sought access to the vaults. As the armed men roamed the city, attacking and looting residences, many people were raped and otherwise assaulted, including girls under the age of 14 and the wives and daughters of foreigners. The son of a prominent businessman was killed when he refused or was unable to meet

¹⁴⁷¹ BBC Media Monitoring, 30 May 1997 transcribing SLBS, 28 May 1997.

¹⁴⁷² Nigerian forces, and then ECOMOG, were based at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD) from 1994 until 1999.



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the demands from armed men for money. At an AFRC press conference on 28 May 1997, this was explained as an accidental shooting.

The AFRC took a number of largely inadequate steps to contain the widespread looting of civilian and government premises. These including creating an anti-looting squad with orders to shoot looters dead on sight and ordering the return to base of all SLA members who did not have proper deployment orders. On 9 June, the AFRC gathered property they had recovered at the Cockerill Defence HQ and invited civilians to search through it for their belongings.¹⁴⁷³

On 25 May, AFRC forces looted tourist locations in the coastal York Rural District along the coastal, peninsula road. AFRC members from the SLA Juba Barracks in west Freetown and the SLA Engineering Mechanical and Electrical Battalion near the Guma Reservoir arrived in Sussex village and looted the Florence Diving Centre and Hotel. AFRC forces also confiscated boats from civilians at the Goderich fishing village and used them to transport looted fridges, TVs, fans and furniture from the Africana Hotel Complex at Tokeh Beach back to Freetown. The RUF would later lodge at Tokeh and Mama beaches, stealing fishing hauls and other food items from civilians. On 27 May 1997, RUF forces also entered villages in the Mountain RD, establishing checkpoints in Regent and Bathurst. On 29 May, RUF forces mounted a checkpoint at St Michael's lodge near Lakka Beach, extorting money and food items from passers-by.

The period immediately after the coup is also marked by a large military build-up of foreign forces within Sierra Leone, including Nigerian, Guinean and Ghanaian forces. A small Ghanaian contingent stationed in Monrovia entered Sierra Leone to evacuate Ghanaian nationals, referred to as "Operation Ogyefo". On 27 May, two boatloads of Nigerian forces arrived in Freetown also from Monrovia, reinforcing the Nigerian base at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD). Additional troops were airlifted to Freetown from James Spriggs Payne Airbase, just outside Monrovia, Liberia.¹⁴⁷⁴ This build-up placed huge pressure on the AFRC, resulting in intense diplomatic activity to prevent further escalation.

The armoured vehicles attached to the Nigerian Army 2nd Mechanised Battalion had been loaded onto the NSS Ambe and previously shipped to Liberia.¹⁴⁷⁵ On 1 June, orders were given to the 2nd Mechanised Battalion and 231 Tank Battalion to perform two simultaneous actions in Freetown. The first was to move from Kossoh (in Waterloo Town, Waterloo RD) and take control of Hastings Airfield and the nearby Police College (Waterloo RD). The second was to capture the Kissy Port Terminal in east Freetown, which would allow the NSS Ambe to dock and offload the armour and supplies required by the Nigerians. The codename for operation would be "Sandstorm." However, the AFRC intercepted the transmission of the operational orders, giving them ample prior warning of the Nigerian plans.

¹⁴⁷³ AFP, 9 June 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁴ AFP, 28 May 1997

¹⁴⁷⁵ This account of the Nigerian assaults on Freetown on 2 June 1997 owes much to Brig. Gen. R.A. Adeshina.



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On 2 June, at 05.30, two ships¹⁴⁷⁶ anchored out at the Cape commenced mortaring the SLA Defence HQ at Cockerill in west Freetown. AFRC spokespersons were quick to dismiss this as a training exercise, but later announced that the Nigerian naval bombardment had caused between 40 and 100 deaths. However, the family of one person claimed by the AFRC to be a victim of the bombardment later revealed that he had in fact been ambushed and killed by unidentified armed men in another part of the city. His Peugeot car was stolen, his body dumped at the central mortuary and he was recorded as one of the victims of the day's fighting. Nigerian forces set up a command post at the Mammy Yoko hotel in Aberdeen,¹⁴⁷⁷ while US marines evacuated some 200 expatriates to the USS Kearsage,¹⁴⁷⁸ stationed in waters off Freetown.

Nigerian forces stationed at Mammy Yoko were isolated, overpowered and captured by the AFRC after running out of ammunition. On 4 June the AFRC released 300 Nigerian prisoners of war, after reportedly threatening to use them as human shields¹⁴⁷⁹ at the SLA Cockerill Defence HQ and Wilberforce in Freetown.¹⁴⁸⁰ RUF/AFRC forces were lodged in the Mammy Yoko complex until the ECOMOG intervention in Freetown in February 1998.

Meanwhile on 2 June, the Nigerian group moving towards Hastings (Waterloo RD) met with strong resistance from RUF/AFRC forces, who set up a defensive position at the Orogun Bridge and shelled Nigerian forces along their line of advance from Kossoh Town. With no mechanical support to clear debris dumped on the bridge by the AFRC, the Nigerian advance was delayed. Eventually, Nigerian forces moved further towards Hastings, arriving at Allen Town. RUF/AFRC forces had taken positions in the surrounding hills and continued shelling. Without significant heavy weapons support and with ammunition supplies depleted, the Nigerians were unable to advance further. Nevertheless, it is probable that Nigerian advance units were briefly in possession of Hastings Airfield and with limited artillery support were able to damage RUF positions at the Police Training School and in the village itself. RUF casualties were evacuated to Benguema Training Centre.

In the evening of 2 June, the Nigerian advance was called off following successful negotiations between the AFRC, the ICRC and foreign governments. Nigerian forces retreated from Hastings Airfield and Allen Town, returning to their base at Kossoh Town. Nigerian forces continued to use Hastings Airfield to obtain supplies of medical provisions and food until 9 June, when the RUF took over the airfield completely. Between 3 and 9 June, Nigerian forces took full control of Lungi International Airport,¹⁴⁸¹ although skirmishes with the RUF/AFRC continued throughout 1997. On

¹⁴⁷⁶ The NNS Ambe and NNS Ekun, joined on or around June 11 by NNS Aradu and NNS Ekpe: Xinhua, 11 June 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁷ The seaside location of Freetown's main hotels. Mammy Yoko would later become the Freetown Headquarters of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

¹⁴⁷⁸ Marines on the USS Kearsage evacuated over 1,200 expatriates between 25 May and 2 June 1997 both from Aberdeen and a collection point on a beach to the south of Freetown. See US Defence Department Briefing, 3 June 1997.

¹⁴⁷⁹ AFP, 3 June 1997 reports: "Sierra Leonean state radio repeatedly broadcast reports of 300 Nigerian soldiers being held as 'lucrative targets which would be targets for any possible Nigerian bombardment' of the city."

¹⁴⁸⁰ AFP, 3-4 June 1997.

¹⁴⁸¹ AFP, 9 June 1997.



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21 June, Ghanaian-led mediation between Nigeria and the RUF/AFRC led to the withdrawal of the four Nigerian warships from Sierra Leonean waters.¹⁴⁸²

Throughout June 1997, RUF/AFRC forces began targeting students and prominent people in Freetown, including journalists, lawyers, human rights activists and others for their perceived lack of support for the RUF/AFRC coup. For example, RUF/AFRC forces beat up a prominent journalist when he told another journalist that he did not support the coup, as a result of which he went into hiding. Two students were arrested and tortured for failing to support the coup. One was held for over two months without charge, while the other was cut with a razor blade for possessing a National Union of Sierra Leone Students (NUSS) card. NUSS issued a statement condemning the coup and called for the reinstatement of the elected government. Another journalist was severely beaten by armed soldiers who accused him of hiding a government minister in his house. This journalist later fled the country after receiving death threats.

Also in June, AFRC officials arrested 15 people – seven civilians and eight senior SLA officers – on allegations that they were involved in a coup plot to reverse the coup. The detainees were ill-treated in custody and held for over six weeks without charge. The same month, the AFRC anti-looting squad caught two civilians who were alleged to have broken the curfew, cut off their genitals and limbs and left their torsos on the road as a warning to others.

July 1997 was marked by similar events. In addition, this was the month when the pro-democracy pirate radio station FM 98.1 came to the air, beginning broadcasting on 7 July 1997 from locations in the Republic of Guinea and possibly from within the Nigerian base at Lungi International Airport.¹⁴⁸³ Seven media workers and visitors were arrested at offices of a Freetown newspaper on the suspicion of being connected to the clandestine station. A woman at the office, who was seven months pregnant at the time, was physically and possibly also sexually abused by her captors; she died three weeks later from a miscarriage and massive bleeding. The other detainees were released after over a week in prison. In addition, RUF/AFRC forces shot a 22-year-old woman when she defended her right to listen to the radio station, which often broadcast anti-AFRC statements and speeches from the exiled President.

The advent of Radio Democracy (FM 98.1) also saw increased attacks on journalists in general. Journalists accused of writing subversive stories were arrested, as were vendors who sold the offending editions. Many journalists were arrested, including one who was arrested and detained for several days, accused of sending messages to the Sierra Leonean President in Guinea, while others fled the country. At the time, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) issued a statement protesting against the arbitrary arrest and detention of journalists as four media workers were held for activities deemed subversive by the AFRC.

People were also killed during this period for other reasons, including for the purposes of taking their property. For example, a civilian was killed in Freetown when a member of the AFRC

¹⁴⁸² AFP, 21 June 1997.

¹⁴⁸³ On 18 May 1998, UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, announced that the Foreign Office had provided £60,000 to support the clandestine radio station. BBC, 20 May 1998.



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demanded he hand over an army belt that he was wearing. The RUF/AFRC forces killed another man when he told them that he had the right to move freely at night since there was no curfew in place. In addition, a trader was shot and killed near Kline Town on 6 July 1997 when a member of the RUF/AFRC opened fire at a person he was arguing with and missed. Youth in the area left the body in the road so that the AFRC Chairman could see for himself the work of "his boys".

In the Wellington area of Freetown, a businessman was robbed of thousands of dollars when armed men in uniform ransacked his home. He was then forced to watch as the RUF/AFRC forces raped his wife. In addition, a Ports Authority worker was arrested on 10 July 1997 on suspicion of being a supporter of the ousted government and was held for over four months at Pademba Road prison.

In the early evening of 12 July 1997, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Nigerian positions at Kossoh Town, but were overpowered and repelled by heavy gun and mortar blasts coupled with air support from an Alfa Jet. As a result of this attack, more civilians fled to the hilltop overlooking Hastings and Kossoh Town. Around 450 houses were looted and partially destroyed by the contingent of the RUF based at Hastings village. Over 10,000 residents fled Hastings and sought refuge at nearby ECOMOG bases at Jui and Kossoh Town. Around Kossoh Town, ECOMOG expanded the territory under their control both to extend protection to these civilians and to block the main highway out of Freetown. Although most intense on 12 and 13 July 1997, skirmishes continued between ECOMOG and RUF/AFRC forces until 17 July 1997. ECOMOG's Kossoh Town and Jui positions were attacked again in August 1997. RUF forces moved from the Benguema Training Centre and attacked Jui, while others moved from Regent and attacked the ECOMOG base at Kossoh Town; both attacks were successfully repelled.

Between 17 and 18 July, a delegation representing the AFRC launched negotiations with the ECOWAS Committee of Five in Abidjan, resulting in a ceasefire. A second round of talks was held across 29-30 July 1997, after which the AFRC leader announced over SLBS that there would be a return to civilian rule in not less than four years.

The National Union of Sierra Leonean Students (NUSS) organised a pro-democracy demonstration on 18 August 1997. This met with an immediate and brutal response from the AFRC. Over 110 people, including 65 students, were arrested and detained for 12 days after the demonstration. Many of the detainees were seriously wounded with bayonets and cutlasses by the RUF/AFRC forces. In one case, the injuries were so serious that the prisons officials refused to accept the detainee for fear he might die. At least six female students were abducted and sexually abused by AFRC forces. One student was held captive for over a week and forced to go naked for the first two days of her captivity. In addition, the Secretary General of the Sierra Leone Teachers Union (SLTU) was arrested and beaten up, because striking teachers declared solidarity with the pro-democracy cause.

A Freetown lawyer and human rights activist was detained by the RUF/AFRC forces, beaten, tortured and forced to make a statement on the government radio, calling on students to go home. He was held incommunicado for over two weeks. A prominent female leader was also arrested a few days after the demonstration. She fled the country following her release from detention. RUF/AFRC forces captured a teacher who had participated in the 18 August demonstration at the

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ECOMOG camp at Jui when she strayed on the main road. She was sexually assaulted by at least eight soldiers on the first day of her captivity then held at the Benguema Training Centre for over a week, during which she was repeatedly raped.

AFRC forces killed at least six peaceful demonstrators. Two of them were students, one of whom was shot. After he died, AFRC forces mutilated and ate his body in what was described as "ritual cannibalism", according to which RUF/AFRC forces allegedly believed that eating human flesh would give them "more courage".

Following the suppression of the demonstration, hostile activity against the press in particular was stepped up. Journalists who attempted to demonstrate were injured and detained at Cockerill Military headquarters. Two journalists required stitches after they were cut deeply on the back and head respectively with a razor blade. The men were held in a freight container at Cockerill for over 24 hours without food, water or medical attention. One SLAJ Executive member was arrested and also held at Cockerill in a freight container for several days for alleged participation in the pro-democracy protest. Armed forces attacked another SLAJ Executive member in his house, who subsequently escaped and fled to Guinea. Arrests and detentions of so-called Kabbah supporters continued. Three people - a teacher, a trader and a student - were all held without charge at the Pademba Road prison for several days on this basis.

The AFRC banned all movement of commercial and relief food to the estimated 30,000 displaced people sheltering at the Jui ECOMOG camp. The death rate from disease and malnutrition rose from 22 in June to 35 by the end of August 1997. AFRC forces laid anti-personnel landmines around the ECOMOG base at the Hastings-Grafton (Waterloo RD) road. In August 1997, disgruntled RUF members started taking private property from civilians passing through their checkpoint at the Boys' Society Compound in Regent (Mountain RD). They claimed that this was in lieu of the monthly salary that soldiers of the AFRC were receiving.

Calls for a trade embargo against the AFRC had been repeatedly made since June 1997. Nigerian forces had imposed a navel blockade on the Port of Freetown between 25 May and 21 June 1997, but were forced to back down by the AFRC's diplomatic overtures concerning return to civilian rule. On or around 2 August a Ukrainian vessel, the *Kapitan Modest Ivanov*, docked at Freetown Kissy Terminal (Greater Freetown) carrying 6,800 tonnes of rice;¹⁴⁸⁴ a number of other ships carrying fuel also docked successfully in Freetown, including a Chinese vessel carrying 28,000 tones of fuel on 3 August¹⁴⁸⁵ and a Panamanian vessel on 1 and 10 August.¹⁴⁸⁶ This was unacceptable to the Nigerian Government, primarily since it took considerable pressure off the AFRC to continue immediate negotiations.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Lloyds List, 2 August 1997.

¹⁴⁸⁵ AFP, 3 August 1997.

¹⁴⁸⁶ AFP, 24 August 1997.



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However, on 29 August, at its 20th Annual Summit, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone, effective throughout all ECOWAS member States.¹⁴⁸⁷ The ECOWAS embargo included military hardware, supplies and spare parts, petroleum and petrol-derived products. An export ban was also imposed. A travel ban was imposed on AFRC members and their families, in addition to a freeze on their assets. Moreover, ECOWAS formally expanded the mandate of ECOMOG to include the use of force to impose sanctions against Sierra Leone.¹⁴⁸⁸ Effectively, this gave legal backing to a complete naval blockade of the Port of Freetown and the prohibition of air-freight traffic. From this date, the Nigerian forces present in Sierra Leone operated under an ECOMOG banner. On the same day that these sanctions were approved, ECOMOG artillery at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District) fired on two cargo ships moored outside the territorial waters of Sierra Leone as a warning not to enter. Aside from shelling incoming ships, ECOMOG forces at Lungi enforced the sanctions by shelling the Kissy Terminal and the Government Wharf in east Freetown. East Freetown is very densely populated, particularly around the port area, where there are a large number of marketplaces and slum settlements.

On 3 September, ECOMOG gunners fired across the bows of the Greek-registered *Proteus* as it entered the Port of Freetown, forcing it to anchor out at sea. This artillery barrage reportedly killed 15 people at Dove Cote market.¹⁴⁸⁹ The AFRC claimed that 50 people were killed across the eastern Freetown ward of Mabella, although there was intense scepticism about this number. Following these deaths, AFRC forces added further security to the Kissy Terminal. In the wake of the shelling, at least two Nigerian nationals resident in Freetown were killed; their corpses were mutilated and put on display along the streets of Freetown on 9 September 1997. ECOMOG Alfa Jets air raided Kissy Terminal on 7 September, reportedly destroying 10 moored vessels.¹⁴⁹⁰ The *Proteus* eventually entered the port, prompting an ECOMOG air sortie, which partially destroyed the boat. On 13 September, SLBS reported that ECOMOG Alfa Jets had bombed the oil tanker *Norvisco*, killing two members of the crew.¹⁴⁹¹ ECOMOG air activity was met with anti-aircraft gunfire from AFRC positions across Freetown.

Over 200,000 people fled the area following this escalation of hostilities between ECOMOG and the AFRC, amid warnings from ECOMOG that the bombing would continue. The bombings also led some AFRC forces deployed in the port and other strategic locations to withdraw from their positions to safer locations the hilltops, leaving behind many arms and ammunition of various types. Later in the month, ECOMOG also announced that they would be patrolling the harbour area with gunboats.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Decision on sanctions against the junta in Sierra Leone, Twentieth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, Abuja, 28-29 August 1997. Source: ECOWAS

¹⁴⁸⁸ Ibid. "Article 7. The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision."

¹⁴⁸⁹ AFP, 4 September 1997.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Xinhua, 7 September 1997.

¹⁴⁹¹ BBC, 15 September 1997.



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On 8 October, the UN Security Council unanimously gave its support to the ECOWAS sanctions regime, extending its provisions to all UN member States.¹⁴⁹² Between 8 and 14 October, ECOMOG Alfa Jets destroyed a number of structures in the SLA Cockerill Defence HQ and silenced SLBS TV and radio by destroying a transmitter located on Leicester Peak, in the peninsular area of Freetown.

Around 8 October, RUF forces attacked and occupied the villages of Bathurst, Mongema and Charlotte (all Mountain RD) along the mountain road between Freetown and Kossoh Town, where ECOMOG were stationed. Civilians were forced to prepare food for the RUF forces, who established checkpoints in all three villages. A few days later, RUF/AFRC forces attacked the Kossoh Town ECOMOG base from four flanks. The clandestine pro-democracy radio station, FM 98.1, announced the impending attack, giving civilians a chance to retreat to safer locations. Two ECOMOG soldiers were captured, killed and their corpses strung up on trees by the RUF/AFRC forces. ECOMOG forces went on the offensive in a bid to repel these forces and capture all the surrounding towns and villages, including Kossoh Town, Grafton, Jui and other nearby coastal villages. This expanded ECOMOG control over movement to and from Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces retreated east to Yams Farm (Waterloo RD). ECOMOG strengthened their position around Hastings, allowing civilians to return to the village.

AFRC actions against civil society continued throughout October. Armed AFRC members beat a university lecturer who was wrongly assumed to be a relative of the exiled President and looted his house. Another 18 men and two women were taken from a house and held in the container cell at Cockerill on suspicion of being informants for the exiled Government. AFRC forces shot a journalist when he went to investigate the AFRC-inspired burning of the Presidential residence, torturing him as he lay wounded on the ground. Another journalist was arrested and thrown in Pademba Road Prison for alleged anti-AFRC activities. His sister-in-law and her 13-year-old daughter were both raped by the AFRC forces during a raid of their residence. In addition, three journalists were arrested within 24 hours of each other, accused of subversive activities; all were beaten at time of their arrest and detained in Pademba Road Prison. No formal charges brought against them. On 15 October 1997, a newspaper editor was arrested and severely beaten by AFRC forces. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the journalist sustained rifle butt wounds on his head, was blindfolded and taken to the notorious Sahr Sandi Army Camp¹⁴⁹³ near Regent (Mountain RD) and detained incommunicado with hard labour.

The AFRC shut down one of Sierra Leone's most popular newspapers during October, raiding their offices, arresting the editor and detaining him in Pademba Road Prison. All the newspaper's equipment and vehicles were seized. The AFRC spokesman told journalists that the paper had been banned. The intimidation and harassment of journalists continued into November 1997, during which the Committee to Protect Journalists posted a special action alert on the Internet warning that the AFRC was circulating a "wanted" list of 13 journalists and called on all to condemn the flagrant attacks on press freedom by the AFRC. Nevertheless, the editor of another well-known Freetown newspaper was arrested on 21 November, tortured and left at the SLP Criminal Investigation

¹⁴⁹² UNSC Resolution 1132 (1997).

¹⁴⁹³ Also known as "SS Camp".



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Division cells for subversive activities. Many other editors and publishers were also arrested and detained for a number of days for subversive activities. This clampdown on journalists continued until December, at which time some journalists went into hiding after receiving death threats from the AFRC.

Civilians fleeing ECOMOG shelling in Kissy and the east end were forced to use the poor quality peninsular road leading through Tombo to Waterloo. This movement resulted in a major road traffic accident at a place called Comfort Bridge near York, during which 67 people were killed. RUF/AFRC movement to the inland provinces was also limited to this route. Checkpoints and security points at major locations like Tombo and St Michaels Lodge on the route were maintained by the RUF/AFRC.

The continuous shelling of strategic locations in Freetown, the effects of the embargo and the AFRC's inability to dislodge ECOMOG from Kossoh and Jui prompted them to continue the negotiations started early in the year. ECOWAS mediators, led by the then Nigerian Foreign Minister, hammered out a peace plan. This led to a ceasefire on 21 October 1997, followed on 23 October by the signing of the Economic Community of West African States six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-22 April 1998).¹⁴⁹⁴ The central provisions of this agreement were the maintenance of a ceasefire and the return of the elected Government by 22 April 1998. Other provisions included the hammering out of nationwide demobilisation and disarmament plans across December 1997 and the return of internally displaced persons to their places of habitual residence. ECOMOG and UN observers would supervise the implementation process, effectively requiring the deployment of ECOMOG forces throughout Sierra Leone.

Throughout December, numerous of violations of the spirit and letter of the ceasefire occurred across Sierra Leone. The CDF High Command implemented "Operation Black December", during which Kamajor units in Boama Chiefdom (Bo District) cut off all the highways and roads leading to the villages, restricting the movement of RUF/AFRC forces. Kamajors from Gorama Mende (Kenema District) also took part, cutting off stretches of the Kono-Makeni highway. In Pujehun District, Kamajors engaged RUF/AFRC forces around Pujehun Town (Kpanga Kagonde Chiefdom, Pujehun District) and in areas of Gbondapi (Panga Kabone Chiefdom, Pujehun District). In Bombali District, ECOMOG jets bombed positions outside of Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District), claiming that the ARFC was constructing an asphalt runway to allow arms supplies to enter the country more freely in violation of ECOWAS and UN sanctions. RUF/AFRC forces conducted violent food-finding missions in Koinadugu District, attacking civilians and stealing from residences in the towns of Mansofenia and Kurobonla (Neya Chiefdom, Koinadugu District).

On 21 December, the exiled President flew from Conakry to the ECOMOG base at Freetown International Airport to spur on the implementation of the peace process.

f) Events in 1998

¹⁴⁹⁴ Full text available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_09231997.html.

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Despite the Conakry Accord, RUF/AFRC attacks on ECOMOG and their harassment of civilians, particularly businessmen and other high profile people, became frequent in the city and its environs. This instability in the city and the country at large provoked the February 1998 military intervention by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces.

ECOMOG began preparations for an invasion of Freetown in mid-January, reinforcing the ECOMOG field artillery and concentrating its forces at Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD), in addition to flying training sorties over selected positions in Freetown. On 5 February, operational orders were given to ECOMOG to break out of Kossoh Town and take control of Freetown. Three major movements were planned. The Nigerian 2nd Mechanised Battalion was to move along the main Freetown highway to capture Freetown. Protecting its flank, the Nigerian 5th Mechanised Battalion was to advance towards Freetown through Upper Allen Town, Calaba Town and Portee (Greater Freetown) along the old Freetown highway, which eventually joins the main Freetown highway through a series of junctions at Kissy. The Nigerian 5th Mechanised Battalion would disperse within Freetown and capture strategic governmental and security institutions. The Nigerian 231st Tank Battalion was ordered to seize Waterloo and the Benguema Training Centre (both in Waterloo RD), heading away from Freetown.¹⁴⁹⁵

Shortly before dawn on 6 February, the ECOMOG intervention began on three fronts. One front moved from Jui (Waterloo RD) towards Freetown; a second front moved from Hastings Airfield towards Waterloo. ECOMOG also opened a third front and moved from Kossoh Town through the hills to Regent (Mountain RD) and down into the Mount Aureol (Mountain RD) and Hill Station (Greater Freetown) entrances to metropolitan Freetown.

RUF/AFRC forces had blocked the road across Orogun Bridge with a large container, delaying the ECOMOG advance. ECOMOG fought several battles along the route into Freetown. At Portee Junction, a fierce battle was fought, forcing the RUF/AFRC to retreat towards the west end of Freetown and giving ECOMOG forces the upper hand to flush them out of Freetown on to the villages via the peninsular, the only safe exit from the city. There is very little detailed information about the conduct of the battle within the Freetown metropolitan area. It is clear that the RUF/AFRC put up stern resistance at the Kissy Terminal and used gunboats to fire on some ECOMOG advance units that reached the Connaught and Wharf areas of central Freetown. Eventually retreating from Kissy Terminal, RUF/AFRC forces booby-trapped and vandalised a considerable amount of the harbour machinery and equipment.¹⁴⁹⁶

The ECOMOG group moving from Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD) into Freetown along the mountain road encountered landmines between Mortema and Charlotte village (both Mountain RD). RUF/AFRC forces also placed a large cargo container filled with sand across the single carriageway road between Mangaba and Mortema village (both Mountain RD). ECOMOG forces assisted by local youths managed to dislodge this obstacle and entered Regent (Mountain RD) by midday on 6 February, securing the village. RUF forces stationed at Regent and Bathurst (both

¹⁴⁹⁵ This account of the advance plans is taken mainly from Adeshina, pp.22 ff.

¹⁴⁹⁶ The vandalism was comprehensive enough to delay the offloading of nearly 800 tons of humanitarian aid from a UN ship on 22 February 1998: AFP, 22 February 1998.



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Mountain RD) withdrew with their possessions along the route from Regent through Gloucester into Freetown. AFRC forces positioned mortars at Regent and shelled ECOMOG along the mountain road.

Between 10 and 12 February, ECOMOG forces advanced into Freetown along two routes into the town: through the Mount Aureol (Mountain RD) campus of Fourah Bay College and through Hill Station (Greater Freetown). Mount Aureol is the highest point in Freetown and overlooks the entire Kissy area and all approach roads into Freetown from Kossoh Town. In addition, the road from Mount Aureol into Freetown leads directly to the civic quarter of Freetown. The Hill Station route leads directly to the SLA Wilberforce Barracks and into the west Freetown areas of Lumley and Aberdeen (Greater Freetown). Control of this road isolates the TV and radio transmitter at Leicester Peak (Mountain RD) and Freetown's second hospital.

Other auxiliary forces also fought alongside with the ECOMOG troops, namely the Organised Body of Hunters Society (OBHS) in addition to Kamajors and Gbethis from the CDF. These auxiliary troops were responsible for carrying ammunition for the ECOMOG forces and some few loyal¹⁴⁹⁷ SLA forces fighting alongside ECOMOG;¹⁴⁹⁸ they were also responsible for burying RUF/AFRC fatalities and civilians who were killed during the offensive. CDF forces advancing with ECOMOG through the Mountain RD villages of Charlotte, Bathurst and Regent were used to screen the many civilians who used bush tracks to flee the fighting on the main highway. The tactic was useful in preventing the RUF infiltration of territory only lightly occupied by ECOMOG throughout the main assault.

The ECOMOG advance westward into Freetown along the main highway left those RUF/AFRC forces stationed in Freetown only one option for retreat: east along the poor quality peninsula road. By 8 February, RUF/AFRC forces retreating along this route using hundreds of commandeered utility vans and jeeps started arriving at Tombo (Waterloo RD). RUF/AFRC forces threatened to kill every resident of Tombo (Waterloo RD) unless the owners of fishing boats gave them passage to Fogbo Jetty (Koya RD). The RUF/AFRC forces abandoned many of their vehicles at Tombo (Waterloo RD). Most were stripped down or burned, but vehicles in working order were taken to Waterloo between February and March of 1998 by the ECOMOG forces and parked in front of the Rural Education Committee School near the Post Office. A large cache of weapons abandoned by retreating RUF/AFRC forces was handed over to ECOMOG by the Tombo village (Waterloo RD) authorities. An RUF member who had failed to escape to Fogbo (Koya RD) shot dead a popular young man who had arranged the weapons collection.

The ECOMOG advance westward into Waterloo from Hastings (both Waterloo RD) along the main highway quickly dislodged the RUF/AFRC forces based at Yams Farm (Waterloo RD) and pursued them to Waterloo. These ECOMOG forces captured Waterloo without any resistance on 6 February 1998. All the villages on ECOMOG's route to Waterloo, including Lower Allen Town,

¹⁴⁹⁷ Namely, those SLA forces that did not change their allegiance to the leaders of the AFRC and instead retained allegiance to President Kabbah.

¹⁴⁹⁸ ECOMOG reported that 84 "loyal" SLA soldiers had surrendered to them in early February, but it is not clear whether ECOMOG had under its command any full units of the SLA that were unaffiliated with the AFRC.



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Rokel and Devil Hole (all Waterloo RD), were cleared of RUF/AFRC forces and lightly occupied. Residents of these villages fled towards Waterloo and onwards towards Newton (Koya RD) as ECOMOG advanced. Civil militia in Waterloo assisted ECOMOG in identifying the key locations in the town. During the shelling of Waterloo, ECOMOG levelled a two-story house.

At Waterloo, ECOMOG mounted a checkpoint at the Post Office, ordering local youths to dig trenches for them. ECOMOG forces shot a man with learning difficulties who had failed to identify himself promptly and executed a man alleged by villagers of Matanky (Waterloo RD) to be an RUF/AFRC collaborator. Throughout Waterloo and Lumpa, ECOMOG conducted house-to-house searches for RUF/AFRC members. Civilians were instructed to clear the streets and remain in their residences while ECOMOG searched for armaments.

In the afternoon of the ECOMOG capture of Waterloo, an Alpha Jet flew over the village and the camp. The ECOMOG forces then moved to Lumpa, where they established a base and a checkpoint near the Banga Farm palm oil plantation (straddling Waterloo and Koya RDs). ECOMOG forces executed a young man and maltreated an unknown number of others before advancing to Campbell Town (Waterloo RD), where they attacked the remnants of the RUF/AFRC forces, killing six. Three days after the capture of Waterloo, several unarmed SSD officers surrendered to ECOMOG at their Post Office checkpoint. Some were sent to Kossuh Town (Waterloo RD) while others remained at Waterloo.

Thousands of civilians, together with some of the RUF/AFRC forces based at the Benguema Training Centre, Waterloo, Lumpa and satellite villages moved towards the Waterloo Displaced Camp, east of Waterloo (all Waterloo RD). The RUF/AFRC forces stationed at the Benguema Training Centre offered resistance to ECOMOG until they were overrun on 9 February.¹⁴⁹⁹

Over the next few days, the RUF/AFRC forces moved from the Waterloo Displaced Camp and counter-attacked the ECOMOG troops based at Lumpa. This led to the renewed shelling of the camp by ECOMOG and a mass movement of civilians and RUF/AFRC forces towards the main highway at Newton (Koya RD), where the other RUF/AFRC forces from Fogbo Jetty (Koya RD) joined them. This group of RUF/AFRC forces subsequently moved inland to Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) along the main highway. They took with them a large number of abducted civilians, allegedly to prevent the ECOMOG Alpha Jet from bombing them on their way to Masiaka.

By 12 February, ECOMOG had control over the majority of the Freetown metropolitan area and had commenced intense "mopping-up" operations. Between 12 and 24 February a curfew was imposed throughout areas occupied by ECOMOG. They established checkpoints all over the city and in villages through the York and Mountain RDs. At locations in York RD, a civil militia was trained by ECOMOG to maintain these checkpoints and assist them in identifying suspected RUF/AFRC members and collaborators. Other militia groups were trained by ECOMOG at Hamilton and Lakka (both York RD). The OBHS, who were armed, also assisted ECOMOG forces

¹⁴⁹⁹ ECOMOG claimed they had captured Benguema Training Centre (Waterloo RD) on 9 February: AFP, 9 February 1998.



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with screening and operating checkpoints. During this period, ECOMOG forces killed a lot of civilians without any form of trial¹⁵⁰⁰ and “cordon and search” operations were conducted as a mechanism for trapping suspected RUF/AFRC members and sympathisers.

Between 16 February and 3 March, ECOMOG mounted checkpoints at Goderich, Lakka, Hamilton, Sussex, Bawbaw, Tokeh, York, Kissy Town (all York RD), Tombo, Russell and Madina (all Waterloo RD). The Nigerian 232nd Tank Battalion operated the checkpoint at Long Beach in Hamilton. ECOMOG forces based at Lakka imposed a fish tax on the villagers: every fishing day, a large basket was passed around among the fishers, into which everyone was supposed to contribute a minimum of four fish to feed the Nigerian contingent. These fish were demanded as a contribution to ECOMOG’s daily food ration, although sometimes they were sold and the ECOMOG forces kept the money.

Between Freetown and Newton (Koya RD), ECOMOG erected several checkpoints. At each of these checkpoints, ECOMOG forces intimidated civilians, took their money and beat and killed people, among other things. For example, people were killed for failing to produce an identity card or for being suspected of being a relative of any member of the AFRC, RUF or SLA forces.

While Nigerian ECOMOG forces were generally welcomed, there were many instances of apparently arbitrary punishment and cruel treatment of civilians. In March 1998, ECOMOG soldiers from the Nigerian 192nd Battalion were stationed at York village (York RD). On finding a vehicle burned-out by retreating RUF/AFRC forces, the ECOMOG platoon commander demanded that all the men of the village gather at the Hospital compound so they could identify who was responsible for the burning. The village elders were made to sit on the floor, which symbolically is extremely demeaning. The gathered men were divided into groups according to their age and interrogated by ECOMOG forces. When they failed to obtain information about the vehicle, ECOMOG forces beat the gathered men with doubled-up length of electrical cable. Starting with the Head Man and moving from eldest to youngest, ECOMOG forces hit each man at least 12 times before deciding that three young men had the information they sought. These three youths were left out in the sun for a day and then beaten with sticks.

After 2 March, ECOMOG forces began running night and day patrols between the villages of Sussex and Baw-Baw (both York RD). Local youths were trained to run patrols between Baw-Baw and Number Two River (York RD).

In early March 1998, there was also an influx of Kamajors into York RD from Kagboro Chiefdom (Moyamba District), establishing bases in and around Tokeh (York RD). Between 8 and 10 March, a Kamajor commander order a local youth group to mount a checkpoint at the Number Two River Road Junction (York RD); ECOMOG later ordered them to dismantle the checkpoint. In Tombo (Waterloo RD), Kamajors took up residence in the village, claiming to be providing security. The Kamajors took property from the houses of two suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators and ill-treated a number of residents who complained. Following requests from the village authorities, ECOMOG



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ordered the departure of all Kamajors from the Tombo area. Kamajors also deployed to provide security in Regent and Bathurst villages (Mountain RD).

On 17 February, a supervisory task force was set-up to provide joint leadership between ECOMOG and the exiled Government during the immediate post-intervention period. The task force met with representatives of key civil society groups and governmental institutions. British and Nigerian military vessels docked in water off Freetown on 1 March 1998 to provide technical assistance on a range of unspecified matters.¹⁵⁰¹ On 10 March, the President returned to Freetown, which was followed a few days later by the UN Security Council lifting the ban on fuel imports to Sierra Leone and deciding to review other sanctions provisions.¹⁵⁰² Nevertheless, the prohibition on the importation of arms remained in force.

Successful ECOMOG interventions in Bo (Kakua Chiefdom, Bo District) and Kenema (Nongowa Chiefdom, Kenema District) took place between 12 and 17 February, coinciding with operations in the Western Area. Following their successful offensives against RUF/AFRC forces in the Western Area and Southern Province, ECOMOG focussed on operations in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sierra Leone. In brief, between 1 March 1998 and 5 March, ECOMOG forces took control of Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District), Makeni (Makari Gbanti Chiefdom, Bombali District) and Magburaka (Kholifa Rowalla Chiefdom, Tonkolili District) and locations in Koinadugu District thereafter. ECOMOG moved into Kono District, taking full control of Koidu (Gbense Chiefdom, Kono District) in early April 1998. ECOMOG forces had also moved as far east as Daru (Jawie Chiefdom, Kailahun District) by April 1998.

On 17 April, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of a 10-strong team of military and security observers to Sierra Leone, who arrived in May 1998.¹⁵⁰³ The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), comprising around 70 military observers and accompanying logistic support, was established on 13 July 1998.¹⁵⁰⁴

Immediately after the reinstatement of the President, criminal investigations into hundreds of alleged RUF/AFRC collaborators and surrendered SLA soldiers detained at the Pademba Road Prison commenced, ending in a wave of treason trials. Between 21 March and 14 April 1998, 35 civilians who were alleged members of the AFRC regime were charged in three separate trials with treason, a crime punishable by death in Sierra Leone. On 24 August, all 35 were found guilty by jury trial and the court handed down sentences of death to 16 of these 35. All appealed the death sentence and were still in prison awaiting their appeals when the RUF invaded Freetown in early January 1999; they were later pardoned as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement. On 24 July 1998, 34 members of the SLA accused of carrying out the AFRC coup faced a court martial. On 12 October, all were found guilty of treason by a military court and 24 were executed by firing squad on 19 October at

¹⁵⁰¹ AP, 1 March 1998.

¹⁵⁰² UN Security Council Resolution 1156 (1998), 15 March 1998.

¹⁵⁰³ UN Security Council Resolution 1162 (1998), 17 April 1998.

¹⁵⁰⁴ UN Security Council Resolution 1181 (1998), 13 July 1998.



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the SLA Juba Barracks in west Freetown.¹⁵⁰⁵ The remaining 10 had their sentences commuted to long prison terms. Some 300 SLA members under investigation for their suspected involvement with the AFRC were released from government custody on or around 3 September. A final set of treason charges were brought against 22 civilians on 14 December.

The RUF leader was repatriated to Sierra Leone from Nigeria on 25 July and charged with treason on 4 September. Despite efforts to locate counsel for him, he represented himself throughout the trial, which began on 4 October. A jury found him guilty and the court sentenced him to death on 23 October; the RUF leader appealed the sentence and remained in custody until he was pardoned as part of the Lomé Peace Agreement. In September, ECOMOG formally moved its headquarters from Monrovia, Liberia to Freetown.

On 21 December 1998, RUF/AFRC forces attacked Songo and Six-Mile (Koya RD) and, by the early afternoon, had arrived at Newton Village (Koya RD), resulting in a mass movement of civilians to Waterloo (Waterloo RD). The swell of people into Waterloo caused widespread panic-buying of food and palm wine. Later that same day, residents of Waterloo heard small arms fire coming from Banga Farm, on the main highway between Waterloo and Newton. Late that night, ECOMOG forces based at the Waterloo Post Office and Peninsular Secondary School launched several mortars towards Banga Farm, followed by an aerial bombardment by the Alpha Jet at the same location.

Heavily armed RUF/AFRC forces attacked Waterloo (Waterloo RD) before dawn on 22 December 1998. During this attack, they killed between 15 and 19 civilians, looted extensively and burnt down at least 53 houses. AFRC forces identified as being comprised predominantly of ex-SLA members marched down Calmont Road with powerful flashlights, targeting the houses of prominent people in Waterloo. A large RUF Small Boy Unit accompanied them, sprinkling petrol on doorframes and around houses. The AFRC forces ignited the petrol with gunfire, setting fire to the houses. A Guinean ECOMOG unit entered Waterloo and commenced shelling the RUF/AFRC forces from an armoured car, resulting in their onwards advance to the Benguema Training Centre (Waterloo RD). The RUF/AFRC forces captured a large cache of arms and ammunition before destroying the base's main ammunition dump. A prominent AFRC commander was killed in the explosion and buried nearby Koba, a few kilometres south of Benguema.

RUF/AFRC forces continued advancing southward along the peninsular road, moving from the Benguema Training Centre through Koba, During Town, Boyah Village and Russell (all Waterloo RD). At Russell, RUF/AFRC forces dislodged the small ECOMOG contingent stationed there. Not long after midnight on 24 December, RUF/AFRC forces entered Tombo through Worlai Village (both Waterloo RD), to the immediate east of Tombo. The day before, the village authorities of

¹⁵⁰⁵ Those sentenced to death in the court martial had submitted a complaint to the Committee on Human Rights under the procedure in the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, alleging that their right to appeal, guaranteed in article 14(5), had been violated: Communication Nos. 839/1998 & 840/1998 & 841/1998. Despite the Committee requesting a stay of execution, they were executed a week after they had lodged their complaint. The Committee subsequently found that their rights had in fact been violated, as there was no right of appeal from a court martial: *Anthony B Mansaraj et al; Mr Gborie Tamba et al; Mr Abdul Karim Sesay et al v Sierra Leone*, decision of 16 July 2001.



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Tombo had received warning of the coming RUF/AFRC attack from an SLA soldier who escaped the attack on Benguema Training Centre.

At that time, the RUF were accompanied by a large number of civilians, some carrying ammunition and other supplies and some banging drums and chanting about celebrating Ramadan in Tombo (Waterloo RD). To help identify each other in night attacks, RUF/AFRC forces stuck the transparent cellophane wrapping from popular boiled sweets called "Diamonds" over their torch lenses, giving the beams a red tint. The Nigerian ECOMOG contingent was outnumbered and immediately retreated towards Freetown along the peninsula road through Kassi to Kissy Town (Waterloo RD), together with thousands of civilians. Many civilians escaped by boats to Shenge (Kagboro Chiefdom, Moyamba District), Banana Island¹⁵⁰⁶ and villages inland along the Ribbi River, while others moved to Lakka Village (York RD). RUF/AFRC forces left Tombo, having taken the contents of many abandoned homes, and burned down at least 20 others without attempting to occupy the township.

Between 22 and 25 December 1998, Nigerian ECOMOG reinforced Waterloo. On 24 December, Hastings was reinforced by around 500 Kamajors, who immediately imposed a curfew between the hours of 18.00 and 07.00. Two days later, Kamajor members arrested two suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators, who were tied up, their heads forced into a large white plastic bowl and their throats cut; civilians were forced to bury the corpses. Kamajors also killed four other civilians at Jui Junction, near Kossoh Town (Waterloo RD), leaving a severed head on a pole at their checkpoint.

Waterloo Town was bombarded by ECOMOG on 26 December 1998, causing further civilian flight from the town. A Guinean ECOMOG contingent from Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) reinforced ECOMOG stationed at Waterloo (Waterloo RD), and set up a base at the SDA School compound, moving later to the PSS School compound. Guinean ECOMOG provided limited security around the market area of Waterloo, where traders remained at work until the RUF/AFRC raided Lumpa (Waterloo RD). Members of the Guinean ECOMOG contingent mistakenly killed eight traders who were running towards the PSS Compound to escape an RUF/AFRC ambush at Lumpa. The RUF/AFRC occupied Lumpa and other parts of Waterloo, effectively dividing the town in two. RUF/AFRC forces stole medical supplies from the Waterloo Health Centre. The RUF/AFRC stayed in Lumpa throughout January, forcing civilians to perform domestic services for them; they would not allow civilians to close their doors and performed frequent house-to-house searches for food. The RUF commanding officer in Lumpa personally executed at least three civilians, dumping the body of one victim in a pit latrine and cutting out and eating the heart of another. At this time, the RUF and AFRC forces were not lodging together.

Between 25 and 28 December, RUF/AFRC advance units continued from Tombo around the peninsula towards Freetown. The villages of Black Johnson and Big Water (both York RD), on the approach road to York, were infiltrated by small numbers of RUF/AFRC. RUF/AFRC forces exchanged heavy machine gun fire with Nigerian ECOMOG forces at the York Grass Field area of York town. ECOMOG gunners killed three members of the RUF/AFRC. Following these attacks

¹⁵⁰⁶ Also called Plantain Island.



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around the peninsula road, Nigerian ECOMOG redeployed at Tombo (Waterloo RD) in greater force. A Kamajor detachment was sent to guard the bridge at MacDonald (Waterloo RD). Nigerian ECOMOG imposed a strict security regime around the York Town area, organising local youth into groups to accompany them on a continuous day-and-night patrol routine. ECOMOG also began collecting and, in collaboration with locals, screening for RUF/AFRC infiltrators displaced by the fighting on the peninsula at locations. These screening centres included the Cotton Club and St. Michaels Lodge in Lakka and the Hamilton Community Centre (all York RD). After 6 January, villagers in Tombo burnt alive an RUF/AFRC member at the Tombo Grass Field area. An unknown number of other suspected RUF/AFRC members were killed with bladed weapons by the Tombo youth.

g) Events in 1999

Between 30 December and 5 January 1999, RUF/AFRC forces staged attacks on Hastings and Kossoh Town (both Waterloo RD). Using bush tracks through the hills from Waterloo (Waterloo RD), RUF/AFRC forces staged major attacks on Hastings, Allen Town and Jui on 5 January. They encountered sporadic resistance from ECOMOG forces who, considerably reduced in number, progressively retreated towards Freetown. On 4 and 5 January, RUF/AFRC forces, hardware and vehicles were moving continuously through Newtown and Four Mile (Koya RD) towards Waterloo, gathering in the Ibo Town area (Waterloo RD).

Just after midnight on 6 January, RUF/AFRC forces began their assault on Freetown. An advance RUF/AFRC unit, numbering around 300, moved quickly to engage ECOMOG at their Kissy Roundabout security point. Meanwhile, RUF/AFRC forces in Waterloo started round the clock attacks on the Guinean ECOMOG contingent at PSS in Waterloo. On 9 January, the RUF/AFRC granted the Guineans safe passage from the town only in return for their remaining stock of ammunition.¹⁵⁰⁷ From Ibo Town, the RUF also began sending out units to Yams Farm (Waterloo RD), from where throughout the night they laid down heavy machine gun fire on ECOMOG positions at Hastings. Civilians were often used in these attacks.

The advancing RUF/AFRC forces were reinforced by thousands of others, who entered the Wellington and Calaba Town areas of eastern Freetown. On 7 January, RUF/AFRC forces occupied a petrol station near Kissy Road roundabout and started burning every solid structure in its immediate vicinity. The exact chronology of the movement of RUF/AFRC forces through east Freetown is not completely clear. One of their first successes, on either 6 or 7 January, was a raid on Pademba Road Prison, releasing many RUF/AFRC members captured by ECOMOG and pro-government forces over the previous year. Pademba Road Prison is to the west of central Freetown in Brookfields at the end of Pademba Road, which is also an access route through to the New England and Wilberforce areas of western Freetown. That RUF/AFRC forces made it to Pademba Road so quickly suggests that they had free movement through both the centre of Freetown, through the "PZ" junction and also through the Mountain Cut route from Kissy through to New England.

¹⁵⁰⁷ The Guineans actually handed the RUF/AFRC a haul of blank ammunition.



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However, the brunt of the RUF/AFRC assault was in east Freetown. RUF/AFRC forces quickly occupied the Clay Factory IDP camp in Kissy, killing at least 20 people. ECOMOG commenced shelling into the hills behind the Clay Factory. By the early afternoon of 6 January, RUF/AFRC forces had occupied the main Kissy Terminal, killing eight ECOMOG soldiers in the Terminal's security office. The Kissy Police Station and the Kissy Mental Hospital were set on fire and a number of churches including the Holy Trinity and the Trascott Church were burned down.

Behind their line of advance, RUF forces made every civilian in the Eastern part of Freetown hoist white pieces of cloth in front of their houses and tie white ribbons on their heads and wrists to signify their support for peace. Each night, civilians were forced to burn old tyres in order to light up the city and to sing peace songs. Some beat drums while others clapped their hands or banged empty tins together. Some were even forced to dance, especially old people. Those who failed to obey these orders were shot and killed or had their houses set on fire; many civilians were burnt alive in their houses.

At irregular intervals, ECOMOG Alpha Jets bombed various locations in Freetown including "PZ", a busy business district centre, killing an unknown number of civilians who had been forced onto the streets by the RUF/AFRC.

Between 8 and 9 January 1999, the RUF/AFRC forces advanced into the west end of Freetown and were prevented from crossing the Congo Cross Road Bridge by the combined forces of ECOMOG, "loyal" SLA and CDF. The Congo Cross Road Bridge carries a dual carriageway (dubbed "main motor road") from Brookfields through to Congo Cross, Wilkinson Road, Murray Town, Lumley and Juba. It is the only way of quickly moving a large force from central to western Freetown; alternative routes into west Freetown are longer and far easier to secure. One route moves from New England to Hill Station up a steep winding mountain road in full sight of ECOMOG's main base at Wilberforce. Other routes to Congo Cross move from King Harmon Road up the winding Old Railway Line through Tembah Town and also through Congo Town along a poor quality road and a decrepit old bailey bridge. Combined with artillery from Wilberforce and the defence of the Hill Station route into west Freetown, RUF/AFRC movement westwards was halted at Congo Cross Road Bridge, from where the RUF/AFRC forces launched missiles into Congo Cross.

ECOMOG forces fought with RUF/AFRC forces for control of a key roundabout called Eastern Police between 8 and 9 January. By 10 January, ECOMOG were putting pressure RUF/AFRC forces stationed at Waterloo Town. By 11 January, the RUF/AFRC had begun their retreat east from the civic centre of Freetown, burning down the Law Courts, the telephone exchange and many government buildings.

Behind ECOMOG lines, a curfew was imposed from 15.00 to 06.00. Ahead of ECOMOG lines, a 24-hour curfew was then announced by the Government on Radio Democracy 98.1 FM. Anyone caught violating the curfew would be perceived as hostile and would be executed on the spot by the ECOMOG forces. By 13 January, ECOMOG had pushed the RUF/AFRC forces back from the Congo Cross Road Bridge and had taken control over the densely populated, central-west Brookfields area. The RUF/AFRC forces started burning houses as they retreated eastwards.



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ECOMOG advised civilians to move into the National Stadium,¹⁵⁰⁸ where ECOMOG in collaboration with the Kamajors and OHBS screened civilians. An unknown number of suspected RUF/AFRC members were lined up against the walls of the National Stadium and shot dead by ECOMOG. Other collection points for displaced persons included the National Workshop by Pademba Road Prison and the Parade Group on Fourah Bay Road. ECOMOG also began confiscating satellite telephones and radio communications equipment from international NGOs, reportedly to prevent them falling into the possession of the RUF/AFRC.

On 18 January, the HMS Norfolk arrived in Freetown carrying medical supplies and a 200-strong liaison and reconnaissance group. The UK denied that it was taking any military part in the conflict, but had earlier in January released over \$1.6 million for humanitarian supplies and logistic support for ECOMOG.

RUF/AFRC forces started mutilating civilians on 19 January 1999 at Black Hall Road in Freetown, as ECOMOG forces steadily forced them out of the city. At that time, ECOMOG forces had control over the Ferry Junction at Kissy eastward to Waterloo (Waterloo RD). Civilian volunteers used carts to transport the corpses of those killed in the conflict to the Kissy Road cemetery. On 16 January, RUF/AFRC forces they had befriended warned civilians remaining in Waterloo that an order had been given to amputate the arms of any non-RUF/AFRC found in the town. The ECOMOG Alpha Jet bombing of numerous RUF/AFRC positions in the east end of Freetown and Waterloo pushed RUF/AFRC forces eastwards to the outskirts of the city. As they retreated via the hills, avoiding the ECOMOG checkpoint at Kossoh Town, RUF/AFRC forces abducted hundreds of civilians, many of whom were given narcotics to make them compliant.

Although most of Greater Freetown area had come under ECOMOG control by 20 January, RUF/AFRC forces continued to stage attacks and attempt to infiltrate locations in the east of the town. ECOMOG reported having trouble with large numbers of snipers remaining in hillside locations overlooking their positions following the main RUF/AFRC retreat. Across February and March, RUF/AFRC occupied Waterloo (Waterloo RD), evading ECOMOG Alpha Jet bombardments by using bush paths and moving mainly during the nighttime from Waterloo to attack surrounding villages. For example, one night they attacked Susu Town near Devil Hole (Waterloo RD) at a location called Compound, where they raped and killed a policewoman. Many civilians escaped across the Madonke creek to villages in Koya Chiefdom (Port Loko District). In addition, RUF/AFRC patrols rounded up civilians hiding in the Waterloo area and returned them to the town.

At the end of January, Nigeria announced that it wished to remove its troops from Sierra Leone by May 1999.¹⁵⁰⁹ On 2 February, ECOMOG continued to reinforce with the arrival of over 400 Malian troops¹⁵¹⁰ and around 1,000 Ghanaian troops by 8 February.¹⁵¹¹ A general mobilisation of

¹⁵⁰⁸ At the highpoint of the invasion, UN World Food Program estimated that around 40,000 civilians sought security in the National Stadium by 21 January 1999.

¹⁵⁰⁹ BBC, 28 January 1999.

¹⁵¹⁰ IRIN West Africa, 2 February 1999.

¹⁵¹¹ IRIN West Africa, 8 February 1999.



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ECOMOG throughout Freetown was announced on 5 February 1999.¹⁵¹² The Chief of Staff of the SLA reportedly announced that ECOMOG would not hesitate in firing on civilians should the RUF/AFRC use them as human shields.¹⁵¹³ The ECOMOG general mobilisation was followed by an intensification of cordon and search operations throughout the city.¹⁵¹⁴ ECOMOG restructured its operations to include a specific garrison and force for the Freetown area. The UK Government stated that it would be providing a package of comprehensive logistic and other support to ECOMOG,¹⁵¹⁵ followed soon after by the announcement that it would be providing around \$16 million in military and training support for Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.¹⁵¹⁶

Between 20 and 25 February, ECOMOG launched an attack on Waterloo by continuously shelling the town. Some of the shells landed at the creek at the Christian cemetery. The remnants of RUF/AFRC forces, who were mainly ex-SLA, pulled out of Waterloo and Campbell Town along the Prince Alfred Road towards Cole Town (all Waterloo RD) and proceeding along bush tracks to the Waterloo Displaced Camp. By nightfall, all of them had left and headed towards Newton (Koya RD). In Waterloo, around 700 houses had been burnt down during the RUF/AFRC occupation. ECOMOG and Kamajor forces secured the town, with approximately 50 Kamajors deploying to Waterloo. They were shown around town by a local man who identified suspected RUF/AFRC collaborators, of whom at least two were tortured and executed by the Kamajors. The Kamajors also deployed at Bath-Comp (Koya RD), where they looted and burnt down an unknown number of civilian residences. At Kissy Town, near the IDP camp, combined "loyal" SLA and CDF on the one hand and ECOMOG on the other, erected checkpoints.

Responding to demands made by the RUF/AFRC, on 15 April the Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone temporarily released the RUF leader from prison,¹⁵¹⁷ where he had been awaiting appeal from his treason conviction, allowing him to meet with the High Command of the RUF/AFRC and engage in peace talks in Togo, Lomé.¹⁵¹⁸ Preliminary discussions between representatives of the RUF/AFRC and the Government of Sierra Leone yielded a ceasefire, which entered into force on 24 May. Full talks commenced on 25 May, leading to the signing of the Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone on 7 July 1999 (the Lomé Peace Agreement).¹⁵¹⁹ The Lomé Peace Agreement provided for a number of joint RUF-GOSL processes for the provision of humanitarian assistance, return of displaced persons, demobilisation, management of natural resources and other matters related to the consolidation of the peace process. Additionally, it contains provisions for a governmental power-sharing arrangement between the RUF and the Government. The Lomé Peace Agreement also pardoned

¹⁵¹² AFP, 4 February 1999.

¹⁵¹³ IRIN West Africa, 5 February 1999.

¹⁵¹⁴ BBC, 6 February 1999.

¹⁵¹⁵ IRIN West Africa, 22 February 1999.

¹⁵¹⁶ IRIN West Africa, 3 March 1999. The UK starting exporting ammunition and military equipment to Sierra Leone after 7 October 1999.

¹⁵¹⁷ The RUF leader was reportedly taken from Pademba Road prison into protective custody in the Republic of Guinea prior to the RUF/AFRC 6 January 1999 assault on Freetown.

¹⁵¹⁸ BBC, 15 April 1999.

¹⁵¹⁹ The full text is available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html.



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the RUF leader and others and granted a blanket amnesty to all combatants and collaborators for acts done in fulfilment of their objectives.

The RUF and AFRC leaders arrived back in Freetown on 3 October 1999 from Liberia, where they had gone following the conclusion of the peace talks.¹⁵²⁰ On 22 October, the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission to Sierra Leone to replace the previous observer mission.¹⁵²¹

h) Events in 2000

Between January and May 2000 no violent incidents are recorded for the Western Area. By 12 April 2000, the DDR program had taken on over 22,000 ex-combatants, comprising 4,227 RUF; 7,474 CDF; 5,590 AFRC; 3,804 SLA; and 1,463 unaffiliated combatants.¹⁵²²

On 1 May, the United Nations reported that RUF forces had attacked its positions near Newton (Koya RD), a few miles east of Waterloo (Waterloo RD),¹⁵²³ that there had been a number of RUF attacks near Waterloo and that RUF forces had been seen moving towards Hastings (Waterloo RD). However, the BBC reported on 6 May that UNAMSIL had retracted the latter statement and that in an “unfortunate reporting error on our part” they had confused this with RUF activity near Lunsar (Marampa Chiefdom, Port Loko District).¹⁵²⁴ Nevertheless, while information gathered for this report confirms that there were no RUF attacks on locations in the Western Area at this time, rumours of RUF attacks sparked at least 20,000 civilians to leave Songo, Newton (both Koya RD), Waterloo and Hastings (Waterloo RD) and move into the Greater Freetown Area.¹⁵²⁵

However, UNAMSIL faced a serious crisis between 5 and 28 May: nearly 500 troops from different UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed and held hostage by RUF forces. On 8 May, the UK military commenced “Operation Palliser”, deploying to Sierra Leone the *HMS Ocean* and other vessels with around 800 soldiers from the Parachute Regiment.¹⁵²⁶ Initially, UK forces secured the airport at Lungi and commenced the evacuation of UK nationals and other expatriates. Also on 8 May, civilians in Freetown held a large demonstration outside the Spur Road residence of RUF leader. The details are not clear, but a number of gunshots were fired, reportedly by RUF members guarding the residence.¹⁵²⁷ Nineteen civilians were killed during the rally and were buried on 13 May.¹⁵²⁸ The RUF leader apparently disappeared, but was apprehended by civilians on 17 May whilst travelling in a civilian vehicle through the Lumley area of Freetown. The UK Secretary of Defence

¹⁵²⁰ Both reportedly held talks with the Liberian President in Monrovia during this time: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0999.html>.

¹⁵²¹ UN Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999).

¹⁵²² From National Commission from Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), quoted in IRIN West Africa, 18 April 2000.

¹⁵²³ IRIN West Africa, 1 May 2000.

¹⁵²⁴ BBC Online News, 7 May 2000 (06:40 GMT 07:40 UK).

¹⁵²⁵ OCHA Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 12 May 2000.

¹⁵²⁶ On 24 May, soldiers from the 42 Commando Royal Marines replaced the paratroopers.

¹⁵²⁷ BBC Online News, 8 May, 2000, (17:13 GMT 18:13 UK).

¹⁵²⁸ BBC Online News, 13 May 2000 (01:53 GMT 02:53 UK).



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subsequently stated to the BBC that the RUF leader was being held in “protective custody” by UK forces.¹⁵²⁹

Between 8 and 14 May, RUF forces unsuccessfully attempted to gain control of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) from pro-Government forces. During the same period, UK forces bolstered security at strategic locations on the main highway at Hastings and Waterloo. On 19 May, UK Royal Marines rehearsed amphibious landings in the Freetown area¹⁵³⁰ in preparation for replacing the Paratroops deployed on 8 May.¹⁵³¹ In addition, the UK announced its decision to provide an ongoing series of six-week training courses for around 8 battalions of the SLA.¹⁵³² The 180-strong team began arriving in Freetown on 10 June 2000,¹⁵³³ dovetailing with the withdrawal of the Royal Marines after 15 June 2000.¹⁵³⁴ On 24 July, nearly 1,000 SLA members graduated from the UK-run training course,¹⁵³⁵ the first group of a total of around 8,000 who would eventually be trained this way. Various rotations of the UK military teams occurred between August and December 2000. The overall number of UK service personnel in Sierra Leone was around 550, operating from the headquarters of the 1st Mechanised Brigade in Freetown.

On 14 August, the AFRC leader announced that he had formally disbanded the AFRC,¹⁵³⁶ which had seized power in the coup on 25 May 1997. On 22 August, a senior RUF member replaced the RUF leader, who remained in custody.

The West Side Boys apprehended 11 UK soldiers from the Short Term Training Team near Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom, Port Loko District) on 27 August 2000. Although UK negotiators secured the release of five of the captives, UK Special Forces and Paratroopers arrived in Freetown and executed “Operation Barrass”, freeing the remainder on 10 September.¹⁵³⁷ In the Western Area, no further significant incidents are reported for 2000.

i) Events in 2001 and beyond

In January 2001, the Ukrainian contingent of UNAMSIL deployed from Freetown, contributing 534 men, 220 Armoured Personnel Carriers and 220 trucks to the peacekeeping mission.¹⁵³⁸ Ukrainian troops were based at Hastings (Waterloo RD). The RUF, the CDF and the Government of Sierra Leone commenced tri-partite peace talks on or around 16 May 2001.¹⁵³⁹ Disarmament proceeded at the Hockey Pitch at Wilberforce Barracks. At Waterloo the OBHS who used to patrol the village disarmed at the IDP Camp. By 30 September 2001, the UK had reduced its military presence in

¹⁵²⁹ BBC Online News, 17 May 2000 (18:03 GMT 19:03 UK).

¹⁵³⁰ BBC Online News, 19 May 2000 (15:48 GMT 16:48 UK).

¹⁵³¹ IRIN West Africa, 24 May 2000.

¹⁵³² The UK Military handed over to a UK-led International Military and Advisory Training Team (IMATT) in September 2001.

¹⁵³³ BBC Online News, 10 June 2000 (19:28 GMT 20:28 UK).

¹⁵³⁴ IRIN West Africa, 14 June 2000.

¹⁵³⁵ IRIN West Africa, 24 July 2000.

¹⁵³⁶ BBC Online News, 14 August 2000 (03:40 GMT 04:40 UK).

¹⁵³⁷ See Port Loko District: West Side Boys for more details.

¹⁵³⁸ IRIN West Africa, 10 January 2001.

¹⁵³⁹ BBC Online News, 16 May 2001 (00:26 GMT 01:26 UK).



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Sierra Leone to around 360¹⁵⁴⁰ and UNAMSIL reached the ceiling of its authorised deployment strength of 17,500 personnel on 20 November 2001.

Following disarmament and demobilisation of members of all the different fighting factions, on 18 January 2002 President Kabbah declared that the war was over and held a symbolic "Arms Burning Ceremony" at Lungi (Kaffu Bullom Chiefdom, Port Loko District).

3. Conclusion

** TO BE COMPLETED ON COMPLETION OF ANALYSIS FOR THE NORTHERN PROVINCE**

¹⁵⁴⁰ OCHA Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 01 - 30 September 2001.

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Annex I: List of Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Force Revolutionary Council
APC	All Peoples Congress
CDF	Civil Defence Force
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group
EO	Executive Outcomes
NPFL	National Patriotic Front for Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
UNAMSIL	United Nation Mission in Sierra Leone
ULIMO	United Liberation movement for Democracy in Liberia.

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Annex II: Acknowledgments

This report is the result of a program carried out in Sierra Leone over many months and in which many people took part. Although it is not possible to name each and every person who participated at one point or another, the following list of people reflects the dimension and importance of the No Peace Without Justice Conflict Mapping Program in Sierra Leone.

Conflict Mapping Program

The following persons took part in the Conflict Mapping Program in Sierra Leone. All have worked with untiring commitments to the goals of the program and each has contributed their professionalism and dedication to their respective areas of work.

Program Director

Niccolò FIGÀ-TALAMANCA

Country Director

Alison SMITH

Conflict Mapping Coordinator

Catherine GAMBETTE [Feb2003 onwards]
Andrew SWINDELLS [Sep2002-Feb2003]

Conflict Mapping Officer

Kizito G. BANGURA

Conflict Mapping Recorders

Patrick	ADU	Alpha A.	KANU
Joseph J.	ALPHA	Idrissa	KENDOR †
Roland	ALPHA	Joseph	KOBBA
Francis	AMADU	Kabba S.	KOITA
Paul K.	AMARA	Alusine S.	KOROMA
Aiah A.Y.	AROUNA	Hassan K.	KOROMA
Sahr S.	AROUNA	Joseph M.	KOROMA
Joseph I.	BABAO	Komeh A.	KOROMA
Florence	BAION	Magdalene	KOROMA
Bentson M.	BAKOOI	Milton	KOROMA
Francis A.	BANGALI	Osman	KOROMA
Ibrahim G.	BANGURA	Sembu	KOROMA
Mohamed R.	BANGURA	Syl S.	KOROMA
Santigie	BANGURA	James B.	LAHAI
Sherbora	BANGURA	John A.S.	LAHAI
Sulaiman H.	BANGURA	Alpha M.	LALUGBA
Thaimu S.	BANGURA	Andrew	LISSA
Mohamed L.	BARRIE	Mathew T.J.	LORH
Sahr J.	BENDU	Philip C.	MACFOY

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Mohamed BLAKE	Moses MANDO
Munda D. BOCKARIE	Aliou B. MANSARAY
Samuel K. BOCKARIE	Mohamed MANSARAY
Joseph O. BUREH	Zainab MANSARAY
Samuel CAULKER	Janet MASSAQUOI
Alfred COLE	Mustapha S. MASSAQUOI
Christiana CONNEL	Tamba D. MOIWO
Ibrahim B. CONTEH	Brima M.S. MOMODU
Magnus CONTEH	Harriet M. MYERS
Morlai CONTEH	Alfred S. NABIEU
Sallieu A. CONTEH	David A. NGOMBU
Samuel S. CONTEH	Sahr NJAAMA
Thomas M. CONTEH	Alpha B. ONEIL
Mustapha DABENI	Jonathan PEARCE
Ann-Marie DARAMY	Susan PESSIMA
Ibrahim DARAMY	Julrick PRATT
Lennox DEIGH	Sylvanus O. PRATT
Foday S. DUMBUYA	Sawudatu SAMAI
Yusufu T. FABU-KANJA	Sandi SAMURA
A. P. FOMBA	Hindolo A. SANDI
Alex K. FOMBA	Abdulai G. SANKOH
Allieu K. FOMBA	Augustine SANNOH
Neneh A. FULLAH	Dominic SEBBEH
William T.P. GBANABOME	Abu B. SESAY
Tamba B. GBENDA	Alfred K. SESAY
Hassan M. GIBATEH	Brima SESAY
Esther HARDING	Edward B. SESAY
Richard HOWARD	M.S. SESAY
Biah Y. IDRIS	Mohamed A. SILLAH
Abdul R. JALLOH	Mohamed SIMBAY
Mohamed B. JALLOH	Andrew SIMBO
Joseph B. JUSU	Wilfred O. SOLOMON
Paul JUSU	Ahmed B. SOMBIE
Alims KABIA	Rosetta M. SOVULA
A.S. KAIFINEH	Augustine K. SUMAILA
Andrew S. KALIVA	James M.B. SUMAILA
Sylvestre KALLON	Abu B. TAILU
Abdul K. KAMARA	Sorie Bala TARAWALIE
Alie B. KAMARA	Abdulai THORONKA
Ambrose KAMARA	Faith G. TUCKER
Bamba S. KAMARA	Dominic VANDI
Catherine K. KAMARA	Patrick S. VANDY
David S. KAMARA	John C. VANJAH
Mohamed A. KAMARA	Matthew M. YAMBA

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Mohamed B. KAMARA
 Momodu B. KAMARA
 Osman KAMARA
 Theresa F. KAMARA
 Yakoya KAMARA
 Amara KANNEH

Moses L. YANGUBA
 Andrew YAVANA
 Mohamed M. YEMOH
 Francis YONDA

Conflict Mapping Trainers

Abdul BANGURA
 Andrew SIMBO
 Patrick FATOMA

Conflict Mapping Reviewers

Abdul BANGURA
 Alieu MANSARAY
 Andrew SIMBO
 Idriss TARAWALLIE

Typists

Melody MARTIN
 Annette NICOL
 Letitia SESAY
 Violetta STANLEY

Data Entry Processors

Andrea BROGGI
 Sharon CARROLL
 Martin EBERT
 Ilario FUSARO
 Patrick JOHNBULL
 Yvonne JOHNSON
 Mohamed KALIL
 Julianna KAMANDA
 Nicole NADIA
 Stefano PANTALEONE
 Letitia SESAY
 Violetta STANLEY
 Rachel TAYLOR
 Margaret TURAY
 Hubert TSHISWAKA

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Some of these Data Entry Processors also took part in the analysis of the initial draft, namely Andrea Broggi, Sharon Carroll, Martin Ebert, Ilario Fusaro, Patrick Johnbull, Nicole Nadia, Stefano Pantaleone and Hubert Tshiswaka.

The implementation of the program in the Provinces was made possible thanks to the invaluable assistance of an array of dedicated persons, including Focal Points and members of the SCWG District Chapters.

No Peace Without Justice Sierra Leone Project

As members of the NPWJ Sierra Leone Project, the following persons played an active part in the Conflict Mapping Program.

Outreach Program

- Thomas LONGLEY
- Isha WRIGHT
- Abdul Rahim KAMARA
- Josephine KOROMA
- Bailey HAND

Legal Profession Program

- John STOMPOR
- Ibrahim KOROMA

Judicial Assistance Program

- Pascal TURLAN

Library

- Avril ROWE
- Eldred DURING

Operations Officer

- Matilda KOROVESHI

Intern-Project Assistant

- Edward PLEETH

Drivers

- Mamadu JALLOH
- Mohamed JALLOH
- Sam ALLIE, Jr.

Logistics

- Yah AMOH
- Sahr ANSUMANA



N O P E A C E W I T H O U T J U S T I C E

Joseph BANGURA
Pa ISSA
Mr JAMES
Brima TARAWALLIE

Additional thanks also go to Sensible Data, particularly Stefano Figa-Talamanca and Francesco Burrigato, for their technical assistance and 24-hour (frequently used) hotline. Special thanks go to Richard Bednarek, who laid the groundwork for the successful implementation of this project as NPWJ's Outreach Coordinator in 2001.

Partners

The following persons have been of an invaluable help for the time they dedicated to our program, through providing assistance and advice:

The members of the Special Court Working Group (SCWG), both in Freetown and in the District Chapters, for their assistance in the planning, implementation and organisation of the Conflict Mapping tour; the Campaign For Good Governance (CGG), in particular the Coordinator, Mrs Olayinka Creighton-Randall, and the Field Monitors for their initial comments on our preliminary findings; Students from Fourah Bay College for research assistance and for their participation in the cross-checking stage; Peter and Gillian Arnot Smith, for the time they spent proofreading our drafts and helping in the design of the open sources database; Annette Rolfe and her team in Freetown at the GIS unit of the Development Assistance Coordination Unit, Sierra Leone; Nabil Bahsoon and the team at *NabsTech* for solving unsolvable problems; the Government of Sierra Leone, in particular H.E. Solomon E. Berewa, Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, The Hon Eke A. Halloway, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, and Ambassador Allieu I. Kanu, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations; Corinne Dufka, Theresa Kordeczk and all the other people in Sierra Leone and elsewhere we cannot name individually but who have contributed to this program and whose friendship and support were invaluable.

During the drafting of the legal analysis, we were fortunate to have the assistance of several people, whose knowledge, experience and expertise contributed greatly to this report. We would like to thank the following people for giving so generously of their time to review the drafts and to help us ensure the legal analysis is as accurate as it can possibly be: Stuart Alford, Olympia Bekou, Sylvia de Bertodano, Andrea Carcano, John Cerone, Robert McCorquodale and Gerry Simpson. Of course, No Peace Without Justice takes full responsibility for any errors or omissions

Key Persons

The Conflict Mapping Program was based on collecting information from identified key persons; this report would not have been possible without their involvement. We therefore address a special thanks to the 402 key people across the country, including Oscar, who gave so freely of their time and themselves to share with us their information on the violations of international humanitarian law committed during the conflict.

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Number	Item	Content
216	Speech	Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Freetown, 28 May 1997.

Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma
Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Freetown - 28 May 1997

My fellow countrymen: This is Major Johnny Paul Koroma, the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC, of Sierra Leone. Since my last broadcast to the nation announcing the overthrow of former president Tejan Kabbah and his government, I now wish to apprise you of the following:

As already explained to the nation, developments in the country just before AFRC intervened, were threatening the cohesion of the country. The policies in the country had polarized into regional and tribal factions. The former president had lost total control of the situation as atrocities spread throughout the country. The overthrown government made only half-hearted moves; but more disastrously was the fact that the former armed civilians from only one part of the country harassed servicemen and members of the civil society. The rebel war, which started in the country, was fought gallantly by our forces, seriously aided by the Guinean troops, Nigerian troops, the special task force, and the SSD (Special Security Detachment).

My countrymen and countrywomen: In our effort to liberate our fatherland, the only civilians who volunteered to fight during the difficult days were the Kamaboys, who were fighting alongside the Army as an auxiliary force, and the cooperation between the Army and the Kamaboys was extremely cordial as the Kamaboys defended mostly their localities. Some time in January 1994, a group called Hindu-Hindu was organized in Kenema, and the formation of Hindu-Hindu led to a series of breaches of the peace, causing the organization to be disbanded.

In 1996, the same group that had been disbanded re-emerged as the Kamajors, and like in the days of the Hindu-Hindu, the Kamajors instantly targeted the Army as their perceived enemy. However, the military overlooked the activities of the Kamajors and fought alongside them as local forces, but when the SLPP came to power, the SLPP government emphasized that the Kamajors should be given ante-military training which caused serious confrontation between the soldiers and the Kamajors. While the Army was only made up of 14,000 men, the number of Kamajors has swelled up to 37,000 men, vastly outnumbering the constitutional Army.

Welfare of the Army: The SLPP, which got the full support of the Army after the election, suddenly became very partisan in handling the security of the state. Welfare of the Kamajors was treated more seriously than the welfare of the Army. It was not surprising that a one-time chief Kamajor was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense who spent all his energy organizing the Kamajors. Even though the military had fought the war for five years, the SLPP spent all its time providing logistics for the Kamajors, and totally forgetting the welfare of the Army. The Kamajors in the eyes of the SLPP suddenly became a superior force, even though the Armed Forces are constitutionally responsible for the security of the state. The Kamajors started to engage the Army in battles causing the death of many soldiers.

Even though the SLPP claimed to have spent between 2 billion and 3.5 billion leones on the Armed Forces every month, this was not reflected in the status of the ordinary soldier. The Kamajors, on the other hand, were well catered for as Deputy Defense Minister Hinga Norman alone collected 35 million leones on behalf of Kamajors every month. This does not cover the amount Hinga Norman collected from government to cover logistics for the Kamajors. Salaries for soldiers are delayed for long periods whereas monies to Kamajors are paid instantly on demand. Ration for the fighting men was reduced thereby putting a lot of pressure on the

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commanders who feel hard to handle the same number of men.

The public service: My countrymen, the SLPP government launched an all-out war against members of the civil service who were suspected to be non-SLPP supporters. Many permanent secretaries and heads of department were sent on leave just because they were not members of the SLPP. The civil service came to a standstill when important officials such as the Establishment Secretary, the Accountant General, and other heads of department were forced on leave without explanation. Even though the former head of state promised a 20 percent increase in the salaries, no such increase took place. Instead, government went ahead to retrench more workers from the civil service. The teachers remained unpaid for a long time to the extent that many teachers would no longer pay their way to work. This situation is not tenable, and we promise to change this immediately.

Number	Item	Content
217	Speech	Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Freetown, 1 June 1997

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Address by Major Johnny Paul Koroma
Head of State and Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Freetown - 1 June 1997

My fellow countrymen, friendly nations and members of the international community. The big question at this moment on the lips of everybody inside and outside the country is what prompted us to oust former President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his government from power.

Before dwelling on the main above-mentioned theme of my address, I want first and foremost on behalf of my colleagues avail myself of this opportunity to solemnly extend our sincere and heartfelt sympathy and expression of regret for the unfortunate incidents that occurred during the takeover operation in which some of our brothers and sisters, as well as foreign nationals, lost their lives and property.

In this regard, the AFRC, as you have been informed through the media, has taken appropriate measures to prevent the recurrence of such unfortunate incidents. My address this evening is not only directed to fellow Sierra Leoneans. It is also meant to enlighten concerned non-nationals and the international community about the welfare of our beloved country, on the main motive of our action.

I have already emphasized in my last two addresses that our action was not motivated by selfish [as heard] and greed for power. The main objective of the AFRC to seize power is to restore lasting peace and political stability in this country, which has been ravaged and continues to be shattered by a senseless war.

On this vital issue of restoring peace and political stability in our country, I would like on behalf of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the entire nation to pay a special and fitting tribute to the Ivorian head of state, His Excellency President Henri Konan Bedie, with special mention to his Foreign Minister Amara Essy, the government and people of La Cote d'Ivoire for the very important role they played in getting Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, the charismatic leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone around the negotiating table, that resulted to the signing of the Abuja peace accord last November. But for the relentless efforts of the authorities of this great African country, in the true state of African solidarity, we will not even have been thinking about...[pauses] talking about inviting the RUF leader to command his fighters to (?cease) hostilities and to join the revolution with the sole objective of bringing lasting peace to our beloved country.

The AFRC would also like to seize this opportunity to thank friendly sister countries in the subregion, namely the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Guinea, and Ghana for their effective and invaluable role in averting irreparable destruction of our fatherland at the height of the rebel war. The AFRC would also like to behalf of the entire nation to thank the international community and NGO's [words indistinct] to the United Nations Organization, the Commonwealth, the OAU, the International Alliance, the International Community of the World Force for the very important roles they played toward the success of the Abidjan peace process.

Fellow countrymen, friendly nations, members of the international community, I would now like to dwell on the main theme of my address this evening. The main reason that prompted us to take the [word indistinct] and timely decision to overthrow the former regime and to extend an invitation to RUF Cpl. Foday Sankoh and the RUF to operate with us.

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It is true the wind of democracy has blown and continues to blow around the world. Patriotic and national Sierra Leoneans, old and young, put in everything, sometimes at the expense of their lives, during the transition process to democratic rule with the objective of being in tune with progressive nations around the globe and restoring lasting peace and political stability in Sierra Leone. After five years of military governance, our country was returned to democratic rule with great pains, but due to lack of political ingenuity and sincere commitment on the part of former President Tejan Kabbah and some of his lieutenants, the hard-won democracy was being gradually jeopardized by the flagrant antidemocratic and unpatriotic practices of the late regime. The unanimous vote in favor of the new president by SLPP parliamentarians and the appointment of ruling party stalwarts to most of the key positions of the state's administrative machinery is a palpable truth of such tendencies.

In an exclusive interview granted to the West African magazine of March this year in Washington, OAU Secretary General Dr. Ahmed Salim Ahmed (sic.) rightly opined, and quote, "Progressive African leadership must now operate, above all, on the clear knowledge that the question of peace, security, and political stability of their respective continent is of primordial importance. Without peace, security, and political stability, it is not possible that any country will achieve the type of democratic and economic growth, the type of social development that we aspire to," quote. [as heard]

This is why my colleagues and I on the AFRC have decided to focus on the question of resolving our internal conflicts. The war that has shattered our once flourishing economy, with much more of [word indistinct] efforts and reality. [words indistinct] this priority of priorities--the return of lasting peace and political stability in our country--is achieved, we will then focus on the whole question of democratization and greater respect for human rights. Military issues, the question of economic and social development, the question of security and stability, and the issue of democratization and human rights are related. If we are to achieve the objective the AFRC will set for itself and address the new challenges that face our country [sentence as heard]. The AFRC will endeavor to address each of these goals and their [word indistinct] within the present context of the social and political situation prevailing in the country.

Our brother Cpl. Foday Saybana Sankoh is quick to understand this when he emphatically stated in his radio message to the nation from Abuja that a democracy without peace, security, and political stability is baseless. The remarkable economic growth and social development achieved by our sister and friendly Republic of La Cote d'Ivoire is due to the legendary peace, security, and political stability in that country. Foreign investors and economic operators will only pour in their money into countries that will guarantee their personal security and that of their investment.

Fellow countrymen, you will surely agree with me that the unseated president and some of his round pegs in square holes collaborators dragged their feet in implementing the priority clauses stipulated in the Abuja peace accord related to developments of mutual forces to carry out encampment and disarming of combatants. The Commission of the Consolidation of Peace, PCP, was never given the attention needed to carry out its functions.

Fellow countrymen, I will not dwell much on the negative [word indistinct], but let me touch on some of its saddest aspects. The death toll could be estimated at about 15,000 troops. Damaged property could easily amount to several billions of leones. The economy has been completely crippled. Thousands of families which once enjoyed the warmth of living together have been separated. Innocent citizens, mainly comprised of agricultural workers in rural areas, were mutilated and maimed, rendering them physically handicapped and useless throughout the rest of

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their lives. The brain drain in the country during the war reached unprecedented proportions with its negative effects on the standard of education in our university and other institutions of higher learning. Children in their thousands have become homeless, orphans, and street-beggars. Persons traumatized by the atrocities of the war have become mentally unbalanced. Fellow countrymen, the negative spoils of the war cannot be fully exhausted in this address.

Nationalistic and patriotic Sierra Leoneans as well as well-meaning non-nationals and the international community will now understand why the AFRC deem it at this point in time to drive away the enemies of this nation and to call upon Cpl. Foday Sankoh and the RUF to join the revolution so as to bring about lasting peace and to arrest the unmerited and unwarranted sufferings of our people.

With the return of lasting peace and political stability in this country, Sierra Leoneans will regain their lost personality and integrity, but more especially our shattered economy [words indistinct] foreign investment. Our country will once more regain its rightly place among the progressive nations of the world.

My fellow countrymen, we are undergoing a very crucial stage in the history of our country. Our destiny and that of generations yet unborn is in our hands. Shakespeare rightly put, quote, "There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken on the tide (sic.) leads on to fortune, omitted all their voyage is bound in shallow waters," unquote.

We should not leave the fate of this only country that we have to be determined by other people for their own personal aggrandizement. The Lord Almighty, our creator, loves this country. He has made it possible for us to know our enemies at the right time. The Biblical saying "God's time is the best" should be an eye opener for us. Prayers said in our numerous churches and mosques on Sundays and Fridays throughout the national territory for the return of lasting peace to our beloved country have not gone in vain. My fellow countrymen, our priority of priorities today is peace. Peace is an inseparable factor for human development. We have been longing for it for the past six years. Thanks to God, it is here. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and true patriots of this country are therefore solemnly appealing to all Sierra Leoneans, irrespective of their ethnic grouping, creed, social standing, and political affiliation, within and outside our national territory to join the God-inspired revolution for the ultimate salvation of our beloved fatherland.

I will end my address by declaring three days fasting and prayers throughout the country, from Sunday, 1 to Tuesday 3 June 1997. United We Stand, Divided We fall. I thank you very much.

Number	Item	Content
218	Press Release - Radio Broadcast Statement	CDF Statement of FM 98.1, 22 December 1997 from the movement for the restoration of democracy, MRD, civil defence secretariat, Freetown.

1 SPEAKER: Press release, dated from the movement for the
2 restoration of democracy, MRD, civil defence secretariat, Freetown.

3 To all peace-loving citizens of Sierra Leone:

4 Fellow citizens, the Civil Defence Force of Sierra Leone, CDF/SL,
5 has been watching closely with keen interest into all the peace deals
6 between the AFRC/RUF and ECOWAS on the peaceful settlement to the Sierra
7 Leone political crisis as from the 25th of May, 1997 to date. According
8 to CDF observation and understanding from all the so-called negotiations,
9 CDF strongly believes that the junta only wants to buy more time to
10 continue its hegemony over this nation. As such, the junta has no genuine
11 intention to develop this country or to return this country to the
12 democratically elected president and his government, but to destroy it
13 economically, educationally, socially, and morally.

14 It is clearly seen that they set their own conditions at every
15 meeting, which they will not adhere to afterwards. CDF, as a civil
16 organization which comprises well-meaning Sierra Leoneans, will not sit by
17 to allow the barbaric idlers, thieves, killers, to dump this nation into
18 the drainage. In this connection, therefore, the CDF is left with no
19 alternative but to give the following orders:

20 ~~As from the 20th December 1997~~ If a system is not established
21 that can indicate the immediate reinstatement of the democratically
22 elected president, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, such as the deployment
23 of ECOMOG troops and commencement of disarmament, the following orders
24 will be executed throughout the length and breadth of Sierra Leone:

25 1) that all roads within the borders of Sierra Leone should be

1 made inaccessible to all traffic;

2 2) that anyone working in the interests of the junta, from local,
3 to national executive level, will be considered an enemy of the state, and
4 therefore, a target; with the exception of health workers;

5 3) that any government employee who resists the junta shall
6 receive his or her denied benefits on the return of His Excellency, the
7 president, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

8 Therefore, all well-meaning citizens and non-citizens should
9 desist forthwith from working for and in the interests of the junta. All
10 those in the health sector should be careful from becoming imposters.

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Number	Item	Content
219	Press Release	Kamajor Press Release issued by Samuel Hinga Norman, 23 December 1997

Fellow Citizens and Friends,

Greetings from Sierra Leone. I wish to enjoin the recent speech by H.E. the President that the military junta has deliberately upset the timetable for the implementation of the Conakry Peace Plan as a pretence to hold on to power illegally. It is, therefore, my duty to accept the responsibility as Deputy Minister of Defence to bring this matter to a just and final conclusion by every available means at my disposal. In consultation with ECOWAS and at the behest of the President, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) have outlined the following courses of action in order to install the constitutionally elected government of Sierra Leone and bring to an end the suffering of our people.

- The CDF has declared Saturday, 20 December, 1997 as Black Saturday (pardon the expression);
- As of that day, all roads and highways in Sierra Leone are to be blocked and any movement by junta forces anywhere in the country will be considered hostile and repelled by force of arms;
- Mechanized units of the CDF have taken positions in the East of the country and in locations within striking distance of Freetown, including the international airport at Lungi;
- To prevent the ensuing conflict from spilling into Liberia, ECOMOG troops have taken command of the strategic Mano Bridge;
- The CDF henceforth considers any and all persons or groups who have voluntarily assisted or collaborated in any way with the junta to be in active rebellion against the State.
- Ground, air and naval forces of ECOMOG will continue to monitor and repel any attempt by the junta to circumvent the international embargo in violation of ECOWAS sanctions and UN Resolution 1132.

I wish to thank all our friends and citizens who have placed their confidence in us to resolve this matter, for your prayers and goodwill. Such is the gravity of this matter that I have relocated myself, my staff and my family back inside Sierra Leone for the duration of this endeavour. We ask you to keep me and my men in your prayers and I look forward to reporting to you on regular basis.

Merry Christmas and God Bless you all.

Samuel Hinga Norman
Civil Defence High Command
23 December, 1997

Number	Item	Content
220	Interview	Summary of Conversations Held with Civil Defence Force Leader Sam Hinga Norman, 10 January 1998 by Alfred Sam Foray

**SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE
LEADER SAM HINGA NORMAN, 10 JANUARY 1998**

Submitted by Alfred SamForay

CAPTAIN NORMAN:

The High Command of the Civil Defence Force wishes to make known to all interested parties that Phase I of the Operation Black December has just concluded. This phase of the operation involved the occupation and/or domination of all major roads and highways in the country by the CDF. The main objectives of this phase are:

1. to deny freedom of movement by junta forces throughout the country;
2. to isolate junta brigades in Bo, Makeni and Kenema;
3. to deny access to the diamond mines to junta forces

As part of this phase, large quantities of cars and trucks some containing large quantities of ammunition as well as cash crops headed for the international market have been confiscated by the CDF from junta forces. These include a brand new Mercedes Benz sedan now sitting outside my office. As reported in the international press, these objectives have now been sufficiently met and we are now set to begin Phase II of Operation Black December the week of 12 January, 1998.

Phase II of the operation involves the encirclement of all major towns and cities throughout the country. The objective of this phase is to restrict junta forces to their primary domains and keep them from regrouping or transporting reinforcements from one area to another. We would hope that they will venture from the cities and highways and join us in the bush where we can settle this matter once and for all. Efforts are also being made to neutralize construction of airfields in the country by junta forces.

As soon as Phase II is in full force, the CDF intends to offer its last ultimatum to the junta to vacate the seat of government or be crushed. This will constitute the final phase, Phase III of our operation.

We urge all our citizens abroad to continue to be vigilant on the diplomatic and political front even as we are vigilant on the resistance front and to maintain the unity of all Sierra Leoneans abroad. As many of you are aware, ground operations in the North and the West are conducted jointly by Northern militia forces (Tamagboros, Donsas, Kappras) along with the Kamajors of the South and East.

We look forward to a speedy and final conclusion to this matter.

Best Wishes,

Sam Hinga Norman,
CDF High Command,
Sierra Leone.

Number	Item	Content
221	Statement	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, "Government Statement", 24 May 2000.



MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2000

It has been brought to the attention of Government that there are some children who are either fighting alongside forces loyal to the Government of Sierra Leone, or are being allowed to remain in front line positions with the loyal forces. Government wishes to state that this practice is totally against Government policy which stipulates that 18 years is the minimum age for bearing arms in Sierra Leone.

It is the view of Government that children should not be involved in conflict, and it is the responsibility of the Government and all forces loyal to it to ensure that children are protected from the horrors of armed conflict. While it is acknowledged that some children may be voluntarily involved in fighting, and in some cases insist on being involved, even such children should not be allowed to carry arms or stay in areas of active conflict. They should be protected from themselves.

In the light of the above, the Acting Chief of Defence Staff has been instructed to ensure that all those below the age of 18 years currently involved in fighting on the side of Government should be immediately withdrawn, demobilized and handed over to competent institutions for rehabilitation. Henceforth, any commander who allows a child below 18 years to carry arms within his area of operations or allows children to remain in areas of active conflict will face severe disciplinary action.



Number	Item	Content
222	News Report	Inter Press Service, "Children – Sierra Leone: Militia Admits Recruiting Child Soldiers," Lansana Fofana, 29 June 1998.



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CHILDREN-SIERRA LEONE: Militia Admits Recruiting Child Soldiers

By Lansana Fofana

FREETOWN, Jun 29 (IPS) - Sierra Leone's pro-government militia, popularly known as the Kamajor, has admitted to recruiting thousands of children into its ranks to fight the remnants of the ousted military junta.

"In Kailahun district (east of Sierra Leone) alone, we have 3,000 child Kamajors," said Kamajor field commander, Patrick Zangalaywah. "These kids are very brave on the frontline."

Zangalaywah said children are unadulterated and that they keep the laws governing the conduct of the militia like abstinence from sex, drugs and looting when in combat.

"We don't trust adults quite much because many have breached the rules governing our militia group and so they get killed by the enemy," he explained in a recent interview.

Last month, the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, urged Sierra Leone's belligerents to stop recruiting child soldiers into their army and to demobilise those already serving in their fold.

"I saw children as young as 10 and 14, bearing arms and in battle-readiness. This is unfortunate," said Otunnu, after visiting Sierra Leone's eastern war zones.

Otunnu told IPS that the Kamajor Movement National Coordinator, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, had given him his word to demobilise the child Kamajors, whose exact number is not known.

Norman, Otunnu added, also had assured him that no new child Kamajors would be recruited and that a process to demobilise them would soon begin.

But until now, there has been no demobilisation of child Kamajors. IPS recently saw dozens of children being drafted into the militia group in the north of the country, where remnants of the ousted military junta are committing atrocities against civilian populations.

A top Kamajor commander, Monya Farmah, told IPS last week that the militia would rather do away with adult Kamajors. "The children know the battle terrain quite well and they can meander through the forests in pursuit of rebel bandits," he said.

This view has, however, been rejected by rights and child advocates groups. "This is a gross abuse of the children's rights," said Jonathan Freeman of the Freetown-based 'Save the Child', a new non-governmental organisation that advocates the rights of the child.

"It is appalling and I think the government should move fast enough to demobilise the kids within the Kamajor group," he said.

"These children have killed, maimed and acted as adults. I believe they should be immediately demobilised and a process of trauma counselling be put in place for them," said Thomas Sandi of the Freetown-based Human Rights League.

Ironically, some of the child Kamajors interviewed by IPS said they would want to become soldiers in adult life, as well. "I am 14 and a rebel killer. I don't want to be demobilised, because the rebels know I kill them mercilessly," said Sandi who is based in Daru, a military garrison in the east of the country.

The problem of children involved in the conflict is becoming complex. Retreating junta troops have been abducting and conscripting dozens of children in the north-eastern provinces.

In a strongly-worded message, Otunnu appealed to the rebel forces to discharge all child combatants within their fold. "It is difficult to estimate the number of children in the rebel movement, as much as it is to reach the rebels and persuade them to demobilise children," he said.

The United Nations Children's Fund (Unicef), in collaboration with Sierra Leone's national radio and television, has launched a major campaign aimed at demobilising the children and rehabilitating them.

Discussion programmes are aired everyday and rights groups are eagerly waiting to see whether the Kamajors will take the lead by letting the children go.

The Kamajors took up arms in 1992, a year after the outbreak of Sierra Leone's civil war, to complement the efforts of the national army to fight the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

The RUF, headed by former army corporal Sankoh Foday, joined forces with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) junta which was toppled in February. Remnants of the AFRC are still fighting to oust the elected government of President Ahmed Kabbah, who returned to power in March. (END/IPS/LF/MN/PM/98)

Number	Item	Content
223	News Report	BBC News, "Sierra Leone diamond town besieged", 20 November 1997.

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Thursday, November 20, 1997 Published at 06:37 GMT

World: Africa**Sierra Leone diamond town besieged**

Reports from eastern Sierra Leone say the Kamajor hunter-militiamen are besieging the diamond-mining town of Tongo.

Residents who fled the area said the Kamajors and forces loyal to the military rulers began a gun battle over the town on Tuesday night.

A diamond dealer said the Kamajors had captured all roads leading to the town, and were preventing people from entering or leaving it.


A spokesman for the military rulers Allieu Kamara accused the Kamajors of breaking the ceasefire agreed with the West African peacekeeping force last month.

But a spokesman for the Kamajors said they had only responded when attacked.

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224	News Report	BBC News, "Sierra Leone clashes with Kamajor militia", 17 December 1997.



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Front Page Wednesday, 17 December, 1997, 02:02 GMT

World **Sierra Leone clashes with Kamajor militia**



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The military government in Sierra Leone says its troops have been involved in skirmishes with the Kamajor militia at the country's south-eastern border with Liberia.

An army spokesman, Major John Milton, told the BBC the Kamajors had attacked their military positions near the town of Zimmi but had been pushed back across the Mano River Bridge towards Liberia.

Major Milton said the Kamajor militia was being helped by Nigerian troops of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force which has its headquarters in Liberia, with bases in Sierra Leone.

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Sunday, January 18, 1998 Published at 15:22 GMT

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Despatches

Mark Doyle
Abidjan

Rebels in eastern Sierra Leone have taken control of the key diamond mining area of Tongo from troops loyal to the military government. Revenues from Sierra Leone's diamond fields, which produce some of the highest quality gems in the world, finance both government and rebel activity in the war. The leader of the Kamajor rebels, Hinga Norman, said Tongo was taken late last week. The military government's spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel John Milton, speaking on Sunday, confirmed that Tongo had fallen but added that government forces were now regrouping in the area. Our West Africa correspondent Mark Doyle reports from Abidjan:

Diamonds have been both a blessing and a curse on Sierra Leone. They generate hundreds of millions of dollars-worth of revenue, but very little of this benefits the ordinary people of Sierra Leone, as the gems are fought over and smuggled out to Europe.

The leader of the Kamajor rebels, who say they are fighting for the replacement of the Sierra Leone military regime by the civilian leader ousted in a coup d'etat last May, said Tongo was a "big catch" from a military and financial point of view. A spokesman for the military government, said Tongo could be retaken, but that the government did not want to mount a big offensive because this would lead to all-out war.

Diamond traders said whoever controlled Tongo controlled significant revenues. Although there are so-called kimberlite diamonds deep underground in the region, there are also alluvial stones nearer the surface, which can be dug up quickly and smuggled away via the neighbouring states of Guinea and Liberia to the diamond markets of Antwerp.

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World

Sierra Leone militias capture two cities



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Meanwhile, the Kamajor militias, who fought alongside the ECOMOG troops, have captured the two major cities of Bo and Kenema.

A BBC correspondent in Bo says the militias were welcomed by jubilant crowds.

From Our Own Correspondent

Later, the Kamajors arrested eight soldiers loyal to the ousted military regime on suspicion of planning sabotage.

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They were handed over to the crowd who lynched them.

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Youths also set fire to houses belonging to suspected supporters of the ousted military regime.

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Friday, October 2, 1998 Published at 01:10 GMT 02:10 UK

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World: Africa

Unicef calls for the demobilisation of child soldiers

The Director-General of the United Nations children's agency, Unicef, Carole Bellamy, has appealed for the demobilisation of about 4,000 child soldiers in Sierra Leone.

She was speaking in the presence of the deputy defence minister, Hinga Norman, who said he was committed to the disarmament of all children, but added that it couldn't be done while fighting continued.


Unicef estimates that most of the child soldiers in Sierra Leone are forced to fight in the ranks of the rebel Revolutionary United Front, led by Foday Sankoh, who's on trial for treason.

In a court appearance on Thursday, Mr Sankoh complained that he couldn't afford a defence lawyer.

He said the Nigerian security authorities had taken all the money when they arrested him in Lagos in March 1996. The judge asked the court to take up the matter with the Nigerian authorities.

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228	News Report	BBC News, "Traditional fighters clash with rebels in Sierra Leone", 6 October 1998.

World: Africa

Traditional fighters clash with rebels in Sierra Leone

Army spokesmen in Sierra Leone say traditional Kamajor fighters allied to government forces have killed at least fifty-two rebels and wounded many more in a six-hour clash in the east of the country.

They said fifteen of the dead rebels were women.

Several rebel prisoners were paraded before journalists.


The Kamajor fighters, who wear women's wigs and threadbare dresses, are battling to defeat remnants of Sierra Leone's former military regime and its Revolutionary United Front allies.

Three Kamajors were reported missing after the clash, which resulted in the recapture of six towns from the rebels.

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
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Saturday, December 19, 1998 Published at 16:49 GMT

World: Africa

Sierra Leone defence forces given arms



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The deputy defence minister in Sierra Leone, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, has been distributing guns to civil defence forces CDF in the eastern town of Kenema.

He says the move is to help deal with remnants of fleeing Junta forces.

This is the first time the government has officially distributed weapons to the CDF and comes after a law was passed on Tuesday.

Mr Norman said the CDF will now be allowed to accompany soldiers of the West African Peace Keeping Force - ECOMOG in their battle against remnants of the former government and Revolutionary United Front rebels.

In a separate move, the government has brought forward the start of the midnight curfew to ten o'clock.

No reason was given.

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230	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 June 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

20 June 1997: AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma said Thursday that 21,000 government workers will receive their salaries for May within the next few days. Koroma made the announcement at the end of two days of talks with the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. Union leaders rejected Koroma's appeal that the union ensure their members return to work "to get the industrial machine to start turning." The Labour Congress, which is made up of 21 affiliated unions, presented Koroma with a 10-point communiqué calling on the AFRC to respect democracy and to work toward a negotiated settlement. "The democratic will of the people of Sierra Leone was profoundly expressed during the 1996 general and presidential elections," the statement said. "This democratic will is indeed a reality and must be fully respected and restored to ensure stability in the country." The union called on the AFRC "to resolve the current political stalemate through a negotiated diplomatic settlement to avert a Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone." The Labour Congress said the peace process "should be vigorously pursued to reached an amicable settlement with the Revolutionary United Front." The union has called upon workers to stay home in protest of the May 25 coup, in part because of security concerns but also because of their belief that workers will not be paid.

In a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) statement released on Friday, Executive Director Carol Bellamy called for all sides in the Sierra Leone conflict to stop the use of children as combatants, and to incorporate provisions for their physical and emotional welfare in any future peace settlement. Since the May 25 coup, hundreds of armed children have appeared in Freetown. Many are former child soldiers who had been returned to their communities during a nationwide demobilisation program begun in 1993. They have now been recruited and rearmed by the AFRC and their RUF allies, according to the UNICEF statement. "Children should have no part in war," Bellamy said. "By making them agents of civil conflict and depriving them of their childhood, the vicious cycle of violence is perpetuated." The UNICEF statement called Sierra Leone's record on the recruiting of child soldiers one of the world's worst. Between 1992 and 1996, an estimated 4,500 children were forced to fight on both sides. Children were abducted and forced to commit atrocities in order to turn them into ruthless fighters. Some were ordered to torture and murder their own relatives before being taken to neighbouring villages to slaughter others, the statement said. Bellamy called for the immediate demobilisation of all child soldiers and the urgent implementation of the proposals outlined in the 1996 *Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children* by Graca Machel of Mozambique. She also called for Sierra Leone to adopt the Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, which would raise the minimum age of recruitment and participation in armed forces from 15 to 18 years.

AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma met with two Ghanaian diplomats Friday for three hours in an attempt to reach a solution to the crisis and prevent military intervention by Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces. Neither side would say what was discussed, but the two sides have agreed to resume the talks on Saturday. The Ghanaian delegation consisted of Ghana's Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Gbeho and its Ambassador to Egypt, Brigadier Abraham Twumasi. "We have come to see, discuss and look at the diplomatic rather than the military option," Twumasi said. Four Nigerian warships stationed off the coast of Sierra Leone withdrew Friday from the country's territorial waters to give a conducive atmosphere for the crisis to be resolved by negotiations.

Fighting intensified in Kenema Friday between soldiers loyal to the AFRC and the Kamajor militia. The fighting reportedly started at about 9:30 Thursday morning when the army attacked Kamajors on the main street of Kenema--apparently in retribution for a Kamajors attack on army bases at Kenema and Pujehun on Wednesday. Fighting between the Kamajor and the army was also reported on the Liberian border earlier in the week. On Wednesday Sam Hinga Norman, Deputy Minister of Defence in the ousted government and himself a former Kamajor, broadcast a message over a clandestine Liberian radio station calling for military action to oust the AFRC. He said that negotiations with the coup leaders have proven futile, and asserted that military action is necessary because of the deplorable plight of Sierra Leone citizens. At a Kamajor base in Kenema, Kamajor spokesman Eddie Massally said the militia will march on Bo and then continue on the Freetown to wage war on the coup leaders. AFRC Secretary-General Colonel Abdulkarim Sise reportedly accused President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, U.N. Ambassador James Jonah, and Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi of arming the Kamajors to wage war on the AFRC. He said considerable arms and ammunition, including food rations, have been given to the Kamajors, while mercenaries have been hired from Liberia to fight the army.

UNPP leader John Karefa-Smart held a press conference in New York Wednesday to explain his efforts to seek a negotiated solution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. "My mission has two aims: to explain the situation in Sierra Leone to the Secretary-General of the U.N. and members of the Security Council; and second, to seek their support for a continuing effort for a diplomatic solution to the crisis," he said. Karefa-Smart said he had been unable to meet with U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan but that he met with some U.N. staffers on Wednesday. Asked if he would support the use of force if negotiations failed, he said "I will still not support it, I will just retire from the scene and let whatever happen happen." Karefa-Smart denied that he is working for the AFRC, and said that his decision to undertake the mission was influenced by President Kabbah, with whom he has a close relationship. "President Kabbah telephoned me from Guinea...and said to me you know what is happening, you're on the spot. I must insist that these fellows return everything to me because I was legally elected. Then he said a sentence which was meaningful to me, that the ball is now at your court, which I interpreted to say you do what you can to remedy the situation. Because of that I agreed to undertake this mission." Karefa-Smart, who once served as Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone, said he was afraid his efforts might be misinterpreted as support for the AFRC. "I am worried that people may really believe that I really am behind this coup," he said. "I have clarified that at home, and I have done so in your presence and will continue to do so."

The interim governor of Sierra Leone's Central Bank said Wednesday he had persuaded the AFRC to provide protection to the banks and he hoped the country's banking system would soon be functioning again. "Over the past few days we have been holding meetings with the commercial banks so as to get them to reopen, but they have shown concern about the security of the banks and the nation," Christian Kargbo said. He said he would meet with the commercial banks again on Thursday. The Central Bank opened for the first time Wednesday since the May 25 coup when it was looted by soldiers and badly damaged by fire, along with the adjacent Treasury building. Commercial banks have remained closed since the coup, and people have had no access to their money. Government workers' salaries have not been paid because of damage to the Treasury. "Sierra Leoneans are suffering, and something has to be done," Kargbo said. "We have gone hungry for many weeks. We have gone unpaid. We can't cash our cheques. Some people want to go away but they can't even pay their fares." He said officials are working to get salaries paid. "Even through the Treasury was destroyed by fire during the takeover, the accountant general is working on a plan to get public workers paid. Most of the computers holding the names of workers and also past salary vouchers were burnt in the fire," he said. Lists of pensioners were also reported to have been destroyed. Kargbo said the AFRC had asked him to take over as governor of the bank. "I turned the offer down but offered to advise them. Something has to go on in the interim while they are pursuing negotiations with the RUF and the international community," he said. Kargbo, who was Minister of Development and Economic Planning under the previous military government, confirmed that the World Bank and the International Monetary

Fund had cut off aid of Sierra Leone after the coup. He appealed to donors not to impose sanctions on Sierra Leone. "What they should do is come and examine the problems. Most of us do not favour military rule. Let the international community come and see what could be done to resolve our problems, so that we do not die, of hunger or otherwise," he said.

A delegation from Ghana arrived in Freetown Thursday night to mediate the impasse between the AFRC and Nigeria. Ghana's Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Gbeho and its Ambassador to Egypt, Brigadier Abraham Twamasi, will meet with AFRC leader Major Johnny Paul Koroma on Friday. On Thursday, the AFRC accused Nigeria of arming the deposed civilian government in preparation for an attack.

Number	Item	Content
231	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 2 September 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

2 September 1997: Sierra Leone's military rulers have asked that flags be flown at half-staff nationwide as a tribute to Princess Diana. SLBS (state radio) announced that flags should remain at half-mast until Saturday, when Princess Diana will be buried. Flags on official buildings flew at half-mast on Tuesday.

Ministers of the AFRC-led junta have not been invited to annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, IMF sources disclosed Tuesday. "The Sierra Leone authorities were informed that they will not be able to attend the annual meetings in Hong Kong unless the chairman of the board of governors decides otherwise," said one source.

Members of the Kamajor militia and their Kapra allies Monday beheaded four persons they suspected of being soldiers or AFRC sympathisers. The four were travelling to Makeni in a commercial vehicle when it was stopped at a Kamajor checkpoint at Gumahun, 25 miles from Bo. After a search of the vehicle by the Kamajors, the driver was identified as a retired soldier and arrested. Two other men in military t-shirts were also apprehended, along with the 27-year old girlfriend of one of the men. All four were summarily executed and their vehicle impounded. The other passengers in the vehicle were allowed to continue their journey to Makeni. The military brigade commander in Bo, Lieutenant Colonel Boisey Palmer, admitted that the Kamajors had occupied the highway, but said his troops would soon flush them out. This is the second time the Kamajors have occupied the road since the current conflict between the militia and the army began.

Number	Item	Content
232	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 7 September 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

7 September 1997: Nigerian Alpha fighter jets Sunday bombed the cargo ship *Seaway* as it unloaded cargo at the water quay in Freetown. The planes attacked at 10:30 a.m., hitting the ships with two bombs. Smoke was seen coming from the ships after the attack. Witnesses said the ships returned fire. The Nigerians first attacked the port Saturday night at about 6:30 p.m., a day after ECOMOG Commander Major-General Victor Malu issued a "last warning" to ships violating the ECOWAS-imposed blockade. In Saturday's attack, the planes dropped bombs into the water near the ships, seriously injuring three paramilitary policeman and a port official. AFRC spokesman Allieu Kamara said the ship was struck by two bombs. "One exploded, the other one did not. And furthermore, a new charter bus, owned by the Road Transport Corporation, was damaged. An office building was damaged and 10 vehicles destroyed," he said. He said that shrapnel had burst the ship's engine room. Kamara condemned the Nigerian action, saying that the attack was not sanctioned by the ECOWAS mandate. "These people have actually gone to the extremes because the ECOWAS mandate has actually abused itself because it has no mandate to do what they are doing. It is pathetic that, you know, we as a very poor country, a country that has suffered for six years, can undergo such stress. People are moving away, people are running away. Nobody knows what is happening tomorrow." Kamara said that the ship had been carrying a cargo of rice. Military officials said that soldiers moved heavy anti-aircraft guns into ports early Sunday, and stepped up security. "We've got intelligence reports that Nigerian troops are devising methods and strategies to effectively enforce their self-imposed economic blockade and the sea, air and land embargo by capturing the main port," an army spokesman said.

The Kamajor militia launched a three-prong attack against junta forces Saturday and Sunday to dislodge the military from key highways connecting the towns of Golahun Tunkia and Joru in southern Sierra Leone. The militia also besieged Zimmi in a renewed effort to recapture the town. The fighting lasted throughout the night and into Sunday morning. During fighting on Sunday, the Kamajors evacuated their wounded to Fairo, now a major Kamajor base 18 miles west of the Liberian border. Reinforcements of men and a large consignment of ammunition were sent to the front line Sunday morning. The Kamajors reportedly have seized control of a 19-mile stretch of highway linking Joru and Kenema. Kamajor leader Sam Hinga Norman said Sunday that the militia's objective was to clear the region of junta forces in order to allow Sierra Leonean refugees in Liberia to return home. "Our people are now being molested and harassed in Liberia by security agents, and this is a result of utterances against us by President Taylor," he said. In a radio address on September 1, Taylor described the Kamajors as an "illegal armed group" and alleged that fighters of the disbanded Liberian ULIMO-K militia were fighting alongside the Kamajors. "The men fighting for us are those Sierra Leoneans trained over the years by the defunct NPFL (Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia)," Norman said. The renewed fighting comes days after Kapra hunters from northern Sierra Leone joined ranks with the Kamajors after graduating from a training camp in the southwest.

Number	Item	Content
233	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 2 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

2 November 1997: Nine bus passengers were killed between Kenema and Bo Sunday in a clash between soldiers and members of the Kamajor militia. State bus company officials said the shoot-out occurred when soldiers on the bus ignored an order to disembark given by the Kamajors, who had stopped the vehicle.

Nigerian ECOMOG commanders and their Sierra Leonean counterparts met at the town of Oroogo on Sunday to work out modalities for implementing the peace accord agreed to in Conakry on October 23. Lieutenant Colonel Buhari Musa headed a six-member ECOMOG delegation, while the Sierra Leonean side was led by Chief of Army Staff Colonel Samuel Williams. Military sources said the Nigerians agreed to stop disarming Sierra Leonean soldiers passing through ECOMOG checkpoints, while the Sierra Leoneans will return weapons captured from two Nigerian bases. West African diplomats described the talks as friendly. "If the trend continues, the peace agreement would far exceed the expectations of both sides," one diplomat was quoted as saying. Sunday's talks had originally been scheduled to take place on Friday. No explanation was given for the delay.

ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu is expected to visit Freetown shortly to plan the deployment of ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone. "His talks will focus mainly on the strategic positions to be occupied by the allied troops for the disarmament of combatants and the supervision of the supply of relief items," a diplomat said.

Chief of Defence Staff Samuel Koroma sent a message of solidarity to his Guinean counterpart on Sunday, commemorating the 28th anniversary of the defeat of a Portuguese-led invasion by mercenaries in 1969. "We join you in celebrating this august occasion in a spirit of brotherly relations," the message said.

Number	Item	Content
234	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 4 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

4 November 1997: AFRC Chairman Major Johnny Paul Koroma has described the Conakry peace agreement as "a broad declaration of intent (which) we accept in principle." In a speech to the nation Tuesday night, Koroma set forth a number of "concerns and conditions" which, he said, were necessary to lead to "sustainable peace, security and development" in the country. Koroma said Sierra Leone would not accept any participation by Nigeria in monitoring the implementation of the peace plan, and he demanded that Nigerian ECOMOG troops leave the country immediately. Invoking a provision of the accord which provides for the disarmament of the warring factions, Koroma said that the Nigerian ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone should be classified as combatants. "They are the initiators of the recent unprovoked aggression against our country and they must leave immediately if the six-month plan is to be given any chance to succeed," Koroma said. He said the ECOMOG II monitoring group "should not include any Nigerian soldier or officer, and the command structure should not include any Nigerian. Sierra Leone will not accept an ECOMOG II that is spear-headed by Nigeria, and any attempt to force this issue will torpedo the six-month plan." Koroma called on the other ECOWAS nations to commit resources and to take over Nigeria's role in the peace monitoring process. "Let them put their money where their mouths are, and stop this Nigerian bullying in its talks," he said. Koroma also questioned the "formation, composition, duration and role" of the civilian government which will replace the military junta.

ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lassana Kouyate will brief United Nations Security Council officials on the situation in Sierra Leone next Tuesday. Nigerian Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi, who is chairman of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, will accompany Kouyate on the trip. The ECOWAS delegation will brief the Council on the peace accord agreed to between ECOWAS and the AFRC on October 23, and is expected to seek the Council's help in implementing the peace plan.

Nigerian Director of Defense Information Colonel Godwin Ugbo accused the junta Tuesday of not being sincere in implementing the ceasefire as required under the peace agreement. Ugbo said the AFRC is preparing a fresh attack against ECOMOG. He said Steve Bio, the brother of former NPRC Head of State Julius Maada Bio, had called an a meeting to discuss the attack "because they got machinery from Ukraine," including jet fighters. "What they are now thinking is different from what they were really discussing in Guinea. It is very unfortunate that the junta is thinking different from what the ECOWAS is doing," Ugbo said.

The AFRC Tuesday disputed an Agence France-Presse (AFP) news report which described a clash on Sunday between soldiers and Kamajor militiamen on the Bo-Kenema Road, resulting in the deaths of nine bus passengers. The AFP report cited state bus company officials who said the Kamajors had stopped the bus and ordered the passengers to disembark. The soldiers refused, leading to the shoot-out. The AFRC statement denied that any soldiers had been on board the bus. "Active duty soldiers to not travel by RTC buses. They travel in military vehicles when plying the highways," the statement said. The AFRC accused the Kamajors of ambushing the bus, killing passengers who did not speak Mende, and firing on men who refused to join the Kamajor militia, wounding 27.

The AFRC Secretariat reaffirmed its commitment to the Conakry Peace Accord Tuesday, saying it will hand over power to ousted President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 22 May 1998. "He will then be sworn in again as the Head of State. The present Head of State, His Excellency Major Johnny Paul Koroma, will hand over the staff of office to Tejan Kabbah on May 22, 1998. Members of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council are fully committed to the Conakry Peace Plan," the statement said.

Number	Item	Content
235	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 14 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

14 November 1997: Fighting between army troops and the Kamajor militia is continuing in eastern Sierra Leone, witnesses and AFRC officials said on Friday. The fighting began Monday between Kenema and Tongo, according to one traveller who arrived in Freetown. "There has been no let-up since then, even as I left the area on foot to join a vehicle at Kenema yesterday (Thursday) afternoon," he said. One witness said the outskirts of Tongo are "full of armed men in Kamajor regalia." Kamajors have also been seen near the villages of Kamboma, Pujehun and Kangahun, along the Kenema-Tongo road. "The militiamen were stopping vehicles and threateningly asking passengers for food and money," a witness said.

The United Nations Security Council expressed support on Friday for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone "to seek a peaceful settlement of the crisis and the restoration of the democratically-elected government and constitutional order." A statement read out by Security Council President Qin Huasun welcomed the peace plan agreed to in Conkary on October 23, and noted President Kabbah's acceptance of the plan in his statement of 5 November. The Security Council also called upon the junta "to fulfil its obligations under the peace plan, and in particular the ongoing maintenance of the ceasefire." The statement also reiterated the need for the provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance and called on states and international organisations to assist countries in dealing with the influx of Sierra Leonean refugees. The Security Council also reminded member states of their obligation "to comply strictly" with the economic sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone.

Organisation of African Unity foreign ministers will meet in Addis Ababa November 20 and 21 to discuss conflicts in Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Comoros, Somalia, and the Republic of Congo, where Angolan-backed forces overthrew president Pascal Lissouba last month. The meeting will be chaired by OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim.

Number	Item	Content
236	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 17 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

17 November 1997: Sierra Leone's military junta began identifying and registering child soldiers Monday as a first step towards the disarmament of combatants which is due to begin in December. 500 volunteers set out from Freetown to conduct a census of the estimated 4,000 to 5,000 child soldiers, some as young as 9 years old. "The teams have already started identifying and registering the child combatants this morning in the regional capitals Bo, Kenema, and Makeni, and also in other towns," said Secretary of Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs Major Kula Samba. She said the census was being undertaken in the spirit of the Conakry Peace Agreement. "Disarmament under the Conakry agreement should start December 1 and we are registering and documenting the children to get them ready for the start of that disarmament of the adult combatants," Samba said. Although the majority of the children are believed to be with the Revolutionary United Front, Samba said there were also children serving with the army, the Kamajors, and other militias. Sources close to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) predicted there would be problems with both the RUF and the Kamajors. "RUF officials have told us that they are bringing their child soldiers for registration but that they will never allow the children to be disarmed until their leader Foday Sankoh is released from detention in Nigeria," one said. Humanitarian sources in Freetown and Monrovia said they had heard little of the AFRC plans for child demobilisation. "It is probably a publicity stunt, but if there is a genuine opportunity to demobilise the children we will do what we can to help," one source said.

ECOMOG Chief of Staff Brigadier General Abdul Mohammed denied Monday that ECOMOG's fighter jets had violated a ceasefire agreement over the weekend. "Our aircraft were shot at so we returned fire," Mohammed said from Monrovia. "There were ships coming in to the port to bring lubricants and other fuel products. We detected them from Saturday," he added, pointing out that this had violated the United Nations Security Council sanctions against the junta. The ships "were given warnings, it was announced all over the place. They were given 24-hour warnings in the Freetown press. But it didn't work out, so we sent Alpha jets to enforce the U.N. embargo," he said. An Agence France-Presse (AFP) correspondent in Freetown reported that no warning advertisements were published in the press over the weekend, and that anti-aircraft guns had been dismantled in accordance with the Conakry Peace Agreement.

Liberian President Charles Taylor said Monday that he is seriously concerned about the current economic sanctions being imposed on Sierra Leone, stressing that the situation has caused the deaths of thousands of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees due to the lack of food. Taylor appealed to the world not to ignore the plight of the Sierra Leonean people, describing the sanctions imposed on a poor nation by the United Nations through the influence of world superpowers as a gross violation of human rights. Taylor's comments were reported on Liberia Communications Network Radio.

AFRC spokesman Allieu Kamara said Monday that the junta remains committed to the peace agreement despite what he called a breach of the ceasefire by a Nigerian Alpha jet fighter plane on Sunday. Kamara said ECOMOG Force Commander Major-General Victor Malu would meet with AFRC Chairman Major Johnny Paul Koroma on Wednesday to resolve differences over disarming of combatants and the dominance of Nigerian troops in ECOMOG.

The Inter-African Committee on Harmful Traditional Practices identified Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Egypt as pockets of resistance in eradicating harmful traditional practices which affect the health of at least 100 million African women and children. The Committee's president, Berhane Ras-Work of Ethiopia, said religious and cultural arguments were being advanced by authorities in these countries to blunt the struggle against harmful practices--identified as female genital mutilation (female circumcision), early marriage, and nutritional taboos. Senegalese Minister of Health and Social Action Ousmane Ngom advised the Committee to diversify information and training programmes so as to reach all target groups in Africa. He also called for the full application of the Convention on Children's Rights and the African Charter of Rights and the Well-being of the Child, which call for the protection of children against harmful practices. The Committee, which operates in 26 African countries, is holding a five day congress in Dakar, Senegal.

Number	Item	Content
237	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 November 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

20 November 1997: A visit to Freetown by the ECOWAS Committee of Five foreign ministers scheduled for Friday has been postponed. The foreign ministers were to have met with junta officials to discuss the return of the country to civilian rule. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Pallo Bangura was quoted as saying that the meeting will now probably be rescheduled for November 27. The postponement was due to renewed fighting between the army and the Kamajor militia near Tongo, in eastern Sierra Leone.

Renewed fighting between the army and the Kamajor militia has been reported in the Tongo area, with each side accusing the other of violating the ceasefire. Kamajor spokesman Eddie Mando said the Kamajors had accepted the peace agreement because it was in the best interest of Sierra Leone. He accused the junta of attacking the militia and civilians as part of their "tricks." AFRC spokesman Allieu Kamara accused the Kamajors of breaking the ceasefire, and said he will report the incidents to ECOMOG. A Kamajor spokesman said the militia had only responded when attacked. Residents fleeing the area were quoted as saying that the Kamajors hold all roads leading into Tongo. They said Tongo residents were warned to leave the town by November 28, before the Kamajors launch an all-out attack on the junta forces holding the town. Thousands of people fleeing the area reportedly arrived in Kenema on Wednesday.

Liberian President Charles Taylor said Thursday that the crisis in Sierra Leone is a threat to Liberia's security. "There is a real threat of the activities on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, but that threat is not sufficient for our citizens to panic," Taylor said in a national radio broadcast. He said the Liberian government had arrested an unspecified number of Kamajor militia members and seized "massive documentations, including hospital records and rosters which prove that there is a threat." Although Liberia is not armed yet, Taylor said, if threatened from outside "there are ways that we will take the arms from those who have them and we will use them." Taylor said he supports efforts by the United Nations and ECOWAS to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone, "but Liberia continues to object to economic sanctions, especially food and medicine, because women and children die." In a BBC interview Thursday, Taylor said that he favours the release from detention of RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh.

Number	Item	Content
238	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 4 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

4 December: Lawyers representing the exiled Sierra Leone government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah have succeeded in obtaining a restraining order to prevent the currency printing firm Thomas de la Rue from printing billions of leones in new currency for the AFRC, Kabbah said Thursday. Speaking to a cross-section of the Sierra Leonean community in Conakry, Kabbah said the junta had entered into a contract with the firm to print new notes, which would have gone into circulation at the end of December. According to Kabbah, some 20 billion leones were in circulation in Sierra Leone prior to the May 25 coup, with four times that amount in reserve at the Central Bank. Apparently, he said, the money had been misappropriated by the junta, resulting in the AFRC's attempt to print new notes. He said this demonstrated the junta's reckless and irresponsible spending of the nation's money.

AFRC Chairman Major Johnny Paul Koroma appealed Thursday to Nigerian leader and current ECOWAS chairman General Sani Abacha to lift economic sanctions on Sierra Leone. In a letter to Abacha, Koroma expressed "grave concern over the afflictions on the ordinary Sierra Leoneans," foreign minister officials said. "Since the Conakry Agreement has mandated the (military) government to continue to govern and conduct the affairs of state without hindrance for a period of six months, the sanctions and embargo should be lifted," Koroma wrote. "The health and welfare of the citizens is our direct responsibility, and Sierra Leoneans are now looking up to us as a government to fulfill their needs and basic requirements...The continuing imposition of sanctions and embargo on all commodities entering Sierra Leone makes neither sense, nor can it be in the interest of peace and the ordinary people of Sierra Leone. The people of Sierra Leone cannot be expected to survive for six months without imports of food, fuel and medicine." Koroma said that transportation is "slowly grinding to a halt due to the non-availability of petrol. The masses are forced to walk long distances to earn their livelihood. The prices of all basic goods have been more than doubled, and drug and health services are becoming increasingly inaccessible." He said farmers "cannot get their produce to the markets, the national electrical power generation is at a standstill, and (there is) a pending inability to treat any water at all in the very near future." Koroma argued that the lives of many Sierra Leoneans have been put at risk by what appeared to be an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of sanctions which are destined to brutalise the people of Sierra Leone through starvation and disease.

U.S. President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore will attend the world premiere of Stephen Spielberg's new film *Amistad* on Thursday evening. The *Amistad* was a Spanish schooner which entered U.S. waters in 1839, after its cargo of Africans kidnapped from the coast of present-day Sierra Leone seized the ship off the coast of Cuba.

Kamajor militiamen killed eight people in the southeast this week, a military official in Kenema said Thursday. On Tuesday, four soldiers and a woman were killed in an ambush along the Kono-Tongo road, he said. "The four soldiers were butchered with machetes and buried in shallow graves," the official said, adding that the bodies had been recovered. At Jembeh, on the Bo-Kenema road, Kamajors ambushed a commercial truck carrying over 200 bags of rice. A radio correspondent said two men and one woman were killed in the attack. "They shot and killed a woman who owned part of the truckload as well as two men. Their bodies were riddled with bullets, and another man was badly wounded," he said. On Wednesday, the Kamajors reportedly ambushed and seized a Sierra Leone Red Cross truck delivering relief food to Moyamba. Town

Chief Joseph Benda and other officials were quoted as saying the Kamajors had manhandled the Red Cross staff and told them that in the future all relief supplies should be handed over to them for distribution. The AFRC has condemned the attacks, saying they "violate the Conakry Peace Plan which called for a cessation of hostilities by all sides involved in the Sierra Leone conflict." A Kamajor spokesman in Kenema accused the army of using airborne troops to attack Kamajor positions in Moyamba and Bonthe, and tormenting civilians in the two areas. "We are only defending ourselves from repeated harassment from government soldiers," the spokesman said. "We are also blocking soldiers from depleting the country's diamonds through illegal mining in Kono and Tongo."

Liberian President Charles Taylor called Thursday for a re-definition of the ECOMOG force as a condition for ECOMOG's continued stay in Liberia. "But the functions of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone should be defined and separated," Taylor was quoted as saying at the conclusion of a two-day official visit to Nigeria. Taylor described as "rumor" statements attributed to him that he would not allow Liberia to be used as a base of operations to solve the Sierra Leone crisis. Since Liberia is a member of ECOWAS, Taylor said, the country will support any ECOWAS plans on Sierra Leone.

Number	Item	Content
239	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 12 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

12 December: Director of Defence Information John Milton said Friday the military government was "baffled" over the bombardment of Benduma village, in eastern Sierra Leone, by a Nigerian Alpha fighter jet. Military sources said 20 people were killed when the jet dropped two bombs on the village. "We don't know why the Nigerians picked on that target, as the village is inhabited by subsistence farmers who have nothing to do with any political crisis," Milton said. Military sources in Freetown said all of the country's military positions were on high alert for fear of another attack. The ECOMOG high command in Monrovia issued a statement calling the junta's allegations "malicious, misleading and untrue." The statement said one of ECOMOG's planes had come under attack while on routine patrol, and had fired back in self-defence. "The ECOWAS/UN embargo on Sierra Leone will be enforced vigorously and relentlessly," the ECOMOG statement said. ECOMOG Chief of Staff Brigadier-General Abdul-One Mohamed said the jets had been on a reconnaissance mission in eastern Sierra Leone. "As you are aware, we are enforcing an embargo on the junta. So yesterday when on a reconnaissance mission, some people fired at them, so they fired back," Mohamed said. "As a standing rule, we normally tell them to fire back only in self-defence." He said he was unaware of any casualties. "I am yet to get the details," he said. An aid agency official confirmed the attack on the town. "We received information from our office in the area that a jet bombed this village last evening, killing several people and wounding others," the official said. AFRC spokesman Allieu Kamara said the plane had apparently targeted the military barracks at Daru, about 2.5 miles from Benduma.

ECOMOG accused Sierra Leone's military junta Friday of "flagrant violation of the ceasefire in Sierra Leone." The statement said that the junta and its RUF allies on Tuesday and Wednesday launched "massive unprovoked attacks on positions of the Civil Defence Force, the Kamajor hunter militia, in eastern and southeastern Sierra Leone." The statement, which was signed by Major S.O. Adewusi on behalf of ECOMOG Force Commander Major-General Victor Malu, named the villages of Joru and Gorahun in the east and Sonoshun (?), Fairo and Dia in the southeast as the towns most seriously affected. "These attacks were backed by helicopter gunship, artillery, mortar rocket propeller grenade and other small arms. These attacks afforded the rebel troops the opportunity to loot, rape and traumatize innocent citizens," the statement said. It added that some women, children, and elderly had escaped the fighting and managed to reach ECOMOG troops at Bo Waterside in Liberia where they are receiving treatment. The ECOMOG statement also accused the junta of carrying out unprovoked attacks on the Kamajor militia in an effort to push the Kamajors back and enter the ECOMOG location to create an avenue for more attacks on civilians. The statement said ECOMOG considered the attacks to be a serious violation of the Conakry Peace Accord, and warned of grave consequences. "This High Command is therefore constrained to reiterate its preparedness and commitment to enforce the ceasefire. The junta is therefore warned that any further violation will inevitably draw appropriate action from the ECOMOG High Command." The Kamajors and junta troops have reportedly been engaged in intense fighting in the southeast since Wednesday.

In a press release issued by the Friday, the Kamajor militia said it would launch new attacks against the junta, because the military government had failed to implement the peace agreement. Anyone working for the junta would be a target, the statement said. A Kamajor field commander accused the junta of killing a number of people during an attack on a town in the southeast earlier in the week. He said the entire town was burned down before junta forces were repelled. The army also attacked a town on the border with Liberia on Thursday, killing 15 people, he said.

AFRC spokesman Allieu Kamara said it was the Kamajors who were killing people and destroying property in the southeast. Kamara also blamed Nigerian ECOMOG troops for the continuing crisis in Sierra Leone. "We'll not disarm on schedule if Nigeria keeps bombarding our innocent civilians and keeps harassing our people with their jets," Kamara said. Military sources in Freetown said Friday they had information that most of the military arsenal used by ECOMOG in Monrovia would be transferred to Freetown. They suggested that the ECOMOG were aimed at trying to establish a corridor to move a number of tanks into Sierra Leone as they disengaged from Liberia. There was no independent confirmation of the claims.

Guinea has tightened its border controls to prevent the smuggling of petrol, flour, sugar, and other necessities into Sierra Leone, according to diplomatic sources in Freetown. "The Guinean government has undertaken this action to bring pressure to bear on the Freetown junta to comply with the Conakry agreement and to work with all parties to effectively implement it," one diplomat said. Guinean gunboats have reportedly eight boats in the last three days attempting to smuggle goods into Freetown. Only the junta appears to have any fuel left, and the prices of staple foods has nearly doubled in the past week as a result of the tightened blockade, diplomats said.

Sierra Leone identified 976 child soldiers in a campaign last month to register child combatants in preparation for disarming them and returning them to a normal life, the Ministry of Children and Gender Affairs said Friday. The campaign had aimed to disarm 5,000 children, but lack of cooperation from some of the armed factions, as well as by some of the children themselves, hindered the operation. "Many factors affected the exercise not reaching the projected figure," said Baila Leigh, who was in charge of the disarmament programme. "In most cases, half of the target was not met." Registrars expressed concern over the fate of a colleague, Samuel Conteh, who failed to return from a mission to Kailahun. No child soldiers were registered in the east of the country. Leigh said he was optimistic that the next attempt at registration would prove more successful.

AFRC Chairman Major Johnny Paul Koroma on Wednesday ordered the release of six prisoners who were detained in October after an anti-junta demonstration which left three people dead. The six include former logistical director Colonel Kes Boyah, former senior paymaster Colonel Sahr Sinnah, and four customs officers. Officials at Pademba Road Prison said that hours before their release, shortly after midnight on Tuesday, a group of soldiers led by Corporal Tamba Gborie "stormed the prison" and demanded that the men be released. "They instructed Assistant Supervisor of Prisons Alie Sesay, who was the night orderly, to release the detained men," a prison official said. "They were turned down flatly as the orders did not come from the proper channel. It is very unusual for us to release prisoners or detainees at night. They were told it was impossible and that they had a hidden agenda." Military spokesman Joseph Amara confirmed Gborie's attempt to free the six. Corporal Tamba Gborie first was the first to announce the May 25 coup over SLBS (state radio). He was reportedly suspended from his position in the AFRC and placed under "mess arrest" last month for "undermining the revenue-generating capacity" of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources in the eastern diamond mining areas.

The aid agency Oxfam called on Friday for a European code of conduct which would prevent arms sales to repressive governments, or those using child soldiers. Oxfam UK said 200,000 children were being used as soldiers around the world, and that 45 percent of those killed in wars between 1993 and 1996 were children. "British arms export licenses were issued to Sierra Leone and Liberia as recently as 1996, where the killing of children, and by children, has been rampant," the agency said in a statement. "If we are to stop small arms falling into small hands, then a vital part of the solution is for both British and EU arms sales to be regulated by a far tougher code of conduct than the government appears to be committed to," said Dianna Melrose, Oxfam's head of policy.

Number	Item	Content
240	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 23 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

23 December 1997: 8 people were killed over the weekend in clashes between the army and the Kamajor militia, Director of Defence Information Lieutenant-Colonel John Milton said Tuesday. Milton said the army repelled an attack by Kamajors at Masingbi, where they were attempting to block the Makeni-Kono highway.

Kamajor leader Sam Hinga Norman announced that a military operation, named "Black December", was launched over the weekend to capture main roads in Sierra Leone and put them under the control of the ECOMOG force. Norman denied junta allegations that ECOMOG is arming the Kamajor militia.

Sources from the Committee on Food Aid (CFA), which includes the World Food Programme (WFP), said Tuesday that Sierra Leone is facing serious food shortages, which have already become acute in some areas. The CFA said that the balance of the relief supplies, which have fallen below 500 metric tons, would provide rations for only 60,000 of the most vulnerable of the 157,000 registered internally displaced persons. The sources said feeding programmes for the most needy had virtually come to a halt.

Number	Item	Content
241	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 24 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

24 December 1997: Army Chief of Staff Colonel Sam Williams said Wednesday that the army has been put on "red alert" for any attempt to destabilise the country over Christmas. "We have monitored intelligence reports of a pending attack hatched by Nigerian troops in ECOMOG, backed by Kamajor militiamen and some hired Liberian mercenaries to make Christmas Day a bloody Thursday," Williams said. "We are ready to react to any such threat to ensure that the free movement of the public will not be deterred by enemies of the state." Williams said people need not fear for their safety and should continue to attend social functions over Christmas. "The job of the army is to defend all civilians residing in the country and we are determined to follow this to the letter," he said. Police Chief Kandeh Williams said Tuesday that he would not approve permits for the traditional carnival processions and masquerades. "We are in a fluid situation," he said. "That is why we decided to ban all demonstrations."

Travellers from Bo have disputed a claim by Kamajor leader Sam Hinga Norman that the militia has blocked the Freetown-Bo highway. Norman, who was Deputy Defence Minister in the ousted civilian government, said that all areas under Kamajor control were being turned over to ECOMOG troops as part of the deployment programme. "We have also mounted a big military operation to dislodge junta forces along highway check points in the country under operation Rambo raid," Norman said. The military reported a Kamajor raid Monday at the Mile 91 checkpoint, but said troops drove the Kamajors into the bush with aerial bombardment.

Number	Item	Content
242	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 30 December 1997, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

30 December 1997: Kamajor leader Sam Hinga Norman claimed success Tuesday in the militia's "Black December" military offensive in southeastern Sierra Leone. In a press release quoted by the BBC, Norman said 92 RUF fighters surrendered to the Kamajor militia at (?Bumpe) Chiefdom in Bo District on December 27. All 92 have been turned over the ECOMOG, the statement said. The militia also claimed to have blocked the Freetown-Bo, Bo-Kenema, and Bo-Pujehun highways. Kamajor spokesman Henry Manjo warned people to avoid travelling on the highways, adding that anyone who contravenes this order will have himself to blame.

The Secretary of State for the Northern Region, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Bottor, accused the international community Tuesday of treating "the complex situation in Sierra Leone with utter neglect." In an address to fuel dealers in Northern Province, Bottor said "the scarcity and high cost of petroleum products is very alarming and a remedy should be found." Petroleum and petroleum products are among the items included in the United Nations Security Council sanctions. Bottor said fuel supplies have virtually dried up and prices have soared since the coup. Fuel is only available on the black market at four times its official price of \$3.00, he said. Diesel has practically disappeared from the open market, and now sells at \$10.00 a gallon, five times its official price. "It could be disastrous if the prices are not checked," Bottor warned, adding that much of the fuel available has been contaminated with a mixture of jet fuel and soft drinks to give it a reddish color.

The Department of Defence on Tuesday ordered a stop to the "indiscriminate and irresponsible" firing of weapons to usher in the New Year, according to a press release read over SLBS (state radio). "Anyone caught firing during that period will face the penalty of the law," the statement said. Gunshots fired to greet the New Year in 1997 killed 10 civilians and wounded over 30.

Nigerian Director of Defence Information Colonel Godwin Ugbo accused Sierra Leone's military junta Tuesday of breaching the Conakry Peace Accord by building up its military forces. "The junta in Sierra Leone has acquired fighting aircraft and is developing airfields in Bo, Kenema, and Magburaka to use in its nefarious activities," Ugbo told a news conference in Lagos. There has been no independent confirmation of his claim. Ugbo said the junta's military expansion was being assisted by former Sierra Leonean President Joseph Momoh and the Ukrainian government, and that Ukrainian troops had been sighted in Sierra Leone. During a visit to Abuja in November, Deputy Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grischenko denied that Ukraine had provided military assistance to the junta. Ugbo said the military government shows few signs of willingness to abide by an agreement to restore the civilian government next April. "The process to return Kabbah to government is being derailed, which is against the spirit of reconciliation and the Conakry Accord," Ugbo said, adding "We are still appealing to the junta to follow the peace plan."

Number	Item	Content
243	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 1 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

1 January 1998: Two soldiers and six Kamajors were reported killed New Year's Eve in a shoot-out at a village ten miles east of Kenema. Bo was described as calm, despite reports of Kamajor militiamen gathering near the outskirts of the town. Government troops are searching all vehicles entering or leaving the town. A source in Freetown quoted reports that Kamajors have also searched vehicles along the Freetown-Bo highway, but have allowed them to pass. The Kamajors have threatened to prevent government buses from travelling in the interior, claiming they are earning revenue for the junta. Currently, only private vehicles are said to be travelling up-country. In the north, the Secretary of State for the Northern Region said "it is the quietest of all times." News service reports say Kamajors have seized several roads in the northeast. Freetown was reported quiet, as soldiers and RUF fighters obeyed a directive from the Department of Defence not to fire their guns to celebrate the New Year. Gunshots fired during New Year's celebrations a year ago killed 10 civilians and wounded over 30.

ECOMOG force commander Major-General Malu said Thursday that ECOMOG would resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone during 1998. In his New Year's message delivered in Monrovia, Liberia, Malu commended ECOMOG soldiers for their exemplary conduct, enthusiastic dedication to duty, honesty, and loyalty. He pointed to ECOMOG's success in bring peace and security to Liberia, and said the same could be done in Sierra Leone. Malu called the ECOMOG force West Africa's first attempt at conflict resolution, adding that he wished the force would make ECOWAS proud of it at all times.

Rice has become increasingly expensive in Freetown, with a cup now selling for Le 350. Bags of rice are said to be hard to find, but sold just before the New Year for Le 50,000. On Wednesday, soldiers at barracks in Wilberforce and Murray Town were reportedly asked to share bags of rice, but refused, demanding their full ration. At the police barracks in Kissy, 38 bags of rice were delivered to supply 200 policemen. A shortage of petrol in Freetown has caused taxi fare to increase to Le 500.

Number	Item	Content
244	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 2 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

2 January 1998: Military authorities in Freetown said Friday that a number of people were killed near Bo Thursday night in a Kamajor attack on the country's second-largest refugee camp. They declined to give casualty figures, but a civilian source said he counted about 35 dead. "Some of them were hacked to death by the Kamajors, while others were killed by crossfire (with the army)," the source was quoted as saying. Aid workers in Bo confirmed the attack by Kamajor militiamen armed with AK-47 rifles, machetes, and spears. "We have no idea of casualties, although we know that people in the camp and the village were killed," one aid worker said.

Number	Item	Content
245	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 8 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

8 January 1998: A United Nations technical team is expected to leave New York for Freetown on Friday. The mission, which will be led by U.N. Special Envoy Francis Okello, will assess the conditions on the ground and the role of the United Nations in implementing the Conakry Peace Accord. The team will present its findings to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who is expected to issue his second 60-day report on Sierra Leone in early February.

AFRC Public Relations Officer Amidu Bailor Bah welcomed the visit by the United Nations technical team, but questioned the timing of the plan to restore civilian rule in Sierra Leone. "We need to revisit the entire timing of the peace plan," Bah said, emphasising that the timetable agreed to in the Conakry Peace Plan was behind schedule. Diplomats in Conakry, Guinea said the U.N. team would assess the prospects for humanitarian assistance and the deployment of ECOMOG and United Nations peacekeepers. "The U.N. is gravely concerned about the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone and with the increasing clashes between the Sierra Leone military and the civil defence forces in the country," one diplomat said. The U.N. has decided to take urgent steps to avert a humanitarian catastrophe."

Paris-based Action Contre la Faim said its feeding centre at Durbar, near Bo, was ransacked Sunday. The group urged both sides not to block humanitarian aid.

Information Director of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary Adrienne Yande Diop on Thursday called on Sierra Leone's military government to respect the peace plan to end the country's crisis, and called for strengthening of the sanctions against the junta. Diop said the ECOWAS Committee of Five foreign ministers has reiterated that the Conakry Peace Accord, signed between the junta and ECOWAS on October 23, remains the best framework for the restoration of constitutional order.

Former BBC reporter Foday Fofanah was expelled from Guinea on Wednesday, after being detained without charge for three months. Fofanah, who worked for an independent newspaper in Conakry, was escorted across the border to Sierra Leone. Journalists have accused the Guinean government of targeting reporters critical of the administration in the run-up to forthcoming elections, the BBC reported.

The Secretary of State East A.Y.K. Mansaray Thursday deplored as "undemocratic and inhuman" the Kamajor militia's blocking of roads in the country. "They are also killing innocent civilians and impeding the free movement of people and goods with the support of Nigerian troops in ECOMOG," Mansaray told the executive members of the Amalgamated Transport Union in Kenema. Mansaray warned that his administration "will not hesitate to take action against Kamajor supporters," including any paramount chiefs suspected of covertly aiding the Kamajors.

A battle between army troops and a well-armed Kamajor militia band reportedly continued a second day near Zimmi on Thursday, after a lull in the fighting on Tuesday. The military high command in Kenema confirmed the fighting, but was unable to give casualty figure. A military communiqué said sporadic fighting was continuing near Tongo, with the army "consistently beating them back." The army account is disputed by the Kamajors, who say they have killed

over 20 soldiers and surrounded the government forces. There has been no independent confirmation of either claim. Military forces in Bo say they killed 35 Kamajors and lost 5 army troops in fighting on the outskirts of the city. Residents reported that the fighting died down on Tuesday, but that the area remained tense.

RUF War Council Chairman Solomon Rogers dismissed reports Thursday of a split between the military government and the RUF following disciplinary action taken against looters of the Iranian Embassy. Of the eight men implicated, six were from the army and 2 were from the RUF People's Army. RUF Captain Browne was dismissed from the People's Army, while RUF Battle Group Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Issa Sesay will lose three months pay. "There is no split because of the decision," Rogers said. "This action will not in any way bring cracks in the alliance since the Anti-Looting Decree was agreed by all in the alliance." Rogers is also Secretary of State for Agriculture and Forestry.

Number	Item	Content
246	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

13 January 1998: Guinea will recall its estimated 600 troops serving in the ECOMOG force in Liberia and Sierra Leone, according to an unnamed military source in Conakry quoted Tuesday by the news service *Xinhua*. The pullout from Liberia was in line with the withdrawal of the ECOMOG force from that country, while the departure from Sierra Leone was to save money, the source was quoted as saying. A diplomatic source questioned the report's accuracy, saying that Guinea has not made any decision to withdraw its troops from the ECOMOG force.

Kamajors have attacked two villages near the town of Rotifunk, 55 miles from Freetown, according to junta spokesman Amidu Bailor Bah, quoting travellers arriving in Freetown. "People arriving in Freetown yesterday from villages around Rotifunk said they saw heads dripping with blood, hung on stakes at Kamajor roadblocks," Bah said. There was no independent confirmation of the attack. A diplomat, citing an account by a humanitarian source who described the attackers as wearing dreadlocks, suggested that the attack may have been carried out by elements of the disbanded Liberian ULIMO militia, rather than by the Kamajors.

Paramount Chief Krogba Bangura, Section Chief Alimamy Oluia Mala Sesay, and two tribal councilors were shot to death Tuesday in Tonko Limba Chiefdom in an apparent robbery. Four other persons, including the paramount chief's wife, were wounded.

Soldiers beat a number of teachers at the Collegiate Secondary School compound on Wilkinson Road Monday, after students reported that the teachers were refusing to hold classes, according to a source in Freetown. The Sierra Leone Teachers Union (SLTU) has been on strike since the May 25 coup, citing lack of pay, educational, and security concerns.

The European Community Tuesday approved ECU 1.9 million for medical and food aid for Sierra Leone. The money is intended to provide basic health care and food aid in Freetown, Bo and Kenema, as well as assistance in remote rural areas. The aid will be distributed through Concern Universal, the British Red Cross, Medicens Sans Frontieres, Merlin, and Action Aid.

Number	Item	Content
247	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 16 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

16 January 1998: United Nations Special Envoy Francis Okelo said Friday that news talks between Sierra Leone's military junta and ECOWAS were needed to put the peace process back on track, and called for all parties to the Sierra Leonean conflict to redouble their efforts for a peaceful solution. "We are recommending that the ECOWAS Committee of Five and the AFRC meet as early as possible to iron out the problems the military government say are hampering implementation of the peace plan," he said. "If we don't do that we might fall behind the deadline of April 22, 1998 for the return of constitutional order to the country." Okelo said he continued to hope that both sides were committed to implementing the accord within the framework of the Conakry Peace Agreement, adding that this meant the restoration of the civilian government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. "We are now at the half way point. We have three months to go. We are calling on all the parties...to assist vigorously in the implementation of the accord," Okelo said. He described as successful the eight-member United Nations technical team's three day visit to assess the infrastructures in the country for the deployment of U.N. military observers.

The Kamajor militia has stepped up raids in the south, east, and north, according to a *Reuters* news report Friday, which quoted civilians as saying that the bodies of civilians or soldiers killed in ambushes lie alongside the main highways. Travellers reaching the capital Friday said they counted over 25 bodies along the Bo-Freetown road. One witness said Kamajors ambushed a commercial truck near Bo, killing 6 passengers. Others claimed the Kamajors were diverting trucks carrying vegetables to Freetown. According to the Democrat newspaper, "About 15 villages between Sumbuya and Moyamba Junction have been completely burned down" in clashes between junta forces and Kamajor militiamen.

The Ministry of Trade, Industry and State Enterprises issued a statement Friday accusing Nigerian ECOMOG troops at Jui of detaining commercial vehicles passing their checkpoint. "Sierra Leoneans have every right to engage in any commercial activity in their God-given land without hindrance from any external aggressor, and we view the action of the Nigerians as an act of piracy," the statement said. Local journalists report that Nigerian soldiers have confiscated bags of locally-grown rice and garri from traders, accusing them of violating the sanctions. The sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone's military government by the United Nations Security Council and ECOWAS cover only fuel, arms, and ammunition.

AFRC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma Friday stressed the junta's "overwhelming commitment" to the Conakry Peace Plan, and proposed the immediate formation of a number of technical committees to address "salient issues" contained in the agreement, according to a SLBS news release. Koroma told the United Nations technical team, led by U.N. Special Envoy Francis Okelo, that membership of the committees "must reflect the major stakeholders, as well as the technical and political realities on the ground." The proposed committees would include the Coordinating and General Purpose Committee, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Committee, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Committee, and the Committee on the Formation of the Broadly Based Government of National Unity. The proposal was first alluded to by AFRC Secretary-General A.K. Sesay in a January 9 press briefing, which sources close to the military government indicated would form the basis for the junta's working paper for the talks with the United Nations technical team.

Number	Item	Content
248	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 17 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

17 January 1998: The Kamajor militia captured the diamond mining town of Tongo Saturday, after a three day battle with government troops, the BBC reported.

Two *Herald Guardian* journalists arrested in Freetown last week are still being held without charge, the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) said Saturday. "They should either be charged and released on bail or set free," an SLAJ statement said. "There is no case against them." Sylvanus Kanyako, a reporter for the *Herald Guardian* and David Kamara, the newspaper's owner, were said to be in poor health and have bruises on their hands. Production Editor Mohamed Kallon, who had also been detained, was reportedly released on January 15. The Paris-based *Reporters Sans Frontieres* linked the arrests to an article calling on parents not to send their children to school because of insecurity in the country.

All newspapers will have to re-register starting at the end of January, according to a Department of Information, Broadcasting, Tourism and Culture press release. The statement said the decision was taken as a result of "recent disturbing developments leading to the brutalisation of journalists by some sections of the public." It warned printers and vendors to verify that the newspapers they sell were registered "to avoid any further embarrassment."

AFRC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma Friday stressed the junta's "overwhelming commitment" to the Conakry Peace Plan, and proposed the immediate formation of a number of technical committees to address "salient issues" contained in the agreement, according to a SLBS news release. Koroma told the United Nations technical team, led by U.N. Special Envoy Francis Okelo, that membership of the committees "must reflect the major stakeholders, as well as the technical and political realities on the ground." The proposed committees would include the Coordinating and General Purpose Committee, the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Committee, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Committee, and the Committee on the Formation of the Broadly Based Government of National Unity. The proposal was first alluded to by AFRC Secretary-General A.K. Sesay in a January 9 press briefing, which sources close to the military government indicated would form the basis for the junta's working paper for the talks with the United Nations technical team.

Number	Item	Content
249	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 18 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

18 January 1998: The Kamajor militia captured the diamond mining town of Tongo on Saturday, disrupting a key revenue source for Sierra Leone's military junta and forcing thousands of residents to flee their homes. Military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel John Milton said Sunday the Kamajors had besieged the town for two weeks, ending in "three days of bitter fighting" with many casualties. "It is not clear how many of them finally attacked, but our men defending the town said there were close to 1,000," he said. "Yesterday, finally, the Kamajors overpowered our troops and drove them out of town, but skirmishes are still going on the outskirts...The 200 soldiers based in Tongo Field put up a brave fight before they ran out of ammunition and were forced to make a tactical retreat to Panguma." Milton said reinforcements were being sent from various towns with orders "to take back Tongo Field at any cost." Milton described the Kamajors as "well-armed with G3-type weapons used by the Nigerian contingent in the ECOMOG base in Freetown." There was no immediate response from ECOMOG, but in the past the peacekeeping force has denied suggestions that it was providing assistance to the Kamajors. Aid workers said the dead and wounded were being taken to Kenema, 12 miles away. About 20 bodies had been brought there from Tongo, most of them civilians, they said. Civilians who fled to Kenema seeing dozens of corpses on the roads leading from the town and in the bush. Soldiers who returned to Freetown told of bodies of army troops, Kamajors, and civilians littering the streets. Three diamond merchants--a Lebanese and two Malians--were reported to be among the dead. International Committee of the Red Cross Relief Coordinator (ICRC) Diego Thorkilsson said in Freetown that thousands of residents were fleeing along the road to Kenema, bound for refugee camps organised by international and local relief agencies. He said it was not yet clear how many people had left Tongo, as the exodus was still underway. Staff of other aid agencies working in the area were quoted as saying that 8,000 to 10,000 had fled so far; local journalists put the number who had reached Kenema at 4,000. Thorkilsson said staff from the ICRC, Merlin, the World Food Programme, Africare, and other non-governmental organisations were co-ordinating their efforts to provide food, shelter, and medicine for the thousands of refugees arriving at the camps. "We have food stocks in our camps in Kenema and Segbwema that can feed 2,000 families (of six) for one month," Thorkilsson said. He said the agencies would take blankets, plastic sheeting, and buckets to the camps by road as soon as possible. "The Kamajors issued a press release yesterday in which they said they would not attack or interfere with any transport carrying humanitarian aid," he said.

Number	Item	Content
250	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 19 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

19 January 1998: A force of 800-1,000 soldiers of the Army 4th Battalion, along with RUF fighters, has recaptured Tongo after a night of heavy fighting with mortars, anti-aircraft guns, and rocket-propelled grenades, military commanders in Bo said Monday. They said more than 50 Kamajors and 8 soldiers were killed overnight, but that they expected the number would rise as more bodies were discovered in destroyed houses. One commander put the total number of casualties in three days of fighting at over 100. "It was when we began to search the town this morning that we discovered the true extent of the massacre that took place in heavy fighting over the weekend," he said. "Many of the bodies are lying in the streets and beginning to rot." Local relief workers reported meeting Kamajor militiamen retreating from Tongo with their wounded on makeshift stretchers. They quoted the Kamajors as saying they had lost control of the town, but would return with a larger force to recapture it in the next few days. Under Secretary of State for Information Allieu Kamara accused the Kamajors of setting fire to Tongo as they left. "Our men are in full control of Tongo Field although they are trying to put out the fires the Kamajors started to burn down the town when they fled," he said. Civil Defence Forces leader Sam Hinga Norman told the BBC he was unaware of the current situation, denied that the loss of Tongo would be a blow to the militia. "Tongo is going to be a tug of war," he told the BBC. "I can tell you that all civil defence fighters throughout the country will be summoned to retake Tongo."

Military commanders in Bo said Monday they recaptured the town of Grima, near Koribundo, in a dawn raid on Sunday, killing 50 Kamajors. Aid workers in Bo reported an influx of refugees from the town.

Number	Item	Content
251	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 20 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

20 January 1998: ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate said Monday that consultations among ECOWAS leaders are underway to put together a 15,000 member peacekeeping force to disarm the warring factions in Sierra Leone. "If our experience in Liberia is anything to go by, only those who contributed to ECOMOG in that country might contribute to the latest effort," Kouyate said. He said he believed that a disagreement between the United Nations and ECOWAS on troop deployment could be resolved amicably. "The U.N. wants ECOMOG to deploy into Sierra Leone first, but we are disagreeing. We think they should land there before us, Kouyate explained." Kouyate confirmed that ECOWAS will insist that Sierra Leone's military government turn over power by April 22, saying that the junta was not in a position to impose new conditions on the international community. "The international community condemned the coup," he said, adding that it was ECOWAS' prerogative to determine the tenure of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. A meeting of the Committee of Five foreign ministers on Sierra Leone will take place in Abuja in February to review the political situation in Sierra Leone, Kouyate said.

A clash between soldiers and RUF fighters in eastern Freetown Monday left at least three of the combatants dead, police and witnesses said Tuesday. The clash broke out after a woman driving a truck filled with fertiliser told RUF fighters that soldiers, after asking for documents to show who owned the fertiliser, had illegally seized the vehicle. Junta spokesman Amadu Bailoh Bah said both sides had been warned against a repeat in such behaviour. He warned civilians not to involve soldiers or RUF fighters "in matters that are purely civilian," adding that such matters should be left to the police.

The group Action by Churches Together (ACT) announced Tuesday that it plans to raise \$2.1 million during 1998 to benefit 100,000 internally displaced persons, primarily in Bo District. ACT, working through the Council of Churches in Sierra Leone, Christian Aid, and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Sierra Leone, plans to carry out a comprehensive emergency programme to assist families, communities, and vulnerable groups to rehabilitate their homes and community structures. The churches will also provide local level trauma counseling, and work toward reconciliation, and to facilitate the demobilisation and resettlement of ex-combatants.

About 130 people were killed in fighting at Tongo over the weekend, half of them Kamajors, Under Secretary of State for Information Allieu Kamara said Tuesday. He said 30 people died in fighting for the town on Saturday, and about 100 on Sunday. SLBS (state radio), quoting Military Spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel John Milton, accused ECOMOG of instigating the Kamajor attack. "The fighting in Tongo Field has been perpetrated by the Nigerians who are aiding and abetting the Kamajors," the statement said. Some of the civilian killings were reportedly the result of old scores related to the chieftaincy and land disputes.

Number	Item	Content
252	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 21 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

21 January: Civil Defence Forces leader Sam Hinga Norman has denied a claim by Sierra Leone's military junta that to have recaptured Tongo from the Kamajor militia. Norman told Radio 98.1 on Wednesday that the Kamajors remain in control of the town.

Former President Joseph S. Momoh Wednesday rejected as "baseless and unfounded" charges made last month by Nigerian Director of Defence Information Major Godwin Ugbo accusing Momoh and the Ukrainian government of assisting the junta's military buildup. "I wish to state most categorically and emphatically that (I have) no knowledge whatsoever of any military buildup in Sierra Leone, and I have never in all my life had any dealings with the Ukrainian government," Momoh said in a press release distributed by SLBS. Momoh also termed as "a figment of his imagination" Ugbo's assertion that he, rather than Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma, is actually leading Sierra Leone's military government. "My most burning desire for Sierra Leone is to see my country restored to constitutional rule, and whatever I can do to aid and further that process will be done with all the emphasis at my command," Momoh said. "Sierra Leone has been bleeding for the past six years, and I stand to gain nothing by creating chaos in the only country which I have in the world."

Relief workers expressed concern Wednesday about the plight of refugees fleeing the fighting around Tongo. Local humanitarian sources said villages around Bo and Kenema had been deserted in the past few days. They expressed concern residents might be afraid to venture into towns for help because of the presence of soldiers.

U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright on Wednesday awarded the Secretary's Award for Heroism to Mary Ann Wright and Jeffrey C. Breed "in recognition of their exceptional service in Sierra Leone during the May 1997 military takeover and the subsequent U.S. military evacuation of 2500 civilians," according to a press statement issued by State Department Spokesman James P. Rubin. Wright was the Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy and, as the highest ranking U.S. official in Sierra Leone at the time, took personal responsibility for American citizens and embassy employees in the country. She established a dialogue with rebel leaders to seek a peaceful conclusion to the crisis, and planned and directed the evacuation of Americans, embassy staff, and other endangered foreign nationals from Freetown. Breed, who was the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Regional Security Officer at the time of the coup, coordinated the Embassy's security response to the crisis, and was instrumental in maintaining order among the thousands of people seeking to escape Freetown during the evacuations.

Number	Item	Content
253	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 26 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

26 January 1998: Kamajor militiamen ambushed a convoy of soldiers and civilians at Moyamba Junction Sunday, resulting in a highway battle that killed at least 47 people, military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel John Milton said Monday. He said the dead included 15 civilians, 3 soldiers, and 29 Kamajors. Two traders who escaped the fighting said the death toll was likely much higher, as many civilians were trapped and burned alive inside their vehicles, which exploded during the fighting.

Over 800 soldiers, RUF fighters, and police personnel have given themselves up to ECOMOG forces at Lungi and Jui since last December, ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Max Khobe told the BBC on Monday. He said 300 Sierra Leone Army personnel, 180 police officers including some from the Special Security Division, and over 400 RUF rebels had voluntarily surrendered, some with their weapons. Khobe's claim was disputed by Khobe junta spokesman Amidu Bailor Bah, who called it "just another manifestation of hostile propaganda" by ECOMOG. "Definitely, it is baseless and it is unfounded," he said.

Junta spokesman Amidu Bailor Bah denounced 40 members of Sierra Leone's dissolved civilian parliament as "rebels" on Monday in response to an announcement that the M.P.'s intend to convene parliament on Sierra Leonean soil, on ECOMOG-held territory at Lungi. "We are confronted with a very funny situation here because, naturally, you will not have two governments in the state affairs," Bah said. "There is a government, and that government is a government of the AFRC." Bah said that if the parliamentarians were accepting the AFRC's invitation to return to Sierra Leone before the April 22 deadline for reinstating the civilian government, they must communicate that to the AFRC. "We want to first of all have their status clearly defined," Bah said. "If they are rebels, then we are going to treat them accordingly." He said the junta would continue "to extend the olive branch" to the parliamentarians, but that Sierra Leone's "government of the day" was the AFRC. "If any group of persons are claiming a government as traitors, naturally we refer to them as rebels. But in this case now, we are not going to treat them the way people expect rebels to be treated, that is, by fighting them or by waging war on them. We are tired of fighting war, but we will at the same time let them know that they are rebels."

Number	Item	Content
254	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 29 January 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

29 January 1998: The *Agence France-Presse* (AFP), quoting local journalists Thursday, reported that the Kamajor militia had "pinned down" army troops in eastern Sierra Leone. "The situation is desperate as mortar shells and rocket-propelled grenades are falling like rain as both sides try to dislodge each other," one soldier was quoted as saying. The two sides continue to make conflicting claims as to who controls Tongo. "(The Kamajors) are still in control in Tongo Field, giving government troops hell," Civil Defence Forces spokesman Arthur Koroma said. He added that the Kamajors had repelled government troops and taken a number of prisoners. AFRC Under Secretary of State for Information Allieu Kamara has maintained that "loyal troops are still in total control."

Security officials in Makeni have reported a spate of armed robberies by men in military fatigues.

The Organisation of African Unity will hold a summit meeting on the prevention and settlement of disputes in Africa February 11-12 in Harare, Zimbabwe. The agenda will reportedly deal with crises in Comoros, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Angola, and will also discuss Egypt's efforts to reconcile warring factions in Somalia.

Number	Item	Content
255	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 8 February 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

8 February 1998: Heavy artillery fire was heard at the edge of Freetown Sunday afternoon as pro-junta forces battled Nigerian ECOMOG troops on the outskirts of the capital. The streets of Freetown were largely empty except for truckloads of junta soldiers carrying AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Radio 98.1 reported that ECOMOG was moving toward Freetown from Portee, about six miles from the city center. ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi denied that his troops were going on the offensive. "We are only defending ourselves," Shelpidi said from ECOMOG headquarters in Monrovia, Liberia. "If they use small arms, we use small arms; if they use artillery, we use artillery." Military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel John Milton said ECOMOG appeared determined to overthrow Sierra Leone's military government. "We have intercepted ECOMOG military intelligence with orders to start military intervention to drive the AFRC from power," Milton said. There were unconfirmed reports Sunday evening that ECOMOG troops had advanced as far as Kissy. An AFRC press release Sunday, citing "reports monitored from the fighting front" claimed that ECOMOG troops had been "dislodged from their bases at Jui" and routed. Casualty reports were sketchy, but medical workers at Connaught Hospital said seven bodies and 30 wounded were brought in Sunday by health teams, who reported more bodies lying in the streets. The hospital received 52 wounded on Saturday, 49 of them soldiers, and has run out of beds and basic supplies, staff members said.

Sierra Leone's military junta said Sunday its gunners shot down a Nigerian Alpha jet as it flew over Freetown. "We are searching for the main body of the plane," a military officer said, adding that it may have crashed in mangrove swamps east of the capital. *Reuters*, which in its initial report described hundreds of people dancing in the street brandishing what they said were plane parts, later said the plane fired on a tank mounted with an anti-aircraft gun near the center of the city, killing six persons and wounding others. "Soldiers who had fired on the jet with their rifles danced in jubilation as they picked up fragments of metal they said had fallen from the plane," the report said, adding that the warplane flew off, apparently unscathed. According to a diplomatic source, ECOMOG headquarters in Monrovia has dismissed the AFRC claim as "a complete fabrication." An AFRC press release issued Sunday claimed the plane was hit as it flew over Calaba Town and crashed in Kissy, killing the pilot and co-pilot. Their bodies were tied to a vehicle and driven across the city, accompanied by crowds chanting slogans in support of AFRC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma, the press release said. A source close to the AFRC, quoting SLBS sources, said that the wreckage of the plane was photographed by an SLBS film crew and reportedly shown on SLBS television. The plane was said to have crashed into the sea near Old Wharf, with its nose up. The source quoted AFRC Secretary-General A.K. Sesay as saying four persons were killed in Kissy when the plane's wing fell on their car. Shortly after the junta reported downing the jet, another Nigerian warplane bombed the area around Wilberforce Army Barracks.

The Kamajor militia attacked Kenema on Sunday, forcing thousands of civilians to flee the city. Aid workers were quoted as saying the approximately 1,000 soldiers and RUF fighters were having difficulty containing the attack. "Our staff have locked themselves indoors and are watching from their windows at the exodus of people," one aid worker at Kenema Government Hospital said. "Our hospital is shut and we cannot go outside because of the intensity of the fighting." An AFRC official, quoted by a source close to Sierra Leone's military junta, said the attack on Kenema was repelled with heavy Kamajor casualties. There has been no independent confirmation of the claim.

Number	Item	Content
256	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 February 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

13 February 1998: Nigerian ECOMOG troops controlled most of Freetown Friday, although sporadic gunfire continued in the western part of the city. ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said his troops now controlled about 95% of the city, but were still encountering sporadic resistance. The junta no longer appeared to be functioning, Shelpidi said, although some junta officials may still be commanding troops. Numerous houses and buildings were sent on fire overnight by desperate junta troops, residents said, while a number of junta supporters were burned or beaten to death in reprisal killings. "Civilians, mostly youth, are actually going out looking for soldiers, RUF rebels, and other sympathizers of the AFRC, and in most cases actually killing them on the spot," BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay reported. Authorities imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew and broadcast appeals to residents to surrender their arms and to refrain from retaliatory attacks on junta members. In Kissy, advancing ECOMOG troops discovered large caches of arms belonging to soldiers and junta supporters, Ojukutu-Macaulay said.

25 members of Sierra Leone's military junta were detained by ECOMOG troops Friday, after an ECOMOG warplane intercepted the two helicopter gunships in which they were travelling and forced them to land at Monrovia's Spriggs Payne Airport at about 9:00 a.m. local time. "We intercepted the helicopter, which had no clearance to land on Liberian soil, and forced it to land at Spriggs Payne Airport where the 25 men on board, including the crew, were arrested," ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi told reporters in Monrovia. Witnesses at the airport said 51 persons were on board the helicopters, which were quickly surrounded on the tarmac by ECOMOG troops. Shelpidi confirmed that the passengers were junta members. "There are 25 Sierra Leonean officials. There are also the Ukrainian and Russian crew members and technicians," he said. "We do not know their full identities yet, but we are investigating." One of those detained was identified as Secretary of State, Office of the Chairman Major Victor King. Shelpidi said the Liberian government had demanded that the arrested men be turned over to its security forces, but that they were still being investigated. "All we are doing is to enforce the U.N./ECOWAS embargo, which prohibits junta members or their families from traveling to a U.N. member country," he said. Following an emergency cabinet meeting at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia Friday afternoon, Liberian Foreign Minister Monie Captan said Liberia has protested the ECOMOG action. "This is an infringement on our territory," Captan said, adding that Liberia has recalled its ambassador to Nigeria for consultations. AFRC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma was not among those detained, Shelpidi said. An unconfirmed report Friday said Koroma had left Sierra Leone by boat. The Pan African News Agency (PANA), quoting "foreign media" sources, reported that Koroma had applied to Liberian President Charles Taylor for asylum. A source close to the AFRC said early Friday morning that Koroma was still in Freetown, but that his wife Makuta had fled to the interior.

A diplomatic source said ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi placed his forces in Monrovia on high alert Friday after Liberian President Charles Taylor threatened "drastic action" if the detained junta leaders were not turned over to Liberian authorities by a 2:00 p.m. deadline. As the deadline drew near, ECOMOG tanks and armored vehicles took to the streets and Alpha fighter jets made low passes over the capital and the Executive Mansion, the source said. In reply to a journalist's question on why the warplanes had been "terrorizing Monrovia", Shelpidi replied that the pilots were doing flight training.

AFRC Under Secretary of State for Information Allieu Kamara denied Friday that the junta had been defeated. "We are in control, and we are avoiding catastrophe, which will lead to total demolition of Freetown," Kamara told the BBC. "So, what we are actually trying to do is retreat, and make sure that the guys that are coming in, that is, the Kamajors and the Nigerians, will be killed and definitely be captured. So, we are trying to avoid property damages." Kamara said the junta would continue to offer resistance, in order to "defend the territorial integrity" of the country. "We are not going to give ourselves up. This is just the beginning of the battle. Sierra Leone is ours. If Nigeria feels they can come in and dominate, they are missing the point," Kamara said. "We have forces in Kenema, we have forces in Bo, we have forces in Daru, we have forces in Makeni. This is just the beginning of the battle. We are talking about Sierra Leone, not Freetown. If they feel they can take Freetown and tell the world that they have succeeded, this is just the beginning of the battle because our men are determined to defend the sovereignty of this country."

Thousands of Kenema residents have taken refuge in nearby villages following a threat by junta troops "to burn the town and create mayhem" if ECOMOG troops approached the town. BBC correspondent Prince Brimah said Friday that an ECOMOG contingent which crossed the Mano River Bridge into Sierra Leone over the weekend has made only slow progress on its 106 mile journey to Kenema because of the logs left across roads during the Kamajor militia's "Black December" operation. The ECOMOG troops are equipped with five tanks fitted with mine detectors, Brimah reported. An ECOMOG official said Kamajor militiamen were helping to clear the roads, and that he was optimistic that Kenema would be captured Friday evening. A ECOMOG fighter jet reportedly bombed the AFRC's Kenema headquarters on Wednesday, killing several AFRC troops. The London-based human rights group Amnesty International (AI) said Friday it had received reports from Kenema that soldiers and RUF fighters, joined by Liberian fighters, were searching house-to-house for suspected opponents. "People perceived as supporters of the ousted government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah face a serious risk of being arrested, tortured, ill-treated, or executed," the report said, adding that Amnesty International had received information that unarmed civilians were being tortured and killed by both sides. "Several prominent members of the community in Kenema, including the chairman of the town council, B.S. Massaquoi — who are accused of supporting the Kamajors — have been arrested and remain in detention; many of them have been tortured," AI said. "On Sunday, 8 February, at least 300 soldiers and RUF forces entered the town of Kenema, posing as Kamajors, and called for civilians to join them; those who came out into the street were killed."

Kamajor militiamen in control of Tongo, say they have surrounded the junta's military garrison at Daru, and the city of Bo. Aid workers quoted by Agence France-Presse (AFP) Friday confirmed that fighting was taking place in Bo. Fighting between Kamajors and junta forces at the army's 36th Battalion headquarters in Koribundu, which started Monday, is still continuing. Casualty figures are unavailable, but a number of persons have been reported killed during during four days of fighting. Kamajor forces have reportedly blocked roads in the south and east of the country to prevent AFRC officials from escaping to Liberia.

The government-in-exile of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah appealed Friday for humanitarian aid to "halt the famine." Up to half a million civilians in Freetown who had been cut off from food aid during the fighting were in jeopardy, the World Food Programme (WFP) said. The Sierra Leone Committee on Food Aid, comprising the World Food Programme, CARE, Concern Universal, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision, said that recent events in Sierra Leone have "accelerated the downward spiral of humanitarian conditions found throughout the whole nation." The Committee said that people were starving in some areas, and expressed particular concern for children.

A diplomatic source disclosed Friday that the World Health Organisation (WHO) is sending personnel from Conakry to test the water at Guma Valley Reservoir, following an unsubstantiated report that the water supply had been poisoned Thursday night by retreating junta troops.

More than 3,000 refugees from the fighting in Freetown have arrived in Guinea in motorised canoes (pampas), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokesperson Judith Kumin said Friday. She said refugees Thursday reported that at least 20 more boatloads of people had set out on the ten to twelve hour journey. "We are preparing for a large influx (of refugees), depending on what happens in Freetown," Kumin said in Geneva. "The flow has been quite limited so far, because the roads have been blocked and there has also been firing on the dock area, where people would leave, by vessels offshore. The question is, when the fighting stops completely, whether people stay put or panic, which often happens." The UNHCR has prepared a refugee center east of Conakry, with a capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 persons.

Reaction: U.S. State Department Spokesman James Rubin: *"We urge all forces to exercise restraint, avoid civilian casualties, and respect the human rights of all parties. The leadership of the junta has fled the country. We hope the democratically-elected government of President Kabbah will quickly return to Freetown and that calm will soon be restored. The United States will be working with the Kabbah Government and the international community to address the pressing needs of the civilian population."* Zimbabwean President and OAU Chairman Robert Mugabe: *"ECOMOG will remain in Sierra Leone until they are certain that all resistance is gone. It may take time but all the same we want to say well done to them."* Mugabe praised ECOWAS for restoring democracy in Sierra Leone, and said the OAU will ensure that President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is returned to power. Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs and African Integration: *"The government wishes to congratulate the ECOMOG Chief of Staff and troops for the steps taken to provide protection and security for the civilian population, and exhorts them to keep it up. The government is happy about the imminent restoration of the legitimate government of Tejan Kabbah, and the new prospects of peace, harmony, and progress which open for Sierra Leone."*

Number	Item	Content
257	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 15 February 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

15 February 1998: ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Max Khobe said Sunday that ECOMOG's focus would now shift to restoring law and order to Freetown. "With immediate effect, acts of vandalism, revenge killings, and looting must stop," Khobe warned. "Anyone caught will be shot on sight." More than 390 junta soldiers had surrendered to ECOMOG, Khobe said. As the ECOMOG force tightened its grip on Freetown Sunday, residents reported looting and terrorising of civilians by rebels of the Revolutionary United Front in areas not yet under ECOMOG control. A number of residents of Goderich Village, to the west of the capital, fled their homes Saturday night to seek shelter nearer the city center. "They are cutting people's hands and burning houses," said a hotel manager quoted by *Reuters*. Nigerian troops later moved into Goderich and restored calm. "We have met little or no resistance," a Nigerian officer said. BBC correspondent Mark Doyle described looting on Saturday night by "angry armed men" in Aberdeen. "Last night I was ambushed by a group of RUF, although they may have been Liberians, I'm not sure. But militia of some sort attacked the car I was in and we were lucky to get away with our lives," he said. A representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said Freetown was "totally calm" on Sunday, with no significant signs of the fighting remaining. Residents ventured out onto the streets after a week of chaos, and church services in much of the city were reported to be packed. Some markets were beginning to reopen, although they had little food to sell. A bag of rice in Freetown now costs Le 100,000.

ECOMOG force commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said Sunday that his troops were still rounding up junta officials, and will bring them back to Freetown to await the return from exile of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. "Victor King (detained in Liberia) and others will be flown back to Freetown as soon as we complete compiling our investigation report, in line with the U.N. and ECOWAS mandate," Shelpidi said. Agence France-Presse (AFP) quoted "well-placed sources" Sunday who said 250 senior junta officials had given themselves up to ECOMOG, and that 100 were on their way to Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. Shelpidi said his troops would continue to pursue junta leaders. "The war has just begun because we are going to go after the junta leadership into the hinterland," he said. "Most of them are now fleeing into the bushes, but we will chase them to anywhere they go." ECOMOG sources said about 15 additional junta officials had been apprehended in Conakry, and that some had already been shipped back to Freetown. Lebanese officials on Sunday denied ECOMOG "intelligence reports" that AFRC Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma was seeking asylum at the Lebanese Embassy in Conakry. "The Lebanese Charge d'Affaires Nasir Baz in Conakry assured me that the news that Koroma was seeking to take asylum in the Lebanese embassy there is totally untrue," said Lebanese Consul Ibrahim Assaf, who is currently in Beirut. ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Max Khobe expressed his belief Sunday that Koroma had left for Liberia by boat. On Saturday, Koroma contacted the BBC by satellite telephone, claiming to be in the hills around Freetown.

The cities of Bo and Kenema have been captured by the Kamajor militia, the BBC reported Sunday. "Over 10,000 well-armed Kamajor militiamen entered Bo town from three points, singing war songs and looking for soldiers of the ousted junta," a BBC correspondent in Bo reported, adding that the militiamen "were welcomed by jubilant crowds." Later, the Kamajors arrested eight junta soldiers "suspected of planning sabotage" and handed them over to a mob of youths for execution. The youths also set fire to the homes of suspected AFRC supporters, the BBC reported. Reprisal killings have been reported in Kenema as well. A former soldier who tried to lob two hand grenades into a crowd of demonstrators was caught hiding. Another, accused of

setting fire to a hotel on Saturday, was identified by an angry crowd. "All were tried in public and later burned alive," the BBC correspondent said. A Kamajor spokesman, quoting Civil Defence Forces (CDF) leader Captain Sam Hinga Norman on Sunday, said the Kamajors captured Pujehun on Friday and Koribundu on Saturday.

The military barracks in Makeni was bombed by an ECOMOG Alpha fighter jet, according to a report issued Sunday by the World Mission News Weekly Update. A Kamajor spokesman said Sunday that Civil Defence Unit troops are heading for Makeni and Daru.

Exiled President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, in a radio broadcast from Conakry late Friday night, said he would ask all members of his government to tender their resignations to enable him to set up a slimmed-down government. Kabbah said his government had waited patiently for the crisis "created by the military government" to be resolved peacefully, but in vain. He suggested that in light of the AFRC's refusal to hand over power, the provision of the Conakry Peace Accord granting amnesty to junta members might be re-evaluated. "Since the beneficiaries of these two elements (the RUF, in the case of the Abidjan Accord, and the so-called 'AFRC' in the case of the Conakry Peace Plan) have refused to yield to every peaceful overture to cooperate in the implementation of the terms of both documents, it would have to be determined whether or not and to what extent the immunities to be accorded them under those agreements may have been forfeited," Kabbah said. He added that all the junta's promotions and nominations would be cancelled. Kabbah thanked Nigeria, Guinea, the ECOWAS Committee of Five, the United States, Britain, and the Commonwealth for their support during the crisis. A close aide said Saturday that Kabbah could return to Freetown next week.

Three missionary doctors from a Catholic-run hospital in Lunsar at about 12:00 p.m. Sunday, according to statements issued by the Foreign Ministries of Spain and Italy, the Catholic Diocese in Makeni and the World Mission News Weekly Update. One account identified the abductors as "former members of the army," while another blamed the Revolutionary United Front. The doctors were identified as hospital director Rev. Fernando Aguilo from Spain, who has worked in Sierra Leone for more than a decade, Rev. Joseph Erhard from Austria, and Rev. Gilberto Ugolini from Italy. Various reports have indicated that from one to three religious brothers of the Order of St. John of God were kidnapped as well. The abductors also looted the Catholic parish and a Catholic technical school run by the Josephite Fathers. 14 missionary priests and nuns of various nationalities escaped and hid in the bush. Pro-junta soldiers in Makeni looted the church's pastoral center on Sunday, as well as the mission compound, St. Paul's Major Seminary, the Minor Seminary, and the Sisters of Mother Theresa mission compound, the World Mission News Weekly Update said.

RUF fighters are reportedly surrendering to Liberian security forces along the Sierra Leonean border, Liberian *Star Radio* reported Sunday. The RUF fighters were reportedly escaping clashes at Zimmi between junta forces and a joint force of Kamajor militiamen and ECOMOG troops. One of the surrendered fighters said in Dambala that many of his colleagues were still hiding in Sierra Leone. They were willing to give themselves up, he said, but were being prevented from crossing the Liberian border by the Kamajors. The Liberian Immigration Commander at Dambala, Captain Mohammed Kromah, said Liberia will receive all surrendered soldiers.

Number	Item	Content
258	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 6 March 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

6 March: An ECOMOG official in Freetown said Friday that the ECOMOG force captured Kabala on Thursday. Father Michael Conteh of the Catholic Mission in Freetown, who contacted the mission in Kabala by radio, said junta forces fired indiscriminately at fleeing residents early Thursday, killing about 50 people. ECOMOG troops entered the town later in the day, meeting little resistance, Conteh added. He said several girls aged between 15 and 17 were raped during the chaos. The fleeing junta soldiers burned about 40 homes, and looted a Catholic Church, two Catholic schools, and a school for the blind, Conteh said.

ECOMOG has captured the RUF's Camp Charlie, located at Mile 91, an ECOMOG official said on Friday.

Junta troops attacked Magburaka before dawn on Friday, killing eight people, looting, destroying vehicles, and burning at least 19 homes. The ECOMOG force had left the town unprotected for the night. Several of the victims, including a police officer, were burned to death. The others, all civilians, were shot.

Civil Defence Force leader Sam Hinga Norman arrived in Bo Friday to meet with his frontline militiamen who, along with ECOMOG, are restoring order to the city. Norman said his men were giving their unflinching support to ECOMOG, because the force had come to restore a properly elected president. Norman said the army had put the entire nation to shame by being disloyal and unfaithful to the people and the president of Sierra Leone. Norman then visited Bo Government Hospital, where he sympathised with hundreds of persons injured in the fighting.

There are reports of an outbreak of fighting at Daru Barracks in Kailahun District between the army and the RUF, BBC correspondent Prince Brimah reported on Friday. "It's believed that the regular army troops in Daru want to surrender but the RUF doesn't, and this has led to a fight between the two groups," Brimah said. Junta forces attacked Dodo village in Bo District Thursday evening, killing six people and burning down several houses, Brimah reported.

British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone Peter Penfold returned to Freetown Wednesday for the first time since shortly after last year's military coup. He was flown to his official residence in the capital from Conakry, where he had been staying since last June. Penfold was accompanied by Anthony Dymock, captain of the British frigate HMS Cornwall. "We brought the British High Commissioner back to Freetown two days ago, along with Sierra Leone's foreign minister," Dymock said on Friday. They are now having meetings to start up international aid. He has gone back to his official residence. Thanks to his very loyal staff who have protected the building, it only has one gun shot bullet hole in a window."

Number	Item	Content
259	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 13 April 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

13 April 1998: ECOMOG has begun a "final offensive" against junta loyalists in Kono and Kailahun Districts, ECOMOG task force commander Colonel Maxwell Khobe announced on SLBS (state radio) late Sunday. "Our troops commenced the final push today," Khobe said. Aid workers said Monday that the ECOMOG force was using tanks and warplanes in its drive against junta positions. Civilians reaching Bo and Kenema reported fierce fighting near Koidu and the town of Kailahun. Khobe said his troops were converging from Kabala, Sewafe, Bo, Kenema, and Daru, while Guinean ECOMOG troops were advancing from their border. "At the moment, the central axis is making good movement," he said. "The junta troops are divided into pockets and are fighting in different directions." Yengema, on the outskirts of Koidu, had already been captured by ECOMOG troops, he added. On Friday, Khobe told reporters that ECOMOG would "liberate" Kono and Kailahun Districts by Wednesday. ECOMOG Force Commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said the rebels have made use of Sierra Leone's thick forests to evade capture and to launch ambushes against ECOMOG troops, but he noted that the attacks were infrequent and did not appear to be well-organised. He said it was not clear how long it would take to complete the offensive. Junta loyalists and RUF fighters have vowed to make their final stand at Koidu, and witnesses say they have fortified the city and massed thousands of fighters in preparation for the ECOMOG assault. Civilians fleeing Kono have told of widespread killing of civilians and destruction of property by junta forces at Koidu and in numerous villages throughout the district.

RUF leader Sam "Maskita" Bockarie has disputed reports that ECOMOG is closing in on Kono District. "I learned [indistinct] they are trying to do so, that they are forcing their way to take Kono, but we haven't given any chance and I am telling you that I will not allow them to take Kono. We will not allow them. We will fight till as much as they want us to fight. We will not give up. It is true they have launched an all-out offensive, but they will not succeed," Bockarie told the BBC by satellite telephone. He said that the RUF was prepared to wage guerilla warfare against ECOMOG. "As a guerilla, we don't want to fight in the big towns. We trick them to get into the jungle where we can deal with them, before ever marching to the towns." Bockarie rejected a suggestion that the RUF lay down its weapons. "We are fighting a just cause. We are fighting because ECOMOG has moved into our country," he said.

Deputy Minister of Defence and Civil Defence Leader Sam Hinga Norman denied rumours Monday that he planned to overthrow the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah with the aid of Kamajor militiamen. "No presidents have performed better for the ousting of the illegal AFRC regime and the return of civilian rule than President Kabbah," Norman told a crowd at Bo Town Hall. He promised he would remain loyal to the head of state "till the end of the world." Norman disclosed plans for the formation of a regional task force for the defence of the eastern, southern, and northern provinces in times of aggression.

Number	Item	Content
260	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 29 June 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

29 June 1998: Sierra Leone's Central Bank has less than \$5,000 of currency reserves in its vaults, an unidentified bank official told *Reuters* on Monday. "The military junta left the bank clean of all foreign exchange when it fled Freetown in February," the official said. Reserves rose to over \$1 million following the ousting of the junta in February, but deteriorated when the government banned gold and diamond mining last month. The lack of foreign exchange has affected the import of essential goods, and the government has turned to the World Bank for assistance. "President Kabbah has had to beg in the past few days for the World Bank to provide Sierra Leone with \$5 million so that the central bank can continue to operate," Presidential Spokesman Septimus Kaikai said. "We hope they will give us the money soon and not wait until September, when officials from the World Bank and IMF resume talks with the government to get programmes going again in the country," the central bank official said. Sierra Leone's two largest banks, Barclays and Standard Chartered, are also experiencing currency shortages. "We have less than 1,000 pounds sterling in our vaults. Most days we have less than \$1,000," said a manager at Barclays head office in Freetown. "Dollars and pounds have stopped flowing from the diamonds. And those organisations that bring in foreign exchange -- the international airlines, the embassies and many international aid agencies -- have not returned to Sierra Leone since they fled after the coup last year."

Following a five week dispute between Minister of Internal Affairs Charles Margai and Deputy Minister of Defence Sam Hinga Norman in which the two ministries have made competing claims over who control the Kamajor militia, Vice President Albert Joe Demby has made a "definitive policy statement" on the issue in the presence of the two ministers, BBC correspondent Prince Brima reported on Monday. Following a tour of the south and east, Demby told Paramount Chiefs and thousands of Kamajors gathered in Bo on Sunday that the Kamajors have to work alongside ECOMOG under the Ministry of Defence. He called on all Kamajor militiamen to return to their respective chiefdoms to be registered and provided with identity cards, in order for the government and aid agencies to know their numerical strength. On the issue of the eventual disbanding of the militia, Demby said the Kamajors could only be disbanded on the completion of the war in Kono and Kailahun Districts. He promised that the contentious issue of the re-engagement of surrendered soldiers would be resolved soon by the government. Demby also announced that the court martial of junta soldiers would begin soon, and issued a warning to all foreigners still engaged in diamond prospecting in the countryside to move to Freetown or face immediate deportation.

The 60-bed Netland Hospital in Freetown, now converted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) into a reconstructive surgery hospital, opened its doors on June 26, according to an ICRC news release on Monday. "The ICRC set up the hospital to provide surgical care and rehabilitation for civilians who have sustained war injuries and require primary or secondary surgery or specialized care to recover the use of their limbs," Netland Head Nurse Stephanie O'Connor was quoted as saying. The first patients were transferred from Connaught Hospital, but arrangements were being made to bring patients from hospitals in other parts of the country, the ICRC said. Blood for the hospital is being supplied by the Sierra Leone Red Cross blood bank. An independent physiotherapy centre with a capacity of 120 patients is being set up, and should start admitting patients in the beginning of July. Medical personnel will be trained in war surgery, the statement said.

Sierra Leone has deported U.S. businessman Roger Crooks, allegedly for arms trafficking, Police Commissioner James Kakanyako said on Monday. "Crooks was given 48 hours to pack his baggage, and yesterday afternoon was escorted to Lungi Airport into the plane that took him out of the country," Kakanyako said. "Crooks was deported for trafficking in arms from Northern Ireland to Sierra Leone and the other way around." Crooks, a Texas native, was formerly involved in diamond mining in Sierra Leone, and maintained extensive business interests in the country, including the Mammy Yoko Hotel, which was badly damaged in a battle between AFRC/RUF fighters and ECOMOG last June. Crooks and a number of foreign "security experts" guarding his hotel and other interests, were evacuated from Sierra Leone by U.S. Marines the following day. He reportedly returned to Sierra Leone about the same time President Kabbah returned from exile, and began operating hovercraft and other ferry services between Sierra Leone and Guinea.

Kamajor militia leaders have acknowledged recruiting thousands of child soldiers to fight AFRC/RUF rebels, according to an Inter-Press Service (IPS) report published on Monday. "In Kailahun District alone, we have 3,000 child Kamajors," said Kamajor field commander Patrick Zangalaywah. "These kids are very brave on the frontline." He said the children were "unadulterated" and that they followed rules governing the conduct of Kamajors, such as abstinence from sex, drugs, and looting while in combat. "We don't trust adults quite (as) much because many have breached the rules governing our militia group and so they get killed by the enemy," he added. Last month the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, urged an end to the recruitment of child soldiers, and called for those already serving to be demobilised. "I saw children as young as 10 and 14, bearing arms and in battle-readiness. This is unfortunate," Otunnu said after visiting eastern Sierra Leone. He said that Deputy Minister of Defence and Civil Defence Forces leader Sam Hinga Norman had assured him that no more children would be recruited by the Kamajors, and that a process to demobilise them would begin soon. Up to now that has not happened, the report said, adding that the IPS recently saw dozens of child soldiers being drafted into the militia in the north, where AFRC/RUF rebels have committed atrocities against the civilian population. Kamajor commander Monya Farmah said the militia would rather do away with adult Kamajors. "The children know the battle terrain quite well and they can meander through the forests in pursuit of rebel bandits," he said. That view has been rejected human rights and child advocate groups. "It is appalling and I think the government should move fast enough to demobilize the kids within the Kamajor group," said Jonathan Freeman of "Save a Child," a Freetown-based children's rights group. "These children have killed, maimed and acted as adults. I believe they should be immediately demobilized and a process of trauma counseling be put in place for them," said Thomas Sandi of the Freetown-based Human Rights League.

The Washington, D.C.-based organisation Refugees International (RI) said Monday that ECOMOG "is losing ground in its fight" against AFRC/RUF rebels. "ECOMOG has suffered heavy casualties and rebel forces seem to be getting stronger," RI said in a bulletin issued in Washington. Based on the recommendations of Natacha Scott, the organisation's field representative in Sierra Leone, RI called for ECOMOG to be reinforced. "A strengthened ECOMOG with a strong military posture may be the best means of encouraging discussions between the government and the rebels to seek an end to the civil war," the group advised. The statement expressed concern about the plight of refugees in northeastern Sierra Leone, saying little is known about the humanitarian situation there as security problems prohibit travel by international organisations and NGO's in much of the country outside the capital. An RI spokesman quoted Scott as saying that no NGO's or international organisations are currently able to travel outside of Freetown by road. RI has also called on relief agencies to plan for the delivery of large quantities of food aid to Sierra Leone until at least August 1999.

Some 60 AFRC/RUF rebels drowned in the Moa River in Kailahun District Saturday when the canoes in which they were travelling struck rocks and capsized, according to a Catholic relief organisation quoted by AFP. Last week, fisherman pulled five bodies from the Moa River, also identified as rebels.

Cypriot authorities took in 116 foreign immigrants Monday after the fishing trawler in which they were travelling, the Syrian-flagged *Rita Allah*, experienced engine trouble 35 miles off the coast of Cyprus. The boat was found drifting in the Mediterranean Sunday night, crammed with men, women, and children from Sierra Leone, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. "Two men aged between 20 and 30 died from lack of food and were thrown overboard two days ago.... They were stacked in that boat like sardines. This is flesh trade," a police source said. Ten of the passengers, including two children, were taken to a hospital in the town of Limassol. The vessel had set out from Lebanon on June 18 with the stated destination of the Libyan coast.

Number	Item	Content
261	News Report	Article from SL News Archives, 15 September 1998, published on the Sierra Leone Web

News Archives

15 September 1998: ECOMOG troops and the Kamajor militia have recaptured the four eastern towns of Joru, Mande-Kalema, Tokunbu, and Nyama in a surprise attack, Liberian *Star Radio* reported on Tuesday. The rebels were reportedly engaged in diamond mining at Nyama when the attack was carried out. A Kamajor commander was quoted as saying that the rebels suffered heavy casualties. 300 civilians held captive by the rebels were reportedly set free. A large cache of arms and ammunition bearing the inscription "Liberia Armed Forces" was said to have been discovered.

Deputy Defence Minister Sam Hinga Norman has charged all newspaper journalists and publishers of being junta collaborators. Norman made the statement during a speech to a crowd of local leaders, traditional rulers, and residents in Kenema District. According to the *Vision* newspaper, Norman said that journalists visit rebels in their hideouts and that is why they always know about their plans. "It is reckless of journalists to put out to the reader what the rebels' plans are and not what the government's plans are," Norman said. He added that the rebels were even pumping money into the newspapers. In a front page commentary on Tuesday, the *Vision* said it hoped Norman's statement was not intended to incite the Kamajors against journalists.

Number	Item	Content
262	News Report	Newswave, "To Die or To Live? The Verdict on Sierra Leone's plotters", October 1998.

NEWSWAVE ⁶¹¹⁵

West Africa's No. 1 Magazine

October 1998

TO DIE OR TO LIVE?

The verdict on
Sierra Leone's
plotters




INTERVIEWS:

▣ James Jonah

▣ Hinga Norman

▣ Miss AfroCaribbean 98

THE KAMAJORS



Who are they?

UK £2.00

The story of the Kamajors

Everybody in Sierra Leone knows about the kamajors and the role they played in the restoration of the ousted president Tejan Kabbah's regime. However, not many people have the faintest idea of how the kamajor group was formed. Sulaiman Momodu caught up with a founding member of the civil defence group and he narrates how it all started.

"It was on 19th November, 1992, that the then secretary to the Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) SAT Bayoh wrote to our committee stating that it had pleased the NPRC Chairman Cpt. Strasser to grant formal recognition to the Kailahun District War Effort Committee and to wish us success and good luck in our endeavours towards the

ending of the war." Recalls Mohamed S. Kallon now a member of parliament

On 28th December, 1989, an insurgency conflict was initiated in Nimba county, eastern Liberia, with the stated objective of removing the regime of president Samuel Kanyon Doe. The rebellion which was under-rated by the late Kanyon Doe was led by Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Now Taylor is presi-

dent of that Republic.


The war in Liberia was brutal and on 9th September 1989, President Doe was captured and brutally murdered. Thousands of Liberians became refugees in neighbouring countries including Sierra Leone.

The rebel war which enveloped Liberia started in Sierra Leone with a dawn attack on Sienga and Bomaru in the eastern district of Kailahun on 23rd March 1991.

Hon. Mohamed Kallon remembers too well that the attack which was dismissed as a simple border incident from a dispute between Sierra Leone soldiers and NPFL rebels in the border region over commercial transaction soon took a more serious dimension.

Several towns in Kailahun district became targets and before the military could realize what was happening, the invading forces had attacked and captured a large area of Kailahun district, including the commercial centre of Koindu.

Although a dismissed army named Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh said over BBC that he was the leader of a rebel movement called RUF, most Sierra Leoneans recalled that on 1st November 1990, Charles Taylor had made threats in an interview over the BBC to attack and destroy Freetown airport for the simple reason that Sierra Leone was playing host to West African



Hon Mohamed Kallon

Intervention Force, the Ecomog peace monitoring group (Ecomog).

The battle for Koindu on 29 March 1991 and capture of high ranking rebel commandos and weapons revealed the rebels' preparedness for war.

The then president Momoh boasted he would crush the RUF rebellion. But Hon. Kallon who was a prosperous businessman in the eastern district town of Segbwema knew that the war was not all that easy to end without the active involvement of the local people, who were more familiar with their terrain.

The Sierra Leone army was suffering from defeat after defeat and it became clear the next target of the rebels was Segbwema. The idea to organize the kamajor local hunters into a civil militia group then came up.

Paramount Chief Jimmy Jajua V also now a member of parliament immediately called all his section chiefs and local dignitaries including Paul Tapema and one Benson Pessima, principal of Holy Ghost Secondary School in Segbwema, and the Kailahun District War Effort Committee was formed. It was later transformed into the Eastern Region Defence Committee (EARED-COM). A former lecturer in modern history at the university of Sierra Leone and activist for a democratic political system, Dr. Alpha Lavalie was elected

Chairman. Hon. Mohamed Kallon was elected Vice Chairman. Other founding members include current minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. S.S. Banya, Vice President Albert Joe Demby who was a member of the executive, and Dominic Ngomba - current Resident Minister, East.

The war was becoming intense almost everyday and areas in Pujehun and Kono district had been taken over by rebels. The kamajors movement came into being under the NPRC led by Captain

The Sierra Leone army was suffering from defeat after defeat and it became clear the next target of the rebels was Segbwema

Valentine Strasser.

Even before their official recognition, the kamajors who had only single barrel guns and machetes had complemented the efforts of the military helping to recapture major towns like Bunumbu, Manowa, Mamboma and Golahun.

In June 1992, Hon. Kallon, was among those officers that led troops to recapture Gandorhun together with the NPRC Deputy Defence Minister, Komba Mondeh. "That was the most successful operation which was undertaken by both the military and kamajors without any casualties on our side" said the member of parliament.

In 1993, the kamajors, the Sierra Leone army and another northern civil defence group, the Tamaboros recaptured the commercial town of Koindu. Some kamajors and tamaboros claimed they had mystical powers and they fought the war with all sincerity, commitment and energy because they were anxious to return to their villages.

After making significant progress in efforts to end the war, the kamajors who were getting some support from the military soon discovered that the honeymoon between them and the military was over. "The NPRC military regime accused some of us of having selfish motives in trying to end the war and this was when I started suspecting that the military had decided to deliberately procrastinate the conclusion of the war just to continue to stay in power." Mr. Kallon disclosed.

It was soon to be found out that the rebels, hitherto defeated by the kamajors, and who had gone into disarray,



Chief Norman flanked by Kamajor Menchurun

started attacking their positions wearing brand new military combat fatigues.

The Chairman of the Eastern Region Defence Committee (EAREDCOM) Dr. Lavalie travelled to Great Britain and United States to sensitize Sierra Leoneans about the war and raise financial support for the kamajors numbering only a few hundreds.

Hon. Kallon was acting Chairman of EAREDCOM from June to October in 1993 and during Dr. Lavalie's trip abroad. Hon. Kallon vividly remembers the NPRC military top guns making threats to arrest him (Dr. Lavalie) on his return for allegedly making statements abroad which apparently did not go down well with the junta.

"When Dr. Lavalie returned, the junta invited us to a meeting at Mano junction 12 miles from Kenema," said Mr. Kallon adding that he was living in Segbwema but was unable to attend the meeting.

It was later to be reported unconvincingly though, that Dr. Lavalie had been violently killed in a land mine explosion along the road which other vehicles had recently travelled on and close to a military guard post.

"I still remain convinced that Dr. Lavalie was assassinated by the military and all efforts I made for the junta to set up a commission of enquiry into the EREDCOM Chairman's death fell on deaf ears," the kamajor founding member lamented.

The death of Dr. Lavalie did not altogether kill the spirit of kamajors and other Civil Defence movements. However, the NPRC junta was indiffer-

"I still remain convinced that Dr. Lavalie was assassinated by the military"

ent to giving them the much-needed support and logistics.

In late 1993 and 1994, the war intensified and there was popular belief among the civilians that members of the army were defecting to the rebels and were

waylaying civilian vehicles in ambushes and looting their properties. The military was not entirely innocent of such accusations.

Before 1995 the RUF had made significant progress coming close to Freetown. Very little was known of the Civil Defence co-ordinator whose chief-dom Telu-Bongor (where he was regent chief) was devastated with the loss of an unspecified number of lives in what

most people believe was a calculated sell-out to rebels by soldiers.

In 1996, with a very strong opposition against the NPRC junta, general and presidential elections were conducted and the SLPP with Ahmad Tejan Kabbah as its leader emerged victorious.

In an effort to end the war, the kamajor movement, with a widely reported specially acquired spiritual power waged an all out war against the RUF rebels together with the military. The kamajors claimed to be bullet-resistant and probably as a result of this several RUF bases were captured.

"The military had never wanted to relinquish power, so they decided to weaken kamajor positions thus giving rise to the frequent clashes between kamajors and other Civil Defence Forces on one hand and the military who had by then perceived the civil defence militia groups as enemies on the other," said the parliamentarian.

It will be recalled that on 25th May last year, the coup announcer, Cpl. Tamba Gborie emphasised that the issue of the kamajors which they described as "a tribal and regional army" was one of several reasons given for the overthrow of President Kabbah's SLPP government.

Chief Hinga Norman as Deputy Defence minister vowed to fight back. "I left the country and joined the kamajors thereby establishing a movement for the restoration of democracy, the military wing at Gendoma near the border with Liberia" Hon. Kallon revealed.

Conditions at the border were not very favourable for the kamajors and at one point, they were defeated by the junta and had to retreat into a clearly hostile Charles Taylor territory. Taylor threatened to arrest Chief Norman and his cohorts if they were seen.

Reports also persisted that the command structure within the civil defence forces was lacking although they managed to launch an operation code-named "Operation Black December" which proved very successful in 1997.

"We would have long flushed out the junta but there was lack of financial transparency and accountability within the civil defence movement" Hon Kallon noted, adding that "Some people were fighting against the junta for selfish motives. But some of us only wanted the return of democracy so we encouraged the kamajors to press on. "In the



A Kamajor

process thousands of kamajors were recruited."

Anyway, after Ecomog and kamajors flushed out the junta, it was not long before stories of kamajors harassing civilians started to feature prominently in the press. The government of president Kabbah was not very pleased with critical reports about the kamajors although Chief Norman could not dispute such report of harassments particularly at numerous checkpoints manned by the militia men.

The Kamajor founding member, in a recent survey, though not well structured, came up with findings suggesting that 80% of the Civil Defence Forces were unwilling to join the national security services.

The member of parliament found out in his survey that most CDF members are satisfied to live and carry out their usual occupations such as fishing, mining, farming than to leave their villages, wives and children for services in an army where their future would be remote as majority of CDF members are illiterates.


Government says that the kamajors, kapras and tamaboros are going to stay as civil militia groups in their various communities and may be only called to assist the national army when the need

arises. Chief Norman had also told the nation that the kamajors would not transform into a national army.

Already, there is a growing dissatisfaction and concern among civilians about the recruitment of surrendered soldiers into the army and the kamajors take great exception to this move.

Reports have it that before the Ecomog intervention, not more than 50 soldiers had responded to Kabbah's appeal for loyal soldiers to surrender and from all indications, most surrendered soldiers who had committed atrocities against civilians are yet to show signs of remorse.

Few kamajors and some of their allies may be fortunate to be recruited into the new army. But the question puzzling most people including the founder member himself is what will the relationship be between recruited surrendered sol-



Another Kamajor

diers and the Civil Defence Forces who have formed a fixed idea of them (soldiers) as being enemies of the people.

President Kabbah has a challenging task to rebuild Sierra Leone that has been devastated by a senseless war. But the biggest task is unquestionably that of security. The apprehension of most people is, what will befall Sierra Leone with a union of recruited kamajors and surrendered soldiers.

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INTERVIEW

“The war has ended”

—Chief Hinga Norman

Chief Hinga Norman is not one to grant interviews indiscriminately. Not that he doesn't love talking but that his schedule is so tight he wouldn't be able to accommodate interviews. For months Newswave ran after him; we trailed him from Makeni to Magburaka, from Freetown to Kono. He is either in the bushes giving commands to fighters or he is out of the country soliciting for arms. Finally, Norman was grabbed. He was interviewed by Kingsley Lington, James Oguoguo and Sulaiman Momodu. The interview is a revelation.

Newswave: What is the state of the war today?

Chief Norman: The state of the war is not bad at all. It is very encouraging. We are moving forward to what I would imagine is the end of the war. Normally I am very cautious in referring to this type of situation now as a war. I would say it is fighting that has to continue after a war. We had been at war. The war came to an end with the eviction from the seat of power of those that were recalcitrant and then they have started causing a lot of havoc, injuring people as you may have known or seen and right now they are in very minimal pocket sizes. To some other people they would say: “Oh yes but they are causing havoc”. I would say yes they are causing havoc. But the type of situation we are faced with, there are other nations that are not at war whose situations relative to violence is far more severe than what we are going through. That is the reason why I say the war has ended and fighting has continued. We are trying now to put a permanent end to this type of fighting.



Newswave: Is there a particular area that rebels occupy?

Chief Norman: I would say ‘yes’ a minimal area of the nation. We are a 12-district-plus-one country. That is 13 districts. Out of these, we can only talk about the Kailahun district and less than one third of Kailahun district and the Kono district. Again I would say less than one third of Kono district is being occupied. And then the Koinadugu district, around Kabala. Again when you talk about the size of a district, it is a massive land space - now you are talking about Kabala and Kabala is a very small area in terms of the landscape of the district. Then you have Kambia district. Again we are saying that they are in pocket groups in minimal areas. They are not in any place where they can be said to be in total control. They are always on the run. Hit and run.

Newswave: Kono and Kailahun. These are very important districts, the country's economic life-line. Haven't that imparted so much on economic activities of the country?

Chief Norman: It really has. And that is the reason why we are saying - the reason why the war entered that area is because of the economic importance to both the RUF and the Sierra Leone government. As it is, they have been playing havoc with the crop areas of Kailahun. They have been selling a lot of coffee and cocoa to neighbouring countries and they could realize money to back up their logistical supplies to continue the war. And that was the reason why Ecomog and the Civil Defence Forces are constantly launching operations in those areas to make sure that the rebels or the junta are not allowed to concentrate or make financial gains. Then Kono is also a diamondiferous area and you know - if they get diamonds, they will sell this commodity to support the war effort. Most probably they may get some other logistical supplies. But now with the type of situation where they are not in total control of Kono and especially in the rich area of mineral resources, we believed that they are troubled, they are now in financial difficulties. That again led the Civil Defence in the few deciding days of the actual war to capture Tongo. Tongo is more diamondiferous and they were getting a lot of diamonds and so Civil Defence launched an onslaught on them and captured Tongo. From that time the balance of the war has tilted against the junta.

Newswave: How soon do you think the country side would be totally rid of their menace?



Chief Norman: Again I will say I have to be very careful. We are talking of people with whom we are owners of this nation - like ourselves. And they are people of the terrain and they know their people. Now to say we are going to get rid of them totally to bring total peace to this area, we can't time-limit that; we can say we will stop them from doing havoc on a major scale. But to say we are going to put an end to this one - our aim now really is between now and the end of the year - maybe our wish. This is rebel or junta organization. Maybe one or two people lurking somewhere would be causing havoc. But as I said, this is the trend of the world. There is no place of the world where there is absolute peace. So we intend to make sure that the nation receive security and peace by the end of this year.

NewsWave: *Do you foresee a situation whereby the entire thing might settle through peace talk?*

Chief Norman: There was a time when I was foreseeing it. But right now I am in doubt.

NewsWave: *Why?*

Chief Norman: We gave them an opportunity to end this problem on a negotiating table. We gave them the first opportunity when there was a peace accord that was signed in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. After that, the leader Foday Sankoh went in search of arms to launch another war which did not come into being until the army that was under the suspicion by the Civil Defence Forces of undermining the efforts of government openly did a coup that called on the same rebels. The rebels did not say that they had decided to do this thing to finish it on a conference table or a negotiating table. They jumped outright and supported the army's coup and sided with them and stayed in power until they were evicted by force. Force again coming after the negotiation that drew up a communiqué in Conakry which again became - you know - a sort of deception to the people by the junta - that is the AFRC and the RUF. As at now after we had launched a military operation, unseated a military power and had taken over three of their brigades - these brigades have been captured now. Nine battalions have all been captured all the units and the little places of their strength have been taken over by Ecomog and the Civil Defence Forces. Now they are in disarray and we begin to talk about negotiating peace - we are in a position of strength. Right now they are on the run. If they want to offer peace yes the door is still open. We cannot close it but it is not our place to go and say we are

still offering negotiations as a condition as if we are the one pushed to the corner. That is why the government is very cautious about still reminding them of the amnesty that the president has offered them and the people are still talking saying: "let us stop this fighting, we are the same people and so on. Stop inflicting this injury that has become very horrible to the world, that has made the world not even to support you anymore."

NewsWave: *What was your first reaction on hearing Collins's 'Operation Spare No Soul'?*

Chief Norman: My reaction was that it was a big bluff on their side. It was a big bluff. Spare No Soul? Then who are you going to govern?

NewsWave: *Did it not scare you?*

Chief Norman: It did not scare me at all. I have not seen any regime in the world that will not spare any soul. So that was sort of a misnomer. Probably an utterance without reasoning. And that is what I feel that has caused havoc in their midst. This is a world of very elastic understanding of languages. So we must be very careful with the type of language we use. Sometimes you use a language that will make you appear very funny and that is what I believe happened to them. Really when I heard this I smiled to myself. "what could he mean by Spare No Soul?" After killing every soul or destroying every soul, is he going to rule trees or fishes or birds? And that is what made me realize that he was being funny.

NewsWave: *Shortly after the AFRC coup, many people ran away. But you, rather than do that, put your life on the line. Where did you get that inspiration from?*

Chief Norman: Ah... I got the inspiration from the simple fact that this is the only country that I have. If I lose it, my very belonging - I will be... be dispossessed of belonging to a nation. Even the bird perching on the tree would be better than me.

NewsWave: *We heard that the junta wanted you dead or alive.*

Chief Norman: I can imagine that now that they know what I did when I remained alive, one would have imagined that yes this was the reason why they wanted this fellow dead or alive.

NewsWave: *Okay... but many people seem to believe or speculate that you may have contributed to the crisis in the first place because it is alleged that you gave the kamajors a higher profile than the army. What explanation do you have for this.*

Chief Norman: It is like ... the grape. If it is not in your hands then it is sour because the other man has it. There must be a reason to anything in the world. To some people even that reason may be an unreasonable reason but it has to be a reason all the same. Eh... If I am accused of giving the kamajors a favour that they accused me of, then I believe that the end justifies the means. We have all tested ourselves; ...having realized that this is an army to which 2.5 billion leones of the tax payers' money was given every month to cater for uniform, for arms and ammunition, for food, for lodging, for education, meeting every comfort even before other workers in this nation, ...and inspite of all this they were not satisfied, they would want to overthrow the very government that provided them with this kind of opportunity - comparing their own action to the action of a people who got themselves together saying "I am going to fight this too and re-instate the government and restore democracy into my country for nothing." Not even with arms and ammunition that was bought - nothing like that - not on salary, not for any offer whatsoever. Then I would like to see what manner of man or a nation that would not recognize the services of such sacrifice in a people like the Civil

Mrs Saj Musa: In government net

Defence Forces. So they say that I favoured Civil Defence Forces. Yes I favoured the Civil Defence Forces because they realized that the government by the people for the people must be protected and kept in safety by the people. If they, to whom everything was given, have become very unfaithful and 'he to whom nothing was given' has become faithful then this is a matter of sanity. Anybody who realises that the one who does a service like the Civil Defence could be rejected and the one who does a disservice like the army itself could be accepted, it is left to imagination. But I believe that the best in a man has to be encouraged and that is the reason why.

Newswave: What is the future of the Civil Defence Forces?

Chief Norman: The future of the Civil Defence Forces is in the hands of the government and the people of Sierra Leone, not Chief Norman.

Newswave: You as Deputy Defence minister, people expect you to work out a programme.

Chief Norman: Yes. If I am given the programme to work out the future of the Civil Defence I would encourage government to keep this kind of organization and I would expect - I will in fact encourage the rest of Africa to raise their own people to protect their rights and to make sure that the constitution is always kept and not killed because some people have the guns for which they are paid to defend the people and not to offend them. I will recommend every African nation to encourage its own people, the one who knows the terrain and who knows the people and love democratic system to actually emulate the type of thing that has started in Sierra Leone.

Newswave: At what point did it become necessary to do away with mercenaries?

Chief Norman: First of all you have to know whether there were mercenaries. The question presupposes that you think that there were mercenaries in Sierra Leone.

Newswave: The Executive Outcomes.

Chief Norman: They were not mercenaries. They were people like anybody - myself I am paid - everybody is a mercenary to his own profession.

Newswave: But they were imported from overseas.

Chief Norman: But if it is a profession we have people here who

are doctors and they are imported into Sierra Leone for doctoring. Some are administrators, others are doing other things for which they are paid because of their brain power. They have been imported into Sierra Leone. Would you call these ones mercenaries?

Newswave: But they are not legally recognised in the countries of their origin?

Chief Norman: If it is a constitutional government that hires the services of these people - would you say they are not legally recognised? The legality is there in the constitutionality of the government so that is what I am saying. When a man renders a service for a reward, he is a mercenary for that service.

Newswave: Are you suggesting that the Civil Defence Forces - some of them - should be admitted into the new army?

Chief Norman: I am not saying that the Civil Defence Forces or members of it should be transformed into the nation's army. All I am saying is that they should be encouraged to be in the land and ready to render services whenever such opportunity arises. After all if we do away with the Civil Defence and we turn them all into soldiers then the Civil Defence will become depiete and it would not be of service to the people. They should be encouraged to exist.

Newswave: How much encouragement is government giving them now?

Chief Norman: The encouragement that government is giving is what the Civil Defence has only requested for; that is food to sustain themselves, arms and ammunition to make sure that they pursue the war to the end, to the finish and some medicines to keep well.

Newswave: They are not being paid?

Chief Norman: They are not being paid. Ask anywhere else, they are not salaried and there is no incentive that is kept aside by the government of Sierra Leone even in the minimal form of salary.

Newswave: But are these not necessary?

Chief Norman: Eh... well I would say they are necessary. But the Civil Defence has not asked for this. And this is where I will say the quotation and the words and the description that was made by Churchill in the finest hour by the British Air Force also now obtains in Sierra Leone but not with the Air Force of Sierra Leone. But by ordinary people who have taken up arms to defend the course of protection of life and property. In Britain Winston Churchill said "Never was so much owed by so many to so few." That is he was referring to the Air Force. Now in Sierra Leone I would go further to say 'never was so much owed by so many to so few for nothing'. In the case of Britain, these were men who had been hired on salaries, they were paid. They did more than their salary required. In Sierra Leone they did more than what the ordinary man could ever do for another person - laying down your life not on any bet or any favour whatsoever - just laying down your life so that the other man can live in freedom. That is what the Civil Defence has been doing.

Newswave: You are talking about support for the Civil Defence Forces... Newswave was touring up-country and there was an atmosphere of apprehension among local dignitaries and the civilian population in Kenema that the war is still raging and the kamajors are not being given the right support even in terms of arms and ammunition to fight. I wonder what you can say in this regard.

Chief Norman: Well, it has been an age old cry and we are talking about the control of arms and ammunition, government of Sierra

Leone is not going to give arms and ammunition to any man who cries for defence of this nation. Some conditions or criteria must be taken into consideration and this is the control of such arms after the war. We are encouraging Sierra Leoneans to set up units and that is what it is now. At every district you have an administrator. The district administration is also in control of the battalion of fighters, and so these are people in their own district, in their own chiefdom, in their own little locality that they command, you know, knowledge of the terrain and knowledge of their people.

NewsWave: Do you feel betrayed by countries who promised to supply men and material and have not done so?

Chief Norman: I would not use the word betrayal. Cautiously I would say probably some restrictions may have forestalled their intentions. So we are not very happy that it has turned out like this - when promises were made and they still have not been fulfilled. But we feel that being brothers in the same region, that there must be some constraints that keep them away from fulfilling their promises. And we are hoping that they would come forward and fulfill their promises if and when those constraints are removed or needs are met.

NewsWave: What is the relationship between the Civil Defence Forces and Ecomog - Is it cordial?

Chief Norman: Eh... I would say it is cordial because there is not any occasion where we have gone into fighting with each other and so on. But in every situation even in love affairs there is always a moment of abrasion. So those abrasions may occur occasionally. We would not take those to mean being not cordial.

NewsWave: Okay eh... recently we heard of some rift between you and the minister of Internal Affairs over who should actually control the kamajors. Is that settled now?

Chief Norman: I think you have asked a question which is pre-supposing that indeed you believed that there was a rift. Whether or not there was rift, it was a matter of misunderstanding by the public. And public is always desirous of rift - you know especially when government is in it and people say that two ministers are fighting in the same government it becomes news, but that was not how it was. It was only a matter of not understanding responsibility and it is not because the minister of Internal Affairs did not understand or the Deputy minister of Defence did not understand, it was a matter of knowing that security and defence are partners in development and progress. One cannot do without the other but there are distinct lines of demarcation. People in arms must be controlled by areas of defence. So, if the public was holding the contention that the Civil Defence because of the word 'Civil' must go under the ministry of Internal Affairs, what about the guns and ammunition that they were carrying? Could it also mean that one part of it should be under the ministry of Defence and then another part should be under the ministry of Internal Affairs? So the government had to look at this situation so as not to leave the public with the understanding that there was still this contention. Government decided to put out a policy statement to say Civil Defence is under the command and control of the ministry of defence that is in charge of the defence of the nation administratively. Up to now there is no difference between Charles Margai and myself.

NewsWave: What about your personal relationship. Is it cordial?

Chief Norman: Personal relationship is cordial. We belong to the same ethnic grouping, we belong to the same political party and then not very divergent in view.

NewsWave: This issue of Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) is coming out like the puzzle of the egg and the fowl. Which comes first?

Chief Norman: Good. Eh... in the area of the egg and the fowl, it is theological. Something belonging to an area we do not understand but we believe that species were created whole. Thereafter they created their off springs. Okay? Now in the matter of DDR whether the DDR should wait until the war is ended, they say 'make hay while the sun shines'. We are preparing for peace even as the situation of fighting is going on. There are those who we may not want to put into this war now because we believe that the war is becoming minimal every day. What are we going to do with those? To keep them? Hold them when we do not want them? Why not begin to demobilize now so that the situation as soon as it is ended then the whole situation will come under control. We believe that the DDR has to start now even as we are running the war to an end.

NewsWave: Have you any political ambition?

Chief Norman: Eh... a politician is always ambitious.

NewsWave: So you want to be president one day of Sierra Leone?

Chief Norman: No, not necessary being president. I mean I can leave the ministry where I am at the disposal of the president's wishes. Today if he says Chief Norman is no longer minister, I would not raise a finger. So my ambition is that when I have served government I may go to parliament where I will assist in legislating and then putting out my views. In the area of elevation, I am a deputy minister. Indeed my ambition is to become a minister but the ambition of becoming a president is far-fetched. We have a president that is loved by all of us and I admire him. Why he is serving, he is the best that the nation has picked up. So why begin to think right now of becoming a president when I am even a junior minister right now. I am not even a senior minister yet. That does not occur to me.



The Kamajors